University of Illinois at Chicago
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Belief Bias: The Role of Epistemic Values and Analytic Thinking

thesis
posted on 2024-05-01, 00:00 authored by Sinem Yilmaz
We examined in two studies how epistemic values and analytic thinking contribute to belief bias (i.e., the phenomenon where prior knowledge or beliefs about the nature of the world interfere with logical reasoning). In Study 1, we examined whether individual differences in epistemic values and analytic thinking predict belief bias when the beliefs in question stem from relatively value-neutral facts about the world. In Study 2, we investigated whether results from Study 1 generalize to situations where political beliefs, rather than neutral facts, interfere with logical reasoning. Our results suggested that only prior beliefs that are politically motivated (vs. neutral) interfere with logical reasoning among liberals, and that high analytic thinking skills are associated with less political belief bias. This was especially the case among individuals who strongly (vs. weakly) value epistemic rationality.

History

Advisor

Tomas Ståhl

Department

psychology

Degree Grantor

University of Illinois Chicago

Degree Level

  • Masters

Degree name

MA, Master of Arts

Committee Member

Linda J. Skitka Michael Pasek

Thesis type

application/pdf

Language

  • en

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