Cyber-Physical Vulnerabilities and Resiliency of Power Electronics Systems

The increasing integration of power electronic systems (PES) in modern energy infrastructure has introduced significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, particularly in the form of intrusions that disrupt control feedback, degrade performance, and compromise system stability. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated in networked PES architectures, where interconnected inverters and solid-state transformers (SSTs) rely on real-time communication and control coordination, making them susceptible to both cyber-physical attacks and delays induced by secure communication protocols. This dissertation investigates these challenges by analyzing the impact of side-channel noise intrusions (SNI) cyber threats on power converters, identifying their consequences on system performance, and developing novel methodologies to enhance resilience through detection, mitigation, and secure control frameworks. A major contribution of this work is the development of advanced resilient-by-design control mechanisms, including intrusion detection system (IDS) and impact mitigation algorithms, developed from spectral signature analysis, enabling real-time identification and self-healing of power electronics systems against malicious interferences to its closed-loop dynamic performance. To address the adverse effects of such intrusions, the study introduces novel mitigation strategies, including Kalman-filter-based signal reconstruction and adaptive control adjustments, which allow the system to maintain stability even when control feedback is compromised. By systematically characterizing cyber vulnerabilities, developing real-time detection and mitigation strategies, and proposing resilient multi-layered control architectures, this dissertation contributes to fortifying power electronics systems against evolving cyber threats, ensuring stable, secure, and efficient operation in future smart grids and energy networks.