The Role of Public Policy in Nutrition, Childhood Stunting, and Corruption

This dissertation examines government policies in the context of nutrition and corruption.The first chapter studies the effect of expanding eligibility to food assistance through a policy called Broad Based Categorical Eligibility (BBCE). Evidence is based on event study and regression designs that exploit quasi-experimental variation in income eligibility cutoffs across states over time. I find that expanding eligibility through BBCE does not create work disincentives, has no effect on food security, and reduces financial hardships for inframarginal families. The second chapter explores the factors that led the height-for-age z score (HAZ) distribution and stunting rates in Egypt to change markedly. Despite increased access to health care and better maternal nutrition, the stunting rate has increased. However, what factors led to these changes remain unknown. Using a dinardo, fortin, and Lemieux decomposition, and a recentered influence function, the results indicate that the variation in HAZ and stunting are driven mainly by changes in the association between mother's height and weight and children's height. Rising socio-economic inequality is a potential explanation for this result. The third chapter examines whether firm growth affects corruption. Corruption is costly yet its determinants are not well understood given its illicit nature. Using a bartik instrument approach, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in firm growth, in terms of sales, resulting from oil price fluctuations. Oil price fluctuations lead to oil cost shocks that differ by industry based on the industry's intensity of oil usage in production. The results indicate that oil cost shocks negatively affect firm sales, and contrary to macro-evidence, government officials do not extract more bribes as oil prices change.