Adolescents’ Reasoning about Gender Harassment:
The Role of Grade and Victim/Perpetrator Genders

BY

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THESIS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction and Theoretical Rationale</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Study</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Literature Review</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining Gender Harassment</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locating gender in harassment</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Relation between Victim/Perpetrator Gender and Judgments of Harassment</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasoning about Gender Harassment involves Distinct Domains of Social Knowledge</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity in the moral domain: the role of victim and perpetrator gender</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importance of gender norms: the role of victim gender</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Importance of the Perpetrator’s Intentions in relation to Judgments</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of Reasoning about Gender Harassment</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental trends in prevalence of gender harassment</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental trends in social reasoning during adolescence</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Method</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research design</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical models</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power analysis</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of gender stereotypes</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vignette</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genders of victim/perpetrator</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding and reliability</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construal of harassment interaction</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim acceptability</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequence to the victim</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator intention</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Results</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data cleaning</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS CONT’D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missing data</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsement of Gender Stereotypes</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment and construal of vignettes</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justifications</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary Analyses</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Testing</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question 1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question 2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question 3</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question 4</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Question 5</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of findings</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Discussion</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Research on Gender/ Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Research on Social Cognitive Development</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications for Gender Harassment Intervention</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDICES**

| Appendix A: Complete Interview Protocol | 115 |
| Appendix B: Survey                     | 117 |
| Appendix C: Recruitment Script         | 119 |
| Appendix D: Consent                   | 120 |
| Appendix E: Parental Consent          | 123 |
| Appendix F: Assent                    | 127 |
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Participant Grade and Gender by Vignette Condition</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Justification Codes and Definitions</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Collapsed Justification Codes Used in Analyses</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Proportion Endorsing Construal Variables and Judgment by Condition and Grade</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Mean Scores on Endorsement of Gender Stereotypes by Condition and Grade</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Proportion Endorsing Reasoning Categories by Condition and Grade</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Predicting Ambivalence about the Victim’s Acceptability</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Predicting Judgment from Gender Stereotypes and Victim Gender</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Odds of Believing Victim was Upset by Victim and Perpetrator Gender</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. Odds of Believing Victim was Upset by Domain of Reasoning</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. Odds of Believing the Perpetrator had a Negative Intention</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. Predicting the use of Predominantly Conventional Reasoning</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. Use of Predominantly Moral Reasoning by Grade and Victim Gender</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV. Predicting Judgment by Domain of Reasoning</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV. Reasoning and Gender Stereotypes in Predicting Judgment for Male Victim</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

This study investigated middle and late adolescents’ judgments of and reasoning about an incident of homophobic harassment in four conditions, where the genders of the victim and perpetrator were varied (N = 104). Participants were asked whether they thought the victim in their scenario was upset, as well as whether or not the perpetrator had a negative intention. Social cognitive domain theory served as the framework for coding adolescents’ reasoning. In addition, adolescents’ endorsement of gender stereotypes was measured. As expected, having had a male victim, as opposed to a female victim, was related to lesser odds of believing the harassment was completely wrong among tenth graders, and lesser odds of believing the victim was upset. Participants in tenth grade were also more likely to use conventional reasoning in justifying their judgments about harassment than those in twelfth grade. Participants in the male victim/perpetrator condition were less likely to believe the perpetrator had a negative intention than those in the female victim/perpetrator condition. Contrary to expectations, endorsement of gender stereotypes was unrelated to the use of conventional reasoning. The effects of endorsement of gender stereotypes and use of moral reasoning in relation to judgments of harassment were significant among participants in the male victim condition, but non-significant among participants in the female victim condition.
Harassment related to gender and sexuality is a common experience among adolescents (Hill & Kearl, 2011), however, the experiences of young people who identify as male as opposed to female differ in important ways. For example, while female adolescent are more likely to experience and report being upset by forms of unwanted sexual attention, male adolescents are more likely to experience and report being upset by homophobic harassment (McMaster, Connolly, Pepler & Craig, 2002; Walsh, Duffy, & Gallagher-Duffy, 2007; Hill & Kearl, 2011). Interestingly, however, both young men and young women are more likely to report being upset by harassment perpetrated by a male peer than a female peer (Petersen & Hyde, 2009; Walsh, et al., 2007). Together, these findings suggest that both the gender of the victim and the gender of the perpetrator may be important in determining how a young person experiences a specific incident of harassment. While research suggests an association between the perpetration of harassment, acceptance of harassment, and endorsement of gender stereotypes among adolescents (Foulis & McCable, 1997), little is known about how the genders of the victim and perpetrator may be related to these factors. Finally, research suggests that there may be a potential peak in harassment, overall, in middle adolescence (Pepler, Craig, Connolly, Youle, McMaster, & Jiang, 2006), however, less is known about how these age-related differences may be related to young people’s endorsement of gender stereotypes and concerns about harm to others resulting from harassment.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships among the genders of the victim and the perpetrator and adolescents’ construals of, reasoning about, and judgments of a specific incident of gender harassment during the distinct developmental periods of middle and later adolescence. Social cognitive domain theory provides a useful framework for investigating
these issues because it suggests that individuals reason about their social interactions in complex ways, simultaneously attending to concerns for others’ welfare (moral reasoning), understandings of social norms (conventional reasoning), and issues of personal choice and expression (personal reasoning) (Nucci, 1981). In her research investigating adolescents’ reasoning about exclusion and teasing related to peers’ gender expression and sexual orientation, Horn (2006; 2007; 2008; Horn & Nucci, 2003) has found that adolescents frequently reference all three of these domains when making judgments about harassment. Furthermore, young people’s reasoning is likely to be influenced by their beliefs about the consequences of the harassment to the victim, and intentions of the perpetrator (Turiel, Hildebrandt, Wainryb, 1991; Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001). Given the various gender-related differences in the frequency and severity of experiences with specific types of harassment, it seems likely that young people’s beliefs about the consequences of and intentions for the harassment, as well as the domain of reasoning used to judge the harassment, may differ in relation to the genders of the victim and perpetrator. If so, using social-cognitive domain theory as a framework for studying adolescents’ reasoning about gender harassment between peers of different genders may illuminate the ways in which adolescents’ judgments about harassment are influenced by normative assumptions and stereotypes about gender, as well as construals of the situation.

As suggested above, research demonstrates that individuals who endorse gender stereotypes report greater acceptance of sexual harassment and less inclusive definitions of sexual harassment (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Terrance, Logan, & Peters, 2004). As is common among researchers studying sexual harassment, however, these studies focused on incidents of unwanted sexual attention and gender bias, and did not include homophobic harassment or investigate the role of the victim’s or perpetrator’s gender. Given research demonstrating that
normative attitudes about masculinity are associated with the perpetration of homophobic harassment among young men, it seems probable that gender stereotypes may also be related to acceptance of this form of gender harassment\(^1\) (Poteat, Kimmel, & Wilchins, 2010). While homophobic harassment is not always considered to be a form of sexual harassment, the intersection of masculinity and homophobia appears to be particularly salient in interactions among young men (Kimmel, 2007), just as the experience of sexual objectification is salient for young women (Fine, 1988; Fine & McClelland, 2006). Likewise, just as it may be seen as more acceptable to attack women’s sexuality because of gender stereotypes idealizing women as sexually passive, it may be seen as more acceptable to call men “gay” because of gender stereotypes idealizing men as hyper- (hetero) sexual.

Thus, differences in experiences with specific forms of harassment may represent the cognitive function of these forms of harassment as acts of gender regulation, which vary in meaningfulness based on the gender of the victim. For example, while it may be normative to a young person to criticize a young man for complementing the appearance of another young man by calling him “gay,” it may seem odd to criticize a young women for engaging in similar behavior by calling her “gay”. This may explain why reasoning about homophobic harassment and exclusion related to gender expression is influenced by the gender of the harassment target (Horn, 2007; Horn & Nucci, 2003). In other words, because gender stereotypes about young men differ from stereotypes about young women, it is likely that endorsement of gender stereotypes leads to greater acceptance of homophobic harassment of young men, rather than young women.

\(^1\) As discussed in chapter 2, I will use the phrase “gender harassment” throughout this paper to refer to forms of harassment targeted at young people in gendered ways. The phrase “sexual harassment” is used in reference to specific studies, when the authors of those studies conceptualized the phenomena they measured as sexual harassment. While various authors’ definitions of sexual harassment vary across studies, my definition of gender harassment is consistent.
More research is needed to determine how homophobic harassment may be seen as more or less legitimate based on the gender of the victim.

Research on social cognition and moral development has also found that individuals’ beliefs about the likely consequence of an act contribute heavily to their acceptance of the perpetrator’s behavior (Turiel, et al., 1991). If, as suggested by young people’s reports of their experiences, the consequence of a specific incident of harassment varies in relation to victim and perpetrator genders, it is possible that the victim and perpetrator gender may inform their understandings of the consequences of an act of harassment, and consequently, their use of moral reasoning about the harassment. In addition, research suggests that older children and adults are able to differentiate between harm that is caused intentionally or unintentionally, and they are less likely to judge transgressors harshly if they believe that the actor did not intend harm (Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001). If norms around perpetration of harassment vary in relation to victim and perpetrator gender, adolescents understanding of the perpetrator’s intentions may also vary in relation to victim and perpetrator gender, impacting their judgment.

As discussed previously, age is also related to adolescents’ experiences with and interpretations of harassment. For example, researchers have found that middle adolescents are more accepting of harassment than older adolescents and adults (Foulis & McCabe, 1997), and the greatest prevalence of harassment may also occur at this time (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Pepler, et al., 2006). Understanding young people’s reasoning about gender harassment over the course of adolescence will provide insight into the ways that social cognitive development may be related to adolescents’ harassment experiences. Particularly, since endorsement of gender stereotypes is associated both with acceptance of and engagement in harassment (Fineran & Bennett, 1999; Foulis & McCabe, 1997), developmental changes in reasoning about gender
norms may inform young people’s acceptance of gender harassment. Specifically, the greater prevalence and acceptance of harassment in middle adolescence may be related to the development of conventional reasoning at this age. Because conventional reasoning is similar to reasoning about gender stereotypes (Carter & Patterson, 1982), it may be significant to our understanding of adolescents’ reasoning about gender harassment that this peak coincides with a period when adolescents’ understandings of norms and conventions are becoming more relevant to them (Turiel, 1983). In fact, research using social-cognitive domain theory investigating adolescents’ views of exclusion and harassment related to gender and sexual orientation has found that middle adolescents were more likely than older adolescents to use conventional reasoning when judging these interactions (Horn, 2006; 2008; Horn & Nucci, 2003; Killen, Lee-Kim, McGlothlin, & Stangor, 2002).

Finally, research using social-cognitive domain theory suggests an increase in adolescents’ ability to coordinate conflicting information, and a greater capacity to think equitably over time (Turiel, 1983; Nucci & Turiel, 2007). As adolescents’ understandings of cultural (and peer) conventions are becoming more contextualized toward the end of high school, they are also more likely to view norms and conventions as less important than during earlier adolescence. It is probable, then, that it may be easier for older adolescents to coordinate their understandings of social norms with their assumptions about the consequences of harassment and the intentions of a perpetrator. Thus, it seems likely that developmental changes in the prevalence and acceptance of harassment may be the result of complex social-cognitive developmental processes. If, in fact, the complex age-related differences in experiences with harassment discussed above are indicative of social-cognitive processes, then a study of
adolescents’ reasoning about a specific incident of gender harassment may prove particularly illuminating to the fields of both sexual/gender harassment and social cognitive development.

**Current Study**

This study investigated how the genders of victims and perpetrators related to adolescents’ construals of, reasoning about, and judgments of a specific incident of homophobic harassment, which was hypothesized to represent a normative form of gender regulation for male, as opposed to female victims. In this study, adolescents’ construals of the harassment vignette included their beliefs about the acceptability of the victim’s behavior, which preceded the harassment, the intentions of the perpetrator, and the consequences of the harassment to the victim. The vignette describes an incident of homophobic language (a more common and upsetting experience for adolescent males than females), which was directed at a victim after they tell a same-gender peer they look good today (a behavior hypothesized as representing male gender non-conformity; Romeo, 2013). Utilizing a clinical interview methodology (Piaget, 1928) and a short survey, I determined whether or not the victim and perpetrator’s gender were related to their assessment of these factors (victim acceptability, consequence to the victim, perpetrator intention), the domain of reasoning used to justify their acceptance of the harassment, and the role of endorsement of gender stereotypes in relation to their views of victim acceptability, reasoning, and judgments of the harassment.

As discussed above, previous research has found an association between endorsement of gender stereotypes, and acceptance and perpetration of traditional forms of sexual harassment (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Fineran & Bennett, 1999). In addition, research on homophobic harassment has found that endorsement of masculine gender norms is associated with the perpetration of this form of harassment (Poteat, et al., 2010). Research on the prevalence of
harassment also demonstrates differences in the specific forms of harassment most often experienced by young people who identify as male, as opposed to female (Hill & Kearl, 2011). Nonetheless, little is known about the specific reasons why endorsement of gender stereotypes is related to perpetration of specific forms of harassment. If these forms of harassment are attempts to regulate the gender expression of peers perceived as male or female, this implies that different forms of gender expression are viewed as more or less acceptable for male as opposed to female peers. Therefore, my first question was:

Q1: Does participants’ acceptance of the victim’s behavior vary as a function of their age, endorsement of gender stereotypes, and victim gender condition? How might this be related to judgments of an act of homophobic harassment?

As discussed above, young men are experiencing more homophobic harassment than young women, and this behavior is theorized as representing gender regulation of young men, specifically (Kimmel, 2007). Therefore, I expected participants’ endorsement of gender stereotypes to be less related to their acceptance of a female victim, as opposed to a male victim. In addition, because I expected that greater perpetration and acceptance of harassment in middle adolescence were the result of greater affirmation of gender norms (measured as endorsement of gender stereotypes), I expected that this effect would be more pronounced among participants in tenth grade than twelfth grade (Horn, 2006). In other words, I expected that:

H1a: Participants in the male victim condition who endorsed gender stereotypes more highly would be more likely to be unaccepting of the victim’s behavior than participants in the female victim condition who endorsed gender stereotypes more highly. I expected that this effect would be particularly pronounced among tenth graders.
Furthermore, research suggests that endorsement of gender stereotypes is associated with acceptance of harassment, and the greatest rates of harassment may occur during middle adolescence (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Pepler, et al., 2006). Again, because homophobic harassment is used as a mechanism for regulating masculinity, specifically, I expected that:

**H₁b:** Participants in the male victim condition who endorsed gender stereotypes more highly, and those who did not think the victim’s behavior was completely acceptable would be less likely to believe the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong. I expected that this pattern would be more apparent among tenth graders than twelfth graders.

This study also addressed the importance of various aspects of adolescents’ reasoning about the harassment scenario using insight from literature on social-cognitive development. As discussed, social cognitive domain theory suggests that reasoning occurs in three domains: moral (concerns for others’ welfare and rights), conventional (concerns for norms and authority) and personal (concerns for individual choice) (Nucci, 1981). The use of reasoning from different domains, however, is further influenced by individuals’ beliefs about the consequences of an act (Turiel, et al., 1991). For example, if a young person believes that there is unlikely to be a negative consequence associated with an act of harassment, they are unlikely to express concerns about others’ welfare in their response to it. Furthermore, as discussed with respect to the previous hypotheses, gender norms differ for male and female adolescents, and so do experiences and consequences of different forms of harassment (Hill & Kearl, 2011). Therefore, the importance of conventional reasoning about gender norms, or moral reasoning about consequences may vary as a function of the victim and/or perpetrator gender. To fully
understand the relationship among victim and perpetrator gender, beliefs about consequences, and the domain of reasoning used in evaluating harassment, I asked the following question:

**Q2:** What was the relation between beliefs about consequences to the victim, domain of reasoning, and the genders of the victim and perpetrator?

Research has found that young men are more likely to report being upset by being called gay than any other form of gender or sexual harassment, whereas young women are more likely to report being upset by other forms of harassment (Hill & Kearl, 2011). Nonetheless, research also suggests that young women are more likely than young men to report being upset by gender and sexual harassment, in general (Hill & Kearl, 2011; Walsh, et al., 2007). Furthermore, both young men and young women report being most upset by harassment perpetrated by a male as opposed to a female peer (Walsh, et al., 2007). Therefore, I expected that:

**H2a:** Adolescents’ expectations about the consequences of the perpetrator’s behavior would vary in relation to the victim’s gender. Participants would be more likely to expect negative consequences to the victim in stories with a male perpetrator.

In addition, because moral reasoning is focused on concerns for others’ welfare, adolescents’ who think a victim of harassment is likely to be upset may be more likely to use moral reasoning to evaluate the interaction. Therefore, I expected that:

**H2b:** Participants who believed that the victim was upset by the harassment would be more likely to use moral reasoning.

Finally, taking all of the above into consideration, it also seems likely that the domain of reasoning used by adolescents may vary in relation to the victim’s gender. In fact, previous research about adolescents’ reasoning about gender and sexuality-related harassment has shown a greater propensity for moral reasoning about female victims (Horn, 2007). In addition, because
homophobic harassment appears to be more normative among young men and because it may be used as a mechanism for gender regulation of young men, as opposed to young women, I expected that:

**H2c:** *Participants in the male victim condition would be more likely to use conventional reasoning than those in the female victim condition, whereas, participants in the female victim condition would be more likely to use moral reasoning.*

Research also suggests that beliefs about the intentions of a transgressor have an impact on individuals’ judgments of their behavior (Chandler, et al., 2001). To investigate the impact of adolescents’ beliefs about the intention of the perpetrator in relation to their judgments of homophobic harassment, as well as the potential role of the victim and perpetrator’s gender in relation to these beliefs, I asked the following questions:

**Q3:** *Were participants’ judgments about the harassment scenario influenced by their beliefs about the intentions of the perpetrator? Did participants’ beliefs about the perpetrator’s intention vary in relation to the victim and perpetrator genders?*

Because research suggests that individuals are less likely to judge a transgressor harshly if they believe they did not have a negative intention, I expected that:

**H3a:** *Participants who believed that the perpetrator had a negative intention would be more likely to think that their behavior was completely wrong than those who did not believe that the perpetrator had a negative intention.*

Potentially complicating the role of these factors, young people may have different understandings of the intentions of the perpetrator based on the gender of the victim and perpetrator. Given the greater incidence of homophobic harassment perpetrated toward male victims by male perpetrators (Petersen & Hyde, 2009), I expected that:
H₃b: Participants in the male perpetrator, male victim condition would be less likely to attribute negative intentions to the perpetrator than participants in the other conditions.

Research has also shown that adolescents’ think differently about peer interactions at different ages (Horn, 2006). Therefore, I asked:

Q₄: Did reasoning vary in relation to participants’ grade?

Because previous research has found greater levels of conventional reasoning among middle adolescents than older adolescents (Horn, 2006), and an association between the developmental capacity for conventional reasoning and understandings of gender stereotypes (Carter & Patterson, 1982), I hypothesized the following:

H₄a: Among participants in the male victim condition, tenth graders, those with higher endorsement of gender stereotypes, and those who were less accepting of the victim’s behavior would be more likely to use conventional reasoning to judge the perpetrator’s action (saying “That’s so gay,”). I expected that these variables would have less of an effect among participants in the female victim condition.

Furthermore, given research suggesting that older adolescents are better able to coordinate moral and conventional concerns (Turiel, 1983), and more likely to use moral reasoning about gender and sexual orientation based harassment (Horn, 2006), I expected that:

H₄b: Adolescents in twelfth grade would be more likely to use moral and moral coordinated forms of reasoning than adolescents in tenth grade.

My final goal was to further delineate the most central factors in predicting adolescents’ judgments about harassment. I asked:

Q₅: What factors were most predictive of adolescents’ judgments of harassment?
While findings from the sexual harassment literature suggest that endorsement of gender stereotypes is related to judgments of harassment (Foulis & McCabe, 1997), research using social cognitive domain theory suggests that the domain of reasoning is also related to judgments of harassment (Horn, 2006). Previous research has suggested that participants using conventional reasoning to evaluate harassment related to gender and sexuality were more likely to be accepting of it, while participants using moral reasoning were less likely to be accepting (Horn, 2006; 2008). Therefore, I expected that:

**H5a:** Participants who used conventional reasoning as opposed to other forms of reasoning, would be less likely to believe that the harassment was wrong. I also expected that the finding would be stronger in the male victim condition than the female victim condition.

Finally, because I expected endorsement of gender stereotypes and conventional reasoning to share a negative relationship with believing that harassment is wrong, while the use of moral reasoning would share a positive relationship with believing that harassment is wrong, I expected that:

**H5b:** In the male victim condition, the relation between believing the harassment was wrong and endorsement of gender stereotypes would be moderated by domain of reasoning; participants who endorsed gender stereotypes more highly but used moral forms of reasoning, as opposed to conventional reasoning, would be more likely to believe the perpetrator’s behavior was wrong. I expected this pattern to be less evident in the female victim condition.

In summary, adolescents’ reasoning about and acceptance of harassment is complex and multifaceted. In support of a view of homophobic harassment as a form of regulation of non-
conformity to masculine gender norms, I hypothesized that participants would be less accepting of a male victim complementing a same gender friend and more accepting of harassment of a male victim, particularly if they endorsed gender stereotypes more highly. I expected that this pattern would be especially true among tenth grade adolescents and those using conventional reasoning. I expected that participants’ beliefs about the consequences of harassment, which would influence their use of moral reasoning, may also be influenced by the genders of the victim and/ or perpetrator. Furthermore, I expected that participants’ beliefs about the intention of the perpetrator would vary in relation to the genders of the victim and perpetrator in a harassment scenario, also impacting their judgment of the scenario. I expected to find grade-related differences related to both conventional and moral reasoning, and differences in judgments related to the domain of reasoning used to evaluate the scenario. Finally, for participants in the male victim condition, I expected that the relationship between endorsement of gender stereotypes and judgments of harassment would be moderated by the use of moral forms of reasoning. An exploration of these hypotheses should begin to clarify the role of victim and perpetrator gender, as well as adolescents’ social cognitive development, in influencing their reasoning about and judgments of gender harassment.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The goal of this chapter is threefold. First, through a review of current research on sexual harassment, I will demonstrate the utility in reframing the phenomena discussed in this literature as gender harassment. This framing better accommodates a discussion of the ways in which these forms of harassment are multifaceted, and may be experienced differently depending on the genders of the victim and perpetrator. Specifically, I will argue that differences in the experiences with homophobic harassment for young men and women may be representative of the ways that homophobic harassment is used to regulate masculinity among young men, thus, making it a form of gender harassment. Second, I will explain how reasoning about gender harassment may require adolescents to coordinate information from multiple domains of social knowledge (particularly moral and conventional), as they construe consequences of harassment and the intentions of perpetrators through the lenses of their own experiences and gender stereotypes. Finally, I will draw connections between developmental trends in harassment prevalence and developmental trends in social cognition to suggest possible grade-related patterns in reasoning about gender harassment.

Defining Gender Harassment: The Importance of Victim and Perpetrator Genders

In 1999, the Supreme Court interpreted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as entitling young people to protection from peer harassment on the basis of sex if it creates a “hostile environment” at school (Davis v. Monroe). Since then, a great deal of research has focused on measuring sexual harassment in schools, often highlighting the ways in which such harassment disproportionately effects women, despite frequent findings that both young women and young men experience behaviors labeled as sexual harassment at high rates (Hand & Sanchez, 2000). Although helpful in refining our understanding of gender differences related to
harassment, emphasizing the negative effects of sexual harassment for young women, as opposed
to young men does not address the potential role of normative assumptions about gender in the
perpetration of harassment toward both women and men. Finally, sexual harassment research
often neglects the experiences of sexual minority youth, who are also at greater risk of sexual
harassment (Williams, Connolly, & Pepler, 2003). By reframing experiences that have often
been viewed as sexual harassment as “gender harassment,” I intend to draw attention to the ways
in which these forms of harassment are gendered, and the intersection between homophobic and
misogynistic forms of harassment.

The term “gender harassment” is also more inclusive in that it does not exclude forms of
harassment that are not “sexual in nature” as is often the case with interpretations of the term
“sexual harassment” (Office of Civil Rights, 2010). Furthermore, I have chosen the term
“gender harassment,” as opposed to “sex harassment” because the experience of gender
harassment is not necessarily driven by an individual’s designated sex (i.e., chromosomes,
hormones, and internal and external sex organs). Rather, gender is related to cultural
constructions of what it means to see one’s self and be seen by others as being of a particular
gender (Butler, 1990). The importance of this view is emphasized in the most recent AAUW
report (Hill & Kearl, 2011), which found that while young people were most likely to rate “girls
whose bodies are really developed, more than other girls” as the most at risk of sexual
harassment (58%), the second most at risk group, “girls who are really pretty,” was followed
closely by “boys who are not athletic or not very masculine” (41% and 37%, respectively).

Framing these phenomena as “gender harassment” also recognizes that assumptions
about appropriate expressions of gender are at the core of negative perceptions of homosexuality,
and homophobia is often used to police gendered behavior for men and women, regardless of their sexual orientation. As explained by Seidman (2005):

Individuals who deviate significantly from gender norms are stigmatized as homosexual. For example, women who are masculine, aggressive, or erotically assertive may be called whores, but also dykes; men who are passive or too emotional or feminine in their self-presentation are labeled as sissies, fags, or queers. These disparaging labels aim to enforce a binary gender order that also assumes the normality and rightness of heterosexuality.

Thus, my conceptualization of gender harassment includes harassment that is related to constructions of gender, including both misogynistic and homophobic forms of harassment, which may be, but are not necessarily, related to the victim’s biological sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation.

Throughout this section, I will demonstrate the gendered nature of experiences measured as sexual harassment in contemporary research by highlighting distinctions in the forms of harassment that young men and women are most likely to experience. It is noteworthy that, although I choose to refer to this harassment as gender harassment, my conception of this phenomenon is not necessarily different from many researchers’ who study sexual harassment. In fact, in the third, and most recent report on sexual harassment conducted by the AAUW, the authors suggest that homophobic harassment is an important form of gender harassment, which must be included in our conceptions of sexual harassment as a form of gender regulation (Hill & Kearl, 2011).

**Locating gender in harassment: the importance of victim and perpetrator gender.**

As homophobic harassment has been excluded from legal definitions of sexual harassment, it has
also been inconsistently included in measures of sexual harassment in the research literature. For example, the AAUW (Bryant, 1993) and SEQ-HS (Fitzgerald, 1995) scales are two of the most widely used measures of sexual harassment. Many studies using the AAUW measure either retain its original item, measuring homophobic harassment (“been called gay or lesbian”), or adjust it to include additional homophobic terms (such as “fag,” “dyke,” “lezzie,” or “queer”; Chiodo, et al., 2009; McMaster, et al., 2002; Williams, et al., 2003). In contrast, the SEQ-HS (1995), or the SES (Young, Grey, & Boyd, 2009), do not include an explicit focus on homophobic harassment, although some versions of the SEQ-HS include an item asking if respondents have been “called a vulgar homosexual name,” (Lacasse, Purdy, & Mendelson, 2003). Importantly, some measures of sexual harassment do not include any items representing homophobic harassment (for example, Young, et al., 2009).

This exclusion may differentially impact our understanding of the specific ways in which young men experience gender harassment, rather than young women. For example, while young women were more likely than young men to experience being pressured for a date or sex, or being called “sexually offensive” names (items commonly included on sexual harassment measures; Fineran & Bennett, 1999), in many studies, young men were more likely than young women to report having been called gay (Lipson, 2001; McMaster, et al., 2002). Unfortunately, because few researchers have reported findings about specific types of harassment by gender of participant, it is not clear whether variation in overall findings about gender differences is related to the inclusion or exclusion of particular items. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that measures including homophobic harassment may be better able to capture young men’s experiences with gender harassment than those only measuring more overtly sexualized forms of harassment, which may be more prevalent for young women.
Interestingly, young men and women also report perpetrating different forms of harassment (Hill & Kearl, 2001; Fineran & Bennett, 1999; McMaster, et al., 2002). When asked about what types of behaviors they perpetrate, boys were more likely than girls to report perpetrating the following behaviors: “pressuring a peer for a date;” “forcing someone to do something sexual other than kissing;” “telling sexually offensive jokes;” “touching someone or brushing up against someone in a sexual way;” “showing someone sexual messages;” and “calling someone gay” (Fineran & Bennett, 1999; McMaster, et al., 2002). In one study, girls reported “making comments about a classmate’s weight, body or appearance” more than boys (Fineran & Bennett, 1999), but were not more likely than boys to report engaging in any sexual harassment behaviors listed on the original AAUW scale (Lipson, 2001; McMaster, et al., 2002).

Furthermore, although both young men and young women are more likely to report perpetrating harassment toward other gender peers than same gender peers, young men are more likely than young women to report perpetrating harassment of a same gender peer (McMaster, et al., 2002; Petersen & Hyde, 2009). In a study reporting prevalence of individual behaviors by the gender of the victim and perpetrator, four times as many young men as young women reported experiencing being called gay or lesbian by a same gender peer (Petersen & Hyde, 2009). In the same study, cross gender perpetration of this behavior was low for both girls and boys (1% and 2%, respectively). This is consistent with the research of Pascoe (2005), who suggests that homophobic banter is a particularly common form of gender regulation among young men, but less so, among young women.

Evidence suggests that differences in experiences with particular forms of harassment may be related to the gender of the victim, the gender of the perpetrator, and the relation between the genders of the victim and perpetrator. Thus, a clearer understanding of the gender harassment
occurring between adolescents requires careful attention to the specific forms of harassment measured and experienced, and the relation between these harassment types and the genders of victim and perpetrator. It is not yet clear whether higher rates of specific forms of harassment are indicative of greater acceptance of these forms of harassment. Nonetheless, if a specific behavior, such as being called “gay,” is viewed differently depending on the genders of the victim and perpetrator, a better understanding of how reasoning about the same behavior varies in relation to the genders of the victim and perpetrator may provide insight into reported differences in prevalence. Furthermore, if homophobic harassment of young men, in particular, is viewed as more normative and/or more acceptable than homophobic harassment of young women, this lends support to the suggestion that homophobic harassment is a form of gender harassment, particularly for young men.

The Relation Between Victim/Perpetrator Gender and Adolescents’ Judgments about Gender Harassment

As discussed above, the specific types of harassment experienced by young people appear to vary in relation to their own gender, as well as the gender of their perpetrator. However, little is known about how the gender of the victim and perpetrator in a homophobic harassment scenario may impact adolescents’ reasoning about and acceptance of harassment. To date, researchers have investigated young people’s attitudes toward hypothetical harassment scenarios by assessing acceptance of a list of specific, decontextualized “unwanted” sexualized behaviors (Roscoe, Strouse, & Goodwin, 1994), or through the use of more contextualized harassment vignettes (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Terrance, et al., 2004; Horn & Nucci, 2003; Horn, 2006; 2007; 2008). While the findings from these studies suggest that the form of
harassment impacts adolescents’ reasoning, less is known about how the gender of the victim and perpetrator may be relevant to young people’s judgments of harassment.

In their study of adolescents’ attitudes toward sexual harassment, Terrance and colleagues’ (2004) asked participants to rate the extent to which they viewed six vignettes as sexual harassment, on a scale of 1 (definitely not sexual harassment) to 7 (definitely sexual harassment). The vignettes included a less and more explicit act of three forms of harassment of female victims by male perpetrators (with the more explicit form following the less explicit form, respectively): (1) physical (sexual cornering v. sexual touching), (2) verbal/visual (unwanted, repetitive requests for dates v. leering and whistling), and (3) derogatory (indirect sexist comments v. direct sexist comments) (Terrance, et al., 2004). Among their participants, the derogatory forms of harassment were least likely to be viewed as harassment (Terrance, et al., 2004), however, because they did not include an incident of homophobic harassment, it is not clear if adolescents might have reported a similar amount of ambivalence regarding homophobic comments as they did with the sexist comments.

Furthermore, these studies did not investigate the role of victim and perpetrator gender in relation to adolescents’ judgments about harassment. As described above, Roscoe and Strouse (1994) did not indicate the genders of victims in their survey, and Terrance and colleagues (2004) only included vignettes with female victims. Although Foulis & McCabe (1997) controlled for the genders of victim and perpetrator in their measure, they did not report whether or not the relation between victim and perpetrator gender had an impact on judgments about the acceptability of different harassment vignettes. Because previous research on adolescents’ judgments about harassment has not typically systematically investigated differences related to the genders of the victim and perpetrator, it is difficult to determine if the genders of the victim
and perpetrator may have also played a role in adolescents’ judgments. In light of the finding that young people were particularly ambivalent about derogatory forms of harassment (sexist comments) targeted at a female victim, young people may also experience ambivalence about homophobic comments targeted at a male victim.

In fact, in her research on harassment related to gender expression and sexual orientation, Horn (2008; Horn & Nucci, 2003) has found that the gender of the victim has an impact on adolescents’ reasoning about harassment based on gender non-conformity and sexual orientation. For example, boys were more likely to accept exclusion and assault of same gender peers who were gender nonconforming than same gender peers who were gender conforming, whereas girls were more likely to accept exclusion, but not assault, of a non-conforming same gender peer (Horn & Nucci, 2003). Interestingly, however, both girls and boys judged exclusion of gay adolescents as more acceptable than exclusion of lesbian adolescents (Horn, et al., 2008).

Nonetheless, because the gender of the victim was confounded with the gender of the participant or the sexual orientation of the victim in these studies, it is not clear whether these differences would be significant if only the gender of the victim was investigated. If homophobic harassment is conceptualized as a form of gender harassment, which is experienced by heterosexual adolescents, as well as gay and lesbian adolescents, the role of victim gender in relation to reasoning about homophobic harassment should be investigated more directly.

**Reasoning about Gender Harassment Involves Distinct Domains of Social Knowledge**

Because gender harassment victimization is often associated with negative outcomes (Ormerod, et al., 2008; Walsh, et al., 2007), it seems likely that concerns for the victims’ welfare would be particularly salient when a young person considers the acceptability of a harassment scenario. The extent to which young people are concerned about these consequences, however,
may be impacted by the gender of the victim given differential findings about the consequences of harassment in relation to the victim’s gender. While female victims are generally more likely to report being upset by harassment, young men are more likely than young women to report being more upset by homophobic harassment than other forms of harassment (Hill & Kearl, 2011; Walsh, et al., 2007). In addition, acceptance and perpetration of gender harassment appears to be influenced by young people’s endorsement of gender stereotypes (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Fineran & Bennett, 1999). It appears from the research then, that young people must coordinate their reasoning about gender-specific stereotypes with concerns for others’ welfare.

According to research using a social-cognitive domain theory framework, young people’s reasoning about conventional, moral, and personal issues develops simultaneously, albeit, distinctly, in each domain (Turiel, 1983). Researchers have established distinctions between conventional and moral reasoning by differentiating between children’s appeals to authority and rules in justifying their view that an act is wrong or not wrong and their descriptions of the negative consequences of a behavior to another person (Turiel, 1983). Using a clinical interview methodology (Piaget, 1928), researchers have used criterion judgments about prescriptivity (is the act judged as wrong), authority (is the act wrong if an authority permits it), rule contingency (is the act still wrong if there is not a rule about it), and generalizability (is the act wrong in other contexts) to distinguish between moral and conventional domains of social reasoning (Nucci, 1981). For example, individuals may use both moral and conventional reasoning to determine that an act is wrong (prescriptivity), however, individuals using conventional reasoning to arrive at such a judgment are less likely to view the act as wrong if an authority permits it (authority), if there is not a rule about it (rule contingency), or if they are asked about the acceptability of the act somewhere else, where it is not considered wrong (generalizability). If an individual is
reasoning in the moral domain, however, they are more likely to view the act as wrong regardless of the presence of a rule or law about it and/or where the act occurs. Domain theorists have suggested that reasoning develops distinctly in the moral domain (including concerns for others’ welfare, justice, and rights, which are seen as universal), and the conventional domain (including appeals to authority, rules and norms that vary by context) (Turiel, 1983). Finally, research suggests that individuals view some issues as outside the jurisdiction of moral or conventional concern, as they are seen as relevant only to the individual (Nucci, 1981). Reasoning about these issues is said to represent a third domain, which is referred to as the personal domain of reasoning (Nucci, 1981).

Because of its ability to explain complex, even contradictory patterns of thinking, social cognitive domain theory is well suited to the study of reasoning about multifaceted social issues. For this reason, researchers have used the theory to study adolescents’ reasoning about peer interactions. In applying this framework to adolescents reasoning about gender and race based exclusion, for example, Killen and colleagues (2002) adapted interview probes commonly used in research using social cognitive domain theory to be more relevant to the normative context of adolescents’ school peer environments. Using this method, Killen and colleagues were able to establish clearer parameters between adolescents who viewed a transgression as wrong for moral reasons (regardless of peer norms, parent instructions, school rules, or cultural context), and those who viewed instances of gender or race based exclusion as wrong because of conventions opposing it. Horn (2006) has also used this framework to study adolescents’ reasoning about peer-to-peer harassment related to sexual orientation, also finding that differentiating between domains of reasoning reveals patterns in responses to exclusion and teasing of gay and lesbian peers.
With respect to the study of gender harassment, it seems evident that reasoning in the moral domain may be relevant to young people’s assessments of these interactions. Social-cognitive domain theory suggests that moral reasoning is used to evaluate the acceptability of a scenario when negative consequences to another person are intrinsic to an act depicted in the scenario, rather than when negative consequences are imposed by some external authority, such as a parent, school authority, or police officer who is enforcing a rule or law (Piaget, 1932; Turiel, 1983). For example, hitting someone is distinct from raising one’s hand before speaking, because hitting someone would result in that person feeling hurt, regardless of whether or not the act were punished, whereas failing to raise one’s hand before speaking is unlikely to result in any negative consequence unless there is a rule about it and the teacher punishes the transgressor. The harm resulting from hitting another person is intrinsic to the act. Similarly, if “calling someone gay or lesbian in a negative way” leads to them feeling hurt, this negative consequence to the victim is intrinsic to the act, and thus, would be expected to lead an individual to employ moral reasoning in their evaluation of its acceptability. If young people use moral reasoning in their evaluations of gender harassment, this would be expected to result in lower rates of acceptance of the harassing behaviors.

Conventional reasoning may also play an important role in adolescents’ reasoning about gender harassment, since evidence suggests that adolescents’ reasoning about gender stereotypes is similar to reasoning about other conventions (Carter & Patterson, 1982). In their study, Carter & Patterson (1982) found significant similarities between reasoning about gender stereotypes and silverware etiquette (a more straightforward convention). If young people are considering gender stereotypes in their reasoning about the acceptability of various forms of harassment, this may lead them to view some forms of harassment toward male or female peers as acceptable
forms of regulation of appropriate gendered behavior. For example, if a young person views being affectionate toward a same gender friend as a more acceptable behavior for a woman than a man, they may view it as appropriate to use homophobic language toward a young man as a way to regulate that behavior, but inappropriate (or perhaps, silly) to use similar language in response to a young woman.

**Ambiguity in the moral domain of reasoning: the role of victim and perpetrator genders.** While some researchers have focused on the prevalence of sexual harassment without directly evaluating the negative outcomes associated with harassment, others have framed the consequences of harassment as an integral part of its definition (Walsh, et al., 2007). In this view, reports of experiences with harassing behaviors ought to be further qualified by asking participants about the extent to which they felt upset by the behavior (Walsh, et al., 2007). Importantly, if the victim does not report being upset by the experience, then the behavior is less likely to result in negative consequences, suggesting that not all interactions, which may be perceived by researchers as harassment are necessarily harmful (Walsh, et al., 2007).

Researchers who have examined adolescents’ reactions to sexual harassment have found that, despite similar frequencies of harassment experiences, girls are more likely than boys to report feeling threatened or upset by harassment, in general (Chiodo, et al., 2009; Hand & Sanchez, 2000; Walsh, et al., 2007). However, both the gender of the perpetrator and the type of harassment appear to influence the extent to which young people report feeling threatened or upset by a form of harassment, and these factors affect young men and women’s experiences in different ways (Hill & Kearl, 2011; Lacasse, et al, 2003).

In their most recent survey, the AAUW (2011) asked adolescents who had experienced at least one form of harassment to list which behavior had been most upsetting. While young
women were most likely to report “unwanted sexual comments, etc.” as the most upsetting form of harassment they had experienced, boys were significantly less likely than girls to rate this form of harassment as upsetting (Hill & Kearl, 2011). Young men, on the other hand, were most likely to report having been upset by being called gay in a negative way, which they were significantly more likely than young women to report having been most upset by (Hill & Kearl, 2011). The second most common response that young men gave to this question was “none,” suggesting that these young men were not upset by any of the harassment they had experienced (Hill & Kearl, 2011). This answer was also selected significantly more by young men than young women (Hill & Kearl, 2011). Interestingly, boys were more likely than girls to report feeling “normal” or “like a fool” after experiencing sexual harassment and girls were more likely to report feeling “embarrassed,” or “frightened” (Timmerman, 2005). Thus, it seems that consequences of harassment for girls and boys are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. This may affect the way young people understand gender harassment, making it more difficult for them to identify intrinsic consequences in some harassment situations (depending upon the gender of the victim), and therefore, less likely to view these forms of harassment as wrong.

Furthermore, it appears that the gender of the perpetrator may play a role in the extent to which young men and women report being upset by harassment. Significantly, in a study by Walsh and colleagues (2007), male and female participants who reported feeling upset by the harassment they experienced were 4.5 times more likely to report that their perpetrators were male than female. Again, if the consequences of harassment differ in relation to the gender of the perpetrator, than this factor may also influence a young person’s construal of a harassment situation and therefore, their reasoning about it.
Importantly, there is also variation in reports of gender differences in outcomes across studies using different measures of harassment and negative outcomes associated with it. For example, in studies evaluating the extent to which young people report feeling upset by their experiences with harassment, those studies that did not include an anti-gay item have found that girls are more likely than boys to be upset by all forms of harassment (Lacasse, et al., 2003, Walsh, et al., 2007). However, researchers who used measures of harassment with an anti-gay item found that young men were actually more likely than young women to report being upset by this form of harassment (Fineran & Bennett, 1999; Hand & Sanchez, 2000; Hill & Kearl, 2011). One study measuring negative psychological outcomes, which did not include an anti-gay item, found that peer harassment only directly predicted negative psychological outcomes for young women (for young men, negative psychological outcomes were predicted by perceptions of a school climate that is tolerant of harassment; Ormerod, et al., 2008). In studies including an anti-gay item in their measure, however, peer harassment was associated with negative psychological outcomes for both men and women (Chiodo, et al., 2009; Duffy, et al., 2004). In fact, Duffy and colleagues (2004) found that boys who do report being upset by harassment are not any less likely than girls who report being upset to experience negative psychological outcomes. This is important when considered along with the finding of the AAUW (Hill & Kearl, 2011) that anti-gay name-calling was the most common upsetting experience for adolescent male victims of harassment.

Associations between harassment, overall (as measured in various studies), and a variety of outcomes (psychological health, school safety, substance use, etc.), are generally stronger for young women than they are for young men (Chiodo, et al., 2009; Hand & Sanchez, 2000; Timmerman, 2005). Nonetheless, peer-to-peer sexual harassment victimization is associated with
many negative outcomes for both young men and women, particularly when an anti-gay item is included (Ormerod, et al., 2008; Chiodo, et al., 2009). Thus, although the negative effects of gender harassment appear to be more prominent for young women, the effects of homophobic harassment, in particular, may be particularly salient for young men.

It is also possible that participants’ reports of not being upset may be related to social-desirability. For example, boys may be less likely to say that they are upset because they do not want to violate stereotypes about masculinity, which suggest that men should be both unemotional and hypersexual (Kimmel, 2007). Finally, young people may be legitimately confused about how they feel about harassment experiences. While only 15% of harassed students reported being upset, many students responded that they were unsure how they felt (11%) and others did not respond to the question (18%) (Walsh, et al., 2007), suggesting that young people’s feelings about the harassment that they experience may be complex and unclear. This complexity is likely to affect their understandings of the negative effects of harassment, further complicating the way that adolescents’ judgments and reasoning about gender harassment relate to the type of harassment being perpetrated and the gender of the actors involved in the interaction.

**The importance of gender norms: the role of victim gender.** As discussed above, the prevalence and reported consequences of specific forms of harassment appear to be gender-specific implying that norms around harassment vary in relation to the victim’s gender. Furthermore, beliefs about gender stereotypes and sexism are related to greater acceptance and perpetration of sexual harassment of peers (Foulis & McCabe, 1997; Terrance, et al., 2004; Fineran & Bennett, 1999). For example, young women who had more egalitarian views of women’s roles in both the U.S. and China were less likely to be accepting of cross-gender
harassment than those with less egalitarian views (Terrance, et al., 2004; Tang, et al., 1995). In their Australian sample of high school students, college students, and adults, Foulis and McCabe (1997) found that gender stereotypes significantly predicted both acceptance of various forms of same and cross gender harassment, and engagement in sexual harassment among their high school sample. Finally, Fineran and Bennett (1999) found similar results with a U.S. sample, using the Heterosexual Relationships Scale; young men and women who endorsed male dominance were more likely to report perpetrating harassment (the association for young men was stronger than the association for young women).

Similarly, Poteat and colleagues (2010) have found that greater endorsement of masculinity is related to acceptance of homophobic harassment. Interestingly, Horn (2007) has found that young people were not only less accepting of gender non-conforming peers (for example, girls playing football, or boys taking ballet) than gender conforming peers, they were significantly less accepting of male peers who were described as gender non-conforming in appearance (wearing eyeliner and nail polish) than they were of gender non-conforming females or males who do not conform to other gender norms. When considered alongside the finding that “being called gay or lesbian in a negative way” is the only form of harassment measured by the AAUW that was more upsetting for male than female victims, these findings further support the hypothesis that this form of harassment is a central mechanism for policing masculinity among young men (Kimmel, 2007).

The suggestion that gender stereotypes may influence adolescents’ reasoning about harassment of peers is also supported by research on young people’s reasoning about the treatment of gay and gender non-conforming peers. For example, Horn (2006; 2007; 2008; Horn & Nucci, 2003) has found that reasoning about the treatment of peers was influenced by both the
victim’s sexual orientation, and the extent to which the target of harassment was conforming to
gender-stereotypical dress and behavior. In her samples, young people who were more accepting
of gender non-conforming and gay peers, in general, were less accepting of exclusion or teasing
of gay or gender non-conforming peers (Horn, 2006; 2007; 2008; Horn & Nucci, 2003). Again,
this suggests that young people’s commitment to norms has some influence on their acceptance
of harassment related to violations of those norms. As expected, she also found that young
people who held more accepting attitudes toward harassment of a gender non-conforming peer
were more likely to use conventional reasoning (suggesting that it’s okay to harass a boy who
wears eyeliner because boys should not wear eyeliner), whereas those viewing exclusion and
teasing as wrong were more likely to use moral reasoning (focusing on the harm to the person
being harassed) (Horn & Nucci, 2003).

Overall, findings about differences in the consequences of harassment and the
relationship between gender norms and harassment suggests that young people may need to
negotiate reasoning from both moral and conventional domains when reasoning about gender
harassment. Furthermore, the victim’s gender is likely to impact this process. For example, if
participants are judging homophobic harassment of gay men as more acceptable than
homophobic harassment of young women because of gender specific norms about masculinity,
then homophobic harassment of a young woman is unlikely to cue norms about masculinity.
Likewise, if participants are aware of the greater likelihood that a young woman will be upset by
an experience with harassment, in general, they may be more likely to reference concerns about
the victim’s welfare if the victim is female, as opposed to male.

The Importance of Perpetrator Intention to Judgments of Moral Transgressions
In addition to the factors discussed above, it seems that judgments are also related to individuals’ understandings of the intentions of the actor. Although their study compared adults to young children (ages 5-7), Chandler and colleagues (2001) found that children who did not see individuals as agents able to interact intentionally with their environment equated the rightness or wrongness of an act exclusively to the consequence of the action. When circumstances were manipulated, however, to indicate that an individual had either unknowingly committed murder or accidentally committed murder through the exercise of poor judgment, adults and children who viewed individuals as intentional agents judged the unknowing killer less harshly than the poor judgment killer. In another study assessing judgments of others’ moral transgressions, individuals across age groups were less likely to judge a transgressor harshly if they were told that the transgressor had incorrect factual information about the effects of the transgression (Wainryb, 1998). However, participants were not less likely to judge the transgressor negatively after being told that the transgressor believed that the act was not immoral (Wainryb, 1998). In other words, if the participants were told that the transgressor believed that the act would not cause harm, they were not viewed as negatively as if participants were told that the transgressor believed that it was not wrong to cause harm, or if they behaved recklessly. Thus, if a young person believes that the perpetrator of an act of harassment was unaware of the negative impact of their actions, they may be less likely to judge the harassment as wrong, however, if they view the transgressor as having had the capacity to have anticipated the negative consequence and avoided it, they may be more likely to judge the harassment as wrong.

In summary, when reasoning about a social dilemma that involves information from multiple domains of social reasoning, individuals must also coordinate their construal of a harassment situation with their understandings of information relevant to the domains of social
knowledge discussed above (Turiel, 1983; Nucci & Turiel, 2007). For some individuals, concerns within one domain may take precedence over concerns within another domain, leading them to judge a situation primarily through the lens of reasoning within that domain. For others, however, the task of coordinating information across domains, particularly if the information is contradictory, may be difficult. Adolescents’ reasoning about gender harassment is likely to require coordinating across these different domains, attending to their own gender stereotypes, their beliefs about potential consequences to the victim, as well as their beliefs about the intentions of the perpetrator. More research is needed to understand the specific ways in which different types of reasoning may be used when the victim and perpetrator genders are varied.

**The Development of Reasoning about Gender Harassment**

Although it is not yet clear how acceptance of and reasoning about gender harassment may be related to perpetration of harassment, it is noteworthy that endorsement of gender stereotypes is related to both acceptance of harassment, and the prevalence of harassment (Foulis & McCabe, 1997). If the prevalence of gender harassment is related to gender stereotypes, it may be possible that developmental changes in the prevalence of gender harassment are related to developmental changes in social cognition. Although age-related findings have been inconsistent, it seems plausible that gender harassment may peak in middle adolescence, before becoming less common in later adolescence and adulthood (Pepler, et al., 2006). Also during middle adolescence, conventional reasoning is becoming more salient in conjunction with the development of systemic thinking (Turiel, 1983), and is more likely to drive adolescents’ reasoning about their treatment of peers at this age than at older ages (Horn, 2006). If there is a relation between acceptance of and reasoning about gender harassment and it’s prevalence, a
clearer understanding of adolescents’ reasoning about gender harassment may be integral to intervention efforts.

**Developmental trends in the prevalence of gender harassment.** Although developmental differences have generally not been the focus of sexual harassment research, researchers who have included homophobic harassment and age as a variable may suggest a curvilinear trend. Specifically, there appears to be an increase in sexual harassment from grades 5 to 9 (Petersen & Hyde, 2009) or an overall increases from middle school to high school, when grades within each were combined (Gruber & Fineran, 2007). By treating grade as a categorical variable with their sixth – twelfth grade sample, however, Pepler and colleagues (2006) found that harassment peaked in grade nine, before declining again in later grades. While this may appear contradictory to the findings reported earlier, Pepler and colleagues also found that overall rates of harassment remained higher in later adolescence than in middle school. Thus, differences found in other studies between individual middle school and high school grades and/or composite group scores between middle and high school age students would be expected to show higher rates of harassment in later grades, regardless of a peak in early high school. Also in support of this suggestion, Foulis and McCabe’s high school sample (grade ten) reported higher rates of harassment than their adult sample (mean age in their thirties), with age being negatively associated with harassment. Again, Foulis and McCabe (1997) did not find a significant difference in prevalence between their middle adolescent sample (grade ten) and their later adolescent/ young adult sample (college students); however, age was significantly negatively associated with harassment prevalence in their sample, over all.

Although it is unclear if developmental patterns in harassment prevalence are related to developmental differences in acceptance of and reasoning about gender harassment, Foulis and
McCabe (1997) did find a somewhat similar developmental trajectory in attitudes toward harassment. In their study, the negative association between age and attitudes toward harassment approached significance, with adolescents in grade ten reporting the greatest acceptance of harassment in comparison to other groups (Foulis & McCabe, 1997). Not surprisingly, at all ages, greater tolerance of harassment was associated with higher endorsement of gender stereotypes (Foulis & McCabe, 1997). It is possible, then, that developmental trends in perpetration of harassment are associated with trends in the development of social reasoning during adolescence.

**Developmental trends in social reasoning during adolescence.** As adolescents become older, their reasoning within moral, conventional, and personal domains develops in distinct ways. Moral reasoning becomes increasingly complex over time, as young people develop the capacity to think about fairness in terms of equity, rather than strict equality, in early to middle adolescence (Piaget, 1932). Conventional reasoning, on the other hand, follows an oscillating pattern, as adolescents go through periods of affirmation and negation of the norms and conventions in their environment (Turiel, 1983). Importantly, affirmation and negation of conventions at different developmental periods is qualitatively different (Turiel, 1983). While affirmation of conventions in preadolescence is focused on respect for authority figures and novice understanding that conventions serve a purpose, it is not until middle adolescence that young people are likely to understand the function of conventions from a systemic perspective, and therefore, affirm their importance as personally relevant to them (Turiel, 1983). Finally, as adolescents get older and become more autonomous in preparation for adulthood, they are also increasingly likely to use personal reasoning in making decisions about their social worlds (Smetana, 2005).
As reasoning in each of these domains develops, young people must also learn to effectively coordinate relevant information from each domain when faced with a complex social dilemma, such as deciding whether or not it is okay to pick up money dropped by another passenger on a bus (Nucci & Turiel, 2007). For example, Nucci and Turiel (2007) found that adolescents in fifth and ninth grades were more likely to appeal to authority in justifying their judgments about these dilemmas, saying that it would be wrong to pick up the money because it is against the rules/law, while seventh and eight graders were more likely to negate the dictates of adult authority, instead, suggesting that picking up the money is a matter of personal choice (Nucci & Turiel, 2007). Although later adolescents were still more likely to negate conventions and use personal reasoning, they were also more likely to identify the intrinsic harm in such a situation, viewing the act as stealing from the other person (Nucci & Turiel, 2007). Thus, it appears that adolescents’ ability to coordinate conflicting information improves as they get older.

Because of the suggested association between gender stereotypes and adolescents’ understandings of gender harassment, development within the conventional domain may be of particular importance to our understanding of adolescents’ reasoning about gender harassment in adolescence. As discussed above, Carter and Patterson (1982) explored the extent to which reasoning about gender stereotypes develops similarly to conventional reasoning among a sample of young people from grades two through eight. In their study, knowledge of gender stereotypes increased with age, along with knowledge of silverware etiquette (Carter & Patterson, 1982). Eighth graders (in a period of negation of conventions), however, were more flexible with their beliefs about gender stereotypes and silverware etiquette than younger participants. Young people’s maturity in understanding stereotypes as flexible was the best predictor of maturity in understanding etiquette as flexible, and vice versa (Carter & Patterson,
Thus, although it is unclear if the eighth graders’ flexibility in gender stereotypes was related to the curvilinear developmental trend of negation and affirmation of conventions, or a linear developmental trend in understanding norms as flexible, the former seems plausible. If so, young people in periods of negation of conventions should be less likely to rely on gender stereotypes when reasoning about gender harassment, however, adolescents in periods of affirmation of convention (particularly, during middle adolescent grades nine and ten) may be more likely to rely on gender stereotypes when reasoning about gender harassment.

In fact, reasoning about harassment of non-conforming peers does follow a predictable trajectory, with middle adolescents more likely than older adolescents to use conventional reasoning about harassment of a gay or gender non-conforming peer and older adolescents more likely than middle adolescents to use moral reasoning (Horn, 2006; 2008; Horn & Nucci, 2003). However, it is not clear if the same patterns of developmental differences in reasoning about other forms of gender harassment are apparent, or how specific stereotypes about gender and sexuality may affect young people’s reasoning about gender harassment over time. Using a social-cognitive domain framework may enable us to better understand the developmental trajectory of adolescents’ judgments about particular forms of gender harassment, and how their reasoning may vary in relation to harassment type and victim gender.

**Conclusion**

Existing research suggests that adolescents’ experiences with gender harassment can be best understood by acknowledging differences in the specific forms of harassment experienced by young men and young women. Furthermore, the genders of victim and perpetrator also have an impact on adolescents’ self-reported consequences of different forms of harassment. Nonetheless, little is known about how the genders of a victim and perpetrator of harassment
might impact adolescents’ understandings of its legitimacy and consequences, or any potential differences in beliefs about the intentions of the perpetrator.

Research examining the development of adolescents’ reasoning suggests that young people’s understandings of the harm caused by a form of harassment, as well as their endorsement of gender stereotypes related to the harassment, are likely to influence their acceptance of it. As young people get older, they must learn to coordinate concerns about the welfare of others’ with gender stereotypes and other forms of conventional reasoning. Because harassment may be seen as gender appropriate, and negative intrinsic consequences may not always occur (or be obvious), coordinating these concerns may be particularly difficult for young people. More research is needed to determine how young people coordinate these concerns over the course of their development. In addition, research is needed to determine the ways in which adolescents’ understandings of harassment at different ages may be related to assumptions about the consequences of the harassment to the victim, the intentions of perpetrators, gender stereotypes, and views on the rights of individuals to express their gender and sexuality as they please. To best understand these processes, research should attend to variation in reasoning that may be explained by the genders of the victim and perpetrator. If these concrete aspects of harassment cue reasoning within different domains or differences in judgments, an understanding of these differences will provide important guidance for future research and intervention practices.
Chapter 3: Methods

Participants

Participants for this study included 104 adolescents drawn from psychology and sociology classes taught by two teachers at a high school in a suburban community near a large city in the Midwest. Students from these classes were from high academic tracks within the school, such as honors and college prep. Participants were approximately evenly distributed across sex and grade (46% male, 54% female; 46% tenth grade and 54%, twelfth grade). Sixty-seven percent of students identified as White; 12% identified as Black or African American; 18% identified with another racial or ethnic group or multiple racial or ethnic groups; and 3% of students did not respond to the question about race.

The racial composition of the sample was largely representative of the population for the surrounding community, which is 67% White, 19% Black, 6% Latino, 5% Asian, and 3% multi-racial. Ninety-six percent of the population has graduated high school, and nearly 69% has graduated college. The median household income is well above the state average, at nearly $100,000, and just 7% of the population is below the poverty line. The student body of the school is slightly more diverse than the surrounding community; 55% of the student body is White, 27% Black, 9% Hispanic, 3% Asian, and 6% are of mixed racial background. Twenty three percent of students at the school are considered low income.

Procedure

The lead researcher presented parental permission forms to students under the age of 18 and consent forms to students who were 18 or older during their regularly scheduled psychology or sociology class. They were asked to return the consent form to an anonymous box set up in the back of the room, and told that classrooms returning 80% or more of the consent forms (with
or without permission) would be provided pizza or donuts. Students who submitted consent forms or parental permission forms were scheduled for one-on-one interviews. Prior to being interviewed, students under the age of 18 also provided verbal assent. Interviews took place in a private office during students’ regularly scheduled classes, and lasted anywhere from 5-50 minutes, with the average interview lasting around 10-15 minutes.

**Research Design**

The study was conducted using a between subjects design, investigating the role of grade (2), gender of victim (2) and gender of perpetrator (2) in relation to outcome variables. Each participant was read a vignette describing an interaction between high school aged peers (described in greater detail below). The vignette describes a victim engaging in a behavior that is hypothesized to represent gender non-conformity for a young man (telling a same gender friend that they look good today), which was rated by undergraduate college students as more likely to result in a male adolescent being teased than a female adolescent (Romeo, 2013). In total, four unique harassment vignettes, which differed in relation to the gender of the victim and perpetrator (2 victim gender x 2 perpetrator gender), were distributed (see Appendix A for an example of the complete interview protocol). Participants were evenly divided across conditions randomly within grade, gender, interviewer, and class period (see Table 1). After hearing the scenario, participants’ were asked about their judgment of the harassment (4-point Likert-type scale rating of the wrongness of the perpetrator’s action), and justifications for those judgments (coded categories based on social cognitive domain theory). They were then asked questions to determine how they were construing relevant aspects of the harassment situation by rating their perception of victim acceptability, perpetrator intention, and victim consequence on a four-
point Likert-type scale. After the interview, participants were provided a survey measuring their endorsement of gender stereotypes.

**Statistical Models.** Although I am hypothesizing complex and potentially interrelated relationships among variables in this study, the disparate nature of research on social cognition and research on gender harassment means that many of these relationships have not been tested simultaneously, and therefore, preliminary testing of relationships was necessary. For this reason, testing many of my hypotheses served the dual purpose of establishing the independence of variables that may contribute to **justifications** and/or **judgments** about harassment, as well as contributing to a knowledge base for development of more complex understandings in future research. To thoroughly distinguish between findings relevant to existing research from the two literatures, I structured my hypotheses and tests of these hypotheses hierarchically, building upon more basic relationships among variables established in previous research, so as to guide more complex model development for this and future studies.

Using multiple tests requires an adjustment for family-wise error (FWE), however, given the complex and inter-related nature of hypothesis testing and model development, as well as the small sample size for this study, an adjustment is not made uniformly across tests to account for this issue. Instead, I have included an adjustment to *p*-values for each predictor within families of tests using the same outcome variable, with the exclusion of tests used to inform more complex model development. In this way, *p*-values for tests of pairwise comparisons are only adjusted once. I use the Holms-Sidak (1979) method, which involves first calculating *p*-values, followed by an adjustment of *p*-values based on the total number of tests in the family, with the most conservative criteria applied to the test with the lowest initial *p*-value. The Holms-Sidak adjustment changes the *p*-value for a specific test to be compared with a predetermined
threshold for significance (typically set at .05), inflating the $p$-value associated with each variable as opposed to deflating the threshold for significance. Where multiple tests are performed using the same outcome variables, I have adjusted the $p$-values while maintaining the threshold of $p \leq .05$, except in the case of the judgment variable. Running multiple tests with judgment as the outcome variable allowed me to specifically address issues relevant to distinct literatures, however, because this disproportionately increased the family-wise error rate, I raised the threshold for significance to $p \leq .10$ for tests of predictors of judgment. For the purpose of demonstrating the probability of obtaining these results by chance, I have included the initial $p$-values, to demonstrate the significance of each variable, prior to the correction, as well as the adjusted value.

**Power.** An initial estimate of power was based on Foulis & McCabe’s (1997) overall model predicting attitudes toward sexual harassment with the most individually significant variables being perceptions of harassment and gender stereotypes (adjusted $r$ square = .44). I expected an effect size of (.79) for my most complex model (testing the effect of endorsement of gender stereotypes and other variables on judgment) using OLS regression. This analysis suggested a total minimum sample size of 96 would safely accommodate this model (power = .8, probability = .05). Because changes to scales required adjusting the analysis method, however, post-hoc power analyses were conducted for logistic regression. According to the method suggested by Hseih, Bloch, & Larsen (1998), power was recalculated for each model at an effect size of 1.25 logits for one standard deviation of any given predictor. This effect size roughly corresponds to an increase in probability of .75, or an odds ratio of 3/1. This conservative effect size accommodates the available sample size for each model tested, though Type II error is still possible, given this high threshold.
Measures

Demographics. Participants completed short surveys after the interview with forced choice options for gender: “male,” “female,” “trans/ gender queer”; and grade: “ten,” “twelve.” Because of the lack of anonymity due to the interview format, we did not ask participants about their sexual orientation. Participants were asked to respond to an open-ended question about their race/ethnicity. Because the race/ethnicity question was open-ended, some interpretation was necessary. Participants who responded that they were, “Caucasian,” “White,” “Arian,” “Polish,” “Italian,” “European,” or some combination of these, were coded as “White,”; participants who said that they were “Black,” or “African American,” were coded as “Black/ African American,”; participants who reported multiple racial or ethnic categories (i.e., “Italian and Black”, “Asian and White,” etc.), or who selected another category that was rarely endorsed (i.e., “Asian,” or “Hispanic”) were coded as “Other”.

Endorsement of gender stereotypes. Endorsement of gender stereotypes was measured using a revised version of The “Macho” Scale (Villemez & Touhey, 1977). The original scale includes 28 items and has demonstrated high test-retest correlations among diverse samples. Because it was developed in the 1970’s, however, many of the items were dated, and therefore, I conducted a pilot study to ensure that the measure was both ecologically valid and psychometrically sound. In addition, given time limitations with the high school sample, I sought to shorten the measure considerably. The revised version was created through pilot testing with undergraduate students (N=63). The initial alpha with all 28 items for this sample was .66. To reduce the scale, outdated or redundant items were removed one at a time when their removal resulted in a higher overall alpha. This resulted in 8 remaining items, with an improved alpha coefficient of .72 (see Appendix B for revised measure). Participants rated each of the eight
items on a four-point scale: “strongly agree,” “agree,” “disagree,” “strongly disagree.” Higher scores indicated greater acceptance of stereotypical gender roles. The reduced version of the “Macho Scale” demonstrated good reliability with the study sample using Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = .72$), however, deleting one item: “A love for competition is basically a male trait, even though some women possess it,” raised the alpha coefficient slightly ($\alpha = .73$). Thus, the remaining seven items were used in analyses rather than the original eight items.

**Vignettes.** Because the harassment scenarios were developed to investigate differences in reasoning related to victim/perpetrator gender, other aspects of the harassment situation that may lead to variation in judgment, such as the type of harassment (homophobic harassment), the relationship between perpetrator and victim (casual friends/acquaintances), and the location of the harassment (school hallway) remained the same across vignettes. These determinations were made based on existing research suggests that most harassment is perpetrated by a known peer (Fineran & Bennett, 1999), and occurs on school grounds (Ormerod, et al., 2008). Both the intention of the perpetrator and the effect of harassment on the victim were left ambiguous, to allow for adolescents to construe aspects of the situation based on their own assumptions. An example of the vignette format follows (see appendix A for complete interview protocol):

**JOHN** and **MIKE** attend the same school and have many mutual friends. They often spend time together in large groups after school or on the weekends. One day, while a group of them are talking in the hallway during passing period, **MIKE** tells another **MALE** friend that **HE** looks good today. When **HE** sees this, **JOHN** looks at **MIKE** and says, “That was so gay!”

**Genders of victim and perpetrator.** As discussed above, participants were provided with only one vignette, which featured either a male or female victim, and either a male or female
perpetrator. **Victim** and **perpetrator gender** conditions were counter-balanced in relation to one another to ensure equal cell sizes across the four total possible conditions in relation to participants’ grade and gender.

**Judgment.** After hearing the vignette, participants were asked if they thought it was wrong or not wrong that (the **perpetrator**) said to (the **victim**) “That was so gay!” (judgment: 1 = *not at all* wrong, 2 = mostly not wrong, 3 = mostly wrong, 4 = completely wrong)

**Justification.** After providing a rating of their judgment of the perpetrator’s behavior, participants were asked to explain why they thought the behavior was wrong or not (justification). To further understand which domains of reasoning participants were referencing in their evaluations, they were then asked a series of questions meant to test the parameters of their judgments (will they change their mind if normative, authoritative, and cultural circumstances are varied?). These questions were based on an adapted list of criterion judgments used by Killen and colleagues (2002). (See appendix A, Interview Protocol for the exact questions.)

**Coding and reliability for justifications.** The coding scheme for **justification** codes was developed iteratively, applying a domain theory framework to the data. To best understand the effect of conventional concerns, as opposed to moral concerns, as well as adolescents’ coordination of the two, justifications were coded with consideration of their responses to criterion judgments. Participants who focused exclusively on harm to the victim or others were coded as using **moral** reasoning only, while those who focused only on norms, group functioning, or dictates of authority were coded as using **conventional** reasoning only.

Participants who described both moral and conventional concerns were coded as using either **moral and conventional uncoordinated** reasoning (if they did not articulate a relation
between the two concerns), or moral and conventional coordinated reasoning (if they articulated a relation between the function of the norm and moral concerns). Among participants who coordinated moral and conventional concerns, some participants described harm as originating from, and therefore, arbitrary in relation to, relevant conventions (coded as second-order moral), while others viewed the convention as exacerbating harm that was essentially intrinsic, due to seemingly stable social norms. Participants expressing the latter perspective were further differentiated by the extent to which they understood harm as related to individuals (coded as interpersonal harm in social context), as opposed to groups of people (coded as moral conventional coordinated). Finally, participants who focused only on the prerogative of the perpetrator to do as they pleased were coded as using personal only reasoning (See Table 2, for a description of codes). These codes were negotiated between two independent coders and revised as needed, in consultation with the literature and experts in domain theory. The coders randomly selected a set of interview transcripts for reliability coding (20% of the total dataset for). Using Cohen’s Kappa, reliability was good (k = .76; percentage agreement = 81%).

**Construal of harassment interaction.** Participants were then asked a series of questions to determine how they were construing the victim’s acceptability, the victim consequence, and perpetrator intention. The participants were asked the following questions to determine ratings for each of the three construal variables:

“In your opinion, how okay do you think it is that (the victim) told a same-gender friend that they look good today?” (1 = not okay at all, 2 = mostly not okay, 3 = mostly okay, or 4 = completely okay) (victim acceptability).
“How likely do you think it is that (the victim) was upset by what (the perpetrator) said/did?” (1 = definitely not, 2 = probably not, 3 = probably yes, or 4 = definitely yes) (victim consequence).

“How likely do you think it is that (the perpetrator) was trying to upset (the victim)?” (1 = definitely not, 2 = probably not, 3 = probably yes, 4 = definitely yes) (perpetrator intention).
Chapter 4: Results

Data cleaning and data reduction

Missing data. Because of the format of the interview protocol and brevity of the survey, there was very little missing data across items (0%- 3%), except for the question: “Do you think the victim was upset by what the perpetrator said?” which 7 participants did not answer. No discernible patterns were evident for these 7 participants using chi-square analyses in relation to participant race, gender, grade, or victim or perpetrator gender conditions (χ² values ranged from .282 - 1.506; p values ranged from .115 – 1.0). Based on this, missing items were treated as such and were excluded from relevant analyses on a case-wise basis.

Endorsement of gender stereotypes. Overall, participants reported low endorsement of gender stereotypes on the Macho Scale, with only one participant averaging above “somewhat agree” across the 7 items. This participant’s score was truncated (reduced from 24 to 21, one point higher than the next highest participant) to prevent a disproportionate skew in the distribution (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). After this transformation, the overall scale range for this sample was 7-21, out of a possible range of 7-28 (M = 13.52; SD = 3.16).

Judgment and construal of vignettes. Endorsement of extreme scores across each of the scales was very low, so scales were dichotomized. For the judgment scale, only one participant said that the perpetrator’s behavior was completely not wrong. Fewer than 10% of participants said that the perpetrator’s behavior was mostly not wrong. Thus, judgment was dichotomized to account for participants who said the behavior was “completely wrong,” (scored as “1”, n = 53) as opposed to those who expressed ambivalence (“mostly not wrong” or “mostly wrong”; scored as “0,” n = 51); because the participant who rated the interaction as “not at all wrong” was
expressing neither ambivalence or a belief that the action was completely wrong, they were excluded from analysis.

The acceptability of the victim scale showed even less variability, with no participants saying that they thought the victim’s behavior was completely not okay and only two participants saying that the victim’s behavior was “mostly not okay”. This scale was also dichotomized to account for participants who said that the victim’s behavior was “completely okay” (scored as “0”, $n = 15$) as opposed to those who expressed ambivalence (either “mostly not okay” or “mostly okay”; scored as “1”, $n = 89$). Both the perpetrator intention and consequence to the victim scales were kurtotic, with fewer than 10% of the sample endorsing the extreme values on either side. Therefore these scales were dichotomized to account for those who said “probably/definitely yes” as opposed to those who said, “probably/definitely no”. Participants who believed the victim was probably upset were scored as “1” ($n = 61$), while participants who believed the victim probably was NOT upset were scored as “0” ($n = 36$). Participants who believed the perpetrator probably had a negative intention were scored as “1” ($n = 37$), and participants who believed the perpetrator probably didn’t have a negative intention were scored as “0” ($n = 65$).

**Justification.** Because second-order moral reasoning suggests a prioritization of conventional reasoning over moral reasoning (i.e., harm is viewed as arbitrary in relation to the conventions), I conducted chi-square tests to see if there were meaningful differences between participants using conventional reasoning only and those using second order moral reasoning, specifically. There were no differences in endorsement of gender stereotypes between these two groups ($t(33) = .56$, $p = .58$), nor were there differences in relation to the perpetrator or victim gender, participant grade or gender, construal variables, or judgment ($\chi^2$ values ranged from
While the difference between the use of conventional reasoning as opposed to second order moral reasoning between participants who identified with a racial or ethnic group other than White or Black and the White and Black groups approached significance (χ² (2) = 5.85, p = .05), the lack of meaningfulness of the “Other” category makes this finding difficult to interpret. Based on these results, conventional reasoning was combined with second order moral reasoning as a composite category (predominantly conventional reasoning).

I then conducted analyses to determine if there were differences between participants using the two forms of moral coordinated reasoning (moral conventional coordination and interpersonal harm in social context). There were no significant differences between these two forms of moral coordinated reasoning in relation to endorsement of gender stereotypes (t (27) = .61, p = .50), perpetrator or victim gender, participant grade or gender, construal variables, or judgment (χ² (1) = 0.01 – 1.22; p = .41 – 1.0). Based on these results, I combined these two types of moral coordinated reasoning into one category (moral conventional coordination). Because only one participant used predominantly personal reasoning, this code was combined with the uncodeable category. The final categories of justification retained for analyses were: moral only, moral coordinated, predominantly conventional, and moral and conventional uncoordinated (See Table 3 for percentages of the sample using each category of reasoning).

Preliminary Analyses

Prior to hypothesis testing, I tested for group differences by participants’ race and gender for each of the categorical outcome variables using chi-square analyses. Because of experimenter control, there were no differences in participant gender related to grade, or vignette condition. In addition, across all categorical/ dichotomous outcomes (beliefs about victim
acceptability, the perpetrator’s intention, the consequences to the victim, each type of justification category), there were no significant differences for gender ($\chi^2 (1) = 0.05 - 3.13, p = .37 - .85$). There were also no significant differences in relation to race by grade, victim gender, participant gender, or outcome variables listed above ($\chi^2 (2) = 0.64 - 4.44, p = .11 - .73$). Students with a racial or ethnic identity other than White or Black were significantly more likely to have a male perpetrator than White or Black participants ($\chi^2 (2) = 6.08, p = .05$).

Using multivariate analysis of variance, I entered participant race and gender as IV’s to assess group differences in endorsement of gender stereotypes. This test revealed no differences related to gender ($F (1, 96) = 0.39, p = .54$), however, White participants demonstrated less endorsement of gender stereotypes than Black/ African American participants ($F (3, 96) = 2.96, p = .04$). Because of the associations among gender stereotypes, race, and perpetrator gender, a linear regression analysis was also conducted to assess whether race and perpetrator gender shared a collinear relationship to endorsement of gender stereotypes. Tolerance statistics for these variables were all near .95, suggesting that race and perpetrator gender contributed uniquely to gender stereotypes. Based on the findings from these analyses, participant race and gender were not included in subsequent analyses. Tables 4 - 6 show descriptive information for each outcome variable in relation to the remaining between group variables.

**Hypothesis Testing**

Because all outcome variables were scored dichotomously, logistic regression and chi-square analyses were used to investigate hypotheses. The likelihood ratio test, calculated as a chi-square with one degree of freedom, was used as opposed to the Wald statistic to test the significance of the addition of each predictor to the model (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Although most predictor variables were categorical, and therefore, also dummy coded
dichotomously, logistic regression assumes linearity in the logit for continuous variables, and therefore, analyses were run to ensure that scores on the macho scale shared a linear relationship to relevant outcome variables. In addition, scores on the macho scale were centered around the mean for all analyses. An investigation of each hypothesis follows.

**Q1:** *Does participants’ acceptance of the victim’s behavior vary as a function of their age, endorsement of gender stereotypes, and victim gender condition? How might this be related to judgments of an act of homophobic harassment?*

Because of gender differences in experiences with harassment and theoretical arguments suggesting that homophobic harassment is used as a way of regulating masculinity, I hypothesized that participants in the male victim condition who endorsed gender stereotypes would be more likely to believe that the victim’s behavior was not okay than participants in the female victim condition who endorsed gender stereotypes. Furthermore, I expected that this effect would be more pronounced among tenth graders.

Eighty-six percent of the students in this sample believed that it was completely acceptable for the victim to tell their same-gender friend that they looked good today. So as to avoid over fitting the model (resulting in reduced power), it is generally recommended that there be at least 10 events in the outcome variable for every predictor in a model (Stoltzfus, 2011). Of the 15 students who did not believe that is was completely acceptable for the victim to complement their same gender friend, 40% were tenth grade students in the male victim condition, with the remaining 60% of participants divided evenly across the other three cells. Thus, for both the male victim condition and among tenth graders, the same six participants provided the majority of the deviance in the outcome that could be attributable to either variable.
Because I was primarily interested in the relationship between victim gender condition and endorsement of gender stereotypes, I did not include grade in the logistic regression model.

To test this hypothesis, I first examined the unique contribution of victim gender (the female victim condition was used as the reference group) and gender stereotypes without the addition of the interaction term, in predicting the odds of expressing ambivalence about the acceptability of the victim’s behavior. Then, I assessed the additional contribution of the interaction term to the model. Prior to adding the interaction term, the model for predicting ambivalence about the acceptability of the victim’s behavior with gender stereotypes and victim gender was significant ($\chi^2 (2) = 16.30, p = .00; -2 \text{ Log Likelihood} = 69.51; \text{Nagelkerke R square} = .26$). While having a male victim increased the odds of believing the victim’s behavior was not completely acceptable, this effect was non-significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 0.78, p = .34; OR = 1.73, 95\% \text{ C.I.} [0.51, 5.87]$). Endorsement of gender stereotypes, however, significantly increased the odds of believing that the victim’s behavior was not completely okay ($\chi^2 (1) = 15.72, p = .00; OR = 1.48, 95\% \text{ C.I.} [1.19, 1.85]$). The addition of the interaction term was also significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 6.44, p = .01; \text{for the overall model, } \chi^2 (3) = 22.75, p = .00; -2 \text{ log likelihood} = 63.07, \text{Nagelkerke R square} = .35; \text{p- value adjusted for FWE} = .00$). That is, for participants in the male victim condition, endorsement of gender stereotypes was associated with a larger increase in the odds of believing the victim’s behavior was not completely okay than for those in the female victim condition (see Table 7 for odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals). After accounting for the interaction between victim gender and endorsement of gender stereotypes, both victim gender and endorsement of gender stereotypes, independently, were non-significant.

Furthermore, because I hypothesized that gender regulation was the cause of both acceptance of the victim and judgments of harassment, I expected that participants in the male
victim condition, who endorsed gender stereotypes, and who were less accepting of the victim’s behavior would be less likely to think that the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong. Again, I expected that this effect would be more pronounced among tenth graders, as opposed to twelfth graders.

Because the previous analyses demonstrated that acceptance of the victim was strongly associated with the interaction of endorsement of gender stereotypes and victim gender, and the relation between acceptance of the victim and victim gender may be confounded with grade, acceptance of the victim was excluded from analyses. After removing this variable, none of the variables in the model shared a significant relationship with one another. I then split the file by participant grade to test the effect of endorsement of gender stereotypes, victim gender, and their interaction in predicting judgment for tenth grade, as opposed to twelfth grade participants, using logistic regression.

Using the split-file, I assessed the main effects of victim gender and gender stereotypes in relation to judgments for each grade (the female victim condition was the reference group). The overall model was significant among tenth grade participants ($\chi^2 (2) = 6.73, p = .04$; -2 Log Likelihood = 58.47; Nagelkerke R Square = .18; see Table 8 for odds ratios and 95% confidence interval). Individually, victim gender condition contributed significantly to the model ($\chi^2 (1) = 4.02, p = .045$; the $p$-value adjusted for FWE = .09, still below the revised threshold for significance of $p = .10$). Although endorsement of gender stereotypes also had a negative relationship with believing the perpetrator’s behavior was completely okay, this association was not significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.67, p = .10$). The addition of the interaction term was also non-significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 0.78, p = .38$).
Among twelfth graders, while both victim gender and endorsement of gender stereotypes had a negative relationship with judging the perpetrator’s behavior as completely wrong, the model was non-significant ($\chi^2 (2) = 3.07, p = .22$; -2 Log Likelihood = 73.92; Nagelkerke R Square = .07; see Table 8 for odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals). The addition of the interaction term was also non-significant for the twelfth grade group ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.68, p = .10$).

Q2: What was the relation between beliefs about consequences to the victim, domain of reasoning, and the genders of the victim and perpetrator?

Because young women are more likely than young men to report being upset by sexual harassment, in general, but young men are more likely to report being upset by homophobic harassment, in comparison to other forms of harassment, I expected that there may be differences in young people’s expectations about the consequences of the harassment related to the victim’s gender. Furthermore, because both young men and young women are more likely to report being upset by harassment perpetrated by a male, as opposed to a female perpetrator, I expected that participants may be more likely to think that the victim would be upset if they had a male perpetrator.

To test this hypothesis, I conducted a logistic regression examining participants’ beliefs about the consequences of harassment in relation to the victim’s gender, as well as the perpetrator’s gender. The results partially support the hypothesis in that participants with a female victim were more likely to believe that the victim was probably upset by the harassment interaction ($\chi^2 (1) = 6.71, p = .01$; p-value adjusted for FWE = .02). There were no significant differences in expectations about consequences to the victim related to the perpetrator’s gender ($\chi^2 (1) = 0.29, p = .59$; see Table 9 for odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals).
Because moral reasoning involves concerns for others’ welfare, I expected that participants who believed that the victim was probably upset would be more likely to use moral forms of reasoning. Providing support for this hypothesis, a chi-square test revealed that there were significant differences among individuals using different categories of reasoning with respect to whether or not they thought the victim was upset ($\chi^2 (3) = 10.24, p = .02$; $p$-value adjusted for FWE = .03; see Table 10). Only 1 participant who used moral only reasoning did not believe that the victim was probably upset, whereas fewer than half of participants using moral and conventional uncoordinated reasoning believed that the victim was probably upset. Among participants using moral coordinated and predominantly conventional domains, more than half believed the victim was probably upset.

Because of findings from previous research, I expected that participants with a female victim would be more likely to use moral reasoning, while participants with a male victim would be more likely to use conventional reasoning. A chi-square test revealed that this hypothesis was not supported, as there were no significant differences in participants’ reasoning related to the gender of the victim ($\chi^2 (3) = 1.31, p = .73$).

Q3: Were participants’ judgments about the harassment scenario influenced by their beliefs about the intentions of the perpetrator? Did participants’ beliefs about the perpetrator’s intention vary in relation to the victim and perpetrator genders?

With respect to the intention of the perpetrator, given previous research about the mitigating effect of beliefs about the intention of a transgressor on their judgments of the transgression, I expected that participants who believed the perpetrator did not have a negative intention would be less likely to judge the harassment as completely wrong. Contradicting this hypothesis, a chi-square test revealed that there were no significant differences
in judgments of the perpetrator’s behavior related to whether or not participants believed the perpetrator probably had a negative intention \( \chi^2 (1) = 0.59, p = 0.44 \).

Because homophobic harassment most often occurs between male victims and perpetrators, **I expected that participants would be less likely to expect negative intentions in the male victim and perpetrator condition, as opposed to the other conditions.** To determine whether or not participants who heard vignettes about a male victim and a male perpetrator were less likely to believe that the perpetrator had a negative intention than those in the other three conditions, I conducted a logistic regression using dummy codes for participants who were in the male victim and female perpetrator condition, female victim and female perpetrator condition, or the female victim and male perpetrator condition. Participants in the male victim and male perpetrator condition were used as the reference group.

This model was significant \( \chi^2 (3) = 14.98, p = 0.00; -2 \log \text{likelihood} = 118.64, \) Nagelkerke R square = .19). While there was a trending difference between participants in the male victim and male perpetrator condition in comparison to participants in the male victim and female perpetrator condition \( \chi^2 (1) = 3.00, p = 0.09 \) there were no significant differences between participants in the female victim and male perpetrator condition as opposed to the male victim and male perpetrator condition \( \chi^2 (1) = 0.96, p = 0.33 \). Unexpectedly, the odds of believing the perpetrator probably had a negative intention were 3.38 times greater for participants with a female victim and a female perpetrator than those with a male victim and male perpetrator \( \chi^2 (1) = 4.46, p = 0.04; \) see Table 11 for odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals).

**Q4:** Did reasoning vary in relation to participants’ grade?
For the model predicting conventional reasoning, the relation between victim gender and gender stereotypes in predicting acceptance of the victim’s behavior warranted splitting the file by victim gender condition. Furthermore, previous analyses demonstrated a lack of independence between moral reasoning and believing that the victim was probably not upset, which was, in turn, related to the victim’s gender. Therefore, the data file was also split by victim gender for analyses of moral reasoning.

Because previous research suggests that reasoning about gender stereotypes is a form of conventional reasoning, I expected that endorsement of gender stereotypes and conventional reasoning would be related to one another. In addition, because previous research shows that tenth graders are more likely than older adolescents to engage in conventional reasoning, I expected that being in tenth grade would also be related to the use of conventional reasoning. While participants using moral coordinated, uncoordinated, and predominantly conventional reasoning categories all referenced some form of conventional reasoning, they used conventional reasoning in distinct ways. Participants using predominantly conventional reasoning were the only group that either did not reference concerns for harm in their reasoning, or explicitly viewed any potential harm from the interaction as resulting from arbitrary conventions. This makes them the only group whose reasoning indicated that they viewed the wrongness of the interaction as essentially a conventional issue. Therefore, I was primarily interested in understanding the relation between endorsement of gender stereotypes, grade, and the use of predominantly conventional reasoning.

As suggested by Begg & Gray (1984), the findings of regression analyses using an outcome variable with multiple discrete categories as separate dichotomous variables are comparable to polychotomous methods. Thus, to investigate the relation among predictor
variables and predominantly conventional reasoning, I ran logistic regression using predominantly conventional reasoning as a dichotomous outcome variable. Only 17 participants in the female victim condition used conventional reasoning, suggesting that inclusion of all three predictors may lead to an over fit model. In addition, acceptance of the victim was excluded from the model because it was strongly associated with endorsement of gender stereotypes. I included grade and endorsement of gender stereotypes in the model.

For the male victim, the overall model was significant ($\chi^2 (2) = 6.71, p = .04$; -2 log likelihood = 61.21; Nagelkerke R square = .17). Controlling for grade, endorsement of gender stereotypes was not significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.50, p = .12$). After controlling for endorsement of gender stereotypes, the odds of using conventional reasoning were 3.33 times greater for participants in tenth grade, as opposed to twelfth grade ($\chi^2 (1) = 3.81, p = .05$; see Table 11 for odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals). For participants in the female victim condition the overall model was not significant ($\chi^2 (2) = 0.88, p = .65$; -2 log likelihood = 64.05, Nagelkerke R square = .02; see Table 12 for odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals).

**Because research suggests that older adolescents are more likely to use moral and moral coordinated forms of reasoning, I expected to find this pattern in my sample.** To test this hypothesis I conducted chi-square analyses to test the independence of grade and predominantly moral reasoning. I first collapsed moral reasoning and moral coordinated reasoning. Although the expected pattern does appear in a visual review (see Table 13), the chi-square was not significant in either condition (female victim: $\chi^2 (1) = 0.22, p = .64$; male victim: $\chi^2 (1) = 1.76, p = .18$).

Because I hypothesized that the effects of the domain of reasoning and gender stereotypes would vary in relation to the victim gender condition, I split the data file by victim
gender condition for these analyses. There were only 20 participants in the male victim condition who believed that the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong, whereas there were 31 participants in the female condition who thought so. Thus, given the small sample and these disproportionate numbers, both models were likely to be over fit, given the number of predictors necessary to test the impact of reasoning.

Q5: What factors were most predictive of adolescents’ judgments of harassment?

Given previous research, I expected that the use of conventional, as opposed to moral forms of reasoning would lessen the odds of believing the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong. To determine if the domain of reasoning was related to judgments of harassment, I used logistic regression. Moral, moral coordinated, and uncoordinated reasoning were entered as dummy codes, with conventional reasoning used as the reference group in predicting judgments of harassment.

As expected, domain of reasoning contributed significantly to judgments about the perpetrator’s behavior in the male victim condition ($\chi^2 (3) = 8.27, p = .04$; -2 Log Likelihood = 61.98; Nagelkerke R Square = .20). The odds of believing the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong for participants using moral reasoning instead of conventional reasoning were 13.33 times greater ($\chi^2 (1) = 7.15, p = .01$). For participants using moral coordinated reasoning, the odds of believing the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong were 4.67 times greater than those using conventional reasoning ($\chi^2 (1) = 3.89, p = .05$). The increase in odds attributed to using uncoordinated reasoning was not significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.53, p = .11$), however, given the large confidence intervals, this may have been the result of an over fit model.

The model was not significant for participants in the female victim condition ($\chi^2 (3) = 1.60, p = .66$; -2 Log Likelihood = 66.71; Nagelkerke R square = .04; see Table 14 for odds ratios
and 95% confidence intervals). There were no significant differences in the odds of believing the participants’ behavior was completely wrong related to domain of reasoning.

Because research suggests that adolescents’ judgments about harassment are related to both their endorsement of gender stereotypes and the domain of reasoning they use in evaluating it, I expected that both endorsement of gender stereotypes and domain of reasoning would have an impact on judgments of harassment. In addition, I expected that because moral reasoning was likely to share a positive relationship with believing the harassment was completely wrong, while gender stereotypes and conventional reasoning were likely to have a negative relationship with believing the harassment was completely wrong, using moral reasoning, as opposed to conventional reasoning may have a moderating effect on endorsement of gender stereotypes. Because of the small sample size and disproportionate number of participants judging the perpetrator’s behavior as completely wrong, as opposed to expressing ambivalence, I was unable to test if the relationship between gender stereotypes and judgments of the perpetrator’s behavior was moderated by the domain of reasoning participants were using. Instead, I ran a series of logistic regressions to further differentiate the unique contributions of the reasoning variables, and endorsement of gender stereotypes.

Because previous analyses assessing the influence of gender stereotypes in relation to judgment included the entire sample, I first reran this analysis with the split file. As expected, endorsement of gender stereotypes contributed significantly to judgments about the perpetrator’s behavior in the male victim condition ($\chi^2 (1) = 7.22, p = .02$; -2 Log Likelihood = 63.04; Nagelkerke R square = .17). For every unit of endorsement of gender stereotypes, the odds that a participant in the male victim condition would think the perpetrator’s behavior was completely were 0.77 of the original odds (95% C.I. [0.62 , 0.95]). For participants in the female victim
condition, the model was not significant ($\chi^2 (1) = 0.00$, $p = .97$; -2 Log Likelihood = 68.31; Nagelkerke R square = .00).

Next, I examined the unique influences of each form of reasoning with endorsement of gender stereotypes included in the model. Among participants with a male victim, this model was significant, overall ($\chi^2 (4) = 13.00$, $p = .01$; -2 log-likelihood = 57.25; Nagelkerke R square = .30). After controlling for reasoning, endorsement of gender stereotypes still significantly reduced the odds of believing that the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong ($\chi^2 (1) = 4.47$, $p = .03$; $p$-value adjusted for FWE = .09, still significant at the revised threshold for significance of .10; see Table 15 for odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals). After controlling for gender stereotypes, however, while the effects of using moral reasoning ($\chi^2 (1) = 4.88$, $p = .03$; $p$-value adjusted for FWE = .10, still significant at the revised threshold for significance of .10) and moral coordinated reasoning ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.35$, $p = .13$) were smaller than in the model excluding gender stereotypes, the effect for participants using uncoordinated reasoning actually increased ($\chi^2 (1) = 2.51$, $p = .11$). Nonetheless, only the effect of moral reasoning was significant. Among participants with a female victim, the model including gender stereotypes and reasoning variables was also non-significant ($\chi^2 (4) = 1.81$, $p = .77$; -2 Log Likelihood = 66.50; Nagelkerke R square = .05).

**Summary**

In summary, most hypotheses were confirmed, while some were contradicted, and others require further research given the limited sample size for this study. As expected, participants in the male victim condition who also endorsed gender stereotypes were more likely to think the victim’s behavior was not completely okay; neither victim gender nor endorsement of gender stereotypes were significant after accounting for the interaction. The decrease in the odds of
thinking the perpetrator was completely wrong associated with being in the male victim condition was greater among participants in tenth grade, as opposed to twelfth grade. Although the interaction of gender stereotypes and victim gender was not significant in predicting judgments, the differential impact of endorsement of gender stereotypes on judgments of harassment for participants in the male victim condition was apparent when examined with the split-file: while endorsement of gender stereotypes did not influence the odds of believing the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong among participants in the female victim condition, participants with a male victim were significantly less likely to believe the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong with greater endorsement of gender stereotypes.

While victim gender condition appears to have been independent from the domain of reasoning used by participants, beliefs about the consequences of the harassment did have an impact on domain of reasoning: only 1 participant using moral only reasoning believed that the victim was probably not upset. In turn, participants in the male victim condition were more likely to think that the victim was probably not upset. With respect to beliefs about the perpetrator’s intentions, participants in the male victim/ male perpetrator condition were less likely to think that the perpetrator had a negative intention than those in the female victim/ female perpetrator condition. Nonetheless, beliefs about the perpetrator’s intention did not have a direct influence on judgments of the harassment.

Contrary to hypotheses, endorsement of gender stereotypes was not significantly associated with the use of conventional reasoning. As expected, however, the association between grade and conventional reasoning appeared to differ by victim gender condition, as it was significant only among participants with a male victim. Also, unexpectedly, these findings suggest that grade was not directly related to the use of moral forms of reasoning about the
perpetrator’s behavior. The relationship between gender stereotypes, domain of reasoning, and judgment also varied between the two victim gender conditions: the use of moral reasoning, as opposed to conventional reasoning was the strongest predictor of believing that the harassment was completely wrong, while endorsement of gender stereotypes was also significant. On the other hand, in the female victim condition, neither domain of reasoning or gender stereotypes was significant in predicting judgments.
Chapter 5: Discussion

With this study, I sought to bridge two distinct research literatures: the sexual harassment literature, and research on social-cognitive development, to better understand the roles of the victim and perpetrator’s gender, as well as grade (as a proxy for social cognitive development), in influencing young people’s reasoning about an incident of gender harassment. The findings from this study contribute to both of these fields in several ways. With respect to the sexual/gender harassment literature, this study further clarifies the role of gender stereotypes in relation to adolescents’ understandings of homophobic harassment by demonstrating the importance of victim gender and, potentially, grade in moderating this relationship. Similarly, this study adds to the growing body of literature using social-cognitive domain theory to study adolescents’ reasoning about gender and sexuality-related harassment among peers by highlighting the importance of victim and perpetrator gender, gender stereotype endorsement, and how young people construe an incident of homophobic harassment in relation to how they reason about that harassment and whether or not they view it as wrong. Given the complex relationships among these variables and participants’ grade, it seems likely that social-cognitive development may be related to young people’s judgments of this form of harassment. These findings imply that gender harassment interventions may be most effective if they incorporate developmentally appropriate discussion of the consequences of harassment, as well as challenging gender norms and stereotypes.

Implications for Research on Gender Harassment

While research on sexual harassment has suggested a relationship between gender stereotypes and both acceptance and perpetration of harassment, the exact mechanism(s) through which this association is important has not been well investigated. For example, it may be that
individuals who endorse gender stereotypes think that victims ought to be treated in gendered ways or that perpetrators are bound to act in gendered ways. One central premise of this study was that the importance of gender stereotypes to judgments of the acceptance of harassment would be moderated by the victim’s gender, particularly to the extent that the victim was perceived as having engaged in a gender non-normative behavior (a young man telling their same gender friend that they look good). The findings from this study largely confirm this expectation. Furthermore, these findings confirm hypotheses about the centrality of victim gender in relation to gender stereotypes in predicting judgments of homophobic harassment, as well as the contention that this effect may be more pronounced among middle adolescents than later adolescents. In addition, the findings of this study may also shed light on the potential importance of perpetrator gender in relation to the influence of endorsement of gender stereotypes on young people’s understandings of harassment.

Although participants in this sample were accepting of telling a same gender friend that they look good today, regardless of the gender of the person saying it, the victim’s gender did have an impact on beliefs about the acceptability of complementing a friend when considered along with participants’ endorsement of gender stereotypes. Participants who endorsed gender stereotypes in the male victim condition were more likely to think that it was not completely okay for the victim to complement their friend than participants in the female victim condition, who endorsed gender stereotypes. Extending the finding of the AAUW (Hill & Kearl, 2011) that young people view both sexualized (“developed” or “pretty”) women and “boys who are not really masculine” as at greater risk of harassment, this suggests that gender norms may differentially influence adolescents’ acceptance of homophobic harassment depending on the gender of the victim. This finding affirms the AAUW (2011) suggestion that homophobic
harassment is a form of gender harassment, and thus, lends support to my argument that it is
problematic to exclude forms of homophobic harassment from our conceptualizations of sexual
harassment as a form of gender-based discrimination.

The differential impact of victim gender condition evident between the tenth and twelfth
grade groups provides support for the hypothesis that the importance of gender norms in
predicting judgment is related to acceptance of the victim, and further, that this effect may be
moderated by age. The fact that the effect of victim gender was still significant, after controlling
for gender stereotypes, while the effect of gender stereotypes was not significant, is of particular
interest. This suggests that there is some impact of the victim’s gender that is unrelated to
explicit endorsement of gender stereotypes. This may be because of implicit stereotypes, or some
other mediating factor, such as beliefs about consequences to the victim (discussed further,
below). This is in keeping with literature on prejudice, which suggests that stereotypes often
operate implicitly, despite explicit efforts to suppress them, when cued by relevant stimulus
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In other words, it may be that a young man telling a
same gender friend he looks good and/ or being called “gay” by a peer cues knowledge of
stereotypes regardless of participants’ explicit endorsement of them. If this effect is the result of
such implicit bias, this may also have implications for how young people interpret these
interactions in their day- to- day lives.

Nonetheless, it is also worth noting that gender stereotypes were significant in predicting
judgment after the file was split by victim gender condition. This is largely consistent with
previous literature finding a significant association between acceptance of sexual harassment and
endorsement of gender stereotypes (Foulis & McCabe, 1997), as well as an association between
endorsement of masculinity and perpetration of homophobic language (Poteat, et al., 2010). This
consistency is complicated, however, by the apparent role of victim gender. The findings from this study suggest that explicit endorsement of gender stereotypes does play a role in judgments of homophobic harassment but ONLY for a male victim. Taken together, this suggests that young people may be more likely to be ambivalent about homophobic harassment of a male victim regardless of their level of endorsement of gender stereotypes; however, this effect is increased with greater endorsement of gender stereotypes. Again, for female victims, gender stereotypes did not influence acceptance of their behavior or judgments of saying to them: “That’s so gay!” This distinction further supports the gender specificity of the suggestion that this type of language is a performance of masculinity, a performance that is likely of more relevance to young people perceived as male (Pascoe, 2005; Kimmel, 2007), particularly among those for whom gender stereotypes (including masculine norms) are important.

Another possibility, which has not been explored in previous research, is that these stereotypes are related to the perpetrator gender in informing young people’s understandings of a harassment interaction. If so, looking only at the victim’s gender may not be enough to fully understand the importance of gender stereotypes or the ways in which young people’s understandings of harassment may be influenced by their understandings of gender norms. For example, while perpetrator gender does not appear to have an impact on adolescents’ understandings of the consequences of this behavior for the victim, participants with a male perpetrator and victim were less likely to think that the perpetrator had a negative intention than participants in the female victim and perpetrator condition. While believing that the perpetrator did not have a negative intention was not directly related to judgments of the interaction, it is still possible that these beliefs may influence judgments indirectly, in relation to either gender stereotypes or domain of reasoning (discussed in greater detail in the next section).
It is worth noting that the majority of participants did not think that the perpetrator was trying to upset the victim, however, little is known about what may be motivating young people to harass one another if it is not explicit harm or domination. While research suggests that endorsement of gender stereotypes is associated with perpetration of harassment (Fineran & Bennett, 1999), not enough is known about how or why perpetrator’s endorsement of gender stereotypes may lead to perpetration, or how we might conceptualize this relationship without attributing mal intent to the perpetrator. Importantly, the AAUW (2011) found that 44% of young people who perpetrated harassment did so because “it’s just a part of school life.” Considering that the majority of the participants in this study did not believe that the perpetrator had a negative intention, a direct focus on the role of perceived norms around harassment (as well as how understanding of these norms may vary in relation to perpetrator gender and/ or gender stereotype endorsement) may be a productive direction for further study.

Because the relationship between endorsement of gender stereotypes and ambivalence about the perpetrator’s behavior was complicated by the gender of the victim, research investigating young people’s judgments of harassment in relation to gender stereotypes, alone, may not say enough about these complex relationships. Furthermore, because gender stereotypes about men differ from gender stereotypes about women, it seems likely that the role of victim gender will vary depending on the specific form of harassment studied. For example, if homophobic harassment of young men is viewed as more acceptable than homophobic harassment of young women because of the centrality of homophobia to conceptions of masculinity, than sexual objectification of women may be viewed as more acceptable than sexual objectification of men because of gender stereotypes about women’s sexual passivity (Fine, 1988; Fine & McClelland, 2006). Research should investigate how this might be different with
different forms of harassment, particularly for more traditional forms of sexual harassment more often targeted at young women.

**Implications for Research on Social- Cognitive Development**

The findings from this study also make a significant contribution to the field of research on social-cognitive development in four important ways: first, it appears that adolescents’ beliefs about the likely consequences of gender harassment have an impact on their reasoning about it, and these beliefs are influenced by the gender of the victim of harassment. Second, this study further clarifies grade-related differences in the use of both conventional and predominantly moral reasoning. In this section, I will also discuss several possible reasons why I did not find the expected association between conventional reasoning and the use of gender stereotypes. Third, I will discuss the importance of the normative relevance of harassment among peers of different genders with respect to the context wherein these data were collected and participants’ beliefs about the perpetrator’s intentions. Finally, I will discuss the effects of gender stereotypes and moral reasoning in relation to judgments of harassment.

According to social-cognitive domain theory, moral reasoning centers largely around concerns for the welfare of others (Turiel, 1983). Nonetheless, the consequences of harassment appear to vary considerably in relation to the genders of the victim and perpetrator (Walsh, et al., 2007), as well as the type of harassment experienced (Hill & Kearl, 2011). Given this complexity, I believed that there would be some variation in beliefs about the consequences to the victim, which would, in turn, impact the use of moral reasoning. As expected, nearly all participants using moral reasoning believed that the victim was probably upset.

Unexpectedly, more participants using uncoordinated reasoning believed that the victim was probably not upset than believed that the victim probably was upset. This finding has
indirect implications about the relationship between conventional reasoning and believing that
the victim will probably be upset, considering that participants using “moral only” reasoning
were the only group who did not use any conventional reasoning. After collapsing “second-order
moral” (26%) and “conventional reasoning” (7%) categories, nearly 80% of students in the
“predominantly conventional” reasoning category were coordinating some moral concerns with
their conventional focus, while those using “moral coordinated” reasoning were coordinating
conventional concerns with their moral focus. Participants using uncoordinated moral and
conventional reasoning then, were unique in their use of both forms of reasoning without
articulating a connection between the two. Given that the majority of these participants were not
seeing harm as intrinsic to the act, perhaps many participants using uncoordinated reasoning
were unable to make a connection between their moral and conventional concerns because they
did not believe it to be imperative to do so. Future research should continue to investigate the
role of young people’s beliefs about harm to victims of harassment in relation to their use of
uncoordinated reasoning.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that, while the gender of the victim did not directly
influence the domain of reasoning used by participants, the gender of the victim did impact the
likelihood that they would view the behavior as upsetting. As discussed in the literature review,
there may be some rational basis for this belief, given findings about the greater likelihood of
young women reporting that they felt upset by the harassment they experienced (Hand &
Sanchez, 2000; Hill & Kearl, 2011; Walsh, et al., 2007). Nonetheless, it is also true that young
men are more likely to report being upset by homophobic harassment than any other form of
harassment, and young men who report being upset by the harassment they experience are also
likely to report negative psychological consequences (Duffy, et al., 2004). Future research should
investigate what may be guiding young people’s beliefs that young men are less likely to be upset by this harassment, and the potential relationship between this belief, endorsement of gender stereotypes, and the use of conventional reasoning.

In this study, I also sought to clarify the potential relationship between grade, endorsement of gender stereotypes, and the use of conventional reasoning. In their study, Carter and Patterson (1982) suggest that young people’s understandings of gender stereotypes develop along the same trajectory as their understandings of other conventions (namely, silverware etiquette). In interpreting their findings, I suggested that the relation between understandings of silverware etiquette and gender stereotypes as flexible might have been the result of their older participants’ negation of conventions (in eighth grade), rather than a linear developmental trend in greater understanding of flexibility of norms, per se. If this were true, we may have expected that tenth graders would be affirming gender stereotypes at the same time they are likely to be affirming other conventions, leading to greater endorsement of gender stereotypes. While this pattern was clearly not evident in this sample, Carter and Patterson found that reasoning about the flexibility of table etiquette was a better predictor of reasoning about the flexibility of gender stereotypes than age, and vice versa. Therefore, I tested the association between endorsement of gender stereotypes and the use of conventional reasoning, to determine if the same pattern was evident. Contrary to my hypothesis, this association was also non-significant.

There are several plausible explanations for this finding. First, there are clear differences in the measures used to assess both “gender stereotypes” and “conventional reasoning” between this study and the study conducted by Carter and Patterson (1982). First, Carter and Patterson measured adolescents’ knowledge of and flexibility in understanding of gender stereotypes, in comparison to their knowledge of and flexibility in understanding a prototypical conventional
issue (silverware etiquette). Flexibility was measured continuously in terms of young people’s willingness to go against the rule in response to criterion judgments about rule alterability and generalizability (“Would it be okay to (go against the rule) if there were no rule/ in a country where it is considered okay?”). They measured knowledge of and flexibility in understanding of gender stereotypes, while I measured endorsement of gender stereotypes. Similarly, because they were investigating the capacity for conventional reasoning, they also measured conventional reasoning as knowledge of and flexibility in understanding of a prototypically conventional issue, while my code captured the prioritization of conventional reasoning about a multifaceted issue. Because of research findings about the prevalence of harassment, I expected that norms would be permissive of this particular form of harassment, and therefore, young people using conventional reasoning would be affirming this permissive norm. In other words, I believed that my measures would assess the relation between affirmation of gender stereotypes and affirmation of gender regulation (as a prevailing norm).

Because Carter & Patterson (1982) used a continuous measure of “flexibility” in their study, as opposed to measuring the use of conventional reasoning as a discreet category, it may still be possible that endorsement of gender stereotypes is related to greater flexibility in judgments of this scenario, rather than greater odds of using predominantly conventional reasoning, per se. Because conventional reasoning is, fundamentally, a cognitive structure for understanding social rules that are perceived as alterable, rather than intrinsic, like moral rules (Turiel, 1983), it is likely that participants’ negation and/ or affirmation (and consequent prioritization) of conventions may be, at least partially, distinct from their understanding of the alterability (or “flexibility”) of those conventions. If this is true, it seems that the extent to which participants view the acceptability of gender harassment as arbitrary (meaning that they are more
or less willing to alter their judgment in response to norms and rules that are either prohibitive or permissive) may be the more relevant measure of association between endorsement of gender stereotypes and the use of conventional reasoning. While similar, measuring their prioritization of conventional reasoning above moral or personal concerns (meaning that they are focused primarily on the arbitrary or normative nature of the act in their justification as opposed to some other justification) may not fully capture or accurately quantify this central aspect of conventional reasoning, particularly when participants are referencing multiple domains of reasoning in their justifications. Further research should investigate how the association between gender stereotypes and conventional reasoning about gender harassment may vary in relation to one another and grade, when conventional reasoning is measured in terms of degrees of “flexibility” in judgment.

This lack of association may also be explained by two other possibilities: 1) participants in this sample frequently used conventional reasoning in opposition to gender stereotypes (“We try to be really open to different types of people in this community,”) and 2) it seems likely that participants can be influenced by gender norms without necessarily endorsing gender stereotypes, particularly to the extent that their understanding of gender norms influences their beliefs about perpetrator’s intentions.

With respect to the first possibility, again, my assumption was that the affirmation of norms supporting gender harassment and affirmation of gender stereotypes (stereotype endorsement) would be related to each other. While this may or may not have been true in another context, this relationship is likely complicated by the fact that the conventions being affirmed in some contexts are likely not supportive of gender harassment. For example, the sample for this study was drawn from a unique community, from a school with a progressive
anti-bullying policy and several “out” gay teachers. In fact, both teachers (and several students) described the community as an environment wherein homophobic harassment is not accepted, and traditional masculinity and power structures are challenged by focusing pep rallies for athletic events as celebrations of all school clubs, including theater, chess, and others (Teacher, personal communication, June, 2013). Furthermore, a significant portion of the sample volunteered that they believed that there was nothing wrong with being gay as a part of their justification. In addition, because the sample was drawn from psychology classes that focus on sexuality and gender roles as topics in their curricula, the norms in this context may have led to more flexible beliefs about gender. To the extent that norms differ across contexts, then, it seems possible that endorsement of gender stereotypes, and relatedly, acceptance of gender harassment, may be more in keeping with the conventions of some contexts, and not others. In fact, research by Horn and Szalacha (2009) suggests that the norms and policies around acceptance of sexual diversity in a school environment have an impact on acceptance of teasing gay and lesbian peers. In a school without these norms and policies, more young people may have used conventional reasoning to justify greater acceptance of the perpetrator’s behavior.

In keeping with the findings of Horn (2006), I expected participants in twelfth grade would be more likely than participants in tenth grade to use moral reasoning, while participants in tenth grade would be more likely to use predominantly conventional reasoning. The findings from the chi-square test found that grade and the use of predominantly moral reasoning were not significantly related to one another, however, given the small sample size, it seems plausible that the lack of significance is related to the loss of power from splitting the file by victim gender. Regardless, being in tenth grade was significantly associated with conventional reasoning, specifically in the male victim scenario. This is similar to the findings of other researchers using
social cognitive domain theory to study adolescents’ reasoning about harassment (Horn, 2006). Therefore, this study reaffirms Horn’s findings (2006; 2008), suggesting that middle adolescents, in a period of affirmation of conventions (Turiel, 1983), are more likely to use conventional reasoning about gender harassment. Future research should work to clarify the relation between prioritization of conventional as opposed to moral concerns during different developmental periods.

Again, there is consistent evidence that conventional reasoning is used more often to evaluate interactions among peers during middle adolescence (Horn, 2006) and an association between endorsement of gender stereotypes and acceptance of harassment among adolescents (Fineran & Bennett, 1999; Foulis & McCabe, 1997). This study confirms those findings. On the other hand, while Foulis and McCabe (1997) found that their middle adolescents showed higher average endorsement of gender stereotypes and acceptance of harassment than their college and adult samples, the difference among their samples was non-significant. In this sample, there were no grade-related differences in endorsement of gender stereotypes. Furthermore, Pepler and colleagues (2006) findings about a potential developmental peak in the prevalence of harassment have not been clearly replicated with other samples. Therefore, it may be that the association between conventional reasoning among tenth graders and endorsement of gender stereotypes (and perhaps prevalence of harassment) depends upon the conventions of a particular context. Future research should investigate the potential role of context in the developmental trajectory of reasoning about gender stereotypes and the prevalence of harassment.

Furthermore, the finding that conventional reasoning was significantly associated with being in tenth grade in the male victim scenario, but not the female victim scenario suggests that grade is only associated with greater conventional reasoning to the extent that the scenario cues
relevant norms and conventions. Because telling a same gender friend that she looks good is not generally considered non-normative among young women, the norm manipulation likely felt less relevant to young people in the female victim condition. This may also be explained as a potential confluence of gender stereotypes about young women and beliefs about harm to a female victim. In other words, while both endorsement of gender stereotypes about young men and the relative frequency with which homophobic harassment occurs among young men may be in conflict with an understanding that there is harm resulting from the interaction, no such contradiction is presented in the female victim condition. Therefore, the norms cued in the male victim condition, which are more relevant to tenth graders’ judgments, are unlikely to be cued in the female victim condition, regardless of the participant’s grade.

This suggestion is relevant to the second possibility, mentioned above, that participants may be influenced by their understanding of gender norms, irrespective of their approval of those norms. In other words, recognition that “it is more common for boys to do this” may lead to ambivalence that is related to beliefs about the perpetrator’s intentions, or reasoning about issue cognizance, rather than explicit endorsement of gender stereotypes. Issue cognizance is a form of reasoning discussed by Nucci and Turiel (1993), in a study of religious individuals’ views of the acceptability of violations of religious conventions among people from other religious groups. They used this code to describe a form of conventional reasoning wherein their participants suggested that it would be okay for members of other religious groups to go against the norms because they were not aware of the rule. In this study, this form of reasoning was also used in response to criterion judgments, as participants sometimes altered their judgment based on the belief that the perpetrator may not “know any better” if the norms in their environment support the behavior. Thus, it is conceivable that middle adolescents may not be relying more on
endorsement of gender stereotypes, per se, but rather, referencing their knowledge of gender norms as a part of their lived experience (again, “boys do this” as opposed to “boys should do this”). This reading may actually be more in keeping with the framing of Carter & Patterson (1982), discussed above, in terms of the importance of young people’s knowledge of stereotypes, as opposed to their endorsement of stereotypes. Furthermore, it extends both the developmental and contextual findings of Horn (2006; Horn & Szalacha, 2009), by suggesting that while the content of the norms may differ across contexts, the developmental salience of those norms in influencing reasoning is likely to be consistent. Furthermore, even in an environment working against oppressive norms, young people’s reasoning may still be impacted by their knowledge of these norms.

Again, this may also be relevant to the finding that participants were more likely to believe that the female perpetrator with a female victim had a negative intention than a male perpetrator with a male victim. Perhaps, given the infrequent occurrence of this particular form of harassment between cross gender peers, and the overall greater occurrence of this type of harassment between male as opposed to female peers, this distinction is more meaningful to their lived experiences (Petersen & Hyde, 2009). Although I did not find a significant association between beliefs about perpetrator intention and participants’ judgments of harassment, I did not investigate the possibility that this relationship may be mediated by participants’ use of reasoning in justifying their judgment. Because reasoning about issue cognizance was so frequent among participants using moral coordinated reasoning, it seems that young people’s beliefs about the perpetrator’s intentions do have an impact on their reasoning. Considering the finding that the perpetrator’s gender, at least in part, has some impact on beliefs about their intention, this seems like an avenue deserving of further attention. My hypotheses assumed an
association between the prevalence of specific forms of harassment perpetrated toward or by male or female adolescents and young people’s beliefs about intentions, however, I did not thoroughly investigate the connection between the prevalence of specific forms of harassment, norms, and beliefs about intentions. It seems clear from participants’ use of reasoning about issue cognizance that their beliefs about intentions are related to norms, though it is not yet clear how the genders of victim and perpetrator may influence this relationship.

With respect to the importance of endorsement of gender stereotypes and the domain of reasoning used by participants in their judgments of harassment, it seems that these variables were only important in the male victim condition. In the male victim condition, participants using predominantly conventional reasoning were less likely than those using other forms of reasoning to believe that the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong, although these differences were only significant for moral only and moral coordinated reasoning. While I was not able to directly test the potential modifying relationship between the use of moral forms of reasoning and endorsement of gender stereotypes, changes in the effects of the different types of reasoning may provide some information about this potential relationship. Interestingly, controlling for gender stereotypes decreased the odds that a person using moral only or moral coordinated reasoning as opposed to conventional reasoning would think the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong, while increasing the odds for participants using uncoordinated reasoning as opposed to conventional reasoning. This suggests that controlling for endorsement of gender stereotypes better differentiates between participants using uncoordinated reasoning who are ambivalent about the harassment from those who believe it is completely wrong. This may lend support to the hypothesis that the prioritization of moral concerns lessens the impact of gender stereotypes on reasoning. Nonetheless, the large confidence intervals for the moral
coordinated and uncoordinated groups suggest that these odds ratios should be interpreted with caution.

The only significant effects in the full model for the male victim condition included a positive effect for the use of moral only reasoning, and a negative effect for endorsement of gender stereotypes. Again, no predictors were significant in the female model. Considering the negative associations between believing the victim was not upset and moral reasoning, as well as the positive association between believing the victim was not upset and having had a male victim, this finding seems particularly important. It may suggest that adolescents’ gendered beliefs about the consequences of harassment are key to young people’s reasoning about homophobic harassment of young men.

Implications for Gender Harassment Intervention

The findings of this study have clear implications for gender harassment intervention. First, the centrality of moral reasoning in predicting judgments of harassment for participants in the male victim condition suggests that young people who are focused on a male victim’s welfare are likely to be unaccepting of homophobic harassment. If reasoning impacts rates of harassment, this may be a particularly important point of intervention. Coupled with the fact that young people were significantly more likely to believe that a female victim of harassment would be upset by it, it may be necessary for interventions to address gender stereotypes along with perceptions about the consequences of harassment.

Second, the greater likelihood of using conventional reasoning among tenth graders in the male victim condition suggests that interventions targeted at establishing more inclusive norms around gender and sexual diversity may be particularly effective among middle adolescents. While this study does not directly address the potential peak in harassment during middle
adolescence suggested by Pepler and colleagues (2006), it does seem probable that, coupled with more traditional gender norms in an environment, the affirmation of conventions in middle adolescence may explain different prevalence rates.

Finally, if knowledge of norms is understood as the developmental process driving ambivalence toward harassment in a normative scenario (a young man being called gay, as opposed to a young woman), then it may be necessary to move beyond a general focus on endorsement of gender stereotypes. As suggested above, developing an understanding of the norms in a particular context may be of particular importance, given the propensity of young people to be more accepting, simply, of the way things are or appear to be in their environment. Furthermore, however, we found the greatest proportion of participants who believed the perpetrator’s behavior was completely wrong among those using moral coordinated reasoning (75%, prior to being collapsed with participants using reasoning about interpersonal harm in social context). These young people were distinguished from their counterparts by their perception of the perpetrator as not only perpetuating a problematic norm, but being responsible for their own actions, regardless of the prevailing norms. In this respect, helping youth to view themselves and one another as agents capable of changing norms in their environments, as opposed to simply agents destined to perpetuate norms in their environment may be particularly helpful.

Limitations

While providing necessary clarification about the role of victim and perpetrator gender in relation to adolescents’ reasoning about homophobic harassment, this study was limited in several ways. Because of the small sample size, the use of experimental conditions and the strategy of splitting the file by condition left many analyses underpowered. Nonetheless, the fact
that many findings were significant despite the small sample size speaks to the integrity of these effects. Nonetheless, because my hypotheses were based on the integration of findings from research about judgments of harassment in two disparate fields, thoroughly exploring lower level relationships was necessary to inform omnibus model development. For this reason, the findings from preliminary hypothesis tests are better considered in relation to the findings from the full model including all relevant predictors. In addition, because the use of multiple tests exponentially increased the family-wise error rate, I used a revised threshold for significance of $p \leq .10$ for tests using judgment as an outcome variables. This resulted in $p$-values that were above the accepted threshold of .05, and therefore, further research is necessary to validate findings.

This study is also limited in that it is cross-sectional and therefore, cannot make developmental claims. Furthermore, it may be more difficult to draw developmental conclusions about social cognitive development from this study because of its focus on an issue (acceptability of calling a peer “gay”) that is not prototypically conventional, or moral, instead including implications for both domains. Thus, this study did not assess the developing capacity of adolescents to use conventional or moral reasoning, but rather, their prioritization of conventional and/ or moral aspects of a scenario designed to elicit concerns in both domains. While the complexity of this task was meant to help differentiate middle and later adolescents’ capacity to coordinate reasoning across domains, it may also make the findings less comparable to other studies. Furthermore, the use of only one vignette makes it difficult to determine the reliability of the construct of homophobic harassment.

Finally, while the findings from this study are relevant to the study of gender harassment, more broadly, it is essential that other forms of gender harassment, such as unwanted sexual
attention, which occur more often to young women, are studied separately. Given differential experiences with these forms of harassment related to the victim’s gender, it is very unlikely that the same study, conducted with a different form of gender harassment, would yield the same results.

Conclusion

Overall, these findings demonstrate the central importance of the victim’s gender to young people’s perceptions of homophobic harassment. This is particularly true among tenth graders, who, in a period of affirmation of conventions, are more likely to use conventional reasoning when evaluating this type of harassment. Considering the potential variation in gender-related norms across contexts, and the relatively progressive norms of the context wherein these data were collected, it is noteworthy that the tenth graders in this sample were still clearly influenced by the gender of the victim in their vignette. This suggests that norms, implicit bias, or some combination of these factors, plays an important role in reasoning about harassment, independent of explicit endorsement of gender stereotypes.

In addition, among participants in the male victim condition, while endorsement of gender stereotypes reduced the odds of thinking that it was completely wrong to say, “That was so gay!”, the use of moral reasoning increased the odds of thinking it was completely wrong. Considering that all but one participant using moral only reasoning thought the victim would be upset, coupled with the reduced likelihood that young people in this sample thought a male victim would be upset, it seems this may be a particularly important area of focus. To curtail incidences of homophobic harassment, discussion of the negative effects of homophobic harassment to young men may be particularly helpful. More research is needed to understand the potential importance of beliefs about the perpetrator’s intention in relation to perpetrator gender,
the use of conventional forms of reasoning (particularly, reasoning about issue cognizance) and judgments of harassment. Future research should also investigate these questions with young people from other schools and/or demographic regions, which may have different norms around gender and sexual diversity. Finally, further research should investigate the relation between these variables with forms of harassment more commonly experienced by young women. Hopefully, by gaining a more complex understanding of the relationships among these factors in influencing young people’s reasoning about this situation, greater progress can be made in the interest of making schools safer places for all youth.
References


Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 120 F. 3d 1390 (Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1997).


Smetana, J. G., Jambon, M., & Ball, C. (2013). The social domain approach to


Table 1

*Participant Grade and Gender by Vignette Condition*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Grade and Gender</th>
<th>Condition</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female Victim</td>
<td>Male Victim</td>
<td>Female Victim</td>
<td>Male Victim</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>Female Perpetrator</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female Perpetrator</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female Perpetrator</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

*Justification Codes and Definitions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Typical Criterion Response</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncodeable</td>
<td>Participant does not use any domain of reasoning or uses only personal reasoning pertaining to the victim’s prerogative to do or say as they please.</td>
<td>No Pattern</td>
<td>“That’s not what gay means.” “You shouldn’t judge someone.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>References to the perpetrator’s prerogative to do or say as they please.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
<td>“He should be able to say what he wants.” “It’s no one else’s business.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>References to harm, equality, fairness. May also include references to the victim’s right to self-expression, free from harassment. No conventional reasoning.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
<td>“That could really hurt someone’s feelings.” “When you say that you are putting down a whole group of people.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>References to group norms, group functioning, or authoritative structures. No moral reasoning.</td>
<td>Response is likely to change but may not if participant is still focused on the act being wrong because of the norms/ conventions of their own community or family.</td>
<td>“I see this all the time, it’s just everywhere.” “That’s just weird for him to say that.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Typical Criterion Response</td>
<td>Examples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Moral Conventional Coordinated    | Second-Order Moral Reference to harm couched within concerns for group functioning and/or believing that harm will no longer occur in a normative context supporting the perpetrator’s behavior. | Response is likely to change with criterion judgments.                                                          | “The people around him might not take it like a joke, even though it might not involve them at all, they might just take offense to it, but if they were alone and she’s not offended I don’t think it’s wrong.”  
“I guess if that is the norm than no one is going to be offended in this other country so it would be okay for them.” |
| Moral Conventional Coordinated    | References to the normative use of homophobic language as contributing to systems of inequality, which have harmful impacts on groups of people (gay people, or men, for example). | Criterion judgments rarely change, but participant may envision a hypothetical society wherein structural oppression does not exist, in which case the action may not have the negative consequence of perpetuating it. | “When people use gay in a negative way, it makes it seem like there is something wrong with being gay… If they don’t have a rule about it than that would be even worse because probably even more people would say it, and then gay people at the school would feel unsafe.”  
“… if Mike wants to complement his friend, then he should be able to do that without feeling put down, because usually, being called gay is a put down for guys... but if people keep saying stuff like that, it’s going to keep furthering the division between the homosexual and heterosexual groups because they’re not going to feel like they fit and belong in the same place…” |
| Interpersonal Harm in Social Context | References to the normative use of homophobic language as harmful to individual people. | May change with criterion judgments with references to the perpetrator being “not to blame” due to their exposure to these norms. | “People use gay to mean weird so that can hurt a gay person’s feelings.”  
“People tend to go along with how they were raised so I wouldn’t blame her as much, but someone should still explain to her that saying that can really hurt someone’s feelings.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Typical Criterion Response</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>References to harm and conventions with no articulation of a relation between the two. The convention is not viewed explicitly as having an impact on harm.</td>
<td>No pattern.</td>
<td>“It is kind of wrong because someone might be hurt but it is really common for guys to say that to each other so it’s not really a big deal.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“It could hurt someone’s feelings. Even if it is okay there it is still not considered to be acceptable where I grew up.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3

*Collapsed Justification Codes used in Analyses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Code</th>
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<th>Collapsed Code</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Uncodeable</td>
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<td>Missing</td>
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<td>Personal</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
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<td>Moral</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
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<td>Predominantly Conventional</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Order Moral</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Moral Coordination</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral and Conventional Coordination</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Harm in Social Context</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Moral Coordination</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral and Conventional Uncoordinated</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Moral and Conventional Uncoordinated</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 4**

*Proportion Endorsing Construal Variables and Judgment by Condition and Grade*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping Variable</th>
<th>Ambivalent about victim behavior</th>
<th>Perpetrator is trying to upset victim</th>
<th>Victim is not Upset</th>
<th>Perpetrator was completely wrong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (n = 53)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>47.2%*</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (n = 51)</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>51%*</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>60.8%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perpetrator Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (n = 53)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (n = 51)</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grade</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten (n = 48)</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve (n = 56)</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>55.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*χ² significant at p ≤ .05
Table 5

*Mean Scores on Endorsement of Gender Stereotypes by Condition and Grade*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Gender</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>3.24</td>
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<td><strong>Perpetrator Gender</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>12.84</td>
<td>3.23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14.17*</td>
<td>2.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grade</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13.52</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*T-test significant at $p \leq .05$
Table 6

*Proportion Endorsing Reasoning Categories by Condition and Grade*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping Variable</th>
<th>Moral Only</th>
<th>Moral Coordinated</th>
<th>Uncoordinated</th>
<th>Predominantly Conventional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victim Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (n = 53)</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (n = 51)</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perpetrator Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male (n = 53)</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (n = 51)</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grade</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten (n = 48)</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve (n = 56)</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* All values are ns.
Table 7

*Predicting Ambivalence about the Victim’s Acceptability*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Victim</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>[0.07, 2.88]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macho Scale</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>[0.86, 1.51]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Victim x Macho Scale</td>
<td>1.92*</td>
<td>[1.07, 3.42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at p ≤ .05*
Table 8

Predicting Judgment by Gender Stereotypes and Victim Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Ten</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>Twelve</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Victim</td>
<td>0.29*</td>
<td>[0.08, 1.01]</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>[0.15, 1.33]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macho Scale</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>[0.68, 1.05]</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>[0.76, 1.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at p ≤ .05, adjusted for family-wise error p ≤ .10**
Table 9

*Odds of Believing the Victim will be upset by Victim and Perpetrator Gender*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Victim</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td>[0.14, .78]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Perpetrator</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>[5.39, 2.98]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at $p \leq .05$
Table 10

*Proportion Believing Victim was Upset by Domain of Reasoning*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain of Reasoning</th>
<th>Moral Only</th>
<th>Coordinated</th>
<th>Uncoordinated</th>
<th>Predominantly Conventional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim Upset</td>
<td>94% <em>a</em></td>
<td>56% <em>b</em></td>
<td>44% <em>b</em></td>
<td>62% <em>b</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Not Upset</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Values with different subscripts are significantly different at $p \leq .05$
Table 11

*Odds of Believing the Perpetrator had a Negative Intention*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Victim and Male Perpetrator</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>[0.561, 5.571]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Victim and Female Perpetrator</td>
<td>3.34*</td>
<td>[1.06, 10.71]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Victim and Female Perpetrator</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>[0.07, 1.27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at $p \leq .05$
Table 12

*Predicting the use of Predominantly Conventional Reasoning*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Victim Gender</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macho Scale</td>
<td>OR 1.14</td>
<td>[0.96, 1.42]</td>
<td>OR 1.05</td>
<td>[0.87, 1.27]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Grade</td>
<td>3.33*</td>
<td>[0.98, 11.33]</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>[0.51, 5.38]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at p ≤ .05*
Table 13

Use of Predominantly Moral Reasoning by Grade and Victim Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim Gender</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Moral or Moral Coordinated Reasoning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Ten</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twelve</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Ten</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twelve</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All values are ns.
Table 14

*Predicting Judgment by Domain of Reasoning*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain of Reasoning</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>13.33**</td>
<td>[1.71, 103.75]</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>[0.12, 2.75]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Coordinated</td>
<td>4.68*</td>
<td>[0.95, 23.04]</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>[0.11, 3.10]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>[.71, 20.53]</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>[0.33, 6.46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* These tests are preliminary and therefore, p-values are not adjusted for family-wise error.

*Significant at \( p \leq .05 \)

**Significant at \( p \leq .01 \)
Table 15

*Reasoning and Gender Stereotypes in Predicting Judgment for Male Victim*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>9.74*</td>
<td>[1.15, 82.59])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Coordinated</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>[0.67, 18.81]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>[0.69, 23.42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macho Scale</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
<td>[0.63, 0.99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at p ≤ .05, adjusted for family-wise error p ≤ .10*
Katherine E. Romeo

University of Illinois at Chicago
1040 W. Harrison M/C 147
Chicago, IL 60607
Ph: (734) 476-9603, E-mail: kromeo2@uic.edu

Education:
University of Illinois, Chicago, IL (2006-2014)

- PhD Candidate, Educational Psychology: Human Development (2014)
  - Advisor: Dr. Stacey S. Horn
  - Dissertation: “Adolescents’ Reasoning about Gender Harassment: The role of Grade and Victim/Perpetrator Genders.”
  - Certificate in Gender and Women’s Studies


Antioch College, Yellow Springs, OH (2001-2005)

- Bachelor of Arts, Cultural and Interdisciplinary Studies: Education (2005)
  - Senior Project: “Empowering Students through an Identity-based Creative Writing Curriculum.”

Publications:


Presentations:

“Bitch!” How youth make meaning of homophobic and misogynistic language. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research on Adolescence, Austin, TX.


**Grants and Fellowships:**

**Safe SPACES Project**, *Research Fellow* (October 2010- present)
- Amount Paid: $16,000 annual stipend, plus Tuition Waiver
- Four-year fellowship funded through Safe SPACES project. The Safe SPACES project is funded by the Ford Foundation through a grant to Dr. Stacey Horn, Principal Investigator.

**Research Experience:**

**Safe SPACES Project**, *Senior Research Assistant* (October 2010- present)
- Assisted in writing the grant for Ford Initiative for Youth’s Sexuality and Rights.
- Assisted with training and orientation of additional incoming fellows.
- Assisted with the design, implementation, and analysis of data across multiple research studies ranging from qualitative case studies, focus groups, clinical interviews and broad scale quantitative survey (see below).

**Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality (SAFE SPACES)**

- **Vignette Study (Dissertation), Principal Investigator**
  Recruitment of a local high school, student participants at the high school, training of interviewers, and on-site logistics for data collection for an interview study assessing adolescents’ reasoning about an incident of gender/sexuality-related harassment.

- **Youth Survey, Research Assistant**
  Assisted with survey development, data collection, cleaning and analysis of survey data about the prevalence, effects, and acceptance of homophobic and misogynistic harassment among students at one middle school and three high school campuses.

- **Case Study, Research Assistant**
  Assisted with design of case study at the middle school campus. The case study involves document review, observation, and key personnel interviews focused on policies and practices related to misogynistic and homophobic harassment among students.
Sexual Harassment Attitudes, Responses and Experiences (SHARE) Focus Groups, *Research Assistant*
- Assisted with research design, data collection, and analysis of findings from focus groups with adolescents participating in after school programs from the Chicago area. This study investigates participants’ language use, and understandings and acceptance of various forms of gender and sexuality related harassment.

Prevent School Violence Illinois, *Research Assistant* (October 2011- present)
- Assisted with the design of a Bias Based Bullying Survey (BBBS), which was used by schools across Illinois as an addendum to the Illinois Youth Survey. The BBBS asks students about their experiences as bystanders, victims, and perpetrators of specific forms of bias-based bullying.
- Assisted with data analysis and dissemination of findings from the BBBS.
- Provide ongoing support in updating the BBBS to accommodate the needs of schools and provide research for advocacy.

Bias & Stigma, *Research Assistant* (January 2012- present)
- Assisted with coding and reliability for a large collaborative research project with participants across multiple university and college campuses. This study investigates differences in reasoning among religious and LGBT individuals with respect to their views of harassment and exclusion of individuals on the basis of sexual orientation, religion, and race/ethnicity.

Understanding Adolescents’ Construals of Peers’ Sexuality Related Interactions, *Principal Investigator* (June 2009- present)
- Designed a narrative study assessing undergraduate students’ experiences with sexual harassment among peers in high school.
- Recruited and interviewed participants from campus.
- Analyzed interview data through line-by-line coding of content, as well as interpreting discursive themes in narratives.

**Teaching:**
University of Illinois, Chicago, IL:
*Teaching Assistant for Statistical Methods in Behavioral Science* (January 2014- May 2014)
- Taught two discussion sections of an intermediate statistics course for undergraduates
- Graded student work and assisted with students in preparing for homework and exams

*Instructor of Adolescence and the Schools* (June 2011- August 2013)
- Required course for secondary education courses elective for other students focused on adolescent psychology in context
- Updated curriculum to meet TPAC requirements for future teachers
- Taught 9 sections of the course with students from programs across the College of Education and other Colleges on campus
**Teaching Assistant** to Dr. Stacey Horn for Adolescence and the Schools (August 2009-December 2010)

- Provided assistance to Dr. Horn with teaching, grading and planning of assignments

**Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos Puerto Rican High School, Teacher, Chicago, IL (April 2007- June 2008)**

- Developed and taught curriculum for a poetry class at the Family Learning Center (a satellite school) during the final quarter of the 2006-2007 school year
- Developed and taught curriculum for a composition class at the main high school during the 2007-2008 school year

**The Gads Hill Center: Teen Connection, Tutor/Mentor, Chicago, IL (October 2006- June 2007)**

- Developed and taught curriculum for a study skills course for 11th and 12th grade students
- Tutored students individually and in large group settings


- Taught and developed curriculum at The SPOT (a satellite school)
- Assisted students with developmental, emotional and behavioral disabilities at the main high school

**Other Education Related Work Experience**

**University of Illinois Council on Teacher Education, STEAC and Program Coordinators’ Graduate Assistant, Chicago, IL (August 2007 – January 2011)**

- Provided assistance to students seeking certification with general questions, applications, as well as tracking of field hours for certification and tuition waiver requests
- Provided assistance to the Secondary Teacher Education Advisory Council (STEAC), including organization of the Student Teacher Orientation and the Classroom Management Seminar, as well as keeping records of monthly STEAC meetings
- Provided assistance to Coordinators of Programs across the College of Education and kept records of monthly Program Coordinators’ meetings
- Trained and supervised other Graduate Assistants and Student Workers

**CAPTAIN Youth and Family Services, Intern, Clifton Park, NY (May 2005- August 2005)**

- Provided direct care, supervision and tutoring to teen residents at the Youth Home

**Professional Service:**

**Graduate Student Council for the University of Illinois at Chicago, Alternate Representative for the Educational Psychology Department (October 2013- December 2013)**

**Jean Piaget Society Conference 2013, Local Arrangements Committee (October 2012- June 2013)**

- Recruited volunteers for service and provided supervision during the conference
- Provided on-site assistance to presenters and organizers prior to and during the conference

**Community-based Trainings:**
Community and School Partnerships for Sexuality Education: New Directions for Advocacy, Policy and Practice in Chicago, IL (October 8-9, 2009).

Illinois Safe Schools Alliance Summer Institute. Creating Safe Schools for All: A training course on preventing anti-LGBT harassment in schools (June 18-20, 2007).
Appendix A
Interview Protocol #4

NICOLE and MARTA attend the same school and have many mutual friends. They often spend time together in large groups after school or on the weekends. One day, while a group of them are talking in the hallway during passing period, MARTA tells another FEMALE friend that SHE looks good today. When SHE sees this, NICOLE looks at MARTA and says, “That was so gay?”

1. Do you think it was wrong or not wrong that NICOLE said to MARTA, “That was so gay?” (1=not at all wrong, 2= mostly not wrong, 3= mostly wrong, 4= completely wrong)? Why do you think that?

For a judgment of Wrong

a. What if all of NICOLE and MARTA’s friends think that it is okay to call someone gay? Would it be wrong for NICOLE to say that then? Why?
b. What if NICOLE’s parents think that what she said was okay? Would it be wrong then? Why?
c. What if NICOLE and MARTA go to a school where there is no rule about calling someone gay? Would it be wrong for NICOLE to say that then? Why?
d. What if NICOLE and MARTA lived in another country where it is considered okay to call someone gay? Would it be wrong for NICOLE to say that then? Why?

For a judgment of not wrong

e. What if all of NICOLE and MARTA’s friends think that it is wrong to call someone gay? Would it be wrong for NICOLE to say that then? Why?
f. What if NICOLE’s parents think that what she said was wrong? Would it be wrong then? Why?
g. What if NICOLE and MARTA go to a school where there is a rule against calling someone gay? Would it be wrong for NICOLE to say that then?
h. What if NICOLE and MARTA lived in another country where it is considered wrong to call someone gay? Would it be wrong for NICOLE to say that then? Why?

2. In your opinion, is it okay that MARTA told another female friend that she looked good today (1= not okay at all, 2= mostly not okay, 3= mostly okay, 4= completely okay)? Why do you think that?

3. Do you think NICOLE was trying to upset MARTA (1=not at all, 2= probably not, 3= probably, 4= definitely)? Why do you think that?
4. Do you think **MARTA** was upset by what **NICOLE** said (1=not at all, 2= probably not, 3= probably, 4= definitely)? Why do you think that?

5. After talking about it, would you still rate **NICOLE** calling **MARTA** gay as (**REPEAT THEIR ORIGINAL RATING**), or would you like to change your response? Why/why not?
Appendix B

Revised “Macho” Scale

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

1. A love for competing and winning is basically a male trait, even though some women possess it.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree

2. I would be very uncomfortable in a situation where the woman worked and the man stayed home to take care of the house and children.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree

3. No matter what people say, women really like dominant men.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree

4. Most women have little respect for weak men.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree

5. It is important for a man to be strong.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree

6. It is alright for a woman to work, but breadwinning remains primarily a male responsibility.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree

7. A competitive woman is harder to get along with than a competitive man.
   Strongly Disagree   Disagree   Agree   Strongly Agree
8. In general, it is more important for a man to be successful in his career than it is for a woman.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

What is your gender (circle one)? Male          Female          Trans/ Genderqueer

What grade are you in (circle one)? 10          12

What is your ethnicity/ race? ______________________________
Recruitment Script (to be read to students in sociology and psychology classes)

Hello, my name is Katie Romeo, and I'm a Research Assistant working with Dr. Stacey Horn, from the University of Illinois at Chicago. We are working with your school on a project called Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality (SAFE SPACES). This study is funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation's initiative to research issues relevant to young peoples' sexuality and rights.

We are here to invite you to participate in a one-on-one interview regarding your attitudes and beliefs about how young people should treat one another. We are hoping to use what we learn from you during this project to help your school and others to create safer school environments for all students.

Participation in this study includes filling out a short demographic survey and agreeing to be interviewed by a researcher during this class period for around 10-20 minutes. The questions will be about your opinions about some specific interactions that might happen between peers at your school.

You do not have to participate in the interview if you don't want to. If you are interested in participating, you will be interviewed by one of the research assistants associated with the project. Your teachers or peers at the school will not be given your responses to the interview questions. While we will share information with school personnel about what we learn from students, overall, no individual responses will be shared. We would like to use the information we gather to learn about what adolescents your age think about these issues. For those of you who are under 18, we are asking that you provide your parents with consent forms, which contain information about the study, and ask for their permission for you to participate in the interview. If your parents and/or you do not want to participate, you do not need to; however, we are asking that all students under the age of 18 show the consent form to their parents, and return the form with your parents' signature and check mark indicating that they do or do not give you permission to participate. If 80% or more of the students in your class bring back consent forms, we will provide pizza for the class.

If you or your parents have any questions, please contact Dr. Stacey Horn at (312) 413-3679.
University of Illinois at Chicago

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality (SAFE SPACES)

Why am I being asked?
Because I am interested in what people your age think about specific interactions among peers related to gender and sexuality, I am asking you to participate in an interview about these issues. The interview will take place only once for 10-20 minutes, during your regularly scheduled psychology or sociology class in a private room at school. The interviewer will ask about your beliefs about some specific examples of gender and sexuality-related interactions that might occur between peers. In addition, you will be asked to fill out a survey asking a few questions regarding your beliefs about men and women, as well as some demographic information (e.g. race, gender). Your name will not be associated with your answers to our questions and we will do our best to ensure that your responses remain as confidential as possible.

This study, which is titled: Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality (SAFE SPACES), is being conducted by Dr. Stacey Horn, who is a Professor in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Dr. Horn’s office is located at 1040 W. Harrison in Chicago, IL, 60607, and she can be reached at (312) 413-3679, or via e-mail at sshorn@uic.edu. This research is funded through a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Your decision whether or not to agree to participate will not affect your current or future dealings with your school or the University of Illinois at Chicago. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without affecting your relationships with the school or the University. Approximately 96-160 participants may be involved in this research.

What is the purpose of this research?
This research is being conducted in order to better understand what young people think about specific forms of gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment, and which of these interactions are perceived as more or less of a problem. We intend to use this information to help adults at your school and others to better understand gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment and how to create environments that feel safe for young people.

What procedures are involved?
- If you agree to participate, you will participate in one 10-20 minute interview during your regularly scheduled psychology or sociology class.
• Each participant will be asked to fill out a brief survey with information about his or herself during the interview (age, gender, race), as well as their beliefs about men and women, but will NOT be asked to provide his or her name or contact information.
• Researchers will create a unique identifier for each student to use instead of their name to help ensure confidentiality and privacy.
• The interviews will be recorded, but will be kept separately from your signed consent form. We will erase the interview once it has been transcribed so that no one will be able to identify your voice.

**What are the potential risks and discomforts?**
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would experience in everyday life. Because gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment can be upsetting, however, you may be uncomfortable answering questions about what you think about these types of things. However, because you will be interviewed in private and your identity will not be associated with your answers, this discomfort is expected to be low. Interview transcripts will be kept separately from any identifying information in your consent form. Due to the format of this study the risks to confidentiality (revealing information about you to others to whom you have not given permission to see this information) are greatly minimized. A risk of this research is that others will find out that you are taking part in this study; however, being known to participate does not reveal anything about an individual and thus does not pose a meaningful risk to privacy. If you do become upset as a result of participating in the interview, please talk to the counselor or principal at your school or contact me, Stacey Horn, 312 413-3679 or sshorn@uic.edu. Please be assured that any identifiable individual responses will not be shared with your parents, the staff here, or other youth at the school.

**Are there benefits to taking part in the research?**
This study is not designed to benefit you directly, although your school may use information from the interviews to make your school environment feel safer. This study is designed to learn more about gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment among peers in middle and high schools. The study results may also be used to help other people in the future.

**What other options are there?**
You have the option to not participate in the study.

**What about privacy and confidentiality?**

- The people who will know that you are a research subject are members of the research team and the school. Otherwise information about you will only be disclosed to others with your written permission, or if necessary to protect your rights or welfare or if required by law.
- When the results of the research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that would reveal your identity.
- Your identifiable individual responses will not be shared with your parents, the staff here, or other youth at the school.
- The UIC IRB and State of Illinois auditors may review research documents to ensure that the researchers are observing ethical and regulatory guidelines.
**What are the costs for participating in this research?**
There are no costs to you for participating in this research.

**Will I be paid for participating in this research?**
You will not be paid or offered incentives for participation in this research.

**Can I withdraw or be removed from the study?**
If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time.

**Who should I contact if I have questions?**
Contact the researcher, Dr. Stacey Horn at 312 413-3679 or email address: sshorn@uic.edu
- If you have any questions about this study or your part in it,
- If you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research.

**What are my rights as a research subject?**
If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or if you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, including questions, concerns, complaints, or to offer input, you may call the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS) at 312-996-1711 or 1-866-789-6215 (toll-free) or e-mail OPRS at uiicirb@uic.edu.

**Remember:**
You do not have to participate in this research. This is up to you and no one will be upset if you don’t want to participate. Your decision will not affect your current or future relations with the school you attend or the University. Signing your name at the bottom means that you agree to have your responses to the survey included in the research database and used for research purposes. You will be given a copy of this form after you have signed it.

**Signature of Subject or Legally Authorized Representative**
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. I have been given information about who to call if I have questions. *By signing below, I certify that I am at least 18 years of age and able to provide consent for myself.*

____ I agree to allow information from my interview responses to be included in the research database and used for research purposes. I was given an extra copy of this form for my records.

Name of Participant ____________________________ Date ____________________________

______________________________

Signature Age Grade in School

____ I do not agree to allow UIC to use my responses for research purposes.

SAFE SPACES School-Based Youth Interview Consent, Version 3, [2/13/13], Page #3of3
University of Illinois at Chicago
PARENTAL Permission/Consent for Participation in Research
Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality
(SAFE SPACES)

Why am I being asked?
You are being asked to provide permission for your child to participate in a research study about bullying and harassment that is related to gender and/or sexuality. The study involves interviews with students at your child’s school about their views of specific forms of harassment related to gender and sexuality, along with a short survey, which includes demographic questions. They will not be asked to reveal any personal information in these interviews; they will only be asked to share their opinions about hypothetical harassment experiences that are common among adolescents. If your child agrees to participate, the interview & survey will occur only once, during their regularly scheduled psychology or sociology class. Researchers are required to provide a consent form such as this one to tell you about the research, to explain that taking part is voluntary, to describe the risks and benefits of participation, and to help you to make an informed decision. You should feel free to ask the researchers any questions you may have.

This study, which is titled: Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality (SAFE SPACES), is being conducted by Dr. Stacey Horn, who is a Professor in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Dr. Horn’s office is located at 1040 W. Harrison in Chicago, IL, 60607, and she can be reached at (312)413-3679, or via e-mail at sshorn@uic.edu. This research is funded through a grant from the Ford Foundation.

Your child’s participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to agree to have your child participate will not affect your current or future dealings with the organization that your child attends or the University of Illinois at Chicago. If you decide to allow your child to participate, you are free to withdraw her or him at any time without affecting your relationships with Oak Park River Forest High School or the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Why is this research being done?
This research is being conducted in order to better understand what young people think about different types of verbal harassment among peers that is related to gender and sexuality. Youth will be asked to participate in a 10-20 minute interview during their regularly scheduled sociology or psychology class. During the interview, they will be asked what they think about some specific hypothetical interactions among peers. They will also be given a short survey asking about their views of men and women, as well as some demographic questions. Your child
may choose not to participate in this research, or not to answer specific questions. You or they may also decide to discontinue participation at any time.

**What is the purpose of this research?**
This research is being conducted in order to better understand what young people think about specific types of gender and sexuality-related harassment among peers. We will use this information to help other young people and adults working with young people to better understand gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment and how to create environments that feel safe.

**What procedures are involved?**
- Each participating youth will be asked to participate in one 10-20 minute interview during their regularly scheduled psychology or sociology class at school.
- They will be asked what they think about a specific form of gender and sexuality-related harassment that may occur among peers.
- After the interview, they will fill out a short survey about their view of the roles of men and women, as well as demographic information.
- The surveys will be collected and the interviews will be recorded, but will not include your child’s name.

Approximately 96-160 subjects from your child’s school may be involved in this research.

**What are the potential risks and discomforts?**
To the best of our knowledge, the interview and survey have no more risk of harm than they would experience in everyday life. Because gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment can be upsetting, however, your child may be uncomfortable discussing their views about these types of things. Research personnel will have information available to direct the student to available school resources, in case they become upset.

**Are there benefits to taking part in the research?**
This study is not designed to benefit your child directly. This study is designed to learn more about what adolescents think about gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment among peers. The study results may be used to help other people in the future. Also, your child may enjoy having the opportunity to discuss their views and feelings about the appropriateness of different gender and sexuality related interactions.

**What other options are there?**
You have the option to not allow your child to participate in this study.

**What about privacy and confidentiality?**
- All youth who participate at your child’s school will be encouraged to return a parental consent form regardless of whether or not their parents provide consent, so as not to draw attention to those students whose parents provide consent and those who do not.
- Although some staff at your child’s school who help us to arrange the interview time will also know that your son or daughter is participating in this research project, they will not
be present for the interviews, and will not be aware of how your child answers questions in the interview or on the survey.

- After interviews have been transcribed, there will be no way to connect your child to the answers they have provided to us; your child’s responses will remain confidential.

- Other than parental consent forms, no record of participants’ names will be maintained by research personnel and assent will be provided verbally. Transcribed interviews will not contain identifying information and audio recordings will be deleted after transcription.

- Interviews will be conducted in a private room and no staff or other youth will be allowed to observe the interviews.

- Researchers will not discuss participant’ responses with youth, staff or parents and will make efforts towards protecting confidentiality of all participants by coding their identity in documents and reporting results only in aggregate form. The findings from the study will be reported in aggregate and not linked to any individual. The school may be described, but will not be identified in published research, and information linking the interviews or surveys with the school at which the interviews were conducted (for example, consent forms and other documentation about scheduling) will be kept in a locked filing cabinet.

- The UIC IRB and State of Illinois auditors may review research documents to ensure that the researchers are observing ethical and regulatory guidelines.

**What are the costs for participating in this research?**
There are no costs to you for participating in this research.

**Will my child be paid for my participation in this research?**
If 80% or more of the students in your child’s class return consent forms to their teachers (with or without parental consent), your child’s class will be provided with pizza during school hours.

**Can I withdraw or be removed from the study?**
If you decide to allow your child to participate, you are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time. Your child also has the right to leave the study at any time without penalty.

**Who should I contact if I have questions?**
Contact the researcher, Stacey Horn at 312 413-3679 or email address: sshorn@uic.edu
- if you have any questions about this study or your part in it,
- if you have questions, concerns or complaints about the research.

**What are my child’s rights as a research subject?**
If you feel you or your child have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or if you have any questions about your child’s rights as a research subject, including questions, concerns, complaints, or to offer input, you may call the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS) at 312-996-1711 or 1-866-789-6215 (toll-free) or e-mail OPRS at uicirb@uic.edu.
Remember:
Your child's participation in this research is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to allow them to participate will not affect your current or future relations with Oak Park River Forest High School or the University of Illinois at Chicago. If you decide to grant permission for your child to participate, you are free to withdraw them at any time without affecting those relationships.

Signature of Parent or Legally Authorized Representative
Please indicate whether you agree to allow her or his participation in the research below. We ask that you or your child return this form to your child's school, whether or not you agree to allow her or him to participate in the research project.

I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. I have been given information about who to call if I have questions. By signing below, I certify that I am authorized to provide consent for my child to participate in research.

_____ I agree to allow my child to participate in the research. I was given a copy of this form for my records.

Child's Name ____________________________________________

_________________________   _______________________
Parent or Guardian Signature   Date

_________________________
Printed Name

_____ I do not agree to allow my child to participate in the research
University of Illinois at Chicago

ASSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Social Pressures, Attitudes, Culture, and Experiences related to Sexuality
(SAFE SPACES)

1. My name is Stacey Horn and I am a professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago in the Department of Educational Psychology.

2. Because I am interested in what people your age think about specific interactions among peers related to gender and sexuality, I would like to be able to interview you. The interview will take place only once for 10-20 minutes, during your regularly scheduled psychology or sociology class, in a private room at school. I will ask about your beliefs about some specific types of interactions that might occur between peers. In addition, you will be asked to fill out a short survey asking about your views of men and women, as well as a few questions regarding your demographic information (e.g. race, gender). Your name will not be associated with your answers to our questions and we will do our best to ensure that your responses remain as confidential as possible. Your name or any other identifying information will not be included in the database so no one will be able to track your specific answers back to you.

3. To the best of our knowledge, participating in the interview and by agreeing to have your responses to the questions included in the research database will present no more risk of harm than you would experience in everyday life. Because gender and sexuality-related interactions and harassment can be upsetting, however, you may be uncomfortable answering some of the questions. You have the right to choose not to answer questions in the interview or the survey. If you do become upset as a result of participating in the interview, please talk to the counselor or principal at your school or contact me, Stacey Horn, 312 413-3679 or sshorn@uic.edu. Please be assured that your identifiable individual responses will not be shared with your parents, the staff here, or other youth at the school.

4. Your parents have already provided permission for you to participate in this interview however, you do not have to agree to participate. Remember, this is up to you and no one will be upset if you don’t want to participate.

5. If you have questions about this study, you can ask me at any time. If you have a question later that you didn’t think of now, you can call Stacey Horn, at 312-413-3679.

Do you assent to participate in this research?