Privacy Frames: How the Media Write, Discuss, and Afford Privacy

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THESIS
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Social Network Site</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
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SUMMARY

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a conceptual map of the frames of privacy that were made available in American mainstream media during peaks of technological development of the 20th and 21st century. In addition, this project aimed at exploring how media discourse across time rendered the social norms related to privacy. It also investigated whether and how the media reflected upon the shape and role of sociocultural, political, economic and legal contexts with respect to privacy.

To do so, the current project primarily relied upon Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) approach to frame analysis. The initial phase of the current project was of exploratory nature and aimed at identifying the frames of privacy surfacing in media coverage. During this phase, a pilot study was conducted to develop a signature matrix (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) that was used as the coding protocol for the second phase of this project. Later, content analysis and discourse analysis techniques were utilized to answer four research questions. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches also enabled to overcome possible limitations of both methods.

The content analysis sought to quantitatively assess frame implementation across timeframes and media outlets. It was also helpful to explore how the media utilized different rhetorical styles when discussing different dimensions of privacy. The discourse analysis, informed by Fairclough’s (1995, 2000) critical approach, had two main purposes. First, it sought to explore whether and how media narratives rendered the contextual nature of privacy, its relationships with evolving social norms, and its interactions with different societal contexts. Second, it sought to further confirm, challenge, and clarify quantitative results. Findings revealed the emergence of
quantitative and qualitative trends. In fact, both the content and the discourse analysis identified interesting patterns of change and continuity in how the media discussed different aspects of privacy across time. The results of this project clarified crucial questions as to how the media rendered and communicated the shape of privacy through more than a century of technological, sociocultural, political, economic, and legal changes. Based upon the assumptions of frame theory, findings also suggested important considerations as to how the media, across the decades, influenced the public opinion to think about privacy by emphasizing and obscuring certain attributes and aspects of the debate.
I. INTRODUCTION

Social network sites (SNSs) offer opportunities for sharing that challenge our understanding of the privacy of personal information. In response to the increasing popularity of social network platforms in recent years, Mark Zuckerberg\(^1\) suggested that privacy is dead. Admittedly, the spontaneity of self-disclosure observed in social media was unthinkable few years ago. Despite this increased tendency to share personal information online, where the boundaries of one’s audience are often blurry, research reveals that individuals still value privacy as a fundamental component of their lives (e.g. Nippert-Eng, 2010). This apparent paradox between behaviors and expectations, however, does not indicate the dissolution of privacy. Rather, it may be the consequence of an increased confusion, emerging in a time of burgeoning technologies and evolving social norms.

Online as well as offline, privacy management involves an ongoing, routine negotiation in which one weighs the opportunities of sharing against the risks of privacy loss. Yet, as SNSs evolve and afford different opportunities for sharing at variable privacy cost, negotiating boundaries becomes a challenge. Individuals who desire to effectively manage their privacy in complex social environments must monitor technological adjustments and think about how they share carefully. Research shows that online media provide new possibilities for connection, support,

\(^1\) Facebook founder and CEO.
entertainment, convenience, and access to information encouraging one to trade personal data for other benefits (e.g. Ellison, 2007; Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Yet, new tools may also create new possibilities for privacy infringement (e.g. Rule, 2007; Solove, 2001; 2005). These questions are not novel; people continuously make decisions about how they share personal information as they form social relations, groups, and circles. These decisions are connected to greater narratives, personal and collective, about how we perceive privacy, publicity, and sociality. Technological developments frequently prompt rethinking of sharing behaviors, as they invite increased disclosure, frequently at the expense of privacy.

Resulting tendencies and tensions around social norms for sharing and withholding information may emerge in a variety of social planes, including the media. Mainstream media have the potential to create and spread vocabulary, narratives, and frames that people may use to recognize privacy risks when engaging in self-disclosure (boyd, 2008b). The media offer language and interpretive lenses that people may reference in understanding disclosure and privacy online. Moreover, they offer examples of practices that individuals may consider in adjusting their own attitudes or behaviors. This premise, informed by frame analysis (Entman, 1991; Goffman, 1974), is the overarching assumption of this dissertation. Within this context, the present research project investigates how mainstream media have framed privacy across decades of technological development.

The “right to privacy” as intended in contemporary democracies was brought into focus in 1890, when Warren and Brandeis claimed the unacceptable intrusion of photography upon the domestic sphere and suggested that the press had used new
tools to violate “obvious bounds of propriety and of decency” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 195). Their landmark Harvard Law Review article was a reaction to the development of photography that had modified the traditional flow of information, increased the complexity of the communication environment, and made it easier to “render a private event public” (Papacharissi & Gibson, 2011, p. 75), at times challenging one’s psychological integrity (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Needless to say, technology has progressed in ways unforeseen since 1890. Both the telephone and television provided a further connection between the domestic realm and the outside world. Computers facilitated the collection and aggregation of data. The internet and social media improved the ability of computers to gather and spread information (Shapiro, 1998). Each of these changes, as well as the narratives surrounding them, may have contributed to making the boundaries between what is private and what is public more permeable.

Online platforms further facilitate access to publicity and sociality, providing intertwined stages for self-presentation, social connections, and community building (Ellison et al., 2011; Papacharissi, 2011). In online environments, individuals find themselves sharing information with multiple and often interconnected audiences. Online platforms often make it difficult for users to understand what is the context of disclosure, because these networked stages overlap in ways that are not readily visible to individuals (boyd, 2008b). Users decide how to share by weighing the evolving dynamics of networked publics and by adapting their expectations of privacy (boyd, 2011; Nissenbaum, 2010; Papacharissi, 2011; Solove, 2001). Still, the increased
persistence and searchability of data afforded by networked platforms complicates decisions users make about how they share.

The balance between publicity, sociality and privacy is often renegotiated across developing communication environments. To achieve an ideal balance, individuals may also refer to definitions, norms, and practices related to new technologies that emerge in mainstream media narratives. For example, these narratives may suggest strategies to manage one’s image when engaging in multiple and overlapping social spheres online. In such a context, this dissertation explores how the portrayal of privacy has evolved in mainstream media discourse, leading into dominant narratives about privacy, publicity, and sociality that characterize different phases of technological development of the 20th and 21st centuries. This study is important and timely for a number of reasons that will be addressed in the following few paragraphs.

First, a historical investigation of media portrayal of privacy in relation to technology can help one to understand and map the boundaries of a traditionally complex and layered concept. A study of mainstream media discourse implemented during the golden ages of telephone, photography, television, computers, internet, and social media may provide fundamental elements to describe how privacy has been collectively rendered. In addition, a longitudinal comparison of how mainstream media presented privacy over time may reveal how the contours of privacy evolved and thereby provide a context to understand how current frames of privacy emerged.

Second, even though scholars have been very active exploring the evolution of privacy, they have not yet addressed the role of mainstream media in contributing to (and/or reflecting) such an evolution. Most current research has focused on users’
concerns (e.g. Baruh, 2007; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Solove, 2007) tackling the role of trust (boyd, 2008; Dwyer et al., 2007; Schmidt, 2011; Turow, 2003; Turow & Hennessy, 2007) and of social capital (e.g. Ellison et al., 2007; Ellison et al., 2011) in information sharing. Some have investigated security and legal issues often pointing out the lack of adequate legislations and the need for legal intervention (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2008; Nissenbaum, 2010; Regan, 1995; Solove, 2001, 2005). Others have explored the increasing commercial exploitation of personal data online (Fuchs, 2011; Odlyzco, 2003; 2007). The attention of academic researchers towards privacy suggests that privacy is an important yet complex concept. Research has shown that the boundaries of privacy have become increasingly blurry in online platforms. By investigating mainstream media narratives of privacy, this dissertation addresses questions not yet answered. These questions revolve around the role of mainstream media in developing and discussing frames, definitions, norms, and practices of privacy in new technological environments that are often ambiguous about how they afford privacy. Addressing these questions is particularly important because media narratives frequently inform individuals' understanding of privacy (boyd, 2008b).

Third, in modern democracies, privacy is a fundamental value (Warren & Brandeis, 1890) that enhances individual autonomy, freedom of choice, and social interaction (Westin, 1967). One’s sense of what is private and what is public continuously evolves and adapts, as privacy is contextually sensitive (Nissenbaum, 2010). Mainstream media may provide vocabulary and narratives to contextualize and frame one’s understanding of the world (Entman, 1991; 1993). They do so by offering ideas, models, conceptual maps, and terms that one may use when discussing privacy.
(boyd, 2008b) or when “doing privacy work” (Nippert-Eng, 2010). They may also influence the understanding of what constitutes appropriate disclosure in different circumstances, perhaps addressing the users’ confusion that emerges when new technologies obfuscate the boundaries between contexts. Thus, a longitudinal study of how mainstream media have framed privacy across time may reveal how the evolving shape of such a fundamental value has been collectively communicated and constructed.

Fourth, an investigation of media frames of privacy may also reveal the underlying political economy of dominant interests related to information disclosure. Many online corporations emphasize the opportunities of connection and the benefits of sharing over the risks of privacy loss (Fuchs, 2012). With these practices, private corporations may try to shift one’s attention away from their routines of data collection, aggregation, and use for the purposes of targeted advertising, consumers profiling, and price discrimination (Fuchs, 2011; Odlyzco, 2003; 2007). Arguing, “privacy is dead,” Mark Zuckerberg, Eric Schmitt2, and other chief executives have suggested that it is not necessary to protect one’s data anymore because “you have zero privacy anyway” (McNealy3 as cited in Sprenger, 1999). Yet, some have interpreted such a claim as an attempt to protect profitable practices (such as targeted advertising) turning information into income. Unfortunately, information commodification and discriminatory practices may encourage users to self-censure their online disclosure. Thus, they may become a challenge for participatory democracy. Rendering these practices more or less

2 Google CEO.
3 Sun Microsystem former CEO.
transparent, mainstream media may clarify or obfuscate the political economy of
information.

Finally, research has pointed out a gap between attitudes toward privacy and
actual behaviors (e.g. Acquisti & Gross, 2006). When asked, individuals tend to value
privacy as an important component of their lives and to advocate its protection. When
functioning in everyday life though, most behave in ways that make it easy for third
parties to collect information (Nissenbaum, 2010). Barnes (2006) described this collision
between expectations of privacy and tendency to disclose as a modern “privacy
paradox.” Such a paradox may result from the lack of clarity around the public nature of
the internet as well as the obscure privacy policies of online platforms (Fuchs, 2012),
rather than a decreased interest in the management and protection of one’s personal
information (Bilton, 2010; boyd & Hargittai, 2010). Media narratives may have promoted
this paradox by emphasizing the gap between privacy expectations and actual
disclosure. Alternatively, they may have contradicted it suggesting coherence between
behaviors and expectations.

Privacy has a transdisciplinary nature, yet the scope of this dissertation makes it
first and foremost a matter of communication as it concentrates on how privacy has
been communicated via dominant narratives. In particular, this research explores media
discourse starting from the assumption that mainstream media may reach large
audiences and thus have the potential to influence how people understand the contours
of privacy (boyd, 2008b). Even though this dissertation does not directly measure
changes in individuals’ attitudes and behaviors towards privacy (that have emerged in
current research e.g. Debatin et al. 2009; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Hough, 2009;
Nissenbaum, 2010), its assumptions are informed by previous scholarship suggesting that individual perceptions of privacy are frequently informed by dominant privacy narratives presented in mainstream media (boyd, 2008b).

From the standpoint of communication, this dissertation investigates how media discourse reflected the evolution of social norms related to information sharing in complex and developing communication environments. Technological development has often encouraged a renegotiation of social norms and practices. It has also challenged one’s ability to control the flow of personal information and to adjust previously assumed norms of appropriateness and norms of flow of distribution (Nissenbaum, 1998; 2004; 2010). Mainstream media may provide individuals with perspectives in perceiving, interpreting and understanding the world and, thereby, foster a dialogue that creates a cultural community and transmits its values, norms and beliefs (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976). Such a role becomes particularly helpful when new communication technologies emerge.

Moreover, this research project focuses on communicative practices to investigate whether and how mainstream media discussed the role of technological literacy in one’s management of personal information. The evolution of communication devices challenged users who must remain digital literate to understand the changing possibilities of information flow (Bilton, 2010; Kowitz & Cranor, 2005). Nowadays, one frequently shares private information to access SNSs and other online resources, yet the terms of such an exchange are often vague. As boyd (2008b) suggested, mainstream media may contribute to keeping people informed and facilitate one’s understanding of the risks related to evolving technologies. Thus, they may foster the
development of one's technological knowledge and privacy literacy. Based on this idea, the current research project investigates how mainstream media frame the relationship between privacy, literacy, and technological development, and what vocabularies they offer users for reconciling resulting tensions.

Furthermore, this research is relevant to the field of communication as it investigates whether and how media narratives reproduce and potentially reinforce particular political and economic interests related to the flow of personal information. Communication scholars have analyzed media framing to understand the influence of political administrations and major corporations in media narratives (e.g. Entman, 1993). Available media frames may help one to understand how and why privacy infringements happen, and what may be the role of power, politics, and economy in information sharing. For example, the media may discuss existing inequalities between individuals’ benefits of disclosure and corporate’s benefits of collection, aggregation, and sale (that emerged in Solove, 2001; 2005; Fuchs, 2012). Private corporations suggest that privacy is dead. Mainstream media may discuss such a claim, promoting or contradicting its legitimacy. They may thereby preserve the diffusion of independent, relevant information challenging dynamics of power (Musa, 1996).

Finally, privacy is not perceived in a vacuum. Media rhetoric may contribute to focusing on how individuals understand and discuss privacy (e.g. boyd, 2008b). The study of media frames, however, has not achieved a general consensus as to how frames emerge and what may be their connection to one’s thinking. Even though the study of frames is omnipresent across social sciences and humanities, it is particularly relevant within the field of communication. Having a wide breadth and a
transdisciplinary potential, communication may contribute to the development of frame theory by “synthesizing a key concept’s disparate uses, showing how they invariably involve communication, and constructing a coherent theory from them” (Entman, 1993, p. 151). In particular, this dissertation aims at contributing to the development of frame theory by trying to synthesize how privacy has been communicatively rendered in media discourse over time.

The understanding of privacy has certainly changed from a time when the publication of private pictures generated vast privacy concerns (Warren & Brandeis, 1890) to a time when many are willing to share their daily activities on SNSs. Privacy may not be dead, yet the current technological development may mark a new turning point in how one perceives the intersections of private and public realms. Media discourse fundamentally informs how privacy is collectively perceived, defined, and internalized across decades of technological evolution. Addressing such a mediated discourse, the current project adds to a tradition of research that has explored the relation between privacy and technology. The findings will be interpreted to suggest what role dominant narratives play in providing the context against which our collective interpretations of privacy are shaped.

In the next chapter, I will draw upon existing literature to outline how the concept of privacy developed, what are intervening factors in its evolution, and what have been the major concerns of research addressing privacy offline and online. In chapter two, informed by the literature, I also propose the four research questions guiding this dissertation. In chapter three, I detail the methods implemented to address the research questions. I begin by describing the rationale for the selection of sample, timeframes,
and media outlets; then, I explain the features of the pilot study, the content analysis, and the discourse analysis developed to answer the four research questions identified. Next, I delve into the actual data collection and analysis. In particular, chapter four details the content analysis and investigates the frames surfacing in media coverage of privacy during different timeframes. Chapter five reports on the discourse analysis developed to explore how media narratives discuss sociocultural, political, economic and legal contexts in respect to privacy. Chapter six details the discourse analysis conducted to explore how media discourse elaborates on the continuity or evolution of relevant social norms of privacy. Finally, chapter seven outlines, discusses, and integrates the results emerging from the current research, also comparing and contrasting quantitative and qualitative findings. Chapter seven concludes by addressing the limitation of the current project and suggesting directions for future research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Privacy, in modern Western societies, is expressed as a multifaceted construct. Its boundaries are fluid and constantly renegotiated within complex and evolving communication environments. In the late 19th century, most would consider the publication of photos shot at a private party as an unacceptable intrusion of the privacy of the domestic environment (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Now, publishing and tagging pictures that portray private events has become a widespread phenomenon. Online platforms provide new spaces for self-presentation encouraging disclosure and inviting individuals to trade personal information in exchange for connections, social support, access to information, and other benefits. Changes in the understanding of privacy may reflect, more or less meaningfully, transformations of the communication environment due to the introduction of technologies that provide new social affordances.

In this chapter, I discuss how research has explored the intervening variables that may have contributed to modifying the understanding of privacy across decades of technological evolution. In particular, this dissertation is informed by Nissenbaum's (2004; 2010) framework of contextual integrity, which specifies that appropriate flows of information are inherently contextual. Nissenbaum’s framework is particularly helpful in addressing privacy in relation to emerging technologies. As new media are introduced, the contexts of sharing are renegotiated due to the adapted ability to aggregate and spread information for purposes that differ from those of disclosure. As a consequence, social norms may adjust to the possibilities presented by new technologies (Nissenbaum, 2010). Understanding privacy through the lens of contextual integrity may be particularly useful in the context of information technologies. In fact, in computerized
societies, digital information is easily collected and processed for unexpected purposes – such migration typically violates the contextual expectations of flow.

To gauge how new tools may have encouraged a redefinition of one’s understanding of privacy, in a later section, I explore the affordances of different technologies introduced during the 20th and the 21st centuries. In doing so, I pay particular attention to how new media have enhanced the possibilities for context migration thereby challenging one’s ability to control the flow of personal information. For example, SNSs created converged platforms for sociality and self-presentation but have also disoriented those users who did not have the knowledge necessary to take informed decisions when engaging in public (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Christofides et. al, 2009; Livingstone, 2008). The understanding of the relationship between new tools and their effects on privacy has not developed in a vacuum. Rather, media narratives of privacy may have influenced it by providing conceptual maps that disentangled its complexity. Starting from this assumption, the present research explores how mainstream media have presented the implications of new technologies in relation to privacy.

In addition, technological (r)evolutions and media portrayals of them always emerge within overarching sociocultural, political, economic, and legal contexts. Thus, this chapter explores how research has discussed the relationship between evolving understandings of privacy on the one hand, and sociocultural, political, economic, and legal environments on the other hand. The historical overview of these factors will provide a context to discuss how the understanding of privacy has changed across time.
in relation to an evolving society. These changes may also emerge from the dominant media narratives developed in different timeframes.

Frame analysis is the overarching framework for this research. Thus, in this chapter I also review existing research on frame theory to suggest how media frames may emerge and spread, and explain how mainstream media may contribute to creating and transmitting values. In sum, the goal of this chapter is to map how the understanding of privacy has evolved in the past, which elements have historically contributed to its variation, which role sociocultural contexts, technology affordances and individual literacy have played, and what direction the research on privacy in the digital environment has explored so far.

A. **A Modern Definition of Privacy**

Privacy is a layered concept. Among scholars who have suggested a definition of privacy in modern Western societies, many have focused on its relationship to information disclosure. Altman (1977) defined privacy as the selective control of access to one’s personal information arguing, “privacy is a boundary control process whereby people sometimes make themselves open and accessible to others and sometimes close themselves off from others” (p. 67). He emphasized the dialectic nature of privacy and the idea that “ideal privacy” is a contextually sensitive value that changes across social situations and depends on desired levels of interaction. Similarly, Petronio (2002) referred to the concept of boundaries permeability to argue that individuals constantly renegotiate the separating line between private and public domains. Changes in one’s accessibility to others are related to levels of intimacy or to contextual expectations (Nippert-Eng, 2011). When defined as the limited access to personal information or the
power to control such an access, privacy is a threefold construct. It includes secrecy, the access to one’s information; anonymity, the knowledge of one’s identity; and solitude, the access to one’s physical proximity (Gavinson, 1980).

Privacy, intended as the control of access to personal information, is necessary to maintain the variety of social relationships (Rachels, 1975). New technologies, however, might challenge one’s ability to control personal data. They may also enhance the possibilities for new forms of surveillance that may influence the behavior of those observed (Solove, 2001). To capture the potential of increased visibility in the internet era and illustrate its possible consequences, many used the metaphor of the Panopticon (e.g. Foucault, 1995; King, 2001). The Panopticon is a ring-shaped building with an inspection tower in the middle, designed to give the prisoners the sense of being under continuous surveillance (Bentham, 1995). Perceived constant visibility could foster self-monitoring within the inmates.

Scholars emphasize that modern technologies afford the potential to recreate a Panopticon and may have normative consequences on one’s behavior (Gandy, 1993). Individuals, in fact, might act differently if they fear information leakages. Thus, the perceived risk of privacy infringement may modify communication about particular topics and have inhibitory effects (Solove, 2006). Discussing the risks of privacy loss, scholars emphasize that surveillance and social control may limit self-expression, creativity, and self-development; they may also impact freedom of choice by encouraging self-determination (Kachhi et al., 2009; Solove, 2005).

Another facet of privacy encompasses the ownership of information. This has become more problematic with the diffusion of new information technologies that have
provided individuals, corporations, and government with the increased potential to use information about others. A debate about ownership might look for the definition of ethical use of information that is influenced, for example, by privacy policies or by expected use of personal data (Loch et al. 1993). Mainstream media might contribute to spreading cultural norms related to self-disclosure. They have the potential to foster a public debate that tackles company rights and individual rights and helps to identify the boundaries of ethical use of information.

Privacy, in brief, deals with instrumental (e.g. ownership) and intrinsic values (e.g. freedom, human dignity) and is a blurring, complex concept (Fried, 1990). It may be challenging to draw a line that separates private and public realms because privacy is a moving target sensitive to sociocultural, political, economic, and legal contexts. In addition, the concept of privacy encompasses the following dimensions: spatial, when it refers to one’s space or private property; informational when it includes one’s writing and thinking; right when it raises matters of values or regulations; psychological when it involves people’s needs and desires in respect to the protection of their data; and boundary management when it takes into account how individuals deal with intrusions (Zwarun & Yao, 2007).

To address privacy concerns and information flow in the era of social media, Nissembaum (2010) suggested using the framework of contextual integrity. Contextual integrity is based on the assumption that information revealed in a specific context depends on roles, relations, and norms peculiar to the context of delivery. Privacy, viewed through the lens of contextual integrity, is challenged when information intended for a social sphere migrates to different contexts thus encountering unexpected
audiences (Binder et al., 2009; Joinson et al., 2011). Developing such a theoretical framework, Nissembaum (2010) highlighted that the traditional distinction between public and private has become a false dichotomy. Contextual integrity might provide a fundamental heuristic that one can use to understand privacy in relation to those new media that may generate a blurring of contextual boundaries (Andrejevic, 2011).

A definition of privacy that considers its layered complexity is important for a number of practical reasons. First, a descriptive understanding of the concept enables one to recognize losses of privacy. Second, a normative consideration of privacy allows identifying instances of infringement as undesirable thereby justifying the need for protection. Third, the legal delineation of its boundaries facilitates the detection of actionable violations (Gavison, 1980). Defining privacy is also necessary to understand the parameters of a very important value and recognize how the evolution of social constructs, technologies, and legislations may have influenced its shape. Media discourse may encourage a public debate that contributes to defining the shape of privacy influencing the rhetoric available to individuals who discuss it (boyd, 2008b).

Privacy, first and foremost, is central to modern democracies that consider it a fundamental human right (Westin, 1967). It is unclear, however, how privacy is evolving in the era of increased visibility due to modern technologies. Media discourse may have contributed to spreading an understanding of such a stratified concept during peaks of technological development. Also, it may have fostered public discussion and provided people with frames of reference to dissect the complexity of privacy. Finally, media frames may have educated publics or obfuscated privacy risks, thus influencing how people evaluate privacy costs and disclose information online.
In the next section, I will map some fundamental steps in the evolution of communication technology and suggest how these may have contributed to modeling expectations and understandings of privacy. New tools may have encouraged one to constantly reconsider the placement and permeability of the boundaries between private and public realms (Shapiro, 1998). The features of each step may have encouraged somewhat different perspectives on the distinction between private and public. These might also emerge from the longitudinal analysis of media discourse as implemented in this dissertation.

B. “New” Technologies and Privacy

Communication technologies in Western societies have provided variable contexts for the exchange of social meanings, to the point that some have considered them “vehicles for navigating social territories” (Marvin, 1988, p. 8). New tools have often allowed new practices, dispositions, and capacities, refining the self who used them (Foucault, 1988; Sterne, 2003). This may pertain to the internet and social media, which are relatively new technologies now, but it also may have applied to other media during their golden ages. When investigating the role of technological changes in society it may be helpful to remember that, “new technologies is a historically relative term” (Marvin, 1988, p. 3) and that, “technology and privacy have a long history of interaction” (Shapiro, 1998, p. 275). Adopting a longitudinal perspective to understand the intermingling of privacy and technology provides a context that has the depth and breadth necessary to better understand privacy in today’s society.

Technological development has often encouraged the reassessment of previously private boundaries repositioning the line that separates the domestic sphere
from the outside world (Eisenstein, 1983; Fang, 1997; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Shapiro (1998) used the concepts of place and space to draw a distinction between physical locations (progressively intended as places) and conceptual or virtual ones (increasingly thought of as spaces). Shapiro (1998) suggested that the need for such a distinction emerged as a consequence of technical developments that gradually allowed multiple and intersecting connections between interactive spaces of publicity (as a telephone connection or a chat room) and private places (as one’s home). Emerging communication technologies, thus, may have set the stage for new social norms that surfaced to manage the overlapping of previously separated contexts.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, communication technology advanced enormously with the application of electricity to communication media (Marvin, 1985). The development of photography and the introduction of lithographic print allowed the spread of yellow journalism and institutionalized gossip, perhaps challenging existing boundaries between private and public contexts (Shapiro, 1998). In 1880, newspapers published the first photos using halftones, in 1891 the large press was able to print and fold 90,000 four-page papers an hour (Fang, 1997). Between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the spread of paparazzi and investigative journalism challenged the barriers of the sacred domestic realm. New technologies progressively enabled people to gain access to previously private settings, thus inspiring Warren and Brandeis (1890) to write their landmark article that advocated the need for privacy.

During these decades, the telephone also afforded new connections between the house and the outside world. The telephone enabled one to easily cross previously
private boundaries but also to privatize actions that beforehand required some publicity (such as calling the doctor instead of being seen walking into her office) (Shapiro, 1998). Mainstream media discourse implemented during these decades helped the public to further contextualize emerging technologies suggesting practices, dispositions, and capacities of new media in relation to privacy.

In 1939, the introduction of regular electronic television broadcasts set the stage for the golden age of television in the United States (Fang, 1997). The first Network TV was founded in 1949, and by 1951 1.5 million television sets had been sold. Television reached a quasi-complete share of the US population by the end of the 1950s (Fang, 1997). Television projected spheres of sociality within domestic boundaries. It thereby enabled individuals to access others in unprecedented fashions. The features of this medium, perhaps, encouraged one to reshape the sense of space and place and to develop an understanding of where and with whom one is when watching television (Meyrowitz, 1985). In this phase, culminating in the 1960s, media discourse might have contributed to drawing the features and the potentials of television, perhaps encouraging specific practices and suggesting the relationship between television, privacy, and social meanings.

Communication technologies kept developing, further contributing to shifting the boundaries between private and public. Mainframe computers originated in 1946 (Solove, 2001) and started selling in 1951 (Fang, 1997) preparing the premises for a fundamental revolution in the ability to collect and aggregate data. The first microcomputer developed in France in 1973 and arrived in the home market in the United States in 1975. The laptop emerged in 1981, and in 1983 Times magazine
awarded the computer as “man of the year” (Fang, 1997). Since the early days of mainframe computers, many voiced their concerns that such a technology “may become the heart of a surveillance system that will turn society into a transparent world in which our homes, our finances, and our associations will be bared to a wide range of observers” (Miller, 1969, p. 1092). Needless to say, the increased potential for surveillance afforded by computers fostered the emergence of new privacy concerns.

The development of information technologies facilitated the spread of databases and credit cards in the 1970s and in the 1980s. Combining the use of databases and credit information, companies could easily sort potential customers into categories for direct marketing (Solove, 2001). As regulations needed time to evolve in order to protect privacy in new technological environments, corporations were allowed to collect, aggregate, use, and sell personal data about their clients. In this way, companies started to monetize personal information turning it into a modern commodity. These practices contributed to further blurring the boundaries between public and private realms. In particular, information technologies magnified the threats to privacy inherent to handling information and facilitated the de-contextualization of personal data (Nissenbaum, 2010). New practices and renegotiated social norms may have also emerged from the analysis of media discourses implemented during the golden age of computers.

Later on, the internet further contributed to facilitating the collection and use of information for personal needs, as well as for marketing purposes. The Advanced Research Project Agency implemented ARPANET, the predecessor of the internet, between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. ARPANET was a
network aimed at facilitating communication for purposes of national defense (Zakon, 2002). Partly based on the infrastructures created for ARPANET, the internet became available to the public in the early 1990s allowing businesses, media, communities, and individuals to access information and connect in unprecedented ways. The internet, in Miller’s (1995) words, became an “information superhighway” that empowered its users by shortening the path to information and, at times, by facilitating the access to private data. The cyberspace magnified the affordances of existing technologies to collect, aggregate, and share information creating new opportunities as well as new privacy risks (Nissenbaum, 2010). It also increasingly allowed the separation between physical places and social spaces (already afforded by previous technologies), perhaps accelerating a new shift in the placement and permeability of private and public boundaries.

The internet provided an infrastructure within which social media could spread. The social web, introduced in 1997 with the SNS SixDegrees, became gradually popular with Friendster in 2002, MySpace in 2003, Facebook in 2005, and Twitter in 2006 (boyd & Ellison, 2007). SNSs emerged within a context that afforded persistence, replicability, scalability, and searchability of information (boyd, 2011), and increasingly encouraged its shareability (Papacharissi & Gibson, 2011). In particular, the internet afforded persistence as it created durable records of events and thereby transformed how one accessed and managed information about others. It allowed replicability as it simplified the creation of identical copies of existing information and the alteration thereof, thus challenging one’s ability to control personal data. It facilitated scalability as it substantially increased the potential for (more or less desirable) visibility (boyd, 2007;
Christofides et. al, 2009; Senft, 2008; Solove, 2007; Zhao et al., 2008). Finally, the internet increased the searchability of data as it allowed users to easily search and access information about others, in ways that may also infringe one’s expectations of flow (boyd, 2011). Within this context, the architecture of SNSs increased the shareability of information, as it encouraged users to share rather than withhold data about the self (Papacharissi & Gibson, 2011). These five structural affordances, which may have emerged in media discourse of privacy as well, intensified the exposure of information and the potential for privacy infringements (boyd, 2008; 2011).

Shaping converged mediated environments, SNSs created new stages for publicity and sociality where users could easily activate and maintain ties, access information and social support, and publicize their social networks. The social web afforded new opportunities for its users, but it also provided public agencies and private businesses with the increased potential to mine, aggregate, and spread information (Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Due to the lack of transparency of online privacy policies and to the architectural affordances of online platforms, users often faced uncertainty when trying to understand and control the flow of personal information online (Baruh, 2007; Fuchs, 2012; Hough, 2009; Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2008; Turow, 2003). Reflecting on the potential benefits and costs of online self-disclosure, the media may have crafted preferential narratives to discuss the meanings of social media. Thus, the media may have provided individuals with frames of reference to understand the increased complexity of the communication environments and the new privacy risks of online presence.
Privacy relates, first and foremost, to the management of information flow and the ability to understand contextual norms of disclosure (Nissenbaum, 2010). Social media, as well as other emerging technologies, have often reshaped the architectures of the communication environment causing confusion, challenging social rituals, and failing to meet one’s expectations of flow (Lardinois, 2010). The digital domain, for example, blurred contextual boundaries and encouraged a renegotiation of social norms of disclosure, often turning privacy into an elite privilege. It increasingly confused the intersection of privacy and public exposure creating new private spheres whose boundaries blurred within larger public domains. Each step of technological evolution presented in this chapter may have influenced the understanding of the contours of privacy and entailed new strategies to measure costs and benefits of using new communication devices. As these technologies emerged, mainstream media may have highlighted their affordances in respect to information. Media narratives may have provided individuals with paths to follow when accessing or disclosing personal data and when negotiating the desire for privacy, publicity, and sociality. Doing so, perhaps, media frames echoed the work of researchers, policy makers, privacy advocates, internet companies, and other actors, and thereby spread cultural frames that individuals could adopt when discussing privacy.

To explore how media discourse has contributed to the public debates surfacing around important issues, the following section will present the literature on framing. Frame analysis is the theoretical lens utilized in this dissertation to explore what “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21) mainstream media adopted to
portray the evolution of privacy during peaks of technological development of the 20th and the 21st centuries.

C. **Theoretical Background: Frame Theory**

Frame theory is based on the assumption that the media implement different frames when reporting on the news, and thereby create narratives that readers may adopt to understand complex issues. Media discourse has the potential to activate certain interpretative lenses and provide perspectives that might endorse or challenge powerful actors (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Also, the media contribute to creating “pictures in our heads” that enable readers to simplify and process complex information (Lippmann, 1922). Frame theory has been applied to a variety of issues to gauge media effects on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors.

Goffman (1974) suggested using frame analysis to understand the influence of media narratives on the reader. Frames are “schemata of interpretation” that allow one “to locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman, 1974, p.21). Goffman depicted frames as positive constructs necessary for individuals to understand and communicate reality. Similarly, Gitlin (1980) defined frames as indispensable “principles of emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters” (p. 6). Journalists, in this perspective, often use pre-existing frames of reference to help individuals understand new issues from familiar perspectives.

Frame theory evolved significantly since its initial introduction in 1974. Iyengar (1989) focused on the role of framing to influence individuals' decisions and emphasized that the wording of questions has effects on the patterns of response.
Iyengar pointed out that the use of frames influenced the attribution of responsibility of specific issues. Entman (1993) stressed the concepts of selection and salience, arguing that media "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem, definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described" (p. 52). In brief, Entman suggested that dominant narratives have the potential to influence the understanding of a problem tackling matters of costs, benefits, causes, and solutions, or providing individuals with specific moral judgments.

Similarly, scholars suggested that frames contextualize and explain issues through selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration (Tankard et al., 1991) and may contribute to developing and spreading patterns of judgment (Haidt, 2001). Framing relates to the "salience of issues attributes" (Scheufele, 2000, p. 298) as frames might influence individuals’ agendas by emphasizing specific values, facts, judgments, responsibilities, or other considerations. Media frames function as organizing principles that individuals may use to transform events into narratives. They provide concepts, images, emotional charges, metaphors, values, and symbols to understand, interpret, and communicate events (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

Frame analysis scholars have addressed a variety of issues including matters of politics and social power (e.g. Entman, 1993; Carragee, & Roef, 2004), responsibility (Iyengar, 1989), health (e.g. Lawrence, 2004), hegemony, and moral judgments (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). In particular, the moral component emphasized in Gamson and Modigliani (1989) may play a very important part in how one perceives complex issues. A package, to Gamson and Modigliani (1989), has an internal structure
and “offers a number of different condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catchphrase, or other symbolic device” (p. 3). Packages provide readers with a shared context to understand events and thereby foster the formation of public opinion. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) indicated a list of elements that constitute a frame including: metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, appeal to principles, exemplars, depictions, roots, and consequences.

Research emphasizes crucial similarities between the assumptions of frame theory and second level agenda-setting. To be more specific, agenda-setting scholars suggest that the media influence individuals’ frames of thought by selecting the issues one should think about and by providing pre-packaged viewpoints to think about these issues. At the first level, the attention the media place in certain subjects strongly influences the importance that the public opinion ascribes to these subjects (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). At the second level, the attributes used in media discourse to present certain issues provide preferred perspective that influence how the public opinion reflects upon these issues (Ghanem, 1997). Based on these premises, research holds that “the media structure, if not dictate, the way the public thinks about its second-hand reality” (Reese, 2001, p. 3).

Sharing some of the assumptions of agenda-setting, frame theory holds that media discourse influences the perceived importance of topics and issues as well as the preferential interpretations thereof (Miller, 1997). First, the media agenda influences the public agenda by suggesting what the public should think about – the attribution of salience of an object is thus transferred from the media to the public. Second, media
discourse uses preferential attributes that contribute to organizing and making sense of the complexity of reality thereby also influencing how the public thinks about these issues. Finally, the attributes utilized in the media to frame different issues also contribute to influencing their perceived salience in the public agenda (Ghanem, 1997).

Media frames are therefore significant because they draw the public attention toward certain attributes of the objects reported. In addition, they also supply preferential viewpoints by selecting and emphasizing certain aspects of reality, as well as by promoting preferred interpretations thereof. Because of its ability to thoroughly assess the possible influence of the media agenda upon the public agenda, framing has become a widely adopted approach to studying media effects. Its similarities and relationships with agenda setting have strengthened its potential to predict the influence of media discourse upon the diffusion of preferred ways of thinking (Weaver, 2007).

In short, frame theory is useful to studying the development and evolution of media frames of privacy for several reasons. First, framing provides a theoretical lens to explore how the media invited the public opinion to think about privacy. Second, it reveals which elements of the debate around privacy have been highlighted or obscured in media discourse. Third, it pinpoints the attributes used in the media to draw the shape of privacy thereby also suggesting the preferred viewpoints in respect to privacy conveyed in media discourse across the decades.

Given that media have the ability to cultivate dominant frames and vocabulary that individuals use to discuss privacy, a frame analysis that investigates the discourse around privacy is particularly relevant in the current media climate. In fact, technological development and the increased interaction in the online environment have enhanced
the potential for privacy violations and the risks of self-disclosure (Solove, 2005; 2007). Constant changes in privacy policies have made it difficult for users to keep up with evolving threats to personal information (Nissenbaum, 2010). Particular interests related to self-disclosure (e.g. targeted marketing) may also have contributed to shaping the discourse around data collection (Fuchs, 2012; Odlyzko, 2003; 2007).

Based on the scholarship presented so far, and guided by Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) definition of frames, this dissertation explores the conceptual maps that emerge from mainstream media discourses of privacy. Following the assumptions of frame theory, this dissertation holds that media frames may influence the development of cultural frames of privacy, contribute to the organization of individual schemata, and promote particular agendas. Conceptual maps, as suggested in Gamson and Modigliani’s model, may develop through the use of recurring words, images, metaphors, catchphrases, and other attributes that emerge from the analysis of media narratives. Thus, this dissertation begins by addressing the following two research questions,

RQ1. What are the frames that emerge in media discourse of privacy during peaks of technological evolution of the 20th and of the 21st centuries?
RQ2. What are the main elements of these frames?

Media frames of privacy are also importantly interconnected to narratives portraying the evolving shape of sociocultural, political, economic, and legal settings. Media frames, in fact, may assign salience and influence the interpretation of specific aspects of privacy debates. The analysis of media discourse may suggest the features of mutual influences between contexts of society, media artifacts, and shape of privacy.
To further understand the relationship between privacy and society and to address the renegotiation of such a relationship in media frames, the next section will provide some historical examples of how the features of society have influenced the understanding of the contours of “private” and “public” in the past.

D. **Relation Between Privacy and Sociocultural, Political, Economic, and Legal Contexts**

The distinction between “private” and “public”, historically, evolved as a consequence of changes in the design of social environments and in the renovations within sociocultural, political, economic, and legal domains (Wacks, 1989). Historians tend to agree that the boundaries of the state’s authority traditionally influenced the limits between private and public spheres (Ariès & Duby, 1989). To understand the evolution of privacy, scholars consider a number of elements including the followings: the relation between state and domestic realm, the shape of technological environments, and the role of the economic and legal contexts to influence the value of intimacy. In addition, scholars suggest that frames presented in different means of communication contributed to such an evolution by spreading mediated reflections of the shape of privacy (Ariès & Duby, 1989).

Within capitalistic Western societies the perception of privacy may intersect with economic forces as, “privacy under capitalism can best be characterized as an antagonistic value that is, on the one hand, upheld as a universal value for protecting private property, but is, on the other hand, permanently undermined by corporate and state surveillance into human lives for the purpose of capital accumulation” (Fuchs, 2012, p. 141). For example, the availability of aggregated information about a
consumer’s purchases and interests may be used to generate powerful taxonomies of consumers that largely benefit the database industry (Acquisti, 2004; Turow, 2012). As a consequence, there may be a sense of frustration and vulnerability due to the reduction of personal information to a new form of currency (Angwing, 2011; Solove, 2001).

The intersection of privacy and economy often emerged in a legal grey area. In new mediated environments, such as SNSs, private information is communicated in networked spaces making it increasingly complex for laws to adjust to the contours of such a moving target. Yet, the legal domain may set the parameters to measure what constitutes privacy infringement, influence the vocabulary and frames available to discuss privacy, and direct the attention to determinate aspects of it. Even though privacy advocates often suggested the need for more comprehensive privacy regulations in the United States (e.g. Solove, 2001; 2005), some also stressed that laws issued to protect privacy might limit access to sociability (Jeff Jarvis, 2011).

Legal contexts also contribute to providing conceptual maps that mainstream media may adopt when discussing privacy. Also, mainstream media discourse may be key to spreading information related to the issuance (or the lack thereof) of appropriate regulations to protect individuals from privacy infringements, perhaps putting it in perspective with the evolution of cultural norms and of societal contexts. Mainstream media may supply the frames and narratives that map how the legal protection of privacy has evolved. They may explain how legal protection has responded to the shape of sociocultural, political, and economic contexts. They may also explore what has been considered more or less vulnerable (or worth protecting) by legislators, and
what has been presented as the adequate vocabulary to discuss privacy. In return, media discourse may seek to reshape or renegotiate existing legal frames in relation to privacy.

A general knowledge of existing laws contributes to defining the parameters that individuals use when discussing privacy. Research suggests that most citizens rely on the media to learn about laws and policies (Fox, Van Sickel & Streiget, 2007; Friedman & Rosen-Zvi, 2001; Spitz, 2000) as media discourse tends to simplify complex issues making them easier for individuals to understand (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Therefore, reporting on the activity of legislators the media may contribute to spreading the understanding of privacy regulations. They may suggest a connection between legal, sociocultural, political, and economic contexts, and provide individuals with frames and vocabulary necessary to capture and discuss the parameters of privacy protection. To explore how the media have discussed the relationship between privacy and other societal contexts, this dissertation addresses the following questions,

*RQ3 – How are sociocultural, political, economic and legal contexts presented in media coverage of privacy?*

To further understand how privacy has been communicated through media narratives, this dissertation also investigates how the media discussed the social norms of information sharing in emerging technological domains. Thus, in the following sections I will outline how research has mapped the development of social norms of interaction in relation to technology. In particular, I will review norms related to the contextual features of privacy expectations, norms connected to the use of technology, and norms associated with the negotiation between publicity, sociality, and privacy.
E. **Contextual Integrity and Social Norms**

Different contexts of disclosure entail different social norms that regulate the flow of information. The decision that a specific act violates privacy is a consequence of the social context in which the practice takes place. It depends on the types of information exposed and on the social roles of the individuals involved. In addition, self-disclosure relies on a set of transmission principles that stipulate the expected flow of information and include confidentiality, reciprocity, desert, entitlement, compulsion, and need (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 145). Social contexts as health care, business, education, religion, and politics have their particular privacy expectations. Each of them depends on complex social norms that suggest the standards for the transmission and control of information (Nissenbaum, 2004). Mainstream media may recommend appropriate social norms that apply to different technological contexts. Also, they may suggest the proper expectations of privacy that one may experience in different social environments.

Social norms influence how specific information about individuals is expected to flow from party to party, assuming that one holds different roles in different situations. In health care contexts, for example, patients share private information trusting that their physicians will keep it confidential. In friendships or romantic relationships the flow of private information is often reciprocal and depends upon the choices of friends or partners. Disclosure also serves different functions in different contexts. In romantic relationships, giving up on some level of privacy is necessary to let the relationship to grow. In doctor-patient relationships, self-disclosure is crucial to access appropriate health care treatments. In the words of Nissenbaum (2004; 2010), “contextual integrity” is a frame of reference that one may apply to gauge the extent to which social norms
related to the flow of information are respected. She suggests that the stream of personal information is contextually regulated and that situational clues are necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of flows. Thus, informational norms generate expectations that help one to assess the acceptability of specific practices in given circumstances (Nissenbaum, 2010).

The construct of contextual integrity suggests that individuals evaluate situational cues to formulate expectations of privacy. However, new technological contexts may challenge one’s ability to gauge the appropriate flow of information because social norms for emerging contexts may not be available (Nissenbaum, 2010). For example, assessing appropriate flow of information on the internet can be difficult because of a context collapse that is, “an infinite number of contexts collapsing upon one another into that single moment of recording” (Wesch, 2008, para 5). Boyd (2007) discusses how context collapse disorients students in their attempts to craft personal images online where peers, faculty members, parents, and potential employers may all access their online profiles. The challenge for students is to design a persona that would look “cool enough” for one’s peers, and would still be acceptable for parents, employers, and teachers (boyd, 2007).

This dissertation addresses matters of contextual integrity by exploring whether and how mainstream media discussed the contextual nature of emerging privacy concerns and fleshed out the social norms suitable to different situations (and to different technologies). In particular, it investigates media discourse in different timeframes to explore what facets of contextual integrity emerge in media narratives across time, focusing on the discourse around cultural norms of interactions. The
overarching goal is to foster the development of Nissenbaum’s framework through a longitudinal frame analysis of media narratives.

To further investigate the elements that could influence one’s understanding of privacy and broaden the review of relevant cultural norms that may also emerge from media discourse, the following section will explore how research tackles the relationship between privacy and technological literacy. The latter may involve: understanding the norms of use of different technologies, knowing their key terms and concepts, and being aware of their potential impact on society (Miller, 1983).

F. Technological Literacy and Social Norms

Scholars emphasize that experience with new technologies is key to grasp new privacy concerns and master control strategies (Bellman et al., 2004; Freese et al., 2006; Hargittai, 2007). For example, frequent users of SNSs update their privacy settings more often than occasional users (boyd & Hargittai, 2010). Similarly, those with technical familiarity, surveillance awareness, and policy understanding are better off controlling personal information (Park, 2011). On the internet some realize who are the potential audiences of their information, but many may be unaware of how available their posts are and may lack strategies to control access to them. Technical expertise, often necessary to manage one’s privacy, includes the understanding of one’s data exposure and permanence, and the familiarity with privacy policies and cultural norms of disclosure in different domains.

When new technologies emerge, individuals who want to protect their privacy need to update their knowledge to understand how new devices may modify the flow of information. Mainstream media address such a need by suggesting the possibilities of
privacy infringements peculiar of each stage of technological development. For instance, the media might discuss the *exposure* and *permanence* of information shared online. Doing so, they might explain how unexpected audiences could access such information. Also, they might emphasize that individuals rarely have the opportunity to fully remove personal data from the internet. Mainstream media either foster or overlook the complex debates involving privacy and technology. Thus, they make the relationship between privacy literacy, experience with technology, and privacy management more or less explicit. In addition, media discourse frames the responsibilities for infringements and further contributes to reshaping the understanding of privacy. Alternatively, media narratives highlight the need for increased education related to new technologies and privacy risks, thus shifting the responsibility to educational institutions and government actors. Or, by tackling the need for more transparent policies, they may attribute the responsibility of confusion and misunderstanding to corporations and policy makers.

Finally, when discussing the social norms of information sharing, research shows that individuals, often, understand and measure the value of privacy against that of publicity and sociality. Disclosure, as a consequence, may also be the result of an individual negotiation between these competing yet interconnected values. To further understand the parameters that may influence such a negotiation, the next section will briefly explore how literature has rendered the relationship between privacy, publicity, and sociality. Elements surfacing in privacy scholarship may emerge from media discourse of privacy as well.
G. **Publicity, Sociality, Privacy, and Social Norms**

Individuals often negotiate the need for publicity and sociality weighing it against the demand for privacy (Livingstone, 2008). Giving up on some levels of control is necessary to let sociality to grow, as information disclosure is a fundamental element for the development of personal relationships (Debatin et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2007). As anticipated earlier in this chapter, research suggests that individuals engage in a costs/benefits analysis when negotiating the desire of publicity and sociality against the demand for privacy (e.g. Maaß, 2011). Yet, many have trouble understanding the risks of disclosure and weighing them against the potential benefits of connection (boyd & Hargittai, 2010). A reasonable explanation is that drawing the line between “private” and “public” in new technological contexts is difficult as these boundaries are blurred and constantly renegotiated (Nissenbaum, 2010). Media narratives evoke the evolving shape of social norms and suggest how new technological environments can challenge the control of personal information. Also, the media provide conceptual maps to outline the benefits and costs of disclosure thus contributing to organize individual schemata and to inform one’s process of self-disclosure and one’s costs/benefits analysis.

“Good privacy” (to use Christena Nippert-Eng’s term) is one’s ability to manage the control of information as a member of social units and as an individual. Emerging technologies, however, challenge such ability and confuse one’s familiarity with the cultural norms of disclosure (Nippert-Eng, 2010). The understanding of how people engage in their decisions of sharing and how they negotiate the boundaries between privacy and publicity is challenging. Despite the alleged excessive disclosure online, research emphasizes that privacy is still a very important aspect for individuals (Nippert-
Eng, 2010). What complicates its protection when new technologies emerge is that, “conditions [of disclosure] change and contexts and norms evolve along with them (...) [generating] a schism, many schisms, between experience and expectation” (Nissenbaum, 2010, p. 231).

Informed by Nissenbaum’s (2010) framework of contextual integrity, and borrowing from existing research that addresses the emergence and reshaping of social norms in new technological environments, this dissertation explores how mainstream media discussed the evolution of norms during different phases of technological development. In particular, it investigates how media discourse of privacy tackled the relationship between norms and evolving technologies to explore what conceptual contexts and behavioral guidelines have been made available to individuals who approached new technical environments. Thus, the fourth and last research question asks,

*RQ4 - What social norms related to privacy appear in mainstream media coverage of privacy across timeframes?*

To conclude, privacy has traditionally been a very elastic concept (Allen, 1988). A brief historical overview showed how the features of the state and its social, political, and legal components reshaped the distinction between private and public domains. Also, the literature review emphasized the layered and versatile nature of privacy as a construct whose features often changed across social contexts and technological domains (e.g. Nissenbaum, 2010). Informed by the work of historians, this chapter discussed the relationship between privacy, socio cultural, political, economic, and legal domains, and media reflections of them. Finally, borrowing from the research on
contextual integrity, technological literacy, and social capital, this chapter discussed how new forms of mediated interaction provided new venues for publicity and sociality, thereby perhaps encouraging the evolution of social norms of interaction and sharing.

The overall theme of the discussion has been that mainstream media might dissect and communicate the layered nature of privacy providing narratives and conceptual maps that one can use to understand and discuss privacy. Mainstream media are influential vehicles in the formation of public opinion as they represent an easily accessible source of information that individuals tend to refer to (Chaffee & Frank, 1996; Graber, 1994).

Finally, in the next section I will discuss the rationale that informs this research and guides the answers to the research questions presented in this chapter.

H. **Rationale**

As discussed, many intervening variables influence the placement and permeability of the boundary between private and public spheres. Thus, it may be challenging to determine a comprehensive definition of privacy. Privacy, intended in terms of contextual integrity, is highly situational and depends on subjective traits, contextual expectations, social norms, and laws that are constantly renegotiated within emerging technological environments. The understanding of privacy through Nissenbaum’s (2010) framework of contextual integrity helps one to address the variability of the concept in relation to evolving sociocultural, political, economic, legal, and technological contexts.

Emerging communication technologies, as well as the discourse around their evolution, encourage a renegotiation of roles and functions (Nissenbaum, 2010),
perhaps encouraging the emergence of preferential social practices and cultural norms (Sterne, 2003). Many intervening variables might contribute to influencing one’s understanding, use, and (re)interpretation of technologies. Among those variables, technological affordances represent a fundamental component as they provide the canvas within which social interpretation may occur. In addition, personality traits, education, literacy, contexts of interaction, as well as political, sociocultural, economic, and legal systems all influence how one understands the intersection of technology and privacy (Nippert-Eng, 2010; Nissenbaum, 2010). Media discourse contributes to informing one’s negotiation between privacy implications and social opportunities. It also suggests social meanings that one could associate with emerging or existing technologies.

Photojournalism increased the possibilities to infringe one’s situational expectations of privacy by publicizing private pictures allowing unexpected audiences to access them. The telephone, television, the computer, and the internet provided connections with the outside world that could be either useful or undesirable. These communication technologies influenced the permeability of the house walls, alternatively lowering or enhancing one’s ability to control information about the self and to access information about others (Shapiro, 1998). The telephone and the internet permitted “real-time contacts (unlike the mail) outside of the public gaze” (p. 280) facilitating one’s access to social connections. Television and the internet drawn leisure activities inside “morally safe” (p. 281) domestic places. Bidirectional technologies also increased the possibilities for private information to leak from one’s home.
The internet provided an extraordinary platform for publicity (Solove, 2007). SNSs generated an unprecedented potential for creating and cultivating ties, often fostering one’s access to social capital (boyd, 2011; Ellison et al., 2007; 2011; Govani & Pashley, 2008; Gross & Acquisti, 2005; Stutzman et al., 2012). In the last few years, online corporate managers, such as Zuckerberg and Schmitt, claimed that privacy is no longer a social norm. They probably did so to encourage individuals to keep providing valued private information that enhance the effectiveness of corporate customized marketing (Fuchs, 2012). Research, however, shows that individuals still value privacy as a fundamental aspect of their lives (e.g. Nippert-Eng, 2010).

New communication technologies generate new opportunities for publicity and new challenges for the control of personal information (Livingstone, 2008). To address the layered complexity of privacy this research investigates how the discourse around privacy in mainstream media evolved in relation to technological development. Doing so, it tries to provide a longitudinal context within which the elastic shape of privacy can be described. In the attempt to contribute to the framework of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010) this research investigates which cultural norms of self-disclosure surface in the public discourse around privacy across timeframes. It also explores the mutual relation that emerges between media frames of privacy, on the one hand, and sociocultural, political, economic and legal contexts on the other.

This research explores media frames that surfaced during peaks of technological evolution of the 20th and 21st centuries. As further detailed in the method section, the choice of the timeframes to analyze emerged from the combination of two timelines. First, it considered the fundamental steps in the evolution of technology that may have
influenced the shape of privacy (Figure 1). Then, it observed the number of editorials tackling privacy published decade by decade since 1850 in the media outlets selected. Even though the number of editorials published may not be sufficient to substantiate the salience of issues, it is a preliminary indicator of their resonance.

As shown in Figure 1, the first phase of technological evolution considered in this research includes the improvements of photography and print that brought to the growth of yellow journalism. In this period, the introduction of the telephone also allowed new spaces of publicity within previously private places (Shapiro, 1998). The second timeframe investigated how the golden age of television influenced the framing of privacy. Bringing inside the home sources of public entertainment, discussion, and information, television – perhaps - increased the perceived permeability of the domestic boundaries. Television allowed individuals to access others in unforeseen ways, possibly suggesting the need to renegotiate the contours of “private” and “public” spaces.

The following phase that may have influenced the shape of privacy entails the spread of computers and the development of the database industry (between 1963 and 1989). In the 1970s and in the 1980s the diffusion of mainframe computers raised significantly, the number of people owning credit cards grew, and marketers started supplementing their data with psychographic information to create taxonomies of people (Solove, 2001). Some suggested that the diffusion of computers increased the concerns related to surveillance and privacy (e.g. Miller, 1969). Such concerns might also emerge from the analysis of media discourse implemented in this phase.
The last two phases in the evolution of technology include the introduction of the internet, between 1990 and 1999, and the spread of social media between 2000 and
2012. The web increased the ability to collect, aggregate, and share information revolutionizing the world of advertisement and allowing individuals, businesses, and public agencies to share and access information in unprecedented fashions (Solove, 2001). The internet, as a consequence, enhanced the possibilities for privacy infringements, perhaps raising concerns related to information disclosure and use of technology (Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Nissembaum, 2010). SNSs went a step further often encouraging users to share rather than withhold information. They offered exceptional stages for publicity and sociality allowing individuals to trade personal data for social connection and likeability (boyd, 2008; 2011). In the next page, Figure 1 summarizes and visualizes the timeline described.

In sum, new media afford new possibilities for the renegotiation of previously private boundaries. Evolving concerns may emerge from a longitudinal investigation of media discourse around privacy and technology. Starting from the assumption that the media may provide individuals with conceptual maps to understand and discuss matters of privacy (boyd, 2008), I conducted a content analysis and a discourse analysis of mainstream media narratives to analyze how they framed the concept of privacy during peaks of technological development of the 20th and 21st century. Media narratives about social norms of privacy, as well as the discourse around the relationship between privacy and sociocultural, political, economic, and legal contexts, also reveal important aspects of the intersections between one's understanding of privacy and technological evolution.

In particular, the current research addresses the following research questions:
RQ1. What are the frames that emerge in media discourse of privacy during peaks of technological evolution of the 20th and of the 21st centuries?

RQ2. What are the main elements of these frames?

RQ3 - How are sociocultural, political, economic and legal contexts presented in media coverage of privacy?

RQ4 – What social norms related to privacy appear in mainstream media coverage of privacy across timeframes?
III. METHOD

As discussed in the previous chapter, privacy is a complex concept. Nissenbaum’s (2010) framework of contextual integrity helps to understand the role of situational social norms that regulate disclosure. Nissenbaum’s framework is also useful to interpret reactions to infringements that may occur when information travels across “spheres of mobility” (Zimmer, 2007). It provides explanations, evaluations, and prescriptions to manage the flow of personal information and to gauge the appropriateness of socio-technical devices and practices adopted for protection. Informed by previous privacy scholarship, the current research combines content analysis and discourse analysis to explore how mainstream media discussed privacy in different timeframes of the 20th and 21st century.

A. Population and Timeframes

To address the research questions, the current project collected and analyzed editorials published in the Chicago Tribune, the New York Times, the Washington Post, Newsweek and Time Magazine across selected timeframes. The first three are leading newspapers that published consistently since the late 19th century providing coverage for the entire period studied. They have a large readership and represent influential sources of information capable to set the agenda for other media (Chong & Druckman, 2008; Clark & Illman, 2011; Dickson, 1992; Donovan, 1925; Gallagher, 1998; Weiss, 1974). Newsweek and Time magazine are the United States’ two largest circulating news magazines. Time published constantly since 1923, Newsweek since 1933 (Adkins Covert & Wasburn, 2007; Warner, 1985).
The Chicago Tribune and the Washington Post tended to assume a national scope whereas the New York Times is considered an influential leader both nationally and internationally (Clark & Illman, 2003). The Chicago Tribune adopts a more conservative approach (Gallagher, 1998) whereas the New York Times and the Washington Post are considered liberal outlets (e.g., Angela & Frederick, 1994; Lichter et al., 1986; Ju, 2005). A study pointed out that the Washington Post relies on United States’ administration officials more than the New York Times (Dickson, 1992). The New York Times is considered a leader in many areas, including technology (Weiss, 1974). Its writers are influential thinkers who have conveyed important ideas related to practices and implications of emerging technologies (Kadushin, Hover, & Tichy 1971; Nelkin 1995). Finally, Time and Newsweek are very influential weekly magazines that researchers often use as representative informational magazines that report on news and opinions (Adkins Covert & Wasburn, 2007; Huhmann & Brotherton, 1997; Steuter, 1992).

Considering these differences in ideology, readership, and scope of influence, a comparison of frames implemented in these outlets may help avoiding biases in the sample and thereby provide a broader perspective on available narratives used to discuss privacy. Differences that emerge from such a comparison will be as enlightening as similarities. A preliminary search conducted imputing the keyword “privacy” in the databases Lexis Nexis, ProQuest Historical Newspapers and in the Time magazine archive generated the results shown in Table I, Figure 2 and 3.
### TABLE I
NUMBER OF EDITORIALS INCLUDING THE KEYWORD "PRIVACY," BY DECADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>NYT</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>WP</th>
<th>NYT+CT+WP</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Newsweek</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850 - 1859</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860 - 1869</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870 - 1879</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880 - 1889</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890 - 1899</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900 - 1909</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910 - 1919</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920 - 1929</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>61(^a)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930 - 1939</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>56(^b)</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940 - 1949</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 - 1959</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1969</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 - 1979</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 – 1989</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>1546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 – 1999</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>2078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 – 2009</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>3181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>3594</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>2419</td>
<td>6531</td>
<td>2809</td>
<td>2046</td>
<td>11504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) data from 1923

\(^b\) data from 1933

The first timeframe selected for the analysis was the decade 1900-1909. In this period the number of editorials focusing on privacy published in the three newspapers selected \((n = 309)\) was the highest among the decades included between 1850 and 1959. The following timeframes included the editorials published between 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009 (Table II). These frames roughly match with the phases of technological development previously identified (Figure 1).

### TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1900 – 1909</td>
<td>Telephone, photography, press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1960 - 1969</td>
<td>Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1970 – 1979</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; phase of computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1980 – 1989</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; phase of computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1990 - 1999</td>
<td>Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2000 - 2009</td>
<td>Social media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. **Sample and Procedures**

To investigate frames and answer RQ1 and RQ2 the current project adopted Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) constructivist model. It thereby mapped the availability of interpretive packages implemented in mainstream media discourse around privacy. As discussed earlier, Gamson and colleagues (1983; 1989) suggested that media frames emerge as central organizing ideas that convey particular social meanings.
Interpretive packages contain core frames that might surface through framing devices or reasoning devices used in media discourse. Framing devices include *metaphors*, *exemplars* (concrete examples), *catchphrases*, and *depictions* (related to particular actors). Reasoning devices include *roots*, *consequences*, and *appeals to principle*. In particular, *roots* entail analyses of the causal dynamics motivating a set of behaviors, *consequences* involve descriptions of the possible outcomes of specific policies or practices, and *appeals to principle* are moral claims. The structural features of these packages may be summarized in a table that Gamson and Modigliani (1989) called the *signature matrix*. Such a scheme includes a number of “packages parts” and aggregates them into coherent wholes.

For example, as shown in Table III, a core frame (or interpretive package) for privacy might emphasize that social media enhance the possibilities for connection. The *core position* of such an interpretive package would suggest that communication tools increase one’s possibilities to access social capital. It would also hint that the benefits of sharing might exceed the risks of privacy infringements. *Metaphors* for this package would describe SNSs as global communities. *Exemplars* would portray instances in which individuals have connected online enjoying the benefits of sharing. *Catchphrases* would include slogans as “sociality, not privacy,” or “privacy is over, here comes sociality.” *Depictions* would entail instances in which particular subjects (e.g. social media) are portrayed as important or necessary to improve sociality. *Roots* would include the suggestion that the need to access social capital may motivate one to self-disclose. *Consequences* would be instances in which media discourse suggests that regulating privacy may hinder the possibilities of the sharing industry (as in Jarvis,
Finally, **appeals to principle** would involve moral claims, as the suggestion that the value of social capital overcomes that of privacy.

### TABLE III
**EXAMPLE OF INTERPRETIVE PACKAGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing devices</th>
<th>Package (P1)</th>
<th>Disclosure for Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P1)</td>
<td>Disclosure is necessary to strengthen relationships. New technologies enhanced the possibilities for connection. Privacy should not be a concern anymore because the benefits of sharing exceed the risks of infringements.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P1)</td>
<td>Social media as community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P1)</td>
<td>Instances in which individuals have disclosed personal information to enjoy the benefits of sharing and defying the fears of privacy losses. Zuckerberg saying, “Our mission is to make the world more open and connected.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P1)</td>
<td>“Privacy is over, here comes sociality”; “Sociality, not privacy.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P1)</td>
<td>Technology as a place to “share” and to “connect” with others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasoning devices</td>
<td>Roots (P1)</td>
<td>Individuals engage in self-disclosure because they value sharing as a way to gain social capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consequences (P1)</td>
<td>Regulating privacy may hinder the possibilities for connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals to principle (P1)</td>
<td>The value of social capital is higher than privacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first step of this research was a pilot study conducted to design a signature matrix that captures the interpretive packages used to discuss privacy in media discourse. In this phase a stratified random sample of 112 editorials (4 per source per timeframe as shown in Table IV) was selected and analyzed to explore the use of “packages parts” implemented in media discourse, as exemplified in Table III. The signature matrix (Appendix A) summarizes the interpretive packages surfacing in editorials across timeframes. The list of elements identified, associated with their package, formed the coding protocol for the main content analysis.

The second step of this project was a content analysis of 420 editorials selected through stratified random sampling (Table IV). Even though different timeframes included different numbers of editorials, proportionate sampling was not implemented to avoid over-representing or under-representing each period. Two coders used the signature matrix to code the 420 editorials selected. Each item was tested for intercoder reliability. The results were analyzed to measure and compare the extent to which each package part was implemented in each newspaper in different timeframes.

A discourse analysis addressed RQ3 and RQ4. During the content analysis, coders selected four influential editorials per source for each timeframe that were further analyzed in this phase of the project (Table IV). Discourse analysis is a qualitative process that seeks a deeper explanation of meaning through the observation and analysis of themes and patterns that emerge from mediated texts. Tonkiss (2004) suggested three fundamental pointers to guide discourse analysis: “identifying key themes and arguments, looking for variations in text, and paying attention to silences” (p. 378). Adopting Fairclough’s (2000) approach to discourse analysis, the current
research project paid particular attention to the connection between use of language and exercise of power. For instance, when analyzing content, neutrality and legitimacy were questioned, also taking into account omissions, latent content, and connotatively charged words that may reveal practices of power and power relationships (Fairclough, 2000).

TABLE IV
TIMEFRAMES AND SAMPLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sample for pilot study</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Sample for the content analysis</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Sample for the discourse analysis</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nyt</td>
<td>ct</td>
<td>wp</td>
<td>nw</td>
<td>time</td>
<td>tot</td>
<td>nyt</td>
<td>ct</td>
<td>wp</td>
<td>nw</td>
<td>time</td>
<td>tot</td>
<td>nyt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1909</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tot</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This process began by pointing out key themes, categories, and terms used to depict the contours of privacy and gauge its intersections with the evolution of technology. This also explored what themes and terms emerged from the discussion of evolving social norms, and investigated how interconnections between sociocultural, political, economic, and legal contexts have been discussed. Moreover, this process
scrutinized, compared, and contrasted how themes and categories emerged, suggesting what these may reveal of the interconnection between privacy and technology. Additional elements that were considered when inferring dominant themes included the followings: recurring images and metaphors that clustered around central ideas, associations connecting actors or problems, and the tone of the discourse. To identify patterns of variation, the analysis looked for conflicting ideas and contrasting arguments within the texts, which may be indexes of inner uncertainties and hesitations. In addition, the analysis searched for preferred explanations, perspectives, and discrepancies between the analysis of the problem and the suggested solutions (as in Tonkiss, 2004).

To answer RQ3, this research considered a number of sub-questions guided by research reviewed in the previous chapter. First, to provide a background for the discourse analysis and evaluate general issues that may emerge from media narratives of privacy, this research asked the following guiding questions: how did media discourse problematize the intertwining between the evolving shape of privacy and sociocultural, political, economic, and legal contexts (e.g. Wacks, 1989)? Did the media suggest an interconnection between the contours of the state’s authority and the negotiation of public and private spheres (e.g. Ariès & Duby, 1989)? Then, to further explore how the media rendered the connection between privacy and economy, the discourse analysis asked whether media narratives discussed the value of information and the relationship between privacy and the economic system (e.g. Fuchs, 2012; Turov, 2011). It also explored whether media discourse of privacy took into account the power relationships of economy (Fuchs, 2012). Additional questions explored legal issues asking, for
example, whether the media tackled the complexity of creating appropriate legal protections for new technological contexts (e.g. Nissenbaum, 2010; Solove, 2001; 2005). Finally, the discourse analysis investigated whether media discourse attempted to reshape existing social contexts (e.g. political, economic, legal) by providing operative guidelines.

To address RQ4, guided by the review of existing literature, another set of sub-questions was tackled. In order to explore whether and how the media rendered the contextual nature of privacy, this research asked what contextual aspects of information sharing emerged from media narratives. It also investigated whether the media suggested the use of a framework of contextual integrity, in Nissenbaum’s (2010) terms, to explain the expected flow of information. Additional questions addressed social norms of disclosure asking whether the media framed privacy using the traditional paradigm of secrecy (Solove, 2005), and whether they tackled cultural norms related to intimacy, anonymity, secrecy, and solitude (Gavinson, 1980; Manen, 2010). Investigating the relationship between privacy and technological literacy, the discourse analysis also asked: did the media suggest what social norms apply to different technologies? Did they explore matters of self-efficacy and privacy management norms? Finally, addressing the negotiation between privacy, sociality, and publicity, the current research investigated whether the media discussed the norms that one might use to weigh the opportunities for publicity and sociality against the risks of privacy loss. It also explored whether the media addressed the need of a negotiation between these values, perhaps discussing opportunities and risks brought about by the “sharing industry,” in Jarvis’ (2011) terms.
At the conclusion of the process, results and inferences drawn from quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis were compared and integrated to interpret similarities as well as differences and sketch a comprehensive description of privacy frames that surfaced in mainstream media across timeframes. Results and inferences obtained from this project also aimed at further developing Nissenbaum's framework of contextual integrity. Overall, the main goal of this research was to draw a background within which the contours of privacy and their relations to evolving technological contexts may become clearer.
IV. CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis is a quantitative analytical method that uses mediated artifacts as the core for social research; it systematically investigates the generation of meaning through analyzing content. The following pages describe the quantitative analysis of media coverage of privacy conducted in response to RQ1 and RQ2. Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) approach informed the current content analysis. Thus, the coding protocol relied upon the development of a “signature matrix” (see Appendix A), a detailed codebook that describes the interpretive packages, or frames, surfacing in media coverage. As specified in chapter three, these interpretive packages have an internal structure that emerges around a core position – the central organizing idea – and develops through a set of symbolic components or “packages parts.” These components include: Metaphors, Exemplars, Catchphrases, Depictions, Roots, Consequences, and Appeals to Principle.

The content analysis, thus, consisted of two steps. First, a stratified random sample of 112 editorials (four per media outlet per timeframe) was collected. As detailed in the method section (chapter three), the six timeframes analyzed included the following: 1900-1909, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. The media outlets chosen for analysis were: the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, Newsweek, and Time magazine. Upon random selection, editorials were carefully read multiple times, and qualitative notes were taken to develop the signature matrix. During this first phase, eight packages emerged, which will be described in the next few paragraphs. Initially, the signature matrix was pre-tested on a subset of editorials in order to check for completeness as well as to test and strengthen
initial agreement between coders. Then, the signature matrix was used as the coding protocol for the main content analysis, which consisted of 420 editorials randomly selected. Two coders (the author and a colleague, identified as coder A and B) were trained to interpret the editorials and code them using the signature matrix; they coded 210 editorials each (50%). Additionally, coder A coded 21 editorials randomly selected from the ones analyzed by coder B and vice-versa. This enabled measuring the level of intercoder agreement on a total of 42 editorials (10%). In particular, agreement was computed using the Perreault and Leigh (1989) reliability index, as detailed later.

The pilot study implemented for the current research project captured the surfacing, in media discourse, of the following eight interpretive packages: White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Privacy as Property, Appropriate Information Flow, Users’ Responsibility, Value of Truth, Privacy is Dead, and Fundamental Privacy.

The package “White Lies” underscored the value of relationships and suggested that privacy is necessary to keep healthy relationships based on trust. Often, editorials implementing this frame indicated that lies might be better than confessions to keep one’s relationship healthy and to “spice it up with some mystery⁴.” As this interpretive package was developed, lies were described as innocent strategies necessary to preserve one’s relationship of love and friendship – in fact “if the doll is pretty and satisfactory, what matters whether it be stuffed with sawdust, cotton or hair⁵.” Technology, in this package, was portrayed as an actor potentially accountable for privacy infringements that may cause relationships to suffer or end.

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⁵ Article #231, Don’t Be Too Inquisitive, Chicago Tribune, 1906.
The package “Disclosure for Community” also placed the emphasis on relationships, but from a different angle. This was an individual frame suggesting that people who disclose personal information engage (or should engage) in a tradeoff by weighing the potential to nurture one’s sociality and publicity against the risks of privacy losses. When assessing costs and benefits of disclosure, this frame advocated that individuals must consider how privacy might hinder possibilities for community building and maintenance. Too much privacy, in fact, may be detrimental to one’s publicity and access to social capital. In the negotiation between privacy and disclosure, then, one should remember that privacy could also mean loneliness.

“Privacy as Property” presented an economic argument explaining that privacy has measurable value often identifiable with ownership and property. For instance, this package described personal information as a commodity that may be collected, sold, traded, and used for profit. Editorials developing this frame echoed that scholarship that explored the instrumental dimension of privacy, explaining the value of privacy in materialistic terms (see Campbell & Carlson, 2002; Fried, 1990; Moor, 1997). This package fostered the idea that privacy, in contemporary Western societies, turned into a modern product, a consumerist and rather concrete property whose protection might be granted only, or primarily, through legal enforcement. For instance, editorials would suggest that “your privacy is worth a million bucks” and that one “owns” and “trades” personal information.

“Appropriate Information Flow” developed around aspects of what Nissenbaum (2010) describes as the contextual integrity of information. Contextual integrity, as detailed in chapter two, entails the idea that information disclosed is tagged with
appropriate situational norms of flow that depend upon the context of delivery. These may include the norms of confidentiality and transparency. Editorials implementing such a frame suggested that, when disclosing information, individuals evaluate the context of disclosure and attach expectations of flow to the information revealed. For instance, editorials claimed that governmental agencies and private companies should be transparent as to how information is collected and used, in order to guarantee appropriate flow. Also, editorials hinted that individuals should be granted the right to modify or delete existing information.

“Users’ responsibility” advanced an individual argument suggesting that people should be held accountable for their own privacy losses. In fact, the frame claimed, those who unveil personal information are responsible for their disclosure. Thus, they ought to develop specific literacies to fully understand the possibilities of flow that different platforms or technologies involve. This package presented informed disclosure as necessary to avoid confusion and unrealistic expectations of privacy. It promoted personal awareness and privacy literacy thereby encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their choices with respect to privacy and publicity. Privacy literacy and technological mastery were described as important individual duties that may effectively contribute to safeguarding privacy and safety.

The interpretive package “Value of Truth” undertook a political argument suggesting that truth, transparency, and public good are more important than privacy when national, international, or individual security are at stake. Concealment and deception, especially involving people in power, were described as dangerous threats for the well-being of society. This frame suggested that public figures willingly put
themselves under the public eye thus waiving their right to privacy for the safeguard of a higher public good. The package Value of Truth, thus, framed the freedom of the press and the rights of the citizens to know as necessary components of a democratic society. Consequently, the infringement of privacy became an essential step to grant the protection of citizens and to facilitate the fight against terrorism, corruption, and other abuses of privacy.

The frame “Privacy is Dead” developed a dystopian argument suggesting that, as a consequence of modern communication technology, protecting personal information has become increasingly challenging. The frame suggested that technology gradually facilitated the collection, aggregation, and spread of data. For instance, editorials utilizing this frame claimed that, with the introduction of ubiquitous surveillance techniques, privacy had become an exception rather than the norm. Editorials implemented this interpretive package through Metaphors such as the Big Brother and the Panopticon. Importantly, this frame perpetrated the idea that infringements had become inevitable and, as a consequence, trying to protect one’s private data had become excessively - and often uselessly - burdensome.

Finally, the package “Fundamental Privacy” cultivated the idea that privacy is an essential human right – comparable to freedom, autonomy, and liberty – and is crucial for the maintenance of democracy. This frame emphasized that privacy is an inalienable right and, as such, is implicitly protected in the constitution. Also, considering its importance, privacy was oftentimes described as a fundamental norm of a civil society and as a value that deserved social and moral enforcement. Fundamental Privacy developed a right-related argument emphasizing the intrinsic, sacred, and inalienable
worth of privacy (as described in Moor, 1997). This interpretive package echoed that scholarship that defined privacy as something that one desires for its own sake (i.e. Fried, 1990), or as a necessary aspect of other fundamental values such as autonomy or dignity (i.e. Jonson, 1994; Moor, 1997). These scholars shed light upon the intrinsic value of privacy, which was also the core position of the interpretive package Fundamental Privacy.

These eight interpretive packages, or frames, are further detailed and exemplified in the signature matrix utilized for the current content analysis (see Appendix A). Two coders used the signature matrix to identify the implementation of these different frames in the editorials previously selected. Upon reading each editorial, coders recorded the editorial’s ID, timeframe, and media outlet. Complete agreement was reached on these three variables. Then, each package part was coded for presence or absence, as a nominal variable. On a later stage, the “level of intensity” of each interpretive package was calculated as the sum of package parts recorded in an editorial. For instance, if a coder identified the occurrence of Metaphors, Depictions, and Appeals to Principle for the frame White Lies in the editorial N. 1, then the level of intensity of White Lies for that editorial would be three. Level of intensity was thus considered a ratio variable. Intercoder reliability for the levels of intensity of the eight interpretive packages ranged between .92 and 1, as detailed in the following pages. The next sections will present the analyses undertook to answer the first two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2).
A. **Frames, Timeframes, and Media Outlets**

The first research question (RQ1) aimed at exploring the interpretive packages surfacing in media coverage of privacy during six peaks of technological evolution in five different media outlets. A variety of analyses were conducted in response to this question. First, descriptive statistics were calculated to understand prevalent tendencies in the sample analyzed. These included means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the levels of intensity of the interpretive packages to gauge their longitudinal surfacing. Descriptive statistics were conducted for the whole sample across each individual timeframe. Second, Pearson correlation coefficients (r) were used to measure tendencies across timeframes and interpretive packages. Third, oneway ANOVAs were conducted and mean distributions were plotted across the timeline so as to further explore the tendencies identified through. Finally, an analogous three-step analysis was undertook to explore the implementation of interpretive packages in the different media outlets selected. It is important to emphasize that descriptive statistics and correlations were used, mostly, to get a sense of the general tendencies, whereas oneway ANOVAs provided the most appropriate and informative analyses.

1. **Frames implementation across timeframes**

Descriptive statistics revealed that the most implemented interpretive package, across timeframes, was Appropriate Information Flow. This frame, as detailed earlier, suggested that individuals who disclose information do so with situational expectations of flow in mind; these expectations depend upon the context of delivery. The mean score of the level of intensity of Appropriate Information Flow, for the entire
sample, was $M = 1.80$ ($SD = 1.98$). When analyzing individual timeframes, the level of intensity of Appropriate Information Flow ranged from $M = .53$ in 1900-1909 to $M = 1.92$ in 2000-2009 revealing a longitudinal increase. The presence of the frame Privacy is Dead ($M = 1.68$, $SD = 2.22$) also increased longitudinally ranging from $M = .67$ in 1900-1909 to $M = 2.13$ in 1990-1999. Similar tendencies emerged for Privacy as Property ($M = .85$, $SD = 1.52$) that grew from $M = .11$ in 1900-1909 to $M = 1.63$ in 2000-2009. Smaller longitudinal growth was reported for the package Disclosure for Community ($M = .30$, $SD = 1.10$) that ranged from $M = .13$ in 1980-1989 to $M = .76$ in 2000-2009. Opposite tendencies emerged for other packages. In particular, Fundamental Privacy ($M = 1.30$, $SD = 1.66$) decreased longitudinally ranging from $M = 1.91$ in 1900-1909 to $M = .63$ in 1990-1999. Similarly, White Lies ($M = .09$, $SD = .66$) ranged from $M = .76$ in 1900-1909 to $M = .00$ in the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s. Finally, Value of Truth ($M = .82$, $SD = 1.54$) ranged from $M = .55$ in 1990-1999 to $M = 1.09$ in 1980-1989; and Users’ Responsibility ($M = .32$, $SD = 1.05$) ranged from $M = .08$ in 1970-1979 to $M = 1.00$ in 1900-1909. Overall, these scores revealed the predominant recurrence of Appropriate Information Flow, Privacy is Dead, and Fundamental Privacy. They also began to suggest the occurrence of longitudinal shifts in certain frames (as White Lies, Privacy as Property, and Fundamental Privacy) and the relative stability of others (as Value of Truth).

To further explore the longitudinal tendencies of these interpretive packages, Pearson correlation coefficients ($r$) were calculated. These analytical techniques were implemented to measure strength and direction of the linear relationships between timeframes and level of intensity of different frames. To conduct this analysis,
timeframes were considered as the independent set of variables and the level of intensity of the eight interpretive packages as the dependent set of variables. As a result, some significant relationships were found; the highest correlations were of a moderate to low nature. Moderate correlations described how the frames White Lies \((r = -0.202, p \leq 0.001)\), Privacy as Property \((r = 0.359, p \leq 0.001)\), and Fundamental Privacy \((r = -0.268, p \leq 0.001)\) progressed through the timeline. Considering the overall tendencies, these data showed that the editorials analyzed were more likely to implement the interpretive packages White Lies and Fundamental Privacy in earlier timeframes whereas they tended to increasingly implement the frame Privacy as Property as the decades went by (see also Figures 4-9). Significant yet lower positive correlations were also found between the variable timeframe and the level of intensity of the following frames: Appropriate Information Flow \((r = 0.144, p \leq 0.01)\), Disclosure for Community \((r = 0.130, p \leq 0.01)\), and Privacy is Dead \((r = 0.128, p \leq 0.01)\). The positive value of \(r\) revealed that the implementation of these three packages was slightly more frequent in more recent timeframes.

Also, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to further explore the correlations previously emerged between the timeframes and the levels of intensity of the frames identified. Resulting means plots were particularly helpful toward visualizing and interpreting emerging tendencies in greater detail. Means plots reported in Figures 4-9, in fact, confirmed and further illuminated the results obtained through the Pearson coefficient. As these figures show, the frame White Lies was primarily implemented in the early 1900s and almost disappeared in later decades. Furthermore, two longitudinal tendencies emerged. Fundamental Privacy steadily decreased whereas Privacy as
Property gradually increased revealing a twofold longitudinal movement in how the media framed the value of privacy. In fact, moving from earlier decades to more recent ones, media discourse implemented two distinct yet intersecting shifts. First, it progressively left aside the intrinsic value of privacy and its worth as a fundamental human right. Second, it increasingly focused upon the trade value of personal information, thereby shifting the attention towards the instrumental value of privacy – and further away from its intrinsic value (see Figures 4-9).

Minor and less regular shifts emerged for other frames as well. For instance, as the frame White Lies almost disappeared after the timeframe 1900-1909, the opposite relationship frame, Disclosure for Community, gradually increased, peaking in the decade 2000-2009. This dual shift, which may be the consequence of changes within existing social norms, suggested the emergence of newer ways to understand, perform, and organize sociality and community. In particular, as these longitudinal changes revealed, media coverage from the early 2000s was more likely to emphasize the importance of connections, community, and sociality above privacy – perhaps partly motivated by the wide spread of social media. Doing so, media coverage framed sociality as a value in competition with privacy. One possible effect of this may be that individuals increasingly understand privacy as a potential obstacle for personal relationships and community. However, it is important to remember that, despite its increased presence, Disclosure for Community emerged as a rather marginal frame.

Finally, longitudinal comparisons revealed that Appropriate Information Flow and Privacy is Dead became significantly more present in more recent years. And yet, these significant differences were, mostly, the result of unsteady growths characterized by
large differences between the first (1900-1909) and the second timeframe (1960-1969), followed by rather steady implementations in subsequent decades. These tendencies are also interesting as they reveal important patterns of continuity in how media frames surfaced longitudinally, often readopting preexisting interpretive packages in respect to evolved technological, sociocultural, political, and economic contexts. All these relationships, significant at the $p \leq .05$ level, were visualized in Figures 4-9. No significant relations were found for the frames Users’ Responsibility and Value of Truth.

Figure 4. Mean plot for the relation between timeframes and surfacing of the interpretive package White Lies.

Figure 5. Mean plot for the relation between timeframes and surfacing of the interpretive package Privacy as Property.

Figure 6. Mean plot for the relation between timeframes and surfacing of the interpretive package Disclosure for Community.

Figure 7. Mean plot for the relation between timeframes and surfacing of the interpretive package Appropriate Information Flow.
In sum, data referred to RQ1 revealed important longitudinal tendencies. First, the implementation of the frames White Lies and Fundamental Privacy decreased longitudinally whereas Privacy as Property was increasingly more present in more recent decades. These emerged as moderately significant relationships. Second, significant yet weaker relationships revealed that the frames Appropriate Information Flow, Disclosure for Community, and Privacy is Dead surfaced slightly more frequently in more recent decades. These relationships were the results of different kinds of shifts. In particular, changes in Privacy as Property and Fundamental Privacy were rather consistent and fluid across timeframes. Instead, changes in White Lies, Appropriate Information Flow, Privacy is Dead, and Disclosure for Community were more scattered. For the first three frames, shifts resulted from larger differences between the first two timeframes (1900s and 1960s) and more stable implementations from the 1970s on. Instead, the presence of the frame Disclosure for Community was rather
stable from the early 1900s until the late 1990s and increased significantly in the early 2000s – perhaps as a consequence of the introduction and wide spread of social media as platforms for social connection. In the next subsection, I will explore frame implementation across the different media outlets analyzed.

2. **Frames implementation across media outlets**

To further investigate the data and answer RQ1, descriptive statistics were calculated to describe the surfacing of different frames in the five media outlets selected. As general means scores for the levels of intensity of frames were reported in a previous section of this chapter, the current section will report solely on the distribution of Levels of Intensity in different media outlets – emphasizing those papers that implemented each package the least or the most. Results were the following: Appropriate Information Flow ranged from $M = 1.42$ in the Washington Post to $M = 2.31$ in Time magazine; Privacy is Dead ranged from $M = 1.19$ in the Washington Post, to $M = 2.19$ in Newsweek; Fundamental Privacy ranged from $M = 1.07$ in Time magazine to $M = 1.76$ in The New York Times; Privacy as Property ranged from $M = .57$ in the Chicago Tribune to $M = 1.15$ in Time magazine; Value of Truth ranged from $M = .52$ in Time magazine to $M = 1.02$ in the Washington Post; Users’ Responsibility ranged from $M = .09$ in Time magazine to $M = .44$ in the Washington Post; Disclosure for Community ranged from $M = .06$ in the Chicago Tribune to $M = .52$ in The New York Times; White Lies ranged from $M = .00$ in the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time magazine to $M = .24$ in the Chicago Tribune. These scores revealed slight overall variances
in how different outlets implemented the interpretive packages in their coverage of privacy.

To further explore these differences, additional analyses were undertaken. In particular, Pearson correlations coefficients \(r\) and oneway ANOVAs were calculated to gauge the strength and direction of the relationships between frames implemented and media outlet. As a result, the few significant correlations found were of a low nature. These revealed how the interpretive packages Fundamental Privacy \(r = 0.102, p \leq .05\), and Disclosure for Community \(r = -.117, p \leq .05\) changed across media outlets.

Oneway ANOVAs were calculated to clarify and illuminate these changes. Resulting means plots facilitated the visualization and interpretation of emerging tendencies, providing greater detail to the findings. The analysis revealed that the frame Fundamental Privacy, across timeframes, was significantly more present in the New York Times \((M = 1.76)\) than in any other media outlet \((p \leq .05)\), and was significantly less present in Time magazine \((M = 1.07, p \leq .05)\) (Figure 10). The package Disclosure for Community ranged from \(M = .06\) in the Chicago Tribune to \(M = .52\) in the New York Times, this difference was also found to be significant at the \(p \leq .05\) level (Figure 11). In sum, these relationships revealed slightly different editorial tendencies between Time magazine, the New York Times, and the Chicago Tribune. Nevertheless, significant differences were, overall, marginal.
Finally, intercoder reliability was calculated for the level of intensity of each interpretive package using the Perreault and Leigh (1989) reliability index:

\[ Ir = \left\{ \left[ \left( \frac{F_o}{N} \right) - \left( \frac{1}{k} \right) \right] k \left( k - 1 \right) \right\}^{0.5}, \text{ for } F_o \div N > 1 \div k \]

where \((F_o)\) is the observed frequency of agreement between coders, \((N)\) is the total number of judgments and \((k)\) is the number of categories. Intercoder reliability for the level of intensity of the packages White Lies and Privacy is Dead was 1; for Privacy as Property was .98; for Disclosure for Community, Users’ Responsibility, and Value of Truth was .97; for Appropriate Information Flow was .96; and for Fundamental Privacy was .92.

B. Elements of Frames

The second research question (RQ2) concerned the composition of each interpretive package. As discussed in the method section (chapter three), each frame could surface in media discourse through a number of components that rotated around a Core Position, which is the central organizing idea structuring the
frame. Beyond the Core Position, these components included: Metaphor, Exemplar, Catchphrase, Depiction (all considered framing devices), Roots, Consequences, and Appeals to Principle (considered reasoning devices). Framing devices, in particular, suggested how to think about a specific issue, they provided paradigmatic or captivating examples and delivered symbolic elements that one might use when dealing with reality. Framing devices implemented “integration and synthesis into wholes” (Gamson & Lasch, 1983, p. 398), whereas reasoning devices provided more depth and complexity to the discussion, for instance by suggesting what should be done in respect to a specific problem and emphasizing “analysis and differentiation into parts” (p. 398).

In answering RQ2, descriptive statistics were used to identify the most frequently recurring elements for each frame, measured in the whole sample. As the Core Position was the central organizing idea of the interpretive package, such element was expected to emerge as the most recurring component for the majority of frames. For this reason, in the following paragraph, the two most recurring elements of each frame will be accounted for.

Findings revealed that, at the aggregate level, the most implemented package parts were Core Positions (20.6%) and Depictions (16.8%). As expected, Core Position was the overall most implemented component. Additionally, the abundant use of Depictions revealed a general tendency of the media to implement symbolic elements or framing devices that developed appealing and typically colorful accounts of specific actors or elements involved. For instance, Depictions for the frame Appropriate Information Flow would portray the government as “nosey;” Depictions for the frame Disclosure for Community would
describe technology as a "place to share" or a "community." Depictions, and framing devices in general, provided episodic rather than thematic accounts of issues and events. In the context of this project, Depictions could have influenced individuals to think about specific instances of privacy infringements, rather than to develop a deeper thematic approach to contextualize infringements.

When focusing the analysis at the frame level, the most frequent components of the interpretive package White Lies were Core Positions (20.3%) and Appeals to Principles (17.2%). Privacy as Property was mostly implemented through Depictions (25.4%) and Core Positions (23%); Disclosure for Community emerged mainly through Appeals to Principles (22.8%) and Core Position (19.7%); Appropriate Information Flow surfaced primarily through Roots (17.5%) and Core Position (17.4%). Users' Responsibility was mostly discussed through the use of Core Position (20.7%) and Depiction (20.0%); Value of Truth emerged mostly in Appeals to Principles (21.2%) and Core Positions (19.1%), Privacy is Dead tended to appear through Core Positions (19.5%) and Depictions (17.3%); Fundamental Privacy, finally, was mostly implemented through Appeals to Principles (27.5%) and Core Positions (26.4%).

These data revealed that editorials tended to implement different reasoning devices when discussing different dimensions of privacy, as I will further discuss in the next few pages. In particular, Appeals to Principles were preferred when discussing the importance of privacy against that of other social values (such as social capital and public good). Importantly, this package part emphasized morality, ethics, and moral judgments. Typically, such emphasis can be used to effectively promote and strengthen the effects of frames (Nisbet et al., 2012).
Roots, instead, were mostly utilized when tackling the importance of adequate norms to meet the expectations of flow (such as confidentiality, in the frame Appropriate Information Flow). These tendencies will be exemplified and clarified in the following paragraphs.

To further explain the use of different packages parts, I utilize the terminology suggested by Zwarun and Yao (2007) presented in chapter two. They defined privacy as a layered construct encompassing the following five dimensions: spatial (referred to one’s property and private space), informational (referred to one’s ideas and writing), rights (involving one’s values and rights), psychological (related to one’s needs and desires in respect to privacy), and boundary management (explaining how individuals handle intrusion).

As specified above, the content analysis revealed that Appeals to Principles were utilized frequently when comparing the value of privacy to the importance of social capital (i.e. White Lies and Disclosure for Community) – which is when discussing aspects of the psychological dimension of privacy. Sociality, in fact, was presented as a need or a desire competing against privacy (in Disclosure for Community), or benefitting from the maintenance of privacy (in White Lies). To be more specific, Appeals to Principle provided a moral appeal to these two frames and endorsed certain overall principles in respect to personal relationships. Utilizing the frame White Lies, for example, the media suggested that love and friendship are based on trust and that, at times, lies could be justified by the need to preserve these relationships. Privacy, in these instances, was presented as necessary to conceal white lies and to grant the well-being of social ties. Alternatively, utilizing the frame Disclosure for Community, the media
suggested that too much privacy could endanger access to social capital. Editorials emphasized that individuals considered their need to develop relationships and to access community as more important than privacy.

Presenting these alternative judgments, Appeals to Principle provided readers with helpful indications to think about privacy and sociality. However, the media utilized this reasoning device partially, usually presenting a one-sided argument. Editorials emphasized, alternatively, that either privacy or disclosure were necessary to facilitate sociality. Media narratives favored either lies/silences (when utilizing White Lies) or disclosure (when utilizing Disclosure for Community). But they did not combine the discussion of pros and cons of the two possible choices – as the two frames typically surfaced in different editorials. As a consequence, editorials provided a partial set of reasoning devices in respect to privacy and sociality. They thus fostered a one-sided argument instead of assisting readers to engage in informed negotiations between these two societal values.

As emerged from the content analysis, Appeals to Principles were also frequently used when emphasizing the importance to follow a principle of honesty and loyalty to safeguard societal well-being (in the frame Value of Truth). In other words, the media utilized this reasoning device when discussing the dimension of privacy related to rights and values (Zwarung & Yao, 2007). Value of Truth, in fact, gauged the importance of privacy against another important social value – the public good. In particular, suggesting that one should always follow the principle of honesty and transparency, the Appeals to Principle for the current frame perpetrated a moral rhetoric that had considerable cultural importance and
rhetorical advantage. Possibly, such rhetorical advantage further reinforced the resonance of Value of Truth and, likely, further influenced readers leaving them with the unrealistic and quite unethical option to choose privacy over public good.

Finally, the use of Appeals to Principles was predominant in the framing of Fundamental Privacy. Similarly to what suggested in respect to Value of Truth, in the current case also the use of Appeals to Principle was prevalent when discussing the dimension of privacy related to rights and values (Zwarun & Yao, 2007). Emphasizing the intrinsic value of privacy had important ethical and moral implications this reasoning device provided privacy with a rhetorical advantage and a cultural resonance comparable to other fundamental values such as dignity, freedom, and autonomy. Benefitting from such resonance, the use of Appeals to Principles perhaps strengthened the frame Fundamental Privacy and encouraged readers to defend and value privacy above other values. The resonance of Fundamental Privacy, however, was diminished by the fact that this frame longitudinally disappeared from media coverage – as discussed in the answer to RQ1.

Another reasoning device, Roots, was prevalent in the framing of Appropriate Information Flow. Utilizing this package part, editorials discussed the causal dynamics that might influence or challenge the flow of information. These editorials tackled, alternatively, the spatial or the informational dimensions of privacy (Zwarun & Yao, 2007). For instance, media discourse utilized Roots to explain that controlling the flow of disclosed information may be difficult because new technologies facilitated the context migration of personal data. Emphasizing causality, the use of this reasoning device perhaps helped readers to understand
more in depth the possible risks of information sharing. However, its use may also have caused a sense of powerlessness in the readers – especially when editorials claimed that disclosure often meant inevitable loss of control. This package part, in fact, explained the causes of context migrations, but also emphasized the inevitability thereof.

The use of reasoning devices and their relationship to different dimensions of privacy will be further explored in the last chapter of this dissertation. The next few paragraphs, instead, will present some considerations on the use of framing devices in media coverage of privacy.

The use of framing devices (i.e. Depictions) was predominant in editorials that utilized the interpretive packages Privacy as Property, Privacy is Dead, and Users' Responsibility. As detailed in the next few paragraphs, these frames mostly focused on aspects of the spatial and the informational dimensions of privacy, describing privacy in terms of private data, private property, or private space. For instance, Depictions were prevalent in the frame Privacy as Property that provided a very concrete account of personal information. This frame contributed to the commodification of privacy by discussing it in terms of property and information ownership. Depictions were also predominant for the interpretive package Privacy is Dead, which was a dystopian and rather dramatic frame. For this package, the use of colorful representations resulted particularly effective in the perpetration of a more episodic dramatic effect. Importantly, editorials utilizing the frame Privacy is Dead also tended to focus upon the spatial and the informational dimensions of privacy – for instance presenting personal data in terms of ownership. Finally, framing devices surfaced occasionally in editorials that focused on the dimension
of privacy dealing with boundary management. Depictions, in fact, were frequent in the frame Users’ Responsibility. This was a rather episodic frame focusing upon specific or hypothetical instances of privacy loss due to lack of literacy – when users were depicted as “non-informed” or “irresponsible.”

One possible justification for these differences is that, for value-laden packages that discussed the dimension of privacy referred to rights and values (such as Value of Truth and Fundamental Privacy), the Appeals to Principles had stronger rhetorical advantage. Moral and ethical judgments, in fact, are rhetorical elements that frequently accompany and strengthen discussions around values and rights (Appell, 1980). As a consequence, the use of this package part had the potential to reinforce value-related frames in the mind of readers. Instead, for more episodic packages that emphasized the spatial and the informational dimensions of privacy (such as Privacy as Property and Privacy is Dead) or its boundary management dimension (such as Users’ Responsibility), intriguing symbolic devices as Depictions provided more concrete and memorable episodic accounts of the frame. Thereby, they contributed to delivering a stronger resonance. These considerations will be further explored in the last chapter, the focus of the discussion.

In sum, data analyzed in response to RQ2 contributed to understanding the structure of different frames surfaced in media coverage of privacy. At the aggregate level, findings revealed that the media tended to use mostly Core Positions and Depictions to discuss privacy. At the frame level, the media utilized predominantly Core Positions and Depictions when discussing the frames Privacy as Property, Users’ Responsibility, and Privacy is Dead.
were prevalent when the media discussed the frame Appropriate Information Flow. Finally, the media preferred using Core Positions and Appeal to Principles when presenting the frames White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Value of Truth, and Fundamental Privacy. In general, as these findings suggested, the media utilized reasoning devices when weighing privacy against other social values (such as transparency, security, and sociality) or when considering the worth of important social norms (such as confidentiality). In general, Appeals to Principles were preferred by editorials that focused on the psychological dimension of privacy, or on the dimension related to rights and values. Conversely, the media preferred utilizing Depictions when developing narratives around the spatial and the informational dimensions of privacy, or when discussing its boundary management dimension. Depictions emerged as symbolic elements; as such, they developed attractive and memorable accounts of specific events and actors. Also, Depictions tended to develop episodic rather thematic accounts of privacy; their prevalence in the discussion of more episodic frames – as those focusing on spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions - was thus not surprising.

These results, as well as the ones reported in answering RQ1, suggested important insights in respect to how media discourse framed privacy. They revealed how frames evolved and what were the main elements that structured them. They also hinted what might have been the influences of emerging technologies upon how the media discussed – and the public opinion perceived – the evolving shapes and features of privacy. To provide further insights on how media discourse rendered privacy during the last century, the next two chapters
will describe and analyze results emerged in the discourse analysis component of the current project, conducted in response to the last two research questions (RQ3 and RQ4).
V. THE ROLE OF SOCIOCULTURAL, LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS IN RESPECT TO PRIVACY - A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF MEDIA COVERAGE

Qualitative discourse analysis seeks a deeper explanation of meaning achieved through a detailed observation of thematic patterns that emerge in a mediated text. This chapter and the next (chapter six) present the qualitative analysis of news coverage of privacy implemented to answer RQ3 and RQ4. Beyond addressing these questions, the discourse analyses also aimed at substantiating, expanding, and further informing results of the quantitative content analysis detailed in the previous chapter. The themes discussed in the following pages emerged through an in-depth reading of 112 editorials – four per media outlet per timeframe. These editorials were selected during the content analysis process because they were considered particularly influential for their discussion of sociocultural, legal, political or economic backgrounds (RQ3), or because they developed narratives around the social norms related to privacy and information sharing in different technological domains (RQ4).

The editorials were read and reread several times, letting themes and thematic patterns emerge from a combination of inductive and deductive processes; some surfaced from media text inductively, others were deductively shaped by the analysis of existing literature. Most were the outcome of a combination of both techniques. The approaches to framing and to discourse analysis employed in this project guided the identification and interpretation of themes. To facilitate and systematize the documentation of the elements
surfacing from each reading, notes were taken in respect to use of language, tone, thematic patterns, variations, and silences. Excerpts, metaphors, recurring terms, and connotatively charged words were also recorded and analyzed to capture the development of themes. The notes documented the number of sources in which different elements emerged. Finally, the notes were carefully read and analyzed through the lens of existing privacy scholarship, as well as through the chosen approaches to framing and discourse analysis.

In particular, to investigate themes and patterns that emerged in news coverage of privacy in relation to societal systems and to social norms, the current qualitative analysis followed Fairclough’s (2000) approach to discourse analysis, addressing “systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and sociocultural practices” (Fairclough 1995, p. 17). Overall, the analysis sought to explain themes and patterns with the guidance of Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) approach to framing – which defines frames as central organizing ideas that convey particular social meaning. Informed by these guidelines, the analysis also held that media frames might influence the cultural understanding of privacy, contribute to the development of individual schemata, and promote particular agendas (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Throughout, the discussion was further guided and informed by the existing privacy scholarship detailed in chapter two.

The next sections will present the analysis addressing RQ3, which sought to capture whether and how media coverage of privacy across timeframes discussed and problematized the intersections between privacy and society. To be more specific, the analysis paid particular attention to how media narratives
presented the role of sociocultural, legal, political and economic contexts in respect to privacy.

Privacy, defined as control over personal information, is a concept that emerged in modern times together with changes in the sociocultural, economic, political, and legal structures of Western societies (Sennett, 1977; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). As detailed in chapter two, the surfacing of privacy is, mostly, a legacy of the 19th century. It developed in response to new or changed social systems, such as industrial capitalism and objective secularism (Sennett, 1977). In addition, towards the end of the 19th century, the national state increasingly influenced renegotiations of the acceptable intrusions of the government within individuals’ freedom, occasionally reducing citizens’ rights to privacy (Hálfdanarson, 2008; Sassen, 2006). In such a context, the need for privacy emerged as a necessary precondition for individual autonomy (Margulis, 2003; Westin, 1967) and was defined as “the need for a space of one’s own, an area in which we are left to try to do or be what we want to do or be, without the interference of other persons” (Cooke, 1999, p. 23).

Changes and continuities in the sociocultural, economic, political and legal contexts also emerged in media coverage throughout the sample. In the attempt to shed light over the emergence of these movements, the present chapter will present the main themes surfaced in how media discourse of privacy portrayed these societal contexts. Three qualitative themes emerged. The first theme revealed a longitudinal shift in the portrayal of the value of privacy. Media discourse, in the earlier timeframes, focused upon the value of privacy as a necessary component of dignity, freedom, and autonomy. Later, coverage
increasingly turned to reporting on more tangible instances of privacy infringements thereby shifting the focus upon the value of privacy as property. The second theme presented another longitudinal change surfacing in how media discourse depicted the responsibilities for privacy protection. In earlier timeframes, privacy infringements were framed as highly unethical, and privacy was presented as a fundamental value that social and moral enforcements could effectively protect. Contrarily, more recent media coverage suggested that the legal system ought to be responsible for protecting tangible instances of privacy breach. The first two themes, in media discourse, were importantly interconnected. Thus, despite the attempt to discuss them separately, overlaps inevitably emerged.

The third theme presented a necessary negotiation between the right to know, which is crucial for the well-being of society, and the right to privacy, which is an important individual right. This negotiation oscillated across timeframes as media discourse emphasized the prevalence of one or the other based upon external influences. In particular, the right to know tended to surface as more important during times of political turmoil and social insecurity, whereas the right to privacy gained natural advantage when the political, economic, legal, and social contexts were relatively more stable. This theme revealed an important element of continuity surfacing in media discourse across timeframes, as important questions related to the negotiation between right to know and right to privacy kept resurfacing indecisively. The following sections will further elaborate on these three themes providing illustrative excerpts collected from media text, and suggesting syntheses and analyses thereof.
A. The Value of Privacy: From Dignity Towards Property

A first qualitative trend that surfaced in media coverage reflected the tendency to define the value of privacy providing justifications that wavered across a continuum, from more intrinsic to more instrumental ones. In fact, in earlier timeframes, media discourse frequently discussed privacy as a necessary element of dignity, autonomy, and other civil liberties. As the decades went by, the media increasingly discussed the value of privacy in more tangible and materialistic terms, such as property and ownership. The first theme surfaced in such a fluctuation.

In particular, the intrinsic approach, more prevalent in earlier decades, presented privacy as based upon natural law and moral conduct, and defined it as a necessary component of psychological well-being, as well as a prerequisite to preserve dignity and personhood. This position – intersected with the interpretive package “fundamental privacy” previously identified in the content analysis – echoed existing scholarship in the suggestion that privacy is something that people desire for its own sake (Fried, 1990), or is an essential aspect of other fundamental values such as autonomy (Johnson, 1994) or security (Moor, 1997).

The instrumental approach, prevalent in later decades, described privacy in more materialistic terms – such as ownership and private property. It suggested that personal information is a commodity that may be purchased, traded, or sold, and it provided a rather concrete definition of infringement, reiterating a capitalist ideology. Additionally, the instrumental account of privacy often developed an economic argument in respect to personal information, reverberating the features
of the interpretive package “privacy as property” – which was identified in the content analysis and detailed in chapter four. Between these two extremes, more moderate views suggested that the decision to protect privacy was the outcome of a negotiation against countervailing values, and was necessarily contingent upon the nature of the elements involved in the negotiation. The current theme intersected with an additional, important shift in how editorials framed privacy infringements. These, in fact, were portrayed as problems to the detriment of society in the first two timeframes – when privacy was compared to freedom and other civil liberties and, as such, considered a fundamental component of democracy. Infringements were increasingly described as individual problems from the 1970s on, when privacy loss “became” a more tangible and episodic risk, frequently emerged as the object of specific Court cases. The following paragraphs further detail, illustrate, and clarify these components of the current theme.

In the early 1900s, privacy was commonly portrayed as essential for the maintenance of values such as dignity, autonomy, and freedom. Emerging tensions between such a fundamental account of privacy and the practical meanings of property started to surface in media coverage, sporadically, in the first timeframe analyzed. Editorials from the early 1900s suggested that social norms of ethical conduct usually prescribed the respect of one’s privacy, intended as one’s intimate and sacred private space, but started to identify a shift. In particular, the media seldom claimed that respecting privacy previous was an implicit ethical prerogative of social participation. And yet, with the progress of technology and the renegotiation of ethical conduct, privacy was increasingly
identified with property and, as such, eroded and infringed upon. The following excerpt, published in the Washington Post in 1908, provides a typical illustration of such a shift:

Certainly not until very lately had the right [of privacy] been assumed to make use of the name and of the picture of an individual or to drag his most intimate and private affairs into publicity without his consent or against his will for the gratification of curiosity or for pecuniary benefit. Possibly until recently no law has been needed to protect any one in those rights [of privacy], since they were assumed to be within the pale of those unwritten social laws which every one knows and respects, and which public opinion has enforced without resort to the courts. We have, however, reached a stage of progress or of retrogression in which the right to privacy is constantly invaded⁶.

Holding that the right to privacy is based upon natural law – as privacy is necessary for the moral well-being of a democratic society – such a position mimicked Warren and Brandeis’ (1890) taken on privacy. In particular, it did so by condemning the action of taking and selling pictures for personal profit and, thereby, by advocating the protection of one’s features in the name of personal privacy as,

[The protection of one’s image] establishes a wholesome code, which is for the good of society and tends to the discomfiture of busybodies, meddlers, and those who are ready to trample on their neighbors’ rights for their own benefit.⁷

Through this type of rhetoric, editorials such as the ones reported in the two excerpts above revealed a number of tensions that developed in media discourse in the early 1900s. First, the media identified and condemned the beginning of a shift from the intrinsic value of privacy, based upon unwritten natural law and safeguarded by social norms, towards a new and more

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⁷ Article #328, The Right to Privacy, Washington Post, 1908.
materialistic account of privacy. The latter was embodied in concrete elements mentioned throughout the text - such as one’s “pictures” and “private affairs” - that may be abused for “pecuniary benefits.” Second, media discourse demanded the implementation of adequate laws to safeguard the new understanding of privacy as property, whose protection could not rely anymore upon social norms of conduct. This second component will be further discussed in the section referred to the second theme.

Furthermore, the editorial quoted above – as well as others in the first timeframe – criticized a newborn fascination with gossip that was increasingly becoming part of a modern trade. In this timeframe, in fact, personal information was at times embodied in the publication of photographs or in the popularization of other private information that caused the “defamation of one’s character.” Private information was slowly becoming modern merchandise. Editorials adopted a rather indignant terminology, suggesting that the press would “drag [one’s] most intimate and private details into publicity.” Similarly, the New York Times and the Washington Post, in two editorials dated respectively 1902 and 1908, identified the violation of a right to privacy in the use of a woman’s pictures for advertising purposes “without her knowledge or consent” and thereby infringing her expectations of flow (Nissenbaum, 2010). For the first time, personal information was discussed in terms of its monetary value. In other words, media discourse began to frame the value of privacy in instrumental terms, providing exemplars in

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8 Article #16, Political Gossip, Washington Post, 1903.
which personal information was monetized. Thereby, media discourse, already in the early 1900s, may have contributed to gradually reshaping the public understanding of privacy from a fundamental value based upon natural laws to an instrumental value that may be traded or sold (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

Evidence of a shift in the portrayal of privacy from dignity to property kept surfacing in the 1960s – with features similar to the ones identified in the first timeframe – and became prevalent after the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, this shift surfaced from terms and examples used to discuss privacy, which increasingly included more materialistic accounts thereof – such as private phone numbers, Census’ data, social security numbers, and electronic records. At the same time, media discourse progressively “forgot” more abstract instances of infringements, such as those involving one’s personhood, freedom, dignity, and intimacy.

In more recent decades – especially from the late 1980s – the overarching debates revolving around the value of privacy importantly intersected, in media discourse, with the portrayals of the economic context. In particular, as the implementation of instrumental accounts of privacy increased longitudinally, the economic discussion was also more frequent in recent media coverage. Understandably, with the introduction of new marketing techniques and the increased availability (and facilitated retrievability) of data about potential consumers, the protection of privacy progressively collided with economic forces. In the 1970s and in the 1980s, private businesses started implementing practices of data collection, modeling, and targeting to develop more effective marketing campaigns (Solove, 2001). Despite these practices, media coverage in the 1970s
and in the 1980s often failed to mention the newborn and already profitable business of personal information. In fact, explicit economic considerations of privacy surfaced rather late in the media. Except for a handful of editorials that mentioned the selling of personal pictures in the first decade of the 1900s or the interests of phone companies in avoiding unlisted phone numbers in the 1960s, the economics of personal information was nearly absent from media coverage until the late 1980s.

From the 1990s, the economic discussion became rather frequent and tended to focus upon the information collection facilitated by the internet. Some editorials mentioned that the use of credit cards already enabled marketers to infer purchasing habits and ability to pay. However, the media generally described practices of behavioral marketing as legacies of the internet. For example, editorials would suggest that private companies tracked individuals’ behavior on the web for the purpose of targeted advertising. Importantly, however, editorials often failed to identify specific private companies as the actors responsible for privacy infringements. Instead, they utilized rather vague attributions of responsibility that pointed at unspecified “online companies” or “commercial enterprises.” The following editorial published in the Chicago Tribune in 1997 portrayed an emblematic approach to describe the modern economy of personal information:

People who spend time on the World Wide Web are being tracked, often without their knowledge, by commercial enterprises that collect personal data that can be used to target likely buyers. Sometimes that information can be embarrassingly personal, sometimes it can
find its way into unscrupulous hands and sometimes it can be abused$^{10}$.

Private companies, in this respect, were described in negative terms, and rarely identified by name. Not surprisingly, coverage adopted a rather concrete terminology and a mostly negative tone, describing privacy in terms of “personal data” that may be “tracked” and end up in “unscrupulous” hands. Data collection was portrayed as “covert” and “potentially embarrassing.” The business of targeting was described as “highly profitable,” “growing out of control,” “careless,” and “non-transparent.” Some editorials adopted a particularly dystopian rhetoric suggesting that, “human beings are in danger of being mere chattel for commerce$^{49}$.” Individuals were often labeled as “buyers” or “customers.”

Economic practices surfaced rather frequently in media discourse after the 1990s, bringing about power relationships and monetary interests of different groups, and often reverberating the growing capitalistic ideology that was spreading in these decades (Fairclough, 2000). The consequences of these practices could have been several. First, readers may have developed a sense of helplessness fostered by the revelations that companies tracked individuals “without their knowledge.” There was, in fact, a general lack of discussion around whether and how users might develop media literacy to counteract these “subtle practices of data collection.” Second, the terminology adopted in media coverage might have encouraged an increasing commodification of personal information in the public opinion. In general, the media tend to influence discourse practices.

They do so by providing readers with prepackaged narratives that become more readily available and may influence the vocabulary used to discuss specific issues (Fairclough, 2000).

At times, journalists suggested that, “databases are the lubricant that keeps modern businesses running” and emphasized that such practices may be discriminatory – for example when used to determine whether one is worth of credit or of health insurance. Editorials often described profiling as a “discriminatory practice.” They suggested, for example, that capitalist economy used modern databases to gradually turn private lives into commodities that have “increasingly conspicuous value in today's marketplace.” Many also responded to the risks of discriminatory practices adopting a prescribing approach, as exemplified in the following excerpt published in the Washington Post in 1998 and claiming that,

Along with medical records, financial and credit records probably rank among the kinds of personal data Americans most expect will be kept from prying eyes. As with medical data, though, the privacy of even highly sensitive financial data has been increasingly compromised by mergers, electronic data-swapping and the move to an economy in which the selling of other people's personal information is highly profitable -- and legal. [...] As the pace of the much-touted "information economy" quickens, safeguards against these previously unimagined forms of commerce become ever more important.

For the most part, the portrayal of the intersections between privacy and economy was rather stable in media discourse during the first decade of the 2000s. The rhetoric adopted echoed the one used in the 1990s. Media discourse

11 Article #355, Assaulting on Privacy: Nowhere to Hide, Time, 1991
12 Article #111, And a Matter of Privacy, Washington Post, 1998
kept emphasizing a general distrust towards business operation, especially in
closest to the internet. For example an editorial published on Newsweek in 2006
asked,

Who is this shadowy organization? It's Google—as well as Yahoo,
Microsoft and AOL, among others. None of these companies are
tracking you using cell-phone photos today, of course; that capability
is still at least a few years off. But they are following you in other
ways, and profiting from doing so. And they're gearing up to keep a
much closer eye on all of us, so that within five years these and other
firms will routinely track our movements, friends, interests, purchases
and correspondence—then make money by helping marketers take
advantage of the information.13

Not surprisingly, media coverage in the early 2000s focused upon the
“unprecedented and amazing profitability” of emerging online enterprises such as
Google, Yahoo!, and Facebook whose practices of data collection and sell were
framed as particularly worrisome. Media also noted that companies who collect
data for profit might change their policies at any time, often accessing and
collecting data without the users' knowledge or consent. Companies were seldom
identified by name. More frequently, coverage pointed at unspecified “online
private companies” as responsible for data collection. In fact, even though the
excerpt presented here provided more concrete responsibilities for privacy
breaches – naming Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, and AOL – this specificity was the
exception rather than the norm. Furthermore, personal information was
conventionally described through a commercial rhetoric, utilizing terms such as
“commodity” and adjectives such as “profitable,” “lucrative,” “measurable,” and

13 Article #34, Why Privacy Won’t Matter, Newsweek, 2006.
“valuable.” This tendency further contributed to fostering the instrumental account of privacy and to advancing the identification of privacy with private property.

Despite the general trend, in media coverage, to portray a change of the value of privacy from dignity to property, some backlash kept surfacing across decades. For instance, going beyond mere descriptions of the economics of privacy, a few recent editorial pieces suggested that the database industry was becoming a potential threat to civil liberties, partly echoing the rhetoric used in the early 1900s. Overall, however, the marginal presence of an intrinsic account of privacy in recent decades confirmed and further clarified the longitudinal decreasing of the interpretive package “fundamental privacy,” identified in the content analysis and discussed in chapter four. In recent timeframes, morality and the intrinsic depiction of privacy emerged almost as an outlying countertheme (see also Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). In fact, instrumental accounts of privacy (i.e. property) increasingly surfaced as conventional and normative. Instead, intrinsic definitions of privacy (e.g. dignity) were progressively discussed in quasi-nostalgic terms. These intrinsic accounts of privacy almost reverberated a skeptical claim that suggested that newer societies are inevitably unprincipled – because progress is often synonymous of moral decay (Smith, 2001). For instance, one editorial published in the Washington Post in 1974 implemented a rather moralistic rhetoric acknowledging that computers and machines fundamentally threatened privacy, but also emphasizing that unprincipled men
represented the bulk of the problem. In fact, “with or without technology, unprincipled men can find a way to invade our privacy.”

Within this ‘moral backlash,’ another overall tendency became increasingly central in the 1990s and in the early 2000s. In these decades, editorials voiced the need for an operational definition of privacy as a necessary first step to decide what needed to be protected in the name of privacy. The need to define privacy surfaced within a larger theme entailing the negotiation between the instrumental and the intrinsic value of privacy, as detailed in the previous pages. Editorials, in the 1990s and in the first decade of the 2000s, increasingly distinguished between our “private life” – such as intimate feelings, which are rather intrinsic accounts of privacy – and more tangible, measurable and instrumental facts, our “private parts” – such as one’s body, one’s salary or one’s purchasing desires. But media coverage also went beyond such a macro-distinction, suggesting for example that “many still try to hang on to a sense of privacy, even in today global village, but we have very unstable notions about the privacy of individuals.” This editorial suggested that the first step to protect privacy was, necessarily, to take a clear stand on its definition. In fact, the crucial factors in the perception of privacy depend upon how broadly one defines the right of privacy, how much weight one

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17 Article #370, Privacy in a Global Village, Time, 1999.
places on individual liberties and civil rights against competing interests – such as law enforcement, efficiency in business and in government.

In sum, the current discourse analysis identified a first important element of change in how media coverage discussed the value of privacy since the early 1900s. As detailed in this section, early coverage focused upon the role of privacy in the safeguard of fundamental and more abstract values such as dignity, autonomy, and freedom. Conversely, later coverage increasingly left this intrinsic component of privacy and shifted towards a more concrete account thereof, frequently identifying privacy with personal property and ownership. This change importantly intersected with the recommendations on how to protect privacy, which revealed another longitudinal change in media discourse – which will be addressed in the next section. Early editorials, in fact, suggested that the respect of privacy was perceived as a moral and ethical responsibility and, as such, could be successfully socially enforced. More recent editorials, instead, emphasized the need for formal legal enforcement, suggesting that concrete legislations were necessary to protect infringements of property and ownerships. The emphasis on the need for legal enforcement might be a consequence of a shift from presenting privacy in intrinsic terms to the more recent presentation of instrumental terms. In fact, intrinsic accounts of privacy typically described privacy as a core value of society, comparable to dignity and freedom. Individuals tend to understand intrinsic values as important for the greater public good; thus, most respect them in the name of ethics and morality (Moor, 1997). In contrast, instrumental values are more concrete; they are means to an end. Typically, their safeguard refers to individual benefits rather than societal goods. Instrumental values, thus, need to
be formally regulated (Moor, 1997). The second theme, emphasizing the shift from the social to the legal enforcement of privacy, will be further detailed in the next section.

B. **Protecting Privacy: Social Responsibility Versus Legal Enforcement**

As briefly discussed in the introduction, the first two themes presented two longitudinal changes in respect to privacy. First, media coverage shifted moving across a continuum that went from more intrinsic to more instrumental accounts of privacy, as detailed in the previous section. Second, it fluctuated in attributing the responsibility for privacy protection to social enforcement in earlier timeframes, and to legal enforcement in recent decades. These two tendencies often intersected. During the first decade of the 1900s, in fact, the media frequently emphasized that the safeguard of privacy, intended as a fundamental value, was a responsibility of natural laws and social enforcement. By the 1960s, and progressively in later decades, media coverage discussed the instrumental accounts of privacy and exemplified concrete instances of privacy loss. After the 1960s, coverage also suggested that the protection of privacy had progressively become a responsibility of the legal system. Importantly, however, the legal system was commonly portrayed as ineffective in the safeguard of privacy. This dual trend left individuals in an indecisive position in respect to privacy protection. The media, in fact, progressively suggested that legal enforcement was the only viable solution for protecting privacy. However, they also emphasized that the legal system was always inadequate for such a task – thereby leaving the problem unresolved. In addition, from the 1960s on, the intrinsic account of
privacy and a related moral code of conduct surfaced, sporadically, as peripheral counterthemes. When these counterthemes emerged, the media presented them as constantly-failing attempts to fight the moral decay of current society, skeptically refusing progress as an inherently negative change (Smith, 2001). The current section will further illustrate these tendencies, exemplifying how they emerged or faded-out during successive decades.

The growing tension between requests for legal or socio-normative protection of privacy intersected, in media discourse, with the need for a distinction in the definition of privacy. To this end, when exploring the right to privacy, Reiman (1976) suggested to separate the protection of private property from the protection of intimate facts that constitute one’s personhood and contribute to the development of one’s identity – as exemplified in the previous section. Adopting a similar distinction, media discourse from the early 1900s suggested that the safeguard of one’s personhood could hardly attain legal enforcement. The Constitution, in fact, was traditionally bent to preserve more tangible damages to private property, for which actual harm was easier to prove. For example, the current legal system failed to identify one’s personal portrait as one’s property and, consequently, had troubles condemning the use of such information without one’s consent as the violation of a property right. Until then, however, social norms were generally responsible for the protection of one’s intimacy and personhood. But at the beginning of the 20th century these norms were being renegotiated. The hint of such a renegotiation emerged, for instance, in a 1902 editorial from the New York Times that quoted Judge O’Brien – who
ruled that a right of privacy is not enforceable unless the infringement involves violation of property or actual harm. In particular, the editorial stated,

"If the use of this young woman’s picture was a legal injury at all it was an injury either to her person or to her character. We may discard entirely the suggestion that a lady has anything in the nature of a property right in her form or features that is invaded by the circulation of her picture against her will or without her consent." 18

This excerpt, as well as others from the first timeframe, suggested that legal enforcement was mostly applicable to the protection of concrete infringements of physical property. Damages to one’s personhood – to one’s “person or [one’s] character” – were not considered worth of protection from the legal system. This approach may be understandable from a practical standpoint, because non-physical infringements were clearly more difficult to detect and protect. However, the consequence of this kind of coverage might have been to further encourage a shift, in the understanding of privacy, from something that had intrinsic value – and did not need legal protection – to something that had instrumental value – and required legal safeguard. As noted in the previous section, the media were contributing to a larger reframing in public opinion of the definition of privacy. In particular, the portrayal of privacy tended to shift from a fundamental and socially enforced right to a tangible property that demanded legal protection.

By the 1960s, the legal system was still delayed in updating the protection of the information flow to the possibilities of new communication technologies (Regan, 1995). Media discourse, in this decade, focused rather frequently on the

need to revise the legal system in order to protect private information – thereby limiting the power of new technologies over data. When compared to the previous timeframe, editorials adopted a rather technical rhetoric frequently mentioning the need for proper privacy protection against “electronic surveillance,” “bugging,” “wiretapping,” “eavesdropping,” and “snooping.” Thereby, they revealed an important – and not surprising – focus on the risks brought about by surveillance technologies. Media discourse, in the 1960s, depicted the violation of privacy as a technical rather than an ethical threat. For instance, an editorial published in the Time magazine in 1967 – mentioning Westin’s work – suggested that the solution to privacy loss should be found in new legislations carefully crafted to protect informational privacy from unauthorized search. In particular the editorial claimed that,

[There is a need for] laws carefully drawn to limit access to personal-data computer banks, to end both public and private use of lie detectors and personality test unless the subject freely consents and to confine surveillance to what can actually be seen and heard with the unaided human eye and ear.\(^{19}\)

Holding that the solution for privacy protection was, primarily, a responsibility of the legal system, editorials explained that when new technologies emerge there might not be ready-to-use sets of parameters to define their features and possibilities. When discussing the “possible uses” or the “preferred uses” of technological tools, the media often adopted a neutral terminology. At times, coverage chose negatively charged descriptions, suggesting for example that new technologies enabled “new and unforeseen modes of attack.\(^{20}\)” The

\(^{19}\) Article #380, Privacy and the Law, Times, 1967.
problem, in the 1960s, was mainly identified in a slow-to-adapt legal system that risked stumbling upon operative inconsistencies, and proceeded in trial and error. For example, an editorial published in the Chicago Tribune in 1969 conveyed the difficulty of adapting existing laws to the new possibilities of wiretapping. The editorial reported that,

Is it legal when wiretapping is done off of the victim’s property? For years, the Supreme Court said it is; then, in 1967, it said it isn’t. Is wiretapping a form of search and seizure as defined in the 4th amendment? At first, the Court said no; more recently it said yes. But in saying yes, it suggested that wiretapping would be legal if conducted with a court warrant, as in the search of a person’s property.\footnote{21}

Failing to take a clear stand in relation to wiretapping – as media discourse explained – the Court epitomized the problem with new technologies that created situations for which normative definitions and parameters were not quite expressed as of yet. New technologies, in fact, challenged axiomatic assumptions of flow and encouraged a renegotiation of relevant norms, practices, and existing laws (Nissenbaum, 2010). Media discourse, across papers, frequently described analogous situations often suggesting that the Court failed to take a clear stand. By doing so, the media voiced the struggle of different groups – particularly legislators and law enforcement agents – in developing classifications and constructions of social reality (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

In addition to discussing the inadequacy of legislations in respect to privacy – as detailed in the previous excerpt – the media also informed and warned readers about current dangers for society brought about by the unpredicted

\footnote{21 Article #228, To Preserve Privacy, Chicago Tribune, 1969.}
affordances of new technologies for which the legal system still needed to adapt. Thereby, the media portrayed a current situation of legislative inadequacy. The media, however, failed to go a step forward helping readers to engage in informed action in respect to privacy, or to develop an educated and more in-depth understanding of current problems. The readers, instead, were left in a decisional limbo. They were told that the legal system was the only viable alternative for the protection of privacy but, unfortunately, legislations were portrayed as always inadequate or too slow to adapt.

Furthermore, by describing specific events and Court cases, media coverage often provided particular accounts of privacy loss that did not depict the complexity of reality. A more valuable alternative could have been to develop a thematic and more in-depth discussion of the components revolving around privacy, technology, surveillance, and legal system. The media, in other words, offered specific and partial toolkits that readers could have used to address definite instances of infringement. But the media did not provide more substantial analyses to help readers to fully understand the issues circling around privacy. Also, the media did not contribute to developing the contours of a necessary legal framework. It is understood that media coverage often does not have the word length necessary to develop comprehensive accounts of complex issues. However, this kind of episodic coverage risked providing partial understandings of privacy, and thus offering a rather limited context for the formation of a well versed public opinion (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). These issues kept resurfacing in subsequent decades, with slight changes.
Beginning in the late 1960s and increasingly in the following decades – and primarily to respond to the new possibilities of data mining and information control – the United States issued a number of laws for the protection of privacy (Regan, 1995). Despite such an effort of the legal system, media coverage of privacy in the 1970s and in the 1980s kept emphasizing legal shortfalls in respect to privacy rights. A typical approach is exemplified in the following excerpt drawn from a 1979 Washington Post editorial and claiming that,

One tough challenge in the “information age” is protecting citizens against abuses of private data, such as personal financial records, that are held by somebody else – a bank, an insurance company, a credit-reporting firm or some other private organization. […] The administration has tried to secure elementary safeguards for consumers without putting heavy new regulatory burdens on the industry involved. The aim is laudable. The results – a series of differing rules for different industries – may leave consumers somewhat confused. Congress can probably make improvements there²².

Few editorials, in these two decades, reintroduced the distinction between rights over private property and rights over what constitutes one’s personhood (as discussed in Reiman, 1976 and further detailed in the previous section). Additionally, even when acknowledging the attempts of the legal system to address the risks of emerged technological affordances, journalists kept suggesting that the legal system still needed to adapt to protect private data as carefully as it preserved more tangible beings. Another typical approach – similar to the one presented above – is exemplified in the following excerpt published in 1970 in the Time magazine,

Although a developing body of laws has begun to establish the rights and wrongs of wiretapping and bugging, modern technology provides Government agencies and others with ever more subtle and delicate means of surveillance. Legislatures and courts have hardly begun to deal with what may soon prove to be the greatest threat to man’s “right to be let alone,” as Louis Brandeis once described it. The threat is modern information-processing techniques, most notably ubiquitous tool of post-industrial society, the computer23.

As demonstrated in the two excerpts above, the principal concern – in the 1970s – involved the computerized storehouses of data, frequently described as “citizens’ personal lives and habits” owned by federal agencies. In general, the worries emerged in media discourse addressed the control over information enabled in a computerized communication environment. In comparison to the previous decade, journalists engaged in more specific requests, often emphasizing the increased need for the legal enforcement of – namely – transparency, confidentiality, and appropriate flow. Admittedly, these requests began surfacing in media coverage in the 1960s, and yet they were more sporadic and less specifically addressed then. With the advancement of technology, the terminology used became more precise and concrete – for example, increasingly voicing the need for the legal enforcement of confidentiality and transparency. And yet, this kind of coverage kept revealing a contradictory practice of the media. On one hand, they expressed the need for a more comprehensive legal framework. On the other hand, they failed to provide deeper thematic discussions of privacy that could contribute to drawing the possible contours of such a framework. Instead, coverage kept mimicking the existing scattered and episodic

legal situation; it kept focusing upon specific Court cases, as it did in the previous
decade.

The discussion in the late 1970s and 1980s tended to add a new angle to
the debate. Journalists, in fact, increasingly held that technological threats were
becoming particularly worrisome because too often individuals had no chance to
correct erroneous or misleading files. In such a scenario, journalists reported it
was difficult to be protected against mistakes or abuses of data by private
companies, law enforcement agents, or other governmental agencies. For
instance, a Washington Post editorial published in 1974 claimed that,

Clearly some basic rules need to be set before the government’s
penchant for collecting information grows any further out of hand. Last year an HEW advisory committee proposed several fundamental
principles: that there should be no files whose existence is
undisclosed; that citizens should be able to review and correct almost
all records about themselves; that information gathered for one
purpose should not be used for another one without the subject’s
consent; and that extensive efforts should be made to protect the
security and confidentiality of all files. 24

Such an approach surfaced in most editorials analyzed from the 1970s and
1980s. These editorials, in fact, focused upon the powerlessness of citizens who
become victims of detailed personal dossiers that one might not access or rectify.
The theme of powerlessness – as discussed more in detail in chapter six – was
central in Solove (2001) who specified that the ‘dossier dictatorship’ was a legacy
of computerized databases. Thus, the considerable attention paid to such theme
in media coverage of privacy during these decades is not surprising. Also, it is
important to notice that, as exemplified in the excerpt above, governmental

agencies were identified as responsible for infringements more frequently than private companies – this trend was rather uniform across decades. One possible consequence of such tendency could have been that of priming the public opinion toward the fear of a Big Brother, and partly drifting it away from the role of private companies in the process of data collection and use.

Media discourse, by the end of the 1980s, seemed to have become accustomed to the challenges that computerized technologies posed to the flow of personal information, as well as to the inability of the legal system to keep up with the pace of technological developments. Predictably, in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, some editorials still tackled the ongoing need for legal protection and enforcement of privacy rights, using a rhetoric similar to the one adopted in the previous two decades. Mostly, these editorials suggested that technological advancement and new possibilities for data surveillance too often overcame weak and dated laws by creating communicative environments for which legislations and legal definitions needed to adapt. For example, an editorial published in Newsweek in 1991 reported that,

Congress is scrambling to catch up with its constituents in the battle over privacy. It has a daunting task ahead: to make sense of the jumble of laws that have been passed -- or are currently under consideration -- to regulate privacy. Why, for example, is it legal to listen in on someone's cordless phone conversation but illegal to listen to a cellular call? Why are video-rental records protected but records of health-insurance claims largely unprotected?25

But in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, media discourse of privacy began tackling the tensions between right to privacy, technological improvements, need

for updated legislations, and loss of social norms going beyond this rather familiar approach. In these decades, in fact, new and previously unexplored considerations surfaced. These considerations emerged within the overarching thematic debate between social enforcement and legal regulation. An emerging trend, for example, concerned the risks of an overregulated communication environment. Echoing a suspect that was later carefully explored in privacy scholarship (e.g. Jarvis, 2011), in the 1990s journalists suggested that privacy infringements may be acceptable tradeoffs for those who wanted to enjoy the benefits of sociality, connection, and access to information enabled in a networked environment. Overregulation, in fact, risked hindering the opportunities of an open medium such as the internet. Moreover, some suggested, risks of privacy loss were not prerogatives of newer technologies - namely the internet. In fact, a large amount of personal information, such as Census data, was already available in public sources and private records before the web. This position is well exemplified in the following excerpt published in a Chicago Tribune editorial from 1997,

The privacy danger posed by the Internet is genuine, but it is not the huge, voracious octopus conjured up by some. While Americans are worrying about that risk, they should also keep in mind the hazards of overregulating a medium that has flourished precisely because of its wide-open, free-flowing nature.  

Matters of acceptable tradeoffs that emerged in media discourse covered a variety of domains, including but not limited to the internet. For example an editorial published in Newsweek in 1997 reported that,

In Maine lawmakers tried earlier this year to bar the release of any information without a patient's written consent. The law seemed reasonable at first, but the result was chaos. Doctors caring for the same patient couldn't compare notes without first seeking permission. Clinical labs had to stop giving patients their results over the phone. You couldn't even call a local hospital to find out if a loved one had been admitted. Confidentiality is a vital component of the trust between patients and physicians, and protecting it is worth some inconvenience. But information is the lifeblood of good health care. In short, privacy can be hazardous to your health.  

Acknowledging the risks of overregulating the safeguard of privacy, editorials such as the one quoted above presented a legitimate and important concern. Several sponsors voiced this concern exemplifying the possible consequences of excessive regulation. For instance, in the excerpt above, doctors, clinical labs, and hospitals could have been the sponsors who suggested that, “privacy can be hazardous to your health.” Thereby, they claimed the value of health over privacy. Undoubtedly, such an argument is ethically sound – in fact the value of life is clearly higher than that of privacy. However, media coverage could have added that underregulation of the health system may be as dangerous as overregulation. Instead, the media kept a one-handed, partial focus. Additionally, as emphasized in respect to previous decades, this kind of coverage reflected a rather episodic focus upon specific instances of privacy loss. Thereby, coverage failed to address a more complex problem, which should have been identified in the lack of an overarching legal framework for the safeguard of privacy. Once more, readers were left alone with a problem that had no manifest solutions; the media, in fact, claimed that overregulating the flow of information might have hindered the well-being of other societal systems - such as health

care. And yet, the media did not provide any alternative and viable direction for the safeguard of privacy.

In general, as discussed in the current section, the analysis of media discourse revealed an overarching shift from the emphasis upon the social enforcement of privacy towards the need of a legal protection thereof. Despite this dominant trend, a peripheral request to recover prior social norms for the safeguard of privacy kept emerging in media discourse. Across the decades, this scattered drift tended to surface as a reaction to technological progress that was framed as inherently negative for the moral well-being of society. In fact, the discourse around social norms and the call for the recovery of a moral code to protect personal information, which emerged as rather central in the first timeframe, was only marginally touched upon in the next decades. For instance, one editorial published in 1966 in the Time magazine suggested that the solution for privacy safeguard had to be both legal and moral, and that the decision of infringement had to be based upon an ethical negotiation against other countervailing values. Keeping the focus on technical risks and legal protection, a peripheral interest for moral conduct and ethical behavior surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s as well. Few editorials utilized a normative perspective suggesting that the expanding right of privacy increasingly collided with fair and effective law enforcement thereof. These editorials emphasized that social enforcement of privacy was the only viable alternative. In particular, journalists emphasized that privacy should have gained natural advantage over other values when the term was used as representative for dignity, independence, and integrity. In these instances – the media suggested - the norm of morality prevailed over the legal
protection of countervailing rights. Finally, in the 1990s and in the 2000s, the advice to re-implement a code of morality for the safeguard of privacy emerged, still peripherally, as a viable response to the risks of overregulation. Clearly, this peripheral tendency importantly echoed the "moral backlash" identified in relation to the first theme, which emphasized that despite the general shift in the definition of privacy, some editorials kept portraying the intrinsic and fundamental value of privacy across decades.

In sum, the second theme identified in media discourse involved the recommendations for protecting privacy. As detailed in the current section, early editorials presented the safeguard of privacy as a responsibility of the social system. More recent coverage tended to emphasize that legal enforcement of privacy was the only viable option. Within this main tendency, a few additional changes also surfaced. In the 1970s and in the 1980s the media underlined the problem of individuals’ powerlessness due to the emerged dossier dictatorship; in the 1990s and in the early 2000s the media tended to discuss the risks of overregulation and suggested that appropriate legal safeguard of privacy might also have downfalls. In general, however, media discourse shifted from demanding social enforcement for privacy to suggesting that legal protection was the most feasible solution. Importantly, the media constantly portrayed the legal system as inadequate to grant privacy protection, thereby leaving readers in a decisional limbo as to how one may effectively protect one’s privacy. Finally, the media kept emphasizing the need for a legal framework, but failed to provide a deeper thematic discussion within which the potential contours of such a
framework could have begun to emerge. To conclude, the next section will present the third and last theme surfaced in media discourse in response to RQ3.

C. Public Good Versus Private Rights

The third qualitative theme, importantly intertwined with the political context of privacy, emerged in the attempt to find a balance between the right to privacy of public figures and the right to know of citizens. The media frequently presented such balance between privacy and transparency as a prerequisite of democratic societies, necessary for the reliable conduct of public affairs. The surfacing of this theme was prevalent in times of political turmoil, such as during the years of Watergate, when transparency, honesty, freedom of the press, and public commitment were framed as fundamental principles for the well-being of society. For instance, media coverage frequently criticized lack of transparency and governmental corruption emphasizing that too much privacy might hinder public trust. Clearly, the current theme importantly intersected with the interpretive package “Value of Truth,” further detailed in chapter four.

The third theme directed the focus of the discussion towards public figures and governmental actors. Research suggested that the public opinion understands the role of government in respect to privacy wavering across opposite positions. Some would define it as a Big Brother, which is an intrinsic enemy of privacy. Others would describe it as a sentinel of freedom that embodies “our best hope” for privacy protection (Garfinkel, 2000). Between these rather extreme perceptions there are several nuances of trust and skepticism that also emerged from the longitudinal analysis of media coverage of privacy. The current
research explored the relationships between the shape of privacy and the depiction of government in media discourse. Doing so, it pointed out an additional and necessary distinction between the right to privacy of political figures and the right to know of citizens. Such a tradeoff, in fact, has been identified as necessary in democratic societies to grant the “rational and responsible conduct of public affairs and to support fair dealing in business affairs” (Westin, 2003, p. 432).

Overall, the current theme cultivated two main ideas. First, it included the discussion around the need for truth and transparency, and the role of the freedom of the press in a democratic society. This first component was particularly prevalent when specific events generated a climate of widespread public distrust. For instance, it prevailed in the first decade of the 1900s, as government was often portrayed as “corrupted,” “misgoverning,” and “crooked.” Similarly, public trust was “often betrayed” and “deceived.” To further support this idea, media coverage emphasized the values of “transparency,” “truth,” and “public trust,” priming the public opinion towards the importance thereof. In the 1960s, the claim of governmental corruption was rather peripheral. In fact, even though the freedom of the press was still framed as a necessary component of democracy, during this decade the media did not report on specific episodes of corruption. From a longitudinal perspective, the surfacing and resurfacing of a discussion around transparency revealed the role of specific events that would shift the public attention towards (or away from) governmental corruption. For example, in the 1970s this idea resurfaced in response to the Watergate scandal, still providing rather harsh critiques against governmental corruption and lack of transparency. However, in the following decades, media discourse mostly left aside this
component of the third theme. The media seldom mentioned the right to know of the citizens, but generally referred in positive terms to the achievements of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966. Generally, the discussion shifted towards the second component of the current political theme, which will be detailed in the following paragraph.

A second component involved the discussion around practices of surveillance. These were frequently described as instances of abuse of governmental power, surfacing in administrative intrusions upon the individual right of privacy. This component, absent from the first timeframe, began emerging infrequently in the 1960s, and became rather prevalent and harsh in subsequent decades. Such predominance was typically triggered by specific episodes of abuses of power epitomized in massive practices of surveillance. For instance, in the 1970s, fears of Orwellian surveillance were nurtured by actual instances of unauthorized scrutiny authored by the FBI and the CIA (Westin, 2003). Concerns of abuses of governmental power became predominant in media coverage of privacy in the 1990s and in the subsequent decade, revealing an overwhelming distrust towards the political domain. Such distrust was particularly encouraged in the context of newer communication technologies that enabled “unprecedented levels of surveillance” and data collection. The oscillation between these two components of the political theme was often encouraged by specific events that directed the public opinion in either direction. Such an oscillation is further detailed and illustrated in the following few pages through a longitudinal observation of how these two components emerged or vanished in media coverage.
During the first decade of the 1900s, the media frequently emphasized “the progress of truth” as a fundamental need for contemporary society, a necessary response to governmental corruption. When framing the importance of truth, the media often used an openly critical rhetoric, echoing the interpretive package “Value of Truth” detailed in the previous chapter. For instance, the Chicago Tribune in 1901 claimed that,

There is great need that men should see and do the truth. Men of truthfulness are needed everywhere today. On every side we are beset with falsehood, hypocrisy, deceit, and fraud. Society is misgoverned, public trust is betrayed, and people are defrauded because of secret deeds and works of darkness. There are too much concealment and deception in the transaction of men. Persons occupying positions of trust and confidence misuse the power bestowed upon them and misappropriate or squander the funds committed to their care. To protect society from such evils men must be called upon to account. Their conduct must be ever open to the inspection of their fellow-men. They cannot be allowed to go on deceiving themselves and others to the subversion of truth and the destruction of society.28

During this decade, media coverage focused on governmental corruption and lack of transparency. Editorials primarily requested the enforcement of a necessary right to know and advocated the principles of honesty, public commitment and truth. Media discourse suggested that individuals should aim at being “men of truthfulness.” The natural rhetorical advantage of truth and transparency was intensely encouraged as a solution against corruption. Importantly, in the early 1900s, there was not yet a distrust directed to public and private institutions and embodied in fears of intrusion upon one’s private life. Practices of surveillance, in fact, were not prevalent as of yet.

The tensions between right to privacy and governmental intrusion upon citizen’s private spheres started surfacing in the 1960s, and often assumed Orwellian characteristics. In this decade, media coverage held that the Constitution implicitly limited governmental authority over private information. For instance, an editorial from the Washington Post published in 1965 claimed that,

A respect for privacy distinguishes a free society from a totalitarian state. To be free, men must withhold some aspects of their lives from official regulation. Indeed, therefore, the idea of privacy is implicit in the idea of government of limited power.29

Editorials such as the one quoted above, recognized a rather important and intrinsic value to privacy, acknowledging its role in granting individual freedom, autonomy, and self-determination. This component of the negotiation between right to privacy and right to know, probably, became particularly salient in the mind of individuals when practices of surveillance were more available in public discourse. Also, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) suggested that certain themes have natural advantage and essential strength because their positions reverberate within larger cultural discussions. The discussion against surveillance was likely to have large cultural resonance as it surfaced within an overarching debate involving one’s freedom from governmental power. Such a position was perpetrated in excerpts such as the one above claiming that, “the idea of privacy is implicit in the idea of government of limited power.”

Media coverage of privacy, in the 1960s, also emphasized the necessary distinction between right to privacy and value of transparency. The first was framed as an individual’s right to participate in a free society without fear of being

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observed, because “exposure of the self to others in varying degree is a concomitant of life in a civilized community.” The second emphasized the importance of a right to know, holding that “in case of public figures almost anything can be significant.” In the 1960s, editorials also began suggesting that, “what makes a public figure is often painfully difficult to define.” In general, the negotiation between right to privacy and right to know was presented as a fundamental tradeoff whose results depended on the acknowledgement that,

The protection of the press is not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system.

In the 1960s, privacy was oftentimes presented as competing with other values, such as transparency and right to know. The following excerpt further exemplified such a tendency,

The ethical rationalizations for breaching privacy are many, and they range from the plausible to the spurious. The FBI has been known to bend wiretapping rules in the interests of fighting crime. The New England Telephone Co. recently admitted to monitoring calls “to determine the quality of customer service. Senator Thomas Dodd’s aide blandly defends the lifting of his employer’s documents on the grounds that he wanted to unmask wrongdoing.

Adopting this kind of terminology, media coverage suggested the features of a rational and informed negotiation of the value of privacy against other countervailing values or competing benefits. These values and benefits were framed echoing the interests of different sponsors who tended to promote specific

collective agendas (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). For instance, in the excerpt above, the FBI supported wiretapping emphasizing the value of “fighting crime” and thereby sponsoring the importance of security above privacy. Telephone companies sponsored the alleged prominence of “customer service” by placing its value above that of privacy and thereby justifying the practice of monitoring phone calls. Finally, the editorial quoted above emphasized the importance of scrutinizing employees’ documents as a way of “unmasking wrongdoings.” Thereby, it voiced the reasons of employers who sponsored the value of justice and ethical conduct above that of privacy. All these viewpoints, in different ways, justified practices of surveillance by promoting the nothing to hide argument.

The nothing to hide argument was often used in the media to minimize the damages of privacy infringements through the importance of screening misconduct. However, research suggested that this argument is inherently fallacious because it entails the assumption that “privacy is about hiding bad things” (Solove, 2011 para. 18). As a consequence, its potential to promote the value of truth over privacy – and thus justify surveillance – resulted unsuccessful. The nothing to hide argument emerged, often, as an episodic argument that identified privacy with secrecy. Frequently, it surfaced as a generalized and inappropriate attempt to indifferently match the adjectives “private,” “wrong,” and “hidden” thereby implying an inherently negative connotation to privacy.

In the 1970s, fears of Orwellian scrutiny, increasing distrust, and criticisms against governmental corruption were predominant in media discourse. Editorials, in this decade, tended to emphasize the right to privacy rather than the value of truth, and to condemn practices of surveillance. This tendency was not surprising.
The 1970s, in fact, were years of political turmoil epitomized in FBI and CIA excesses, and in other instances of governmental abuses culminated with the Watergate scandal (Westin, 2003). In this decade, the rhetoric implemented in the media was rather harsh. Editorials frequently claimed that governmental surveillance “destroys all anonymity and privacy.” Editorials also emphasized that governmental intrusions into personal privacy were “the most real and threatening to many American citizens today” as massive collections of data were often processed “with no clear justification.” Most claimed the need to set basic rules and policies to protect civil liberties against unreasonable practices of surveillance.

Clearly, government may have practical and principled motivations for infringing privacy. Practices of data collection, in fact, often emerged at the intersection of safety, security, and privacy. Editorials, in the 1970s, also acknowledged this tension in discussing the difficulty of reaching an acceptable and objective balance between individual rights and common goods. Accordingly, media discourse frequently claimed that, “there is a subtle balance between private rights and public needs.” In an age of increased global reconciliation – as the media suggested – it is important asking whether and how security operations are justified and whether the governmental affairs need to be so “elaborately

shrouded in secrecy\textsuperscript{37}.” To this end, media coverage tended to emphasize that, “the practice of secrecy is as serious a treat to a free society as wiretapping\textsuperscript{38}.”

Such an oscillation partly reflects the multifaceted complexity of privacy and the consequent need to weave between revealing and concealing private information – as well as between protecting individual rights and common goods. However, indecisive media coverage may further confuse readers who also hesitate between the two extremes. Understandably, though, this oscillation that emerged in media discourse may be the outcome of the media norm of balance. Following such media practice, in fact, somewhat opposite views of a theme indecisively emerge, developing antagonistic positions in respect to a particular issue (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). The solution may be to provide readers with more in-depth, thematic debates utilized to discuss and motivate practices of disclosure and practices of concealments. Thematic coverage, in fact, may contribute to further explaining how external conditions justify the emphasis on public goods or on private rights. It may thereby provide readers with more comprehensive toolkits necessary to independently develop opinions and thus contribute to informing the negotiation between right to know and right to privacy.

Towards the end of the 1970s, and perhaps in response to a number of federal privacy regulatory efforts (Westin, 2003), few journalists had begun acknowledging the attempts of the government to secure elementary safeguards for citizens, limiting the power of governmental agencies to acquire and process individuals’ records. And yet, most journalists would still suggest that more could

\textsuperscript{37} Article #399, Truth and Transparency, Time, 1973.

\textsuperscript{38} Article #401, About Secrecy, Newsweek, 1972.
be done. For example, an editorial from the Washington Post published in 1979 stated that,

Congress may well be able to tighten these provisions somewhat and give citizens that much more assurance of fair treatment by the government as well as the business world.\(^3\)

After a decade of political turmoil, the 1980s were years of governmental relief in respect to privacy rights. From a political standpoint, in fact, privacy was not a central policy issue in this decade (Westin, 2003). Not surprisingly, in the 1980s, most media coverage of privacy left aside political discourse, and only marginally touched upon the intersections between governmental power and private data. The debate between right to privacy and right to know became secondary. The only noteworthy editorial, in this respect, was published in the Chicago Tribune in 1987 and authored by Anita Allen, then associate professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center. In the editorial, Allen emphasized the ongoing need for limited governmental power. In particular, she reminded that the government should equally respect religious liberty, free speech and constitutional privacy as necessary principles for citizens to enjoy life.

Providing a contemporary baseline to capture the development of privacy matters in recent decades, Westin (2003) suggested that privacy became a primary social and political issue in America in the 1990s. Two main reasons influenced this shift. First, an increasing and unprecedented development of information technology enabled extraordinary possibilities for surveillance, often priming individuals against such a practice. Second, Federal law implemented to

\(^3\) Article #262, Protecting Privacy, Washington Post, 1979.
limit the threats of encryption programs raised major concerns among citizens and civil libertarians. In response to such turmoil, media discourse voiced concerns and criticisms against actual or possible abuses of governmental authority, thereby beginning to challenge important dynamics of power (Faircloguh, 2000). Criticisms, in media coverage, addressed three main issues: the possibilities of governmental abuses over electronic medical records, the regulation of encryption programs, and the steady need to enforce and grant a universal right to know.

During the 1990s, the use of information technologies to store and process medical information drew considerable attention of health professionals and privacy advocates, fostering criticisms against governmental surveillance. Media discourse echoed these raising concerns. A focus on medical privacy would take this analysis in a full new direction going beyond the scope of the current research project. However, instances of abuse of governmental power over electronic medical records provided further examples to examine the delicate balance between right to know and right to privacy. For instance, an editorial published in the Chicago Tribune in 1997 reported that,

Government auditors need non-judicial access to guard against fraud in the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. But information so obtained should be used only against providers, never against patients unless they are accomplices in the fraud.40

With this type of coverage, the media alarmed the public opinion against possible frauds in respect to the use of patients’ information. In particular, even after the issuance of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), in 1996, media discourse kept claiming the possibility of

40 Article # 410, Private yet Potent Medical Records, Chicago Tribune 1997.
unacceptable governmental abuses priming the public opinion against misapplications of power (Fairclough, 2000). Coverage thereby emphasized the value of privacy above unjustified surveillance.

In discussing the potential flaws of the electronic managements of medical records, editorials acknowledged the difficulties that the government may encounter in balancing the right to know and the right to privacy of the different actors. A typical approach is exemplified in the following excerpt taken from a Newsweek editorial dated 1999:

While the administration billed the rules as an attempt to strike a balance between the needs of consumers and those of the health-care industry, neither doctors nor insurance companies were happy. The doctors said the rules could actually erode privacy, pointing to a provision allowing managed-care plans to use personal information without consent if the purpose was health-care operations.41

Suggesting the difficulty to balance the “needs of consumers and those of the health care industry,” this editorial listed some of the competing interests partaking in the negotiation between right to privacy and right to collect information. This approach provided important arguments and counterarguments in respect to information protection and use. Importantly, it voiced the viewpoints of different actors involved in the negotiation. It thereby provided the public opinion with a somewhat larger perspective upon the difficulty to balance patients’ rights to privacy and health-care industry’s rights to access information.

Moving beyond the medical domain, media coverage in the 1990s focused rather frequently on the debate around encryption. The difficulty to find a balance between individual privacy and public good became particularly salient in such a

41 Article #34, A Question of Privacy, Newsweek, 1999.
debate. Also, governmental efforts to limit the use of encryption to the protection of national security generated important concerns during this decade (Westin, 2003). The media framed this uproar as an “encryption war" and emphasized the controversies surfacing around the issue. Editorials often denounced the risks of governmental abuse of power and voiced the concerns of civil libertarians. For example, a journalist claimed that, “the government says encoding your e-mail could threaten national security," and added that the government “doesn't want us to communicate and store data in complete security." The government was often depicted as “repressive” and “authorititarian” for not allowing citizens to benefit from the possibilities of data protection. Critiques to the government, in this decade, were rather frequent. Editorials suggested that the Administration “was deaf to the privacy concerns of law-abiding citizens" and “failed to achieve a good balance in the negotiation between privacy rights and protection against crime. Others claimed that the control over encryption was an attack on progress. A typical response emerged in the following excerpt taken from a Washington Post editorial published in 1992:

The civil liberties problems here are obvious, for the purposeful designing of telecommunications systems that can be intercepted will certainly lead to invasions of privacy by all sorts of individuals and organizations operating without court authorization. Further, it is an assault on progress, on scientific endeavor and on the competitive position of American industry. It’s comparable to requiring Detroit to produce only automobiles that can be overtaken by faster police cars. And it smacks of repressive government.

This type of coverage promoted important arguments sponsored by civil libertarians in respect to data collection and use. Thus, it voiced a significant countertheme and provided the public opinion with frames that one may use to challenge more powerful views in respect to privacy.

Finally, in the wake of a rather traditional request for transparency – and thus somewhat consistently with previous timeframes – a 1999 New York Times editorial renewed the discourse around the citizens’ right to know. This editorial emphasized the value of transparency and truth, and their necessary role in a democratic society. Importantly, in this excerpt, the American government was depicted adopting a rather positive connotation. The journalist, in fact, stated that,

No law is perfect. America’s Freedom of Information Act works best for the businesses that are its biggest users and have long relationships with the agencies that query. [...] Despite some flaws, however, Americans have been able to use freedom of information laws to learn about matters as diverse as the Bay of Pigs, housing discrimination and safety problems at nuclear plants. Many government officials admit that even though they resent disclosure provisions, the laws have given citizens a fundamental tool to expose and restrain government arrogance46.

In the following decade, media coverage kept alerting the public opinion against possible abuses of governmental powers. It also often emphasized the value of privacy above the right to know. These tendencies echoed concerns and anxieties emerged during the 1990s in response to the increased governmental surveillance justified by national security purposes. Two events, in particular, catalyzed the public attention in these years: 9/11 and the development of the Project Carnivore (Ventura et al., 2005). Obviously, the terroristic attack of 2001

generated a widespread anxiety and significantly increased the public approval of governmental investigative powers (Westin, 2003). In response to 9/11, Congress granted law enforcement agencies increased power enabling the issuance of a number of laws, policies, and directives that often conflicted with the wishes of civil libertarians for the protection of privacy. Specifically, the Project Carnivore – the pre-existing federal law enforcement’s surveillance tool used to monitor email communication for crime prevention – drew considerable attention from public opinion and media (Ventura et al., 2005).

A typical criticism to the possibility of governmental surveillance is exemplified in the following excerpt taken from a Chicago Tribune editorial from 2000 and claiming that,

The bureau says Carnivore provides it the ability to discriminate among e-mail messages and identify for reading by human investigators only those that meet a pre-approved standard, such as judges establish when granting a wiretap order. Civil libertarians worry, however, because under current law, e-mail messages do not enjoy the same status and protection that telephone calls do. There is no statutory requirement for high-level Justice Department approval to intercept e-mails; no limitation to investigations of serious crimes (espionage, treason, crimes of violence); no provision for exclusion of evidence obtained without the necessary approvals of the courts or the Justice Department.\footnote{Article #7, Privacy Protection in an E-mail Age, Chicago Tribune, 2000.}

In these years media discourse often criticized Congress as too slow to react to threats to privacy surfacing in the internet era. The media also emphasized that too often practices of surveillance (and consequent privacy infringements) were implemented in the name of an unjustified right to know. In this respect, media rhetoric focused rather frequently on the lack of punctuality in
the governmental protection of citizens' privacy. For example, an editorial published in 2004 stated that Congress was “just waking up to the spyware problem". Other editorials described the government as “slow,” “ineffective,” reminding that, “a national conversation about social networking and other forms of online privacy is long overdue.” Or stating that, “perhaps not surprisingly, Congress has been slow to react to the new state of affairs created by the explosion of electronic communications.”

Even when admitting that the line between crime fighting and privacy invasion was blurry, journalists tended to emphasize that the legitimacy of surveillance technologies may become questionable and infringe reasonable expectations of privacy of law-abiding citizens. In general, three main issues dominated media discourse of privacy in this decade. First, editorials debated around the legitimacy of governmental snooping. Second, journalists requested more transparent practices in respect to the collection and management of personal data. Third, the media frequently criticized governmental abuses of power over private data implemented in the name of security and safety.

In sum, the third theme framed the value of privacy as necessarily interlocked with – and typically competing against – the value of truth and the freedom of the press. This theme was importantly characterized by elements of continuity that surfaced in media coverage of privacy. In fact, important questions guiding the debate between the right to know and the right to privacy kept

resurfacing across time, as specific political events directed the prevalence of one value above the other. Clearly, the search of a balance between transparency and privacy is often problematic, and the predominance of one over the other is fundamentally tied to how each value is presented and framed. For example, in times of political turmoil and alleged governmental corruption, the value of truth was predominantly presented as a fundamental value of a democratic society. As such, it easily gained rhetorical advantage above the value of privacy of public figures. Clearly, the rhetorical advantage of the right to know above the right to privacy was even more prevalent when the value of privacy was defined in instrumental rather than intrinsic terms, as discussed earlier in this chapter. To conclude, the next section will summarize the major findings outlined in this chapter and draw some preliminary conclusions.

D. Conclusions

As discussed in this chapter, three qualitative trends prevailed in media coverage of privacy. At the beginning of the last century and in the 1960s, editorials tended to discuss privacy in terms of dignity, autonomy, and freedom. From the 1970s on, editorials increasingly described privacy more tangibly, in terms of property and ownership. In such way, the media contributed to developing an increasingly capitalist ideology, progressively encouraging a commodification of the value privacy in the mind of individuals. This tendency, in recent decades, may have primed individuals to also consider the value of privacy in more materialistic terms rather than in terms of human rights. In fact, the latter account of privacy has become less readily available in media narratives.
The second qualitative trend included the debate around the responsibilities for protecting privacy. This theme was importantly intersected with the distinction between the intrinsic and the instrumental values of privacy. In particular, the protection of intrinsic privacy was usually portrayed as a responsibility of social norms, or as the natural outcome of a moral code of conduct for the respect of personal information. Instead, the safeguard of tangible infringements was generally discussed as a responsibility of the legal system. The legal system, however, was also repeatedly portrayed as unable to promptly respond to technological changes and thus ineffective in the safeguard of privacy. Additionally, the media frequently voiced the need for a legal framework for the protection of privacy, but often hindered the possibility of its realization. Editorials, in fact, kept discussing specific instances of infringements, providing episodic rather than thematic coverage; they typically discussed Court cases rather than try to suggest what an overreaching legal framework would look like. The debate characterizing this second theme was constantly framed around the emergence of new technologies that often created contexts for which laws, norms, and technical shields needed to adapt for the defense of privacy.

Importantly, as suggested above, the media engaged in two contradictory practices in respect to this second theme. First, they emphasized the need for a legal framework necessary to address, understand, and protect privacy but they kept working against the possible actualization of such a framework. They did so by presenting specific, episodic accounts of privacy problems that needed to be solved, instead of trying to tackle deeper thematic accounts of privacy. A thematic approach, however, could better contribute to developing more in depth
understanding of the issue and postulate a broader legal perspective. Such an approach could also begin to provide guidelines to suggest the desired features of an effective legal framework. Second, the media kept suggesting that the only viable solution for the protection of privacy had to be provided by the legal system. However, they kept emphasizing the inadequacy of the legal system to effectively safeguard privacy, suggesting that laws were always too slow to adapt. Thereby, individuals were left with no viable solutions to protect their privacy; they had no concrete directions as to how they could escape the information collection enabled in new technological environments. They had, in other words, no practicable instructions as to how they could utilize their agency, or how they could effectively react to the risks of privacy breaches. The solutions provided, in fact, were often simplistic or impracticable.

One should note that, beyond an overarching longitudinal shift, the second theme involved a fundamental component of continuity. The legal system was consistently framed as inadequate to protect privacy, and there was a frequent request for a legal framework. This is important to notice because the media framed a problem (privacy infringements) and suggested a solution (legal enforcement) while also repeatedly complaining that the legal system was (and kept being) inadequate.

The third qualitative trend emerged in the fluctuation between the right to know and the right to privacy. These were discussed as countervailing values in media coverage, and the prevalence of one above the other was often the consequence of specific political circumstances. For instance, the right to know had rhetorical advantage in the first decade of the 1900s, which were years of
increased governmental corruption and distrust. Corruptions and betrayal of public trust resurfaced intermittently in subsequent decades. In this respect, the media reemphasized the importance of truth and transparency over privacy and stressed a *nothing to hide* argument – which implies that privacy is about hiding wrongdoing. Alternatively, the media fostered the rhetorical advantage of the right to privacy over the right to know. They did so by emphasizing fears of unauthorized and unmotivated surveillance and the suspicions of abuses of governmental power over the privacy of citizens. This second tendency was prevalent when specific events directed the public attention towards the risk of governmental surveillance.

These two components of the third theme – right to know and right to privacy – kept oscillating. Old and unanswered questions resurfaced and disappeared in media discourse, influenced by specific political events, as the decades went by. Such constant fluctuation suggested a societal tendency to grant rhetorical advantage, in different political contexts, either to the right to know or to the right to privacy. As a consequence, however, readers risked experiencing an ongoing cycle, in which the two values were always alternatively competing against each other, with no apparent solution or concrete direction. Such indecisive media coverage could have further confused readers who hesitated between the importance of individual rights and that of common goods. They were not provided with substantial in-depth coverage that could have assisted them in developing an independent, informed opinion in respect to privacy.
Ultimately across themes, there was a predominant tendency to emphasize the need to develop an operational definition of privacy as a necessary turning point to decide and justify what needed and deserved to be protected. The shortage of such a definition explains why the shape of privacy – in media discourse – has been fluid over the years, and why it has undecidedly touched upon several intersecting themes. As explored more in details in the current chapter, some of these themes surfaced and resurfaced organically through the sample. Others were peculiar of determinate timeframes and revealed shifts in how media discourse approached privacy, often responding to variations that emerged within different societal contexts. These preliminary conclusions will be further explored, expanded, and clarified in chapter seven, the focus of the discussion.

Finally, to provide further details on how media discourse framed privacy in the last century, the next chapter will present the results emerged from the last component of the current research, which is a discourse analysis developed to explore the social norms of privacy surfacing in media discourse across timeframes (RQ4).
VI. THE SOCIAL NORMS OF PRIVACY - A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF MEDIA COVERAGE

In response to RQ3, the previous chapter described an in-depth discourse analysis that investigated how media narratives presented the relationship between privacy and society. The chapter focused in particular upon how the media presented sociocultural, legal, economic, and political contexts in respect to privacy. The current chapter further explores how media coverage framed privacy across timeframes. It pays particular attention to the social norms that surfaced in respect to practices of information sharing within traditional and newer technological domains.

The review of literature presented in chapter two identified three main components in the discussion of social norms related to private information. These components also emerged, with different depths, in media discourse across timeframes. First, scholarship explored the contextual norms of disclosure and flow suggesting that protecting privacy is about respecting a set of transmission principles and related expectations. These depend upon the context of delivery, the types of information revealed, and the social roles of those involved in the disclosure (Nissenbaum 2010). Second, scholarship underlined the role of literacy and experience with technology as a fundamental element for the development of appropriate expectations and strategies in respect to the flow of information (Bellman et al., 2004; Freese et al., 2006; Hargittai, 2007). Third, research showed that individuals who share personal information often do so in response to a negotiation between benefits and costs of disclosure. Individuals, in
fact, often measured the value of privacy against their need and desire of sociality and public exposure (Livingstone, 2008). Finding a balance in the complex relationships between publicity, privacy, and sociality is necessary for one’s psychological well-being and sense of self-efficacy. However, this process is confusing for individuals who struggle in the attempt to gauge terms and costs of disclosure in new technological domains. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, media discourse has the opportunity to provide readers with useful guidelines to engage in effective negotiations between costs and benefits of disclosure. The media may thereby suggest appropriate expectations of privacy that apply to different technologies.

Following procedures similar to the one adopted for answering RQ3, the current section describes the discourse analysis undertook to investigate whether and how media narratives presented and problematized social norms related to privacy. In particular, the current discourse analysis relied upon the reading of 112 editorials. These were previously selected because they were considered particularly valuable due to the discussion revolving around the social norms of information sharing. To identify the themes that will be detailed in the following pages, the selected editorials were carefully read and notes were taken in respect to relevant themes emerging from the discussion. Informed by relevant literature, the process undertook to investigate the themes entailed several readings of the texts, combining inductive and deductive approaches in the identification of dominant and secondary ideas. A crucial component of the discourse analysis was the process of annotation – which paid particular attention to tone, connotative and denotative use of language, variations, and silences. To facilitate
the identification and subsequent description of themes, notes also included recurring terms and expressions, as well as particularly meaningful excerpts.

After several readings, the notes were closely evaluated and interpreted through Fairclough’s (2000) critical approach to discourse analysis, which is based upon two main ideas. First, such an approach assumes that language is a social practice and “a historically situated mode of action” (p. 309). Second, it holds that resulting narratives are both socially shaped and socially shaping. Also, the analysis followed the overarching guidelines provided by Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) approach to framing. It thus focused on the assumption that the media develop narratives fostering specific viewpoints that readers can adopt when engaging in the understanding of complex issues. Hence, the media have the opportunity to activate determinate perspectives that endorse or challenge specific actors or frames. The media thereby provide the public opinion with ready-to-use interpretive packages that simplify the complexity of reality, facilitate the understanding of intricate issues and, at times, perpetrate the spread of determinate ideologies (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

The next few pages will present the qualitative analysis of media discourse developed to investigate the social norms of privacy and of information sharing that emerged in respect to new and evolving communication environments during the 20th and 21st century.

In response to the development of new technologies that increasingly challenged and encouraged redefining strategies to manage personal information, Nissenbaum (2004; 2008) suggests following a framework of contextual integrity. Her goal is to define a framework that helps explain the moral, social, and political
foundations of information sharing as well as the related evolving norms, policies, and laws. The construct of contextual integrity, as previously discussed in the literature review, focuses on the importance of norms of informational flow. It is rooted on the assumption that data sharing is always performed within a predetermined context and necessarily assumes context-specific expectations of privacy. These expectations, in Nissenbaum’s words, include implicit and explicit contextual norms of appropriateness (e.g. what information is suitable to a specific context) and norms of flow of distribution (e.g. what are the expectations of flow attached to shared information).

The following subsections describe the social norms and expectations related to privacy that emerged in media discourse across timeframes. Editorials discussed a number of norms, incorporating them within larges thematic niches that revealed interesting patterns of continuity and change in media narratives. In particular, the first theme wavered between the claim of users’ powerlessness and that of users’ responsibility in respect to privacy protection and control of informational flow. The media developed this theme when discussing norms such as free choice and informed consent, decision of adoption, and self-regulation. The second theme developed the idea of an inevitable death of privacy and confidentiality due to the emergence of newer technology. Interestingly, this theme also revealed characteristics of continuity. In fact, as the decades went by, previous and unanswered questions and concerns kept resurfacing - after being slightly reframed as to fit newer technologies. Finally, the third theme emphasized that, for Americans, the fear of loneliness and the need for community may overcome the distress of possible privacy losses. Access to sociality was framed
as an important motivator for disclosure and yet, the media suggested, individual at times ended up sharing too much, turning their desire for community into practices of excessive exhibitionism.

In the analysis of these themes, changes as well as continuities revealed important trends and contributed to further understanding how media narratives rendered the features of privacy across decades of technological evolutions of the last century. The current chapter presents, discusses, and clarifies how these themes emerged, what features characterized them, and how their shape did (or did not) evolve across decades. Frequently, these themes were mutually interconnected in media discourse. Thus, despite the attempt to consider them in separate subsections, overlaps will inevitably emerge.

A. Privacy Control: Responsibility and Powerlessness of Users

A first qualitative theme identified in media coverage involved the discussion around privacy control. In particular, such a discussion wavered between two main points of view in respect to privacy management. The first approach, users’ powerlessness, suggested that individuals lack the power to control personal data, as they are mostly unaware of how technologies can process and elaborate information. This approach partly echoed the interpretive package “appropriate information flow” discussed in chapter four. Its utilization was prevalent in the media and began surfacing in the 1960s. The second approach, users’ responsibility, suggested that individuals should be held accountable for their privacy losses. In fact, users willingly put their information in jeopardy by utilizing technology without developing adequate literacy beforehand.
This approach mirrored the interpretive package “users’ responsibility” utilized in the content analysis. In general, this approach emerged more peripherally across all timeframes. As discussed later in this section, despite minor changes, the rhetoric utilized to develop these two aspects of the current theme was rather constant across timeframes, revealing additional combinations of continuity and change in media discourse.

Individuals who share personal information do so with specific expectations of flow in mind. These expectations are inherently contextual as they depend upon the specific norms of flow that apply to the context in which the information was delivered (Nissenbaum, 2010). However, when expectations of flow differ from actual flow, individuals lose control over their data and thus experience privacy infringements. The control of flow is importantly intersected with matters of power that different actors enjoy in respect to personal data; powerful agents, in fact, may access and process information in unpredictable ways (Solove, 2001). The ability to turn pieces of information into knowledge - exceptionally simplified in the era of computerized databases - is a layered practice of power described as a “dossier dictatorship” (Miller, 1971). Practices of information collection and processing become particularly troublesome when individuals are unaware that information about them may be collected, elaborated, stored, and used - such unawareness inevitably becomes powerlessness. Alas, power inequalities typically favor private companies and public agencies over unaware and powerless individuals who often lose control over data disclosed. To describe the dehumanization and helplessness resulting from these power inequalities, Solove (2001) suggests using a metaphor borrowed from Kafka’s novel The Trial, which
describes individuals as unable to partake in the creation or modification of detailed - and more or less accurate - profiles about them. Matters of users’ powerlessness frequently emerged in media discourse beginning in the 1960s and resurfaced rather regularly across subsequent decades, as further detailed later in this section.

The discussion tackling control of information and privacy management may revolve around matters of power differentials, but it may also focus on matters of individuals’ responsibility. This second option is complex and multilayered; it touches upon several components of responsibility that also emerged in media discourse of privacy. First, media discussed users’ responsibility in terms of free choice, suggesting that individuals have the ability to decide whether to maintain privacy or to grant access to certain information. Notably, free choice is necessarily informed choice, as awareness of the possible outcomes of one’s action is a basic component of the process. Hence, technical literacy and familiarity with newer communication environments are essential components of one’s ability and freedom to choose. This specificity, however, was rarely utilized in the editorials analyzed. Second, media coverage discussed individual responsibility suggesting that the decision of adoption of specific technologies, which was ultimately framed as an independent choice, could automatically put personal data in jeopardy. Third, users’ responsibility was described in respect to the independent decision to protect personal information. Such a decision, as described in media coverage, could bring to the adoption of privacy enhancing technologies or to the development of ethical self-regulation.de
Beginning in the 1960s, and increasingly in subsequent timeframes, media discourse suggested that new technologies enabled governmental agencies and marketers to put together detailed dossiers. Thereby, these technologies facilitated the context migration of information and challenged one’s ability to control personal data. Longitudinally, media coverage kept focusing upon individuals’ unawareness - and consequent powerlessness - in respect to privacy infringements. However, despite an overall continuity in discussing powerlessness across decades, this theme was absent from the first timeframe analyzed. This absence revealed a slight shift in the possibilities of newer computerized technologies over information, which began in the 1960s. Interestingly, the rhetoric used in discussing this theme was also rather consistent across decades. A typical approach is exemplified in an editorial published in 2002 in the New York Times:

> It is not surprising that technological innovations come at the cost of privacy. These instances [of privacy loss] are part of a growing problem, the ability of technology to capture vast amount of personal information about users, often without their knowledge.\(^50\)

The excerpt above was illustrative of such rhetoric. In particular, it revealed the tendency to approach emerging technologies through a rather dystopian lens, suggesting that technology and privacy could hardly coexist. In particular, editorials as the one quoted above hinted that new tools enabled access to personal information in previously unforeseeable ways thereby challenging a well-aware management of personal data. Such a pessimistic and resigned rhetoric, likely, spread a sense of helplessness among individuals, who were too frequently

\(^{50}\) Article #266, Technology’s Threats to Privacy, New York Times, 2002.
described as “unaware,” “uninformed,” or “helpless.” Additionally, from the late 1960s on, media coverage also focused upon the actual possibility that private and potentially discriminating information stored in databanks be “false, incorrect, or incomplete” thereby revealing “inaccurate portrayals” of “often-unaware citizens”. Flawless technology, in fact, was “nothing but a myth.” This kind of terminology was repeatedly used across papers and timeframes.

Further, editorials as the one quoted above attributed an active role to technology, portraying it as an agent able to “capture” information. Media coverage also mentioned private companies and governmental agencies as the actual agents responsible for infringements. However, a majority of editorials depicted the elaboration of data as an inherent and objective property of computerized technologies (Gibson, 1977). In media coverage, these technologies became quasi-rational agents that challenged privacy. Such a trend may have further contributed to fostering a sense of powerlessness among users. An additional consequence may have been the shifting of the responsibilities of infringement, in the minds of readers, from “rational” agents (e.g. CEOs of private companies) to rather impersonal and faceless technologies (e.g. databases, digital dossiers). The latters are more difficult to be fruitfully identified, counteracted, or blamed. This second possible consequence will be explored later, in the section referred to the second theme entailing the alleged death of privacy.

During the 1960s and 1970s, computerized technologies played a fundamental role in facilitating the process of accumulation and centralization of personal information in data banks. As noted earlier, this process was so powerful
that scholars began to frame it as a social problem in the early 1970s (Miller, 1971; Reichel, 1977). The analysis of media discourse allowed to track back the trajectory of such a social problem. This began with the state of awareness, in the 1960s, when editorials questioned potential technological shortcomings asking, for example “what if big brother is wrong?\textsuperscript{51}.” In the 1970s editorials also wandered what could be the consequences of getting “all the data in one place.\textsuperscript{52}” A typical approach is exemplified in the following excerpt published in a Chicago Tribune editorial from 1968 and claiming,

> It is bad enough to think of all the things the computer may know about us that are true, and that it will spew forth to anybody with the authority to punch our number into it. […] But it is even worse to think about the things the computer may say about us that are wrong, and that we might not even know about. […] It is of paramount importance that an individual be furnished a copy of his file and be given a chance to correct mistakes. If Big Brother insists on turning the computers loose against us, this is the least that he must guarantee in return\textsuperscript{53}.

A few important components of the excerpt above are worth a closer scrutiny. First, the editorial implicitly described privacy in terms of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010). In fact, it suggested that the violation of privacy stemmed from context migration of one’s files, rather than from the violation of one’s secret information. Second, it suggested the features of the current dossier dictatorship, emphasizing individuals’ unawareness and powerlessness. It also claimed that one’s control over the accuracy of personal information “is the least that [Big Brother] must guarantee in return.” Unfortunately, the metaphor of a “Big

\textsuperscript{51} Article #229, What if Big Brother is Wrong?, Chicago Tribune, 1968.
\textsuperscript{52} Article #274, All the Data in One Place, New York Times, 1971.
\textsuperscript{53} Article #229, What if Big Brother is Wrong?, Chicago Tribune, 1968.
“Brother” presented a rather faceless, impersonal actor. As a consequence, individuals were not provided with any concrete advice as to how they could overcome powerlessness and lack of control. Third, it portrayed technology in active terms, suggesting that computers may “know” and “say” personal information – as these are intrinsic possibilities of computerized technologies, as further discussed in a later section (Gibson, 1977). This depiction was only partly counteracted by the seeming attribution of responsibility to “anyone with the authority to punch our number.” However, this attribution of responsibility was still rather faceless as it failed to identify actual accountability that could have challenged power inequalities (Fairclough, 2000).

Later coverage of privacy, beginning in the 1980s, revealed a slow shift towards the phase of policy formation and request of reform in respect to the “dossier dictatorship.” Editorials started to advocate that citizens should be re-empowered and granted the ability to monitor, modify, and cancel – in one word, control - records about them that were stored in data banks. Such ability, as suggested in media discourse, could have helped to foster the “security” and “trustworthiness” of personal information thereby re-empowering citizens. Even though the expression “dossier dictatorship” disappeared from media discourse after the 1970s, the problem of powerlessness remained. Using a slightly new, more neutral rhetoric, editorials began to present actors of the database industry as data aggregators that built detailed profiles about defenseless individuals. The following excerpt, taken from a 1989 editorial published in the Washington Post, exemplifies the increased demand of regulations to ensure fair use of personal data and defeat individuals’ powerlessness:
The passage of a law setting out standards that will minimize the accumulation of unnecessary personal information, maximize fairness in the use of the data, enable citizens to access and verify information about them, and allow them to go to court to penalize those who violate expectations of privacy [...] is long due\textsuperscript{54}.

Presenting a normative approach to control, this excerpt depicted another common tendency of media discourse. Frequently, coverage reported on the need of newer “updated” and “more effective” regulations. These were framed as necessary tools to re-empower individuals enabling them to control how personal information was collected and used. In particular, as also detailed in chapter five, the media often identified the legal system as the main responsible for the protection of personal information through the enforcement of fair use. “Fairness,” however, was utilized vaguely and rarely defined, and this practice probably generated confusion. The determination of what could be labeled as fair use, in fact, needed further specifics that the media failed to develop. As a consequence, the media often engaged in imprecise and rather impracticable requests, which often failed to provide adequate support to improve the power of users over personal data. Additionally, limiting the discussion to the legal component of the problem simplified the multifaceted complexity of control over the contextual integrity of information. Control, instead, is naturally and necessarily interconnected with moral, social, and political foundations that the media often failed to acknowledge (Nissenmaub, 2010). Likely, this flattening resulted from the adoption of episodic rather than thematic coverage – which has been identified as a widespread media practice (Iyengar, 1991).

\textsuperscript{54} Article #263, Privacy in the Computer Age, Washington Post, 1989.
Despite the requests of more effective legal enforcement for the control of personal files, in the following decades private companies and public agencies were still allowed to collect and process information available online as well as offline. Some editorials attempted to warn readers about the large amount of personal data that “uninformed internet” users could disclose online. For instance, a Time magazine editorial dated 2000 used the expression “cyberstream” to describe the “electronic chronicle of your daily life\(^{55}\)” that individuals disclosed through their day-to-day use of the internet. The editorial reported that,

> By feeding all this information in the food processor of statistical analysis, your faithful software servants will be able to make smooth, creamy, startlingly accurate guesses about your plans for the near future. They will find patterns in your life that you didn’t know where there. […] The thief will have stolen not only your part and your present but also a reliable guide to your future\(^{56}\).

This editorial reverberated few typical practices also discussed in respect to previous timeframes. It thereby confirmed an important component of continuity in how media discussed privacy by letting unanswered questions periodically resurface. For instance, the editorial identified a rather impersonal actor, “software servants,” as responsible for the violations of the contextual integrity of information. Also, it echoed previously established concerns in respect to a dossier dictatorship, voicing the powerlessness and unawareness of individuals who “didn’t even know” that personal information could reveal patterns about their daily life. Also, the excerpt above exemplified a secondary tendency, surfaced in the 2000s, to question the ability of databases to make accurate inferences about

\(^{55}\) Article #374, Will We Have Any Privacy Left?, Time, 2000.

specific patterns of conduct. The practice of making inferences emerged in this
decade further stressed the powerlessness and lack of control over one’s
information, shifting it from one’s past and present to one’s future. Obviously, this
possibility also increased the chance of inaccurate guesses that would provide
potentially discriminating and misleading portrayals. In general, coverage fostered
pessimistic depictions of the dossier dictatorship, frequently adopting a negative
metaphoric terminology that represented the “software servants” as “thieves” who
“steal” information. And yet, critiques failed to provide concrete and prescriptive
advice as to how one may counteract the practices of the “dossier dictatorship.”
Once more, the media presented a problem that had no realistic or viable
solutions. Thereby, they shed light upon the inevitability of privacy losses and,
perhaps, discouraged users who would perceive the solution to the problem as
out of their reach.

In short, media discourse tended to discuss privacy losses as inevitable
consequences of newer technologies and emphasized the disempowerment that
individuals experienced in respect to the control of information. Thereby, the
media left readers with the impression of having few chances to effectively
engage in practices of agency and control. Despite this overarching tendency, the
media presented few alternative views acknowledging users’ responsibility in
respect to privacy control. Some editorials partly shifted the focus away from
powerlessness and towards agency, engagement, and responsibility. However, it
is important to notice that users’ responsibility was usually discussed in negative
terms. In fact, the media suggested that users should develop engagement and
agency, cultivate technical literacy, and avoid irresponsible disclosure, but also
emphasized that most fail to do so. Users should thus be blamed for their losses. These alternatives views are presented in the remaining paragraphs of the current section.

Privacy research explained that familiarity with technology is important to engage in informed privacy behavior and to rationally chose whether and how to disclose personal data and adopt control strategies (Bellman et al., 2004; Freese et al., 2006; Hargittai, 2007). Obviously, technical literacy is particularly crucial when the introduction of new communication technologies radically challenge previous expectations in respect to the flow of information shared (Bilton, 2010; Kowitz & Cranor, 2005). Technical literacy, in fact, is a necessary condition for individuals who desire to engage in informed disclosure and manage the control of personal data. Of course, control may be framed as a technical issue that needs to be regulated through executive actions to prevent public and private agents from abusing their power of collection and use of data. But control also intersects with decision of adoption, which is the choice to use technology. It is fundamentally related to free choice, which is the informed decision of sharing. And it is tied to technical literacy, which is the extent of information necessary to understand the potential of technology over personal information (Nissenbaum, 2004).

The tension that developed at the intersection of technologies, privacy, control, and users’ responsibility also emerged in media coverage. It appeared somewhat consistently, yet peripherally, across papers and timeframes. Editorials, for example, structured the discussion around the ability of technology to capture “vast amounts of personal information” about users “without their knowledge or
consent”, enabling “unprecedented possibilities” for context migration and violation of privacy. Using this rhetoric, editorials suggested that oftentimes the only choice for users who want to keep private is not to use a technology. In fact, once the information is disclosed, one has no way to control it anymore. Abstinence from technology, however, might not always be a viable choice. A New York Times editorial from 1907, for example, claimed that,

Nobody should say anything over a telephone which he would not telegraph or write upon a postal card.

The epitome of such a dystopian perspective was well exemplified in a 1970 editorial published in the Time magazine. It suggested that the only protection against privacy violation is the abstinence from sharing, the retreat from a public eye:

Privacy must be fought for step by step: the door closed, the questionnaire ignored, the mass resisted, the electronic eye out-stared, the moment of silence stolen and cherished. That way does not lie loneliness or selfishness but the best, indeed the only way toward community. For only in the healing and sometimes illuminating moments of privacy can a man make himself truly fit to live with others.

An analogous attitude was also adopted in an editorial published in Time magazine in 1999. It suggested that abstinence from technology was the only way to safeguard privacy:

You could cut up your credit cards and pay cash for everything. You could rip your EZ-Pass off the windshield and use quarters at tolls.

58 Article #381, Personal Privacy vs. the Print-Out, Time, 1970.
Editorials as the ones quoted above, further contributed to portraying progress in negative terms by suggesting that technology and privacy could hardly co-exist. However, these editorials did not focus the blame of infringements upon private companies and public agencies that were typically responsible for the collection and use of information. Instead, they shifted the responsibility upon the users of technology who must avoid disclosing because “anything out there” could be seen by “prying eyes.” The role of users was framed, again, in terms of powerlessness. Clearly, though, the choice of non-adoption was not a neutral decision. Becoming users, individuals put their information at risks because they wanted to access the benefits of technologies. More effective coverage could have acknowledged this last consideration. Also, the media could have challenged existing dynamics of power by developing detailed attribution of responsibility and by conveying the role of users in the protection of personal information. Editorials could have more clearly described the responsibilities of other powerful actors who were involved in the practices of infringement (Fairclough, 2000).

Besides blaming the mere decision of adoption, the media—in the 1980s also started to tackle matters of free and informed choice in respect to privacy protection. Editorials from the 1980s provided rather vague warnings. They mentioned for instance that spy-satellites enabled new forms of surveillance from the sky. As a consequence, they suggested that if one desired reasonable privacy, one needed to keep in mind the possibilities of emerged technologies and act accordingly. For example an editorial published in the Chicago Tribune in 1986 suggested that,
Technology and social practice do affect the boundaries of individual privacy. Before the development of the magnifying lens, a person could reasonably expect not to be seen by anyone he or she could not see. Now if you want privacy, it is best to close the drapes\textsuperscript{60}.

In general, in the 1980s few editorials – as the one above – suggested that one ought to take into account the development of technologies and laws, and adapt one’s reasonable expectations of privacy and one’s practices of disclosure appropriately. Protecting privacy, in fact, was fundamentally a responsibility of the individual. In particular, editorials explained that expectations of privacy and related social practices depended “not only on the development of technology but also on the development of law\textsuperscript{61}” and of pertinent social norms of conduct. This kind of coverage had several possible consequences. First, it charged individuals with the responsibility of their disclosures suggesting that one should be aware of the possibilities of new technologies over information. This practice could have encouraged a perceived re-empowerment in the audience, as individuals were invited to think that agency was still a possibility for privacy protection. However, media discourse often failed to provide concrete directions that could have helped individuals to develop necessary literacy. Second, media coverage suggested that technologies and social practices had consequences upon the boundaries between private and public. But the media failed to detail such a claim. Instead, they worried individuals, perhaps confused them, and motivated them to ask questions without providing viable answers. In other words, the media emphasized the importance of technical literacy, they stresses the need to

\textsuperscript{60} Article #284, Privacy and Eyes in the Sky, Chicago Tribune, 1986.

\textsuperscript{61} Article #284, Privacy and Eyes in the Sky, Chicago Tribune, 1986.
“control” and “understand” the potential flow of information, but they did not provide any concrete direction as to how actualize these practices.

In the 1990s and in the 2000s, networked technologies such as the internet and social media allowed for more ubiquitous practices of data collection nourishing even more detailed databases (Solove, 2001). In these timeframes, media coverage implemented rather specific criticisms against uninformed use, thereby emphasizing the responsibility of users. As detailed earlier, the media frequently described uninformed use focusing upon users’ powerlessness. They claimed that users of new technologies had no way to know how personal information could be processed and utilized. Fewer times, however, the media also framed uninformed use in terms of users’ responsibility. Data processing, in fact, was at times described as the possible outcome of an interaction with the internet that informed users could, to some extent, control. Especially in the 2000s, editorials provided directions for approaching the internet and social media, claiming the importance to address a domain for which social norms had not consolidated yet. For example, an editorial published in the Time magazine in 2001 explained that,

Surfing the internet feels anonymous, like looking through the pages of a magazine in a library. But the websites you visit can look back at you. Many use “cookies” to collect data about your visit—where you go in the site, what links you click on.

This editorial exemplified a moderately constructive approach to the risks of new technologies. In fact, the editorial suggested few concrete directions that one could take into account to further understand the possibilities of the internet and

act accordingly. For instance, it recommended disabling cookies to limit data collection. Unfortunately, this was a rather superficial advice that failed to present the actual complexity of the internet in respect to the flow of personal information. In addition, the practice of educating readers providing elements of technological literacy was quite infrequent. Concrete technical directions were limited to a handful on editorials published on Time magazine. More commonly, in these decades, media discourse assumed a rather critical tone, using negative terminology and suggesting that people were “willingly uninformed” as to how SNSs might use personal information. The media claimed that most users “don’t even bother reading” the “long” and “ambiguous” privacy policies. This kind of terminology was frequently adopted, fostering the theme of users’ responsibility through blame against those users who “lacked” the literacy necessary to engage in informed “decision” or “free choice” of disclosure.

A handful of editorials shifted the responsibility of privacy losses partly blaming networks and online companies for implementing complex privacy policies. These editorials began to challenge existing dynamics of power in the management of personal information. During the first decade on the 2000s, media discourse revolved around two positions in respect to online privacy protection: the complexity of privacy policies and the lack of privacy literacy. The first position developed blame against online companies, whereas the second held internet users accountable for their losses. For instance, an editorial published in Newsweek and dated 2008 reported that,

63 Article #258, Protect the Willfully Ignorant, Newsweek, 2008.
To take advantage of Facebook’s meticulous controls you have to know the function and implications of each setting: you have to understand every single trade-off. [...] When consumers lack the expertise and clairvoyance to make optimal decisions, responsibility lies with the provider. Networks need to implement stringent default privacy settings, letting users opt into greater exposure from a highly contained circle of contacts, rather than tossing them into the teeming field and letting them build walls for themselves. We’ll be grateful for the built-in constraints.

The blame against online companies emerged particularly in the implementation of negative terminology. For instance, privacy policies were frequently described as “complex,” “hidden,” “meticulous,” “non transparent,” or “excessively nuanced” to the point that internet users need to be “clairvoyant” to foresee the possibilities of information flow in networked environments. However, in editorials as the one quoted above, loss of privacy was concurrently framed as an individual responsibility in the suggestion that “consumers lack the expertise” necessary to engage in informed and responsible decisions of disclosure. Frequently, in fact, media coverage of privacy suggested that individuals increasingly disclosed information online without considering the boundaries of the audiences that could access it. Some editorials, in this respect, suggested that new practices of disclosure were “non informed.” One editorial in particular explained such a phenomenon in terms of “rational ignorance,” borrowing such expression from privacy scholarship (Acquisti, 2003; see also Arkelof, 1970). Rational ignorance, though, was not utilized as a derogatory expression. In fact, the editorial argued, internet users often choose to remain “willfully ignorant” because the cognitive cost of learning “meticulous,” “nuanced,” and “often-

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64 Article #258, Protect the Willfully Ignorant, Newsweek, 2008.
changing” privacy settings was rationally perceived as too high or, at least, not sufficiently rewarding.

Importantly, however, research showed that the collection and use of information on the part of private companies has been fundamentally related to power imbalances as well as to monetary interests. Profit often encouraged companies to adopt privacy policies with complex wording to disorient users and to encourage them to keep disclosing valuable information (e.g. Fuchs, 2012). Despite a main focus of privacy scholarship on the risks of power imbalances in the management of personal data, media coverage often failed to provide specific accounts as to how information could be collected, aggregated and used. Such specificity could have been a valuable tool to educated individuals about the possibilities of information collection in different technological domains. Thereby, the media could have contributed to re-empowering users. In general, however, critiques were developed through the use of negative tone and terminology, but rarely engaged in concrete and constructive criticism. Rather, critiques often failed to develop independent reporting that could have challenged, more in detail, important dynamics of power related to the flow of information (Fairclough, 2000; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Musa, 1996).

In sum, the media discussed matters of privacy control revolving around two alternative views: users’ powerlessness and users’ responsibility. The discussion tackling users powerlessness began to surface in the 1960s and utilized a rather consistent rhetoric across subsequent decades. In particular, from the 1960s on, the media emphasized users’ powerlessness, helplessness, and unawareness in respect to personal information echoing the concerns related to a
developing dossier dictatorship. Technology, in this respect, was often described in active terms as an agent that infringed upon users’ privacy. Importantly, across decades, old and unanswered questions kept resurfacing in relation to newer technologies revealing that the media tended to frame problems without providing solutions. They asked questions that intermittently disappeared and resurfaced without viable answers. They criticized practices of the dossier dictatorship and yet failed to provide concrete and actual advice as to how one could have counteracted these practices.

Alternatively, across all timeframes, the media presented privacy control in terms of users’ responsibility. They did so by focusing upon the decision of adoption of newer technology as a choice that could automatically hinder the flow of information. They also suggested that privacy infringements were often the consequence of lack of appropriate literacy and consequent excessive and uninformed disclosure. In general, editorials often suggested that technologies afforded surveillance, and that users necessarily exposed themselves becoming potential victims of infringement. The mere choice of adoption, the media suggested, automatically put one’s information in jeopardy. Such a discourse developed interconnections with another important theme presenting a fully dystopian approach to the development of technology and suggesting that its consequence was the inevitable death of privacy. The next section will explore such theme.
B. **The (Slow) Death of Confidentiality and Privacy**

The second qualitative theme surfacing in media narratives suggested that new communication technologies had unforeseen power over the flow of information. The media, in fact, frequently claimed that technological progress was responsible for the inevitable death of privacy and confidentiality. Needless to say, the current theme reverberated the interpretive package “privacy is dead” discussed in chapter four. Surprisingly, yet consistently with the findings of the content analysis, this theme surfaced rather steadily across all timeframes, as detailed more in depth in the current section.

Responding to the development of new technologies and focusing particularly upon the power that newer computerized tools had over personal information, private companies often claimed the death of privacy. They also frequently suggested that the attempt to protect one’s privacy had become a discarded custom. As noted early, Zuckerberg’s pronouncement that “privacy is no longer a social norm” sponsored such a frame referring to the development of SNSs. Such theme is not new. In fact, it emerged in media coverage of privacy across timeframes, longitudinally adapting the alleged death of privacy to the newer technologies emerged during the timeframe under scrutiny. The following paragraphs will further clarify this tendency. In particular, across decades, media discourse kept suggesting that new technologies – from the telegraph to social media – had unprecedented and unexpected power over information and, as a consequence, they inevitably challenged the possibility of privacy protection.
Research suggests that when new technologies emerge, individuals perceive them in terms of their potential for action, or their affordances (Gaver, 1991). Such perception may be inborn, or it may be the outcome of social influence conveyed through cultural frames available in several social planes, including the media. In particular, frames revolving around the affordances of new technologies in relation to privacy have a crucial role in how individuals understand the potential of new devices. Among the scholars who investigate the affordances of technology, some hold that these are inherent and objective properties of a tool that encourage users to engage in specific – and somewhat predetermined – actions (Gibson, 1977). Others suggest that affordances are mostly directions as to how one may use a tool. But the actual use is contingent upon one’s experience, knowledge, needs, ethics, and decisions – in one word agency (Norman, 1999). Norman’s (1999) approach implies three main assumptions. First, that the negotiation between designs, affordances, uses, and social meanings is a recursive process of mutual balancing. Second, that users have a fundamentally active role. Third, that the function of technology is dynamic and always renegotiated between producers, designers, and users (Sterne, 2003). In other words, “society shapes technology according to the needs, values, and interests of people who use the technology” (Castells, 2005, p. 3). “New” technologies, in fact, may influence the shape and features of the infosphere (Floridi, 2005), facilitate or obstacle the flow of information, encourage different levels of sharing, and provide stages that enable one to perform certain roles (Meyrowitz, 1985). Technology, though, is not autonomous (Garfinkel, 2000). It is not inherently good or evil. Users – government, private companies, and
individuals – are ultimately responsible for agency. However, by claiming an inevitable death of privacy caused by new technologies, media narratives often failed to acknowledge these possibilities for agency.

Across timeframes, the qualitative analysis revealed frequent intersections between privacy concerns and technological development, suggesting that the blame of technology for the death of privacy is not novel (Garfinkel, 2000; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). What actually changed across decades was mostly the set of tools identified as responsible for privacy losses. For example, editorials from the early 1900s already depicted the progress of new technologies - such as printing press, photography, X-ray, telegraph, and telephone - as fundamental threats to privacy. These editorials used a rhetoric fairly similar to that implemented more recently in relation to computers, internet, wiretapping, and social media. For instance, an editorial published in 1901 in the Chicago Tribune stated that,

\begin{quote}
The achievements by telephone and phonograph, X-ray, and like inventions are causing some alarms as to the possibilities of the use of electricity and other agencies for recording the deeds and words of men [...]. One only escape from such possibilities is the cultivation of a truthful life.  
\end{quote}

Similarly, an editorial published in 1907 in the New York Times reported that,

\begin{quote}
The customary use of cipher in important telegraphic business attests belief that telegraphic secrecy is not perfect. Indeed, there are few large users of the telegraph who have not had reasons to suppose that their exchanges are read with discretion and care not strictly incidental to the business of transmission.  
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
65 Article #251, The Progress of Truth, Chicago Tribune, 1901.
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More recently, an editorial published in 1989 in the Washington Post claimed that,

Improvements in technology have made access to records, and invasions of privacy, faster and easier since 1977. The Privacy Commission’s recommendations – too many of which have been ignored – are more compelling now than ever\(^{67}\).

These three excerpts referred to different technology – including the example of the use of electricity, telegraph, X-Ray and computer. Despite the differences in these technologies, a similar response to the technological process developed. Coverage, in fact, echoed the concern that “there is no escape” from data collection. It suggested the only viable solution was the “cultivation of truthful life” because privacy was dead – even in the early 1900s. The language adopted in the media was frequently negative. Editorials as the one quoted above suggested, for instance, that protecting privacy was “more compelling now than ever.” Resonating the voice of private companies and other powerful actors, the media perpetrated a dystopian approach to the management of information.

The adoption of a pessimistic approach in respect to privacy loss perhaps generated a widespread sense of inevitability and helplessness. Also, it may have encouraged individuals to give up personal information rather than react to the increasing collection and use of personal information. Clearly, powerful actors as private companies and public agencies were the main beneficiaries of this kind of rhetoric. To counteract power imbalances, assist individuals in their attempts to understand the potential of new technologies over information, and thus cultivate more possibilities for agency, the media could have developed thoughtful...
reactions to the alleged death of privacy. They could have done so by discussing such a claim, perhaps directly attributing it to powerful actors who often sponsored it (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), and by independently exploring its legitimacy. Therefore, the media could have developed and spread influential and autonomous reactions to a dominant frame and – thereby – challenged related dynamics of power (Fairclough, 2000; Musa, 1996).

At present, it may seem quite unusual to think about the death of privacy as the legacy of early and rather antique technologies as the phonograph or the telegraph. And yet, media coverage of privacy from the early 1900s frequently portrayed said technologies in these terms. This media practice suggested a fascinating, dystopian pattern of continuity in the rhetoric used to discuss how newer technologies challenged the flow of personal data, to shed light on the power of new tools over information, and to tackle their role in the claimed death of privacy (Nissenbaum, 2010; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). For example, in the first timeframe a conversation over the telephone was “as private as the greetings on a postal card” and Marconi’s telegraph was a “fundamental menace to privacy.”

In the 1960s the “technological juggernaut” was “ceaseless,” governmental wiretapping had “gone wild” and Big Brother did not tolerate any “smidgen of privacy and independent action.” In 1970 an editorial from the Time magazine held that,

71 Article #3, Privacy and Wiretapping, Chicago Tribune, 1969.
72 Article #4, Big Brother, Chicago Tribune, 1965.
Before too long, some distant automated authority may know more about a citizen than the citizen himself.\textsuperscript{73}

Comparably, an editorial published in the New York Times in 1971 suggested that,

Privacy is a crumbling wall. It is being undermined by government snooping and by persistent manipulation through public relations posing as public information.\textsuperscript{74}

Finally, a Chicago Tribune editorial published in 1997 claimed that,

The internet is one of the most powerful tools for transmitting information ever created. And in the view of some people who seek to guard their privacy, that's exactly the problem.\textsuperscript{75}

Similar rhetoric surfaced throughout the whole sample. Technology, for instance, was portrayed in negative terms as “manipulative,” “nosey,” “hidden,” “prying,” “interfering,” and “curious.” Also, technology was often discussed in active terms almost as a rational agent. Consequently, readers were encouraged to develop a negative view of technology, often maturing a sense of helplessness. Privacy, in fact, was presented as “a crumbling wall” and every attempt to protect it was described as “vain” and “fruitless” because “technology is the problem.”

This tendency toward the use of negative, dystopian, and sensational rhetoric reflected a rather common media practice. The media, in fact, frequently utilize negative episodic stereotyping to convey a sense of drama and negative emotions that may further engage readers and attract audience (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

\textsuperscript{73} Article #395, No Privacy Left, Time, 1970.
\textsuperscript{74} Article #278, The Threat to Privacy, New York Times, 1971.
\textsuperscript{75} Article # 297, Privacy and Commerce on the Net, Chicago Tribune, 1997.
As discussed so far, many editorials across timeframes revolved around the idea that newer technologies were responsible for the death of privacy. Additionally, a number of editorials provided more specific claims suggesting that newer technologies were challenging a crucial aspect of privacy: the norm of confidentiality. Confidentiality, intended as the implementation of specific restrictions to the dissemination of information, is central to the framework of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2010). In particular, Nissenbaum emphasizes the role of four main factors that influence the contours of confidentiality including context of delivery, type of information, actors, and terms of disclosure. Of crucial importance in this respect is the notion of breach of confidentiality. In fact, breach of confidentiality involves the revelation of information intended for a specific context - revelation that infringes the trust in and the expectations from specific actors. Hence, breach of confidentiality is particularly problematic from a relationship standpoint because it entails instances of unexpected disclosure and betrayal (Solove, 2005). Aspects of contextual integrity emerged within the current sample of media coverage of privacy, across papers and timeframes, revealing a rather specific focus on how technologies hampered the confidentiality of personal data. In fact, editorials mentioned confidentiality as a fundamental and increasingly jeopardized norm of flow. They suggested that such a norm applied (or should have applied) to the management of information ranging from personal pictures, to employment records, bank accounts, social security numbers, and medical histories. For example, an editorial published in 1999 in the Chicago Tribune claimed that,
With the exception of a spouse, there's hardly anyone who knows you more intimately than your doctor. Such intimacy, and the implicit guarantee of confidentiality, are essential to a good doctor-patient relationship. That confidentiality, however, is being insistently threatened by technology.\(^{76}\)

Media coverage, in the excerpt above, reported on modern challenges to the management of confidentiality focusing upon the responsibility of new technologies that were portrayed, through the use of this rhetoric, as quasi-accountable agents. In particular, editorials frequently considered the potential of information technologies for taking personal data out of the contexts of delivery and thereby violating the norm of confidentiality. Another typical approach is exemplified in the following excerpt taken from a Newsweek editorial published in 1979:

Information that Americans once considered personal and confidential – bank accounts, medical histories, employment records – has been gulped up by computers and stored for instantaneous retrieval by anyone who pushes the right button.\(^{77}\)

As exemplified here, beginning in the late 1970s and increasingly in more recent timeframes, media discourse frequently described the ability of technology to take personal information out of context thereby infringing confidentiality. The media repeatedly described impersonal actors – computers, security cameras, surveillance devices – as “violators of confidentiality.” Thus, the media also implied that agency and engagement had become a remote possibility for individuals. Despite this tendency to identify technology as responsible for the death of confidentiality, some editorials provided more concrete accounts of

\(^{76}\) Article #299, Medical Privacy Under Siege, Chicago Tribune, 1999.
\(^{77}\) Article #248, New Legislation to Guard Privacy, Newsweek, 1979.
responsibility. For instance, some criticized the IRS for turning individual tax returns over to the Department of Defense for the use in non-tax-related cases with the “push of a button” and thereby breaching norms of flow. Similarly, other editorials claimed that telephone companies engaged in practices that would “breach confidence.” More recent coverage – from the 1990s on – presented marketers as “intrusive information thieves” that used “covert software” to “spy” on internet users and targeted “unaware” or “blindfolded” potential customers. In general, from the 1970s on, the use of these negative terms to depict the violation of expected flow – and thus the breach of confidentiality – was rather frequent. This trend further confirmed that the alleged death of confidentiality and privacy are surprisingly not new.

In sum, as discussed in this section, the media frequently suggested that technological evolution involved the inevitable death of all confidentiality and privacy. In fact, the mere decision of adoption of new technologies automatically jeopardized the privacy of personal information. When utilizing this theme, the media tended to engage in two practices. First, they frequently identified technology as the active responsible for the death of privacy and confidentiality, often forgetting to identify more concrete responsibilities. Second, they adopted a pessimistic and resigned tone and utilized a dystopian rhetoric suggesting the inevitability of such alleged death. One possible consequence of such rhetoric is that of preventing users from experiencing the possibility of agency and engagement in the protection of personal information. Surprisingly, the current

theme was not a legacy of computerized technologies. In fact, the longitudinal analysis revealed its consistent resurfacing across decades, beginning in the early 1900s.

Finally, the next section will present the last theme emerging from the current discourse analysis. In particular, as further detailed in the last few pages, the analysis revealed that media coverage of privacy at times emphasized a friction between privacy and community, stressing the importance of sociality over privacy.

C. **Community, Not Privacy (But Not Exhibitionism Either)**

The third theme emerged in media discourse revealed the important connections between privacy, sociality, and publicity. Importantly, it suggested that in the United States the fear of loneliness and the desire of community are fundamental elements motivating individuals to value disclosure over privacy. As detailed in the current section, this theme started to surface peripherally in the 1960s, and became slightly more prevalent in the early 2000s – even though it was still a secondary theme. Across decades, the topics and rhetoric utilized to discuss it were rather constant, even though slight changes emerged. In particular, the discussion wavered between two extremes. In earlier decades – typically from the 1960s to the 1980s – the media suggested that Americans had reasonable motivations for sharing, which included access to community and self-fulfillment. More recently – in the 1990s and in the early 2000s – the media described new practices of disclosure in terms of excessive exhibitionism. They also suggested that the desire to access sociality had gone too far, to the point of
eroding the concept of personal boundaries in the name of publicity. These practices will be further detailed in the next few pages.

As new technologies surface, reshaping the possibilities of the communication environments, social norms of sharing and withholding information also undergo a constant renegotiation. Such a renegotiation is often influenced by the perceived benefits and costs related to practices of disclosure. An important component of this negotiation surfaces in the understanding that privacy is necessarily about opening and closing one’s boundaries to others through “selective exposure,” which is the accurate selection of information disclosed, carefully tailored to different audiences (Nippert-Eng, 2010). The practice of selective exposure is fundamentally intersected with the development of personal relationships that are oftentimes based on decisions of sharing (Debatin et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2007). Hence, disclosure is inherently encouraged by the desire to access sociality and, thereby, develop relationships.

Additionally, disclosure is an important component of the presentation of self. Social platforms, in fact, often become stages for performing the self in more or less ritualized ways. Individuals utilize these platforms to demonstrate and publicize actual or desired personal achievements and social connections and, thereby, try to improve the perception of one’s persona. This may be an inherently fulfilling practice. From photographs to social media, technology has historically provided platforms and opportunities for self-presentation thereby becoming an important vehicle for the development of sociality and publicity, also through practices of exhibitionism. And yet, these platforms also provide potential threats to personal privacy. As a consequence, individuals struggle in the attempt to
balance benefits and costs of sharing. The mutual influence between technology and social practices is not a new phenomenon. For example, as television became popular individuals became increasingly fascinated with exposure (Meyrowitz, 1985). Also, before social media reality TV already contributed to fostering forms of exhibitionism and voyeurism (Papacharissi & Mendelson, 2007).

A tension between privacy concerns and desire for sociality, publicity, and exhibitionism also emerged in media discourse. However, these topics surfaced rather marginally in media coverage of privacy from the 1960s and became slightly more frequent – yet still secondary – in the 2000s. A Washington Post editorial published in 1967, for example, suggested that,

Exposure of the self to others in varying degree is a concomitant of life in a civilized community.79

This editorial framed disclosure as a reasonable and justified means for participation in a community, hinting that sociality – and thus sharing – was an “important component” of “civil life.” Promoting the value of sociality and community over privacy, this theme perhaps invited individuals to engage in practices of disclosure. Importantly, the encouragement of exposure, as exemplified in the previous excerpt, could have been the outcome of power imbalances. For instance, private companies had relevant interests in sponsoring the norm of sociality over privacy, thereby encouraging users to keep disclosing valuable personal information (Fuchs, 2012). Practices of power, in fact, are

important components influencing how different approaches to disclosure emerge and spread (Fairclough, 2000).

The role of power in sponsoring the value of connection was well exemplified in an editorial published in 1963 in the Time magazine. It referred to the emerging practice of “requesting unlisted phone numbers” as a habit that increasingly challenged the interests of telephone companies. In fact, the editorial reported,

This trend is far from pleasing for telephone companies. “It interferes with our basic function,” says a spokesman plaintively. “We are supposed to helping people communicate.” There are also less philosophical reasons. The more unlisted numbers, the fewer phone calls, the less revenue.\textsuperscript{80}

This editorial conveyed a very important discussion confronting the value of sociality and connection – promoted by telephone companies - against the value of safeguarding personal information. The editorial, in particular, hinted that the promotion of sociality over privacy could have been a deliberate strategy of telephone companies that had considerable monetary interests in encouraging individuals to list their phone numbers. Thereby, the media clearly suggested a valuable counterargument to provide the public opinion with alternative considerations of the pros and cons of disclosure. The media thereby began to challenge dominant dynamics of power (Fairclough, 2000). It is important to remember, however, that this meaningful countertheme was adopted in only one instance.

\textsuperscript{80} Article #388, Communications: What’s My Line?, Time, 1963.
A slightly different approach is exemplified in the following excerpt taken from an editorial published in the Time magazine in 1970. It explained the tendency towards exhibitionism as a reaction against the increased impersonality of modern societies claiming that,

In a sense, the modern willingness to surrender personal information may simply be another characteristic of an age that applauds exhibitionism and encourages communal experience. [...] Thousands of people have tried to escape from the impersonality of modern life by banding together in communes – a tribal form of society that rather drastically alters an individual’s prospects on privacy.  

This editorial suggested that the need for disclosure could be explained as an attempt to react against “the impersonality of modern life.” Escape from such impersonality could be achieved through the implementation of traditional forms of sharing or “communal experiences” typical of tribal societies. However, the same editorial a few paragraphs later criticized exhibitionism and condemned excessive practices of exposure. It suggested that Americans were willing to provide “too much information about themselves.” Unfortunately, the editorial only marginally touched upon this alternative position, failing to provide necessary elements that readers could have used to independently decide between the two options. One possible consequence of such lack of depth in media coverage is that of generating confusion in the minds of readers. Readers, as a result, perhaps struggled weighing the benefits of sociality and the risks of excessive disclosure; they had not sufficient elements to engage in informed decision in favor of either position.

In the 1980s and in the 1990s, the media discussed the difficulty to engage in appropriate disclosure, avoiding unnecessary exhibitionism encouraged by emerging technologies. For example, an editorial published in the Time magazine in 1989 suggested that new technologies (namely the TV and the radio) “facilitate and encourage exhibitionistic expressions of the self.” Television in the late 1970s was portrayed as “a confessional.” Accordingly, the tendency to discuss exhibitionism as an “elusive enemy of privacy” also increased with the introduction of newer technologies. Already in the early 1990s, editorials emphasized that social norms were changing as modern society was shifting “from a ‘mind your business’ to a ‘let it all hang out’ approach to intimate information.” The epitome of exhibitionism, as suggested in media discourse, was embodied by the modern practice of ‘lifecasting’ - that is the non-stop recording of one’s life for digital distribution. Discussing such a modern practice of disclosure, an editorial published in Newsweek in 2007 reported that,

The kind of technology developed by Justin.tv [i.e. lifecasting] may one day be crucial in allowing all of us—not just exhibitionists—to create a definitive archive of everything that ever happened to us.

Editorials as the one quoted above suggested that individuals were becoming increasingly fascinated with exposure, and that online exhibitionism risked turning into a modern social norm. Lifecasting, for instance, was becoming a tool that individuals could utilize to construct shared identities and to engage in modern practices of sociality and publicity. Despite a slight criticism against

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83 Article #355, Look at Me, Time, 1991.
84 Article #58, This Is Your Life, Every Bit of It!, Newsweek, 2007.
exhibitionists, this kind of rhetoric risked normalizing practices of excessive disclosure, such as lifecasting, suggesting that we were moving towards an era when exhibitionism could become a social norm of participation.

In the first decade of the 2000s, the focus on exhibitionistic practices emerged more frequently. Media discourse, in particular, explained that the shift towards exhibitionism was the consequence of three main factors. First, the development of new “voyeuristic technologies” – from television to digital media - made it seemingly unobtrusive to observe every aspect of human’s life. Second, the fascination with gossip and talk shows, and the desire to become the center of attention thereof, encouraged people to disclose multiple details of their daily lives. Third, individuals experienced the practice of exhibitionism as a new form of connection that could foster access to sociality and defeat the risk of loneliness. Editorials presented the combination of these components as an important factor that encouraged disclosure over privacy. For example, an editorial published in the New York Times in 2008 reported that,

We log into the [Facebook] Web site because it’s entertaining to watch a constantly evolving narrative starring the other people in the library. [...] The Facebook generation has long been bizarrely comfortable with being looked at, and as performers on the Facebook stage, we upload pictures of ourselves cooking dinner for our parents or doing keg stands at last night's party; we are reckless with our personal information. 85.

The extreme consequences of such a shift towards exposure were hypothesized in a particularly dystopian editorial published in the Time magazine in 2009, which stated that,

The civility of the pre-technology days is gone. We are left with a world in which people’s lives are open to the kind of scrutiny that used to be reserved for celebrities. The concept of personal boundaries has been destroyed.\textsuperscript{86}

The use of such a negative, disappointed tone was limited to editorials published in the Time magazine. And yet, especially in the first decade of the 2000s media coverage increasingly developed criticisms against the emergence of a “society of the self,” and an “age of exhibitionism.” The media suggested that social media often triggered these practices of exhibitionism. Editorials typically identified two main reasons that encouraged excessive disclosure: the need for sociality and community, and the desire to become micro-celebrities of the web.

To summarize, the third qualitative theme described in this section revealed a tension that emerged, in media coverage, at the intersection of privacy, publicity, and sociality. Even though this theme surfaced marginally in the sample analyzed, its presence revealed important developments in how media discourse explained and framed practices of disclosure. In particular, the media suggested that individuals, beginning in the 1960s, shared personal information to escape from the impersonality of modern life. In subsequent decades, individuals became increasingly fascinated with exposure and started to experience exhibitionism as an important means for social participation. The extreme consequence of such fascination, as suggested in few editorials from the 2000s, was the erosion of personal boundaries in the name of access to community and to public exposure. Despite the strength of this kind of rhetoric, and despite its potential to favor powerful private companies whose profit depended upon individuals’ sharing

\textsuperscript{86} Article #372, No Privacy Left, Newsweek, 2009.
behaviors, it is important to remember that the current theme was only marginally utilized. The minor utilization of this theme confirmed and reflected the findings of the content analysis presented in chapter four, which showed that the interpretive package “Disclosure for Community” was rather infrequently utilized in the media.

To conclude, the next section will summarize the findings presented in this chapter and provide some preliminary conclusion. These will be further clarified and developed in the last chapter, the focus of the discussion.

D. Conclusions

As described in the previous pages, three main themes related to the social norms of privacy emerged in media discourse across timeframes. The first theme discussed the control of privacy, alternatively framing it in terms of users’ powerlessness and users’ responsibility. The second theme suggested that technological evolution, inevitably, killed all confidentiality and privacy. Finally, the third theme explored the negotiation of privacy against sociality and publicity. These overarching themes – closely intersected with some of the interpretive packages identified and described in the content analysis – surfaced in media discourse with different levels of detail. Some emerged rather superficially and proposed minor ideas that vanished longitudinally. Others were more layered and presented a stable institutional retention, frequently resurfacing across timeframes. Often, these themes were discussed episodically and narrowly; they focused on few specific aspects of privacy and typically presented only few alternative approaches to the management of personal information. Mostly, the media preferred episodic over thematic coverage (Iyengar, 1991). Thereby, they
typically maintained a rather narrow focus in describing the evolution of norms related to privacy. They also inevitably flattened the discussion of how social norms related to privacy emerged and how they intersected with newer technologies.

To be more specific, the current chapter revealed elements of continuity and change in respect to the themes emerged in media discourse across timeframes. In particular, from the 1960s on, the media discussed privacy control in terms of power differentials. For instance, individuals were described as unaware and powerless in respect to their information. The media used a rather consistent rhetoric across subsequent decades; few changes characterized this first theme. Matters of powerlessness started to surface in the 1960s and become more complex in the 1970s and 1980s, when the media began to suggest that detailed dossiers about individuals might be incorrect or misleading. From the late 1980s on, the media started to advocate that individuals should be re-empowered. However, they did so by providing vague and unrealistic directions that generated mostly naïve and impracticable solutions, leaving individuals alone in dealing with their alleged powerlessness.

Admittedly, across all timeframes, few editorials attempted to counteract the focus upon users’ powerlessness supporting instead the role of users’ responsibility in respect to privacy control. The media, in particular, suggested that users might exercise power over information, as they may choose whether to adopt new technologies. Users might also develop technological literacy and thus engage in informed disclosure. Unfortunately, the media failed to note that these were mostly biased and incomplete solutions bases upon non-neutral choices. For
instance, the decision of non-adoption would prevent individuals from benefitting from technological progress. Alternatively, technical literacy might still not be sufficient to manage personal information when other more powerful agents – such as private companies – were involved. Despite an apparent attempt to provide individuals with agency and power, these narratives failed to deliver actual and viable possibilities for engagement and participation in respect to information control. Users’ responsibility, for instance, was consistently framed as a failing attempt of re-empowerment. Individuals were never described as able to gain adequate literacy. They constantly failed to control and protect personal data. They kept disclosing too much information. The media, in other words, failed to develop concrete narratives or provide valuable solutions able to identify and challenge existing dynamics of power.

The second theme surfaced in this chapter revealed the intriguing tendency of the media to portray technologies, across the decades, as almost-rational agents responsible for the death of privacy and confidentiality. As a consequence, privacy losses could hardly be attributed to actual agents that might be identified, blamed, or counteracted. This practice made it harder to challenge complex dynamics of power and power inequalities (Fairclough, 2000). Furthermore, suggesting that new technologies – from the telegraph to social media – had unprecedented power over information, the media developed a dystopian approach to progress and technological development. They suggested that the inevitable consequences of progress entailed the loss of control over personal data.
Surprisingly, this theme is not new. In fact, the media kept reintroducing it across the decades, slightly reframing preexisting questions to adapt them to newer technologies. These questions, typically unanswered, kept resurfac ing across the decades developing an ongoing cycle of unresolved problems. Importantly, this theme crafted and spread a dangerous sense of inevitability in respect to privacy loss. As a consequence, individuals perhaps experienced frustration and helplessness, and decided that defending privacy was not a possibility anymore. Needless to say, powerful actors as private companies and governmental agencies were the main beneficiaries of this kind of rhetoric that encouraged individuals to stop worrying about their privacy, as there was no viable solution for its safeguard. Not surprisingly, Zuckerberg became one important modern sponsor of such a frame in his suggestion that privacy is no longer a social norm. In such a scenario, the media risked perpetrating dynamics of power – by emphasizing an influential frame that implicitly sustained the interests of powerful actors. Thus, media narratives further challenged the individuals’ possibilities for agency, engagement, participation, and independent decision-making.

Finally, the third theme discussed in this chapter revealed the important intersections between privacy, publicity, sociality, and exhibitionism. In particular, a few editorials in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s discussed the importance of disclosure as a necessary means for social participation. These editorials suggested that individuals disclosed to escape from the impersonality of modern life. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, editorials also began to claim that some individuals shared too much, and hinted that they did so because practices of
exhibitionism were experienced as inherently fulfilling. In the 2000s, excessive disclosure seemed to have grown out of hand. Few editorials would claim, for instance, that the Facebook community “is bizarrely comfortable with being looked at\(^{87}\)” or that, “the concept of personal boundaries has been destroyed […] in the name of community\(^{33}\).”

This focus on disclosure as means for social participation surfaced, in part, from an idea of community that is peculiar of American culture – resulting from long-lived concerns related to ethnicity, population mobility, and religious disunity that often encouraged Americans to seek shelter and social relief in communitarian affiliation (Kusmer, 1979). As a result, the third theme discussed in this chapter might also, and interestingly, be peculiar of American media.

Despite the marginal presence of this third theme, it is important to emphasize its growth in the first decade of the 2000s, which also emerged from the content analysis (see chapter four, Figure 3). Such growth, in fact, could be the sign of a potential future development of the current theme in media discourse. Importantly, an increased coverage of instances of exhibitionism, such as lifecasting, could have the effect to normalize these practices in the mind of readers, suggesting that exhibitionism is becoming a social norm. However, further data would be necessary to confirm the likelihood of this interpretation; the analysis of future coverage would contribute to further understanding and investigating the directions of this trend.

Most importantly, by focusing on the value of sociality, self-fulfillment, access to community, and participation, the current theme echoed a frame sponsored by powerful actors – such as Zuckerberg. As suggested earlier, these actors could significantly benefit from a rhetoric that encouraged disclosure over privacy by shifting the attention towards the value of sociality. Individuals were left with the idea that privacy could mean loneliness. They were presented with an ultimately biased choice between protecting personal privacy (thereby risking loneliness), and disclosing irresponsibly (as many other users do). The outcome of either alternative choice, in media discourse, was necessarily blamed on the individuals. Too much disclosure was framed as despicable; too much privacy was portrayed as likely to generate isolation. A third, more reasonable option, was not available in media discourse. These preliminary considerations will be further described, scrutinized, and illuminated in the next chapter.
VII. DISCUSSION

The purpose of this dissertation was to provide a conceptual map of the frames of privacy that were made available in American mainstream media during peaks of technological development of the 20th and 21st century. In addition, this project aimed at exploring how media discourse across time rendered the social norms related to privacy. It also investigated whether and how the media reflected upon the shape and role of sociocultural, political, economic and legal contexts with respect to privacy.

To do so, the current project primarily relied upon Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) approach to frame analysis. This is the first time that frame analysis has been utilized to explore media discourse of privacy. Thus, the initial phase of the current project was of exploratory nature and aimed at identifying the frames of privacy surfacing in media coverage. During this phase, I conducted a pilot study to develop a signature matrix (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) that was used as the coding protocol for the second phase of this project. Later, I utilized content analysis and discourse analysis techniques to answer four research questions. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches also enabled me to overcome possible limitations of both methods.

The content analysis sought to quantitatively assess frame implementation across timeframes and media outlets. It also helped me to explore how the media utilized different rhetorical styles when discussing different dimensions of privacy. The discourse analysis, informed by Fairclough’s (1995, 2000) critical approach, had two main purposes. First, it sought to explore whether and how media
narratives rendered the contextual nature of privacy, its relationships with evolving social norms, and its interactions with different societal contexts. Second, it sought to further confirm, challenge, and clarify quantitative results. Findings revealed the emergence of quantitative and qualitative trends. In fact, both the content and the discourse analysis identified interesting patterns of change and continuity in how the media discussed different aspects of privacy across time. The results of this project clarified crucial questions as to how the media rendered and communicated the shape of privacy through more than a century of technological, sociocultural, political, economic, and legal changes. Based upon the assumptions of frame theory, findings also suggested important considerations as to how the media influenced the public opinion to think about privacy by emphasizing and obscuring certain attributes and aspects of the debate, across the decades.

This chapter is divided in three main sections. First, I detail the findings, explain how they answered the research questions, and further discuss important themes that were identified through the different phases of the current research. Second, I address the limitations of this dissertation. To conclude, I suggest directions for future research.

A. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same

The first research question sought to explore the frames emerging in media coverage of privacy during different peaks of technological evolution identified through the 20th and 21st century. During the first phase of this project, a pilot study enabled me to identify eight interpretive packages utilized in the media to
discuss privacy. These packages were labeled as follows: White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Privacy as Property, Appropriate Information Flow, Users’ Responsibility, Value of Truth, Privacy is Dead, and Fundamental Privacy.

Longitudinal tendencies identified in the surfacing of these frames suggested four main considerations that will be explored in the current section. First, the most implemented packages, across decades, were Appropriate Information Flow, Privacy is Dead, and Fundamental Privacy. White Lies almost disappeared after the early 1900s. The other packages were utilized across timeframes. Second, findings revealed important elements of continuity in the presence of certain frames, such as Appropriate Information Flow, Privacy is Dead, and Value of Truth. Slightly different trends that characterized the surfacing of these frames will be specified in the next few pages. Third, the surfacing and disappearing of certain frames revealed a tendency to reintroduce old and unanswered questions, often failing to provide satisfactory answers. In general, findings showed that unresolved problems often resurfaced – which created ongoing cycles, proposed recurring rhetoric, or simply reframed pre-existing concerns. Finally, results suggested that many frames held institutional retention (Schudson, 1989) as their presence was stable across decades. Likely, institutional retention strengthened the availability of these frames and thus their potential to influence public opinion.

When measuring the utilization of frames in the whole sample, Appropriate Information Flow, Privacy is Dead, and Fundamental Privacy had the highest means. This indicated that they were the most popular frames in the sample analyzed. Their presence was fairly consistent across media outlets. More
interesting trends emerged when comparing the use of frames across timeframes. In particular, Appropriate Information Flow and Privacy is Dead were secondary frames during the first decade of the 1900s, and they became prevalent in the 1960s. Findings revealed significant differences between these two timeframes. After the 1960s, instead, the frames resurfaced rather consistently. Fundamental Privacy followed a different trend. Despite its prevalence across the sample, this frame decreased rather steadily and became a secondary frame in more recent decades – especially after the 1990s.

The popularity of Appropriate Information Flow significantly increased in the 1960s. This trend revealed the attention that media discourse ascribed to the contextual nature of privacy and to the problem of control. Utilizing this interpretive package, the media emphasized that individuals share information evaluating the context of disclosure and develop appropriate expectations of flow accordingly. As detailed in chapter two, cultural norms of flow typically inform individuals by suggesting appropriate expectations for different social situations (Nissenbaum, 2010). In the 1960s, however, something triggered a change with respect to contextual expectations and control.

In this decade, the significant increase in the presence of the frame Appropriate Information Flow was mostly the consequence of the introduction of computerized technologies. Admittedly, the 1960s had originally been selected to represent the golden age of television. However, the discourse analysis revealed that several editorials had already begun to tackle the role of computers with respect to privacy in these years. The increased presence of Appropriate Information Flow was thus not surprising. In fact, when computers emerged the
boundaries of disclosure became unclear. As a result, media coverage began to suggest that in computerized environments different actors could easily store, access, elaborate, and use personal data for unexpected purposes.

These considerations were confirmed when observing the longitudinal occurrence of the frame Privacy is Dead. Its presence was secondary in the early 1900s and became prominent from the 1960s on. Qualitative findings revealed that this change was mostly due to a dystopian reaction to the introduction and spread of computerized technologies and surveillance devices. As detailed in previous chapters, these tools renegotiated the contexts of sharing and modified the features of the communication environment. Thereby, they challenged individuals’ ability to control personal information and safeguard privacy (Nissenbaum, 2010). As a consequence, already in the 1960s, pessimistic and dramatic narratives were frequently used to claim the death of privacy.

These are important findings that require in-depth considerations. However, more qualitative interpretations discussing the longitudinal trends of Privacy is Dead, and Fundamental Privacy will be provided in the sections addressing RQ3 and RQ4. The current section, instead, will further explore and interpret a central tendency of the media with respect to frame implementation: continuity.

Results suggested that Appropriate Information Flow and Privacy is Dead surfaced rather regularly from the 1960s on. A similar pattern of continuity emerged with respect to Value of Truth. This frame was first utilized in the early 1900s. Afterwards, its use in the media alternatively grew and decreased across the decades. However, across timeframes, the use of Value of Truth was rather
constant as no significant differences were identified. Results from the discourse analysis revealed that minor shifts were typically triggered by political events rather than technological changes. This finding was not surprising because Value of Truth was identified as a political frame.

Overall, these results revealed an important media practice that could be described in terms of continuity. In fact, despite changes that emerged in different societal contexts, the narratives implemented to discuss privacy were often borrowed from previous decades. As both quantitative and qualitative findings confirmed, these narratives were slightly reframed to fit newer contexts, and then reutilized. For example, the discourse analysis revealed that media debates across timeframes emphasized the importance of either public good or individual rights to privacy. However, the media rarely provided answers, solutions, explanations, viable guidelines, or new narratives. They often failed to inform readers helping them to address the uneasy questions that revolved around individual rights and public good. Readers were rarely presented with in-depth analyses, useful to develop informed opinions and to independently address the debate. Instead, across the decades, the debate kept resurfacing. Its features were mostly unchanged. The only apparent shift was that, across timeframes, the media alternatively supported either sides of the argument influenced by contingent and transitory events.

A combination of quantitative and qualitative findings revealed that Value of Truth grew and decreased as the media alternated the focus upon the importance of either public good or privacy rights. When observed from a larger longitudinal perspective, however, these apparent shifts did not generate real change. Rather,
they developed ongoing cycles that may be explained as “cyclical patterns of attention” (McComas & Shanahan, 1999). In this respect, Downs (1972) suggested that specific events trigger dramatic media coverage that typically captures the attention of the audience. However, as time goes by, repeated coverage of an issue may “threaten certain audiences and begin to bore others” (McComas & Shanahan, 1999, p. 31). As a consequence, the media tend to refocus the attention toward alternative issues as a way to keep the audience interested (Downs, 1972). Obviously, cyclical patterns of attention were not solely triggered by the need to secure readership. Important political events, as well as the intrinsic characteristics of these events, encouraged and directed media discourse toward public good or individual rights. However, qualitative findings revealed minor changes in how each side of the debate was constructed, defended, and communicated across timeframes.

Patterns of continuity emerged for other frames as well. For example, quantitative findings showed that Appropriate Information Flow surfaced consistently from the 1960s on. The qualitative analysis emphasized that this frame discussed control in negative terms typically labeling users powerless with respect to the flow of information. Such a focus on powerlessness resurfaced across decades with slight longitudinal changes. The media frequently claimed that either the government or private companies were ultimately responsible for the respect of the Appropriate Information Flow. However, such a claim was unproductive. It did not provide answers, suggest solutions, or identify concrete responsibilities. As a result, little changed in media coverage across the decades. Readers kept experiencing powerlessness through available media narratives. In
other words, readers were left in an unresolved condition of “dossier dictatorship” with no apparent answers or viable solutions.

As I will further detail in the section addressing RQ4, the reemergence of pending questions and unsettled debates also characterized the frame Privacy is Dead. However, to understand such resurfacing, it is important to emphasize here that Privacy is Dead was a rather sensational and colorful frame. Therefore, its features were particularly likely to generate attention and to increase readership. In fact, the use of a dramatic appeal has frequently proven effective in generating interest – and media space has often been allocated based on a “need for sustained drama” (McComas & Shanahan, 1999). Such a need could be useful in explaining the recurrence of this dramatic frame. More in-depth considerations in this respect will be provided later in this chapter.

To further explore the patterns identified in this section and suggest how continuity of media frames may have contributed to shaping public opinion, I refer to the work of Schudson (1989). In the attempt to gauge the role of the media in influencing their audiences, Schudson (1989) developed a model to measure the strength of cultural objects. For this purpose, he described media frames as pre-packaged cultural objects made available through media narratives. Schudson (1989) suggested that the “potency of a cultural object” (p. 160) could be assessed through five dimensions that include retrievability, rhetorical force, resonance, institutional retention, and resolution.

*Retrievability* is the reach of a cultural object – such as the ability of a media frame to reach its audience. The presence of a frame in a major media outlet is usually sufficient to grant certain levels of retrievability. Additional
elements are necessary to make the frame memorable. Among these, *rhetorical force* is the result of using different communicative strategies to attract an audience. Examples of rhetorical strategies include the use of logical, emotional, and ethical appeals. *Resonance* is referred to the extent to which a frame is relevant for its audience. For instance, placing the individual at the center of the storyline may contribute to increasing resonance. *Institutional retention* describes the continuity of a frame. It is often identified with the recognition of a specific frame within a culture. In other words, a frame has high institutional retention when it makes its way into public awareness and becomes widely adopted instead of fading out. *Resolution* is the last dimension identified by Schudson (1989). It refers to intrinsic characteristics of a frame that have the ability to encourage or direct actions. A frame with high resolution, in other words, involves mobilizing information and tells its readers how to act in response to an event or issue that is being reported.

Schudson’s (1989) remarks on the five dimensions of a cultural object can be applied to the current study of frames to further understand the patterns of continuity and cyclical attention identified earlier. In particular, the current section suggests considerations with respect to the retrievability and the institutional retention of the frames analyzed.

The interpretive packages studied in this dissertation had different levels of retrievability and institutional retention across timeframes. For instance, White Lies almost disappeared after the early 1900s, therefore, its retrievability importantly decreased. The frame had no institutional retention. Disclosure for Community surfaced consistently from the 1960s through the 1990s and became
significantly more frequent in the early 2000s. However, its presence was overall marginal. Users’ Responsibility surfaced rather constantly – yet marginally – across timeframes. Overall, these frames had low levels of retrievability and of institutional retention.

Higher levels of retrievability and institutional retention were measured for other frames. Fundamental Privacy gradually declined and thus became less retrievable as the decades went by. However, Fundamental Privacy was amongst the frames with highest means in the whole sample. This finding may suggest that the frame had such a strong presence in the past that some of its components survived in American culture, despite its decrease in media narratives. As I will detail at the end of this chapter, future research could address such consideration. On the contrary, the presence of Privacy as Property increased longitudinally and became particularly frequent from the 1980s. Privacy as Property spread later in comparison to other frames. However, its presence in the last few decades analyzed revealed patterns of continuity and thus suggested moderate institutional retention. Finally, the frames Appropriate Information Flow, Privacy is Dead, and Value of Truth were all moderately retrievable across decades and media outlets – mainly from the 1960s on. The reoccurrence of these frames across time, described earlier in terms of continuity, revealed that their presence in media narratives was not a fad.

Admittedly, institutional retention should also be measured through the actual institutionalization of a frame. In other words, to gauge institutional retention researchers should measure the use of frames in larger cultural forums – such as the education system, the political system, and the economic system.
Nevertheless, because of the continuity of these interpretive packages across timeframes and media outlets, their institutionalization was considered at least plausible. The assumptions of frame theory also contributed to supporting this consideration. In fact, as discussed in chapter two, the current project held that media frames have the ability to influence the public opinion by providing it with pre-packaged meanings and cultural symbols (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

To conclude, findings revealed interesting patterns of continuity and change that characterized the frames analyzed. In general, the media tended to reutilize pre-existing frames adapting them to the features of newer technologies or of current political events. Often, problems and questions surfaced, faded out, and resurfaced. Typically no viable solutions or acceptable answers were provided. Frames strength was assessed in relation to their retrievability and institutional retention. Finally, specific trends that emerged in relation to Fundamental Privacy and Privacy as Property will be explored in a later section of the current chapter. Disclosure for Community will also be further discussed later, in a section focusing upon the tradeoffs between sociality and privacy. The next section examines the features and the rhetorical strategies that characterized the frames identified in the current analysis.

B. Whose Fault Is It? Media Rhetoric, Episodic Framing and Attribution of Responsibility

The second research question aimed at exploring the elements that structured the frames identified. In this respect, the current section outlines how specific rhetorical strategies were used in the media in relation to different frames
of privacy. It also suggests the possible consequences of these stylistic choices. As detailed earlier in this dissertation, Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) methodological approach informed the current research. Thus, using a signature matrix, two coders accounted for the presence of frames through the use of different packages parts in media discourse. These parts included the following: Metaphors, Exemplars, Catchphrases, Depictions, Roots, Consequences, and Appeals to Principle. Gamson and colleagues (1983; 1989) specified that package components could be sorted into two macro categories. Metaphors, Exemplars, Catchphrases, and Depictions are considered framing devices. Roots, Consequences, and Appeals to Principle are described as reasoning devices. To explore the use of different rhetorical strategies, the current section outlines some of the results presented in previous chapters and further clarifies them by looking back on the literature (Iyengar, 1991; 1996; 2005).

At the aggregate level, findings revealed the tendency of media coverage to mostly discuss privacy through the use of Depictions. Depictions are symbolic framing devices that provide captivating accounts of specific issues. They deliver colorful images that become particularly memorable in the minds of readers. In the sample analyzed, the use of Depictions aimed at creating a dramatic tone, typical of episodic framing. In fact, episodic frames provide appealing versions of events to illustrate reality and engage the audience – thereby also addressing market pressures (Iyengar, 2005). In the United States episodic framing has proven predominant in the presentation of news stories (Iyengar, 2005). Therefore, the prevailing use of Depictions found in the current project was not surprising.
When analyzing the use of packages parts at the frame level, findings revealed the prevalence of two elements: Depictions and Appeals to Principle. The media preferred using different components to discuss different aspects of privacy. In particular, the media used mostly Depictions to deliver the frames Privacy as Property, Privacy is Dead, and Users’ Responsibility. Consistently, episodic framing was customary when the media utilized these informative packages. On the contrary, Appeals to Principle were prevalent to discuss White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Value of Truth, and Fundamental Privacy. When presenting these frames, the media tended to adopt a less episodic approach, providing more reasoning prompts that enabled readers to further understand the terms of the debate.

As detailed in previous chapters, Privacy as Property was an economic frame that identified privacy with private property or ownership. Quantitative and qualitative findings revealed that this interpretive package focused upon concrete and sensational accounts of privacy infringements, such as trespass. Editorials frequently described private information as a profitable commodity that could be traded or sold, often adopting a dramatic tone. This focus upon the concrete and measurable character of privacy pointed at the spatial and at the informational dimensions thereof (Zwarun & Yao, 2007). Clearly, these dimensions have inherently concrete features that were effectively visualized through deft images and rendered through episodic portrayals. Not surprisingly, negative tone, dramatic appeal, and captivating images were used to strengthen episodic framing, intensify emotional reactions in the audience, and thereby gain readership (Aarøe, 2011; Gross, 2008, Schudson, 1989).
Similar considerations were true for the package Privacy is Dead. As detailed in previous chapters, this frame described privacy as something that could be tracked or recorded – such as one’s internet browsing data, a phone conversation, or a telegraph message. Or else, it presented privacy as a ‘visible action’ that could be observed and captured – for instance through surveillance cameras. In the frame Privacy is Dead, Depictions were used as event-oriented rhetorical strategies that effectively rendered the concrete nature of spatial privacy and informational privacy (Zwarun & Yao, 2007). The use of negative tone, sensational rhetoric, and dystopian stereotyping – combined with the visual and memorable character of Depictions – aimed at strengthening the effect of episodic framing.

Depictions were also prevalent in the frame User’s Responsibility. By explaining how individuals handled (or failed to handle) intrusion, this frame frequently focused upon the boundary management dimension of privacy. Importantly, this dimension was defined as “the extent to which individuals are able to control the spatial and informational aspects of their private lives” (Zwarun & Yao, 2005, para. 21). As the previous two interpretive packages, Users’ Responsibility was also framed episodically. In fact, quantitative and qualitative analyses confirmed that the responsibility of users was often rendered through concrete instances of ineffective privacy management and consequent privacy loss. Once more, the use of Depictions aimed at strengthening the rhetorical force of episodic framing. Once more, this framing device contributed to discussing spatial and informational aspects of privacy.
Iyengar’s (1991) remarks on the effects of episodic and thematic framing can be helpful to further interpret these findings. Iyengar (1991) noted that, “episodic framing tends to elicits individualistic rather than societal attributions of responsibility, while thematic framing has the opposite effect” (pp. 15-16). Accordingly, in response to episodic framing, “viewers attribute responsibility not to societal or political forces, but to the actions of particular individuals or groups” (Iyengar, 2005, p. 7).

Within the current sample of privacy coverage, the prevalence of episodic framing at the aggregate level – and mostly in the frames Privacy as Property, Privacy is Dead, and Users’ Responsibility – implied important consequences. As literature suggested (Iyengar, 1991; 1996; 2005), event-centered coverage likely discouraged readers from attributing responsibility for privacy problems to broader societal forces. On the contrary, when aspects of privacy were presented in episodic terms, readers’ causal accounts were directed to the individual victims or perpetrators portrayed in the media. By shifting the focus away from broader social or political responsibilities (Iyengar, 2005), episodic practices probably had serious repercussion in the understanding of privacy-related accountabilities. Episodic framing encouraged readers either to blame the victims for their privacy losses, or to ascribe responsibilities to certain perpetrators – such as governmental agencies and private companies. However, as more precisely detailed in later sections, the media often presented these perpetrators in vague terms. Thereby, media coverage further hampered readers’ efforts to determine concrete, valid, and useful responsibilities with respect to privacy losses.
On the other hand, less episodic accounts of privacy were provided through the use of Appeals to Principle in the frames White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Value of Truth, and Fundamental Privacy. While these frames were sometimes rendered episodically, the use of this reasoning device tended to enhance the analytical complexity of the discussion (Gamson & Lasch, 1983; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) thus providing elements of thematic framing. As detailed earlier, the frames White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Value of Truth, and Fundamental Privacy tackled value-laden aspects of privacy – such as its relationship with sociality and truth, or its value as a human right. Thereby, these frames focused upon the psychological and the right-based dimensions of privacy. Findings suggested that these dimensions were more suitable for thematic delivery. However, despite the potentiality of Appeals to Principles to provide thematic complexity to the coverage of privacy, it is important to remember that at the aggregated level the use of Depictions and episodic framing were still prevalent. More considerations with respect to the frames White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Value of Truth, and Fundamental Privacy are provided in separate sections.

To conclude, the media chose different rhetorical strategies to discuss frames that focused upon different types of privacy. In particular, framing devices (i.e. Depictions) were used in event-oriented coverage when discussing more concrete aspects of privacy – such as the spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions. These dimensions of privacy were often delivered episodically and typically emerged in frames such as Privacy as Property, Privacy is Dead, and Users’ Responsibility. In these instances, the attribution of
responsibility for privacy loss was directed to certain victims or perpetrators rather than to broader societal forces (Iyengar, 2005). Instead, reasoning devices (i.e. Appeals to Principle) were preferred to discuss value-laden aspects of privacy – such as the psychological and the right-based dimensions of privacy. Appeals to Principles were prevalent in frames such as White Lies, Disclosure for Community, Value of Truth, and Fundamental Privacy. Reasoning devices provided more depth and complexity to the discussion (Gamson & Lasch, 1983). Thus, they were more suitable to cover events and issues through a thematic slant. Findings confirmed the slight tendency to adopt a thematic approach in packages that utilized Appeals to Principle, revealing that value-laden aspects of privacy were covered with greater depth. However, several aspects of episodic framing surfaced within these packages as well. As detailed in the last section of this chapter, additional data would be necessary to further substantiate, confirm, and explain these trends.

Overall, these results were not surprising. Previous research has consistently indicated the tendency of the United States press to adopt episodic orientation (Iyengar, 1991; 1996; 2005; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008). In fact, due to market pressures, American media have been increasingly encouraged to cover events in shorter and more colorful formats. These considerations suggest that the media, in the future, may become progressively more likely to utilize sensational and episodic frames of privacy – such as Privacy as Property and Privacy is Dead. On the contrary, the media may increasingly forget more thematic frames – such as Fundamental Privacy and Value of Truth.
The next section explores an important longitudinal re-definition of the meaning of privacy that emerged in media narratives.

C. **Individualism, Capitalism, and the Commodification of Privacy**

The third research question focused upon how the media discussed the role of sociocultural, legal, economic, and political contexts with respect to privacy. This was a layered question that sought to provide an in-depth understanding of how the shape of privacy and the features of society intersected in media discourse. Because of the multifaceted nature of this question, the answer will be tackled in different subsections of this chapter. In particular, the current section discusses an important finding related to the longitudinal re-definition of privacy through the ideology of capitalism. To be more specific, such a re-definition included two main changes. On one hand, the media increasingly discussed privacy in instrumental terms – and progressively neglected its intrinsic nature. On the other hand, they gradually portrayed privacy adopting an individualistic, interest-based approach – and moved away from a structuralistic, right-based approach as the decades went by. The next pages further investigate, interpret, and clarify these claims.

To explore the re-definition of privacy it is important to look back on the literature presented in chapter two, as well as to integrate it with additional considerations. As emphasized earlier in this dissertation, scholars suggested that privacy could be understood either in intrinsic terms or in instrumental terms (Moor, 1997). When adopting an intrinsic approach, scholars described privacy as a fundamental human right and focused upon its right-based nature (Zwarun &
Yao, 2007). On the opposite side, scholars who approached privacy in instrumental terms often framed privacy focusing upon its interest-based nature (Moor, 1997).

The distinction between intrinsic and instrumental approaches to privacy could also be connected to an overarching distinction between structuralistic and individualistic theories of privacy (Allmer, 2011). On the one hand, structuralistic theories supported a society-oriented, right-based definition of privacy; they focused upon the fundamental, intrinsic importance of privacy for the well-being of a democratic society (Allmer, 2011; Gavison, 1980; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). On the other hand, individualistic approaches to privacy focused upon the control of information and of personal property (Shils, 1966). Thereby, they emphasized an interest-based, instrumental definition of privacy – often discussing the spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions of privacy (Zwarun and Yao, 2005; 2007).

The structuralistic approach was prevalent in media coverage in the earlier timeframes analyzed. In fact, quantitative data revealed the longitudinal decreasing of Fundamental Privacy in media narratives. Such a frame was prevalent in the early 1900s and had already begun shrinking in the 1960s. Its presence was minimal in the 1990s. Qualitative data confirmed this trend and contributed to elucidating the features of the frame Fundamental Privacy. The discourse analysis substantiated that early editorials focused upon the importance of privacy for the safeguard of freedom, dignity, autonomy, and democracy. In the early 1900s, editorials emphasized that privacy was important for the individual, but was ultimately a society-oriented value. In developing such a claim, the media
also highlighted the right-based nature of privacy, frequently describing it as a fundamental human right. For instance, editorials suggested that privacy was “assumed to be within the pale of those unwritten social laws which everyone knows and respects.” The combination of quantitative and qualitative data confirmed that earlier media coverage adopted a structuralistic approach to privacy, discussed its right-based dimension, and shed light upon its intrinsic importance.

As the decades went by, the media gradually neglected the fundamental approach to privacy. Editorials increasingly focused upon the materialistic nature of personal information, often framing privacy as a commodity. In particular, as discussed in the next two paragraphs, more recent coverage progressively adopted an individualistic, interest-based approach to privacy through a focus on property, ownership, and control.

On one hand, findings revealed an increased discussion around property and ownership. The content analysis showed that the frame Privacy as Property was almost absent from media narratives in the early 1900s. Later, its utilization increased and the frame became predominant in media coverage – especially after the 1970s. The discourse analysis further contributed to understanding the qualities of this trend. More recent editorials tended to discuss concrete instances of privacy infringements that typically involved the spatial and the informational dimensions of privacy. Infringements were often framed episodically through specific Court cases. Thereby, editorials described privacy as merchandise, as a

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88 Article #328, The Right to Privacy, the Washington Post, 1908.
highly profitable commodity that could generate revenue, or as a concrete object that could be observed, recorded, tracked, and owned. In short, in media narratives privacy gradually lost its intrinsic meanings and its right-based dimension. It increasingly acquired instrumental connotations, spatial dimension, and informational dimension.

On the other hand, results revealed an increased focus on control – beginning in the 1960s. The content analysis showed the prevalence in media discourse of the interpretive package Appropriate Information Flow, which was identified as the most prevalent frame at the aggregate level. As I will discuss more in depth in a later section, this frame typically discussed control in terms of users’ powerlessness. The discourse analysis further confirmed the growing focus on control. To be more specific, qualitative data revealed that media narratives began tackling the theme of lack of control in the 1960s. In later decades, this theme was regularly adopted with respect to privacy. Furthermore, privacy was increasingly discussed through its spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions (Zwarun & Yao, 2005; 2007).

A few additional considerations must be explored in relation to these findings. Thus, in the remaining pages of this section I first explain why the shift from intrinsic toward instrumental definitions of privacy also corresponded with the increased request for the legal enforcement of privacy. Second, I suggest that the change from a structuralistic toward an individualistic approach of privacy may be related to more profound changes that occurred within the economic and the technological contexts.
As detailed in chapter five, the increased understanding of privacy in instrumental terms also coincided with an intensified demand for the legal enforcement of privacy. At the beginning of the 1900s privacy was understood as a fundamental human right, as the “right to enjoy life – the right to be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 193). Until then, violations of “the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 196) were typically prevented through social norms and moral enforcement. In the early 1900s, however, political, social, and economic changes triggered a reshaping of privacy (Ariès & Duby, 1989; Ellickson, 1999; Wacks, 1989; Warren & Brandeis, 1890). New technologies – such as instantaneous photographs – increasingly challenged existing norms of flow and created situations for which norms were not established yet. Furthermore, as property began to include tangible as well as intangible possessions, new normative approaches became necessary (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). In response to these changes, social norms began to adapt. Consequently, the development of new laws became increasingly inevitable. Notably, in fact, norms and laws are complexly intertwined and shifts within the one domain often trigger changes within the other (Ellickson, 1999). Across decades, media discourse mirrored these shifts. The media increasingly framed privacy as a commodity and frequently emphasized the demand for a legal enforcement of privacy.

To further explore the growing commodification of privacy discussed in this section, it is also necessary to refer to some contextual cues that may have triggered it. In fact, as detailed earlier, changes within the sociocultural, political, economic, and legal domains often contributed to reshaping the understanding of
privacy (Ariès & Duby, 1989; Wacks, 1989). Probably, the reframing of privacy as a commodity was the outcome of an “information revolution” that occurred in the 20th century, encouraged by economic and technological forces. As explained in chapter two, the use of databases and credit cards increased in the 1970s and in the 1980s thereby greatly facilitating the efficacy of direct marketing techniques (Solove, 2001). Marketing companies progressively used surveillance to enhance techniques of profiling and limit uncertainty (Campbell & Carlson, 2002). These practices were described as a consolidation and development of a new form of “information capitalism” that became central in these decades (Webster, 2000). By increasingly challenging the control over information, the commercial abuse of new surveillance technologies contributed to shedding the light upon information ownership.

In response to these trends, the media gradually provided the public opinion with concrete terminology to address instances of infringements. Coverage progressively delivered vocabulary that detailed the instrumental features of privacy – discussing personal information as merchandise, and adopting the language of an increasingly capitalistic ideology. Privacy, in media narratives, became a modern commodity. The media described personal information as a measurable product that could be collected, aggregated, traded, and sold. They increasingly set aside the moral and right-based components of privacy to make room for more instrumental, commoditized dimensions. These dimensions typically focused upon property, ownership, and individual interest. Economic forces played an important role in such a shift.
Longitudinal changes were also identified in the meaning of privacy implicit in media narratives. Early editorials discussed privacy as a rather broad and vaguely defined concept. In the first timeframe, “privacy” was often referred to as an inalienable and revered right that involved one’s person or character, one’s actions or thoughts. Privacy was described as crucial to protect the “truth about oneself” and its respect was necessary to grant calm and composure through retirement from public life. However, early editorials were often vague in defining privacy, as the concept was rather new, obscure, and fairly unexplored. In later decades, the contours of privacy become more narrow and specific as editorials begun associating the term “privacy” to the spatial and informational dimensions of privacy, such as financial or medical records, browsing data, phone records, social security numbers, and spatial property. Even though the concept “privacy” was never defined in media narratives, the word “privacy” pointed at slightly different meanings in different times. Such meanings, in media narratives, became narrower and more concrete as the decades went by, increasingly leaving aside matters of rights, values, and other components that were present in the first decade analysed. Perhaps, the public understanding and definition of privacy also followed this longitudinal shift. In fact, even though privacy is an inherently subjective concept, its shape and meaning were probably importantly informed and influenced by the language provided in media narratives.

To conclude, the current section discussed important features of the re-definition of privacy that surfaced in media discourse in the last century. In earlier decades, the media tended to adopt a structuralistic approach to privacy, emphasizing the right-based dimension of privacy as well as its intrinsic,
fundamental value. More recently, the media discussed privacy in individualistic terms, emphasizing the instrumental character of privacy, its interest-based nature, and its value as a commodity. Accordingly, recent coverage tended to focus upon the spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions of privacy. The next section explores and clarifies how media coverage failed to acknowledge the possibility of users’ agency, power, and engagement with respect to their privacy.

D. **No Country for Agency, Power, and Engagement**

The previous section discussed important findings in response to RQ3. In particular, it mostly focused upon how changes within the economic and technological environments influenced a longitudinal reframing of privacy. The current section further tackles elements related to the sociocultural, political, economic, and legal contexts of privacy. It thereby further contributes to answering RQ3. By tackling matters of users’ engagement and control, the considerations presented in the current section also begin to unpack the social norms of privacy emerging in media discourse. They thereby also provide critical insights in response to RQ4.

When analyzing editorials to explore how societal systems were presented in media narratives of privacy, the discourse analysis revealed interesting portrayals of the responsibilities of the government in this respect. As detailed in chapter five, media discussion revolved around the practices of governmental surveillance either sustaining or challenging their legitimacy. In such indecision, the political context was portrayed as either an enemy or an ally of the citizens.
For instance, qualitative findings highlighted how in the 1960s the idea of privacy was “implicit in the idea of government of limited power.” Similarly, in this decade the “unrestricted official surveillance of all human behavior” was frequently described as despicable. Nevertheless, the media also acknowledged that some practices of surveillance were acceptable in the attempt “to unmask wrongdoing.” Criticisms against surveillance became more frequent in the media in the 1970s. These were mostly triggered by abuses of power of the FBI and the CIA, which generated a public outcry. In these years the media also acknowledged that surveillance, at times, was motivated to protect a free and democratic society against “threats of secrecy.” The media, however, often failed to provide readers with specific information to distinguish between lawful and illegitimate practices of surveillance. Therefore, the media rarely contributed to fully informing – and thus empowering – its readers.

In the 1990s and in the early 2000s reproaches against unmotivated governmental surveillance intensified. Looking back on the literature (Westin, 2003) this finding was not surprising as it reflected the effects of new surveillance technologies and new encryption programs on media discourse. Nevertheless, the growth found in media coverage was mostly a quantitative difference. In fact, little had changed in the qualitative features of the debate. The media kept condemning practices of governmental surveillance upon citizens’ private records. In these criticisms, however, readers could rarely identify concrete guidelines to counteract excessive data collection. Also, editorials hardly acknowledged users’ 

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ability or potential to react against governmental abuses. Qualitative findings presented in chapter six confirmed the emphasis upon the lack of control that users had with respect to their information. Individuals were typically portrayed as victims of ubiquitous surveillance, which could not be defied. The media repeatedly suggested that newer communication systems “will certainly lead to invasions of privacy.” They emphasized that there were no concrete limitations to the possibilities of governmental power. In other words, surveillance was depicted as a problem that individuals could not prevent. Thereby, the media left no room for individuals’ agency over and control of their personal data.

Obviously, increased media coverage of practices of surveillance was a response to newer ubiquitous information technologies. This increase, in fact, was not surprising. Nevertheless, newer technologies enabled both governmental agencies and private companies to engage in practices of surveillance that facilitated their decision-making activities. As literature emphasized, in the 1990s data mining software enabled American businesses to develop in-depth personalized consumer profiles at lower costs (Westin, 2003). And yet, the media tended to report more frequently on abuses of governmental power – either leaving aside commercial practices of surveillance or discussing them with little specificity.

To further clarify this claim, I look back on the findings presented in chapter five. As detailed there, coverage of commercial practices of surveillance became more frequent in the 1990s. Despite such an increase, governmental intrusions were still the primary focus of media narratives. Moreover, when reporting on the risks of commercial surveillance, the media tended to provide vague warnings.
For instance, they suggested that internet users were “being tracked, often without their knowledge, by commercial enterprises.” The media, however, missed the opportunity to provide their readers with concrete information that could re-empower them in this respect. First, the media emphasized the inability of users to avoid data collection by underlining that information was inevitably gathered “without their knowledge.” The use of this discouraged rhetoric, probably, spread a sense of powerlessness and inefficacy. Second, the media suggested that the most effective strategy users could adopt for privacy protection was to stop using technologies. This, clearly, was not a neutral option. Finally, the media often provided vague attributions of responsibility suggesting that “commercial enterprises” or “Big Brother” were responsible for data collection. However, these agents were repeatedly portrayed as unnamed, faceless entities. As a result, media coverage contributed to disempowering readers by frequently rendering them passive and unaware victims of unavoidable privacy loss.

In response to the increased practices of surveillance and to counteract the claimed powerlessness of users, the media often suggested that the judiciary system was the best option left for the protection of privacy. As detailed in chapter five, media narratives undertook two contradictory directions in this respect. On one hand, editorials voiced the need for a more comprehensive regulatory approach and highlighted the importance of legal resolutions to privacy problems. On the other hand, they advocated a case-by-case resolution in Courts through episodic framing rather than an overarching approach directed by a general regulatory framework. The next few paragraphs review some of the findings and look back on the literature to further discuss and clarify these claims.
Qualitative findings presented in chapter five emphasized the request for a comprehensive legal framework to address privacy. For instance, editorials criticized the narrowness and specificity of privacy regulations suggesting that, “a series of differing rules for different industries [...] may leave consumers somewhat confused.” The media also emphasized that making sense of “the jumble of laws that have been passed [...] to regulate privacy” was too complex a task. Criticisms against scattered laws for the protection of privacy were frequent. Nevertheless, alternative directions were virtually never delivered. Even though the media may not be responsible for reshaping the legal domain, they could have provided the public opinion with more informative analytical discussion on the complexity of privacy protection. Thereby, the media could have contributed to informing readers, also helping them to understand the intricacy of the legal issues revolving around technology and privacy (Nippert-Eng, 2010; Nissenbaum, 2010).

Moreover, the request for a legal framework could have gone beyond discussing how newer technologies challenged the safeguard of personal information. By adopting a broader and less episodic scope when presenting the problem of privacy, the media could have set the stage for more effective responses. For instance, the request for a legal framework could have focused upon the right-based dimension of privacy. It could have emphasized the need to protect the intrinsic value of privacy and to recognize its importance for the well-

being of society (Gavison, 1980). However, as previously detailed, the intrinsic value of privacy, its right-based dimension, and its society-oriented nature were all increasingly neglected in media coverage. As a consequence, the media did not provide the premises for the actualization of a more comprehensive legal discussion.

Instead, qualitative findings revealed that the media consistently presented specific components of the legal debate around privacy protection. Editorials preferred episodic rather than thematic coverage and thus provided readers with a narrow legal perspective and selective vocabulary. This limited set of toolkits available to understand privacy could only be used to discuss specific instances of infringement. Furthermore, the media focused upon concrete dimensions of privacy – such as the spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions – and forgot its right-based nature. Thereby, the legal frames available for individuals to capture and discuss privacy led the public attention toward more concrete dimensions of privacy, and further away from a value-laden discussion.

Another critical contradiction emerged from the discourse analysis presented in chapter five and chapter six. Beginning in the 1960s, the media tended to frame the judiciary system as the ultimate responsible for the protection of privacy. In this respect, editorials reiterated that users were helpless and had to rely upon the issuance and enforcement of appropriate laws for the safeguard of privacy. However, editorials also emphasized that such reliance was typically misplaced, as the legal system was always “too late” or “too slow to react” to the challenges of newer technologies. Instead of informing users in this respect, the
media kept labeling them as “powerless” and “unaware victims” of complex communication environments. As a consequence, media discourse generated an unresolved cycle. At the end, the responsibility for privacy protection implicitly returned to the users.

To summarize, the current section discussed three main components that contributed to providing readers with a sense of inefficacy and powerlessness. First, this section dealt with the portrayal of government, which was alternatively described as Big Brother or as a sentinel of freedom. These shifts were typically triggered by current events that encouraged the public attention to concentrate upon surveillance, governmental corruptions, or public security. Second, this section emphasized that the focus upon governmental responsibilities with respect to privacy frequently shifted the attention away from the responsibilities of private companies. Finally, this section discussed how the media kept claiming the need for a regulatory framework for privacy protection but constantly worked against the possibility of its realization. These three elements were combined by an overreaching consideration. They all contributed to disempowering the readers who were not presented with any possibility for agency, power, and engagement with respect to their privacy.

To further discuss the social norms of privacy emerging in media narratives, the next section explores the fears toward the “technological sublime” and the discussion around the death of privacy that emerged in media narratives of privacy across timeframes.
E. When Technology Killed Privacy

As detailed earlier, the fourth research question sought to explore the social norms of privacy that emerged in media coverage during selected decades of the 20th and 21st century. The previous section provided some elements to answer this question. In particular, it did so by discussing how the media labeled individuals powerless – and thereby claimed the impracticality of users’ control. The current section explores another core component of media discourse, which focused upon the debate around the alleged death of privacy.

In this respect, the current section investigates and interprets three main findings. First, it explores the tendency of the media to discuss technology in active terms as an agent responsible for privacy infringements. Second, it emphasizes the cyclic propensity of the media to suggest that in newer technological domains privacy had become a remote and unlikely possibility. Finally, it underlines the recurring presence of a moral conundrum with respect to newer technologies, which were cyclically framed as inherently immoral. The next few pages further explore findings presented in chapter five and six; they also look back on the literature to further clarify and interpret relevant results.

The discourse analysis revealed a recurring tendency of the media to discuss technology in active terms – thereby ascribing privacy infringements to impersonal entities. Across the decades, editorials kept suggesting that the “prying eyes of surveillance devices” were inescapable. Thus, the media rendered the possibilities of technologies through a rather deterministic lens, often failing to provide concrete accounts of the actual affordances of newer devices. Instead,
coverage tended to present new tools in vague terms, through negative and somewhat mystical features. In general, media narratives rarely acknowledged the possibility of individual agency or provided readers with concrete information that could re-empower them.

Looking back on the findings presented in chapter six may be useful to further clarify these claims. Editorials from the early 1900s suggested that “the only escape from the possibilities of technologies” with respect to privacy could be found in the cultivation of a truthful life. For instance, Marconi’s telegraph was described as a “fundamental menace to privacy.” Editorials referred to technologies such as the telephone, the telegraph, the phonograph, and the X-ray using rhetoric similar to the one implemented in more recent decades. In the 1960s there was “no escape from surveillance” because wiretapping had “gone wild.” In the 1970s, protecting privacy against “some distant automated authority” had become “more compelling than ever.” In this decade the threat was credited to “modern information-processing techniques” – the computer in fact was the “most notably ubiquitous tool of post-industrial society.” In the 1980s, computers had become “the most serious threats to anonymity and privacy.” In the 1990s, confidentiality was “insistently threatened by technology” and computers “gulped up” information in “unprecedented ways.” In the 2000s, “covert programs” could secretly record users’ movements on the internet. Similarly, technology was described as a “menace to privacy.”

In short, the media repeatedly presented technology as an impersonal yet active entity, a mystical force able to generate fear, awe, and sense of inefficacy with respect to privacy. Despite the evolution of technology, across the decades
little changed in how the media addressed the risks brought about by newer tools. Media rhetoric kept nurturing the fear of a “technological sublime” (Nye, 1994), a sense of surprise and disorientation experienced in newer technological environments. Frequently, the media presented the loss of privacy as a price to pay to enjoy the benefits of progress. The use of this resigned rhetoric could have caused several outcomes. First, the media encouraged users to develop lack of confidence toward technology. In response, users probably experienced a sense of inefficacy, helplessness, frustration, and loss of motivation for self-protection (Boyd, 2003; Zwarun & Yao, 2007). Second, the media rarely discussed the affordances of new technologies – thus failing to inform citizens in this respect. As a consequence, the media further hampered the possibility of individual agency also enhancing the sense of powerlessness. Finally, instead of specifying concrete responsibilities for privacy infringements, the media kept labeling technology as “the core of the problem.”

It is important to emphasize that the tendency to ascribe privacy losses to impersonal entities shifted the attention away from actual agents responsible for the infringements – such as private companies or public agencies. When combined to previous findings discussed in response to RQ2 and RQ3, these considerations further emphasize that the media rarely provided proper attributions of responsibility for privacy infringements. Frequently, the media pointed at impersonal agents – such as computers, or security cameras. At times, editorials identified Big Brother as the semi-abstract entity that should have been held accountable. At other times, they ascribed responsibilities for data collection to faceless or vaguely identified actors – such as “online companies” or “private
“business.” More specific attributions of responsibility were the exception rather than the norm. As a consequence, readers were often left alone to concretely identify actual accountabilities for privacy loss.

A closer look at the rhetoric used in the media to discuss the role of technology with respect to privacy infringement suggests another critical consideration. Across timeframes, the media repeatedly used a negative tone and a resigned attitude to emphasize the role of newer technologies in the death of privacy. Importantly, these rhetorical choices were not new or specific of certain technologies – such as the internet and social media. The current project revealed that technologies, at least in the last century, have always been portrayed as intrusive to the private sphere. They have always been framed as active agents responsible for the death of privacy.

In particular, quantitative findings showed that the frame Privacy is Dead began surfacing in the early 1900s, it emerged significantly more often in the 1960s, and it remained rather stable in subsequent decades. Qualitative findings further contributed to clarifying this trend. The discourse analysis revealed that, already in the early 1900s, editorials presented data collection as inevitable and suggested that the only chance left for privacy was self-censure. For instance, editorials claimed that, “nobody should say anything over a telephone which he would not telegraph or write upon a postal card.” In the 1960s there was not “any smidgen of privacy and independent action” left. In the 1970s, privacy had turned into a “crumbling wall.” In the 1980s technology had left “no room for privacy.” In

the 1990s, confidentiality was “falling apart.” In the early 2000s privacy was “no longer a social norm.”

As these data revealed, privacy has been dying a very slow death in media narratives. The allegation of death was constantly triggered by the sensational potential of newer technologies, but the use of dystopian, resigned rhetoric was not novel or specific of certain tools. Across timeframes, the media kept recovering privacy – mostly to assist to a newer execution by means of more modern devices. This practice may be explained as a rhetorical strategy. As detailed earlier in this chapter, media coverage typically benefits from the sensational, colorful, and memorable nature of the issues reported. Thereby, narratives gain emotional appeal and rhetorical force that enable them to capture the audience’s attention and gain readership. Explaining the use of the frame Privacy is Dead as a rhetorical strategy may help to understand why such frame kept resurfacing in media discourse.

Importantly, however, claiming the unavoidable death of privacy could have generated harmful outcomes. On one hand, this rhetoric of technological inevitability further spread a sense of disorientation, self-inefficacy, and helplessness toward progress. On the other hand, this rhetoric encouraged readers to endure privacy losses as the price to pay in order to enjoy the benefits of newer technologies. Powerful actors probably benefitted from media narratives that encouraged individuals to disregard privacy as an outdated norm. This is not to suggest that the media kept claiming the death of privacy in order to support the interests of private companies and governmental agencies. More likely, editorials used this frame to enjoy the communicative force of a colorful,
sensational, and dramatic narrative. Notwithstanding the motivation, the outcome remained. Implicitly and involuntarily, media narratives set the stage for Zuckerberg’s notorious claim well in advance.

A final key point of the debate around progress included the cyclical resurfacing of a “moral backlash” with respect to newer technologies. In particular, across timeframes, the media kept reintroducing a moral conundrum wandering whether progress could generate anything good. For instance, in the early 1900s progress was presented as synonymous of “retrogression.” In the 1980s, the picture phone was described as a “kind of progress [that] could ruin the American family […] and should be stopped while there is still time.” Across the decades, media narratives reverberated the cynical belief that progress was inherently negative and immoral.

The use of a moralistic rhetoric to address newer technologies such as the internet and social media may not be surprising. What is interesting, however, is that such rhetoric kept resurfacing across the decades, revealing that the moral conundrum was not new or specific of the technologies of today. Instead, it emerged as a recurring “moral routine” that repeatedly identified progress with moral decay (Smith, 2001). Such conundrum was not the consequence of a particular device. Rather, it was proven to be an ongoing media practice.

What the media failed to suggest is that the threats to privacy may not be inescapable consequences of the affordances of newer tools. Undoubtedly, computerized technologies contributed to enhancing one’s ability to collect and

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use information in unpredictable ways; similarly, the internet and social media afforded new possibilities for the infringement of personal privacy. Technology, however, is not an active agent inherently able to infringe personal privacy. Furthermore, affordances are not always intrinsic features of an object. Rather, they are suggestions or possibilities as to how one might use a tool. And yet, perceptions and intentions, as well as experience, knowledge, and needs, often contribute to renegotiating a tool’s affordances for the user. Perceived properties may also become affordances and thereby determine the usability of an object and its potential with respect to personal privacy. Therefore, media narratives acquire a particularly meaningful function. They influence how the public opinion perceives, experiences, and understands the role – actual or alleged – of new technologies in the death of privacy. In short, affordances, users’ experience, and media text all contribute to influencing the real or perceived potential of new tools with respect to privacy.

To summarize, the analysis of the debate around technological progress revealed important patterns of continuity. In fact, the technological sublime, the death of privacy, and the risk of moral decay that surfaced in media coverage were not related to the intrinsic possibilities of specific technologies. Despite the tendency to believe that these phenomena are recent reactions to the technologies of today, findings revealed that – in the last century – they have always been recurring, dystopian responses to progress.

Finally, the next section discusses the last element emerged in the media to address the social norms of privacy. In particular, it does so by exploring how media narratives tackled the negotiation between privacy and sociality.
Privacy, Sociality, and Technologies of the Self

As detailed earlier, the fourth research question dealt with the norms of privacy that surfaced in media discourse across the timeframes analyzed. In response to this question, the previous section explored quantitative and qualitative findings to examine how the media ascribed an active role to technology in causing the death of privacy. The last component that emerged in media narratives in response to RQ4 involved the debate around the role of disclosure in the development and maintenance of sociality.

As presented in chapter four, quantitative findings showed a recent tendency of media discourse of privacy to present disclosure as necessary to access social capital. In particular, few editorials began to emphasize the importance of sociality above privacy in the 1960s; such an emphasis increased significantly during the era of social media. Qualitative findings confirmed this trend and further unpacked its features. In the 1960s, self-disclosure was seldom presented as “a concomitant of life in a civilized community.” According to media coverage, in the 1970s people shared to defy the “impersonality of modern life.” In the 1990s the exhibitionistic tendency to “let it all hang out” was presented as a common approach to sociality. In the 2000s practices such as “lifecasting” had almost normalized the tendency toward exhibitionism; also, the “Facebook community” had become “bizarrely comfortable with being looked at.” In general, editorials emphasized that the desire to access social capital “drastically alters an individual’s prospects on privacy.” As noted in previous chapters, the frame
Disclosure for Community was secondary in the sample analyzed. Nevertheless, its significant growth in recent media coverage deserved further interpretation.

Looking back on the literature, the growing focus upon sociality and community emerged during the era of social media was not truly surprising. Research frequently underlined that social media provided new and easily accessible stages where users could perform the self to reap the benefits of sociality, publicity, and community (boyd, 2008b; Debatin et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2007). Accordingly, social media could be described in Foucauldian terms as “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988) that increasingly enabled users to develop specific layers of their identities through a process of “subjectivation” (Foucault, 1988; Siles, 2012). This process of subjectivation involves a social component – because one’s identity also emerges and develops within social participation, benefitting from an ongoing negotiation between the self and the other (Rosenthal, 1996). Accordingly, social media encouraged certain levels of disclosure (which, at times, became exhibitionism) aimed at facilitating identity creation through social participation and community building. However, social media also shaped unfamiliar networked environments where managing privacy became increasingly challenging.

Echoing these opportunities for subjectivation and connection enabled by social media, editorials from the early 2000s increasingly used the frame Disclosure for Community. The media, however, often developed this frame by presenting a one-sided argument in favor of sociality – frequently neglecting privacy-related implications. More specifically, editorials emphasized that online disclosure was an important component of social participation. They highlighted
that sharing personal information could contribute to developing one’s identity also facilitating community formation and maintenance. As an alternative, editorials criticized unnecessary exhibitionism as an immoral practice of exposure, suggesting that some individuals were willing to disclose too much in the name of sociality. But editorials rarely provided readers with a more analytical approach to help them weigh the value of social capital against the risks of privacy loss. Privacy, instead, was simply rendered as an outdated social norm, an obstacle to social participation and community building that new generations were increasingly willing to waive. This is unfortunate because the media could have helped individuals to understand the elements of a complex negotiation between sociality and privacy (boyd & Hargittai, 2010; Maaß, 2011). Nevertheless, editorials often delivered somewhat biased arguments either in favor of sociality or against exhibitionism, without providing readers with concrete information to independently evaluate the benefits of sociality, publicity, and privacy.

Two additional considerations could contribute to explaining the growth of the frame Disclosure for Community in recent decades. First, such a growth could have been the reaction to an increasingly individualistic society. As discussed earlier in this chapter, around the 1960s individualistic values began to overcome communitarian ones; accordingly, the media tended to discuss privacy with an individualistic slant. During these decades, Disclosure for Community surfaced as a minor counter-theme that partly redirected the focus toward the importance of community. Clearly, individualism and community are conflicting values. Thus, a focus upon the value of community, in such a context, could be interpreted as a
marginal reaction against the alienation and fragmentation of modern society (Young, 1990).

Second, it is important to underline that the concept of community discussed here is peculiar of American society. The motivations behind the American need for community – which arose especially from the 1950s and 1960s – are best expressed through the words of Kusmer (1979) who emphasized that,

The new scarcity, the sudden emergence of a concern for "ethnicity," the crisis-whether real or imagined-in the American family, and the consequent anxieties arising from all this have created a powerful interest in, and desire for, a time when life was supposedly simpler, less bureaucratic, and more elemental (p. 380).

The increased segregation due to income and ethnicity, and the shrinking of the American family described in the quote above may have generated a nostalgic desire to re-establish community – and thereby reap the benefits of social wholeness and identification (Calthorpe, 1993). Such a nostalgic desire could also contribute to explaining the surfacing of a marginal frame that valued community above privacy in the editorials analyzed, beginning in the 1960s.

Perhaps more importantly, by identifying community as an American-specific value, these considerations open up critical directions for future research. In particular, researchers could investigate coverage of privacy in non-American countries to further explore whether and how the tradeoffs between sociality and privacy were rendered in media discourse in different societies. This line of research would be particularly helpful to further understand the influences that societal contexts have upon the shape of privacy. Additional directions in this respect are provided in the least section of the current chapter.
To summarize, research findings revealed important patterns of continuity in how the media rendered different aspects of privacy. Editorials frequently reutilized pre-existing narratives adjusting them to fit current events and newer devices. Thus, across the decades, the media kept influencing the public opinion to mostly think about privacy through pre-existing and familiar narratives instead of providing newer perspectives induced and informed by the affordances of newer technologies. The media also tended to re-define privacy longitudinally. In earlier decades, narratives focused upon a structuralistic approach to privacy. Instead, more recent coverage rendered privacy through an individualistic lens. Thereby, the media encouraged the public opinion to discuss and understand privacy through an increasingly individualistic, interest-base, and instrumental rhetoric. They mostly emphasized narrow and rather specific aspects of privacy (such as one’s personal records) and frequently obscured more complex components thereof (such as one’s character, thoughts, rights, and values).

Throughout the decades, the media simultaneously labeled users powerless, but then rendered them empowered by placing ultimate privacy control responsibility on the user. This routine contributed to discourage the public who was constantly influenced to perceive the self as responsible and yet unable to appropriately manage and safeguard personal privacy in newer technological domains. Generally, the media provided vague attributions of responsibility for privacy infringements – often pointing at abstract, faceless, or impersonal entities. Progress was frequently presented in negative terms. In fact, editorials discussed technologies through the rhetoric of the technological sublime, claiming the death of privacy, and emphasizing the risks of moral decay related to progress. Finally,
the media occasionally presented disclosure as necessary to access social capital and form community – often neglecting the implications of disclosure with respect to privacy loss.

Overall, the current project provided a detailed picture to understand how the shape of privacy has evolved in American media narratives throughout several decades of technological turmoil. Interestingly, despite considerable technological evolutions, results emphasized that in the last century little changed in the shape and features of the relationship between privacy and technology. Currently, we tend to think that the internet and social media had a peculiar responsibility in causing the death of privacy, in encouraging the moral conundrum in reaction to progress, in emphasizing the inefficacy of the legal system for the protection of privacy, and in influencing how the public think about privacy. And yet, this study revealed that most technologies throughout the decades have been perceived as invasive of our private sphere, and little has changed in the narratives available to discuss and understand privacy across time. To conclude, the following sections review the limitations of the current dissertation and suggest directions for future research.

G. Limitations

Despite its novelty, the current project presented limitations that need to be considered when evaluating its findings. These limitations involved the design of the coding protocol, the features of the sample, and the shortcomings of the methods utilized. Even though this dissertation provided important insights to
understand how media narratives rendered the shape of privacy across time, its limitations indicate important directions for future improvement.

As suggested at the beginning of the current chapter, frame analysis had never been applied to the study of media discourse of privacy. A first limitation is thus inherently related to the design of the coding protocol utilized for the content analysis and to the exploratory nature of the analysis. To obviate this limitation and minimize subjectivity in frame interpretations, I approached the pilot study programmatically by reading the editorials several times, taking careful and detailed notes, referring back to the literature in the identification and description of frames. Also, I pre-tested the signature matrix on a subsample of editorials to confirm completeness, and substantiating my interpretations carefully through the parameters outlined in the coding protocol.

The second limitation involved the identification of the population studied as well as the collection of the sample. Few considerations need to be made in this respect. The population studied included editorials published in five major American media outlets. The sources were selected to provide a variety of perspectives. Selection was based upon scope of influence, type of readership, and ideology of the media outlets. Importantly, this process was also constrained by the longitudinal nature of the project. In fact, the selection could only include media outlets that had published continuously since 1960 at least. Despite the attempt to include a variety of perspectives, research findings were thus limited by such selection. A more comprehensive study could have analyzed a broader variety of sources – for instance by incorporating news articles, as well as by including non-American outlets in the sample.
An additional drawback in defining population and sample for the current project concerned the selection of the timeframes. In order to analyze a larger timeline and thereby capture major longitudinal changes in media narratives, the current research selected editorials based on their decade of publication. This choice was considered satisfactory based upon the goals of the current study and upon its exploratory nature. Importantly, the timeline utilized was informed by existing literature (Shapiro, 1998, Solove, 2001). Such timeline had previously been adopted as a referring point to investigate the relationship between privacy and the evolution of information technology, it was thus considered adequate for the purpose of the current project. Nevertheless, this choice also entailed limitations as it made it more difficult to identify specific events that could have triggered the prevalence of certain frames above others. To address such limitation future research could explore media coverage of privacy during specific years, selected to represent important sociocultural, economic, legal, or political events that were likely to influence the shape of privacy. However, it is also important to emphasize that a finer grain may not be adequate to studying “slower” changes such as the introduction and adoption of newer technologies. Finally, moving on to the digital era, research may also add a variety of sources to include less traditional outlets, such as digital sources, that have become increasingly popular and influential.

The third major limitation of the current project pertained to the shortcomings of content analysis and discourse analysis. On one hand, the quantitative nature of content analysis typically limits the scope of the inferences that could be drawn from its findings. On the other hand, the limits of discourse
analysis depended upon its qualitative nature. In particular, the findings of the discourse analysis risked being biased by my subjectivity. Also, the small size of the sample analyzed did not allow claiming generizability of findings.

Despite these limitations, the combination of content analysis and discourse analysis helped me to address and overcome the weaknesses of each approach, thereby enhancing the validity of results and inferences. Such a combination enabled me to compare and contrast the findings obtained through each method and thereby clarify, illuminate, and extend them. It also encouraged me to detect inconsistencies, contradictions, and ambiguities emerged in the comparison of findings obtained through different methods – and thus to further strengthen the value of findings. Moreover, as detailed in chapter three, the studies were designed and conducted carefully and systematically in order to minimize the risks of bias typical of both methods.

Overall, decisions associated with the design of this research were carefully balanced so as to utilize methods and interpret data optimally.

H. Future Research

The study of how privacy evolves within changing communication environments is an ever-growing and fascinating area of research. Within this area, the analysis of media frames of privacy presents a new critical and unexplored path that this dissertation began to address. I believe this project delivered valuable considerations with respect to how American media rendered the shape of privacy across decades of technological, sociocultural, political, economic, and legal changes. Due to its exploratory nature, however, this
research involved limitations that opened up important directions for research. These directions are discussed in the following few pages.

First, the current project identified a number of rhetorical approaches adopted in the media to discuss privacy. In particular, the combination of quantitative and qualitative findings revealed that the media utilized different strategies to communicate different dimensions of privacy (Zwarun & Yao, 2005; 2007). For instance, editorials tended to use Depictions to discuss more concrete types of privacy – including the spatial, informational, and boundary management dimensions of privacy. Editorials often rendered these dimensions episodically rather than thematically – accordingly, they used framing devices to deliver dramatic and sensational appeal. On the contrary, editorials used Appeals to Principles to address the psychological and the right-based dimensions of privacy. In general, these dimensions appeared to be less suitable for episodic framing. This finding also suggests that value-laden aspects of privacy tended to be covered with greater complexity than other aspects.

To further clarify these results, future research could pursue a more systematic investigation of the rhetorical strategies used in media framing of privacy. In particular, researchers could do so by developing a coding protocol that quantitatively measures all the rhetorical components identified above. First, such a coding protocol should evaluate whether the text analyzed used episodic or thematic framing. Second, it should identify the dimensions of privacy discussed. Third, it should measure the use of the different frames and packages parts included in the signature matrix for the current project. A study that adopts this detailed coding protocol would provide further quantitative insights to
understand how rhetorical strategies, frames of privacy, and dimensions of privacy intersected in media narratives. For instance, current findings suggested that certain frames – such as Privacy is Dead and Privacy as Property – were more suitable to be delivered episodically. On the contrary, value-laden frames such as Fundamental Privacy and Value of True appeared more appropriate for thematic framing. A study such as the one described in this paragraph would provide the data necessary to further confirm and elucidate these findings.

Second, this research revealed that certain frames changed across the decades, whereas others presented patterns of continuity. Despite the relevance of this finding, research is needed to further unpack its features. For instance, current results revealed that the frame Value of Truth did not change significantly from decade to decade. However, the lack of significant differences in the utilization of this frame may be a consequence of the width of the timeframes analyzed (i.e. ten years). To address this consideration, future research should adopt a finer grain and compare the implementation of Value of Truth during shorter periods of time. For example, a study should collect articles published in response to important events that could have directed the public attention toward public good or individual rights – such as Watergate, 9/11, and the current NSA surveillance scandal. The use of a finer grain would be particularly useful to identify more precisely the role that certain political, economic, or legal events had in triggering these variations.

Referring to the cultural specificity of privacy, a third recommendation addresses the American-centered nature of the sample studied in this dissertation. As discussed earlier, current findings reflected important cultural
idiosyncrasies. For instance, this research identified a longitudinal reframing of privacy. Early editorials rendered privacy as a structuralistic and fundamental value; more recent ones framed privacy as an individualistic and instrumental value. This trend was explained as a response to American individualism and informational capitalism that increasingly encouraged discussing privacy as an interest-based, commoditized product. Emphasizing the cultural specificity of privacy, previous research also suggested that European countries, compared to the United States, have been more inclined to address privacy as a fundamental human right (Hsu, 2004; Singh & Hill, 2003). On a different note, existing research described the focus upon community as an American peculiarity (Kusmer, 1979) – therefore the surfacing of the frame Disclosure for Community was also identified as a cultural idiosyncrasy. Addressing these considerations, future research should investigate whether and how the frames Fundamental Privacy, Privacy as Property, and Disclosure for Community surfaced and evolved in non-American countries. For instance, a study could explore media coverage published in European countries as well as in more communitarian societies. Findings would help clarifying the role of sociocultural specificities in influencing the shape of privacy.

A fourth research direction entails further investigating the evolution of the frame Disclosure for Community. Current findings revealed that this frame increased significantly in the first decade of the 2000s. However, due to the width of the timeframes analyzed, current interpretations could not reveal whether Disclosure for Community grew constantly within that decade, or whether it increased after certain events and decreased shortly afterwards. In other words,
the growth of this frame could be the result of a cyclical pattern of attention (McComas & Shanahan, 1999) – due for instance to the introduction of Facebook. But this growth could also be the symptom of a new, expanding way to discuss and perceive privacy in America. To further investigate and clarify this trend, future research could adopt a finer grain and explore the variations of Disclosure for Community year-by-year, perhaps beginning from the introduction of Friendster in 2002 through today.

A fifth recommendation suggests investigating the actual institutional retention of privacy frames. Current findings revealed important patterns of continuity in the surfacing of certain interpretive packages. Adopting Schudson’s (1898) model, I suggested that the continuity of a frame could be interpreted as an indicator of its institutional retention. To confirm and further enlighten this consideration, future research could investigate the actual levels of institutionalization of the frames analyzed. To be more specific, research could address the surfacing of different interpretive packages within larger cultural forums – including for instance the education system, the political system, and the economic system, as well as other social planes such as blogs, online discussion sites, and opinion polls. Results would be helpful to further understand the relationship between the continuity of media frames of privacy and their measured levels of institutionalization.

To conclude, an important recommendation applies to each research direction identified here. As emphasized earlier, I believe that the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches is vital to the study of privacy frames. On one hand, content analysis enables the investigation of media frames of privacy in
larger samples – and thus provides more valid results. However, as a quantitative method, content analysis risks missing some of the nuances characterizing the layered and complex nature of privacy. On the other hand, discourse analysis does not provide scalable or generalizable results. Nevertheless, it enables to interpret, expand, and clarify quantitative results. In short, as communication researchers we must always keep in mind that a mixed-method approach has the potential to combine quantitative breadth and qualitative depth, thereby delivering more meaningful results.

In sum, this project revealed that – despite societal changes – American media often recycled preexisting narratives to discuss privacy through familiar frames. Across time, recurring narratives resumed the unsolved debate between public good and privacy rights; they renewed the moral conundrum in reaction to progress; they returned to the inevitable powerlessness of users; and they reestablished the death of privacy. In general, editorials adopted different rhetorical strategies to render different dimensions of privacy – typically using framing devices and episodic framing to discuss spatial, informational, and boundary management aspects of privacy. Longitudinally, findings revealed a shift in the definition of privacy. Early coverage addressed privacy in structuralistic terms, focusing upon its intrinsic importance, its right-based dimension, and its society-oriented nature. More recently, the media discussed privacy in individualistic terms, emphasizing its instrumental value and its interest-based nature.

Overall, this dissertation revealed how the shape of privacy was rendered and contextualized in media narratives across time. It thereby contributed to
understanding how the culture of the concept “privacy” historically evolved, suggesting whether and how different events triggered its redefinitions in media discourse. While the results answered important questions, they also opened up crucial directions for future research.
### APPENDIX A - SIGNATURE MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package (P1)</th>
<th>White Lies (relationships argument)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P1)</td>
<td>Privacy is necessary to keep healthy relationships based on trust and confidence. Sometimes white lies are better than confession to keep one’s relationship healthy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P1)</td>
<td>“If the doll is pretty and satisfactory, what matter whether it be stuffed with sawdust, cotton or hair?”; “white lies.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P1)</td>
<td>Instances in which relationship are broken as a consequence of a privacy loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P1)</td>
<td>“A little lie may save your love life”; “trust, don’t ask.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P1)</td>
<td>Technologies crossing boundaries and thereby causing relationship to break.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core position (P2)</th>
<th>Privacy as Property (economic argument)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P2)</td>
<td>Privacy has measurable instrumental value often identifiable with ownership. Personal information is a commodity that companies may use to increase income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P2)</td>
<td>“Information ownership”; “trading information”; technology as a “two-edged sword” because it entails costs and gains.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P2)</td>
<td>Individuals trading their information for other benefits such as discounts and coupons. Companies making income through targeted advertising, price discrimination, and similar practices. People losing their jobs because of privacy losses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P2)</td>
<td>“Privacy is worth a million bucks”; “privacy trade-offs.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P2)</td>
<td>Companies collecting information to gain profit. Personal information as “commodity” or “property.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Roots (P2) | Individuals trade their personal information for other benefits exposing themselves to potential privacy losses. |
| Consequences (P2) | Violations of privacy often happen because information is available in a public domain. The terms of the trade-offs are not always equal: different actors involved have different interests. |
| Appeals to principle (P2) | The value of information should be measured against that of other benefits for which information is exchanged. |
### APPENDIX A - SIGNATURE MATRIX (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package (P3)</th>
<th>Disclosure for Community (relationships/economic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P3)</td>
<td>Disclosure is necessary to strengthen relationships. New technologies enhanced the possibilities for connection. Privacy should not be a concern anymore because the benefits of sharing exceed the risks of infringements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P3)</td>
<td>Social media as community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P3)</td>
<td>Instances in which individuals have disclosed personal information to enjoy the benefits of sharing and defying the fears of privacy losses. Zuckerberg saying, “Our mission is to make the world more open and connected.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P3)</td>
<td>“Privacy is over, here comes sociality”; “Sociality, not privacy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P3)</td>
<td>Technology as a place to “share” and to “connect” with others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots (P3)</td>
<td>Individuals engage in self-disclosure because they value sharing as a way to gain social capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences (P3)</td>
<td>Regulating privacy may hinder the possibilities for connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals to principle (P3)</td>
<td>The value of social capital is higher than privacy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package (P4)</th>
<th>Appropriate Information Flow (contextual argument)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P4)</td>
<td>When disclosing information, individuals evaluate the context of disclosure and attach expectations of flow to the information disclosed. To guarantee appropriate flow, governmental agencies and private companies should be transparent as to how information is collected and used.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P4)</td>
<td>America is on the “pathway towards a dossier dictatorship.” The federal government or private companies are “noisy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P4)</td>
<td>Doctors, lawyers, journalist revealing confidential information thus betraying their trustful patients/customers/sources - I.R.S. turning information to the Department of Justice for use in non-tax-related cases. In general, information migrating from the context of delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P4)</td>
<td>“No deception”; “transparency”; “user control”; “empower net-citizens”; “do not track”; “informed disclosure”; “expected flow.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P4)</td>
<td>Government as “noisy” “non-transparent” and “disguised.” Marketers as “information thieves.” Software as “covert.” Information as “greased.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots (P4)</td>
<td>Information available in a specific forum may migrate from the context of disclosure. As a consequence, flow becomes difficult to control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences (P4)</td>
<td>When the appropriate flow of information is violated, individuals experience actual harm and/or psychological distress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals to principle (P4)</td>
<td>Citizens should be told when their information is collected and used. They should also have the possibility to control, modify and delete it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX A - SIGNATURE MATRIX (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package (P5)</th>
<th>Users’ responsibility (individual argument/appropriate flow)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P5)</td>
<td>To make informed decision about privacy, individuals must develop technological literacy, understand the functions and implications of different devices, and develop strategies to understand and manage the flow of information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P5)</td>
<td>“Talk one’s head off” vs “sealing one’s lips” to avoid privacy losses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P5)</td>
<td>Stories in which citizens are described as responsible for their privacy losses (e.g. uninformed people crossing social spheres online).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P5)</td>
<td>“Informed decision” “informed consent” “responsible disclosure.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P5)</td>
<td>Citizens as “non-informed” and “responsible for their choice of disclosure.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing devices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reasoning devices</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package (P6)</th>
<th>Value of Truth (political argument)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P6)</td>
<td>The value of truth (and of public good) is higher than privacy. Concealment and deception, especially involving people in power, are threats to the well-being of society. Public figures willingly put themselves under the public eye; thereby they waive their right to privacy and submit themselves to the possibilities of gossip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P6)</td>
<td>“Information under the sun”; “abuses of privacy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P6)</td>
<td>In a conflict of values that concerns society’s right to know the details of life and the background of events are more important to collective survival. Watergate is an example of dangerous abuses of privacy by the Nixon administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P6)</td>
<td>“People need to know”; “private life is hidden life.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P6)</td>
<td>Those who occupy public positions must be “open about their lives.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots (P6)</td>
<td>Some loss of privacy is a small price to pay for the protection of the public interest that financial disclosure can provide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences (P6)</td>
<td>The freedom of the press is more important than the individual right to privacy when matters of public interest are involved (i.e. fight corruption to maintain political system).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals to principle (P6)</td>
<td>One should always follow the principle of honesty and transparency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Package (P7)</td>
<td>Privacy is Dead (fatalistic/resigned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P7)</td>
<td>Technology increasingly facilitates the collection, aggregation, and spread of data about citizens. As a consequence of ubiquitous surveillance, privacy is becoming an exception rather than a norm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P7)</td>
<td>The Big Brother. The spies in your computer. Privacy, like Atlantis, is a myth. We are “members of a naked society”; “denizens of a goldfish bowl.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P7)</td>
<td>The Census bureau and other agencies collecting and aggregating large amount information. Phone companies using or selling customers’ data. Google glasses. Facebook Graph search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P7)</td>
<td>“Privacy is dead, long live surveillance”; “Surveillance is the norm, privacy the exception”; “Kiss your privacy goodbye.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P7)</td>
<td>Technology being “ubiquitous” and data collection being “unstoppable.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots (P7)</td>
<td>Once information is disclosed it cannot be controlled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences (P7)</td>
<td>Self-censure is the only way to ensure privacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals to principle (P7)</td>
<td>One should know that controlling information is often not doable, especially as a consequence of technological developments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package (P8)</th>
<th>Fundamental privacy (right/legal argument)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core position (P8)</td>
<td>Privacy is a fundamental right, as the right to freedom and other civil liberties, and should be protected to guarantee the maintenance of a democratic society. Everyone has inalienable privacy rights protected by the fourth amendment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphors (P8)</td>
<td>When protecting privacy the Court is a “sentinel of freedom” “One’s house is one’s castle”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplars (P8)</td>
<td>Wiretaps (and the like) threaten civil liberties and are acceptable only when other more important values are at stake. Government must respect privacy unless other fundamental values are at stake - Laws intruding individual freedom. The Nixons’ private life is a mystery (as, perhaps, it should be). Clinton’s sexual affair broke no law: it was politically unjust and legally improper to denounce his misconduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catchphrases (P8)</td>
<td>“Privacy is sacred, holy and inalienable”; “there is no freedom without privacy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depictions (P8)</td>
<td>Those who invade privacy are “anti-democratic” as they challenge human rights, civil liberties, and democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots (P8)</td>
<td>The right to privacy distinguishes a free society from a totalitarian state. Privacy equals freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences (P8)</td>
<td>Without privacy protection, life would be intolerable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeals to principle (P8)</td>
<td>The risk of surveillance may generate “chilling effects” thus becoming an infringement upon one’s rights including freedom and civil liberty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Turow, J.: Americans and online privacy the system is broken. *A Report From the Annenberg Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania*, 2003.


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Amazon reviews. The Eighth International Conference on Digital Society, Barcelona, Spain, 2014.


