Licensed to Lie: Evidence for Moral Licensing in Persuasive Communication Contexts

BY

ALLISON B. MUELLER
B.A., Northwestern University, 2009

THESIS

Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Chicago, 2015

Chicago, Illinois

Defense Committee:

Linda J. Skitka, Chair and Advisor
Daniel Cervone
Courtney M. Bonam
This thesis is dedicated to my family—Nathan, Mom, Poppy, Mike, and A.J.—for their unwavering love, support, and encouragement. Without them, this thesis would have never been accomplished.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor—Linda J. Skitka—for her invaluable advice, assistance, and support during this process. I would also like to thank Daniel Cervone and Courtney M. Bonam for serving as members of my committee; their feedback strengthened this work. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my lab mates: Anthony Washburn and Tim Carsel for their willingness to help me code this data, Brittany Hanson for sharing with me her statistical expertise, and Caitlyn Yantis for her feedback and support.

ABM
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER                                      PAGE

1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................1
   1.1 Moral conviction ..............................................2
   1.2 Moral self-licensing ..........................................5
       1.2.1 The two models of moral self-licensing theory .........6
       1.2.2 Distinguishing between moral credits and moral credentials ..........8
       1.2.3 Implications of moral self-licensing in the current study ..........9
   1.3 Moral priming ....................................................10

2. STUDY 1 PILOT TESTING ..............................................13
   2.1 Participants ....................................................13
   2.2 Measures .......................................................13
   2.3 Results ...........................................................14

3. STUDY 1 ...............................................................19
   3.1 Method ..........................................................19
       3.1.1 Participants ..............................................19
       3.1.2 Design ....................................................19
       3.1.3 Procedure ...............................................19
       3.1.4 Pre-testing measures ....................................23
           3.1.4.1 Attitude position and strength ....................23
           3.1.4.2 Moral conviction ..................................23
           3.1.4.3 Moral self-image ..................................24
           3.1.4.4 Tendency to lie ....................................24
           3.1.4.5 Machiavellian Personality Scale ................24
       3.1.5 Experimental session measures ..........................25
           3.1.5.1 Essay credibility ...................................25
           3.1.5.2 Moral self-image ...................................26
           3.1.5.3 Religiosity ..........................................26
           3.1.5.4 Tolerance for the use of low-credibility information ........26
           3.1.5.5 Political knowledge ................................26
   3.2 Results ...........................................................27
       3.2.1 Manipulation check .......................................27
       3.2.2 Testing the licensing and consistency hypotheses ...............27
           3.2.2.1 Experimenter-coded credibility scores ................30
           3.2.2.2 Tolerance for the use of low-credibility information ........32
           3.2.2.3 Self-reported credibility scores .....................34
       3.2.3 Weighing the evidence for the licensing and consistency hypotheses ....37
       3.2.4 Testing for evidence of moral credentialing vs. moral crediting ....37
   3.3 Study 1 discussion ..............................................39
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.4.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITED LITERATURE</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. PILOT STUDY 1 SUPPORTING CLAIMS: POLITIFACT SCORES AND PARTICIPANTS’ RATINGS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. STUDY 1 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TENDENCY TO LIE, RELIGIOSITY, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, MACHIAVELLIANISM, MORAL CONVICTION, SELF-REPORTED CREDIBILITY, AND EXPERIMENTER-CODED CREDIBILITY</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF EXPERIMENTER-CODED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF EXPERIMENTER-CODED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (NOT INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF TOLERANCE FOR LOW CREDIBILITY INFORMATION (INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF TOLERANCE FOR LOW CREDIBILITY INFORMATION (NOT INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF SELF-REPORTED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF SELF-REPORTED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (NOT INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. STUDY 2 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS OF MONOLOGUE EVALUATION ITEMS</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. STUDY 2 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEIVER MORAL CONVICTION, PERCEIVER ATTITUDE CONGRUENCE WITH THE SPEAKER, CREDIBILITY FEEDBACK, EVALUATIONS OF THE SPEAKER, AND EVALUATIONS OF THE SPEAKER’S MORAL CHARACTER</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Study 1: The marginally significant interaction of moral conviction and essay condition predicting tolerance for the use of low-credibility information</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Study 2: The significant two-way interaction of perceiver moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker predicting evaluations of the speaker, independent of credibility feedback</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Study 2: The significant two-way interaction of perceiver moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker predicting evaluations of the speaker’s moral image, independent of credibility feedback</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

Why do people feel entitled to do bad things to serve a moral cause, and how do observers perceive these actors? Moral licensing theory suggests that people’s past moral actions entitle them to transgress without guilt (Monin & Miller, 2001) while prompting observers to excuse their transgressions (Effron & Monin, 2010). Thus, people obtain moral licenses by recalling their past good deeds. Still unclear, however, is whether attitudes such as strong moral conviction for a political issue free people do bad things for that cause. I examined this possibility in the current work.

In Study 1, I explored whether people’s strong moral conviction for a political issue would license them to lie to support that cause. People who received a traditional moral license (vs. no license) were more likely to lie regardless of their moral conviction for the issue. In Study 2, I examined whether people’s strong moral conviction for a political issue would lead them to license a political figure who lied to serve that cause. Moral convictions shaped people’s evaluations of those figures: People who supported the target’s attitude with strong (vs. weak) moral conviction licensed her lies for that cause.

Overall, this research suggests that moral licensing occurs in persuasive communication contexts, and strong moral convictions sometimes serve as moral licenses. Results may elucidate the pervasiveness of deceptive moral claims in American politics, and support future work to decrease the likelihood that individuals accept or propagate deceptive moralized claims.
1. INTRODUCTION

In January 2012, the American monologist Mike Daisey appeared on the radio show *This American Life* to showcase excerpts from his famous monologue, “The Agony and the Ecstasy of Steve Jobs” (Daisey, 2010). During his interview, Daisey illuminated the exploitation of workers at Foxconn, the Chinese manufacturing company that produces most computer components for Apple Inc., in an effort to increase public awareness of what he perceived to be a moral atrocity. Daisey claimed that the first thing he observed at Foxconn were angry guards with large guns stationed at the entrance of the factory. His descriptions of the conditions within the factory were no less horrifying: underage workers as young as 12 years old; workers with limbs mangled by malfunctioning factory equipment; workers whose hands shook uncontrollably as a result of exposure to potent neurotoxins. As a result of this litany of horrors, he argued that the costs of globalization and lower manufacturing prices were not worth the human and ethical sacrifices he documented.

After the Daisey broadcast, *This American Life* discovered that several of Daisey’s “facts” were fabricated, including the disturbing claims above. In a subsequent interview with *This American Life* host Ira Glass, Daisey still refused to acknowledge that he lied to the public, and he instead suggested that his mischaracterizations were justified because they served a noble cause. He claimed that everything he said was geared toward making people care about the cause (Glass, 2012).

The goals of the present research are to test whether people are more willing to bend the truth when they have strong moral convictions and are attempting to persuade others to join what they believe to be a noble cause (Study 1). Study 2 is designed to test whether
individuals judge people like Mike Daisey more or less leniently as a function of their moral investment in the same cause.

Mike Daisey’s apparent moral conviction against the exploitation of workers at Foxconn seemed to cloud his judgment of the permissibility of lying to raise awareness of such conditions. Before exploring this avenue of investigation, however, I first briefly review how attitudes imbued with moral conviction differ from strong but non-moral attitudes.

1.1 Moral conviction

Moral conviction refers to ‘a strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral’ (Skitka and Mullen, 2002, p. 36). Attitudes held with strong moral conviction are referred to as “moral mandates,” and they differ from strong but non-moral attitudes in several respects (Skitka, 2002). Unlike non-moral attitudes, moral mandates are theoretically associated with perceived universality, perceived objectivity, autonomy, and strong emotions (Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis, 2005). Together, these elements are thought to give moral mandates strong motivational force; moral mandates in and of themselves are believed to motivate individuals to take attitudinally-consistent action, even deviant action like lying to serve a noble cause (see Skitka, 2010 for a review). Next, I review each theoretical foundation of moral mandates in turn.

Skitka et al. (2005) theorized that individuals regard moral mandates as more universal than other attitudes like preferences or normative conventions. This prediction builds on past research that has found that the moral domain is psychologically different than domains of preferences or conventions (Turiel, 1983). Unlike moral mandates, preferences are at the discretion of the individual and are not socially regulated. Also in contrast to moral mandates, normative conventions dictate how individuals within a certain social group are supposed to act;
they do not speak to how all people should act. Moral mandates are theoretically different from preferences and conventions because they are perceived to be absolute standards of right and wrong that are not culturally bound. Although people with moral conviction for an issue may acknowledge that others have different moral viewpoints, they believe that others would adopt such an absolute standard if they knew the “facts” (Skitka et al., 2005). Moreover, this universalism hypothesis has received empirical support: People are more likely to have a universalistic mindset when thinking about their moral convictions and are also more likely to perceive their moral mandates as more universally applicable than their strong non-moral attitudes (Morgan, Skitka, and Lytle, under review).

A second theoretical feature of moral mandates is that they are experienced as objective facts about the world. People are likely to state that their moral mandates are objectively right or wrong without further justification. Moral mandates are perceived to be as factual as 2 + 2 = 4 (Skitka et al., 2005). The objectivity that is thought to be associated with moral mandates has also received empirical support. The more strongly an attitude is imbued with moral conviction, the more strongly one perceives that attitude to be objectively true (Morgan et al., under review).

Another theoretical characteristic of moral mandates is their autonomy, or how moral mandates operate independently of people’s concerns to adhere to formal rules of authorities or social groups. This “authority independence hypothesis” predicts that when people feel their moral mandates are threatened, they are likely to feel entitled to go outside the law or group norms to serve what they perceive to be a higher moral purpose. Moral mandates are not inherently anti-social, however. Instead, they are hypothesized to be associated with personal concerns rather than concerns for laws or group norms (Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen, 2008). Testing the “authority independence hypothesis,” Skitka, Bauman, and Lytle (2009) found that
respondents accepted and legitimized U.S. Supreme Court rulings depending on their level of moral conviction toward the issue at hand. Moral disagreement with the Court’s decisions undermined the Court’s fundamental legitimacy and authority. These results are especially relevant to the goals of the current project. Given that people are willing to reject the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, and are more likely to steal after learning about a law inconsistent with a morally mandated perspective (Mullen and Nadler, 2008), they might also believe it is acceptable to lie in an effort to persuade others to join the cause.

The final theoretical feature of moral mandates is the strong motivational force associated with such attitudes. Unlike non-moral preferences and conventions, the anticipated negative consequences of falling short of one’s moral mandates are hypothesized to be quite strong, including feelings of shame, regret, and guilt. Similarly, adherence to moral mandates is thought to be associated with stronger positive outcomes (e.g., pride, gratification, elevation, and self-affirmation) than being true to one’s preferences or following normative conventions (Skitka et al., 2008). Research has demonstrated that strong emotions provide moral mandates the motivational force necessary to compel people to take action to support the attitude. Skitka and Wisneski (2011) found that affect partially mediated the link between moral conviction and activist intentions to support the cause: Positive affect partially mediated the relationship between moral conviction and activist intentions for supporters, whereas negative affect partially mediated the relationship between moral conviction and activist intentions for opposers of physician-assisted suicide.

Taken together, there are several features of moral convictions that distinguish them from other strong but non-moral attitudes: universalism, objectivism, autonomy, and emotion-laden motivation. In the current research, however, two of these features are especially apt in
explaining Daisey’s willingness to take immoral action to support his moral beliefs: autonomy of authority and strong motivation. Specifically, people seem motivated to step outside their usual comfort zones (and authority) to support their moral convictions. For example, moral mandates seem to legitimize any behavior that ultimately leads to the mandated results, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to achieve that outcome (Skitka and Houston, 2001). Moreover, outcomes that violate moral mandates increase people’s willingness to engage in deviant behaviors, such as stealing and cheating (Mullen and Nadler, 2008). Past research suggests that people may be more willing to take action—even deviant action, like bending the truth—to serve their strong moral convictions. Two theoretical mechanisms that may speak to the relationship between moral conviction and transgressing for a moralized cause are reviewed next: moral self-licensing theory and moral priming theory.

1.2 Moral self-licensing

One theoretical mechanism through which people might be willing to bend the truth for their beliefs is moral self-licensing (Monin and Miller, 2001). According to Monin and Miller’s (2001) moral self-licensing theory, past moral behavior makes people feel entitled to engage in future immoral behaviors without compunction. Implicit in moral self-licensing theory is the idea that one’s moral self-regard, or momentary assessments of the extent to which one is a moral person, is a dynamic construct that fluctuates in response to situational factors like recent feedback or social comparison. As moral self-licensing theory suggests, these fluctuations in moral self-regard can influence future behavior (Monin and Jordan, 2009).

Monin and Jordan’s (2009) dynamic conception of moral self-regard moves beyond Blasi’s (1983) theory of moral centrality, which posited that “moral identity” is a stable individual difference that reflects how central morality is to one’s self-concept, and in turn, the
degree to which morality influences behavior. In contrast, Monin and Jordan (2009) proposed that people’s thoughts and behaviors are often driven by momentary fluctuations in moral self-regard. Because these fluctuations are influenced by situational factors, momentary changes in moral self-regard can lead people to later act more or less morally. Applied to moral self-licensing theory, Monin and Miller (2001) postulated that a boost in one’s moral self-regard licenses him or her to act less morally in the near future.

1.2.1 The two models of moral self-licensing theory

Monin and Miller (2001) investigated two moral self-licensing models that support the notion that moral self-regard based on recent past behavior influences subsequent morally relevant actions. The first model, called the moral credits model, is based on Nisan’s (1991) moral balance theory. As the name implies, this model suggests that individuals decide whether bad acts are permissible by assessing the moral magnitude of their recent past actions. In essence, this model suggests that people have a ‘moral bank account’; the balance between their moral credits (good deeds) and debits (bad deeds) determine what course of moral action to take next.

Monin and Miller (2001) proposed a second model, referred to as moral credentialing, that suggests that past good behavior serves as a positive lens through which future behavior is interpreted. According to the moral credentials model, high moral self-regard leads individuals to construe future morally relevant actions in a positively biased way. Moral credentials, which boost one’s moral self-regard, allow individuals to interpret subsequent ambiguous moral actions as acceptable and morally upstanding (Merritt, Effron, and Monin, 2010).

Both moral self-licensing models are rooted in moral self-regard fluctuations, whereby increases in moral self-regard negatively impact subsequent moral actions. Therefore, the same
overall finding can be interpreted through the lens of moral credits or credentials. To illustrate, men who were given the opportunity to challenge sexist remarks (i.e., given a moral license) were more willing to later describe a stereotypically male occupation as more appropriate for men than women (Monin and Miller, 2001). A moral credits interpretation of this licensing effect would claim that these men were more comfortable appearing sexist because they perceived that their initial disagreement with sexist remarks served as a moral credit that freed them to make a subsequent moral debit. In contrast, a moral credentials interpretation would claim participants’ initial nonsexist behavior led them to be more confident that their ensuing sexist behavior was not sexist at all; instead, they construed their sexist preference as an honorable concern for women (e.g., that other employees’ sexism could interfere with a woman’s job performance).

The research discussed thus far has focused on moral credit and credentialing effects that emerge when individuals engage in moral behavior and subsequently have an opportunity to transgress. These effects are fueled by self-concerns and fluctuations in moral self-regard (Merritt et al., 2010; Monin and Jordan, 2013). However, evidence suggests that under some circumstances, observers pardon, or license, an actor’s transgressions: An actor’s prior moral behavior makes observers more willing to excuse subsequent transgressions (Effron and Monin, 2010). For actors, licensing represents an effective self-presentational strategy when observers are willing to excuse transgressions based on prior good deeds (Merritt et al., 2010).

When do observers excuse versus condemn actors’ transgressions following moral behavior? For blatant transgressions, observers license actors when their moral behavior is in a different domain than their subsequent transgressions, but they condemn actors’ seemingly hypocritical behavior when moral actions and transgressions are in the same domain (Effron and Monin, 2010). For example, considering the allegation that Martin Luther King Jr. committed
adultery (Abernathy, 1989, as cited in Effron and Monin, 2010), observers tend to license this alleged transgression given King’s tremendous contributions to the civil rights movement. King’s moral deeds and subsequent transgressions are in different domains, leading observers to license his behavior. However, observers are not nearly as forgiving of transgressions that fall in the same domain as previous moral behavior: Eliot Spitzer, a distinguished attorney known for fighting prostitution and sex trafficking, was later accused of being a hypocrite when he hired prostitutes during his tenure as governor of New York (Hakim and Santos, 2008, as cited in Effron and Monin, 2010). Importantly, ambiguous transgressions tend to be licensed regardless of whether or not they are in different domains than preceding moral actions (Effron and Monin, 2010).

Although observers may license actors, moral self-licensing is particularly relevant to Study 1, in which I will investigate whether people are more willing to bend the truth to serve a moral cause when they feel licensed or credentialed to transgress. Because any given moral self-licensing effect can be interpreted through the processes of either moral credits or moral credentials, it is necessary to clarify which mechanism accounts for the effects of moral self-regard on immoral actions, something I turn to next.

1.2.2 Distinguishing between moral credits and moral credentials

To distinguish between moral credits and credentials in the current study, I will first compare the extent to which two groups perceive transgressions to be acceptable: a group who is given a moral self-license versus a no-license control group. The moral credits and credentials models make different predictions about the relative acceptability judgments of transgressions between these two groups. The moral credits model predicts that people who are given a moral self-license, as well as those who are not given a license in the control group, will
rate lying and cheating as equally unacceptable. In this case, transgressions represent moral
deductions among all people, regardless of whether they are given a moral self-license or not. In
contrast, the moral credentials model predicts that people who are given a moral self-license will
perceive transgressions as more acceptable than a control group because those who are given a
moral self-license will construe these transgressions in a positively biased way.

Another way I will distinguish between the moral credits and credentials models will be
to measure fluctuations in individuals’ moral self-regard from baseline to after the experimental
manipulations. These two licensing models differ in the predictions they make about how
engaging in a transgression affects people’s moral self-regard. The moral credits model predicts
that individuals’ moral self-regard should decrease following a moral debit (bad deed), whereas
the moral credentials model does not predict any change in moral self-regard because
transgressions are construed as morally upstanding.

1.2.3 Implications of moral self-licensing in the current study

Moral self-licensing theory suggests that increases in moral self-regard, via moral
credits or credentials, can lead to future immoral behavior. In the current study, moral self-
licensing theory predicts that people will be more willing to lie in support of their beliefs after
they are given a moral credit or credential, such as reflecting on past moral actions, than when
they have not been given a credit or credential.

Moreover, I predict that moral conviction may moderate the relationship between
heightened moral self-regard and lying in the name of a cause. Specifically, I hypothesize that
people with strong moral convictions about the cause will lie regardless of whether they are
given a moral credit or credential, whereas people with weak moral convictions will only lie
when given a moral credit or credential. In essence, moral conviction may serve as a form of
moral self-licensing in and of itself by boosting moral self-regard. People with high moral conviction may lie even without moral credits or credentials because the moral self-regard stemming from their strong moral conviction is sufficiently high to license or credential their engagement in future immoral action. This set of predictions is referred to as the moral self-licensing hypothesis.

1.3 Moral priming

Although the licensing hypothesis is supported by moral self-licensing theory, there is an alternative stream of research findings that contradicts the moral self-licensing hypothesis (e.g., Kraut, 1973; Reed, Aquino, and Levy, 2007). These alternative findings, which stress that priming morality drives future moral behavior, are the opposite of what is predicted by the moral self-licensing hypothesis. That is, these findings suggest that people who reflect on past good behavior go on to act more, not less, morally afterward; their behavior over time is consistent, as opposed to moral self-licensing effects which lead to inconsistent behavior.

The behavioral consistency that stems from moral primes is compatible with past psychological research that suggests that people avoid behavioral inconsistency because it is threatening and uncomfortable (Festinger, 1957). For example, according to the foot-in-the-door effect, people are more likely to help if they have helped in the past (Freedman and Fraser, 1966). Social norm primes guide socially-regulated behavior within a situation (Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 2003), and goal primes induce people to perform according to a goal standard, cooperate with others, or be more egalitarian (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar and Troetschel, 2001; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal, 1999).

Morality researchers have also demonstrated that morality can be primed. Using moral centrality as a framework, Blasi (1984) theorized that heightened accessibility of one’s moral
identity ultimately translates into increased consistency between moral motivation and action. Moreover, Blasi’s (1984) theory has received empirical support. Researchers have demonstrated that moral primes increase the accessibility of one’s moral identity, which in turn leads to subsequent moral action (e.g., Kraut, 1973; Reed, Aquino, and Levy, 2007).

These findings suggest an alternative to the licensing hypothesis. As specified above, the licensing hypothesis predicts an interaction between licensing (yes, no) and moral conviction on how much people lie in support of a cause. People with strong moral convictions about the cause will lie regardless of whether they are given a traditional moral license, whereas people with weak moral convictions will only lie when given a traditional license.

In contrast, if the consistency hypothesis is true, then people of all levels of moral conviction who are given a traditional moral license (i.e., during a licensing manipulation) will continue to behave morally afterward. A moral prime, such as a traditional moral license, should make people act morally to avoid uncomfortable behavioral inconsistency (Festinger, 1957). In contrast, people high in moral conviction will lie more than those low in moral conviction in the absence of a traditional moral prime/license. People with low moral conviction who are not primed with morality will not lie to support the cause because they lack any motivation and justification to do so (Skitka et al., 2005).

To sum up the consistency hypothesis, I predict that people of all levels of moral conviction for the issue will avoid lying after they are primed with morality. Alternatively, when they are not primed with morality, I predict that people with high moral conviction will be willing to lie to serve a cause, whereas people with low moral conviction will not be willing to transgress.
The purpose of Study 1 was to explore whether moral conviction moderates the link between moral self-licensing and one’s propensity to lie. The licensing hypothesis predicted an interaction between a licensing manipulation and moral conviction on how much people lie in support of a cause. People with strong moral convictions about the cause should have lied regardless of whether they were given a traditional moral license because their moral convictions alone should have boosted their moral self-regard and therefore licensed subsequent transgressions. In contrast, people with weak moral convictions should have only lied when given a traditional moral license.

According to the consistency hypothesis, people of all levels of moral conviction who were given a traditional moral license should have behaved morally afterward (not lied). In other words, there should have been no effect of moral conviction on propensity to lie in the moral license condition. In contrast, moral conviction should have affected whether people lied in the absence of a traditional moral license or prime. People high in moral conviction should have lied at a greater rate than those low in moral conviction in the absence of a traditional moral license/prime. Before testing these hypotheses, however, it was important to pilot a set of claims that varied in credibility, and to ensure that low credibility claims were at least as tempting to use as high credibility claims in making an argument.
2. STUDY 1 PILOT TESTING

The goal of the pilot study was to uncover a set of “facts” that varied in credibility but were nonetheless seen as persuasive and therefore tempting to use in a persuasive appeal. Overall, this pilot study was necessary to identify low credibility claims that participants might be tempted to use to increase the overall persuasiveness of their arguments in Study 1.

2.1 Participants

Four hundred sixty one students, faculty, and staff members from the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) were recruited to participate in an online study via mass mail. Participation was completely voluntary, and participants did not receive monetary compensation for completing the pilot study.

2.2 Measures

After participants consented to participate via Qualtrics, they were asked, “Do you support or oppose Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood?” Participants responded with the options support, uncertain/unsure, oppose. If participants indicated that they supported the issue, they were then asked, “How strong is your support for Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood?” Response options included slightly strong, moderately strong, and very strong. In contrast, participants who indicated that they opposed the issue were asked, “How strong is your opposition to Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood?” Response options included slightly strong, moderately strong, and very strong. Finally, participants who responded that they were uncertain/unsure about the issue were asked, “If you had to choose, would you say that you tend to lean more toward supporting or opposing Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood?”
Response options for this question included *lean more toward supporting*, *lean more toward not supporting*, and *uncertain/don’t know*. Only participants who answered with some degree of support or opposition to the issue were invited to participate in the rest of the survey.

Participants were then told to imagine that they were hired to develop political ads to sway public opinion about the issue of supporting or opposing Federal funding of women’s reproductive services, depending on their attitudes about the issue (the questionnaire branched based on participants’ initial attitudes to a pro-attitudinal topic). Participants evaluated 16 pro-attitudinal claims that were consistent with their positions on the issue (see Appendix A). For example, a claim in support of Federal funding of women’s reproductive services includes: “Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention: 80 percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services.” In contrast, an example of an opposing claim is, “You can’t give a child an aspirin in school without permission. You can’t administer any kind of medication, but you can secretly take the child off and have an abortion without parental consent.” They were instructed to rate how persuasive each claim was and to assume that all of the claims were equally true. Response options for the persuasiveness of the claims included *not at all*, *slightly*, *moderately*, *much*, and *very much* (for a list of all Pilot Study measures, see Appendix B).

### 2.3 Results

The goal of the pilot study was to identify whether the claims to be used as stimulus materials in the main study that varied in credibility were nonetheless seen as persuasive and therefore tempting to use in crafting persuasive appeals. In the current UIC sample, supporters for the issue (*N* = 318) were much more common than opposers of Federal funding for
reproductive services \((N = 55)\). For convenience and practicality, I therefore only recruited UIC students for Study 1 who supported Federal funding for reproductive services.

To identify appropriate supporting claims that varied in credibility that were nonetheless seen as persuasive, I used a simple decision rule: Across all claims, I discarded any that fell below the midpoint of the persuasiveness scale (i.e., below a 3 on a 5 point scale). In total, four out of 16 claims had mean persuasiveness ratings below the midpoint (see Table I). I used a one-sample \(t\)-test to determine whether the mean persuasiveness rating of each claim significantly differed from the midpoint of the scale, 3.

Results revealed that the claim with the lowest persuasiveness rating (referred to as “HIV;” see Table 1) was significantly lower than the midpoint, \(t(310) = -7.54, p < .01\), as was the “Romney” claim, \(t(313) = -6.58, p < .01\). Of note, these claims were on opposite ends of the Politifact credibility spectrum (i.e., one was mostly false and the other was true). The two remaining claims that had persuasiveness ratings below the midpoint were both rated as mostly true by Politifact. One claim, “Vatican Position,” had a mean persuasiveness rating significantly lower than 3, \(t(308) = -2.49, p < .05\), but the other claim, “Deductibles,” did not differ from the midpoint, \(t(309) = -0.54, ns\).

Using my decision rule, “HIV,” “Romney,” and “Vatican Position” should have been excluded as stimulus materials in Study 1. However, to ensure that an equal number of true/mostly true claims and false/mostly false claims were included in the stimulus materials used in Study 1, the “Vatican Position” claim was retained. Politifact claim credibility had to be balanced between true/mostly true and false/mostly false to rule out the possibility that participants used low-credibility claims in their persuasive essays simply because there were more low-credibility claims to choose from.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Claim ID</th>
<th>Politifact Score</th>
<th>Mean Persuasiveness Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nearly half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintended.</td>
<td>“Unintended”</td>
<td>True (4)</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Oregon, only 41 percent of adults have ever been tested for HIV.</td>
<td>“HIV”</td>
<td>True (4)</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We've seen more anti-women's choice bills introduced in the first half of this session [of the Ohio House of Representatives] than we've seen in the last three General Assemblies.</td>
<td>“Ohio House”</td>
<td>True (4)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most women, including 98 percent of Catholic women, have used contraception.</td>
<td>“Catholic Contraception”</td>
<td>Mostly true (3)</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage.</td>
<td>“Deductibles”</td>
<td>Mostly true (3)</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on Planned Parenthood come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care.</td>
<td>“Poverty Rate”</td>
<td>Mostly true (3)</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention: 80 percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services.</td>
<td>“Prevention”</td>
<td>Mostly true (3)</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim</td>
<td>Claim ID</td>
<td>Politifact Score</td>
<td>Mean Persuasiveness Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only 14 percent of Catholics agree with the Vatican’s position that abortion should be illegal.</td>
<td>“Vatican Position”</td>
<td>Mostly true (3)</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won't cover birth-control medication.</td>
<td>“Viagra”</td>
<td>Mostly false (2)</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Walker [Governor of Wisconsin] tried to pass a law to allow pharmacists to block women’s access to birth control.</td>
<td>“Pharmacists”</td>
<td>Mostly false (2)</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitt Romney signed government-mandated health care legislation with taxpayer-funded abortions.</td>
<td>“Romney”</td>
<td>Mostly false (2)</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics bear out that any time a country, a state, makes more restrictive abortion laws, fatalities go up and abortions actually increase.</td>
<td>“Statistics”</td>
<td>Mostly false (2)</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An amendment proposed by Representative Stupak to the recently passed Affordable Care Act doesn't just say you can't use your Federal insurance subsidy to pay for an abortion, it says, if you're getting a Federal subsidy of any kind, you're not allowed to buy an insurance plan that covers abortion even with your own money.</td>
<td>“Stupak”</td>
<td>Mostly false (2)</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although we have had a president [President George W. Bush] who pushed abstinence-only sex education programs during his presidency, abortions did not go down.</td>
<td>“Abstinence”</td>
<td>False (1)</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim</td>
<td>Claim ID</td>
<td>Politifact Score</td>
<td>Mean Persuasiveness Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives.</td>
<td>“Cancer Screen”</td>
<td>False (1)</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.</td>
<td>“Preventative Care”</td>
<td>False (1)</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. STUDY 1

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants

One hundred seven introductory psychology undergraduates from UIC participated in the main study and received course credit as a form of compensation.

3.1.2 Design

A 2 (moral licensing: yes, no) × (pre-testing level of moral conviction about Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services) between-subjects design was utilized. Participants’ level of moral conviction was a measured, not manipulated, variable.

3.1.3 Procedure

At the beginning of the semester and prior to participating in the laboratory sessions, participants completed a pen-and-paper mass-testing survey that measured their degree of support or opposition to Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood) and the degree to which they felt moral conviction about the issue. Only participants who supported the issue (i.e., those who endorsed at least slightly when asked the degree to which they support the issue) were eligible to participate in the laboratory session. Participants of all levels of moral conviction were selected for participation, ranging from low to high.

During the mass-testing session, each participant also completed questionnaires that measured moral self-image, propensity to lie, and the degree to which he or she possessed Machiavellian personality traits (e.g., a tendency to distrust others, amorally manipulate others, wish to control others, and attain status for oneself). Moral self-image was assessed during mass-testing and the experimental session to discern whether potential moral self-licensing behavior
occurred via moral credits or credentials. Lower moral self-image at the end of experimental session than the mass-testing session would suggest that the moral credits model was the mechanism through which people were willing to bend the truth for their beliefs. In contrast, no difference between mass-testing and experimental session levels of moral self-image would suggest that moral credentials represented the mechanism. Propensity to lie and Machiavellianism were also measured during mass-testing so those variables could be controlled for in subsequent analyses; they were measured during the mass-testing session instead of the experimental session to ensure that responses were not influenced by experimental manipulations (for a list of all Study 1 pre-testing measures, see Appendix C).

Up to 10 participants were recruited for the experimental sessions at a time, and each was seated in a private cubicle equipped with a computer. Participants were instructed that the purpose of the study was to investigate how college-aged voters craft persuasive political arguments.

Before constructing their persuasive arguments, participants were instructed to complete a short writing task about everyday actions. In actuality, this task served as the moral self-licensing manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two writing conditions: writing about moral or practical actions. Writing about moral actions represented the licensing condition. Participants were asked to imagine and write about the following moral actions: “act caring toward a person who is sad”; “act compassionately toward a person in pain”; “act friendly toward a stranger”; “give generously to a person in need”; “act kindly toward another person”; “act hardworking”; “be fair to another person” (Conway and Peetz, 2012). In the control condition, participants were asked to write about practical actions: “use common sense”; “weigh costs and benefits”; “take time to come to a sound decision”; “decide things in a practical
manner”; “make realistic goals”; “act level-headed during a stressful time”; “work toward goals efficiently”; “act thrifty.” Participants were not explicitly told how much time to spend on this writing task. They could spend as much or little time as they need. The time participants spent writing was measured via Qualtrics.

Next, participants were given a list of facts they could use when crafting their persuasive essays. All participants were asked to write pro-attitudinal essays in support of the maintenance of Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood).

Participants read the following directions:

The Psychology Department recently received a grant from a well-known political research organization that specializes in investigating how ad campaigns affect voters’ attitudes. For this study in particular, they are interested in learning how college-aged voters craft political arguments. This organization’s goal is to ultimately persuade other college-aged voters to support this issue using a very persuasive ad campaign. This organization focuses on the issue of maintaining Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood).

Your job will be to compose a persuasive essay that could be included with this organization’s upcoming ad campaign. In other words, your goal is to convince someone about the importance of maintaining Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood). The information that will be presented to you shortly on flashcards represents arguments some political figures have used when trying to persuade others on this issue. All of these items have been selected from the national political conversation surrounding this important issue. Each item has an accompanying credibility rating derived from a trusted fact checking website dedicated to testing the validity of various political messages. You can use the items provided to you to construct your essay if you wish.

To ensure that participants understood the directions, the directions were also verbally spoken to the participants by the experimenter using a script identical to the instructions presented above.

Participants were given as much time as they needed to read the 14 pro-attitudinal political claims (each claim was presented on a single flash card). Each item had an accompanying credibility score (based on real scores provided by Politifact.com, n.d.) to educate
participants on the degree to which each message was factually true. Credibility scores were presented on a 4 point scale: *false* (1), *mostly false* (2), *mostly true* (3), and *true* (4). These credibility scores ultimately operationalized the degree to which participants lied (i.e., the credibility scores of the claims they used were averaged and served as the dependent variable). After considering all the political messages, participants composed a persuasive essay. Participants were not explicitly told how much time to spend on this writing task. They could spend as much or little time as they needed. The time participants spent writing was measured via Qualtrics.

Participants then completed a 15-minute computer-administered questionnaire. First, all participants completed a moral self-image measure. Next, they completed a measure of the extent to which they supported or opposed the maintenance of Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, and a religiosity scale (as a control variable). To collect further evidence for whether moral credits or credentials were responsible for licensing effects, I then asked how acceptable it was to use low credibility information to serve a noble cause. Demographic information was also collected: gender, age, first language, year in school, and political affiliation. I also tested participants’ political knowledge and controlled for it in subsequent analyses (for a list of all Study 1 experimental session measures, see Appendix D).

Finally, participants self-reported which *Politifact* claims they utilized to compose their persuasive essays. They also were given the option to respond that they did not use any of the claims. To rule out the possibility that participants were dishonest in reporting which claims they used in their persuasive essays, I manually coded their essays and noted which claims they used, if any. Although I did not expect that participants would lie about which claims they used in their
persuasive essays, I explored whether truthfulness in reporting varied as a function of moral licensing (vs. no licensing) or moral conviction for the issue.

At the conclusion of the laboratory session, participants were prompted to write their thoughts about the purpose of the research in a text box on the computer to probe for suspicion and were debriefed.

### 3.1.4 Pre-testing Measures

#### 3.1.4.1 Attitude position and strength

First, I assessed participants’ attitude positions and the extent to which participants’ attitudes toward Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services were perceived as strong attitudes. Specifically, I assessed participants’ positions on the issue by asking, “Do you support or oppose (issue)?” Participants responded with the options support, uncertain/unsure, oppose. Next, they were asked to report the extremity of their attitudes, “To what extent do you support/oppose (issue)?” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much. Participants then responded to four questions that assessed the importance and certainty of their attitudes toward that issue. The items included the stem, “To what extent is your position on (topic)…” followed by four completions: “something that you care a lot about?”; “personally important to you?”; “something you are certain about?”; and “something you are sure you are correct about?” Participants responded on five-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much.

#### 3.1.4.2 Moral conviction

The extent to which participants perceived their attitudes toward the issue in a moral light was assessed with a moral conviction measure. Participants were asked,
“To what extent is your position on (topic)…” followed by four completions: “a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?”; “a reflection of your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong?”; “a moral stance?”; and “based on strong personal principles?” Participants responded on five-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much.

3.1.4.3 Moral self-image

Participants’ moral self-conceptions were assessed with an adaptation of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Moral Identity Scale. Participants were asked the following statements: “I am as caring as I want to be”; “I am as compassionate as I want to be”; “I am as fair as I want to be”; “I am as friendly as I want to be”; “I am as generous as I want to be”; “I am as hardworking as I want to be”; “I am as helpful as I want to be”; and “I am as kind as I want to be.” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much.

3.1.4.4 Tendency to lie

The extent to which participants tended to lie was assessed with the L-r Lie subscale of the MMPI-2 (Hathaway and McKinley, 1951). Participants responded to five items: “I do not always tell the truth,” “Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today,” “I do not like everyone I know,” “I gossip a little at times,” and “Sometimes in elections I vote for people about whom I know very little.” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much.

3.1.4.5 Machiavellian Personality Scale

The extent to which participants tended to distrust others, amorally manipulate others, wish to control others, and attain status for oneself was assessed with the
Amorality subscale of the Machiavellian Personality Scale (Dahling, Whitaker, and Levy, 2009). Participants responded to the following five items: “I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others,” “The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my benefit,” “I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed,” “I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own goals,” and “I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught.” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much.

3.1.5 Experimental Session Measures

3.1.5.1 Essay credibility

Essay credibility was measured in two ways, via participant self-report and experimenter coding of the essays. I measured essay credibility in two ways for the following reasons: 1) The experimenter-coded scores represented true estimates of essay credibility, given that self-reported measures of credibility could have been influenced by social desirability concerns or memory errors; and 2) The self-reported scores reflected the extent to which participants were aware of the true credibility of their essays. Measuring essay credibility in two ways allowed me to test the extent to which participants bent the truth to serve their moral convictions, as well as to conduct exploratory analyses to determine whether participant awareness of credibility varied in systematic ways (e.g., as a function of moral conviction for the issue).

As a self-report measure of credibility, participants indicated the claims they included in their essays from a checklist of all possible claims. Second, the actual credibility scores of the essays were determined by qualitatively coding participants’ essays for the credibility of the content. Two independent raters coded all essays for the credibility of their content, based on
Politifact credibility scores. Then, coders computed average credibility scores for each essay. Inter-rater agreement on credibility scoring was acceptably high, ICC = 0.86.

3.1.5.2 **Moral self-image**

Post-experimental moral self-image was measured the same way it was at pre-test.

3.1.5.3 **Religiosity**

As a control variable, participants’ levels of religiosity was assessed with a short form of the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (Plante and Boccaccini, 1997). Participants responded to the stem “To what extent do the following statements apply to you?” followed by the 3 items: “My religious faith is extremely important to me,” “My religious faith impacts many of my decisions,” and “I look to my faith for meaning and purpose in my life.” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of *not at all, slightly, moderately, much,* and *very much.*

3.1.5.4 **Tolerance for the use of low-credibility information**

The degree to which participants found the use of low credibility information to persuade others acceptable was assessed with the following question: “To what extent do you find it acceptable to use low-credibility information to persuade others to join a noble cause?” Response points included *not at all, slightly, moderately, much,* and *very much.*

3.1.5.5 **Political knowledge**

As a control variable, participants’ political knowledge was assessed with a short form of the American National Election Studies (ANES) Evaluations of Government and Society Study Survey 4 (2012). Participants responded to the following multiple choice questions, “Who is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court?”; “Who is the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom?”; “Who was the Secretary of State during George W. Bush’s second presidential term?”; and “On which of the following does the U.S. Federal government spend the least money?”

3.2 **Results**

3.2.1 **Manipulation check**

Before conducting my primary analyses, I first ensured that participants perceived the licensing manipulation in the way that I intended. I tested whether writing about moral actions put participants into a moral mindset, or alternatively, whether writing about practical actions put participants into a non-moral mindset. To do this, two independent raters who were blind to condition coded participants’ essays, attempting to categorize whether the essays followed the moral or practical essay prompt. Coders correctly categorized a majority of the essays (96.2%), that is, the moral essays were mostly identified as moral and the practical essays were mostly identified as practical. Therefore, my licensing manipulation was successful. Participants in the moral essay condition were in a moral mindset while writing their essays and therefore wrote about moral content, whereas participants in the practical essay condition were in a non-moral mindset and therefore wrote about non-moral content.

3.2.2 **Testing the licensing and consistency hypotheses**

If the licensing hypothesis was true, then I should find an interaction between moral conviction and essay condition predicting essay credibility. People with strong moral convictions about the cause should have used low credibility information similarly across essay conditions, whereas people with weak moral convictions should have used low credibility information more when asked to write a moral than a practical essay. In contrast, if the consistency hypothesis was true, then I should find a different interaction between moral
conviction and essay condition predicting essay credibility: People who were asked to write a moral essay should have resisted the temptation to use low credibility information in their essay regardless of their degree of moral conviction, whereas in the practical essay condition, people higher in moral conviction should have used low credibility information at a greater rate than those low in moral conviction. Unexpectedly, I only found partial support for the licensing hypothesis.

The licensing and consistency hypotheses were tested using a series of hierarchical moderated regressions (Aiken and West, 1991). In all regression models below, I entered my predictors in three blocks, mean-centering all continuous predictor variables. Block one contained control variables: tendency to lie, Machiavellian personality trait, religiosity, and political knowledge. In block two, I entered the dummy-coded licensing condition, as well as moral conviction. Finally, I entered the licensing condition × moral conviction interaction term in block three. I ran three regression models to test three different criterion variables: 1) Experimenter-coded mean Politifact credibility score of the essays; 2) Tolerance for the use of low-credibility information to persuade others; and 3) Self-reported mean Politifact credibility scores of the essays (see Table II for correlations between all variables).
TABLE II. STUDY 1 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TENDENCY TO LIE, RELIGIOSITY, KNOWLEDGE, MACHIAVELLIANISM, MORAL CONVICTION, SELF-REPORTED CREDIBILITY, AND EXPERIMENTER-CODED CREDIBILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tendency to lie</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Religiosity</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political Knowledge</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Machiavellianism</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Moral Conviction</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Essay Condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Self-Reported Credibility</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Experimenter-Coded Credibility</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.34**</td>
<td>0.63**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01.
3.2.2.1 **Experimenter-coded credibility scores**

As can be seen in Table III, third party coders determined that participants with stronger Machiavellian scores used lower credibility claims in their essays. As can also be seen in Table III, essays written in the moral essay condition had lower experimenter-coded credibility scores than essays written in the control essay condition. However, moral conviction did not predict experimenter-coded credibility scores, and the moral conviction × essay condition interaction did not predict experimenter-coded credibility scores above and beyond the other predictor variables. The same pattern of results emerged when the model did not include control variables (see Table IV).

Taken together, my hypotheses were only partially supported. Consistent with the licensing hypothesis, participants who felt licensed used lower credibility claims in their essays than those who were not given a moral license. However, moral conviction did not interact with essay condition to predict experimenter-coded credibility scores, and therefore neither the licensing nor the consistency hypotheses were fully supported by the data.
TABLE III. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF EXPERIMENTER-CODED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE_B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to lie</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-3.67</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay × moral conviction</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.  

TABLE IV. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF EXPERIMENTER-CODED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (NOT INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE_B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-3.38</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay × moral conviction</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.  

3.2.2.2 **Tolerance for the use of low-credibility information**

As can be seen in Table V, higher levels of Machiavellianism and religiosity predicted higher tolerance for using low-credibility information. Neither political knowledge nor tendency to lie predicted tolerance for using low-credibility information.

The interaction of moral conviction and essay condition marginally predicted participants’ tolerance for low-credibility information. Although the effect size was small, I nonetheless followed up the interaction because it was hypothesized. Stronger moral conviction for the issue predicted lower tolerance for the use of low-credibility information in the moral essay condition—not higher tolerance, $B = -0.30$, $SE = 0.13$, $p = 0.02$. Moral conviction did not relate to tolerance for the use of low-credibility information in the practical essay condition, $B = 0.05$, $SE = 0.13$, ns (see Figure 1). Importantly, this interaction did not emerge when I ran the model without control variables (see Table VI), suggesting that the interaction was unreliable.

Taken together, my hypotheses regarding the tolerance for low credibility information were not clearly supported. Moral conviction and essay condition marginally interacted to predict tolerance for the use of low-credibility information. However, those results do not support the licensing or consistency hypotheses. The licensing hypothesis predicted that participants high in moral conviction, as well as those low in moral conviction who were given a license in the moral essay condition, would be tolerant of low-credibility information. In contrast, the consistency hypothesis predicted that only participants high in moral conviction in the practical essay condition would be tolerant of low-credibility information. I found that stronger moral conviction marginally predicted lower, not higher, tolerance of low-credibility information in the moral but not practical essay condition, results that are inconsistent with both of these hypotheses. This unexpected result will be further discussed in the General Discussion.
### TABLE V. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF TOLERANCE FOR LOW CREDIBILITY INFORMATION (INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE_B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>0.51**</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to lie</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay × moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.35†</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-1.84</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

### TABLE VI: STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF TOLERANCE FOR LOW CREDIBILITY INFORMATION (NOT INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE_B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-1.17</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay × moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.
Figure 1. Study 1: The marginally significant interaction of moral conviction and essay condition predicting tolerance for the use of low-credibility information.

### 3.2.2.3 Self-reported credibility scores

My third regression model tested whether moral conviction and essay condition interacted to predict self-reported credibility scores (see Table VII). People with greater political knowledge and lower levels of Machiavellianism reported that they used higher credibility information in their essays. Neither tendency to lie nor religiosity was significantly related to the credibility of information participants reported to use in their essays.

Consistent with the licensing hypothesis, participants in the moral essay condition had lower self-reported credibility scores than participants in the control essay condition. However, contrary to both the licensing and consistency hypotheses, the interaction term for moral conviction and essay condition did not significantly improve the regression model. The same pattern of results emerged when the model did not include control variables (see Table VIII).

Together, my hypotheses were again only partially supported. Consistent with the licensing hypothesis, participants who felt morally licensed self-reported that they used lower
credibility claims in their essays than those who were not given a moral license. However, moral conviction did not interact with essay condition to predict self-reported credibility scores.
TABLE VII. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF SELF-REPORTED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE_B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-3.39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tendency to lie</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-2.51</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 3:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay × moral conviction</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

TABLE VIII. STUDY 1 UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF PREDICTORS OF SELF-REPORTED ESSAY CREDIBILITY (NOT INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th>$B$</th>
<th>$SE_B$</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral conviction</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essay × moral conviction</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.
3.2.3 **Weighing the evidence for the licensing and consistency hypotheses**

In sum, I did not find clear support for the licensing or consistency hypotheses per se: Moral conviction did not significantly interact with essay condition as hypothesized to predict experimenter-coded credibility, tolerance for low credibility information, or self-reported credibility. However, I found that essay condition predicted both experimenter-coded and self-reported essay credibility. Participants who received a moral license (i.e., the moral essay condition) felt more entitled to lie to garner support for a cause than those who did not receive a license (i.e., the practical essay condition), and they were aware that they used lower credibility information. This finding suggests that moral licensing occurred, but it happened for all participants, not just those who had strong moral convictions about the issue. The strength of the moral licensing manipulation was apparently sufficiently strong that individual differences in moral conviction no longer mattered: When participants felt morally licensed, they also felt licensed to “lie.” This moral licensing effect could have occurred via one of two ways, moral credentialing or crediting, so I next analyzed whether moral credentials or credits drove the main effect of essay condition.

3.2.4 **Testing for evidence of moral credentialing vs. moral crediting**

I next sought to clarify whether moral credentials or credits accounted for the moral licensing main effect. To test for evidence of moral credentialing vs. licensing, I compared participants’ moral self-image from the pre-testing session to their moral self-image after the experimental session by conducting a 2 (moral self-image measurement time: pre-testing session, experimental session) × 2 (essay condition: moral, control) mixed design Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
If the results represented moral credentialing, I should have observed an interaction between measurement time and essay condition. Moral self-image at both testing sessions should have been equal for people who were assigned to the moral essay condition, whereas moral self-image after the experimental session should have been lower than the pre-testing session among those assigned to the control essay condition. In contrast, if the results represented moral crediting, I anticipated a main effect of measurement time, but no interaction between measurement time and essay condition. Moral self-image levels at the experimental session should have been lower than the pre-testing session, regardless of essay condition. Neither of these predicted patterns were observed in the data.

There was not a main effect difference between the moral self-image of participants who were in the moral essay condition ($M = 3.91, SE = 0.10$) or control essay condition ($M = 3.94, SE = 0.10$), $F(1, 98) = 0.04, p = .83, \omega^2 = .00$. There was, however, a main effect of measurement time, $F(1, 98) = 21.78, p < .001, \omega^2 = .05$. Participants had higher levels of moral self-image during the experimental session ($M = 4.09, SE = 0.07$) than during the pre-testing session ($M = 3.76, SE = 0.09$). This significant main effect was not qualified by an interaction between measurement time and essay condition, $F(1, 98) = 1.18, p = .28, \omega^2 = .00$, which means the license manipulation had no effect on people’s moral self-image.

Taken together, these results were not consistent with credit or credential accounts of moral licensing. The moral credits account predicted a main effect of measurement time, such that post-session measurements of moral self-image should have been lower than pre-testing measurements. I found a main effect of measurement time in the opposite direction: people had higher self-image \textit{after} the experimental session than at baseline. Similarly, the data did not support moral credentialing because I did not find a significant interaction between measurement
time and essay condition. I will further consider these unexpected findings in the General Discussion.

To further test whether the results represented moral credentialing or crediting, I compared the acceptability judgments of lying in support of the cause between people assigned to the two essay conditions. To do this comparison, I referred to the second regression model from my test of the moral licensing vs. consistency hypotheses above. As a reminder, this model explored whether control variables, moral conviction, essay condition, and moral conviction × essay condition predicted acceptability judgments for the use of low-tolerance information. If the moral credentials model was supported, participants in the moral essay condition should have perceived transgressions as more acceptable than a control group (i.e., a significant main effect of essay condition should have emerged). In contrast, if the moral credits model was supported, people who were given a moral self-license, as well as those who were not given a license in the control group, should have rated lying as equally unacceptable (i.e., no significant main effect of essay condition should have emerged).

As can be seen in Table 5, acceptability judgments did not differ between participants in the moral essay condition ($M = 1.68, SD = 0.98$) and the control essay condition ($M = 1.90, SD = 1.06$). Although this result is more consistent with the credits model of moral licensing than the credentialing model, it should be interpreted with caution because my other test for evidence of moral crediting (vs. credentialing) was inconclusive, and because it requires interpretation of a null hypothesis result. This result will be fully explored in the General Discussion.

3.3 Study 1 discussion

The results of Study 1 indicated that people who received a moral license felt more entitled to lie to garner support for a cause than those who did not receive a license, and they
were aware that they used lower credibility information. However, this effect did not depend on individual differences in moral conviction: Moral licensing only occurred when participants received a traditional moral license, not as a function of strong moral convictions about the issue. Overall, Study 1 results suggest that moral self-licensing does occur in persuasive communication settings, even if moral conviction does not serve as a moral license in and of itself.
4. STUDY 2: PERCEPTIONS OF “MIKE DAISEY”

Moral self-licensing and moral priming represent two explanations for how Mike Daisey’s moral conviction may have clouded his judgment of the permissibility of lying for a moral cause. Next, I will investigate how people perceive figures like Mike Daisey. Specifically, I will test whether individuals judge hypothetical actors who lie for a moral cause more or less leniently as a function of their moral investment in the same cause.

Social scientists, philosophers, and laypeople alike accept the proposition that lying is wrong in most instances (Barnes, 1994; Bok, 1978). However, lying is surprisingly common in everyday interactions. DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) estimate that people lie on average one to two times a day; Turner, Edgley, and Olmstead (1975) found that individuals lie in about two-thirds of their conversations. How is it possible that lying, which is generally considered to be wrong, is nonetheless common in everyday life? When are lies perceived to be permissible versus downright immoral?

The purpose of Study 2 is to explore two processes, moral licensing and the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ (Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens, 1988), that may influence the effect of one’s moral conviction for an issue on evaluations of others’ lies.

4.1 The role of moral licensing in evaluations of others’ lies

As previously mentioned, perceivers may pardon, or license, an actor’s transgressions: An actor’s prior moral behavior makes observers more willing to excuse subsequent transgressions. Observers license actors’ blatant transgressions when their moral behavior is in a different domain than their subsequent transgressions, but they perceive actors’ behavior as hypocritical and blame worthy when moral actions and transgressions are in the same domain.
Ambiguous transgressions tend to be licensed regardless of whether or not they are in different domains than preceding moral actions (Effron and Monin, 2010).

In the current study, I predict that perceivers who support an actor’s attitude position with strong moral conviction may be more likely to pardon transgressions that serve the moral cause than supporters who are not morally convicted or are very low in moral conviction. Consistent with the moral self-licensing hypothesis from Study 1, which predicts that high moral conviction for an issue serves as a moral self-license in and of itself, a perceiver’s recognition and strong endorsement of another individual’s moral conviction may lead the perceiver to grant that person a license and to therefore excuse transgressions that serve the cause.

Unlike the traditional account of moral licensing via observers, which requires an actor to act morally before perceivers excuse his or her transgressions (i.e., Effron and Monin, 2010), I hypothesize that actors who merely share a strong moral conviction with perceivers will be licensed to behave badly in support of the moral cause. When processing morally relevant lies like Daisey’s, perceivers who share that strong moral conviction may excuse an actor’s lies because the moral conviction is seen as noble in and of itself and therefore deserving of a moral license. Here, the actor’s moral conviction for a political cause is in a different domain than his or her subsequent bad behavior (i.e., lying). Because the moral and immoral domains are different, perceivers who share an actor’s strong moral conviction are likely to grant a moral license rather than perceiving him or her as hypocritical (Effron and Monin, 2010). In contrast, perceivers who support an actor’s attitude position but with weak (vs. strong) moral conviction should be less likely to license that actor because they do not find his or her moral conviction for the issue to be remarkably noble. Although they may weakly identify with the actor’s moral conviction, I do not expect that they would grant that person a moral license.
Furthermore, perceivers who oppose an actor’s attitude position with any level of moral conviction should not perceive that person to be inherently noble based solely on an attitude that does not even resonate with their moral values; they should not find that actor worthy of a moral license that would excuse his or her transgressions. In fact, people who oppose an actor’s attitude position with strong moral conviction are likely to feel moral outrage when that actor lies for a cause (Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen, 2004; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner, 2000). Would such moral outrage translate into punitive evaluations of an actor’s behavior? Research on psychological standing suggests it would among people with high moral conviction for the issue; having a moral stake in an issue may grant people the psychological standing to express their true attitudes surrounding that issue and concurrently reject the legitimacy of opposing moral arguments (Effron and Miller, 2012). People with stronger moral convictions may respond negatively to any opponent to their cause, regardless of whether the opponent lied, simply because the opponent is making an effort to persuade others to join his or her cause—something that may be offensive even without learning about the opponent’s dishonesty as well.

When people have psychological standing—or a subjective feeling of entitlement to express an attitude or act upon it—they feel more comfortable speaking up for their beliefs (Miller and Effron, 2010; Miller, Effron, and Zak, 2009). Without psychological standing, individuals may feel that it is inappropriate or “not their place” to express the attitude; doing so would be discrediting and illegitimate (e.g., men sometimes feel like they do not have standing on the issue of abortion). Although there are many sources of psychological standing—for example, having a material stake or personal experience that is relevant to a given issue—moral stakes are particularly relevant to the current study. Having a moral stake in an issue licenses people to express their true attitudes, even in the absence of a material stake in that issue,
because violations of one’s moral values are symbolically harmful. Actions that reduce such harm, such as protest against opposing moral arguments, are experienced as legitimate and justified by the person with the moral stake (Effron and Miller, 2008; Effron and Miller, 2012).

In the context of the current study, I predict that people who oppose an actor’s position with strong moral conviction are likely to feel like they are licensed to make punitive evaluations of his or her behavior, given their subjective sense of moral standing. In contrast, people who oppose an actor’s position with weak moral conviction are unlikely to feel licensed to make punitive evaluations because they lack a strong moral stake in the issue. Instead, their evaluations should be less negative than those with high moral conviction (Miller and Effron, 2010).

Taken together, the moral licensing hypothesis predicts a significant two-way interaction of perceiver agreement with the actor (i.e., whether the perceiver supports or opposes the actors’ position on the issue) and perceiver moral conviction (i.e., the degree to which the perceiver feels moral conviction about the issue) in predicting perceivers’ evaluations of an actor’s transgressions. Higher (vs. lower) levels of moral conviction will be associated with more forgiving evaluations for the actor’s behavior when perceivers support the actor’s cause, but will be associated with more punitive evaluations when perceivers oppose the actor’s cause.

4.2 The role of the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ in evaluations of others’ lies

Although moral licensing may influence the effect of moral conviction on evaluations of figures like Daisey, it is possible that the Black Sheep Effect could instead shape those judgments. According to the Black Sheep Effect, likeable ingroup members are more positively evaluated than likeable outgroup members, whereas unlikeable ingroup members are judged more negatively than unlikeable outgroup members. In essence, the Black Sheep Effect describes
a phenomenon whereby evaluations of ingroup members are more extreme than evaluations of outgroup members, either positively or negatively (Marques et al., 1988).

The Black Sheep Effect builds on the ingroup favoritism literature, which states that individuals tend to favor ingroup members over outgroup members (Turner, 1981). Closely tied to social identity, ingroup favoritism is thought to facilitate self-enhancement goals by reinforcing people’s sense of belonging to their social group, as well as a sense of differentiation between one’s ingroup and an outgroup (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Thus, the Black Sheep Effect prediction that likeable ingroup members will be judged more positively than likeable outgroup members is consistent with the ingroup favoritism literature. However, how does one reconcile the latter prediction of the Black Sheep Effect, that unlikeable ingroup members are judged more negatively than unlikeable outgroup members, with ingroup favoritism?

According to Marques et al. (1988), negative evaluations of unlikeable ingroup members may be a cognitive strategy employed to defend the group’s overall positivity and reputation and to ultimately serve as a sophisticated version of ingroup favoritism. This facet of the Black Sheep Effect builds off a number of empirical studies in which unlikeable ingroup members were derogated in an effort to protect the social identities of other mainstream group members: For example, a member of a discussion group who was consistently in disagreement with the rest of the group was marginalized by the group majority in an effort to bring him back to the mainstream opinion (Schachter, 1951); group leaders who did not satisfy their group members were overthrown (Sherif and Sherif, 1979); group members who hindered progress toward a shared goal were negatively evaluated (Jones and DeCharms, 1957). Moreover, more recent empirical investigations designed to directly test the Black Sheep Effect in inter-group contexts have proven robust. Across a series of studies by Marques et al. (1988), the Black Sheep Effect
emerged so long as evaluative cues were relevant to perceivers’ social identities. Thus, although this facet of the Black Sheep Effect is seemingly incompatible with ingroup favoritism, consistent empirical findings suggest that ingroup favoritism actually encompasses intra-group differentiation, which ultimately preserves ingroup positivity.

In the current study, people who support an actor’s attitude position with strong moral conviction may actually judge that person more negatively when they transgress in the name of the cause than do people who support the position with low moral conviction. This prediction is consistent with the Black Sheep Effect, whereby unlikeable ingroup members are judged more negatively than unlikeable outgroup members. People with high moral conviction for a political cause may ostracize individuals who share that strong moral conviction but taint the overall positivity of the group by transgressing in the name of the cause; people with weak moral conviction for that issue should less strongly identify with the target and are therefore less likely to evaluate him or her as an ingroup member. In contrast, among people who oppose an actor’s attitude position, all levels of moral conviction should be associated with equally negative evaluations because their disparate attitude positions should lead all opposers to judge the target as an outgroup member.

Thus, according to this alternative prediction, referred to as the Black Sheep hypothesis, I predict that a different two-way interaction may emerge between perceiver agreement with the actor and perceiver moral conviction: Among people who support the actor’s cause, high moral conviction will be associated with more negative evaluations for the target than low moral conviction. Among those who oppose the actor’s cause, I predict that all levels of moral conviction will be associated with equally negative evaluations.
4.3 Overview of Study 2

Study 2 will test whether moral licensing or the Black Sheep Effect shapes perceptions of individuals like Mike Daisey who lie for a noble cause. The moral licensing hypothesis predicts a significant two-way interaction of perceiver agreement with the actor (i.e., whether the perceiver supports or opposes the actors’ position on the issue) and perceiver moral conviction (i.e., the degree to which the perceiver feels moral conviction about the issue). Higher (vs. lower) levels of moral conviction will be associated with more positive evaluations for the actor’s behavior when perceivers support the actor’s cause, but will be associated with more negative evaluations when perceivers oppose the actor’s cause.

The alternative Black Sheep hypothesis also predicts a significant two-way interaction between perceiver agreement with the actor and perceiver moral conviction. Among people who support the actor’s cause, high moral conviction will be associated with more negative evaluations for the target than low moral conviction. Among those who oppose the actor’s cause, I predict that all levels of moral conviction will be associated with equally negative evaluations.

Moreover, Study 2 will explore whether the effect of moral conviction on evaluations varies as a function of whether a speaker lies or tells the truth. Thus, the broad purpose of Study 2 is to test the interactive effects of 1) perceiver moral conviction (i.e., the degree to which the perceiver feels moral conviction about the issue); 2) perceiver agreement with the actor (i.e., whether the perceiver supports or opposes the actors’ position on the issue); and 3) feedback regarding the credibility of an issue-relevant monologue (honest vs. dishonest) on evaluations of a speaker and his or her monologue. According to both the moral licensing and Black Sheep hypotheses, I anticipate that a three-way interaction will emerge between perceiver moral conviction, perceiver agreement with the actor, and credibility feedback to predict monologue-
relevant evaluations. However, I predict distinct simple interactions for each hypothesis. Next, I will separately address the predicted simple interactions for each hypothesis in turn.

4.3.1 Moral licensing hypothesis simple interactions

First, according to the moral licensing hypothesis, I predict that the simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker will be significant within the dishonest speaker condition. As stated above, I hypothesize that people who support the speaker’s position will make positive evaluations for the speaker at high levels of moral conviction, but negative evaluations at low levels of moral conviction. In contrast, I expect that all people who oppose the speaker’s position will make negative evaluations for his or her behavior, but the evaluations of people with higher (vs. lower) moral conviction for the issue will be more strongly negative.

Second, I do not anticipate that the simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker will be significant within the honest speaker condition. I predict that, among people who support the speaker’s position, all levels of moral conviction strength will be associated with equally positive evaluations for the speaker. Here, I do not anticipate a difference between the evaluations made by perceivers with high (vs. low) moral conviction because the speaker did not transgress in this condition and therefore moral licenses, which would theoretically be granted by perceivers with high moral conviction to excuse transgressions, should be inconsequential. Similarly, I expect that among those who oppose the speaker’s position, moral licensing should again be inconsequential because the actor did not transgress. Thus, within the honest speaker condition, I predict that the evaluations for the speaker will be equally positive regardless of perceivers’ moral conviction for the issue or agreement with the speaker’s attitude position.
4.3.2 **Black Sheep hypothesis simple interactions**

First, according to the *Black Sheep hypothesis*, I predict that the simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker’s attitude position will be significant within the dishonest speaker condition. As previously mentioned, I predict that people who support the speaker’s position will make more negative evaluations for the speaker at high (vs. low) levels of moral conviction. In contrast, among people who oppose the speaker’s position, I expect that all levels of moral conviction will be associated with equally negative evaluations.

Second, I anticipate that the simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker’s attitude position will also be significant within the honest speaker condition. I predict that, among people who support the speaker’s position, higher levels of moral conviction will be associated with more positive evaluations for the speaker than those with lower moral conviction. This hypothesis is in line with the Black Sheep Effect finding that likeable ingroup members are evaluated more positively than likeable outgroup members. In this case, I expect that those with high moral conviction will evaluate the actor as more of an ingroup member than those who have low moral attachment to the issue. In contrast, I expect that among those who oppose the speaker’s position, all levels of moral conviction will be associated with equally positive evaluations; all perceivers with the opposite attitude position as the speaker should evaluate the speaker as an outgroup member, regardless of their level of moral conviction.

Overall, I predict that perceiver moral conviction, perceiver agreement with a speaker’s attitude position, and feedback regarding the credibility of the speaker will interact to predict evaluations of the permissibility and justifiability of the monologue as well as character judgments of the target.
5. STUDY 2 PILOT TESTING

The goal of the pilot study was to verify that participants found credibility feedback about the monologue (i.e., mostly true or mostly false) believable. This pilot study was necessary to ensure that participants interpreted my credibility feedback manipulation in the way I intended.

5.1 Participants

Thirty-nine participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participation was limited to people who had United States-based IP addresses. Eligible participants were paid 25 cents for their participation.

5.2 Procedure

Participants were instructed that the purpose of the study was to investigate how people interpret monologues about important political issues, and that they would read a monologue and report their impressions of it. They were told the monologue was about Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, and it was aired over public radio. The speaker’s identity remained anonymous to ensure that it would not sway their impressions of the monologue. They read the following monologue on Qualtrics, which was composed of claims derived from Politifact.com:

Now more than ever, we need to focus on political issues that concern women. There is much to lose if we turn a blind eye to politics that are blatantly anti-women and ultimately undemocratic. I am taking a stand now: I pledge to fight for Federal funding of women’s reproductive services.

Planned Parenthood is an organization that uses Federal funding to provide reproductive services to women. Its services include gynecological checkups and contraceptive counseling, among others. Many politicians claim that Planned Parenthood primarily provides abortion services and therefore should not receive Federal funding. Their claim is simply not true. Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention. Eighty percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services. Ultimately, this preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.
Regardless of its focus on preventative care, attacks on Planned Parenthood persist. These attacks come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care. Some states have even eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives. And what’s really astonishing about these budget cuts for women’s care is that men don’t suffer the same cuts. In fact, there are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won’t cover birth-control medication.

This disparity does not reflect public opinion regarding preventative care. A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage. A majority of Americans want to maintain safe and affordable reproductive services for women. The American public needs to stand up for what is right, and not just remain silent while politicians wield enormous power at our expense.

I believe in Federally funded family planning because it helps to prevent unintended pregnancies. I believe that there is no place for politics in a woman’s health care decisions. I believe in promoting health and well being among men and women alike, and providing basic care to individuals who cannot afford it. Finally, I believe that women have the right maintain their dignity and privacy while using reproductive services. These services should not be shameful or demeaning.

What do you believe in? Now is the time to act.

They were randomly assigned to one of two feedback conditions: true or false. Specifically, participants read: “Several fact-checking organizations agreed that the monologue you just read is mostly true (mostly false). It was broadcasted over public radio in 2012 to garner support for this issue. The monologue was eventually replayed (retracted) because of the quality of the speaker’s claims. In a subsequent interview over public radio, this speaker reiterated that she felt completely justified in airing his original monologue, citing the importance of the issue. Besides airing over public radio, this monologue was available online for anyone to download for free. In the first 48 hours after it was posted, it was downloaded 42,000 times.”

Participants were then instructed to complete two questions about whether they believed the monologue was true or false. Lastly, participants were prompted to write their thoughts about the purpose of the research in a text box on the computer to probe for suspicion and were debriefed and paid.
5.3 Measures

5.3.1 Manipulation check

Participants were asked two questions to assess the extent to which they found the credibility manipulation believable. First, they were asked, “To what extent do you think that the monologue was true or false?” Response options included very true, moderately true, slightly true, neither true nor false, slightly false, moderately false, and very false. Next, they were asked, “Do you think the monologue included lies?” Response options were yes or no.

5.4 Results

The goal of the pilot study was to verify that participants found credibility feedback about the monologue believable. Results indicated that participants interpreted the manipulation in the way I intended: The manipulation was in fact believable. More specifically, participants assigned to the false condition believed the monologue was more false \((M = 4.37, SD = 2.11)\) than participants assigned to the true condition \((M = 2.65, SD = 1.95)\), \(t(37) = -2.64, p = 0.01\). Similarly, participants assigned to the false condition believed the monologue contained more lies \((M = 0.79, SD = 0.42)\) than those assigned to the true condition \((M = 0.40, SD = 0.50)\), \(t(37) = -2.62, p = 0.01\).
6. STUDY 2

6.1 Method

6.1.1 Participants

Three hundred thirty one participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participation was limited to people who had United States-based IP addresses. Eligible participants were paid 50 cents for their participation.

6.1.2 Design

A 2 (credibility of actor: honest, dishonest) × (moral conviction about Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services) × (attitude position congruence with actor: agree, disagree) between-subjects design was utilized. Participants’ positions on the issue and their moral conviction for it were measured, not manipulated, variables.

6.1.3 Procedure

Participants first completed a measure of their degree of support or opposition to Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services and the degree to which they felt moral conviction about the issue. I only retained participants who had an opinion on the issue (i.e., those who endorsed at least slightly when asked the degree to which they support or oppose the issue) for analyses. Participants who did not have an opinion on the issue were allowed to finish the study, but they were excluded from subsequent analyses. Given that all participants read the same monologue, which was in support of Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, supporters for the issue were in agreement with the speaker’s attitude position, whereas opposers of the issue were in disagreement with the speaker’s attitude position. That is, they belonged to one of two nominal categories based on their measured attitude position: people who agreed with the speaker’s attitude position, and people who disagreed with
the speaker’s attitude position. Participants of all levels of moral conviction were selected for participation, ranging from low to high.

Next, eligible participants were instructed that the purpose of the study was to investigate how people interpret monologues about important political issues. All participants were then instructed to read to an excerpt from a monologue so they could ultimately answer questions about their impressions of it. Before they began reading the monologue, they read an instructions page that specified that the monologue was about Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, and it was aired over public radio. They were told that the speaker’s identity remained anonymous to ensure that it would not sway their impressions of the monologue. They then read the following monologue on Qualtrics:

Now more than ever, we need to focus on political issues that concern women. There is much to lose if we turn a blind eye to politics that are blatantly anti-women and ultimately undemocratic. I am taking a stand now: I pledge to fight for Federal funding of women’s reproductive services.

Planned Parenthood is an organization that uses Federal funding to provide reproductive services to women. Its services include gynecological checkups and contraceptive counseling, among others. Many politicians claim that Planned Parenthood primarily provides abortion services and therefore should not receive Federal funding. Their claim is simply not true. Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention. Eighty percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services. Ultimately, this preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.

Regardless of its focus on preventative care, attacks on Planned Parenthood persist. These attacks come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care. Some states have even eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives. And what’s really astonishing about these budget cuts for women’s care is that men don’t suffer the same cuts. In fact, there are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won’t cover birth-control medication.

This disparity does not reflect public opinion regarding preventative care. A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage. A majority of Americans want to maintain
safe and affordable reproductive services for women. The American public needs to stand up for what is right, and not just remain silent while politicians wield enormous power at our expense.

I believe in Federally funded family planning because it helps to prevent unintended pregnancies. I believe that there is no place for politics in a woman’s health care decisions. I believe in promoting health and well being among men and women alike, and providing basic care to individuals who cannot afford it. Finally, I believe that women have the right maintain their dignity and privacy while using reproductive services. These services should not be shameful or demeaning.

What do you believe in? Now is the time to act.

After reading the excerpt, all participants were prompted to continue to the next screen in Qualtrics. There, they reported the degree to which they perceived the speaker of the monologue to be an ingroup member (i.e., someone they would affiliate with) and an outgroup member (i.e., someone they would not affiliate with). They also reported the extent to which they perceived themselves to be similar and dissimilar to the speaker. Response options for these questions ranged from (1) not at all to (5) very much.

Next, they were randomly assigned to one of two feedback conditions: People in one condition learned that the excerpt was true, and those in another condition learned it was false. Specifically, participants assigned to either the false or true conditions read: “Several fact-checking organizations agreed that the monologue you just read is mostly false (mostly true). It was broadcasted over public radio in 2012 to garner support for this issue. The monologue was eventually retracted (replayed) because of the quality of the speaker’s claims. In a subsequent interview over public radio, this speaker reiterated that he felt completely justified in airing his original monologue, citing the importance of the issue. Besides airing over public radio, this monologue was available online for anyone to download for free. In the first 48 hours after it was posted, it was downloaded 42,000 times.”

Participants were then instructed to complete a computer-administered questionnaire about their impressions of the monologue excerpt. They were asked the extent to which they
believed the speaker was justified in expressing the excerpt, the extent to which the speaker’s message was permissible, the extent to which they felt that the speaker should have been rewarded or punished for expressing the monologue, and their perceptions of the speaker’s moral character. Finally, demographic information was collected: gender, age, first language, and political affiliation (for a list of all Study 2 measures, see Appendix E).

At the conclusion of the session, participants were prompted to write their thoughts about the purpose of the research in a text box on the computer to probe for suspicion and were debriefed and paid.

6.1.4 Measures

6.1.4.1 Attitude position and strength

First, I assessed participants’ attitude positions and the extent to which participants’ attitudes toward Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services were perceived as strong attitudes. Specifically, I assessed participants’ positions on the issue by asking, “Do you support or oppose (issue)?” Participants responded with the options support, uncertain/unsure, oppose. Next, they were asked to report the extremity of their attitudes, “To what extent do you support/oppose (issue)?” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much. Participants then responded to four questions that assessed the importance and certainty of their attitudes toward that issue. The items included the stem, “To what extent is your position on (topic)…” followed by four completions: “something that you care a lot about?”; “personally important to you?”; “something you are certain about?”; and “something you are sure you are correct about?” Participants responded on five-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and
very much. The internal reliability of the attitude importance measure was \( \alpha = 0.88 \), and the internal reliability of the attitude certainty measure was \( \alpha = 0.89 \).

### 6.1.4.2 Attitude congruence with the speaker

Based on participants’ measured attitude positions, they were categorized as belonging to one of two nominal groups of attitude congruence with the speaker: in agreement with the speaker or in disagreement with the speaker. Because all participants read a monologue of a speaker who supported the issue, people whose attitude positions supported the issue, regardless of the extremity of those attitude positions, were categorized as ‘in agreement with the speaker.’ In contrast, people whose attitude positions opposed the issue with any level of extremity were categorized as ‘in disagreement with the speaker.’

### 6.1.4.3 Moral conviction

The extent to which participants perceived their attitudes toward the issue in a moral light was assessed with a moral conviction measure. Participants were asked, “To what extent is your position on (topic)…” followed by four completions: “a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?”; “a reflection of your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong?”; “a moral stance?”; and “based on strong personal principles?” Participants responded on five-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much. The internal reliability of the moral conviction measure was \( \alpha = 0.95 \).

### 6.1.4.4 Ingroup/outgroup perceptions of the speaker

Participants were asked to provide their perceptions of the extent to which they perceived the monologue speaker as an ingroup or outgroup member. Specifically, they were asked, “To what extent are you similar or dissimilar to the speaker?” Response options included very similar, moderately similar, slightly similar, neither similar nor dissimilar, slightly
dissimilar, moderately dissimilar, and very dissimilar. They were next asked, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the speaker’s monologue?” Response options included very much agree, moderately agree, slightly agree, neither agree nor disagree, slightly disagree, moderately disagree, very much disagree. These questions were administered so I could test for additional evidence for the Black Sheep hypothesis if that hypothesis was also supported by the data about participants’ evaluations of the speaker.

6.1.4.5 Perceptions of the monologue

Participants were asked to provide their evaluations about the monologue, including its permissibility and justifiability. To measure the extent to which participants believed that the speaker was justified in communicating her monologue, they were asked: “To what extent do you feel that the speaker was justified in communicating her monologue?” and “To what extent do you feel that people are entitled to speak their minds regarding political issues, like in this monologue?” Response options included not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much. To measure the extent to which participants believed the speaker’s monologue was permissible, they were asked: “To what extent do you feel the speaker’s monologue was acceptable or unacceptable?” and “To what extent do you feel that monologues like the one you just read are appropriate or inappropriate?” Response options included very unacceptable (inappropriate), moderately unacceptable (inappropriate), slightly unacceptable (inappropriate), neither acceptable nor unacceptable (appropriate nor inappropriate), slightly acceptable (appropriate), moderately acceptable (appropriate), and very acceptable (appropriate).

Finally, to measure the extent to which participants believed that the speaker deserved to be rewarded or punished because of her monologue, participants responded to the following two
measures: “To what extent do you feel that the speaker should be rewarded or punished because of the content of the monologue?” and “To what extent do you feel that the speaker should be rewarded or punished because of the credibility of the monologue?” Response options for each individual measure included very punished, moderately punished, slightly punished, neither rewarded nor punished, slightly rewarded, moderately rewarded, and very rewarded.

### 6.1.4.6 Perceptions of the speaker’s moral character

The degree to which participants perceived the target to be a moral person was assessed with an adaptation of Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Moral Identity Scale. Participants were asked the following statements: “The speaker is caring”; “The speaker is compassionate”; “The speaker is fair”; “The speaker is friendly”; “The speaker is generous”; “The speaker is hardworking”; “The speaker is helpful”; “The speaker is kind”; and “The speaker is honest.” Participants responded on 5-point scales, with the point labels of not at all, slightly, moderately, much, and very much. Higher scores reflected higher agreement that the target was a moral person. The internal reliability of the Moral Identity Scale was $\alpha = 0.95$.

### 6.1.4.7 Principal components analysis of the dependent measures

A principal components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the dependent measures (i.e., participants’ evaluations of the monologue and their perceptions of the speaker’s moral character). Factor loadings suggested that there was a single factor underlying these items, ranging from negative to positive evaluations of the speaker (see Table IX). Six of the seven items had high factor loadings onto the factor. Only one item (“To what extent do you feel that people are entitled to speak their minds regarding political issues, like in this monologue?”) had a low factor loading ($< .50$), and that item was subsequently dropped from analyses. Furthermore, although perceptions of the speaker’s moral image had a high
loading on the factor, I nonetheless deemed that it was conceptually distinct from the other
evaluation measures and therefore necessary to analyze separately. The five remaining items
were averaged into a composite measure of evaluation toward the speaker. Given that the items
had different response scales, the average evaluation measure was converted to $z$-score units. The
internal reliability of the average evaluation measure was $\alpha = 0.91$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent do you feel the speaker’s monologue was acceptable or unacceptable?</td>
<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To what extent do you feel that monologues like the one you just read are appropriate or inappropriate?</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To what extent do you feel that the speaker was justified in communicating his monologue?</td>
<td>0.817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Average speaker moral image</td>
<td>0.816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To what extent do you feel that the speaker should be rewarded or punished because of the credibility of the monologue?</td>
<td>0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. To what extent do you feel that the speaker should be rewarded or punished because of the content of the monologue?</td>
<td>0.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. To what extent do you feel that people are entitled to speak their minds regarding political issues, like in this monologue?</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% variance explained</td>
<td>67.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.1.4.8 **Instructional manipulation checks**

To ensure high data quality, participants completed three instructional manipulation checks (IMC’s) during the course of the study. IMC’s tested whether participants paid attention and followed directions. For example, embedded in the attitude strength and moral conviction block of questions, attentive participants read, “This question is here to make sure you are paying attention. If you read this question, please do not mark any answer choices.” The second IMC was embedded in questions assessing perceptions of the speaker’s moral image: “If you read this question, mark ‘slightly.’” Finally, a third IMC was embedded in the block asking about participants’ perceptions of the speaker’s attitude strength and moral conviction for the issue: “If you read this question, mark ‘much.’” For each IMC correctly answered, participants scored a point. Thus, the maximum (most attentive) score was three, whereas the minimum (least attentive) score was zero.

6.2 **Results**

6.2.1 **Preliminary analyses**

6.2.1.1 **Instructional manipulation checks**

Most participants ($N = 288$) passed at least two out of three IMC’s, suggesting that, on the whole, participants were attentive. The pattern of results described below did not vary as a function of whether participants who failed multiple IMC’s were included in the analyses or not. For this reason, subsequent analyses were not filtered on the basis of IMC scores.

6.2.2 **Testing the moral licensing and Black Sheep hypotheses**

If the *moral licensing hypothesis* is true, then I should find a significant three-way interaction between perceiver attitude agreement with the actor, perceiver moral conviction, and monologue credibility feedback predicting evaluations for the speaker. The simple interaction
between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker should be significant within the dishonest speaker condition. People who supported the speaker’s position should have made positive evaluations for the speaker at high levels of moral conviction, but negative evaluations at low levels of moral conviction. In contrast, people who opposed the speaker’s position should have made negative evaluations for her behavior, but the evaluations of people with higher (vs. lower) moral conviction for the issue should have been more strongly negative.

Within the honest speaker condition, the simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker should not be significant. People who supported the speaker’s position, of all levels of moral conviction, should have made equally positive evaluations for the speaker. Similarly, people of all levels of moral conviction who opposed the speaker’s position should have made equally positive evaluations for the speaker. Thus, within the honest speaker condition, the evaluations for the speaker should have been equally positive regardless of perceivers’ moral conviction for the issue or agreement with the speaker’s attitude position.

In contrast, if the Black Sheep hypothesis is true, then I should find a different three-way interaction between perceiver attitude agreement with the actor, perceiver moral conviction, and monologue credibility feedback predicting evaluations for the speaker. The simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker’s attitude position should be significant within the dishonest speaker condition. People who supported the speaker’s position should have made more negative evaluations for the speaker at high (vs. low) levels of moral conviction. Among people who opposed the speaker’s position, all levels of moral conviction should have been associated with equally negative evaluations.
In the honest speaker condition, the simple interaction between perceiver moral conviction and agreement with the speaker’s attitude position should also be significant. Among people who supported the speaker’s position, higher levels of moral conviction should have been associated with more positive evaluations for the speaker than lower levels of moral conviction. Among those who opposed the speaker’s position, all levels of moral conviction should have been associated with equally positive evaluations. Contrary to these predictions, results more clearly supported the licensing hypothesis.

The moral licensing and Black Sheep hypotheses were tested using hierarchical moderated regression models (Aiken and West, 1991). In all of my regression models, I entered my predictors in three blocks, mean-centering all continuous predictors. Block one contained the dummy-coded credibility feedback condition (mostly true vs. mostly false), the dummy-coded attitude agreement variable (agree vs. disagree with the speaker), and perceiver moral conviction. In block two, I entered my two-way interaction terms: credibility feedback × attitude agreement; credibility feedback × perceiver moral conviction; and attitude agreement × perceiver moral conviction. My third block contained the three-way interaction term: credibility feedback × attitude agreement × perceiver moral conviction. I ran two regression models to predict two different criterion variables: average evaluations of the speaker and participants’ perceptions of the speaker’s moral image (see Table X for correlations between all variables).
TABLE X. STUDY 2 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEIVER MORAL CONVICTION, PERCEIVER ATTITUDE CONGRUENCE WITH THE SPEAKER, CREDIBILITY FEEDBACK, EVALUATIONS OF THE SPEAKER, AND EVALUATIONS OF THE SPEAKER’S MORAL CHARACTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Perceiver MC</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Attitude Congruence</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Credibility Feedback</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Evaluations of Speaker</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.40**</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Moral Character</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.49**</td>
<td>0.33**</td>
<td>0.77**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\dagger p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.$

*Note.* Attitude congruence was dummy-coded (0 = disagree with speaker; 1 = agree with speaker), as was credibility feedback (0 = false feedback; 1 = true feedback). Evaluations of the speaker were measured in $z$-score units.
6.2.2.1 **Average evaluations of the speaker**

The predicted three-way interaction between perceiver moral conviction, agreement with the speaker’s attitude position, and credibility feedback was not significant in predicting average evaluations of the speaker, $B = -0.16, SE = 0.13, t(282) = -1.29, p = 0.20$. However, the two-way interaction between perceiver moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker was significant, $B = 0.18, SE = 0.06, t(283) = 2.93, p < 0.01$. Stronger moral conviction marginally predicted less favorable evaluations when people disagreed with the speaker, $B = -0.09, SE = 0.05, t(283) = -1.91, p = 0.06$, but more favorable evaluations when people agreed with the speaker, $B = 0.09, SE = 0.04, t(283) = 2.29, p = 0.02$ (see Figure 2).

These results contradict both the licensing and Black Sheep hypotheses, which predicted a significant three-way interaction between moral conviction, credibility feedback, and agreement with the speaker predicting evaluations. To the contrary, I found that the effects of moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker on evaluations did not depend on whether the monologue was true or false. Regardless of credibility feedback (true vs. false), stronger moral conviction predicted more positive evaluations of the speaker when people agreed with the speaker, and marginally more negative evaluations of the speaker when people disagreed with the speaker’s position.
Figure 2. Study 2: The significant two-way interaction of perceiver moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker predicting evaluations of the speaker, independent of credibility feedback.

### 6.2.2.2 Perceptions of the speaker’s moral image

The predicted three-way interaction between perceiver moral conviction, agreement with the speaker’s attitude position, and credibility feedback was not significant in predicting evaluations of the speaker’s moral image, $B = -0.26$, $SE = 0.16$, $t(282) = -1.55$, $p = 0.12$. However, the two-way interaction between perceiver moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker was significant, $B = 0.33$, $SE = 0.08$, $t(283) = 4.05$, $p < 0.001$. Replicating the results observed with overall evaluations, stronger moral conviction predicted more favorable evaluations of the speaker’s moral image among people who agreed with the speaker, $B = 0.21$, $SE = 0.05$, $t(283) = 4.09$, $p < 0.001$, whereas stronger moral conviction marginally predicted less favorable evaluations of the speaker’s moral image among people who disagreed with her, $B = -0.12$, $SE = 0.06$, $t(283) = -1.90$, $p = 0.06$ (see Figure 3).

These results also contradict the licensing and Black Sheep hypotheses. Instead of finding a significant three-way interaction between moral conviction, credibility feedback, and
agreement with the speaker predicting moral image, I found that the effects of moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker on moral image did not depend on whether the monologue was true or false. Consistent with my the findings from the first regression model above, stronger moral conviction predicted more positive evaluations of moral image among people whose attitudes agreed with the speaker, whereas stronger moral conviction marginally predicted more negative evaluations of moral image among those who disagreed with that attitude position. These effects were independent of credibility feedback (i.e., learning the monologue was true vs. false).

Figure 3. Study 2: The significant two-way interaction of perceiver moral conviction and attitude agreement with the speaker predicting evaluations of the speaker’s moral image, independent of credibility feedback.
6.2.3 Weighing the evidence for the licensing vs. Black Sheep hypotheses

In sum, results partially contradicted the licensing and Black Sheep hypotheses: I did not find evidence that moral conviction, attitude agreement, and credibility feedback interacted to predict evaluations of the speaker’s actions or evaluations of the speaker’s moral character. Although these findings do not perfectly align with my original hypotheses, they are nonetheless more consistent with the licensing hypothesis than the Black Sheep hypothesis. Namely, independent of whether the monologue was true or false, people who agreed with the speaker were more likely to license her monologue when their attitudes were high rather than low in moral conviction. Furthermore, people who disagreed with the speaker reacted more negatively to her when their attitudes were high rather than low in moral conviction, regardless of whether the speaker lied or told the truth.

Taken together, I found support for the notion that people are more likely to grant licenses to actors based on the strong (vs. weak) moral convictions they share with that person. I also found support for the idea that people with strong (vs. weak) moral conviction are more likely to respond negatively to actors who attempt to undermine that morally convicted cause. Thus, although one facet of the licensing hypothesis was not supported (i.e., that the effects of moral conviction and attitude agreement on evaluations should depend on credibility feedback), I nonetheless found support for other facets of the licensing hypothesis (i.e., that people are likely to grant licenses to others based on the strong, not weak, moral convictions they share with them; that people are more likely to react negatively when others attempt to undermine a strong, rather than weak, moral conviction).
6.3 **Study 2 discussion**

As predicted by the licensing hypothesis, the results of Study 2 indicated that moral conviction served as a moral license in and of itself in the domain of licensing via observers. People who shared a strong rather than weak moral conviction with an actor were more likely to license his or her political message, regardless of its credibility. In contrast, people who opposed an actor with strong rather than weak moral conviction were more likely to react negatively to that political message, regardless of whether it was true or false. In short, observers’ moral convictions shaped their reactions toward an actor’s behavior: When an actor’s actions benefitted (vs. undermined) their strong moral convictions, observers were more likely to license her and therefore evaluate her much more positively.
7. GENERAL DISCUSSION

The licensing hypothesis was partially supported in two studies. People who were reminded of their past moral (vs. practical) actions felt more licensed to lie in an effort to garner support for a cause. In fact, licensed individuals were even consciously aware of their lies (Study 1). Furthermore, people who supported another person’s attitude position were more likely to license her transgressions when their attitudes were high rather than low in moral conviction (Study 2). These findings generally support the notion that moral licensing occurs in persuasive communication settings, both via self-licensing and licensing via observers.

However, some aspects of the licensing hypothesis were not supported evenly across these two studies. For example, in Study 1, I did not find evidence that strong moral conviction serves as a moral self-license in and of itself. I did find a main effect of licensing condition—people who recalled past moral (vs. practical) actions felt more entitled to transgress—and an interaction in the opposite direction as the licensing hypothesis (stronger moral conviction for the issue predicted lower tolerance for the use of low-credibility information in the moral essay condition—not higher tolerance). However, I did not find support for the hypothesis that strong moral conviction alone licenses individuals to lie for a moralized cause. This result is inconsistent with my finding from Study 2: An individual ’s shared moral conviction with another person served as a moral license in and of itself, which granted that other person permission to transgress in the name of a moralized cause. Why are the findings from Studies 1 and 2 inconsistent?

There are some limitations of Study 1 that may explain why I did not find evidence for the licensing role of moral conviction if it exists in reality, as Study 2 suggests. First, Study 1 was very underpowered. With my sample size ($N = 107$) and assuming a small effect size ($f^2 =$
0.05), I only achieved 45% power. In contrast, I achieved 94% power in Study 2 ($N = 331$, assuming $f^2 = 0.05$). Even if the licensing effect of moral conviction did exist in reality, I would have a very limited ability to detect it with only 45% power in Study 1. Thus, one very plausible reason why I did not find reliable evidence for the licensing effect of moral conviction across my two studies is that I had very low power in Study 1 but adequate power in Study 2. My future work will explore this possibility; I will rerun my Study 1 analyses after I achieve adequate power ($N = 200$; my original proposed sample size).

Second, it is possible that I found uneven results for the licensing effect of moral conviction because my two studies’ procedures differed in several respects, which in turn may have differentially affected participants’ willingness to transgress. For example, my definition of what it meant for participants to transgress was different in self-licensing (Study 1) versus licensing via observers (Study 2). In Study 1, participants were tempted to transgress by lying to others via a low-credibility political essay. In contrast, Study 2 participants were tempted to transgress by letting someone off the hook for her bad behavior. It is possible that participants in Study 1 were less comfortable acting on the temptation to transgress than Study 2 participants: Study 1 transgressions were substantially more involved (lying) than in Study 2 (turning a blind eye to another’s lies). It is plausible that people may have considered their own lies to be more morally wrong than excusing another person’s lies: They may have been less able to appraise their own lies as acceptable because those transgressions required more effort, commitment, or intention than excusing another person’s lies. Therefore, personally lying (vs. excusing another person’s lies) would require a more substantial moral license than a strong moral conviction alone. This possibility requires further investigation.
Taken together, the licensing hypothesis was more clearly supported than the consistency or Black Sheep hypotheses. Although the licensing effect of moral conviction was not supported evenly across my two studies, there are some compelling reasons why I did not find support for that facet of the licensing hypothesis. Until those issues are properly resolved, I cannot discount the prediction that moral conviction serves as a moral license in and of itself in the domain of moral self-licensing.

7.1 Moral credits vs. credentials in moral self-licensing

Given that moral self-licensing occurred in Study 1 (participants who recalled moral rather than practical actions felt more entitled to transgress), I sought to determine whether results were more consistent with credit or credential accounts of moral self-licensing. I found that people had a higher moral self-image after the experimental session than at baseline. This finding contradicted the moral credits prediction, which hypothesized that people would have lower self-image after the experimental session compared to baseline. It also contradicted the moral credentials prediction, which hypothesized that moral self-image at both testing sessions should have been equal for people who were assigned to the moral essay condition, whereas moral self-image after the experimental session should have been lower than the pre-testing session among those assigned to the practical essay condition. How is it possible that I found evidence for moral self-licensing without finding evidence for moral credits or credentials?

One explanation is that my procedure may have inadvertently increased all participants’ moral self-image. Participants were asked to write an essay in support of Federal funding for women’s reproductive services: an issue that they all supported. It is plausible that the act of writing the essays gave participants a boost in their moral self-image. This boost in moral self-image from writing the essay may have surpassed any variation in moral self-image due to their
licensing condition or their decision to lie. Thus, I may not have detected the hypothesized variations in moral self-image because participants perceived their engagement in the essay task as moral and therefore deserving of a boost in their moral self-image, regardless of their licensing condition or their decision to lie.

Because my methodology may have interfered with my ability to detect moral credit or credential effects, my other results that are based on acceptability judgments of lying may be more informative than those based on moral self-image fluctuations. Consistent with the moral credits account of licensing, people who were given a moral self-license, as well as those who were not given a license in the control group, rated lying as equally unacceptable. Future work will be aimed at verifying that moral credits better represent moral self-licensing in persuasive communication contexts, given that I was unable to detect the fluctuations in moral self-image that are characteristic of moral crediting.

7.2 Implications and future directions

This work has important implications for political communication and journalism. First, moral mindsets may free politically motivated actors (including politicians and journalists) to bend the truth to persuade others. For example, one explanation for why Mike Daisey felt justified in bending the truth to persuade others is that he possessed a moral mindset at the time of his interview, which in turn licensed him to lie.

Moreover, this work reveals how people are likely to respond to politically motivated actors who bend the truth for a moralized cause. Observers who agree with those figures are more likely to license their lies when their attitudes are high rather than low in moral conviction. In the domain of politics, citizens may be willing to let politically motivated actors off the hook for their misbehaviors, so long as what they do benefits perceivers’ own moral convictions. A
troubling implication of this finding is that political figures appear to be able to act in corrupt ways without damaging their images (at least in the eyes of their supporters).

Although I found that people excused others’ lies as a result of their strong, shared moral convictions, future research needs to establish how observers interpret the credibility of those lies after they have been discredited. For example, it would be interesting to investigate whether moral conviction affects the extent to which people update their initial impressions of false information after it is discredited. Specifically, when people believe something, they tend to continue believing it even after receiving disconfirming evidence (e.g., Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard, 1975). An interesting extension of the current work will be to investigate whether moral conviction exacerbates this cognitive bias. People with high moral conviction for an issue may be less likely to adjust their initial evaluations of issue-relevant stimuli in the face of discrediting information than people with low moral conviction, perhaps as a result of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990).

Another exciting extension of the current work is to more closely examine the cognitive and emotional underpinnings of moral licensing. To my knowledge, no work has described the process of moral licensing from the point of view of licensed individuals. Instead, theoretical models, based on fluctuations in moral self-image, hypothesize that there are two routes to licensing (moral credits and moral credentials). Results from the current work do not support either of these two routes. Although I may not have found support for moral credits or credentials because of flaws in my procedure, it is possible that these two routes do not adequately describe the process of moral licensing. Therefore, a future direction for research would be to explore individuals’ cognitive and emotional processes during the course of moral licensing: What are their thoughts and feelings after receiving a moral license, while deciding
whether to transgress, and after they have transgressed? This research could reveal crucial mediators in the link between receiving a moral license and transgressing, as well as important cognitive and emotional consequences of transgressing after receiving a moral license.
8. CONCLUSION

In everyday life, people like Mike Daisey transgress in the service of moralized causes. The current research revealed one reason why these individuals feel entitled to commit these immoral actions: moral self-licensing. Specifically, when people have moral mindsets, they feel licensed to transgress. Moreover, this research suggests how observers likely responded to Mike Daisey’s lies: Observers were likely willing to excuse his lies as long as they served their strong moral convictions. Overall, this research expands moral licensing findings by first revealing that moral self-licensing occurs in persuasive communication contexts. Second, this work is novel because it suggests that strong moral conviction serves as a license in and of itself in the domain of licensing via observers.
CITED LITERATURE


Carroll, J. S., and Payne, J. W.: The psychology of the parole decision process: A joint


APPENDIX A

STUDY 1 PILOT TESTING SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING CLAIMS

Supporting

1. Nearly half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintended.

2. In Oregon, only 41 percent of adults have ever been tested for HIV.

3. We've seen more anti-women's choice bills introduced in the first half of this session [of the Ohio House of Representatives] than we've seen in the last three General Assemblies.

4. Most women, including 98 percent of Catholic women, have used contraception.

5. A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage.

6. Attacks on Planned Parenthood come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care.

7. Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention: 80 percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services.

8. Only 14 percent of Catholics agree with the Vatican’s position that abortion should be illegal.

9. There are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won't cover birth-control medication.

10. Scott Walker [Governor of Wisconsin] tried to pass a law to allow pharmacists to block women’s access to birth control.

11. Mitt Romney signed government-mandated health care legislation with taxpayer-funded abortions.

12. Statistics bear out that any time a country, a state, makes more restrictive abortion laws, fatalities go up and abortions actually increase.

13. An amendment proposed by Representative Stupak to the recently passed Affordable Care Act doesn't just say you can't use your Federal insurance subsidy to pay for an abortion, it says, if you're getting a Federal subsidy of any kind, you're not allowed to buy an insurance plan that covers abortion even with your own money.

14. Although we have had a president [President George W. Bush] who pushed abstinence-only sex education programs during his presidency, abortions did not go down.
15. Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives.

16. Preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.

**Opposing**

1. A third of all the young people in America are not in America today because of abortion, because one in three pregnancies end in abortion.

2. Almost 37 percent of the total income from Planned Parenthood is from abortions.

3. The vaccine to prevent HPV can cause the person who was vaccinated to develop mental retardation.

4. The polls show over half of Americans identify themselves as being pro-life.

5. 90 percent of Down Syndrome children are aborted in this country.

6. During Rudy Giuliani’s time as Mayor of New York City, he encouraged adoption over abortion. Adoptions during that time went up 135 percent, and abortions went down 16 percent.

7. The Senate health care reform bill allows taxpayer money to pay directly for abortion in Federal community health centers. This means that your money will directly fund abortions, even if you don’t want it to.

8. Planned Parenthood raked in more than $300 million in profits over the past four years.

9. Almost half of the states in the U.S. have ultrasound requirements before abortions.

10. The House Democrats so-called budget was stuffed with an astonishing $335 million to fund prevention programs of sexually transmitted diseases.

11. In some states, Planned Parenthood operations received millions of taxpayer dollars via Federal grants in 2010 and 2011.

12. There have been well over 54 million abortions since 1973.

13. In some states, you could be 8½ months pregnant and have an abortion for no reason.

14. Over 40 percent of children born in America are born out of wedlock. There are dangers to contraceptive use, and we should be stressing abstinence.

15. There are actually 600 abortions done after the 20th week of pregnancy every year in some states.
16. You can't give a child an aspirin in school without permission. You can't administer any kind of medication, but you can secretly take the child off and have an abortion without parental consent.
APPENDIX B

STUDY 1 PILOT TESTING MEASURES

Attitude Position

Do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

☐ Oppose
☐ Uncertain/ Unsure
☐ Support

[For people who are uncertain about their attitude position]:
If you had to choose, would you say that you tend to lean more toward supporting or opposing Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood?

☐ Lean more toward supporting
☐ Lean more toward opposing
☐ Uncertain/ Don’t know

How strong is your support or opposition to federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood?

☐ Slightly strong
☐ Moderately strong
☐ Very strong

Claim Rating Task: Opposers

Instructions: Imagine you were hired to develop ads for a PAC (political action committee) committed to restricting women’s reproductive rights (e.g., eliminating federal funding for reproductive services), and that you would be paid as a function of changes in public opinion as a result of your ad campaign. In other words, your goal is to persuade others who don’t agree with this issue to take your stance. Rate how persuasive you think each of the following claims would be for convincing someone about the importance of restricting women’s reproductive rights. Please assume that all of the claims below are EQUALLY TRUE when giving your ratings, even if you think a given claim isn't very credible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How persuasive do you think the following claims are for convincing someone about the importance of restricting women’s reproductive rights?</th>
<th>Not at all persuasive</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very persuasive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planned Parenthood raked in more than $300 million in profits over the past four years.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
90 percent of Down Syndrome children are aborted in this country.

A third of all the young people in America are not in America today because of abortion, because one in three pregnancies end in abortion.

There have been well over 54 million abortions since 1973.

Over 40 percent of children born in America are born out of wedlock. There are dangers to contraceptive use, and we should be stressing abstinence.

Almost 37 percent of the total income from Planned Parenthood is from abortions.

The polls show over half of Americans identify themselves as being pro-life.

In some states, Planned Parenthood operations received millions of taxpayer dollars via federal grants in 2010 and 2011.

The vaccine to prevent HPV can cause the person who was vaccinated to develop mental retardation.
The Senate health care reform bill allows taxpayer money to pay directly for abortion in federal community health centers. This means that your money will directly fund abortions, even if you don’t want it to.

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are actually 600 abortions done after the 20th week of pregnancy every year in some states.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can't give a child an aspirin in school without permission. You can't administer any kind of medication, but you can secretly take the child off and have an abortion without parental consent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In some states, you could be 8½ months pregnant and have an abortion for no reason.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost half of the states in the U.S. have ultrasound requirements before abortions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The House Democrats so-called budget was stuffed with an astonishing $335 million to fund prevention programs of sexually transmitted diseases.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During Rudy Giuliani’s time as Mayor of New York City, he encouraged adoption over abortion. Adoptions during that time went up 135 percent, and abortions went down 16 percent.

Next, please rate how CREDIBLE you think each claim is, to the best of your ability, using your common knowledge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How true are the following claims?</th>
<th>Not at all true</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very true</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planned Parenthood raked in more than $300 million in profits over the past four years.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 percent of Down Syndrome children are aborted in this country.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A third of all the young people in America are not in America today because of abortion, because one in three pregnancies end in abortion.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There have been well over 54 million abortions since 1973.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40 percent of children born in America are born out of wedlock. There are dangers to contraceptive use, and we should be stressing abstinence.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost 37 percent of the total income from Planned Parenthood is from abortions.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The polls show over half of Americans identify themselves as being pro-life.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In some states, Planned Parenthood operations received millions of taxpayer dollars via federal grants in 2010 and 2011.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The vaccine to prevent HPV can cause the person who was vaccinated to develop mental retardation.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Senate health care reform bill allows taxpayer money to pay directly for abortion in federal community health centers. This means that your money will directly fund abortions, even if you don’t want it to.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are actually 600 abortions done after the 20th week of pregnancy every year in some states.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You can't give a child an aspirin in school without permission. You can't administer any kind of medication, but you can secretly take the child off and have an abortion without parental consent.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In some states, you could be 8½ months pregnant and have an abortion for no reason.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost half of the states in the U.S. have ultrasound requirements before abortions.

The House Democrats so-called budget was stuffed with an astonishing $335 million to fund prevention programs of sexually transmitted diseases.

During Rudy Giuliani’s time as Mayor of New York City, he encouraged adoption over abortion. Adoptions during that time went up 135 percent, and abortions went down 16 percent.

Claim Rating Task: Supporters

Instructions: Imagine you were hired to develop ads for a PAC (political action committee) committed to protecting women’s reproductive rights (e.g., maintaining federal funding for reproductive services), and that you would be paid as a function of changes in public opinion as a result of your ad campaign. In other words, your goal is to persuade others who don’t agree with this issue to take your stance. Rate how persuasive you think each of the following claims would be for convincing someone about the importance of protecting women’s reproductive rights. Please assume that all of the claims below are EQUALLY TRUE when giving your ratings, even if you think a given claim isn't very credible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Not at all persuasive</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very persuasive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won't cover birth-control medication.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most women, including 98 percent of Catholic women, have used contraception.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nearly half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintended.

Scott Walker [Governor of Wisconsin] tried to pass a law to allow pharmacists to block women’s access to birth control.

A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage.

In Oregon, only 41 percent of adults have ever been tested for HIV.

Although we have had a president [President George W. Bush] who pushed abstinence-only sex education programs during his presidency, abortions did not go down.

Mitt Romney signed government-mandated health care with taxpayer-funded abortions.

Attacks on Planned Parenthood come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care.
| Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| We've seen more anti-women's choice bills introduced in the first half of this session [of the Ohio House of Representatives] than we've seen in the last three General Assemblies. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Only 14 percent of Catholics agree with the Vatican's position that abortion should be illegal. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention: 80 percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
| Statistics bear out that any time a country, a state, makes more restrictive abortion laws ... fatalities go up and abortions actually increase. | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ |
An amendment proposed by Representative Stupak to the recently passed Affordable Care Act doesn't just say you can't use your federal insurance subsidy to pay for an abortion, it says, if you're getting a federal subsidy of any kind, you're not allowed to buy an insurance plan that covers abortion even with your own money.

Next, please rate how CREDIBLE you think each claim is, to the best of your ability, using your common knowledge.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How true are the following claims?</th>
<th>Not at all true</th>
<th>Slightly true</th>
<th>Moderately true</th>
<th>Much true</th>
<th>Very true</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won't cover birth-control medication.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most women, including 98 percent of Catholic women, have used contraception.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nearly half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintended.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott Walker [Governor of Wisconsin] tried to pass a law to allow pharmacists to block women’s access to birth control.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Oregon, only 41 percent of adults have ever been tested for HIV.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although we have had a president [President George W. Bush] who pushed abstinence-only sex education programs during his presidency, abortions did not go down.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitt Romney signed government-mandated health care with taxpayer-funded abortions.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on Planned Parenthood come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We've seen more anti-women's choice bills introduced in the first half of this session [of the Ohio House of Representatives] than we've seen in the last three General Assemblies.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only 14 percent of Catholics agree with the Vatican's position that abortion should be illegal.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention: 80 percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics bear out that any time a country, a state, makes more restrictive abortion laws ... fatalities go up and abortions actually increase.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An amendment proposed by Representative Stupak to the recently passed Affordable Care Act doesn't just say you can't use your federal insurance subsidy to pay for an abortion, it says, if you're getting a federal subsidy of any kind, you're not allowed to buy an insurance plan that covers abortion even with your own money.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

STUDY 1 PRE-TESTING MEASURES

Attitude Position

Do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

☐ Oppose
☐ Uncertain/ Unsure
☐ Support

To what extent do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

☐ Slightly
☐ Moderately
☐ Much
☐ Very much

Attitude Strength and Moral Conviction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent is your position on federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)….</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>something that you care a lot about?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personally important to you?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>something you are certain about?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>something you are sure you are correct about?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reflection of your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a moral stance?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on strong moral principles?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Tendency to Lie

Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I do not always tell the truth.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once in a while I put off until tomorrow what I ought to do today.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not like everyone I know.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I gossip a little at times.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes in elections I vote for people about whom I know very little.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Machiavellian Personality Scale

Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my benefit.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own goals.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moral Self-Image

Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am as caring as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as compassionate as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as fair as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as friendly as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as generous as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as hardworking as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as helpful as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as kind as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D

STUDY 1 EXPERIMENTAL SESSION MEASURES

Licensing Manipulation

Here are some behaviors that you might do:

Act caring toward a person who is sad,
Act compassionately toward a person in pain,
Decide things in a fair manner,
Act friendly towards a stranger,
Give generously to a person in need,
Act helpful to someone who needs a hand,
Work hard for another person,
Act kindly towards another person

For a moment, visualize in your mind performing these behaviors. Imagine performing them. Get a clear image in your mind of what it is like to perform these behaviors. Once you have a clear image, write a short paragraph about how you might perform them. What would you do?

Control Manipulation

Here are some behaviors that you might do:

Use common sense,
Weigh costs and benefits,
Take time to come to a sound decision,
Decide things in a practical manner,
Make realistic goals,
Act level-headed during a stressful time,
Work toward goals efficiently,
Act thrifty

For a moment, visualize in your mind performing these behaviors. Imagine performing them. Get a clear image in your mind of what it is like to perform these behaviors. Once you have a clear image, write a short paragraph about how you might perform them. What would you do?
Persuasive Essay Task

The Psychology Department recently received a grant from a well-known political research organization that specializes in investigating how ad campaigns affect voters’ attitudes. For this study in particular, they are interested in learning how college-aged voters craft political arguments. This organization’s goal is to ultimately persuade other college-aged voters to support this issue using a very persuasive ad campaign. This organization focuses on the issue of maintaining federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood).

Your job will be to compose a persuasive essay that could be included with this organization’s upcoming ad campaign. In other words, your goal is to convince someone about the importance of maintaining federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood). The information that will be presented to you shortly on flashcards represents arguments some political figures have used when trying to persuade others on this issue. All of these items have been selected from the national political conversation surrounding this important issue. Each item has an accompanying credibility rating derived from a trusted fact checking website dedicated to testing the validity of various political messages. You can use the items provided to you to construct your essay if you wish.

At this time, please look at the flashcards in Pile A.

When you are ready, please type your essay below.

Moral Self-Image

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am as caring as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as compassionate as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as fair as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as friendly as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as generous as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as hardworking as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as helpful as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am as kind as I want to be.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attitude Position

Do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

☐ Oppose
☐ Uncertain/ Unsure
☐ Support

If you had to choose if you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood), which way would you lean?

☐ Lean toward supporting
☐ Lean toward opposing
☐ Neutral/ Neither

To what extent do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

☐ Slightly
☐ Moderately
☐ Much
☐ Very much

Moral Conviction and Attitude Strength

To what extent is your position on federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)....

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>something that you care a lot about?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personally important to you?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>something you are certain about?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>something you are sure you are correct about?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reflection of your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a moral stance?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on strong moral principles?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Religiosity

To what extent do the following statements apply to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My religious faith is extremely important to me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My religious faith impacts many of my decisions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I look to my faith for meaning and purpose in my life.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tolerance for the use of Low Credibility Information

Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you find it acceptable to use low-credibility information to persuade others to join a noble cause?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographics

Please provide us with a bit of information about yourself.

1. Gender:
   - Male
   - Female

2. Age:

3. Is English your primary language?
   - Yes
   - No

4. Ethnicity (check all that apply)
   - [ ] African American
   - [ ] Asian or Pacific Islander
   - [ ] Caucasian (White)
   - [ ] Latino
   - [ ] Native American
   - [ ] Other
5. Year in school?
   - Freshman
   - Sophomore
   - Junior
   - Senior
   - Other

Political Orientation

Are your political beliefs generally liberal or conservative?
   - Liberal
   - Neutral/ Neither
   - Conservative

If you had to say which way you lean, would you say you are more conservative or more liberal?
   [for people who answer ‘neutral/ neither’ to first political orientation question]
   - Lean toward liberal
   - Lean toward conservative
   - Neutral/ Neither

To what extent are your political beliefs conservative?
   [for people who answer ‘conservative’ to first political orientation question]
   - Slightly
   - Moderately
   - Much
   - Very much

To what extent are your political beliefs liberal?
   [for people who answer ‘liberal’ to first political orientation question]
   - Slightly
   - Moderately
   - Much
   - Very much

Political Knowledge

*To the best of your ability, please answer the following questions.*

1. Who is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court?
   a. John Roberts
   b. David Cole
   c. Anthony Kennedy
   d. Larry Thompson
2. Who is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?
   a. David Cameron
   b. Nick Clegg
   c. Tony Hayward
   d. Richard Branson

3. Who was the Secretary of State during George W. Bush’s second Presidential term?
   a. Condoleezza Rice
   b. Harry Reid
   c. Hillary Clinton
   d. Mitt Romney

4. On which of the following does the U.S. Federal government spend the least money?
   a. Foreign aid
   b. Medicare
   c. National defense
   d. Social Security

Post-Essay Claim Task

Please indicate any of the claims you used in your essay.

☐ Not applicable/ Did not use any claims

☐ There are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won't cover birth-control medication.

☐ Most women, including 98 percent of Catholic women, have used contraception.

☐ Nearly half of all pregnancies in the U.S. are unintended.

☐ Scott Walker [Governor of Wisconsin] tried to pass a law to allow pharmacists to block women’s access to birth control.

☐ A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage.

☐ Although we have had a president [President George W. Bush] who pushed abstinence-only sex education programs during his presidency, abortions did not go down.

☐ Attacks on Planned Parenthood come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care.
☐ Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives.

☐ Preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.

☐ We've seen more anti-women's choice bills introduced in the first half of this session [of the Ohio House of Representatives] than we've seen in the last three General Assemblies.

☐ Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention: 80 percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services.

☐ Statistics bear out that any time a country, a state, makes more restrictive abortion laws, fatalities go up and abortions actually increase.

☐ An amendment proposed by Representative Stupak to the recently passed Affordable Care Act doesn't just say you can't use your federal insurance subsidy to pay for an abortion, it says, if you're getting a federal subsidy of any kind, you're not allowed to buy an insurance plan that covers abortion even with your own money.

☐ Only 14 percent of Catholics agree with the Vatican’s position that abortion should be illegal.
APPENDIX E

STUDY 2 MEASURES

Attitude Position

Do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

- Oppose
- Uncertain/ Unsure
- Support

To what extent do you support or oppose federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood)?

- Slightly
- Moderately
- Much
- Very much

Attitude Strength and Moral Conviction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent is your position on federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services (e.g., Planned Parenthood) ....</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>something that you care a lot about?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personally important to you?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>something you are certain about?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>something you are sure you are correct about?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reflection of your core moral beliefs and convictions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a reflection of your fundamental beliefs about right and wrong?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a moral stance?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>based on strong moral principles?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Monologue Task

Instructions:

The purpose of this study is to investigate how people interpret monologues about important political issues. Specifically, your job will be to make a first impression of a monologue and the speaker who produced it.

The monologue you will be reading today is about the importance of maintaining Federal/taxpayer funding of women’s reproductive services, such as Planned Parenthood. This monologue was originally aired over public radio by a political figure who was trying to persuade others on this issue. That speaker’s identity will remain anonymous to ensure that it will not sway your overall impressions of the monologue.

Please read the monologue below. Afterward, you will learn more about its credibility and will be asked a series of questions about your first impressions of it.

“Now more than ever, we need to focus on political issues that concern women. There is much to lose if we turn a blind eye to politics that are blatantly anti-women and ultimately undemocratic. I am taking a stand now: I pledge to fight for Federal funding of women’s reproductive services.

Planned Parenthood is an organization that uses Federal funding to provide reproductive services to women. Its services include gynecological checkups and contraceptive counseling, among others. Many politicians claim that Planned Parenthood primarily provides abortion services and therefore should not receive Federal funding. Their claim is simply not true. Planned Parenthood focuses on prevention. Eighty percent of their clients receive services to prevent unintended pregnancy, and only three percent of all Planned Parenthood health services are abortion services. Ultimately, this preventive care saves money: for families, for businesses, for government, for everybody.

Regardless of its focus on preventative care, attacks on Planned Parenthood persist. These attacks come at a time when the poverty rate among women is the highest in nearly two decades and 1 in 5 women under 65 don’t have access to health care. Some states have even eliminated gynecological cancer screenings for uninsured women and offered no alternatives. And what’s really astonishing about these budget cuts for women’s care is that men don’t suffer the same cuts. In fact, there are many health insurance plans that will cover Viagra but won’t cover birth-control medication.

This disparity does not reflect public opinion regarding preventative care. A clear majority of Americans want to eliminate the insurance deductibles and co-pays currently associated with prescription contraceptive coverage. A majority of Americans want to maintain safe and affordable reproductive services for women. The American public needs to stand up for what is right, and not just remain silent while politicians wield enormous power at our expense.

I believe in Federally funded family planning because it helps to prevent unintended pregnancies. I believe that there is no place for politics in a woman’s health care decisions. I believe in promoting health and well being among men and women alike, and providing basic care to individuals who cannot afford it. Finally, I believe that women have the right maintain
their dignity and privacy while using reproductive services. These services should not be shameful or demeaning.

What do you believe in? Now is the time to act.”

**Ingroup/Outgroup Perceptions of the Speaker**

*Please choose the best answer for each question on the following pages.*

1. To what extent are you similar or dissimilar to the speaker?
   - [ ] Very similar
   - [ ] Moderately similar
   - [ ] Slightly similar
   - [ ] Neither similar nor dissimilar
   - [ ] Slightly dissimilar
   - [ ] Moderately dissimilar
   - [ ] Very dissimilar

2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the speaker’s monologue?
   - [ ] Very much agree
   - [ ] Moderately agree
   - [ ] Slightly agree
   - [ ] Neither agree nor disagree
   - [ ] Slightly disagree
   - [ ] Moderately disagree
   - [ ] Very much disagree

**Monologue Task Feedback**

**True feedback condition.**

“Several fact-checking organizations agreed that the monologue you just read is mostly true. It was broadcasted over public radio in 2012 to garner support for this issue. The monologue was eventually replayed because of the quality of the speaker’s claims. In a subsequent interview over public radio, this speaker reiterated that he felt completely justified in airing his original monologue, citing the importance of the issue. Besides airing over public radio, this monologue was available online for anyone to download for free. In the first 48 hours after it was posted, it was downloaded 42,000 times.”

**False feedback condition.**

“Several fact-checking organizations agreed that the monologue you just read is mostly false. It was broadcasted over public radio in 2012 to garner support for this issue. The
monologue was eventually retracted because of the quality of the speaker’s claims. In a subsequent interview over public radio, this speaker reiterated that he felt completely justified in airing his original monologue, citing the importance of the issue. Besides airing over public radio, this monologue was available online for anyone to download for free. In the first 48 hours after it was posted, it was downloaded 42,000 times.”

**Evaluations of the Speaker and Monologue**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you feel that the speaker was justified in communicating his monologue?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you feel that people are entitled to speak their minds regarding political issues, like in this monologue?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you feel the speaker’s monologue was permissible/acceptable?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you feel that monologues like the one you just read is inappropriate?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you feel that the speaker should be punished because of the content of the monologue?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent do you feel that the speaker should be punished because of the credibility of the monologue?</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceptions of the Speaker’s Moral Character

Please rate how true each of these statements is to you.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Slightly</th>
<th>Moderately</th>
<th>Much</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is caring.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is compassionate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is fair.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is friendly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is generous.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is hardworking.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is helpful.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The speaker is kind.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demographics

Please provide us with a bit of information about yourself.

1. Gender:
   - Male
   - Female

2. Age:

3. Is English your primary language?
   - Yes
   - No

4. Ethnicity (check all that apply)
   - African American
   - Asian or Pacific Islander
   - Caucasian (White)
   - Latino
   - Native American
   - Other
Political Orientation

Are your political beliefs generally liberal or conservative?
☐ Liberal
☐ Neutral/ Neither
☐ Conservative

If you had to say which way you lean, would you say you are more conservative or more liberal?
[for people who answer ‘neutral/ neither’ to first political orientation question]
☐ Lean toward liberal
☐ Lean toward conservative
☐ Neutral/ Neither

To what extent are your political beliefs conservative?
[for people who answer ‘conservative’ to first political orientation question]
☐ Slightly
☐ Moderately
☐ Much
☐ Very much

To what extent are your political beliefs liberal?
[for people who answer ‘liberal’ to first political orientation question]
☐ Slightly
☐ Moderately
☐ Much
☐ Very much
CURRICULUM VITA
Allison Beth Mueller

EDUCATION

Ph.D. University of Illinois at Chicago, 2012 - Present
Social Psychology
Minor: Statistics, Methods, and Measurement
Advisor: Linda J. Skitka

M.A. University of Illinois at Chicago, 2015
Social Psychology

B.A. Northwestern University, 2009
Psychology

AWARDS

2015 SPSP Graduate Student Travel Award ($500)
2014/5 UIC Chancellor’s Graduate Research Fellowship ($8,000 over two summers)
2014/5 UIC Department of Psychology Travel Award ($700 over two years)
2014 UIC Department of Psychology Thesis Research Grant ($150)
2008 NU Institute for Policy Research Undergraduate Research Fellow Award ($3,150)

PUBLICATIONS


Victorson, D., Carozzi, N., Frank, S., Beaumont, J. L., Cheng, W., Gorin, B.,
Sheng Duh, M., Samuelson, D., Tulsky, D., Gutierrez, S., Nowinski, C., Mueller,
A. B., Shen, V., & Sung, V. (2014). Identifying motor, emotional-behavioral, and
cognitive deficits that comprise the triad of HD symptoms from the patient,
caregiver, and provider perspectives. *Tremor and Other Hyperkinetic Movements*,
4.

Victorson, D., Cavasos, J., Holmes, G., Reder, A., Wojna, V., Nowinski, C., Miller, D.,
Quality of Life (Neuro-QoL) measurement system in adult epilepsy. *Epilepsy &
Behavior*, 31, 77-84.

**PRESENTATIONS**

in persuasive communication.” Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwestern Psychological Association. Chicago, IL.*

Student Research Forum. Chicago, IL.*


Psychological Association. Chicago, IL.*


**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Teaching Assistant
• Theories of Personality (Fall 2012 – Spring 2013)
• Introduction to Research in Psychology (Summer 2013 – Spring 2014)
• Statistical Methods in Behavioral Sciences (Fall 2014)
• Advanced Statistics (Spring 2015)

Guest Lecturer
• Introduction to Research in Psychology
  o Sampling, Descriptive Statistics, & Frequency Distributions (April 7, 2014)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Study Coordinator (2009 – 2012)
• Northwestern University Department of Medical Social Sciences

AFFILIATIONS AND MEMBERSHIPS

• Chicagoland Morality Researchers (C-MORE)
• Midwestern Psychological Association
• Society for Personality and Social Psychology

SERVICE

• Member of the UIC Psychology Diversity Advancement Committee (2013 - Present)
• Volunteer at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology (2012)
• Ad hoc reviewer for Journal of Psycho-Oncology (2010)