Where Policy, Planning & Everyday Practices Meet: Governmentality & Facility Provision in Ciudad Satélite

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THESIS
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<tr>
<td>CONAVI</td>
<td>Comisión Nacional de Vivienda (National Housing Commission)</td>
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<td>SEDATU</td>
<td>Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario, Territorial y Urbano (Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development Ministry)</td>
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<td>SEDESOL</td>
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<td>Secretaría Estatal de Desarrollo Urbano, Vivienda y Obras Públicas (State Urban Development, Housing and Public Works Ministry)</td>
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<td>ZYMA</td>
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SUMMARY

Social housing policy in Mexico addresses a pressing housing need and has thus followed a model that allows for the accelerated construction of massive developments of identical single-family houses at the outskirts of cities where land is cheaper. However, many of these developments are only partially completed resulting in a scarce offer of services and equipamiento and in problems such as large percentage of vacancies, vandalism and quick deterioration, affecting residents’ quality of life. As a result, this housing model reflects a policy paradox, by which satellite cities may be actually perpetuating a range of social problems. In contexts of low incomes, lack of services, increased costs and lack of job opportunities, access to equipamiento is central. These provide residents with local services and facilitate access to opportunities for under-privileged groups. Therefore, creating opportunities to access adequate services has been fundamental for residents who have had to adapt, transform and produce space according with their needs and meager resources. Further, facilities are key elements in the marketing of these projects on the part of governmental agents such as local authorities and developers and are used to increase housing sales. Analyzing the means through which power is exerted by different actors to advance particular strategies and shape the space of facility provision in Ciudad Satélite, this research’s case study, is central to empirically understand the gaps between policy, planning, the will to govern and on-the-ground implementation. Therefore, one of the central aims of this research is to understand how actors produce and seize those gaps to assert their strategies and tactics and impact the production of equipamiento.

Based on Foucault’s governmentality concept, the theoretical framework of my research knits an analytical thread to understand de interplay between neoliberal governmental programs and rationality, subjectification, spatial governmentality and
SUMMARY (continued)

everyday practices. Under the logic of assemblages, this research seeks to bring to light the multiplicity of technologies used from above and below, by state and non-state actors to govern the provision of equipamiento in massive social housing developments in Mexico.

From a mixed methods approach, the research resorts to different methods of data collection such as interviews with key actors, a residents’ survey, base mapping and archival research. The research is qualitatively driven, this is to say that the main objective of my analyses is to provide a nuanced account of the processes through which actors seek to govern and exert power.

At the aid of these methods, findings from this research suggest that the actors involved in the provision of equipamiento in the case studied assemble technologies to control both the territory and the population through urban planning, as a tool to produce reality and justify an ambitious project; through urban design and architecture, as tools to produce environments conducive to desired behaviors and through community as the preferred ‘territory of government’ to imbue governmental agents’ values. Residents, on the other hand, reproduce governmental discourses that use individual responsibility and community values as banners to maintain developments, increase housing sales and raise land values, they familiarize space, as a way to define the terms of their own subjection, and employ different tactics to exert power and strive for equipamiento. Namely, residents adapt and appropriate space, and openly claim the right to produce it.

Ciudad Satélite reproduces the housing model it was intended to counter, providing residents with poor living conditions. Paradoxically, most of the Garden City’s open spaces are abandoned, oversized facilities are partly used and lack ongoing funds to function, Urbi’s private equipamiento is not used and residents hold restrained power to decide over
SUMMARY (continued)

the management of facilities but are the main contributors to their maintenance. Finally, developers’ aim to control the image of developments results in prohibiting commercial uses very much needed by residents.
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and purpose

Social housing policy in Mexico has undergone significant transformations in the last four decades. Since the 1980s, when the sector was restructured, policy has followed international precepts and implemented neoliberal strategies to promote responsible consumption and reduce state intervention, promoting the restructuration of housing institutions, developing a new legal framework and enacting policies that ‘creatively’ reconstructed the way social housing was produced. This reconstruction gave increased power to private sector agents while redirecting production and management to the marketplace. In line with this logic, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, massive\(^1\) housing developments in the outskirts of cities where land is cheaper proliferated across the country. The privatization of ejido\(^2\) land at the fringe of medium and large cities, availability of federal bridging loans for developers, and demand-side subsidies further promoted this trend. Large, peripheral developments allow developers to create economies of scale and save on land values to reduce the final cost of the house and increase gains. Federal infrastructure and demand-side subsidies saved developers the costs of costly infrastructure in peripheral land while ensuring a large pool of buyers. This housing development model has been reproduced across the country as the most efficient solution to pressing housing and basic service needs. While some developments are examples of good urban design and implementation practices (Garcia & Puebla, 1998), many of them are only partially completed (Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998). Social housing researchers

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\(^1\)Schteingart & Graizbord (1998) classify developments with more than 3,000 dwellings as large. For the purposes of this research, by ‘massive’, I refer to developments larger than 10,000 dwellings.

\(^2\)Ejido land refers to socially owned land. However, in 1992 a constitutional change allowed for its privatization.
in Latin America report that social problems such as violence and vandalism are common in publicly-subsidized developments, coupled with quick deterioration and slow provision of facilities (Garcia & Puebla, 1998; Maycote Pansza, 2009). Lack of facilities and long distances to places of work and opportunity affect residents’ quality of life, causing many to vacate these houses and rent closer to such locations (Torres, 2008). In the last decade, the high rate of INFONAVT vacancies shed light on the crisis revealing an unsustainable housing production model whose failures were many times exacerbated by local factors. When a model that segregates low-income families meets with local realities (e.g., power coalitions, lack of planning and institutional coordination), it has a negative impact on families, especially those with reduced mobility options. This housing model reflects a policy paradox, which Latin American scholars refer to as la pobreza de los con techo (‘poverty of those with a roof over their heads’) (Rodríguez & Sugranyes, 2004). While contrasting their condition with that of the homeless (i.e., los sin techo), this term suggests that satellite cities may actually be perpetuating a range of social problems.

Ciudad Satélite, the focus of this research, is a case in point. To date, there are nearly 4,300 identical family dwellings sold in the City, all equipped with basic services (i.e., water, sewerage and electricity) and served by paved streets; offering affordable housing to a segment of the poor earning less than 700 U.S. dollars a month (certainly not the poorest). Despite its apparent success, life in Ciudad Satélite (hereinafter referred to as the City or CS) presents challenges that include a lack of primary health, education, public administration, cultural, sport and recreation services. In fact, a mere 10 out of 191 urban amenities planned for 2015 have so far been built within Ciudad Satélite. As a result, families have limited to scanty health care; children lack after-school programs and are forced to play in debris-filled public parks; and residents face very incipient public transit options to commute from their houses to distant work and service and commercial sites. Like other developments built under this model, Ciudad Satélite corresponds to a
massive residential area, planned for 132,000 inhabitants and already holding close to 6,000, yet still without a high school, daycare centers, sport and community clubs or even a local market. In this context, creating opportunities to access adequate facilities has been fundamental for residents who have had to adapt, transform and produce space according to their needs and meager resources. Further, facilities are key elements in the marketing of these projects on the part of government agents such as local housing agencies and developers given that they are used to increase housing sales.

In this research, I use the term facility to refer to built structures, open and closed spaces, private and publically owned and managed that provide services to communities. In conjunction, facilities are part of a system referred to, in the Mexican planning system, as Equipamiento:

Buildings and open spaces, predominantly of public use, where activities complementary to living and working take place; these [facilities] provide the population with wellbeing and economic support services. Depending on the activities or specific services they provide, they are classified as follows: health, education, commerce and retail provision, culture, leisure and sports; administration, security and public services (H. Congreso del Estado de San Luis Potosí, 2013, p. 8).

Equipamiento then, refers to a wide array of spaces of very different sizes and characteristics, such as day care centers, parks, shops, petrol stations and public administration offices, among many others. Equipamiento as a system, facilitates residents’ everyday livelihood by offering local products, services, spaces of interaction and activities other than work. In this research, I use the term services in two ways: I refer to basic services or infrastructure as the minimum required amenities for a house to be considered inhabitable: electricity, sewerage and water. Services, in general terms, refer to the customer assistance provided to residents within facilities.

Analyzing the means through which power is exerted by different actors to advance particular strategies and shape how equipamiento is provided in Ciudad Satélite is central
to enabling us to empirically understand the gaps between policy, planning, the will to
govern and on-the-ground implementation. Therefore, one of the central aims of this
research is to understand how actors produce and seize those gaps to assert their
strategies and tactics that affect the production of equipamiento.

The research is based on Foucault’s notion of power, which diverts from classical
power theories and conceives it as unavoidable, multiple, relational, contextual, and most
importantly, spread throughout society and hence not limited to the State. In accordance
with this, Foucault analyzed the ‘microphysics of power’, i.e., the way in which power is
exerted by different agents in society and across different aspects of social life (i.e.,
one’self, the family, institutions). Through a genealogical analysis, Foucault identified
different forms of government and coined the term governmentality to refer to the way in
which, in advanced liberal societies, power is used to conduct the conduct of others. To
govern, in this context, is about setting the conditions under which subjects can auto-
regulate and behave in accordance with governmental objectives. In this research, I use
Foucault’s governmentality as a theoretical springboard to understand the technologies or
mechanisms through which different actors seek to discipline others, reclaim or reshape
space and advance their own rationalities to control the provision of equipamiento.

In the housing literature, the governmentality framework has been mainly applied to
research on public housing and Master-Planned Estates (MPEs). A wealth of research on
these topics focuses on neoliberal practices of state ‘roll out’, i.e., governmental practices
that seek to govern intermediary agencies and residents at a distance. Additionally,
another recurrent topic is the subjectification\(^3\) of residents and tenants through
consumption of lifestyles, adherence to specialized communities and compliance with
expected behavioral codes, covenants and by-laws. The governmentality of everyday

\(^3\)Subjectification refers to the process through which individuals become subjects of
government. In other words, refers to the way in which governmental projects work with individuals’
subjectivities to then be able to control their conduct.
practices in formal housing is less studied in the literature, as well as the role of spatial rationalities in shaping residents’ behaviors. Finally, research linking governmentality, housing and public *equipamiento* is scarce. This research addresses this empirical gap and seeks to contribute to the literature on housing and governmentality by bridging socio-political and geographic approaches with Michel De Certeau’s (1984) theories of everyday life.

Along these lines, I locate my inquiry at the intersection of power, knowledge, space and everyday practices. The objective of the research is to unearth the multiplicity of technologies used from above and below, by state and non-state actors, to govern the provision of *equipamiento* in massive social housing developments. I specifically focus on the subjectification (i.e., those that seek to control the conduct of individuals) and spatial (i.e., those that seek to control space) technologies used by governmental actors and the tactics implemented by residents to define where and how *equipamiento* is provided.

Governing is constantly prone to testing and amelioration. Therefore, this research also seeks to understand the paradoxes produced by the will to govern in the case studied in order to inform policy and planning processes.

In sum, the research addresses the following general research question:

- How do power, knowledge, space and everyday practices work in conjunction to govern the provision of *equipamiento* in social housing developments?

In order to understand the complexities of the will to govern and its paradoxes, I explore the following three sub-questions:

- How do actors involved in the provision of *equipamiento* in social housing developments in Mexico assemble rationalities, strategies and technologies to exert power?
• How do residents’ strategies, tactics and everyday practices contribute to the exercise of power and the provision of equipamiento in Ciudad Satélite?
• What governmental and space-making problems arise from the will to govern the provision of equipamiento in Ciudad Satélite?

1.2 Theoretical framework and significance

Central to this work are two streams in the governmentality research: 1) The socio-political approach, centered on the ‘subjectification’ of individuals (Dean, 1999; Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006); and 2) The geographic and planning approaches, seeking to understand the “mechanisms of social ordering based on spatial regulation” (Merry, 2001, p. 16). In addition to these, the research brings in De Certeau’s (1984) research on everyday practices as a point of departure to understand how residents carve spaces of freedom (Foucault, 1982) to advance their own power strategies and negotiate the production of their space within the bounds of local power structures.

Research looking at both components is most commonly produced within spatial disciplines, given that political scientists and sociologists focus mainly on the subjectification of individuals and the governmentalization of the state, giving space a secondary role (Huxley, 2007). Within this stream of research, geographers have produced a wealth of work at the intersection of space and governmentality on topics that range from historical mapping and representation practices to subaltern studies, globalization and neoliberalism (see Huxley, 2008 for a lengthier discussion). From a planning perspective, Foucault’s influence can be primarily located in analyses of power in the planning process focusing on the way different discourses compete and shape space (in opposition to Habermasian planners focusing on consensus building, see for example Richardson, 1996; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Jessop, 2007) and in historical analyses of planning practices (Driver, 1985; Ogborn, 1992). Further, the spatial rationalities behind the
production of the physical dimension of the urban have been scanty addressed in the urban design field (see for example Rabinow, 1982) and architecture (Harwood, 2012; Dutta, 2012). Finally, most of the analyses mentioned tend to emphasize the control side of spatial practices instead of focusing on the production of the ‘liberal subject’ (like studies in sociology and political sciences do), leaving room for fruitful research avenues.

This research seizes these gaps by bringing space into discussion, not only as a container of governmental practices but as a fundamental component. Additionally, I address an under-researched component of spatial rationalities of government: materiality, as a fundamental component to unearth the environmental causalities attributed to space and used to conduct the conduct of subjects. I complement studies centered on subjectification, by promoting a dialogue between top-down programs of government and bottom-up everyday practices with the aid of De Certeau’s theories. Lastly, and in line with existing literature, I adopt a multi-scalar approach to understanding the workings of government from global to local: specifically, to analyze the changes that housing policy in Mexico has undergone in the last two decades. In sum, my work is located at the intersection of De Certeau’s everyday practices with three bodies of work within governmentality research: neoliberal governmentality, the government of populations and the government of space. Finally, with the aid of these theories and based on Miller & Rose (2008), I build an analytical framework to unearth the governmental components of facility provision and the way in which technologies are assembled by actors to implement programs of government and contest them. First, I draw on critical urban studies to understand how neoliberalism as a theory, a project and rationality penetrates all realms of life across the globe, but produces variegated topographies in the spaces it touches (Peck, Theodore & Brenner 2009). The outcomes of neoliberalism as a theory of practice ruled by market logics and individual freedoms result, in many cases, in the ‘creative destruction’ of systems, institutions, regulatory schemes, policy practices and social traditions. The
Mexican social housing sector exemplifies the way in which the neoliberal project infiltrates a previously regulated state realm, to promote, in line with international organizations’ precepts, profound transformations passing on mortgage payment and common space maintenance responsibilities to consumers. Moving away from the approach of critical planners and regulationists, my analysis does not seek to understand these transformations as a project of capital accumulation, or as a state project to regulate the conditions for housing markets to thrive (Newman & Clarke, 2009). Rather, relying on Foucault’s microphysics of power, this work seeks to understand how the sector’s transformations affect the power dynamics and the technologies of government utilized on the ground to control the provision of equipamiento in massive social housing developments.

Second, I delve into the socio-political governmental approach to understand the different mechanisms through which populations are governed. I critically analyze the neoliberal mechanisms used by governmental agents to guide subjects’ behavior at a distance. Policies built under this logic provide cosmetic approaches to problematics built into an inequitable economic system.

Rather than the formation of collective social solidarities to align subjects, communities are the new, more flexible and plural, territories where governmental programs are implemented. Therefore, these territories of government require engineering and Imagineering to promote residents self-regulation, a sentiment of belonging, identification with and adoption of the community morals involved. To understand how communities are ‘produced’, this research analyzes governmental technologies such as marketing and community development, in conjunction with disciplinary technologies such as regulations and fines. These technologies are also utilized to examine how subjects are prompted to ‘voluntarily’ adopt community values and comply with larger governmental objectives (i.e., how they are subjectified).
Engineering of communities and governing of subjects require knowledge. In this research, I adopt this component of Foucault's power triad (power/space/knowledge) as an element of analysis to understand how reality is framed and also how it is produced. Understanding the rationality behind knowledge and the technologies used to advance and produce reality is central to understanding power. Power can validate knowledge which renders populations and spaces governable.

Third, I engage with governmental geographic and planning approaches to understand how space is used as a rationality to govern. Governmentality is inherently spatial both in the spaces it creates and in the logics it employs in its subjectivizing project (Huxley, 2007). In this research, I unveil the spatial rationalities that seek to guide the conduct of subjects. Further, I analyze how problematic spaces of intervention are identified by the programmer; how knowledge on that which needs to be ‘healed', ordered or repaired is produced; and how the spatial tools to intervene are defined.

Spatial technologies translate rationalities into governmental schemes. They seek to control subjects and populations through spatial arrangements. The spatial technologies analyzed in this chapter are far from exhaustive but enlighten those most commonly employed in the cases studied: classification of the population through spatial exclusion and delimitation of ‘problem-free’ zones; commodification of spatial practices that contribute to the exclusion of the poor from the use and production of space; and appropriation of space through everyday practices that, either openly, or (most commonly) latently, reclaim the use of space.

Governmental programs are idealizations of the programmer, and as such, their implementation in reality is always prone to failure. More often than not, programs fail and face contestation and rejection. An ‘ordered’ space is not free from ‘disorderly’ everyday practices, nor will it necessarily produce obedient subjects. However, failure does not mean that these technologies have no effects or that they will be abandoned. Instead,
when spatial rationalities fail, new governmental technologies are recast, adapted, reinvented and retested (Huxley, 2008).

Fourth, I use De Certeau’s writings to shed light on the complex ways in which, through every day ‘bricolage’, subjects also produce space and adapt to the system without leaving it. Building upon Perera’s (2009) concept of familiarization, I explore how residents create room to maneuver within abstract spaces produced and managed for them. Subjects make space familiar through daily tactics such as latent contestation, adaptation and appropriation. All of these technologies allow subjects not to escape from but to negotiate the terms of their subjection. Everyday tactics challenge established rules and are grounded in place; they are creative and flexible but lack a strategy and depend on time and opportunity to be implemented. Conversely, the powerful employ premeditated strategies to determine abstract spaces whose logic does not necessarily coincide with reality. In other words, while strategies produce space from the top, tactics do it from within.

It is at the intersection of tactics and strategies that I locate my research. This conception of power challenges the traditional powerful-subjected dichotomization and invites us to rethink political struggles as processes in which all actors exert power albeit in different forms. From this perspective, the least empowered exert power not to escape from domination but to recast the conditions under which power is exerted (Dean, 1999).

Finally, this research meshes together the theoretical bodies discussed with the aid of an analytical framework that uses the logic of assemblages to analyze how governmental rationalities frame what is desirable (cognition) and what can be made possible (calculation), as well as how to govern (experimentation). I use the logic of assemblages to link the global and the local and shed light on the problems and paradoxes generated when global abstractions meet local specificities (Collier & Ong,
Furthermore, I use this logic to unveil the complex configurations of technologies used in conjunction to govern the population, space and everyday practices.

### 1.3 Argument

In contexts of low incomes, lack of services, increased costs and lack of job opportunities, access to *equipamiento* is central. This provides residents with local services, particularly important for under-privileged, mobility-reduced groups. The literature on governmentality allows for a nuanced understanding of how power and control over space are exercised. Furthermore, it provides the tools to analyze the microphysics of power, i.e., how power is exerted by all actors and through different strategies and tactics. I contend that controlling space is as important as governing subjects and as a result, governmental technologies mix and match ways to govern both realms through mechanisms that mutually reinforce each other. Knowledge in this context is a mechanism that helps governmental agencies to frame and even produce reality to then craft the tools to intervene. Residents, on the other hand, carve spaces of opportunity in which to insert their spatial production practices. These, however, lack structure as well as cohesiveness and as such, residents use a wide array of approaches, such as compliant adaptation, contestation, and appropriation. Through their tactics to adapt space, residents highlight the gaps between the abstract space planned and designed for them and the space they need to adequately live their everyday lives.

### 1.4 Research design and methods

The research is designed with a mixed methods approach that brings together different types of data and information sources. It is, however, qualitatively driven, as the main objective of my analyses is to provide a nuanced account of the processes through which actors seek to govern and exert power. Along these lines, interviewing actors and analyzing texts were central to understand their perspectives and rationalities. In a context
of scarce access to public information and outdated data, I implemented a survey to understand household characteristics and identify residents’ *equipamiento* needs and perceptions of current living conditions. Mapping land uses, housing vacancies and housing extensions helped me identify spatial trends and clustering. Finally, archival research provided data on the historical and political context of the City. It also allowed me to understand how institutional discourses are framed and knowledge used to advance particular interests. I sought to validate findings by using a probabilistic sampling method that allows me to generalize data acquired from a sample. Further, I triangulated my findings by contrasting the data I collected and by integrating different perspectives through purposive interview participant selection. Among the limitations of my method is the lack of stratification both of surveys and interviews by neighborhood which may yield skewed information or limit my ability to identify and cluster differences.

I used an in-depth case study with three embedded sub cases. These were selected to provide variability in terms of development stage and type of developer. Finally, size, consolidation and community organization were the criteria I used to select Satélite, el Manantial and Urbivillas as my three sub cases.

1.5 Chapter Overview

The research is structured in eight chapters. In Chapter Two of this dissertation I address key concepts to understand Foucault’s conceptualization of governmentality. Further, I situate governmentality within the housing literature; this review highlights the way in which neoliberal changes to housing policy further facilitates governing residents and intermediary agents at a distance. Moreover, the literature brings to bear the way in which communities and most importantly a set of values built around community are used by governmental agents (i.e., public agencies and developers) to govern residents. Finally, I identify two under-researched areas: how the material characteristics of space are used to govern and how *equipamiento* intersects with housing. This chapter also discusses the
theoretical bodies that guided my quest: the government of populations, space and everyday practices. In each of these bodies I provide the language, develop the body of theory and identify the technologies of government used to govern each realm. Finally, I identify guiding questions that derive from the literature and lay the grounds to build an analytical framework to inform the research methods.

Chapter 3 presents the analytical approach I used to translate theoretical categories into operationalizable research components and describes the research strategy I designed to collect and analyze data. Along these lines, the chapter presents first the research approach and the logic used to understand how governmental projects function: vertically, by linking the global and the local, and horizontally, by assembling a range of technologies to govern. Subsequently, I identify three components of governmentality: cognition, calculation and experimentation and use them to inform the research methods selected. After this, I present the data collection and analysis process and describe all of the methods used, including instruments, sampling methods, procedures and limitations. Finally, I describe the criteria used to select the three case studies.

Chapter 4 provides the background to understand neoliberal changes in Mexico and how these have affected housing policy. In this chapter I identify key elements to analyze the different governmental domains of housing policy. In other words, I draw on secondary research to understand housing sector changes in the last three decades and their impact on how residents and housing developments are governed. This includes the rationalities, etho-politics (i.e., ideals and values) and technologies used to render the sector more profitable and efficient.

Chapter 5, 6 and 7 describe the case and sub cases studied from the perspective of three key processes: planning, development, life and the provision of *equipamiento* in Ciudad Satélite. In Chapter 5, I describe the planning process of the City and highlight the
way in which knowledge was used to justify an ambitious project and urban design to create a marketable environment and product. Further, I outline the City’s development stages, map the actors involved and unearth the space-making strategies they use to control development. This chapter provides the background to understanding the micro and macro conditions that affected the development of the City, as well as the local political context in which it was planned.

Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the living conditions in the City. First, I describe the general characteristics of the neighborhoods studied and then analyze the community development initiatives of the three neighborhoods. In this chapter I identify residents’ living conditions and explore the intersection between the residents’ socio-economic characteristics, housing vacancies and commuting distances and facility provision needs. Further, I apprise observed and resident-reported factors that hinder community organization and analyze organizational schemes and community initiatives undertaken in relation to the provision of equipamiento. Through this analysis, I unveil how residents are subjectivized and community is used to govern. I also identify different technologies governmental actors resort to in order to govern life in the City (e.g., land tenure regimes and by-laws). Finally, I pinpoint the multiple tactics residents use not only to adapt to the City’s living conditions but also to challenge authorities and claim their needs.

Chapter 7 advances an account of the provision of equipamiento in Ciudad Satélite, particularly looking at the spatial characteristics of each facility, the logics behind their provision, construction process and community involvement. In this analysis, I reveal how equipamiento is used to market and produce an image of the City that appeals to middle-class living standards. Further, I identify the spatial and subjectivizing technologies actors use to control facilities as well as the tactics residents employ to adapt, appropriate and familiarize (Perera, 2009) these spaces in order to fulfill their daily needs.
Finally, in Chapter 8 I apply the analytical framework to each one of the processes previously analyzed (planning, development, everyday life and the provision of \textit{equipamiento}). I approach each process as an assemblage that resorts to multiple technologies to govern both subjects and space and links top-down rationalities with bottom-up tactics. In this analysis I tease apart the changing ‘constellations’ of rationalities, strategies and technologies actors assemble and demonstrate how different governmental rationalities ‘rub shoulders’ and how governmental strategies seeking to exert power and govern space and knowledge production come together and derive into new arrangements. This analysis also sheds light on some of the paradoxes that stem when governmental programs meet reality.
2. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The contact point, where individuals are driven by others, is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government. Governing people in the broad meaning of the word...is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts (Foucault 1993, p. 204).

In the 1970s Foucault delivered a series of lectures at the Collège de France that changed the way in which power and government were conceived. He approached power as an unavoidable, but also potentially positive, force, not limited to the state apparatus, but spread throughout society. His analyses were centered on the trialectics of power-knowledge and space (Soja, 1996). While power and knowledge were extensively studied by Foucault, explicit theorizations of space were scarce in his writings. However, spatial references are present throughout his analyses, as a precondition to understand the interplay between power and knowledge (Foucault, 1986; Soja, 1996; Elden, 2002).

This chapter proposes a structure that honors the triad, approaching knowledge as a crosscutting topic, central to understanding both the subjectification of individuals and the government of space. However, the objective of the chapter is twofold: first, to bring space to the fore, contributing to the task of spatializaing accounts of power that geographers have painstakingly developed (see for example Soja, 1996; Crampton & Elden, 2007; Huxley, 2007); second, to provide a crosscutting narrative of the exertion of power through space, from governmental programs to daily practices of space production.
I draw on Foucault’s concept of governmentality to understand the political rationality behind the exercise of power. Central to my research are two streams in the governmentality framework: 1) The sociological approach, centered on the ‘subjectification’ of individuals, in other words, on the practices that seek to ‘produce’ political individuals of a certain type, e.g.: private owners, urban citizens (Dean, 1999; Huxley, 2007); and 2) The geographic and planning approaches, seeking to understand “mechanisms of social ordering based on spatial regulation” (Merry, 2001). In addition to these, the research brings in De Certeau’s (1984) work on everyday practices in order to understand how residents carve spaces of freedom (Foucault, 1982) to advance their own technologies of power and negotiate the production of their space within the bounds of local power structures. I use Foucault’s term technologies of power to refer to the mechanisms through which different actors seek to discipline others, to reclaim or reshape space and to advance their own rationalities in order to control the provision of equipamiento.

From this intersection, I analyze power both inside and outside the state and contend that if we are to understand the governmental program of public facility provision in social housing production, then we must unearth the multiplicity of technologies used from above and below by the state and non-state actors to govern both the subjects (bio-politics) and space (geo-politics).

In sum, this chapter is an invitation to understand power, knowledge, space and everyday practices as an ensemble that helps us understand governmentality in the context of social housing production in Mexico.

2.1 Foucault and power: governmentality at work

In his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault (1980) explicitly criticized power theories that gave too much attention to the “State” as the power holder. Instead, he proposed an analysis of the “microphysics of power and anonymous strategies” spread
across society, linking many aspects of social life (such as the family, the self and institutions) (Lemke, 2000, p. 3).

Foucault conceptualized power as inevitable, multiple, relational, contextual, competing and in constant change (Flyvbjerg 2002). He acknowledged power’s productive potential and posited that there is no normative a priori good or bad in power relations (Miller & Rose, 2008; Lemke, 2000; Flyvbjerg 2002). Power is about guidance; it is not the form of government, nor the imposition of forms of control, but the conduct of human behavior. According to Foucault (1997), government is “an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them” (p. 68). The political rationality behind the exertion of power was defined by Foucault as ‘governmentality’. He first coined this neologism in his February 1978 lecture, defining it as the “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power...” (Foucault, 1979, p. 20).

Governmentality sits at the conjunction of top-down techniques of government (such as domination) and bottom-up techniques of self-management and control. In conjunction, these techniques seek to produce social order. Governing oneself consists of the reproduction of political rationalities while also self-fulfilling individual desires. At this meeting point, individuals are compelled to be free in specific ways through an ethic constructed around a political project (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006, p. 90). However, this meeting point is always fluctuating, in constant negotiation and in dialectical transformation (Huxley, 2007).

2.1.1 The idiom of governmentality

Foucault moves away from structuralist analyses of power by genealogically unraveling the rationality behind power practices. Practices are events immersed within a
historical context with particular power configurations. To understand these practices, one must understand the underlying grammar of rationalities: “...styles of thinking, ways of rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it was amenable to calculation and programming...” (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006, p. 58). Rationalities are always rational in the sense that they respond to particular logics and values: they provide “the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power by different authorities...[they conform the] domain for the formulation and justification of idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it...” (Idem). However, there is no single perfect rationality, but rather a set of practices inscribed within a set of rationalities (Castro, 2010). Rationalities provide the logics behind programs of government and programs translate rationalities into ways of governing. Programs are optimistic conceptions of how the world should function. However, these are in constant negotiation between what is desirable and what can be done. According to Rose, O’Malley & Valverde (2006, p. 39):

Programmes constitute a space within which the objectives of government are elaborated, and where plans to implement them are dreamed up. But the technologies which seek to operate on activities and processes produce their own difficulties ...governing is not the realization of a programmer’s dream. The ‘real’ always insists in the form of resistance to programming; and the programmer’s world is one of constant experiment, invention, failure, critique and adjustment.

This definition envisions programs as agonistic, yet coherent, sets of strategies planned to advance specific rationalities. It also assumes there is a master mind or ‘programmer’ putting together these strategies. I contend that just as there are multiple rationalities, there are also multiple ‘programmers’ implementing different and many times unplanned strategies; hence programs are, in many cases, blurred agendas implemented through equally unsettled technologies. In parallel, subjects challenge through different means the programmer, implementing, localizing, and adapting preconceived programs.
Technologies are dissimilar mechanisms to render programs operable. Miller & Rose (2008) define them as: “…assemblages of persons, techniques, institutions, instruments for the conducting of conduct…devices, tools, techniques, personnel, materials and apparatuses that enable authorities to imagine and act upon the conduct of persons individually and collectively, and in locales that [are] often very distant…” (p. 16).

Governing both the population and the territory calls for programs to reach and to experiment with disparate configurations of technologies and to resort to different tactics or strategic games. These games structure “the possible field of action of others” (through encouragement, rationalization, persuasion, manipulation and management, amongst other things (Lemke, 2000, p. 5). The aim of strategic games is to motivate individuals to be autonomous and to naturalize the implementation of techniques of government.

In sum, the governmentality frame aims to provide a definition of power outside the confines of the state and offers a specific idiom to understand how power works and through which means or technologies it does so. This term will be employed throughout this thesis, first, to locate local power practices in the context of actually existing neoliberalisms and, second, to unravel the technological configurations or assemblages of programs of government implemented in the case study.

2.1.2 Situating governmentality in the literature

Foucault’s quest to unearth the micro-dynamics of power was truncated due to his untimely death. However, his genealogical work was pursued by his disciples and his writings provide compelling theoretical and analytical tools to understand power, knowledge and space from a myriad of disciplines and periods in time. Without seeking to be exhaustive, critical sociology and criminology, science and technology studies, history and philosophy, political philosophy and postcolonial and cultural studies, geography,
planning and urban design exemplify the applicability of the framework to multiple fields (for a more extensive discussion see Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006).

Central to this work are two streams in the governmentality research: 1) The socio-political approach, centered on the ‘subjectification’ of individuals (Dean, 1999; Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006) and 2) The geographic and planning approaches, seeking to understand the ‘mechanisms of social ordering based on spatial regulation’ (Merry, 2001, p.16).

Research looking at these components in conjunction is most commonly produced within the spatial disciplines, given that political scientists and sociologists focus mainly on the subjectification of individuals and on the state’s governmental strategies, giving space a secondary role (Huxley, 2007). Within this stream of research, geographers have produced a wealth of work at the intersection of space and governmentality on topics that range from historical mapping and representational practices, to subaltern studies, globalization and neoliberalism (see Huxley, 2008 for a lengthier discussion). From a planning perspective, Foucault’s influence can be primarily located in analyses of power in the planning process focusing on how different discourses compete and shape space (in opposition to Habermasian scholars focusing on consensus building, see for example Richardson, 1996; Flybvjerg, 1998; Jessop, 2007) and in historical analyses of planning practices (Driver, 1985; Ogborn, 1992). Finally, the spatial rationalities behind the production of the physical dimension of the urban have been addressed to some limited extent in the urban design field (see for example Rabinow, 1982) and architecture (Harwood, 2012; Dutta, 2012). Most of the analyses mentioned, however, tend to emphasize the control side of spatial practices instead of focusing on the production of the ‘liberal subject’ (like studies in sociology and political sciences do), leaving room for fruitful research venues.
In the housing literature, the governmentality framework has been mainly applied to research on public housing and Master Planned Estates (MPEs). A wealth of research on these topics focuses on neoliberal practices of state ‘roll out’, i.e., governmental practices that seek to govern intermediary agencies and residents at a distance. Additionally, another recurrent topic is the subjectification of residents and tenants through consumption of lifestyles, adherence to specialized communities and compliance with expected behavioral codes, covenants and by-laws. Research at the intersection of governmentality and residents’ lived experience is limited as well as the role of spatial rationalities in shaping residents’ behaviors. Finally, research linking governmentality, housing and equipment is scarce.

**The changing dynamics of housing under neoliberal governmentality**

Under neoliberalism, the governing role of the state appears to be ‘rolling back’ or retreating from direct forms of government and provision (such as welfare). However, authors such as Dodson (2006) argue that the state is not ‘rolling back’ from intervention but it is actually ‘rolling out’, i.e., it is expanding its arm length to govern at a distance.

Through the analysis of four cases of assisted housing in Australia, Dodson found that the state remains a strong agent shaping the policy discourse and its operationalization. In line with Flint (2003, 2004), Dodson argues that assistance (i.e., public) housing policy, is neoliberalizing in three ways: 1) it frames subjects as free and responsible consumers of assisted housing, 2) it shifts programs towards demand instead of supply through housing allowances and finally; 3) it shapes demand for assisted housing by working through the subjectivities of subjects, via housing subsidies and different institutional arrangements. To this, Flint (2004) adds that the roles of tenants and social landlords are changing, as well as the techniques of government. The role of tenants has changed from welfare recipients, to consumers with choices and finally to
active and responsible tenants. In parallel, landlords have acquired a more active role in management, with increased responsibilities such as the provision of community services (Flint, 2002).

The gradual retreat of the state and increased participation of non-state agents has not meant less government; on the contrary, tenants’ are closely regulated by intermediaries such as landlords and housing agents. In parallel, the techniques of government have shifted. Disciplinary techniques (e.g., punitive sanctions for ‘anti-social’ behavior, Flint, 2012) have been complemented with techniques to guide the conduct of tenants, such as training, reward schemes, neighbors’ agreements and tenant inspection teams (Flint, 2002; McKee & Cooper, 2008).

The techniques to guide the conduct of tenants are commonly referred in the literature as ‘etho-power’. Through this, a frame of moral values to govern the conduct of subjects is put in place by governmental agents. Authors coincide in that housing tenure and appeal to shared values within a community of shared interests are two of the main strategies housing agencies and administrators use to produce responsible constituents of a community and empowered and active consumers of housing (Flint, 2003; Dodson, 2006).

**Tenure regimes: housing consumption and morals**

Tenure regimes are ascribed moral values. Housing policy research in the UK (Gurney, 1999; Flint & Rowlands, 2003) demonstrates how home ownership is socially normalized and how it appeals to moral values of care and responsible citizenship. Conversely, social housing tenants’ behavior is tagged as antisocial and in need of intervention. This dichotomization obscures the centrality of economic inequalities determining access to property by stigmatizing those who cannot participate in the consumerist logic of the market. In this context, policy promotes the moral values of good
behavior and responsible citizenship assumed to be present in owners’ behaviors. This is done through training, communitarian arrangements such as residents’ organizations and top-down community organization.

**Using community values to govern residents’ behavior**

Research on public housing in the United Kingdom has extensively examined how community is used to conduct the conduct of problematic tenants by appealing to shared values (in line with private-housing values) and civic responsibility (see for example Flint, 2004).

Etho-power has an effect on the daily lives of tenants and landlords and as such, also meets resistance, especially due to the contradictions stemmed from inserting a market logic onto a social realm. In parallel, wanting to appeal to community while reinforcing individual consumption is contradictory:

While subjects are exhorted to maximize their opportunities for consumption within increasingly privatized and individualistic life processes, poorer subjects, unable to access those circuits of consumption are prescribed collective, communally situated responses to their exclusion (Flint, 2003, p. 626).

In Australia, studies of MPEs (see Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009 and Nethercote, 2015) show how ‘community’ is used by developers as a marketing strategy to attract buyers, as an organizational tool to delegate maintenance responsibilities and as a driver to build shared identities and moral values. Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters (2009) found that good-neighbor habits such as maintaining the front yard and paying maintenance fees on time reflect behavioral principles defended by residents and promoted by developers (through marketing and community work mainly) with the aim of maintaining high property values. In this context, residents’ obligations are based on respect for their neighbors’ rights. In other words, an
ethic responsibility becomes a moral one since it affects others and is controlled by a shared understanding of what it is good and bad behavior. This does not mean, however, that these morals seek to promote a ‘communal’ type of life; they are based on individual obligations to maintain common interests but they hardly promote values such as mutual help and bonding.

**Condominium by-laws**

By-laws and covenants provide a legal framework to ground community morals. Various authors (Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009; McGuirk & Dowling, 2011; Power, 2015) have found that by-laws are central in shaping the governance of housing, given that they condense principles of ‘normal’ behavior that are generally accepted by residents. McGuirk and Dowling (2011) conducted research in four MPEs in Australia and found that, in the cases they studied, “…covenants and by-laws were understood as merely codifying the material and behavioral elements of middle-class respectability…” (p. 2623). Nonetheless, even if by-laws are generally accepted, they are not fully embraced. The authors also found that residents see by-laws as infringing on private property rights by (in some cases stringently) regulating behavior and the built form of dwellings. However, most asserted that a legal framework to mediate neighbor relations was needed (Idem). Communities use by-laws to resolve conflicts while avoiding direct disputes. A corollary of this is the depersonalization of community relations, substituting indirect confrontation and rules for face-to-face conflict resolution (McGuirk & Dowling, 2011).

**Community management**

Neighbors’ committees are central agents in housing management. Under neoliberal governmentality they are expected to assume increased responsibilities such as mediating conflicts, maintaining common spaces and subcontracting services. However,
these tasks can be burdensome for residents. McGuirk & Dowling (2011) found that management is challenging for residents who have to assume the role of business managers to maintain common spaces and subcontract services. In MPEs, participating in complex management tasks is a moral obligation that contradicts the appeal to residents of an imagined ready-made residential community. These tasks are not only burdensome but also liable to taint community relations with contractual and economic logics. Paying maintenance levies, for example, gives neighbors a voice in the community while those failing to pay are ostracized.

**Agency and subjectivity from below**

In addition to residents’ organizational challenges in neighbors’ committees, research on the lived experiences of subjects addresses an under-researched area in governmentality and housing: agency and subjectivity formation from below; i.e., the mechanisms different actors use to question, contest and adapt to governmental programs. McKee (2009; 2011) for example, conducted research on social housing in Glasgow. Her findings reveal how both public housing tenants and landlords strove to reframe the policy objectives that sought to control them at a distance and insert their own rationality. Landlords, for example, were governed at ‘arm’s length’ through managerial technologies such as audits and evaluations, but crafted their own ‘flexible’ strategies to contest these means of control. In other words, landlords carved their own ‘spaces of freedom’ while also adapting to governmental means to control their activities. As a result, domination and resistance are not dichotomized; rather, they deploy in a context of mutual adaptation that often fills the gaps between overarching, abstract objectives and their implementation in the real world (Flint, 2004; McKee, 2009; 2011; McGuirk and Dowling, 2011).
**Spatial materiality in housing**

Another under-researched area within housing and governmentality is the role of space and its materiality in shaping relations and actively contributing to the implementation of programs of government. Through an analysis of nuisances related to dog ownership in condominium buildings in Australia, Power (2015) finds that the materiality of buildings (i.e., their form, distribution, materials and infrastructure) shape the ‘social context’ of community governance. Materiality affects community relations by prohibiting or enhancing contact between neighbors and defining public and private life boundaries or infiltrations (e.g., noise). Access to certain spaces, for example, can empower individuals and lack of physical contact may weaken community ties (Power, 2015). Other authors (Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009; Nethercote, 2015) approach materiality as part of the ‘symbolic value’ of housing, whereby the buildings’ appearance represents aesthetic values and lifestyles residents seek to consume. In sum, the materiality of the built environment is central to understanding how space is used to govern people’s behavior, but has nonetheless been understudied in the governmental literature (I will further develop this concept in the theoretical framework).

**Community facilities**

Facilities are also part of a lifestyle that developers use to market both private and social housing developments. In MPEs, paying public space maintenance and levies to maintain community facilities such as swimming pools, gyms and community spaces is part of residents’ responsibilities and one of the main issues they organize around. The literature addressing the intersection of housing and *equipamiento* is, however, scanty. McGuirk & Dowling (2011) are amongst the few authors to address this gap, albeit tangentially. The authors posit that residents’ approach to *equipamiento* reflects a commodified relation to space by which cost-benefit calculations define interest in
investing in their construction and maintenance, with residents “acting as entrepreneurs investing in the self” (p. 2620). However, they also assert that “the logics of value for money, rational choice and cost-competitiveness are present, yet they do not expunge the presence of other logics or of qualities that are not economically or morally valorized in relation to consumption…” (p. 2620). Examples of these logics are facilities’ appeal to higher quality of life standards and family conviviality.

In sum, within housing studies, governmentality is increasingly used as a framework to understand neoliberal housing programs, as well as the technologies and mechanisms used to govern the different actors involved in both public and private housing. Resident classification, communitarian modes of government and at-a-distance forms of control such as evaluation and auditing are a few examples. Despite the apparent retreat of state control, governing at a distance does not necessarily mean less government. On the contrary, authors coincide in that strategies to govern ‘at arm’s length’ are spreading and combine voluntary and coercive modes of power.

Etho-power technologies such as by-laws and social housing policy seek to change subjects’ behavior, placing responsibilities on individuals instead of on failures in the socio-economic system. For example, rent compliance failure is attributed to individuals’ lack of financial management capacities, instead of lack of job opportunities or low-paid wages (Flint, 2004). Noise pollution is attributed to anti-social behavior instead of poor quality building materials. In both cases, etho-power technologies seek to counterbalance the failures in socio-economic and material contexts by regulating residents’ behavior (Power, 2015). The literature on housing and governmentality questions the mis-attribution of responsibility implicit in etho-political approaches to housing problems and calls for policy shifts that tackle the root causes of social problems. Neoliberal policy, however, seems to point in the opposite direction.
2.2 Advanced liberal governmentality

Neoliberalism as a theory, a project and a rationality overflows the academic literature. The widespread use of the term to define a very large array of market practices puts into question its usefulness as an epistemological tool. In this research I use the term to relate to existing literature on the political economy of policy and planning. Establishing connections between this literature and my work is particularly relevant to identify how policy changes seeking to reduce the intervention of the state and set the conditions for markets to thrive also rely on a different mentality of rule. This mentality of rule, called by neo-Foucauldians advanced liberalism opposes the welfare state. Advanced liberal rationality questions the state’s intervention in social issues and promotes the use of technologies to govern subjects ‘at a distance’. Additionally, this type of rationality uses community as a figure of territorial and governmental control (I will further explain each of these items in this section). With this cautionary note I now turn to neoliberalism to then expand on advanced liberalism.

Neoliberalism has not only stubbornly penetrated the economic systems of almost every country (with very few exceptions), but it has also come to rule all realms of life (Harvey, 2007b). The outcomes of a theory of practice under which market logic and individual freedoms are supposed to benefit all have proven not only paradoxical but in many cases predatory. It is impossible to disregard the chains of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ that benefit a narrow capitalist elite and widen the gaps between rich and poor (Harvey, 2007b, p. 34). Nonetheless, the implementation of neoliberal ideology is an agonistic endeavor that uses cities as a fertile field of experimentation (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009). The neoliberal ideology is agonistic in the sense that it is constantly undergoing cycles of failure and re-invention that result in the creative destruction of institutions, policies, financial mechanisms, sectors attending basic needs and so on. Additionally, neoliberalism is confronted not only with its own contradictions, but also with
those of the geopolitical spaces it touches (e.g., local forms of power to control space).

‘Actually existing neoliberalisms’ are implemented on a base of existing spatial and institutional arrangements, regulatory schemes, policy practices and social traditions (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p. 51). As such, their implementation is path dependent and its study requires attention, not only to the specificities of time and place but also to the resistances it meets.

This research is concerned with how ‘variegated’ topographies of neoliberalism (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009, p. 52) affect the practices of public service provision in social housing developments in Mexico. However, my approach differs from two groups identified by Newman and Clarke (2009): that of critical planners who approach neoliberalism as a political project of capital accumulation and from regulationists who focus on the role of the state in preserving adequate conditions for markets to thrive (Newman & Clarke, 2009). Instead, in line with the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, I seek to unveil the ‘micropolitics’ of power as practiced by state and non-state actors. I accept, however, that there is not always a coherent governmental project behind actors’ practices and that there is no programmer putting together and testing governmental strategies in relation to a given population. Instead, path-dependent technologies and daily practices of contestation are used ad hoc by different actors. With this cautionary note, this theoretical section aims to layout the basis on which we can understand how different technologies of power stem from the omnipresent philosophy of rule we call neoliberalism.

2.2.1 Towards a reflexive government

In his lectures, Foucault set a research agenda to analyze the art of government through history. His framework helped to make sense of the transformations in government in Europe and to unearth the governmental rationalities underpinning these
transformations. He concluded that the relations between state and society changed radically in the 18th century when strengthening the state gave way to the art of governing populations. The notion of an art of governing refers to inconspicuous strategies through which different actors are orchestrated and tuned to carry on a political program. This entails an important shift in the conception of power that accepts its existence beyond the state, in the social (Dean, 1999). Liberalism, the first period of the art of government, opposes its predecessor ‘raison d’état’ which aims to impose its power. Instead, liberalism is mainly characterized by the connection between knowledge and forms of government, by regulatory practices and by making subjects the managers of their own government. To these ends, norms are enacted, positive methods to apprehend reality implemented (e.g., statistics) and expert knowledge engaged. Liberal governments are reflexive, in constant re-making, and constantly seek new ways of reducing the state’s presence. Classical liberalism was questioned for its assumption that the ‘naturalistic processes of the economy could be left alone’ (Dean, 1999, p. 206). In fact, these processes promoted social inequalities. Under welfarism, the state was in charge of regulating not only the economic but also the social realm (e.g., health and education), in order to maximize efficiency. For these purposes, society, expertise and economic state are aligned in the name of the social interest. Subjects are governed through ‘collective solidarities and dependencies’, under the banner of the responsible citizen, incentivized by a system of sanctions and rewards (Miller & Rose, 2008, p.202). Under welfarism, the state is in between subjects and capital interests, balancing them through regulatory practices and enhanced expert knowledge. This is one reason why advanced liberals criticized welfare as excessive government (Dean, 1999). While advanced liberal forms of government inherit the central role accorded to expertise and the individual search for self-realization of the welfare state, these are framed in different terms. Advanced liberal rationalities oppose state intervention in social issues by arguing that it is not capable of efficiently
administering many aspects of life and that its intervention promotes a dependency culture in which the state does what individuals could do for themselves.

Under advanced liberalism, markets are created in realms of life previously administered by the state, such as education and health. These new niches are managed by specialized experts, whose autonomy is increasingly regulated through technologies such as audits and budgeting (Miller & Rose, 2008).

Another important shift in this period is the transformation of the social and the advent of the community as a figure of territorial and governmental control (see section 2.3.1 for further discussion on this issue). This change is not a simple dichotomization of intervention versus non-intervention, nationalized enterprises vs privatized ones or society vs. community. Rather, the mechanisms to govern at a distance proliferated and became more complex, as well as more accepted by private and social actors. Dean (1999, p. 207) asserts that the shift between welfare and neoliberalism “…may mean less state intervention, but not necessarily less government”.

2.2.2 Cultural reform, distant and reflexive government

The implementation of advanced liberal rationalization drew on different mechanisms to gradually reduce state intervention: 1) cultural reform; 2) distant government; and 3) rescaling. First, was a cultural reform that relied on the adoption of freedom as a banner to dismantle the insidious intervention of the state (Dean 1999). The adoption of this banner also built what Harvey (2007b, p.24) calls a “conceptual apparatus”, including moral and ethical principles from which a kit of advanced liberal tools emerged. This kit includes technologies of citizenship to align subjects with market values and to promote autonomous responsibility and consumerism. Second, reduced intervention was complemented by increased, albeit distant, government. This type of government:
Utilized a range of techniques that would enable the state to divest itself of many of its obligations, devolving those to quasi-autonomous entities that would be governed at a distance by means of budgets, audits, standards, benchmarks, and other technologies that were both autonomizing and responsibilizing (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006, p. 91).

Third, distant government is promoting the rescaling of governmental structures, i.e., the inclusion of new actors, mainly international organizations, and private, market-driven stakeholders. This apparent horizontality carries the promise of inclusion, shared responsibility and even representation. However, as Swyngedouw (2005) observes, this idealization is filled with problems and contradictions. Pluralization does not necessarily mean the end of authoritarianism: states can entrench their power while also delegating it. The state’s delegation of power is giving way to the ‘externalization of governance’, by which state functions are privatized and deregulated, the ‘up-scaling of governance’ by which higher-level organizations such as the International Development Bank (IDB) direct national policies, and a ‘down-scaling of governance’ by which local governments and agencies are increasing their functions (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1998). While governmental programs are increasingly crafted by meta-governance agencies (e.g., international organizations), they are implemented by local-level agencies. Paradoxically, this means that local agencies, often advocates of people at a disadvantage, implement empowering strategies that are aligned with neoliberal governmental programs entrenching disadvantage. Furthermore, the participation of new actors can promote: “non-representational forms of autocratic elite technocracy…the consolidation of beyond-the-state arenas of power-based interest intermediation…and grey accountability of hierarchically articulated and non-formalized and procedurally legitimized, associations of governance” (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 2003). In other words, governing at a distance requires both a socially accepted rationality and a new range of quasi-autonomous social
actors who push forward the implementation of the neoliberal program in ways that also benefit them.

Finally, advanced liberal governments are also reflexive in the sense that they “turn the ends of government upon themselves” (Dean, 1999, p. 172). This means that the market logic that underpins governmental strategies is at once the end and the means to implement it. For example, to allow markets to thrive (objective), the state diminishes its intervention and marketizes many sectors of daily life (the means), including those unrelated to the economy (e.g., education, culture and health). Under this rationality, the government is governmentalizing. In other words, it is concerned with how others are governed.

In sum, the implementation of advanced rationalities is underpinned by a value-laden conceptual apparatus, mechanisms to rule at a distance, which are not necessarily more democratic, and increased sophistication in the means and ends of governmental programs.

2.3 Governing the population

In the remainder of this chapter I assemble a bag of theoretical tools to weave together three of the main components of Foucault’s governmentality: knowledge, population and space. The aim of this task is to theoretically demonstrate that their assemblage is needed to understand governmental programs from above and below. In other words, I aim to understand how big (neoliberal) discourses seek to govern the population and to organize space and how in turn, these discourses are appropriated and contested through local practices and everyday operations (De Certeau, 1984). Although Foucault’s work explores the government of populations through different devices, spatial arrangements seem to be present either as metaphors or as backdrops (Huxley, 2007). Further, his work focuses on domination, on the programmer, on the producer of discipline, leaving room to explore how domination and discipline are reworked, reinterpreted and
contested by lay people through everyday practices. These two gaps are explored in this research.

I open the first part of this sub-section with a discussion on the government of populations, I analyze how, according to a neoliberal rationality, the notion of the social is atomizing and giving way to smaller entities of governmental control, i.e., communities. I also discuss how subjects are governed through different power technologies. The theoretical tools in this section will be revisited in the discussion chapter to assess how these technologies were implemented, if at all, in the cases studied.

2.3.1 The social vs the community? Novel ways to govern the population

Paraphrasing Baudrillard, Miller & Rose (2006, p. 85) conclude that prophesizing the ‘death of the social’ is too simplistic to account for the profound transformations it is undergoing in advanced liberalism. Along the same lines, and analyzing an interview with Margaret Thatcher in 1987, Dean (1999) highlights that: “...society is regarded less as a source of needs that are individually distributed and collectively borne and more as a source of energies contained within individuals’ exercise of freedom and self-responsibility” (p. 152). This statement echoes two neoliberal credos: First, if society is no longer conceived as a fount of needs, then the state can retreat from its welfare responsibilities. Second, if society is a ‘source of energies’, then, in order to fulfill their needs, individuals should channel those energies to their advantage. As a result, the ‘death of the social’, understood as a state-managed sector, gives way to atomized, expert, individual and communitarian modes of managing daily life. In this context, the community, as a new sphere to administer the subjects’ existence becomes a medium to govern (Dean, 1999). This is not to say that communities are new (as conceptual entities), but to acknowledge that their use as a technique of government is recent (Miller and Rose, 2006).
In opposition to the one-size fits all project of welfare, communities possess the specificity that the social lacks; they are places of identity and resistance to a homogenizing and distant form of governing. Governing through community entails the task of making evident to individuals where they belong and what is expected from them for the community’s wellbeing: “…it is from one’s community that the guidelines of responsible conduct are derived, and it is through allegiance to community that the obligation to operate within those guidelines is felt” (Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009, p. 658). In many cases, demarcating allegiances needs to be underpinned by the production of cohesive and self-managed communities to which subjects might wish to adhere. To these ends, communities are engineered and produced in the collective imaginary.

**Producing community through engineering and imagineering**

Engineering a community involves different tasks: from ‘creating’ them from scratch to providing them with the tools to function properly, in other words, to produce communities capable of identifying and solving issues, to sustain them through time and to enable them to be ‘self-reliant’ (Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009, p. 663). Imagineering a community means to create an image of the community through strategies such as marketing and physical design among others.

In relation to housing, ‘producing’ communities means that developers must work on the sentiment of belonging so that people identify with and then voluntarily adopt the community’s morals. This is done through marketing and aesthetics (identity, symbols) and also through community development.

Developers rely on community development to foster community attachments, to build a shared history and to produce communities that in a sense market themselves. It may involve organizing events (such as festivities and summer camps), training leaders
and providing services that are not otherwise available. Developers create the spaces, both permanent and temporary, for these interactions to take place. These strategies promote the formation of a shared ethics, lifestyle, interests, aspirations and consumption preferences. After fostering communities of shared interest, agents (e.g., developers, housing administrators, housing agencies) can then govern at a distance with the aid of mechanisms that allow communities to auto-regulate on the basis of moral obligations. The language of morality is aligned with agents’ interests and framed in such a way that communities adopt it for their own benefit:

Not only does this form of power render developers’ interventions unnecessary, but the techniques through which conduct is governed may also be viewed as an expression of the spirit of the community rather than a direct imposition on personal freedom by one’s neighbours…power may be exercised through community in a way that appears benign, and certainly in the interests of those subjected to it (Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009, p. 665).

In sum, the governmental logic that seeks to integrate individuals into a collective social solidarity is transforming and finding in communities the grounds for new forms of government. Hence, communities, within a social context, are nothing more than a ‘continuous regime of authority’ (Dean, 1999, p. 170) albeit more flexible and plural than the ‘social’.

2.3.2 Subjectification

It was from the mid 1980 that the language of neoliberalism --freedom, autonomy and choice -- became dominant, changing how individuals were conceptualized. Rather than social atoms, citizens became autonomous and free actors whose actions needed to be guided, not controlled:
Citizenship was to be active and individualistic rather than passive and dependent. The political subject was to be an individual whose citizenship was manifested through the free exercise of personal choice amongst a variety of options...Programmes of government were to be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they enhanced that choice (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 48).

In other words, the language of neoliberalism was implemented through advanced liberal programs seeking to govern intermediate agents and subjects at a distance by directing their choices. This directive process has been called subjectification (see for example Miller & Rose, 2008; Dean, 1999; Huxley, 2007).

Through subjectification, governmental programs work in between the subjection of individuals and their subjectivity in order to ‘arm’ them to be masters of themselves in line with governmental objectives (Cruikshank, 1993; Chipkin, 2003). Subjectification works through rather than against subjects so as to render them governable on the one hand and self-reliant on the other (McKee, 2011).

Under liberalism, subjects are expected to self-manage, to assume the responsibility of navigating the system and making free decisions to maximize their benefits. Neoliberalism exacerbates and commodifies these practices to the point of touching upon all aspects of life. As Miller & Rose (2006, p. 214) put it:

Hence the problem [of government] is to find means by which individuals may be made responsible through their individual choices for themselves and those to whom they owe allegiance, through the shaping of a lifestyle according to grammars of living that are widely disseminated, yet do not depend on political calculations and strategies for their rationales or their techniques.

In other words, through subjectification, individuals are trained to make the best possible choices informed by marketing and consumption habits. These grammars of living are disseminated through different mechanisms. In addition to marketing, empowerment and training are also technologies that contribute to the subjectification of individuals.
Additionally, etho-power mechanisms allow governmental agents to govern individuals ethically through the morals not of societies as in the welfare state but of narrower communities. According to this logic, complying with community morals becomes fulfilling for subjects. In other words, etho-power entails not the imposition of values but the operationalization of technologies that facilitate individuals' interiorization of ethical principles aligned with larger socio-economic programs to govern.

**Governing at a distance with an army of non-state actors**

The implementation of governmental programs brings about a major shift in the way individuals are conceived: from beneficiaries of welfare to free consumers of marketized services. This shift changes, on the one hand, the role of actors involved and, on the other hand, the rapport between them. That is to say, while the state retreats, it needs an army of non- or quasi-state actors to intermediate between subjects’ political, social and market relations. As marshals of this army, experts (e.g., technocrats, private consultants) are located in a privileged position between subjects and authorities. They translate both political programs and subjects’ daily concerns into the language of science (i.e., of management or accounting) (Dean, 1999). Expert knowledge appeals to objectivity and to tangible and measurable results. Therefore, rationalization based on expert knowledge can be easily moved away from the realm of politics to that of scientific objectivity and as such, normalized and freely adopted by subjects. In addition to knowledge production, experts also work closely with subjects, in order to help them integrate and adopt the idiom of governmentality. In other words, experts act both as consultants and as guides, teaching subjects how to live better and empowering communities to self-realize.

In a complex network of subjects, agents and experts, the role of government is to build and coordinate networks across different actors (Cruikshank, 1993). From this
standpoint, power is relational, constantly negotiated and contingent upon specific configurations of actors at particular times and spaces. These relations are based on common interests actors negotiate and adopt if they align with their own strategies:

> Entities and agents within governmental networks are not faithful relays, mere creatures of a controller situated in some central hub. They utilize and deploy whatever resources they have for their own purposes, and the extent to which they carry out the will of another is always conditional on the particular balance of force, energy and meaning at any time and at any point (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 70).

Subjects are not passive reproducers of imposed programs. They adopt values and reproduce rationalities if they perceive these to play to their advantage: “When each can translate the values of others into its own terms, such that they provide norms and standards for their own ambitions, judgments and conduct, a network has been composed that enables rule ‘at a distance’” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 65).

Neoliberal governmentality deals with the task of governing subjects in ways that leave their individual freedom and responsibility intact. Ruling at a distance thus entails the capacity to guide subjects’ behavior by aligning their values and desires with governmental programs. The tools to operationalize programs are called governmental technologies.

### 2.3.3 Governmental technologies

In his 1982 lecture in Stanford, Foucault defined technology as a tool rooted in a practice. Using a genealogical approach, he identified five types of technologies (Castro, 2010, p. 37): 1) production technologies, which make it possible to “transform or manipulate things”, such as the wheel, the motor, or the hydraulic dam; 2) signification technologies, which provide signification to social practices; 3) power technologies, which seek to control individuals through domination, based on rational calculation (e.g., torture, public executions and forced labor); 4) technologies of the self, which allow individuals to
govern themselves; and 5) governmental technologies, which act at the intersection of domination and technologies of the self. Governmental technologies differ from domination in that they are not compulsory; rather, they direct the conduct of others (to conduct conduct indirectly) by inviting subjects to embrace domination objectives as their own. They allow individuals to define their own objectives and govern themselves by working at the intersection of subjection and subjectification (Castro, 2010). The main difference between governmental and self-technologies is that the first are based on consent and the second, on decision. Governmental technologies focus on setting the conditions to allow for consent to be achieved. These conditions rely on the maintenance of situations of inequality, unquestioned by governed and governors through different strategies: manipulating rationalities (e.g., crafting reality through knowledge production), limiting subjects’ options, or playing with subjects’ aspirations, believes and desires (Castro, 2010).

**Governmental technologies: controlling agents and affiliating subjects**

Governmental technologies render programs to govern operable. These technologies assemble a wide range of tools for their implementation, such as pieces of legislation, contracts, covenants, institutions and spatial arrangements, among others. They are put in place to guide subjects’ conduct and to rule at a distance by setting the conditions for governmental objectives to be met without direct or coercive action. Therefore, these technologies are implemented upon: 1) agents acting as intermediaries as well as over 2) populations organized in smaller communities.

1) Technologies of power used to control intermediaries

The strengthened power that experts gain either as knowledge producers or as intermediaries, and the proliferation of quasi and non-governmental agencies in charge of many formerly state functions, have promoted the diversification of the governmental
technologies used (from above) to control experts’ activities (at a distance). Experts can be problematic for governments if they build selected groups of knowledge and power-holding. Therefore, through technologies of performance such as benchmarking, evaluation and auditing, experts and agencies can be held accountable and programs can be evaluated (Dean, 1999). In fact, these technologies are not only used with entities outside of the state but also with experts within the state apparatus such as local authorities, which therefore gain increased power (Dean, 1999). These techniques provide experts with a bounded freedom to exercise their profession and to direct how entities organize and provide services (Miller & Rose, 2006).

2) Technologies of power used to control communities

The technologies employed to govern subjects through community engage with a politics of inclusion, by which individuals identify their allegiances (and other are excluded) and abide by a moral code of conduct guiding their behavior. The politics of inclusion tends to produce, in Dean’s (1999) terms, *active citizens* and *targeted populations* --or to use the terms preferred by Miller & Rose (2006) *affiliated* and *marginalized populations*. Active citizens are those who act according to the codes of their own community and who carve their way through an individualized economic system. Targeted populations are those unable to self-manage and hence to fit into any particular community. Different governmental strategies are commonly employed for each group. Strategies to control active citizens at a distance (such as counseling and training) help to encourage subjects to act responsibly in accordance with specific values. Strategies of empowerment, control and reformation (i.e., that seek to change behavior through imposing means such as institutionalization) are the most commonly applied by governmental agents to targeted populations. This classification does not pretend to obscure the complexity of shifting subject positions or to assume that certain technologies are applied only to specific
groups. However, it is useful to understand different governmental approaches to affiliate different populations by means of their own agency.

2.3.4 Technologies of citizenship

Working through the agency of individuals entails reinforcing their sense of autonomous responsibility to ‘produce’ governable subjects that act in accordance with desired ethics (Dean, 1999; Chipkin, 2003).

Cruikshank (1993) refers to the technologies employed to link the subjectivity of individuals with their subjection as technologies of citizenship: “technologies of citizenship are the means by which government works through rather than simply against the subjectivities of the poor” (Cruikshank, 1993, p. 33). These technologies reinforce individuals’ sense of autonomous responsibility through different but interlinked means. Examples of these means are community and contractual governance, participation and empowerment (Nethercote, 2015; Cruikshank, 1993).

Community governance: technologies of agency and commodification of identities

Community governance entails, on the one hand, working on individuals to reinforce their sense of autonomous responsibility (also referred to by Dean, 1999 as technologies of agency) but, on the other, working on engineering and imagineering communities so that individuals build identities based on shared meanings and interests circumscribed to a narrow group. Through marketing and its devices (such as consumer preference research or product image and marketing discourse), projects to govern communities use technologies of commodification of identities to direct subjects’ consumption: “Design, marketing and image construction play a vital role in the transfiguring of goods into desires and vice versa, imbuing each commodity with a ‘personal’ meaning…” (Miller & Rose, 2006, p. 49). This commodification of identities
affects not only products but also social services, public \textit{equipamiento}, housing and lifestyles in general.

Community governance does not, therefore, necessarily appeal to communitarian values of self-help and mutual support, but to shared commodified identities and consumption habits. Maintaining a lifestyle in accordance with these shared identities is, therefore, at the core of the morals guiding individuals’ behavior within a given community.

\textbf{Contractual governance: rules and regulations as governmental technologies}

Complementing tacit codes of moral behavior, contractual governance is based on regulations and contracts that ‘guide’ subjects behavior more directly: subjects are obliged to conduct themselves in specific ways by means of legally enforceable rules and regulations.

In public housing in Mexico, for example, developers require purchasers of a new house to agree to specific regulations. Regulations restrict residents’ behavior in both private and public space in the ‘interest of the community’. These rules seek to promote a community ethic that can be enforced but that is intended to be interiorized by residents. This ethic praises the development’s order and pride and encourages people to comply voluntarily with the standards and to act according to community values for the benefit of all. The success of such a technology can be claimed when residents voluntarily adopt these norms and perceive them as desirable and not as restraining the liberties of homeownership (Cheshire, Rosenblatt, Lawrence & Walters, 2009).

\textbf{Participation as a technology to shape agency}

Technologies of citizenship also refer to devices or mechanisms that promote the creation of [controlled] spaces of participation through which individuals are given a voice and a space to inhabit: “These technologies of citizenship engage us as active and free citizens, as informed and responsible consumers, as members of self-managing
communities and organizations, as actors in democratizing social movements, and as agents capable of taking control of our own risks” (Dean, 1999, p. 168). These technologies, as Dean rightly points out, become devices that purposely conduct participation and try to shape agency in particular ways. They seek not to repress resistance but to keep it within the limits of bounded and controllable negotiations.

**Empowerment as a technology to affiliate targeted populations**

Through different but interrelated means, technologies of citizenship seek to align targeted populations with the subjectivity of civilized subjects in a way that they can contribute to their own wellbeing. However, governing targeted populations presents additional challenges since it is not only their needs that need to be managed but also their ability to affiliate. To these ends, targeted populations need to be defined and engineered as a group with graspable needs. Subsequently, they need to be transformed from consumers of state services to self-providers of increasingly market-oriented services. Finally, governmental agents need to create networks of actors who mutually support each other (Cruikshank, 1993).

Transforming consumers into self-providers requires training and empowering targeted populations. Empowerment is at the core of advanced liberal strategies to ‘affiliate’ marginal subjects into the neoliberal governmentality of rule. Cruikshank (1993, p. 35) defines empowerment as a technique that works through the poor’s subjectivities by using their own motivations to get them to act upon themselves (i.e., to become “self-sufficient, active, productive and participatory citizens”) and upon others (i.e., to resist and manifest their discontent).

Through empowerment, subjects are given the tools to become integrated and self-reliant agents within bounds. To be empowered, subjects need to be aware of their disempowerment, understand why they are disempowered and act to change this
condition. Cruikshank (1993, p. 35) posits that the logic of empowerment relies on four aspects: 1) it is supported by expertise (albeit a constantly contested one); 2) it involves the “democratically unaccountable exercise of power” (i.e., it stems from top-down initiatives to empower others); 3) it relies on the knowledge of those to be empowered; and 4) it uses both “voluntary and coercive” power.

In this context, the implementation of a governmental program to produce specific subjectivities through processes such as empowerment is contingent on different but interlinked means of exercising coercive and voluntary power. Dean (1999, p. 71) asserts that “governing often concerns the formation of the subjectivities through which it can work”. Technologies such as empowerment help to shape subjectivities with the consent and active participation of subjects. These technologies of subjectivity rely on the promotion of specific ethics, norms and values individuals can adopt, reproduce and use to judge their own behavior (and that of others). There is, however, a delicate balance between subjectivity and subjection, between helping the poor and helping them to help themselves (Cruikshank, 1993).

### 2.4 Knowledge, power and space

[Power and knowledge directly imply one another...there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge (Foucault 1979, p. 27)]

Engineering communities, training and empowering subjects, helping the poor to help themselves and governing space all require knowledge. The programmer must be able to grasp and measure not only communities’ needs, but also their subjectivities, in such a way that governmental programs can work through them. Subjectivities and needs can, however, also be tailored and even produced through knowledge. In other words, knowledge can be used in two ways: 1) to understand reality and 2) to produce reality (i.e.,
bend, stretch, adapt and transform, among others). In relation to the former, Miller & Rose (2008, p. 31) assert that:

The government of a population, a national economy, an enterprise, a family, a child or even oneself becomes possible only through discursive mechanisms that represent the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with its own limits and characteristics, and whose component parts are linked together in some more or less systematic manner.

The authors argue that having information about subjects and spaces makes it possible to govern them. The colonies, for example, could be governed at a distance because of a range of representational technologies (such as maps) that allowed the colonizers to grasp a foreign reality and calculate how best to govern it. Such technologies made it possible to “…link calculations at one place with action at another…” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 34).

Discursive mechanisms do not, however, always depend on reality to represent that which they seek to govern; power itself can produce this reality. Power can validate knowledge, and through knowledge populations and places are rendered governable:

Power defines what counts as knowledge, what kind of interpretation attains authority as the dominant interpretation. Power structures the knowledge which supports its purposes, while it ignores or suppresses that knowledge which does not serve it (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 226).

In a study of a planning process in Denmark, Flyvbjerg (1998, p. 228) demonstrated how empowered actors were able to advance their own rationalities and produce ad hoc knowledge -- not only interpretative frameworks but “concrete physical, economic, ecological and social realities” to support their strategies. He also found that, as power increased, the need to understand reality decreased because reality could be produced at will. Power therefore is capable of setting the mechanisms to produce the
frameworks to measure and understand reality, validate and even produce knowledge and use it to intervene. In other words, these mechanisms, or *intellectual technologies* operationalize knowledge (Miller & Rose, 2008).

Rationalization lies at the core of intellectual technologies to veil power behind discursive ‘rational’ mechanisms. Rationalization is a context-dependent, backstage lucubration, concealing vested interests behind a rational disguise. This technology is a luxury that those with power can exert (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Disadvantaged groups typically lack the means to challenge top-down rationalizations and to produce their own alternative rationalizations to gain power.

In a context of stable (albeit not necessarily equitable) relations, rationalization is a strong weapon that helps to advance ‘democratic’ projects. When there is power confrontation, however, rationality and knowledge yield to disciplinary power.

In sum, rationality and power cannot be disentangled: “Power defines what counts as knowledge, what kind of interpretation attains authority as the dominant interpretation. Power structures the knowledge which supports its purposes, while it ignores or suppresses that knowledge which does not serve it” (Flyvbjerg 1998, p. 226). Flyvbjerg asserts that Bacon’s famous tenet ‘knowledge is power’ should better be read inversely: “power is knowledge”.

The power/knowledge relationship is grounded in space. In Foucault’s (2000, p. 69) words: “Once knowledge can be analyzed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power”.

Space is not, however, a mere context or background to this relationship; it can both support the exertion of power and contain the seeds of its subversion.
2.5 Governing space

Governmentality is inherently spatial both in the spaces it creates and in the logics it employs in its subjectification project (Huxley, 2007). Building upon existing literature, this section addresses the under-researched connection between spatial rationalities, the production of the subject and the production of space by the subject. Specifically, I engage with authors (such as Huxley, 2007; Rabinow, 1982; Merry, 2001) who seek: 1) to understand the spatial rationalities behind governmental programs; 2) to unveil governmental schemes and analyze the causalities attributed to space planning, management and design serving larger governmental goals and 3) to unearth different spatial technologies to control space in specific contexts.

2.51 Foucault and space

In an interview with Rabinow (1982, p. 20) Foucault argued that: “…Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; Space is fundamental in any exercise of power”. In “Of other spaces”, Foucault (1986, p. 22) states that we are in the era of space, an era in which space can no longer be detached from time: “The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed”.

Whereas, according to Rabinow (1982, p. 68), the “philosophy of the subject” asked questions focusing on time, Foucault took a different approach. According to Huxley (2008, p. 1636), “Foucault wishes to disassociate the idea of the subject from humanist philosophies that postulate transcendental human will and interaction as the source of historical change and social relations”. Instead, Foucault analyzes place and space at the crossroad of subjectification, time and power. Instead of writing a history of space, Foucault “spatialized history” (Elden, 2002, p. 153).
As a philosopher, Foucault did not develop a fully fleshed theory of space, but space was nonetheless central to his study of power: “…without prompting, he would infuse a spatial politics into these writings that ranged from ‘the great strategies of geopolitics’ played out on a global scale to the ‘little tactics of the habitat’, his own preferred milieu” (Soja, 1996, p. 148). Despite this, his work has been subject to different criticisms: Harvey (2007a, p. 42) for example, argues that Foucault deploys a “Kantian spatial rigidity”, Thrift (2007) posits that Foucault lacks spatial theoretical references and Huxley (2007) that he often uses space only as a metaphor. Foucault’s lack of explicit spatialisation of his theories, “obscured the political concreteness of social spatiality”, according to Lefebvre (in Soja, 1996, p. 146).

Additionally, authors criticize Foucault’s most explicit focus on domination; hence undermining people’s ‘lived experiences’ (Huxley, 2007) and failing to bridge theory and reality (Lefebvre, 1991). Soja (1996, p.147) states that he “…rarely translated his spatial politics into clearly defined programs for social action [although] a comprehensive and critical understanding of spatiality was at the center of all his writings…”.

Despite these criticisms, Foucault’s writings give planners, geographers and designers a set of tools to understand the intersections between space, power and knowledge (Crampton & Elden, 2007). Even if he wrote few pieces explicitly addressing space (such as ‘Space, Knowledge, Power’, ‘Questions on Geography’ and ‘Of Other Spaces’: Elden, 2002), he provided a wealth of spatial references in his work on sexuality, imprisonment and madness, among others.

Foucault’s spatialized history is not prescriptive; rather, it provides the tools for an analysis in which space plays an important role but is nonetheless only one among many governmental components (Richardson, 1996; Elden, 2002). In the panopticon, for example, power is directly related to the architecture of institutions. However, power also goes beyond institutions and manifests at a much finer grain, through individuals and other
agents and apparatuses supporting the state (such as markets) (Foucault, 2000): “it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to understand” (Foucault 1984 in Crampton & Elden, 2007, p.9).

Foucault used space as an analytical and political tool (one amongst many) to understand the intersections between knowledge and power (Rabinow, 1982; Soja, 1996). From this perspective, spatial arrangements, architectural and urban configurations are important components of governmental programs at different points in time (Rabinow, 1982). However, these programs are rarely fully implemented. Rather, they constitute a collection of techniques working towards an objective that, when applied, encounter conflict and parallel strategies of resistance:

Foucault’s mappings are far from totalizing, perhaps best seen as sketch maps, approximations toward, signposts. They highlight key features, outline contours, and provide an orientation. Far from being two dimensional, these maps work with both space and time, but are not Cartesian in their abstraction; rather, they work on the level of everyday action (Elden, 2002, p. 115).

In sum, even if he did not fully develop a theorization of space, Foucault brought space to bear in a context where time reigned. Further, his approach provides the analytical tools to understand how space, power and knowledge interact. This work seeks to unearth some of the tools that geographers, planners and designers have developed after Foucault, with the aim of bridging the theory and practice of governmental programs and everyday practices.

2.5.2 Spatial governmentality

“…questions of space are inherently political…politics is inherently spatial…” (Elden, 2002, p. 151).
The production and control of space are part and parcel of the rationality of government. Spatial mechanisms, however, differ substantially from (but are also complemented by) technologies of subjectification, mainly insofar as they target territories and through these the conduct of subjects.

Spatial governmentalities (Merry, 2001) materialize, through policy, planning, architecture and urban design, governmental programs. In other words, they embody in space ways to govern, seeking to structure the lives of subjects (Miller & Rose, 2008) and as a result, play an active role in the project of subjectification:

[S]paces can be delineated for various purposes: to produce grids of classification, order and discipline; but equally to foster particular kinds of environmental qualities (cleanliness, beauty); or to concentrate or fragment the effects of broader social processes found to be present in particular localities (social progress/regress) (Osborne & Rose, 2004; in Huxley, 2007, p. 195).

Governmental rationalities that use space as a technology of government assume that space can help in conducting the subject’s conduct in particular ways space (environmental causality), and as such seek to materialize moral or ethical values in spatial arrangements. Environmental causality supposes that through space behavior can be guided (Huxley, 2008). Ordered spaces, for example, are expected to indoctrinate subjects (Merry, 2001).

Foucault analyzed in depth how architectural and spatial arrangements aid in disciplining inmates, in governing sexual behavior and in (self-) controlling the mentally ill (Elden, 2001). Based on the tools he provided, authors have analyzed examples of environmental causalities in cases that range from the geometric and hierarchical principles of new town planning in the classical age (Rabinow, 1982), to the ergonomics structuring spatial relations between humans and objects in the post-war era (Harwood, 2012) and the delimitation of alcohol-free zones in contemporary Australia (Merry, 2001).
In spite of the disparate examples, the rationalities underpinning spatial governmentality studies can nonetheless be seen to have four main characteristics in common; All of them: 1) assume that urban and architectural forms, structures and limits affect behavior; 2) use complementary, non-spatial, devices in addition to spatial technologies to govern subjects, such as rules and regulations, policing and monitoring; 3) use space to discipline subjects albeit not in a coercive but a preventive way; through spatial devices, risks are foreseen and prevented by “displacing offensive activities” and conducting the conduct towards desired objectives, such as alcohol-free zones (Merry, 2001, p. 19); and 4) use strategies that further entrench inequalities, such as erasing undesirable subjects from sight, imposing lifestyles, and separating land uses in the name of order. These strategies, however, seldom deal with the root cause of inequality but seek to makeup its effects.

This is why understanding the rationalities underpinning spatial technologies is central. Teasing out these rationalities helps us to understand how, with similar principles, space has been produced and used as a governmental tool, to punish, discipline and govern populations (Merry, 2001). In the context of advanced liberalism, governing assumes that subjects are manipulable individuals rather than rational choice-makers. In the neoliberal context, this manipulation is generally conducted towards consumption and individualism, given that the private sector increasingly controls the production of space (Merry, 2001).

The commonalities across cases identified in this section help us to tease out the underlying logics of practices that seek to control the environment with governmental aims across time. These commonalities were defined by Foucault as diagrams.

2.5.3 Spatial diagrams

Spatial rationalities use space for particular ends; Foucault called these rationalities diagrams: “…distillations of underlying logics of multiple and dispersed practices for the
conduct of conducts” (Huxley, 2007, p. 194). Diagrams are based on environmental causalities (Huxley, 2006) that require the identification of problematic spaces of intervention and knowledge of what needs to be ‘healed’, ordered or repaired and of the tools needed to intervene. Diagrams then, direct our attention to the logics that frame what is problematic and to the best possible ways to intervene.

Huxley (2007) identifies three diagrams that, without being exhaustive, provide rich examples to understand the spatial rationalities behind urban design, planning and policy: 1) dispositional; 2) generative; and 3) vitalist.

1) The dispositional diagram is based upon the principle that the physical dimension of space (structure, hierarchy) supports moral values (e.g., order, efficiency, utility and discipline). In other words, that spatial layouts encourage specific types of interactions and behaviors, all of these underpinned by specific societal values. For example, formal order and visibility are used against miasma, illness and urban chaos. These technologies, largely implemented by urban designers, align well with the neoliberal project since they enable and suggest instead of controlling behavior. However, they are rarely implemented independently; complementary technologies such as regulations and surveillance are used in parallel.

2) Generative spatial rationalities aim to ‘generate’ spaces conducive to specific behaviors. This diagram targets problematic areas for specific reforms but in terms not of spatial disposition but of the technologies needed to promote the desired environment. For example, hygienic environments are expected to promote moral behaviors through cleanliness, natural light and ventilation, and sanitation. Hence, generative rationalities of hygiene call for technologies of sanitation (such as sewerage, garbage disposal and water treatment) in addition to constant inspection with the aim of simultaneously sanitizing behavior (Huxley, 2006).
3) **Vitalist spatial rationalities** place human evolution at the core of the creation of environments that foster “urban reform and revitalization” (Huxley, 2006, p. 782). A vitalist spatial rationality “...operates with broader goals, and seeks to create a generalized environment in which biological, social and mental progressive evolution can unfold” (Huxley, 2006, p. 780). The notion of development, for example, underpins theoretical constructs that aid in elaborating policies to guide societies (mainly in developing countries) to higher stages of progress. Built within this notion is the image of the ‘good’ society and the ‘progressive’ space that can promote development as desired (Chipkin, 2003, p. 65).

Huxley’s diagrams are useful heuristic devices to understand idealized principles to implement governmental programs from particular logics. While the dispositional diagram is often used by designers, planners are concerned with creating environments conducive to efficiency and policy makers aspire to larger goals. This does not mean, however, that diagrams are exclusive to each of these practices of the production of space. The spatial rationalities presented in these diagrams are applicable at different scales (i.e., from a building to a region) and are often used in conjunction. Additionally, these spatial diagrams depend on other technologies to implement governmental programs (e.g., institutions and regulations). Finally, it is also important to highlight that these models are seldom fully implemented; rather, they are ‘aspirations’ constantly tested against reality (Huxley, 2006). If reality is not fit for their implementation, then governmental programs will also try to produce and tailor reality. Going back to the notion of development, for example, when this abstract conception of the ‘evolved’ society is built into policy, its implementation not only presents many challenges, but also needs to produce spaces, subjects and environments aligned with its own logics (e.g., to produce civilized, responsible citizens), in order then to be able to implement its strategies (Chipkin, 2003).
Finally, it is important to mention that even when diagrams are applied to specific historical contexts, a genealogy of urban spaces helps us identify how their principles spill over different periods in time, scales and geographical locations. To illustrate this, we will turn to Rabinow’s (1982) analysis of governmental schemes in Europe.

### 2.5.4 Schemes of government

In his analyses of urban plans, Foucault’s 1978 lecture at the Collège de France teased out three governmental ‘schemes’, each related to the control of different spatial units: 1) Under the **sovereign scheme**, the relations between the political, the economic and the social are controlled through territory; 2) Under the **disciplinary scheme**, the bodies of individuals were governed; and lastly 3) **bio-power schemes** seek to govern the population (Rabinow 1982). Rabinow analyzed the spatial configurations of these schemes through three examples: Le Maître’s treatise called La Métropolitée (1682), the new town of Richelieu and eighteenth-century Nantes.

Le Maître’s treatise grounds activities related to capital as well as to power in a centralized space (Rabinow 1982). These activities were functionally laid out in a geometrical plan ordering space. This geometrical order took the shape of a perfect circle with an evident power center.

Richelieu, a new town built in France in the classical age, exemplifies the role that urban design and architecture played in the discipline of bodies (Rabinow, 1982). This form of control is not the carceral type; instead, it is composed of a multitude of institutions exerting a diffused disciplinary power. This new town was projected for a real historical and spatial context, not an utopist one: “Richelieu was conceived as a self-enclosed space within which a hierarchical, visible and functional order could be established” (p. 273). Several elements are salient in Richelieu: its geometrical shape ordering space and facilitating the functional flow of goods and services; its urban structure, hierarchically
laying out main streets for the most powerful and rich; the housing typologies, clearly
demarcating wealth differences and building heights, sizes, materials and shapes, all
conceived to preserve a homogeneous image; and finally, the location of the Cardinal’s
castle, in a position that facilitates the exertion of tight control over the town. All of these
elements helped the Cardinal in controlling his rich counselors. However, as Foucault
posits, such technologies are most commonly practiced over the poor (Rabinow, 1982). In
the case of social housing, for example, spatial arrangements such as housing layout,
typology and location contribute to exert power over residents, albeit not of the dominant
type but rather of a disciplinary type that seeks to align residents with civilizing,
governmental objectives.

In Nantes, it was not the domination over the territory nor the disciplinary control
over subjects that concerned planners in a period of growing trade and commercial
activity; rather, the main concern was to control the population and the city’s systems and
flows to facilitate their governance. Unlike Richelieu, Nantes’ planners were faced with the
challenge of ‘ordering’ an existing space in such a way that it could be used to govern and
control the population. Space was not neutral; it carried a baggage of pre-existing relations
that needed to be first understood and then managed. In this context, knowledge was
central to understand and assess the population and the context, to plan for their future
and assess their constant changes: “The combination of empirical social studies and
calculated efforts to plan for future needs became the task of a particular spatial inscription
of power and knowledge” (Rabinow, 1982, p. 276). In addition to the production of the
knowledge needed to govern, this case shows the diffusion of power among merchants
and business owners interested in planning and producing a space favorable to
commercial activities. As a result, the sovereign lost their totalizing power to produce and
implement a spatial rationality: “The problem has shifted from the correct ordering of space
to the regulation of a milieu…” (Rabinow, 1982, p. 277).
In sum, these three cases show how power and space cannot be disentangled and how knowledge is used to control both subjects and space. Also, as we move towards biopower, power shifts from domination to governmentality and as a result the implementation of technologies of government also change, from direct intervention to control at a distance.

Huxley’s diagrams or rationalities of government were implemented in all three governmental schemes albeit in particular ways. In Le Maître’s treatise geometry and centrality are basic principles to ground capital in the territory. In Richelieu, the hierarchical structure of streets and the spatial arrangement of the housing and main power elements (i.e., those related to both capital and the sovereign) were implemented to discipline subjects. Finally, the location of different land uses and pieces of infrastructure helped different powers (i.e., private and public) govern the population of Nantes. In addition to spatial disposition, other mechanisms, such as built forms, types of land uses and the implementation of infrastructure contributed, in all three cases, to generate a desired environment. In Le Maître, this generative environment deployed the power of capital; in Richelieu, it showcased the power of a sovereign and in Nantes this environment appealed to sanitation and efficiency. Finally, in all three cases a vitalist rationality framing what needed to be understood as order, health, functionality and civility, was materialized in urban spaces, through design, plans and policies.

From these cases, a fourth diagram needs to be added to Huxley’s classification: the material diagram. The materiality of space (i.e., shape, size, materials, textures, colors) matters. Nevertheless, the literature on spatial governmentality and housing has given reduced attention to the issue, granting materiality a symbolic function (Power, 2015): as an aesthetic reflection of middle-class values or an alternative measure of neighbors’ self-management and responsibility, specifically related to maintenance and overall image and preservation (see section 2.1.2).
Materiality shapes how people live. Emotions, social distances, ways of conducting certain activities are all influenced by the materiality of a place as much as this is socially shaped in return. The dispositional diagram addresses the complex interplay between forms of government and different formal characteristics of space in only a limited fashion and as such needs to be complemented with the materiality diagram.

The diagrams and governmental schemes here presented make use of different spatial technologies to apply specific rationalities to govern territory, bodies and populations. As mentioned previously, these are used in conjunction with other technologies of power and knowledge production that seek to conduct the conduct of individuals.

2.5.5 Spatial technologies of power

Spatial technologies are devices that translate diagrams (or spatial rationalities) into governmental schemes. These technologies seek to control subjects and populations through spatial arrangements. Managing space, however, requires the use of different strategies such as confinement and separation, order, commodification and appropriation. Elden (2002) asserts that, to implement these strategies, two mechanisms persist from the classical ages: classification and observation. These two mechanisms were (and still are) materialized in geometry, spatial layout, delimitation and separation. This materialization is fostered through policy, planning and urban design; this is why these are essential components of any governmental regime; they provide the tools to “…establish military control, regulate activities, separate populations, and establish a comprehensive order, on both an aesthetic and political level” (Rabinow, 1982, p. 267).

In the next section, I analyze some examples that, without being exhaustive, provide clues to understand some of the spatial technologies of government used by different actors in the context of this research.
**Controlling space through segregatory practices**

The mechanics of spatial technologies to separate populations act mainly in two ways: by excluding and confining populations to specific, designed spaces or by excluding or displacing undesirable populations from specific spaces. They respond mainly to dispositional rationalities that attribute a moral order to space and populations.

In his work, Foucault analyzed several spaces of exclusion such as the prison, the asylum, and the hospital. In these spaces, the poor and the mentally and morally ill were confined to controlled spaces where physical structures facilitated their surveillance and the treatment of their ‘deviations’. However, these spaces not only segregated but also organized deviant populations according to shared social morals (Elden, 2002). While the classical age produced spaces that punished these populations, the liberal age sought to create a flavor of freedom in spaces of ‘retreat’ where individuals could move freely (within walls) and be rewarded for good behavior:

> For Foucault what this initiates is a system of ‘moral imprisonment’, with the individual disciplining himself and subject to the judgment of the normalizing gaze, ‘more genuinely confined than he could have been in a dungeon and chains, a prisoner of nothing but himself’ (Foucault, in Elden, 2002, p. 131).

The normalizing gaze, offering the threat of punishment, is key to the subjects’ moral imprisonment, pushing (albeit not in a coercive way) them to behave in desired ways.

At an urban scale, the relegation of the poor to massive, peripheral, social housing dormitory estates also exemplifies exclusionary practices that, on the one hand, segregate homogeneously impoverished populations, and on the other, incorporate them into a neoliberal system of mortgages and responsible citizenship self-managed through community. Furthermore, these spaces of exclusion are increasingly governed by the
logics of the market, through housing policies that help developers bust their profits by building on cheap land in contrast with previous decades when the state exerted a closer control over housing development. As a corollary, market mechanisms such as the privatization of space production reinforce exclusion.

Controlling spaces also entails mechanisms of exclusion whereby undesirable behaviors and hence populations are removed from specific spaces. Through the analysis of alcohol-free zones in Australia, Merry (2001) identifies how different strategies are used to remove problematic populations from sight—most commonly from spaces of consumption. This is done with the aid of technologies such as: delimitation of special, problem-free zones, policing and restrictive norms over the use of space. These spatial technologies seek to facilitate the government of populations:

Spatial forms of regulation focus on concealing or displacing offensive activities rather than eliminating them. Their target is a population rather than individuals. They produce social order by creating zones whose denizens are shielded from witnessing socially undesirable behavior (p. 17).

Spatial regulations benefit those allowed to use the space by excluding the problematic. As a result, these strategies hide the problem instead of tackling its causes. In other words, they seek not to address the needs of populations deemed problematic, but to erase them from sight.

**Commodifying space**

In addition to restrictive norms regulating the use of space, the commodification of spatial practices contributes to the exclusion of particular populations (most commonly the poor), from using and producing space. Harvey’s (2006) analysis of Paris in the 1850s exemplifies how Haussmann’s politically charged urban transformations promoted an environment prone to consumption, through the reorganization of the public space and the use of both oppressive and regulatory strategies to succeed. Haussmann’s transformation
of the city facilitated the conquest of central public spaces by the elites. The opening of boulevards where the thriving bourgeoisie installed its commercial activities produced spaces of consumption where the public and the private mingled. The lack of clear distinction between private and public space facilitated the control of public space and capital accumulation at the expense of the satisfaction of basic needs and quality of life for those who could not consume. The commodification of space depoliticizes its appropriation under mainstreamed practices of passive consumption. It also promotes implicit and explicit codes of conduct, based on middle-class values of order and ‘good’ behavior. These codes are enforced through policing and surveillance both by authorities and by consumers (Harvey, 2006). In sum, the commodification of space, underpinned by physical urban transformations, reduces the opportunities available to non-consumerist groups to produce space: “Once the city is imagined by capital…it can then only be consumed passively, rather than actively created by the populace at large through political participation” (Harvey, 2006, p. 6).

**Appropriating space**

Participation in the production of commodified and strongly controlled and designed spaces is claimed through acts of contestation or appropriation. However, these acts are not always as visible as public demonstrations, strikes or spatial appropriations. Instead, they are also latent and ritual (Low, 2000). Latent contestation manifests in symbolic acts of daily struggle, such as spatial encroachment, appropriation, trickery, squatting, acts of ‘misbehavior’ and extra-legal activities. This type of contestation responds to issues of inadequate space design and the need for people to transform their built environments to meet their needs. Finally, ritual protest relates to the temporary appropriation of space, masking contestation with cultural customs, such as fiestas and carnivals.
The appropriation of space props open the gaps that the spatial rationalities behind policy, planning and design produce when they are implemented. More often than not, programs fail, face contestation and rejection or get thwarted. An ‘ordered’ space is not free from ‘disorderly’ everyday practices, nor will it necessarily produce obedient subjects. However, the failure of governmental programs does not mean they have no effect or that they will be abandoned. Instead, when spatial rationalities fail, new governmental technologies are recast, adapted, reinvented and retested (Huxley, 2008).

2.6 Everyday practices

Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power (Foucault, 1978, p. 95).

Power is in constant negotiation. In other words, power can be best understood if we think of levels of domination that shift over the course of political processes, according to agents’ resources at particular moments in time. This game is not, however, passively played by subjects according to imposed rules. Through different means, subjects resist, adapt, and selectively reproduce governmental programs:

[Ent]ities and agents within governmental networks are not faithful relays, mere creatures of a controller situated in some central hub. They utilize and deploy whatever resources they have for their own purposes, and the extent to which they carry out the will of another is always conditional on the particular balance of force, energy and meaning at any time and at any point. Each actor, each locale, is the point of intersection between forces, and hence a point of potential resistance to any one way of thinking and acting, or a point of organization and promulgation of a different or oppositional programme (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 70).

Through his work on governmentality, Foucault sought to understand two main things: how individuals self-govern and what resources allow them to resist subjection (Thompson, 2003, p. 114). Foucault asserted that resistance is never external to power;
however, the very conception of resistance and its forms needs to be revisited in order to understand subjects’ power resources and to shift the focus of study from dominant forms of power to daily and modest but also prevalent forms of resistance.

This section unearths different mechanisms subjects use to resist power but focuses mainly on the tactics lay people employ to fill the gaps and address the paradoxes created by the implementation of governmental programs. The exertion of power is constantly diverted, thwarted, turned around and even neutralized or redirected. Individuals carve spaces in which to insert their lived experiences and claim, even if modestly or extra legally, to be included in the logics of power and space production.

2.6.1 Resisting or adapting to governmental programs?

Forms of resistance take different shapes. Perhaps the most effective way to challenge power by those subjugated is by means of conflict (Flyvbjerg, 1998) or “tactical reversal” (Thompson, 2003, p. 113), openly confronting power-knowledge configurations. However, stable power relations (while not necessarily fair or equitable) are predominant.

For stable relations to be maintained over time, parties need to balance their resources and negotiate, through different means, their particular rationalities: “Stable power relations may entail no more than a working consensus with unequal relations of dominance, which may lead to distortions in the production and use of rational or quasi rational arguments” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 233). In this context, the production of abstract space, i.e., the space produced for the people, by actors such as planners, politicians and private developers, leaves a window for people to produce their own rationalities and contest power. People carve their own lived spaces within the cracks of the abstract space (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996). This process is referred to by authors as the “aesthetics of existence” (Thompson, 2003, p. 123), or the “familiarization” of space (Perera, 2009, p. 51).
Thompson (2003, pp. 131-132) conceives the ethics of existence as the critical resistance to power through the practice of alternative ways of life, such that we must:

[R]eclaim the task of caring for ourselves, for forging our own destinies…[this] would require that the structures of institutions be open to collectively guided change…so as to foster … new forms of sociality, new sorts of shared subjectivities. This, in turn, would entail the creation of new institutions of self-governance…At the core of [this struggle] is the project of autonomous and collective formation: the struggle to create ourselves in ways that are at once shareable and resilient.

Thompson’s “collectively guided change” entails the creation of shared identities with liberation goals standing in opposition to governmental programs. This perspective, however, obscures modest and emergent practices that are not necessarily critical but based upon “situated judgments” that stem from the internalization of mechanisms both of resistance and of compliant adaptation (Nethercote, 2015, p. 187). It is to these practices that I turn to in the following section.

2.6.2 Everyday life and popular procedures

“The characteristic subtle logic of ‘ordinary’ activities comes to light only in the details” (De Certeau, 1984, p. ix).

Ordinary activities such as playing, walking, singing, speaking and cooking carry the trace of cultural practices that creatively adapt top-down produced spaces, regulations and objects to contextual needs. These ‘every day practices’ are, according to De Certeau (1984, p. 24) “internal manipulations of a system…[that] postulate the constitution of a space of their own”.

Looking at everyday practices is central to understand the social production of space from both above and below. This perspective complements Foucault’s writings on the domination of governmental programs by bringing to light the “popular procedures” through which individuals domesticate spaces structured by larger politico-economic
objectives (De Certeau, 1984, p. xiv). Foucault demonstrates how space reflects a discourse that seeks to order deviant subjects’ rationally, to render them subject to observation and to discipline how they behave. However, he isolates a set of technologies (for example those of discipline in his work on the prison) that he then analyzes as if no other smaller techniques existed in parallel. Alongside practices of domination, an atomized set of ‘minor’ practices coexist. These lack the strategic power to impose specific discourses but, nonetheless, they also shape spaces. This gap in Foucault’s writings is addressed by De Certeau.

De Certeau asserts that within a consumerist neoliberal system, the majority of the population is marginalized from the production of objects, spaces, discourses, policy and planning (among many others). The mass of people left out of the production system insert their voices into the same system through consumption preferences and acts of adaptation and appropriation. These acts are modest manifestations of resistance that seek not to emancipate from a ruler but to reshape their room of action (Nethercote, 2015): “…users make (bricolent) innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules” (De Certeau, 1984, p. xiv). Through everyday bricolage, subjects “escape […] the system without leaving it” (Idem); they subject and resist at the same time. However, even if everyday practices follow “established languages” and express themselves through “prescribed syntactical forms” their path follows its own logic:

In the technocratically constructed, written and functionalized space in which the consumers move about, their trajectories form unforeseeable sentences, partly unreadable paths across a space… the trajectories trace the ruses of other interests and desires that are neither determined nor captured by the systems in which they develop (De Certeau, 1984, p. xviii).

Everyday “ruses” or “tactics”, in De Certeau’s words, are not premeditated; rather, they depend on time and opportunity to be implemented: “A tactic insinuates itself into the
other’s place…a tactic depends on time- it is always on the watch for opportunities that
must be seized ‘on the wing’…It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them
into ‘opportunities” (p. xix). These “transverse tactics” are immersed in a context but they
do not depend on its rules; conversely, they represent small “victories of the weak over the
strong” (Idem).

2.6.3 Familiarization: negotiating and adapting space through everyday
practices

The small victories of the weak contribute to the production of everyday living
alternatives that “familiarize” space (Perera, 2009, p. 51). The tactic of familiarization is
neither a direct contestation nor an escape from oppressive conditions. Rather, it is an
adaptation, redefinition, and negotiation of abstract spaces to accommodate everyday
practices. In this sense, the familiarization process is central to subject formation since it
allows people to be subjectified on their own terms. Through this process, subjects open
up “room for maneuver” within defined systems (Scott, 1985, in Perera, 2009, p. 52);
however, this room depends on the strategies at hand to adapt governmental programs
and re-define their meaning.

The need to familiarize space responds to an evident gap between real, lived
space and its representations. These representations are informed by technified
knowledge, producing hegemonic narratives of space. Conversely, lived space is
produced by people’s “immediate tactics” (De Certeau, 1984 in Perera, 2009, p. 52).
Through these tactics, people insert creatively their own logics by adapting the space
according with their particular “worldview” (Perera, 2009, p. 54).

Perera, in line with De Certeau, posits that people’s tactics rarely seek structural
change; rather, they are practices enabling people to survive in imposed systems. As
such, overt opposition is rare and in many cases reflects desperation. Instead, apathy, reluctant compliance and even unintended resistance are common.

In sum, everyday practices of resistance to governmental programs are “…not that dramatic, nor pretty; these are confined to the backstage of social life” (Perera, 2009, p. 56, referring to Scott, 1985). However, these can promote progressive changes and are as important for the subsistence of urban communities as the formal mechanisms of space production.

2.6.4 Tactics and strategies: seizing opportunity and controlling space

Informal tactics of space production fill the gaps left by formal mechanisms by seizing time, opportunities and relational circumstances to insert people’s own ways of operating. However, tactics lack a program; instead, they are creative, flexible and opportunistic:

[T]he space of a tactic is the space of the other…It does not, therefore, have the option of planning [a] general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a distinct, visible and objectifiable space. It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It takes advantage of opportunities and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its winnings (Perera, 2009, p. 37).

In other words, tactics are not planned; they profit from, but do not necessarily create opportunities. Further, tactics lack the power of programmatic interventions; they are “an art of the weak”: “…the weaker the forces at the disposition of the strategist…the more the strategy is transformed into tactics” (De Certeau, 1984, p. 37, adapted from Clausewitz, 1955).

In opposing but complementary ways, strategies use power to determine abstract spaces with “big picture” objectives that do not necessarily coincide with reality. Conversely, tactics are grounded in place. In other words, while strategies produce space
from the top, tactics do it from within. Additionally, they implement different ‘types of operations’; tactics prioritize time while strategies prioritize space:

Tactics are procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to time…to the rapidity of the movements that change the organization of a space…At the very least, they attempt to reduce temporal relations to spatial ones through the analytical attribution of a proper place to each particular element (De Certeau, 1984, p. 38).

Conversely, the implementation of strategies to control space also allows the powerful to control time and to anchor specific types of knowledge in specific locales. Mastering a place provides certainty and oversight and facilitates the planning of new battles.

In sum, space is central to the implementation of governmental strategies of subjectification and time to the context of opportunity within which subjects make situated judgments to transform and adapt space.

**Summary and conclusions**

We cannot therefore speak of power, if we want to do an analysis of power, but we must speak of powers and try to localize them in their historical and geographical specificity. A society is not a unitary body in which one power and one power only exercises itself, but in reality it is a juxtaposition, a liaising, a coordination, a hierarchy, too, of different powers which nonetheless retain their specificity (Foucault, 1976, p.156).

In this chapter I have laid the theoretical ground to understand the power and spatial practices of both subjection to and resistance to governmental programs. This section summarizes the findings of this exploration, identifies the guiding questions derived from the literature and sets the ground to build an analytical framework to unveil the crisscrossing of different powers, the discourses advanced and produced, the spatial strategies and the power technologies implemented to control the provision of
**equipamiento** in the context of massive, peripheral social housing developments in Mexico.

This theoretical framework provides an analytical thread to understand the interplay between neoliberal governmental programs and rationality, subjectification, spatial governmentality and everyday practices.

The research addresses both theoretical and empirical gaps identified in the literature on housing. First, this chapter has sought to bring into the governmentality discussion two under-researched theoretical streams: (1) the formation of subjectivities from below and (2) the spatiality and materiality of governmental projects. These theoretical components are used to analyze the interplay of housing and public facility provision, a gap in the empirical literature.

This research adopts Foucault’s definition of power. This definition diverts from state centering and looks instead at the microphysics of power; in other words, at how power is exerted by multiple actors and in different sites. His analyses, however, were not centered on actors themselves but on the shifting dynamics of power in specific contexts (i.e., the clinic, the prison). Therefore, in addition to understand who exerts power, this research seeks to understand how power is exerted.

Focusing on power relations and acknowledging both their destructive and their productive potential helps us to understand how actors at all levels leverage their power to advance their strategies. Power dynamics offer a contextualized understanding of the way in which plans and policies are applied. This understanding, in turn, helps us to disentangle the nuances between formal and actual power (Richardson, 1996). Formal power is understood as legal attributions granted to specific actors and actual power as the capacity to enact these attributions. Power in this context explains the gap between both as well as their shifting boundaries.
Foucault’s genealogical approach to power enables us to analyze how government has changed over time, as well as the technologies used to exert power. The genealogical approach also helps us to understand how current power practices intermesh with previous ones. From sovereign power to discipline, currently, governmental etho-power works through subjects’ subjectivities but continues to use some of the power and discipline technologies of its predecessors.

This research does not implement Foucault’s genealogical approach to understand the workings of power; rather, it employs the genealogical analyses of spatial regimes of government by authors such as Rabinow (1992), in order to apprehend the use of current neoliberal strategies as they borrow from historical practices.

Neoliberalism, as a theory of practice, is based on principles of individual freedom and market-rulled logics. The implementation of these principles, however, is contradictory, path-dependent and constantly failing. As a result, the governmental programs based on these principles are also constantly being re-invented, providing a wealth of opportunities to analyze their local impacts and resistances. Governmentality provides fertile grounds to analyze the rationalities and governmental technologies used from both top and bottom to exert and contest power. This research explores how the state recasts its role to “rule at a distance” but offers a more nuanced account of its intervention, acting both as the dominant and facilitating power. In line with the literature (based on Swyngedouw), I unveil the re-scaling of governmental practices in the Mexican housing context, with meta-actors (i.e., international organizations) increasingly shaping programs that local agents implement in ways that are also of benefit to them.

The shift from liberal to advanced liberal mentalities of rule needed a renewed “conceptual apparatus” to align subjects with market values and promote autonomous responsibility and consumerism (Harvey, 2007b, p. 24). While advanced liberalism’s conceptual apparatus is becoming global and generally uses the community as a new
territory for the government of subjects, its contextual particularities and variegated implementation of governmental technologies must be examined. Agents’ practices and discourses are used in this research as analytical tools to understand how this conceptual apparatus is framed --in other words, to grasp how reality is problematized, how subjects are defined, how governmental programs are justified and finally how these are operationalized.

The politics of responsibilization behind etho-power is used here as a springboard to address the paradoxes of neoliberal policy focused on individualizing responsibilities while obscuring the political economy of social problems. These types of policies provide cosmetic approaches to problematics built within an inequitable economic system.

Contrary to the formation of collective social solidarities to align subjects, communities are the new, more flexible and plural, territories where governmental programs are implemented. Nonetheless, using community as a unit of government does not necessarily promote communitarian values of self-help and mutual support; its use promotes, rather, the formation of shared commodified identities and consumption habits. Further, these territories of government require engineering and imagineering as to promote a sentiment of belonging so that people identify and voluntarily adopt the community’s morals. To understand how communities are ‘produced’, this research analyzes different governmental technologies such as marketing and community development, in conjunction with other disciplinary technologies such as regulations and fines. These technologies are also utilized to examine how subjects are prompted to “voluntarily” adopt community values and comply with larger governmental objectives (i.e., how they are subjectified).

Engineering communities and governing subjects require knowledge. In this research, I adopt this component of Foucault’s power triad (power/space/knowledge) as an element of analysis to explore how reality is framed and how it is produced. Understanding
the rationality behind knowledge and the technologies used to advance and produce reality is central to understand power. Power can validate knowledge, and through it populations and spaces are rendered governable.

Governmentality entails a complex series of rationalities and the possession and production of different forms of knowledge. Governmentalities are embedded in institutions, built forms, and spatial configurations. Space, the third element of Foucault’s triad, helps us understand how governmental programs and rationalities materialize, and how these seek to structure the lives of subjects (Miller & Rose, 2008). Governmentality is inherently spatial both in the spaces it creates and in the logics it employs in its project of subjectification (Huxley, 2007). In this research, I unveil the spatial rationalities that seek to guide the conduct of subjects. This is done through the analysis of the environmental-causalities that are attributed to specific spatial arrangements and materialities. With the help of Huxley’s (2007) diagrams (see section 2.5.3), I analyze: 1) how problematic spaces of intervention are identified by the programmer; 2) how knowledge on what which needs to be ‘healed’, ordered or repaired is produced; and 3) how the tools to intervene are defined. Huxley’s classification is, however, limited for the analysis of the causalities attributed to the materiality of space (e.g., its form, shape and materials). Therefore, I add to the dispositional, generative and vitalist diagrams, a fourth, material, diagram.

Diagrams direct our attention to the logics that frame what is problematic and the best possible ways to intervene. As idealized models, the spatial technologies used to implement these diagrams are prone to failure, contestation, and adaptation and are therefore constantly being re-made.

The examples discussed in this chapter show that spatial technologies of government are often used in conjunction with subjectivizing technologies; that their targeted unit of government can change; and that current governmental technologies often align with those that characterized sovereign and liberal societies. Rabinow’s (1982)
schemes of government provide us with the tools to understand the last two points. He addresses, from a spatial perspective, Foucault’s genealogical schemes of government: sovereign, disciplinary and bio-power (see section 2.5.4). Each of these schemes centers on a unit of government: territory, the body and populations. Grasping these categories helps us to identify both the diagrams and the spatial technologies employed within each scheme, as well as their juxtapositions and overlaps.

Spatial technologies translate diagrams into governmental schemes. They seek to control subjects and populations through spatial arrangements. The spatial technologies analyzed in this chapter are far from exhaustive but illustrate those most commonly employed in the cases studied: spatial exclusion of certain population groups and delimitation of ‘problem-free’ zones (such as the alcohol free zones studied by Merry, 2001); the commodification of spatial practices that contribute to the marginalization of the poor in the use and production of space; and the appropriation of space through everyday practices that, sometimes openly but more often implicitly, reclaim space.

Governmental programs are idealizations of the programmer, and their implementation is therefore in reality always prone to failure. More often than not, programs fail, face contestation and rejection. An ‘ordered’ space is not free from ‘disorderly’ everyday practices, nor will it necessarily produce obedient subjects. However, that programs fail does not mean they have no effects nor that they will be abandoned. Instead, when spatial rationalities fail, new governmental technologies are recast, adapted, reinvented and retested (Huxley, 2008).

Foucault has been criticized for analyzing governmental practices from above, as if no everyday practices existed ‘from below’. De Certeau’s writings shade light on the complex ways in which, through every day ‘bricolage’, subjects also produce space and adapt to the system without leaving it. Building upon Perera’s (2009) concept of familiarization, I explore how residents create room to maneuver within abstract spaces
produced and managed for them. Subjects familiarize space through tactics such as latent contestation, adaptation and appropriation. All of these allow them, not to escape from power, but to negotiate the terms of their subjection.

Everyday tactics challenge established rules and are grounded in place; they are creative and flexible but lack a program and depend on time and opportunity to be implemented. Conversely, the powerful employ premeditated strategies to produce abstract spaces whose logic does not necessarily coincide with reality. In other words, while strategies produce space from the top, tactics do it from below.

This research is located at the interface between tactics and strategies. From this interface, I challenge the traditional powerful-subjected dichotomization and intend to rethink political struggles as processes that help recast the conditions under which power is exerted (Dean, 1999). The marginalized navigate power relations not to escape from them but so as to negotiate the terms under which new governmental programs will be re-invented by governmental agents.

Table I synthesize the topics, sub-topics and guiding questions derived from the literature as they apply to the case study of this research.

The topics outlined bring together Foucault’s governmentality and De Certeau’s everyday practices with knowledge and space as conceptual constants. Across all topics, the guiding questions seek to analyze the rationality behind government, the technologies through which programs and everyday practices are implemented and the paradoxes resulting from their operationalization. The questions also seek to generate knowledge in different fields, such as spatial theory, housing policy implementation, planning processes and community development.

The next chapter provides a theoretical road map to address the questions proposed and to inform the methods employed in the research.
# TABLE I

GUIDING QUESTIONS DERIVED FROM THE LITERATURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Sub-topic</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Housing policy and planning | Neoliberal policy/ Knowledge/power/space | How has the shift from liberal to advanced liberal forms of government affected Mexican housing policy and the provision of _equipamiento_ in massive social housing developments?  
What is the rationality behind the planning and massive construction of social housing in Mexico?  
How was knowledge used and reality produced in the planning process of Ciudad Satélite (CS)? |
| 2 Governing subjects       | Governing through community/ Subjectification/ Power technologies | How are residents governed through community?  
According to what morals and values?  
What are the rationalities and technologies employed to align residents with a ‘residential’ lifestyle’ and what is the role of _equipamiento_ in this ‘alignment’? |
| 3 Governing space          | Spatial governmentality/ Spatial causality/ Diagrams or spatial rationalities/ Schemes of government/ Spatial technologies of power | What are the spatial rationalities behind public-facility planning in CS?  
What environmental causalities are attributed to _equipamiento_ and what are the technologies employed to guide residents’ behavior? |
| 4 Everyday practices       | Resistance and adaptation/ Popular procedures/ Familiarization/ Tactics and strategies/ Spatial tactics | What are the tactics employed by residents to resist and adapt to governmental programs?  
What spatial tactics do residents employ to familiarize and adapt to their living space?  
What are the gaps between governmental programs and reality highlighted by these practices? |

Source: Author
3. METHODS

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the analytical approach I used to translate theoretical categories into operationalizable research questions and describe the research strategy employed to collect and analyze data. The chapter first presents the research approach and the logic used to understand how governmental projects function: vertically, by linking global and local and horizontally, by assembling a range of technologies to govern. I move on to identify three governmental components: cognition, calculation and experimentation and use them to inform the research methods selected. After this, I present the data collection and analysis process and describe all of the methods used, including instruments, sampling methods, procedures and limitations. Finally, I describe the criteria used to select the main case and the three sub cases studied.

3.1 Research approach: Towards an analytical framework to understand power, knowledge, space and everyday practices

In this section, and based on Miller & Rose (2008), I build an analytical framework to understand how power actually works. Through this framework, I propose the analysis of different governmental components and their intersections via the logics of assemblage.

3.1.1 Governmentality as analytical framework

Governmentality, as analytical framework, allows for an understanding of the specific workings of power. In this sense, it differs from political analyses of power precisely in that it focuses on specific mechanisms as opposed to “abstract principles of rule” (MacKinnon 2000, p. 295).
Governmentality analyses focus on the how (as opposed to the why) of government; in Rose’s words:

An analysis of governmentalities then, is one that seeks to identify these different styles of thought, their conditions of formation, the principles and knowledges that they borrow from and generate, the practices that they consist of, how they are carried out, their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing. From such a perspective, it becomes apparent that each formulation of an art of governing embodies, explicitly or implicitly, an answer to the following questions: Who or what is to be governed? Why should they be governed? How should they be governed? To what ends should they be governed?... Further, instead of seeing any single body—such as the state—as responsible for managing the conduct of citizens, this perspective recognizes that a whole variety of authorities govern in different sites, in relation to different objectives. Hence, a second set of questions emerges: Who governs what? According to what logics? With what techniques? Toward what ends? (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006, p. 84-85).

In other words, governmentality provides an analytical framework that allows us to question, empirically, the micro-politics of government. However, this approach does not focus on the actions of specific actors but on “ways of operating” (De Certeau, 1884, p. xi). It is the analysis of the set of practices that actors conduct that allows us to unveil the “rules” (rationalities) behind those practices.

This study does not pretend to be a genealogical study of governing practices. Rather, it uses secondary research that analyzes historical governmental schemes to understand current ones. I seek to unveil actually existing neoliberalisms using what Deleuze has called “little lines of mutation”: small practices embedded in advanced liberal rationalities albeit in a local and contextual manner (Deleuze, 1979 in Collier & Ong, 2005, p. 15). This approach intends to breach the gap between the rhetoric and realization of governmental programs. Additionally, the research proposes to study practical, on-the-ground governmentalities based on empirical research of everyday practices, as opposed to studies based on a “totalizing view of power” (Nethercote, 2015, p. 175).
I build on the idea that while power holders change the city from above, people do it from within. From this viewpoint, the research recognizes the “transformative capacity of the subjects “who, through everyday practices, produce spaces that are “subversive to varying degrees” (Perera, 2009, p. 71). These forms of covert, latent, power, however, are not easily identifiable. Hence, the focus on the microphysics of everyday relations, “popular procedures” and “ways of operating” or “…innumerable practices by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of socio-cultural reproduction…[a] multitude of ‘tactiques’ articulated in the details of everyday life” (De Certeau (1984, p. xiv).

The research seeks to understand how governmental programs and small practices follow different rationalities and resort to a multiplicity of strategies and technologies to gain modest power battles. To unveil these, I work with the logics of assemblage instead of doing an analytics of structure (Ong, 2007).

3.1.2 The logics of assemblage

Studies on neoliberalism tend to focus on its structural implementation; conversely, the analytics of assemblage seeks to understand how neoliberalism, as a rationality, rubs shoulders with other rationalities. Ong (2005, p. 5) uses the concept of assemblage to “identify an unstable constellation shaped by interacting global forms and situated political regimes…As a field of inquiry, assemblage stresses not structural hierarchy but an oblique point of entry into the asymmetrical unfolding of emerging milieus”.

The focus, then, is on how strategies come together and create new arrangements: “An assemblage is the product of multiple determinations that are not reducible to a single logic. The temporality of assemblage is emergent. It does not always involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation or at stake” (Collier & Ong, 2005, p. 13).
One of the objectives of the notion is to bring to light the problems and paradoxes generated when different rationalities are grounded in specific contexts, i.e., when “global abstractions’ meet ‘local specificities” (Collier, 2006, p. 400). Hence, I use the concept of *assemblage* to understand the variegated forms that governmental programs take under actually existing neoliberalisms, i.e., in specific spatial, economic, politic and social configurations (Collier & Ong, 2005).

In addition to linking global and local, I use the notion to understand the complex aggregation of governmental practices that actors employ to advance their interests in specific contexts. According to Miller & Rose, (2008):

> [O]ur modern experience of power... [is] assembled into complexes that connect up forces and institutions deemed ‘political’ with apparatuses that shape and manage individual and collective conduct in relation to norms and objectives but yet are constituted as ‘non-political’. Each complex is an assemblage of diverse components, persons, forms of knowledge, technical procedure and modes of judgement and sanctions (p. 200).

As a result, the notion of assemblage is helpful to link different scales of government (global and local); to tease out intermixing rationalities and programs of government; to unearth strategies, technologies and tactics implemented in specific locales; and, finally, to grasp the emergence and constant transformation of these configurations.

In sum, the assemblages that I will strive to unearth in this work help us to understand the link between a neoliberal project as it is implemented through the provision of public *equipamiento* in social housing developments, and the forms neoliberal policy takes in a specific context. But most importantly, and in line with Miller & Rose (2008), I intend to unveil the assemblages of governmental practices, technologies and tactics
actors mix and match at different points in time to advance different (and in constant mutation) forms of power.

3.1.3 Components of an analytics of assemblages

Assemblages of governmental practices help us to understand how and through which strategies subjects and agencies at all levels seek to exert different kinds of power. Central to this quest is the relation between different governmental components:

Through an analysis of the intricate interdependencies between political rationalities and governmental technologies, we can begin to understand the multiple and delicate networks that connect the lives of individuals, groups and organizations to the aspirations of authorities in the advanced liberal democracies of the present (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 55).

Governmental components here refer to those elements that governing agents employ to exert power: political rationalities, programs of government and power technologies (Miller & Rose, 2008).

Based on Miller & Rose (2008), I present below a theory-based analytical framework to understand the workings of governmentality in Ciudad Satélite’s planning, the provision of public *equipamiento* and community development.

Miller & Rose’s framework focuses on power as it is exerted from above, where programs are framed and then operationalized. This approach fails to recognize alternative forms of power that also rely on political rationalities but most often lack a governmental program. To address this gap, I introduce the analysis of everyday tactics. Along the same lines, space is only tangentially approached by the authors. Therefore, the framework explicitly includes the spatial dimension into the first three domains.

To understand governmental forms, the framework proposes first to analyze the domain of cognition. In other words, to apprehend how government frames what is
problematic and what is desirable. This is done through the analysis of three items: 1) moral form, 2) epistemological character and 3) idiom. “Moral form” is the set of values or principles guiding government (e.g., freedom, justice, order, cleanliness, responsibility and efficiency). “Epistemological character” refers to the conception of the nature of the subjects and spaces to be governed: “…these can be specified as members of a flock to be led, legal subjects with rights, children to be educated, a resource to be exploited, elements of a population to be managed…” (Miller & Rose, 2006, p. 59). Finally, “idiom” refers to how actors frame reality to render it prone to intervention.

TABLE II
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: GOVERNMENTAL COMPONENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of government</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Items of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>Political rationalities</td>
<td>What is desirable?</td>
<td>Ideals Require a translation into programs</td>
<td>1. Moral form 2. Epistemological character 3. Idiom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spatial rationalities</td>
<td>What is problematic</td>
<td>Calculated activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>What can be made possible?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculation</td>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>What can be made possible?</td>
<td>Calculated activities</td>
<td>1. Forms of knowledge 2. Representation to render the world thinkable, manageable, governed 3. Schemes of government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Miller & Rose (2008) and De Certeau (1984).
Subsequently, in the domain of calculation, programs of government are analyzed. In other words, the strategies to understand, represent and intervene in reality are studied and the spatialities of government are defined.

In the domain of experimentation programs are rendered operable with the aid of different technologies of government. Understanding how technologies are employed by actors at different points in time and with different aims addresses the micro-physics of power, central to this research. The analysis of this domain utilizes the three bodies of literature addressed in this chapter: subjectification, space and everyday practices.

Finally, Miller and Rose propose an analysis of the systems of evaluation governments put in place to understand the applicability of governmental programs. Governing is an agonistic endeavor, always prone to failure and as such, in constant remaking. This is why evaluation is central to recast governmental objectives. This component, however, falls beyond the scope of this research.

The central aim of this research is not to evaluate whether governmental programs work or fail but to understand how they actually work, how rationalities are framed, what tools are used to advance them and how their use changes:

[W]hilst ‘governmentality’ is eternally optimistic, ‘government’ is a congenitally failing operation. Technologies produce unexpected problems [such as]...underfunding...and the impossibility of producing the technical conditions that would make them work...the ‘will to govern’ needs to be understood less in terms of its success than in terms of the difficulties and the variability of operationalizing it (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 35).

**3.2 Research approach and questions**

This research engages with the “intricate interdependencies between political rationalities and governmental technologies” to understand how governmental programs and everyday practices actually work (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 55). Along these lines, the
research seeks to answer questions that help us to understand who governs the provision of *equipamiento* in social housing developments in Mexico, “according to what logics? With what techniques? ...Toward what ends?” (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde, 2006, p. 85).

This type of inquiry requires an in-depth understanding of actors’ practices, power dynamics, and spatial processes.

I ascribe to a worldview in which ‘reality’ is contextual and complexly constructed. From this ontology, reality can only be understood through the process of its construction. This process engages a complex set of actors, each with a different subjectivity, embedded in a context that cannot be controlled for or neutralized, has historical groundings and finally entails change. What counts as truth in this process is not what ascribes to a general theory; rather, the truth is socially and politically constructed. In order to grasp the complexity of social experiences, I adopt a mixed methods approach combining what has been classified as qualitative and quantitative methods, but from a qualitative perspective (Mason, 2006; Moran, 2006).

This approach recognizes the contributions of different research strands to understand the complexity of social experiences. Hence, the objective of mixing methods is to generate different types of data that allow us to explain “whys” and “hows” (qualitative) and to identify trends and predict patterns (quantitative).

A qualitative logic prevails in this research. Therefore, qualitative methods such as interviews, observations and review of contextual or archival documents provided the material to construct a thick narrative of the case and to understand actors’ practices through discourse. The quantitative methods (i.e., survey) were used as an entry point into the field, providing context to findings collected and helping to triangulate the information provided by participants.

This research is a single case study with embedded sub cases. Case study research allows for an in-depth understanding of the complex phenomena shaping specific
contexts (Stake, 2005). My research is qualitatively driven and therefore avoids the application of quantitative principles to it, such as representativeness and generalization. Rather, I seek to enhance the trustworthiness of the study through triangulation, credibility, transferability and dependability (Shenton, 2004). Further, the aim of selecting three sub cases is not to have a representative sample of housing developments in Ciudad Satélite (hereinafter referred to as the City or CS) but to learn more about the power microphysics of each (Small, 2009).

Drawing information from three different cases, within the same political and economic context, but developed by different agents, allows to look at different constellations of actors and to answer my first research question:

- How do actors involved in the provision of equipamiento in social housing developments in Mexico assemble rationalities, strategies and technologies to exert power?

Power is embedded in society, and as such, it is exerted at multiple levels. In the research, I ask how actors use power to govern others and seek to unveil their rationalities and power practices.

To answer this question, I resort to the governmental components defined in the analytical framework to understand: 1) what are the values and morals that social housing policy defends and how are these values used to govern the materiality, use and management of facilities?; 2) what are the rationalities that underpin governmental projects? i.e., how do actors frame and apprehend reality in order to intervene? and how do actors imprint their rationalities in space?; 3) how do governmental agents such as housing agencies and developers define residents and tailor their strategies to conduct residents' behavior?
In addition, I explore how actors: 4) use the City’s planning process to understand, reframe and produce a governable reality; 5) define the spatial strategies that can help them produce self-governed subjects, capable of behaving in accordance with the community values, maintaining and managing facilities; and 6) imagine and engineer the community to govern life in Ciudad Satélite.

Finally, I delve into the technologies actors use to conduct residents’ behavior and to control space. To identify these technologies and understand how they are employed, I borrow from the subjectification and spatial technologies discussed in chapter 2. Namely, I seek to understand how housing agencies and developers: 7) use community as a realm to govern; 8) implement subjectification technologies to guide residents’ behavior; 9) resort to spatial technologies to control land development and; 10) use the materiality of facilities (i.e., their size and shape) and their spatial disposition to market the City.

Using the logic of assemblages, in this analysis I not only identify the technologies used but also how they were used in complementary ways to govern. In sum, this question focuses on how residents are subjectified and how governmental projects seek to govern, from above, what, when, how and by whom facilities are built and managed.

My second research question seeks to understand:

- How do residents’ strategies, tactics and everyday practices contribute to the exertion of power and the provision of equipamiento in Ciudad Satélite?

Residents are not passive recipients of governmental programs. Analyzing subcases with different community organization schemes allows me to understand how residents reproduce, reframe and contest governmental programs and contribute to the production of space.

To answer this question, I first sought to understand the conditions of facilities, the services they offer and how they are managed. Then, I sought to apprehend how residents
frame their reality, express their needs, compare their current situation with their previous one and face daily life challenges, all in relation to access to local facilities. These data helped me understand how residents not only reproduce governmental discourses but also reframe them in their own terms. In line with governmental agents’ practices, residents also seek to apprehend reality and produce knowledge they can use to their advantage, for example, to request adequate equipamiento. Third, to understand how residents contest overarching discourses, I looked at their community organization and spatial practices. Community organization is a strategy that both governmental agents and residents employ to gain power and exert control of the development and management of equipamiento. Analyzing the different community organization models of each sub case allowed me to understand how residents coordinate to frame their right to participate and take control over the production and management of equipamiento. Practices of contestation, however, are not always overt; therefore, I also excavated residents’ tactics of ritual, temporary (i.e., short-lived) and latent (i.e., covert) appropriation and familiarization of space. These tactics allow residents to be subjected on their own terms and to contest pre-established systems with the tools at hand.

In sum, this question explores the everydayness of facility need, use, development, and management in Ciudad Satélite. In addition, it seeks to apprehend how residents assemble different tactics to take control over their lived space.

Finally, my third research question seeks to understand:

- What governmental and space-making problems arise from the will to govern the provision of equipamiento in Ciudad Satélite?

Through this question I sought to understand if and how policy implementation perpetuates the very problems it seeks to address, namely, to provide residents with access to an adequate living environment. Looking at the planning and development
processes of the City allowed me to identify how the exercise of power facilitates the provision of certain facilities but hinders the development of others. Furthermore, this analysis also allowed me to understand the paradoxes and contradictions that stem from actors’ governing strategies and to pinpoint related problems such as facility abandonment, inefficient services and under-use of space and equipment.

Through the analysis of residents’ tactics, this question addresses the challenges developers and housing agencies face in seeking to govern subjects and to align them with an expected residential lifestyle. Residents’ tactics are located at the intersection of abstract space, i.e., space planned and designed from above, and lived space, i.e., the space of everyday practices, adapted and familiarized from below. Therefore, understanding residents’ tactics provides me with the tools to identify the gaps left in between these two spaces and to inform policy and planning practice.

**3.3 Data collection and analysis**

To answer my research questions, I used a mixed-methods approach with a qualitative focus. I relied on semi-structured interviews, surveys, base mapping, observation and archival research as the main methods of data collection. I complemented my data with photography and content analysis of secondary sources. Finally, I also conducted spatial analyses to understand the geographic distribution of vacated houses, commercial activities and housing with extensions built by the occupants.

Fieldwork extended from January 2012 until December 2014. Given that Ciudad Satélite is undergoing rapid development, this lengthy fieldwork period allowed me to document changes in the population, public administration and facility provision and management. Two snapshots taken in the summers of 2012 and 2013 allowed me to compare data on vacancies and land use changes. In parallel to data collection, I transcribed and systematized findings and analyzed them between June 2014 and July 2015.
Prior experience as a planner working in the State Ministry of Urban Development in San Luis Potosi facilitated my data collection and analysis. It meant I was familiar with local planning processes and in particular with CS’s partial plan\(^1\). Furthermore, I was able to identify key informants (i.e., public servants and politicians) from the administration of Marcelo De los Santos (State governor at the time CS was planned).

The data collection process of my research was guided by protocol # 2011-0651, approved in August 2011 by the Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS).

The data collection process was structured in five stages as follows:

1. Archival and secondary data research
2. Observation and photography
3. Base mapping
4. Surveys
5. Interviews

Eligible survey and interview participants had to reside in the City and be 18 or older. Participation was voluntary; subjects could refuse to answer any questions or terminate their participation whenever they wanted. Participants’ responses were confidential and did not affect in any way their relation with governmental authorities or neighbors. Furthermore, there were no risks associated with the methods used and participants could opt out at any time without any consequences. Before participating, individuals read and signed the informed consent form.

3.3.1 Archival and secondary research

I relied on archival research to: 1) document the planning and development process of the City; 2) understand how knowledge is produced and framed; 3) understand

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\(^1\) Partial plans focus on territorial subsets, already included in other city-wide plans. In order to be legally urbanized, the land where Ciudad Satélite sits was subject to a planning process (for further information please refer to chapter 4)
how documents can be used as governmental technologies to exert power; 4) unveil the moral discourses used by governing agents; and 5) document residents’ organization initiatives around the provision of *equipamiento*. Town hall meeting minutes, property rights registries and newspaper and tabloid articles complemented the information provided by interview participants to reconstruct the history of the City. The analysis of the principles and the discourse behind urban plans, public officials’ statements and policy documents allowed me to understand the rationality behind governmental programs and how knowledge is framed and used to justify governmental interventions. By-laws and condominium regulations provided me with the tools to understand how norms are used as contractual technologies to govern. I utilized INFONAVIT community development manuals and developers’ residential life guidelines to understand the morals underpinning the etho-politics that uses community as a territory of government. Finally, I analyzed 24 petitions written by residents to request extended services and provision of *equipamiento*. This analysis allowed me to understand how residents frame their claims and describe and rationalize their living conditions.

I conducted a content analysis of these documents and coded texts in accordance with the code classification used for interview transcripts (see section 3.3.5).

**3.3.2 Observations and photography**

I used this method of data collection throughout the fieldwork. After doing background research to understand the City’s development process, I conducted observations to document the characteristics of the sub cases chosen. Specifically, I first observed the materiality of facilities (e.g., schools, parks, health center): number and characteristics of exterior spaces, state of maintenance, presence of greenery, urban furniture, parking spaces, construction materials and infrastructure. I visited the spaces at different hours of the day and different times of year to gain a complete picture of their use.
The information was gathered with the aid of an observation instrument that contained a map and a color code for each of the characteristics observed. Data was systematized in registry sheets for each facility and then descriptively analyzed (see a registry sheet sample in Appendix A). In parallel, I used pictures to graphically document the conditions of facilities.

Additionally, I observed the housing stock, and collected data on land uses, housing vacancies and home extensions. To define whether a house was occupied or vacated, I recorded the presence of light meters and observed their activity; I also registered the presence of curtains, furniture and front yard maintenance. In many cases neighbors helped me corroborate the information. The information was mapped and then also descriptively analyzed.

Finally, I also observed community meetings, everyday activities in the public space and ritual appropriations of the space, especially around religious activities. This information allowed me to triangulate data collected with other methods and document technologies of participation and spatial governmentality. I transcribed my fieldwork notes, coded them in accordance with the analytical framework’s governmental components and then analyzed them in conjunction with interviews in Atlas.ti.

3.3.3 Base mapping

In order to systematize the information observed, I produced a geographic information systems (GIS) database of the City. Access to public GIS information on Ciudad Satélite is restricted for the public and does not include block and housing plot level data. Therefore, with the aid of an Autocad file provided by INVIES, I created a GIS data base. I used this information to select the survey sample and spatially reference observed information such as: location and total area of housing, public equipamiento, commercial activities and open spaces, location and number of abandoned houses and
home extensions. This information allowed me to analyze the City’s urban design and structure and to identify spatial trends such as clustering of commercial activities, abandoned housing and home extensions (see three sample maps in appendix B).

3.3.4 Survey

Ciudad Satélite is undergoing continuing growth. As a result, census data do not accurately document the City’s current population; 2010 census data yielded close to 2,500 inhabitants whereas I estimated close to 6,000 in 2013. Therefore, one of the objectives of the sample survey I conducted was to obtain accurate demographic data and understand the socio-economic characteristics of families. Moreover, the survey allowed me to compare residents’ previous and current living conditions and access to *equipamiento* and finally, to understand how satisfied they are with their current access to *equipamiento* and what service needs they prioritize.

**Instrument**

In line with these objectives, the survey instrument was designed to include 36 questions. The majority of questions offered respondents multiple choices; however, I also integrated interval scale questions for residents to compare past and current conditions and open-ended questions to gain more insight on residents’ perceptions. Given the limited extent of the social housing literature that considers the provision of *equipamiento*, I examined Schteingart & Graizbord’s (1998) INFONAVIT housing survey. Their research, however, focused on the conditions of the houses and the socio-economic characteristics of residents. Therefore, I adapted the authors’ instrument and structured it in the following sections: 1) Respondent information; 2) Household information, 3) Previous living conditions; 4) Mortgage data; 5) Services and public *equipamiento* and 6) Final questions on satisfaction with current conditions and willingness to participate in an interview (see survey Instrument in Appendix C). Initially, I used the survey’s final question to recruit
interview respondents. Later on, however, I changed my method and interviewed only cluster representatives given that many of the residents interviewed were not involved in community issues and their responses, related to facility use, were repetitive.

**Sampling**

The survey intends to be representative of the three sub cases studied and allows me to make population inferences from a sample. As a result, I used a simple random non-probabilistic method to select participant households. In other words, I numbered all occupied houses from the three sub cases studied (N=1473), and randomly selected a sample (n) from each. All eligible households had the same chances of being selected. The sample size was defined based on the calculation by Bartlett, Kotrlik & Higgins (2001) of a minimum returned sample size for a finite population and for categorical data (see table III).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population size</th>
<th>Continuous data</th>
<th>Categorical data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\alpha=.10$ t=1.65</td>
<td>$\alpha=.05$ t=1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To reach a significance level of 5% (t=1.96), I selected a sample of 306 households. However, due to residents’ availability, resource and time constraints, I was able to conduct only 276 surveys (see table IV). As a result, my sample size represents 18% of the population and yields a slightly higher margin of error of 6% ($1/\sqrt{n}$).
According to Gay & Diehl (1992), a sample of 10% of the population is adequate for a descriptive study. Researchers conducting these types of studies have also relied on a significance level of α=.1 (t=1.65) as an acceptable ‘rule of thumb’ (Hill, 1998 & Hashim, 2010).

**TABLE IV**

**SURVEY SAMPLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>N= occupied houses</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satélite</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Manantial</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbivillas</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s fieldwork

**Process and analysis**

Surveys were conducted between 2012 and 2013, mostly in the morning. Selected households were visited and the survey conducted in front of the house. Residents took around 15 minutes to respond. Where respondents did not wish to participate or where, after three visits, I had failed to find anyone at home, I moved on to the next (occupied) house immediately to the right. Survey answers were systematized in a spreadsheet and households were assigned a code. Codes and addresses were registered on a separate sheet. The data was descriptively analyzed and findings were graphed and reported in the case study chapters (5, 6 and 7). In some cases, residents volunteered additional information or developed their responses; these insights were registered in a research diary and analyzed with interview transcripts.
Limitations

Among the limitations of this survey is the fact that the sample was not stratified by neighborhood and as a result, the proportion of households surveyed is not reflective of the neighborhood’s household composition. Furthermore, given that the surveys were mainly conducted in the morning, a large proportion of respondents were housewives. This may skew the results, especially with regards to the equipamiento they prioritize (such as daycare and community centers). Finally, the database shows missing data due to respondents’ refusal to provide income and mortgage data.

3.3.5 Interview

Based on the analytical framework, semi-structured interviews were fundamental to understand participants’ rationalities, epistemological character and idioms. This method of data collection also allowed me to understand how governmental agents frame their programs and craft the necessary technologies to intervene and subjectify residents. Finally, interviews were also central to identify residents’ tactics and community-organization models.

Instrument

The interview schedule was divided into two sections: 1) general questions for all participants and 2) particular questions for each group. Participants belonged to one of 5 categories: social (residents), public (federal and state agencies and public service providers), religious (priest), academic (a professor involved in a community project in CS) and private (developers, urban designers and a consulting firm).

The general questions serve to classify residents (groups are described in the next section) and understand their backgrounds (i.e., their relationship with the case studied). Specific questions sought to understand participants’ knowledge and perception of the City’s planning process, development and the provision of equipamiento. Questions for
residents explored their experiences in community organizing, the relationship between equipamiento and their everyday life in the City, their involvement in facility development and management. Questions asked of religious and academic actors sought mainly to understand their perception of the City as outsiders and their insights from the community work they have done in CS. Local public actors were asked questions related to the institutional and legal context of planning, social housing development and the provision of public equipamiento in San Luis Potosi and their links with federal policies. Questions asked of participants from federal agencies and the financial consultant concerned how programs, policies and certifications crafted at a federal level work and the nature of implementation for local agents. Finally, private sector participants were asked questions related to the project for the City (e.g., its conceptualization and urban design intentions) and the political and institutional context in which it was developed (e.g., institutions that participated and how decisions were made). Private sector participants and specifically developers were asked questions relating to how behavior is regulated in the City, how marketing is framed and how community work conducted.

**Recruitment**

Purposive sampling was used to select key informants, based on their knowledge on planning and the provision of equipamiento or on their firsthand experience living or working in the City. I sought to gain insight into participants’ perceptions and the rationalities behind the strategies and tactics they (or the institutions for which they work) use to govern equipamiento in the City. In other words, I sought to understand how the exercise of power works.

Participants were recruited both through surveys and by means of snowball sampling. The first method was useful to establish a first contact with participants and collect the insights of residents with little involvement in community issues. To recruit
community leaders and residents who participated actively in community initiatives, I used a snowball sampling method that relied primarily on recommendations and contacts provided by neighborhood representatives.

The table below summarizes the profile of participants; in total, I conducted 46 interviews, all of which were transcribed.

TABLE V
PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social (residents)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satélite</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manantial</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEIEFE (Education Ministry)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVIES (Housing agency)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDESOL (Social Development Ministry)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipotecaria Federal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbi staff (developer)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zyma staff (urban designers)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynámica (developer)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuasar (DUIS financial consultant)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s fieldwork
**Process**

Once participants were identified, I contacted them via e-mail or in person using a recruitment script to determine eligibility. I documented initial eligibility and secured the file. If eligible and interested in participating, a convenient location and time for meeting was arranged with participants. This was typically the participant’s work place or home. Before the interview, I provided them with consent forms to sign and asked whether they agreed that the interview could be audiotaped. Overall, all participants recruited, with the exception of INVIES’ staff, were eager to be interviewed. Given the contested political context in which Ciudad Satélite was developed, rank-and-file public servants and department directors of the housing agency were reluctant to be interviewed. They were mistrustful and refused to allow the interviews to be audiotaped. Out of the 46 participants, 28 agreed for the interview to be audiotaped; for those who refused, I took notes. Recordings and interview notes were transcribed and analyzed concomitantly. Interviews typically lasted between 40 and 70 minutes; they were all conducted and transcribed in Spanish, my mother tongue. I only translated the citations included in this dissertation. The names used in this dissertation are all pseudonyms, to secure participants’ confidentiality.

**Analysis**

Transcriptions were analyzed with Atlas Ti, a qualitative data analysis software. I read all interviews, identified recurrent and emergent topics and coded the text. Codes included two levels of analysis: descriptive and theoretical. Descriptive codes were classified by facility and included references to the history and use of *equipamiento*; theory-related codes were organized by strategies and tactics, and identified references to the experimental component of my analytical framework.
3.4 Data Validation Strategies

Validating qualitative findings relies on strategies to enhance the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of findings (Krefting, 1991). Using Guba’s model for qualitative research (in Krefting, 1991), I sought to establish credibility and confidence in the truth of my findings through an embedded triangulation strategy that integrates different perspectives from informants able to corroborate findings, data from different sources and methods (e.g., archival research and observation) and extensive research into secondary sources to contextualize findings. With these strategies I seek to provide accurate descriptions of the sub cases studied and their planning and development processes. Thick descriptions also intend to provide tools to allow other researchers to transfer my findings to other cases (Geertz, 1994). Research on social housing in Mexico documents similarly challenging living conditions in peripheral and poorly served developments across the country. By linking federal policy to local implementation and highlighting its unintended consequences, this research seeks to inform policy- and plan-making practices in cases similar to Ciudad Satélite. I also resorted to dependability strategies such as a detailed description of methods and the analytical framework, to facilitate the repeatability of the study and increase the reliability of my findings. I tried to clearly outline my research process to help readers identify “explainable sources of variability “if the research were replicated (Krefting, 1991, p. 216). Finally, to secure the objectivity of my data, I employed confirmability strategies such as the triangulation of information through different methods and extended periods of immersion in the field.

3.5 Case selection process

The challenges faced by residents of social housing developments deprived of the basic equipamiento to fulfill daily needs are shared by similar cases across the country
(Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998; Rodríguez & Sugranyes, 2004). Ciudad Satélite is not an exception. It is a typical dormitory town on the outskirts of a medium-sized Mexican city, characterized by a planned and serviced urban environment (i.e., with the basic infrastructure such as sewerage, water and electricity) but lacking adequate *equipamiento*. Nevertheless, if we consider its size, CS was an ambitious project, the product of a particular political and economic context. It is to this particular context that the selection of Ciudad Satélite as a case study refers. The City’s similarities with other cases allow us to identify the contradictions of policy implementation and its differences allow us to observe how local power configurations exacerbate the effects of policy implementation.

Furthermore, Ciudad Satélite offers a compelling case study given that it ties together different sub cases, developed under two different schemes. This results in different actors and different power configurations as well as different community organization models.

Currently, the City is home to seven different neighborhoods. Four of these were built during the first stage, starting in 2008 (Satélite, Nuevo Jardín, Macro 7 and Macro 8), and three during the second, starting on 2010 (CTM, El Manantial and Urbivillas). Macros 7 and 8 and Urbivillas are still undergoing development.

First-stage developments were led by INVIES, the state’s housing authority (see column three, table VI) while second-stage developments were controlled by private firms and a trade union (in Chapter 5 I explain in depth each of these stages).

This difference is reflected in neighborhoods’ community organization schemes. In Satélite, for example, INVIES encouraged the creation of a residents’ association (RUC) that works hand-in-hand with the housing institution. In El Manantial, Dynámica (its developer) exited the site (i.e., left the development before finishing all the houses) and hence the community auto-organized a RUC, independent from governmental agents. Conversely, Urbivillas is under the control of Urbi (its developer) which works closely with residents. As a result, Urbi organized a neighbors’ association (UBR) to manage
community affairs (e.g., public space maintenance and street lighting payment). These configurations of actors directly affect the strategies and tactics they employ to exert power and transform space. Therefore, selecting a sample of sub cases to allow for these variations was crucial.

**TABLE VI**

**CHARACTERISTICS OF SUBCASES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Number of houses built</th>
<th>Number of houses sold</th>
<th>Community organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Satélite</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>RUC/INVIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuevo Jardín</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>RUC/INVIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macro 7</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macro 8</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Manantial</td>
<td>Dynáctica</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>RUC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbivillas</td>
<td>Urbi</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>UBR/Urbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INVIES, Urbi and Dynáctica’s archives

The cases selected for the study could be classified according to differences in their stage of development and the developer responsible. Older and more consolidated cases were chosen to assess community organization schemes and different strategies of government implemented by residents. The proxy used to evaluate the consolidation of sub cases was the number of houses sold. Finally, developments where community organization was inactive or did not exist at all were excluded. As a result, the cases selected were Satélite, Nuevo Jardín, El Manantial and Urbivillas. Nuevo Jardín was then excluded given that it shares similar characteristics with Satélite but its community organization is incipient.
Summary and conclusions

In this chapter I presented the analytical framework that guided my data collection and analysis. I used a mixed methods approach employing different types of data and information sources. The research is, however, qualitatively driven; this is to say that the main objective of my analyses is to provide a nuanced account of the processes through which actors seek to govern and exert power. Along these lines, interviewing actors and analyzing texts were central tools to understand actors’ perspectives and rationalities. In a context of scarce access to public information and outdated data, I implemented a survey to understand household characteristics and identify patterns related to residents’ facility needs and perceptions of current living conditions. Base mapping helped me identify spatial trends and clustering (e.g., of abandoned housing and commercial activity). Finally, archival research provided data on the historical and political context of the City. It also allowed me to understand how institutional discourses are framed and knowledge used to advance particular interests. I sought to validate survey findings by using a probabilistic sampling method that allowed me to generalize data acquired from a sample. I triangulated my findings by comparing the data I collected using different methods and by integrating different perspectives through purposive interview participant selection. Among the limitations of my method is the lack of stratification both of surveys and interviews by neighborhood, a factor that may yield skewed information.

I used an in-depth case study with three embedded cases. These were selected to provide variation in terms of development stage and type of developer. Finally, size, consolidation and community organization were the criteria I used to select Satélite, el Manantial and Urbivillas as my three embedded cases.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this dissertation describe the main characteristics of these sub cases and analyze their planning and development process, living conditions and facility provision history.
4. NEOLIBERALISM AND HOUSING POLICY IN MEXICO

Introduction

This chapter provides the background needed to understand how the broad concept of neoliberalism has influenced the Mexican housing policy. Along these lines, I identify key moments in the political history of the country when a shift towards ‘neoliberal’ strategies to promote economic growth and advanced liberal mentalities of rule were implemented. Furthermore, I draw on secondary research to understand housing sector changes in the last three decades and their impact on urban form, and on how residents and developments are governed. These changes include the rationalities, ideals and values, and technologies used to render the sector more profitable and efficient.

4.1 Mobilizing neoliberalism in Mexico

The neoliberalization of the Mexican state is a product of interaction between foreign policy, national state configurations and local forces. Understanding neoliberalism as a “mobile technology” (Ong, 2007, p. 3), hegemonically applied but locally adopted, this section discusses a key period in the history of Mexican neoliberalization, starting with president De La Madrid in the 1980s, and continuing with president Salinas de Gortari. Using President Salinas’ main social policy, called Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL), I identify some of his neoliberal governmental strategies, in order to contextualize the implementation of the housing policies analyzed in this chapter.

Since 1982 when President De La Madrid took office, the neoliberalization of the Mexican economy and public administration systems, were put in place with interventions such as decentralization, fiscal austerity, privatization of the national banks and public enterprises, technocratization of the state and budget cuts in education, health and
housing (Domínguez & Alonso, 2009). Many of these changes echoed what was later described by Williamson (2009) as the ‘Washington Consensus’. The term refers to the set of policies that Washington-based institutions such as the BID and the IMF were recommending (and implementing at a distance through their lending policies) in Latin American countries. The aim of these policies was to reduce the intervention of the state in the context of import-substitution protectionist states. Examples of these policies are: “Fiscal discipline…tax reform…interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, privatization…deregulation, secure property rights” (Williamson, 2000, pp. 252-53).

When Salinas de Gortari took office, in 1988, he initiated a reform in line with these principles, seeking to change the country’s social, economic and political systems according to what he described as a socio-liberal philosophy. He intended this term to differentiate his political project from welfarism and neoliberalism:

Social liberalism abandons the notion of a radical individualism, out of control and with no social cohesion, based on the total supremacy of the market. At the same time, it dissociates itself from the statization of the public sphere brought about by the excesses of Keynesian liberalism and its welfare state (Concepción, 2002, p. 351)\(^1\).

While social liberalism shares neoliberalism’s trust in market efficiency, it seeks to tackle the social inequalities produced by neoliberalism. As a result, Salinas proposed to rebuild the economic model such that the state would simply fill the gaps left by the market, meeting the needs of the poorer section of the population and promoting communal solidarity as a way to compensate for the resulting social inequality (Concepción, 2002). Salinas’s socio-liberal state was neither paternalistic nor propertied; it

\(^1\)Unless indicated otherwise, all translations by Spanish – from the literature or from primary sources – are by the author
was intended to promote and facilitate rather than to intervene and it was characterized by openness, privatization and de-regulation. Salinas’s state was social in the sense that it prioritized certain social rights over private ones but it sought above all to be state of ‘solidarity’. The solidarity state had three main axes: political democratization, economic progress and social development.

Salinas’s political project aimed to decentralize the political power of the state and to democratize the electoral system. However, authors argue that in practice, his government was characterized by an authoritarian presidentialism and political anti-liberalism (Concepción, 2002). Conversely, on the economic axis, many changes in line with the Washington Consensus were implemented. The old import-substitution economic model was abandoned and the economy opened to foreign direct investment. The industrial sector was deregulated and the free trade NAFTA treaty was signed in. As a result, manufacturing industry grew considerably (albeit generating only low-wage jobs) and imports increased. In parallel, close to 600 public enterprises were privatized nationwide (e.g., the Mexican telephone company was one of the largest, and it was sold to the man who is the richest in the country, Carlos Slim).

On the social axis, the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) was one of the most far-reaching social programs implemented during the Salinas administration. The program sought to decentralize the allocation of resources and channel them directly from the federal level to impoverished municipalities. It also promoted the participation of communities, civil organizations and public institutions through ‘Solidarity Committees’ that decided on the use and administration of resources. One quarter of the resources were provided by communities, in the form of labor, materials or money. Finally, a system of evaluation and monitoring was set up by the federal government to render local committees accountable (Ontiveros, 2005).
An evaluation of the Salinas administration shows that his socio-liberal banner sought to mask the effects of a series of neoliberal reforms which, by the end of his term of office, resulted in deep social inequalities, further entrenched by the 1995 economic crisis (a few months after the end of his administration).

Over twenty years after NAFTA was signed, we can see that the economic benefits of industrial growth were reaped only by the economic elite; all the majority of the population got were low-wage jobs. In fact, Mexico swapped industrial production for assembly industries. GDP fell between 1980 and 2010, and wealth became more concentrated. Today, two-thirds of the Mexican population experience some sort of poverty (e.g., lack of basic food and services, poor access to education and housing) and 67 percent of the country’s wealth is owned by 20 percent of the population (Cypher, 2011).

Salinas’s economic project is an example of how neoliberalism (in the guise of social liberalism) was implemented in Mexico. The implementation inherited the reins of a ‘paternalistic’ state, ruled by an anti-democratic authoritarian presidentialism. In line with the Washington Consensus, Salinas liberalized trade, promoted foreign direct investment and the privatization of public enterprises and promoted the privatization of ejido land (communal tenure). He was able to make all these changes (albeit not to control their results) due to the centralization of power in the Mexican presidency.

The results of PRONASOL were mixed and will not be discussed here (for deeper analyses refer to Ward, 1993 and Fox, 1994). However, it is important to highlight two of the most relevant governmental shifts that were introduced to social policy implementation in Mexico through this program. First, the federal government established a direct relation with municipal governments with the aim of ‘decentralizing power’, but this power was exerted at a distance through program evaluation. Second, public, civil and social actors were brought together in the figure of the ‘Solidarity, thus institutionalizing the
implementation of funds and agreements. As central components of these committees, communities shared the responsibility of the program’s implementation and were compelled to volunteer resources and work. These shifts need to be understood in a context where the federal government had enormous power over states and municipalities mostly ruled by the same party, to the point that it has been suggested that PRONASOL meant that "the president of the country became the mayor of all municipalities" (Krauze, 1994 in Concepción 2006, p. 400). To date, the federal government is still powerful even if the party that ruled for 60 years finally left office in 2000. However, the alternation of political parties has reduced overt manifestations of authoritarian power.

4.2 Social housing policy in Mexico

4.2.1 Re-scaling and ‘rolling back’

In parallel to the changes experienced in the social policy sector, housing policy in Mexico has also undergone transformations that align with the Washington consensus principles such as decentralization, liberalization of interest rates and privatization. These changes follow the agenda of international lenders, leading to the transformation of the sector at all levels of government, affecting institutions and legislation, as well as financial systems and subsidies.

Power structures and discourses behind housing development have also changed substantially in the past three decades. Puebla (2000) identifies two main periods in Mexican housing policy history, roughly before and after the 1990s when the state changed its role from regulator, to facilitator of social housing production. The first period, from 1972 to 1988, was characterized by strong state regulation and limited intervention by international organizations. A legal framework that recognized the constitutional right to adequate housing was built in this period and more federal resources were invested in housing programs. Housing actions concentrated mainly on renovation of
blighted city centers, self-construction and legalization of informal settlements. The sector relied heavily on governmental subsidies for beneficiaries. Also in this period, workers’ saving funds institutions such as INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE were created (Puebla 2002).

The right to housing in México is recognized in the 1917 national constitution but it is until the 1970s that concrete measures were undertaken to structure the housing sector. As part of these measures, INFONAVIT, the main social housing lender in the country was created in 1972, in a context of pressing housing needs, and a heated political environment after the 1968 student protests. This public institution undertook the task of administering employers’ contributions to their workers’ housing fund. This contribution summed up to 5% of businesses total payroll. During its early years, INFONAVIT also undertook many of the task related to building houses (i.e., buying land reserves, acquiring construction materials, planning development and designing prototypes), and strengthening the housing construction sector given that this was still weak. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s INFONAVIT also played a strong role in organizing communities, administering a fund to maintain developments and promoting the provision of equipamiento. By 1980, INFONAVIT intervened in the construction of the 75.8% of all the housing financed through public institutions. However, by the mid-1980s and 1990s, INFONAVIT entered into a crisis that stemmed from the weak financial credit returns, low interest rates and a generalized economic crisis in the country that seriously affected the workers’ paying capacity (Pardo & Velasco, 2010).

It is within this generalized crisis that the housing sector was transformed. From 1989 to 1994, the sector was deregulated, resulting in a growing role for private developers, builders and financial institutions, as well as an increased intervention on the
part of international organizations, and particularly the World Bank\(^2\), in line with the Washington consensus. Through their lending requirements, international institutions controlled at a distance the production of housing in developing countries (Boils 2004). These requirements sought to promote private property and render the housing sector more efficient and profitable by promoting investment returns and encouraging the state to create profitable conditions for construction companies and developers (Boils, 2004). The assumption behind housing policy is that private property is the most appropriate form of tenure to ensure “security, social justice and finally democracy” (Coulomb, 2006, p. 143).

Mexico is one of the countries that built most of the World Bank’s requirements into its housing policy, transforming the sector at the beginning of the 1990s. These transformations included financial systems and housing institutions. These changes led to a general retreat of the state and shifted responsibility to the private sector and enhanced the responsibilities of local municipal governments in issues such as urban planning and the construction of infrastructure. As a result, currently, large developers play a stronger role in buying and developing the land (previously owned and managed by housing institutions), designing urban developments, subcontracting construction companies and allocating housing (Puebla, 2002; Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998; Villavicencio, 1996).

The state also reduced its intervention by cutting subsidies, deregulating mortgage interest, adopting a savings scheme for beneficiary contributions (through down payments), raising the percentage of the employer’s contribution towards their workers’ savings and limiting the role that trade unions had played in credit demand and allocation of houses (Jaramillo & Schteingart 1983).

Several consequences stemmed from the housing sector transformations. First, the larger amount of credits was granted to higher income workers that could cover the down

\(^2\) Although other organizations such as the Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo have also lent money to the Mexican government, the WB has lent the most (Boils 2004).
payment upfront and had the capacity to pay increased interest rates (Pardo & Velasco, 2010). Second, the construction sector made its processes more efficient, to allow for the construction of large amounts of houses at a low cost and in short periods of time. Finally, these economies of scale contributed to the spread of massive developments, commonly located where large plots were available at a low cost, i.e., at the poorly served periphery of cities. While the massive provision of social housing started to fulfill pressing housing needs, these developments failed to fulfill residents’ daily needs related to the provision of equipamiento and access to services and job opportunities.

In sum, the housing sector transformations helped to consolidate institutions, build a legal framework to operationalize the right to housing, render housing production more efficient and put in place financial instruments to secure investment returns. Nevertheless, these transformations did not necessarily benefit the poorest sectors of the population. In addition to these changes, the scale, location and form of developments were radically transformed.

**4.2.2 From unidades habitacionales to conjuntos habitacionales**

Providing housing for workers became an important item in the urban agenda of industrializing countries since the end of the 19th century. In a context of massive migration towards cities and growth of the industrial activity, inner-city quarters to house workers and new towns were developed at a fast pace in different parts of the world.

In México, governmental efforts to fulfill workers’ housing needs can be traced back to 1920 when buildings such as the Isabel (1920) and Ermita (1935) were built in Mexico City (Sánchez Corral, 2012). It was nonetheless in the 1940s and 1950s when the construction of the first housing units (hereafter unidades habitacionales) started, following international models such as Perry’s housing unit and Le Corbusier modern architecture. These housing units or unidades habitacionales were mainly vertical and included
education, cultural, commercial and recreational facilities. This housing model sought to densify urban areas by providing housing to an increasingly large urban population. The concept is based on modernist principles that sought to organize community life in orderly, healthy and rational spaces (Montoya Pino, 2010). Clarence Perry was one of the main precursors of this concept.

Perry’s (1929b) housing unit model was an urban cell dependent on a main urban center for secondary services but locally provided with the basic: “The underlying principle of the scheme is that an urban neighborhood should be regarded both as a unit of a larger whole and as a distinct entity in its self” (p.488). Along these lines, units host four functions: education, recreation, commerce and housing. Education is the structuring function: neighborhood units should host the number of families that an elementary school can provide service to. From the school, the size of the unit is determined by a half-mile radius to allow children to walk to it. According to Perry, schools should also be community centers providing adult education and after school activities in the afternoon. Perry’s model included community, commercial and sports facilities such as parks and playgrounds (approximately 4 sq. meters per inhabitant), small stores “…accessible but not next to their [householders] own doors…” (Perry, 1929b, p. 489), rather organized in small shopping districts; sports grounds, community centers, libraries, churches, daycare centers, a business area, administrative offices and a cinema. The situation of common facilities “…calls for embellishment by means of both architecture and landscaping, and such a treatment would contribute greatly to local pride and the attractiveness of the development” (Perry, 1929b, p. 496). Central gardens structuring housing blocks were also part of his model.

By carefully designing the urban environment, and controlling commercial spaces through zoning and covenants, Perry sought to promote community life: social cohesion would be achieved by attracting people with similar interests; bonding and face-to-face
interactions through public space and *equipamiento*; community consciousness by sharing responsibilities over common spaces; and community identity through a unified image (Perry, 1929a). He envisioned developers embracing his precepts to enhance their housing products and improve people’s living conditions (Perry, 1929a). His model, however, was criticized for promoting homogeneity and entrench segregation and for its environmental determinism (Vidyarthi, 2010). Underlying the housing unit model, is the assumption that communities are “…nurseries of primary ideals…[such as] loyalty, truth, service and kindness…” (Vidyarthi, 2010, p. 75). Furthermore, there is also the supposition that the environment can foster communitarian ways of life.

Social housing *unidades habitacionales* in México follow Perry’s principles by seeking to order the poor in planned developments: “When creating a big housing complex, to a certain extent, a radical transformation of daily life is sought: the behavior, aspiration and values of the population involved. It is believed that in a planned complex people live differently than in a neighborhood built from the sum of individual initiatives and inhabited through more or less long periods” (Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998, p. 9).

Contrary to Perry’s model, *unidades habitacionales* in México traditionally host low-income sectors in both the inner-city and the periphery. While the first was a common location in the early stages, from the 1960s the periphery became the preferred site to develop these *unidades*. In parallel, the construction of small *unidades* characterized the 30s; subsequently, these proliferated in the 40s and decreased by the 50s. At the beginning of the 60s, the few *unidades* built were larger and were financed and produced with increasingly efficient financial schemes and construction technologies (Montoya Pino, 2010). In Latin America, the *unidades habitacionales* were a symbol of modernity and a way to efficiently fulfill increasingly pressing housing needs. These ‘disciplined environments’ (Vidyarthi, 2010, p. 86) align with the order of colonial urbanism, to which many *unidades* are reminiscent of.
It was from the 1970s, when the housing sector begins to consolidate, that big developers such as Sare and Grupo Geo (the largest social housing developer in the country) also start to gain political power, and to bust the construction sector with improved techniques and materials (Sánchez Corral, 2012). Also in this period, the construction of vertical housing declines and the development of single-family dwellings in large-scale complexes (hereafter conjuntos habitacionales) increases, most importantly by the end of the 1980s and 1990s when the sector was deregulated.

A conjunto habitacional is “...an entirely new habitat, that may correspond in some cases to a new economic, technical, and demographic situation; it also implies designing a more or less important number of dwellings organized in an architectonic and urban complex, with an urban plan, and a spatial and volumetric organization that seeks to create an adequate environment for personal, familiar and social life...” (Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998, p. 9). Three aspects are relevant in this definition of conjuntos habitacionales. First, the concept of integrating housing, urban fabric and equipamiento in a planned environment, second, the relationship between these planned environments and the social interactions they foster and third, their size, traditionally larger than that of unidades habitacionales.

While there are good urban design examples of conjuntos habitacionales across the country, policy aspirations were often left unmet when they were locally implemented. In many cases, conjuntos were not built as planned and the provision of equipamiento lagged behind due to poor planning and lack of institutional coordination. Planning in Mexico is characterized by the lack of articulation between plans, public and private urban investment and urban projects structuring space. The what, how and when of city making are not incorporated into the plans. As a result of this, urban plans regulate action but do not promote it (Duhau, 2006).
4.2.3 Policy contradictions: Consequences of building massive *conjuntos habitacionales*

The sector’s transformation increased housing production substantially and facilitated the implementation of the Housing Sector Plan 2000-2006. With the aid of this program, close to 2.3 million houses were built in five years. To date, an estimated 1 million housing credits are granted per year by financial institutions and workers funds (such as INFONAVIT). Roughly, half of these credits apply to newly built, social housing acquisition (CIDOC & SHF, 2010). As a result, since the year 2000, dispersed *conjuntos habitacionales* or dormitory towns proliferated at the fringes of cities where available land is least expensive.

The increased role of private developers in the land purchase, design, construction and commercialization of social housing benefited large companies that monopolized the sector and promoted the impoverishment of the housing quality (e.g., lower quality materials and smaller spaces compared with earlier stages). Currently, developments of up to 20,000 houses with limited house prototypes and reduced built footprints (45m²) are produced in peripheries through an economy of scale in which the individual cost of the houses is very cheap compared to its commercial price, producing large profits. The private sector’s increased participation also entailed the emergence of market-led strategies of land selection (in least expensive, peripheral land) and economy-of-scale approaches to housing production. As a result, massive developments offer homogeneous housing for the urban poor to consume. However, social housing beneficiaries do not constitute the poorest sectors of the population, traditionally living in informal housing.

Social housing dwellers are part of a *propertied poor* class (‘los con techo’ Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2005) enjoying a ‘dignified’ dwelling (i.e., built with solid materials and separate dining and sleeping areas), and basic services (i.e., water, electricity, sewerage and gas) but often lacking access to *equipamiento* (Connolly, 2006). Ultimately,
while solving a housing problem, additional urban and social problems are created through this social housing strategy. To illustrate, based on data from the Income and Expenses National Survey (ENIGH), Connolly (2006) found that Mexican households spent, on average, just under 10% (9.7%) of their income on housing expenses in 2000. This is in sharp contrast with transportation expenses amounting to almost 20% of their income. This indicates that increased economic burdens related to limited access to *equipamiento* and jobs are transferred to residents living in peripheral locations.

Indeed, construction of massive social housing in the urban periphery has promoted a new pattern of segregation (Roberts & Wilson, 2009). When poverty is concentrated and people have poor access to jobs, public amenities and services, disadvantage is entrenched. Authors have found that segregation constrains opportunities of socio-economic upward mobility and undermines community life and the capacity for collective action while promoting violence and mistrust (Marquez & Perez, 2008; Rodríguez, 2001; Sabatini, Cáceres & Cerda, 2001).

Furthermore, due to lax and unclear urban planning regulations developments are built without due attention to the wider urban impact or to ensuring the provision of adequate infrastructure. In sum, the costs attached to this housing production model are absorbed by 1) inhabitants provided with poor and limited housing options; and 2) society at large absorbing their environmental costs (Puebla 2001).

For two decades, the dormitory town model promoted the massive construction of housing. This model faced a crisis in 2009, however, when a period of economic stagnation hit the country hard. Since then, housing demand and the number of mortgages allocated have both decreased (banks’ mortgage allocations have declined by 35% and INFONAVIT’s by 12%: Torres, 2008). Paradoxically, however, government building credits increased from 16% to 21% between 2008 and 2010. The gap between supply and demand became evident in 2013 when the three largest Mexican developers listed in the
stock market went bankrupt. Urbi, the developer of Urbivillas, was one of them. In other words, governmental subsidies and building loans created a bubble in a context of economic crisis and reduced demand, distorting the market and seriously affecting the developers taking advantage of governmental subsidies.

During this period, the highest rates of foreclosures and overdue mortgage portfolios were observed. According to INFONAVIT’s financial plan for 2011-2015, one in every four houses financed by the institute between 2006 and 2009 was vacated or foreclosed. In over 90% of the cases reported, residents abandoned their houses due to problems related to their peripheral location (Infonavit, 2010).

4.2.4 Everyday life in social housing developments

Life in peripheral social housing developments presents many challenges. Lack of social services, public amenities and access to jobs are among the most important (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2005; Villavicencio, 1996; 2000; Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998). In this context, residents employ different tactics to fulfill their needs and cope with their daily life challenges. Housing extensions (often challenging the laws of gravity), expansion towards the street, occupation of public spaces and clandestine business are examples of spatial adaptations of houses to family needs. These adaptations stem from families’ needs to enlarge their houses, accommodate extended families, and install a business to support the family economy. Case study literature documents extensively residents’ living conditions (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2005; Villavicencio, 1996; Villavicencio; 2000), interactions in public spaces (Aguilar, 1998) and organizational strategies to provide certain services and manage common areas (Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998). These studies show that lack of public equipamiento and services is a common trend in formal,
publicly subsidized housing units and that organizing to solve common problems is rare in such developments (Marquez & Perez, 2008; Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998).³

Maintaining developments has been a challenge for residents in a context of scarce resources, especially in apartment buildings that share vertical circulations and hallways. However, this is also the case in horizontal condominiums that share common open spaces. This tenure form has been increasingly used by developers since it allows them to shift maintenance responsibilities onto residents before they municipalize (i.e., before the municipality assumes public space maintenance tasks) (Maycotte Pansza, 2010).

However, organizing residents around maintenance and collecting maintenance fees has been a challenge for community leaders and developers and as a result, common spaces quickly deteriorate. As a response, INFONAVIT developed a program called ‘Mortgage with services’ (HIS from here on). Through this program, residents cover maintenance fees directly through their mortgage payment. Subsequently, INFONAVIT gives the money collected to maintenance companies chosen by residents or by residents’ committees undertaking these activities.

4.2.5 Policy changes: towards compact and serviced developments

Substandard living conditions both at the house and neighborhood level result in low occupancy rates and mortgage default from disillusioned buyers. This is particularly problematic in periods of crisis when unemployed workers fail to pay and mortgage debts increase.

To tackle these problems, federal housing and urban development policies have undergone a third period of transformation since 2007. The 2007 National Development Plan (2007-2012) set as a priority the shift towards ‘sustainable urban development’. One

³ A note of caution is needed here: This cited research was conducted in Mexico City where unidades habitacionales (i.e., apartment buildings as opposed to single-family housing) required neighbors to organize to upkeep common areas. Common areas in single-family dwelling developments can be public or privately managed. Therefore, organization is not always required.
of the initiatives launched to implement this intention is the DUIS certification. Through open access to INFONAVIT subsidies, this tool seeks to provide an incentive for developers to build well-served, ordered, sustainable and dignified urban environments that provide residents with adequate living conditions. The Federal Mortgage Society (Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, SHF), one of the most important lenders for social housing construction in the country, put in place this certification as a way to promote the construction of livable communities (i.e., well-equipped, communicated and served) instead of dormitory towns and hence revert the mortgage payment lag existing in peripheral developments. Ten massive developments were built under this scheme, showing mixed results.

In 2014, the federal government announced a series of changes intended to align urban growth and housing development under the following principles: “...containing disorderly urban growth, consolidating and densifying urban settlements, diversifying housing solutions and paying more attention to rural housing…” (DOF, 2013, n. p).

These objectives promoted the restructuring of urban and housing institutions, legal changes, information access strategies and urban data bases updates. For example, SEDATU, a ministry that controls housing agencies was created, the national law of infrastructure was elaborated and the national registry of land reserves was constituted.

Following these principles INFONAVIT changed its subsidies’ rules of operation to incentivize housing development in line with federal policies. These rules incentivize developers to densify (i.e., build vertically), build housing that integrates green technologies (such as solar heaters) and locate within SEDATU’s contention perimeters. These perimeters define areas by infrastructure and facility access. The better served areas (typically also more expensive) are the higher rated and hence allow buyers to acquire more subsidies.
In sum, current federal policies seek to discourage the development of peripheral dormitory towns through mechanisms that push developers to align their interventions with this objective. One of the greatest challenges, however, is to align federal policies and state and municipal legislation to improve implementation.

**Summary and conclusions**

Housing development for the working class in México dates back to the 1920, a few years after the 1917 constitution recognized the right to housing. However, it was until the 1970s that the housing sector was consolidated. In this decade housing institutions were structured, laws enacted and financial schemes put in place to allow for the construction of social housing. Figure 1 shows a summary of the most important dates related to social housing policy in México.

![Figure 1. Housing policy timeline. Source: author adapted from Puebla, 2001; Marquez & Perez, 2008; Sánchez Corral, 2012.](image)

Note that between 1970 and 1990 the sector is consolidated and housing agencies are regulating agents closely controlling housing development processes. From 1989, when Salinas becomes president, the sector is deregulated, allowing for private investors to acquire increased power in deciding how and where housing is built. Public agencies in...
this period assume the role of facilitators of processes, in charge of setting mechanisms that encourage housing development.

A stepping stone in the transformation of the housing sector was the 1983 amendment to the Mexican constitution that allowed for development of the first Federal Housing Law. In this law, the right of all families to access dignified and decent housing was instrumentalized in a set of governmental tools and agencies created to enact this right (Coulomb, 2010). This right was, however, built into neoliberal policies that promoted the consolidation of an unsustainable housing model. Housing policy, in conjunction with market forces, economic shifts and the social consumption of private property has promoted the production of differentiated spaces. The time-line shows how the housing production model changed throughout the years from compact, inner-city, vertical unidades habitacionales to massive, peripheral conjuntos habitacionales.

Conjuntos habitacionales are disciplinary spaces that rely on controlled urban environments to promote a sense of community and residents’ civilized behavior. Conjuntos in México typically house a homogeneous poor sector (but not the poorest) in the urban periphery where land is cheaper and poorly communicated and serviced. This approach promotes unplanned urban expansion to the detriment of environmental concerns (such as access to water) and the peripherization of low-income families in dormitory towns.

The fact that the state strengthened investments in massive housing production is part of a political, economic and social project. As a political project, housing development showcases politicians and reproduces clientelistic practices (Eckstein 1977; Fox 1994). As an economic strategy, housing development benefits the construction, industrial and financial sectors (Gilbert & Ward 1985), generates jobs, promotes people’s integration into the market (De Soto, 2000), reduces real estate market distortions due to informal housing (Roberts & Wilson, 2009) and finally creates a pool of tax payers living in planned
environments. As an urban project, housing development reduces informality and promotes ordered and planned spaces. Finally, as a social project, housing development creates a class of propertied citizens who are expected to behave according to middle-class values and lifestyles. In this sense, social housing is a complex spatial project embedded in discourses and practices of market efficiency and profitability, private ownership, urban order and civic behavior in which the social element may be a mere rhetorical justification.
5. CIUDAD SATÉLITE: DESIGN, URBAN PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION

Introduction

In the fall of 2006, the then governor (2003-2009) of San Luis Potosí, Marcelo de los Santos Fraga, commissioned a small committee of state planners with the development of the Partial Plan of Ciudad Satelíte. The secret mission could not be unveiled until the task was finished and the governor announced his intentions to build a “Satellite City” for 132,000 inhabitants in the outskirts of the Metropolitan Region of San Luis Potosí-Soledad de Graciano Sánchez (957,753 inhabitants, INEGI 2005). To craft this plan, the team was given the master plan of the city, produced by a local architectural firm, along with a series of feasibility studies drawn up by a local research center. In parallel, a private firm was hired to modify the 2003 Strategic Plan of the Metropolitan Region of San Luis-Soledad (hereafter Metropolitan Plan) so that the new town development would not be out of line with the new town development.¹ The modifications and the plan were published in the Diario Oficial on June 15, 2007 and construction of the City started in September of the same year. This chapter describes the different stages of Ciudad Satélite’s development: land acquisition, design, planning process and construction. Through this description, I unveil the discourse behind the urban design and planning of CS and the strategies used to advance it. Moreover, the description shows the political and financial intricacies of such an ambitious project.

¹ In the Mexican planning system, urban plans become law once they are approved by the town council and published in the Official Diary. In order to become laws, municipal (or any other) plans have to be hierarchically aligned with higher level plans (e.g., metropolitan, state and national levels). Nonetheless, in the case of CS, a higher-rank plan (i.e., the metropolitan plan) was aligned with a lower-level plan (i.e., the partial plan).
5.1 Acquiring the land and designing a Garden City

Governor de los Santos's intention to build a new town for 132,000 people responded to a pressing need for housing announced by the 2003 Metropolitan Plan, drawn up while he was mayor of San Luis (2000-2003). To meet the housing demand of new households, the governor envisioned a development pole that would solve the problems generated by housing developments built in “small spaces, distant from secondary and tertiary services” (Poder Ejecutivo del Estado, H. Ayuntamiento de San Luis Potosí y H. Ayuntamiento de Soledad de Graciano Sánchez, 2007, p. 3). Paradoxically, the land to build the city is located 16 km away from San Luis and 10 km away from the industrial zone, with no direct connection to it. Under the banner “the lower the cost of the land, the higher the benefit for local families” (Poder Ejecutivo del Estado, H. Ayuntamiento de San Luis Potosí y H. Ayuntamiento de Soledad de Graciano Sánchez, 2007, p. 4), the state secured, on May 19, 2006, 1000 hectares of former ejido land at the periphery from an intermediary who raised considerably the final cost to the public sector.

On this land, 300 hectares were planned for industrial use and 700 for affordable housing. The industrial land is owned by the intermediary who received an 8.7 million dollar subsidy to buy it (La Jornada San Luis, 2006) (see figure 2).

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2 The plan projected 132,197 new families between 2006 and 2025 in the Metropolitan region.
3 CS sits on ejido land, a form of communitarian right to use the land. The 1992 reform to article 27 of the constitution allowed ejidatarios to privatize and sell their plots of land. These however, cannot be sold to the state directly, transactions need a private intermediary. In our case, the land was bought by a real state called Dyntel, and then acquired, at a much higher cost, by the State through FONHAPO's Federal program.
4 Affordable or ‘economic housing’ refers to dwellings sold to workers earning between 2 and 5 minimum wages (according to the 2013 salary rates one minimum salary equals 139.9 dollars a month, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2013)
On the land zoned for housing, as stated in the plan, would rise:

The city of tomorrow, a human city where the relationship man-nature is established in a revolutionary event…an example of the production of wellbeing, of urban and economic sustainable development and a reflection of governor de los Santos’s engagement with the citizens of San Luis Potosí (Gobierno del Estado, 2007).

The governor’s vision was reflected in a “garden city” approach, designed by a local firm. This garden city is structured around a public land use axis containing a 61 hectares central park. This axis leads to a former dam, the Varela dam, an empty water reservoir of which only a stone retaining wall remains. Along this axis, 20 macro-plots are
structured into a system of *neighborhoods*, characterized by a hierarchical structure of public and commercial land-use centers and sub-centers.

### TABLE VII

**CIUDAD SATÉLITE’S URBAN STRUCTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Area (hectares)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Land use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban sub-centers (USC)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>Along the main axis</td>
<td>Large public facilities for local and regional needs such as schools, libraries, community centers, a civic square, a sports center, a police station, a university, marketplaces and a health center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public facility areas (PF)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.23</td>
<td>South-west corner</td>
<td>Infrastructure and facilities such as water recycling plants and electric stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood centers (NC)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Distributed across the city</td>
<td>Education, administration, culture and commercial <em>equipamiento</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and public facility corridors (PFC)</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Along main roads</td>
<td>Housing, commercial services, and low impact facilities*5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local centers (LC)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Within housing land use</td>
<td>Local services and public <em>equipamiento</em>, such as day care centers, businesses, dental and medical offices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Ciudad Satélite’s Partial Plan, p. 79-82
*N/A= Not applicable

*5Low impact facilities refers to those that do not generate noise and pollution, and do not demand large parking lots such as small health centers and culture and education-related installations.
Local access to public *equipamiento* was the main concept structuring the urban form. To achieve this, the design organized the area into neighborhoods reminiscent of San Luis Potosí’s historical *barrios* that were walkable and colloquial:

[The project] seeks to regain the urban center, *el zócalo*, as a point of encounter and a fundamental economic, social and cultural axis ...Dwellings surrounding the central park seek to reenact traditional San Luis Potosí neighborhoods⁶...this basic urban cell is structured around a plaza and a church. These elements provide identity and structure to convenience stores and parks (Gobierno del Estado, 2007).

Along these lines, 21 local centers were designed. The local centers connect with three centers (CB) and these, in turn, connect with three Urban Sub-centers (SCU) (see figure 3). The higher the hierarchy, the larger the area and the public facilities provided, as well as the population served. This system is intended to “…distribute services and consolidate a more democratic system, where the population can have access to basic goods without long commutes” (SEGOB, 2007, p. 81).

Supporting this urban structure are a transit system, a cycling path and a web of tertiary, secondary and primary roads connecting public *equipamiento* with housing areas. Housing is structured around local centers and small scale parks (ranging from 100 to 1,500 m²).

Parks, large open spaces and low housing densities are the main components of the ‘garden city’ marketing strategy of the project. This urban scheme was intended to transform the face of working-class developments through green design principles where public space and access to public *equipamiento* were central. According to Pedro, senior architect at the local firm that designed CS’s master plan:

⁶ The historical core of San Luis Potosí is structured into 7 traditional *barrios* or neighborhoods dating back to colonial times. Each of these was founded by a different religious congregation in charge of evangelizing particular indigenous groups. These *barrios* are an important part of the *Potosino* identity.
The general concept of Ciudad Satélite was to make a very, very green space in spite of it being for the working class…with the quality of a higher end development…We always tried to promote the communication, for example, of pedestrians and bikes…almost every plot looks directly towards a green area…we tried to organize the space in macro-plots communicated through a park…the urbanization and the general urban structure are people-centered (December 2012).

Compared to 90 m² economic housing plots in the city, CS offers the larger plots in its category (120m²). In these plots, 45 m², one-story, single-family homes occupy almost
80% of the land zoned for residential purposes. Along secondary and primary roads, the remaining 20% was planned for high-density buildings and two-story houses. In contrast with the small scale of the private space, the project allegedly conveys a “humanized monumentality” though large promenades, pedestrian and cycling paths:

[W]e tried to adapt ourselves to the topography, following the land curves...we tried not to design completely straight streets...we were very concerned with making it [the city] for pedestrians and bikes...the central park articulates the dam and the main access...it is a large architectural promenade...Brasilia was a very important inspiration (interview with Pedro, December, 2012).

As in Brasilia, CS offered its designers the opportunity to think a city from scratch, one that avoided “the vices or the determinants of something given and pre-established” (idem). CS however, was not designed as a city (such as Brasilia) but as a dormitory town to house a homogeneous segment of the population. Yet, it promised a better life for the working class, in an independent, self-sustainable green city, free of the problems linked with urban centers (e.g., gangs and violence) and with all the public *equipamiento* and job opportunities needed. Nonetheless, fulfilling this promise presented great challenges to planners, who undertook the project in October of 2006, after the master plan and urban design were completed.

### 5.2 Planning Ciudad Satélite

On October 30, 2006, the Governor formally requested the municipality to modify both the Municipal and the Metropolitan Plan and to make the Partial Plan of Ciudad Satélite to make sure the project complied with laws and regulations (Gobierno Municipal, 2007). These tasks had already been delegated to a group of local consultants, in charge of aligning the strategies of higher-level plans (i.e., the Municipal and Metropolitan) with those of the partial plan. In parallel, a special team from the State’s Planning office
(SEDUVOP) was appointed to draw up the Partial Plan promptly and secretly. On November 15 of the same year, the Town Council approved the Governor’s proposal and on December 23 both the modifications and the plan were finished and open to formal public consultation. This process consisted in the publication of a poster summarizing the plan in the municipal offices and two meetings organized with developers. The process lasted two months, from December 23, 2006 to February 23, 2007. During this time, citizens were entitled to read the plans and provide written opinions. SEDUVOP and INVIES received “…several comments and those considered pertinent were integrated…” (Gobierno Municipal, 2007, n. p.). Note that SEDUVOP was obliged to read these opinions but not to integrate them into the final version of the plan. On May 11, 2007 the Town Council approved the modifications and partial plan to finally publish them in the Official Daily on June 15, 2007 (H. Ayuntamiento, 2007; Poder Ejecutivo del Estado, H. Ayuntamiento de San Luis Potosí y H. Ayuntamiento de Soledad de Graciano Sánchez, 2007).

In sum, in a period of eight months the Municipal and Metropolitan plans were modified and Ciudad Satélite’s partial plan was made, opened to public consultation, approved by the municipal council and published as the instrument that would guide the development of a city of 132,000 inhabitants.

5.2.1 Revision and modifications to the 2003 Metropolitan Plan

The private firm given the task of modifying the Metropolitan Plan provided a report recommending eleven changes in addition to zoning modifications (SEGOB, 2007a). In order for Ciudad Satélite to be lawfully developed, the land use plan was modified, converting the 1000 hectares of Ciudad Satélite’s land reserve from wilderness to

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7 The results of the public consultation are not available, neither is the full final version of the Metropolitan Plan. As a result, it was not possible to understand whether or not significant changes were implemented as a result of the public consultation.
urbanizable land. Document changes included modifications to the number of hectares of land reserve owned by the state for development as well as adaptations in the text to include this development as part of the Metropolitan Plan’s growth strategies. For example, one of the plan’s strategic guidelines criticized publicly promoted projects such as Ciudad Satélite. This guideline highlighted the metropolitan region’s spatial concentration of inequality, exclusion and poverty, and explained that the real estate market and rational planning promote the segregation of urban functions. The guideline also criticized the exclusion of the poor in the following terms:

Progressive accumulation of housing for vulnerable groups, due to zoning and norms that do not offer urban diversity in a single neighborhood, and medium and large public enterprises that concentrate housing of the same size and value to host one type of household and social group (Poder Ejecutivo del Estado, 2007a, p. 88).

However, given that this guideline contradicted CS’s project, it was discarded from the text. These cosmetic modifications to the Metropolitan Plan validated CS’s project while excluding any considerations of its regional impact and social implications. As indicated before, the governor’s project was not aligned with some of the initial Metropolitan Plan strategies. Despite this, the project remained intact and, instead, the Metropolitan plan’s discourse was changed to justify the City’s development.

5.2.2 Ciudad Satélite’s Partial Plan

With the master plan and a series of feasibility studies explicitly requested by the Municipal Institute of Planning to justify the city’s location, the planning team drew up a development plan. As opposed to other housing developments at the outskirts of the city, Fourteen studies were done by different private consultants on: hydrology, geology, risk management and urban impact, among others.
the partial plan (PP)\(^9\) regulated the development of an urban center providing labor opportunities, services and public equipamiento not only locally but also regionally.

**Location**

Despite the City`s peripheral location, the plan presents it as having a series of cumulative advantages. Among these is the low cost of the land, which allows developers to reduce the final price of the houses, and land use restrictions that reduce speculation. According to the current zoning plan, no building permits for urban uses can be granted around Ciudad Satélite, hence restraining land values from rising. In fact, the PP shows Ciudad Satélite as an isolated polygon of ‘urbanizable’ land, surrounded by land designated wilderness. According to the plan, this polygon is not apt for agricultural nor for livestock activities but is “…a piece of land fully apt to be converted into an urban area due to the qualities it presents to develop the project” (SEGOB, 2007b, p. 28). These qualities refer to local water access (water is extracted from wells that were dig in the land) and the land’s closeness to a major road. In other words, by discarding other uses and relying on new and costly infrastructure, the plan concludes that the area allocated for development of Ciudad Satélite’s polygon is fit for purpose.

**Growth projections**

The City was planned to fulfill a ‘pressing housing need’ identified in the Metropolitan Plan’s projections. This plan’s optimistic provisions\(^10\) yielded an expected growth of 33,000 families between 2006 and 2025 in the Metropolitan region. Close to 38% of these new families (50,094) would earn between 2 and 5 minimum salaries and would therefore be potential consumers of affordable housing. Ciudad Satélite was

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\(^9\) The plan was published as: *Partial Development Plan of the South East section of the intersection of the Rioverde road and Monterrey’s toll road*

\(^10\) This plan projected an average yearly population growth rate of 3.5% between 2003 and 2025. According to the 2010 census, the population growth rate reached only 1.94% per year, hence overestimating the population by close to 100,000 inhabitants.
planned to fulfill close to 66% of the affordable housing demand by 2025. According to the PP’s projections, Ciudad Satélite would house 9,900 families by 2009 (short term), 17,600 by 2012 (medium term) to finally reach its benchmark of 33,000 by 2025 (long term). To house this population, the PP projected a sustained production of 5,000 dwellings per year from 2007 to 2012 and the construction of 191 public facilities between 2007 and 2015.

**Public equipamiento**

Public *equipamiento* planning in Mexico is regulated by the Social Development Ministry (SEDESOL). This Ministry developed a series of manuals to calculate the number, type and size of facilities based on the city’s rank. Ranks depend on the number of inhabitants served (SEDESOL, 1995). According to these manuals, when CS attains its population benchmark (132,000 inhabitants), it will reach the State rank (between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants), which is only lower than the Regional rank (more than 500,000 inhabitants). This means that, as an urban center, it is entitled to a wide range of public *equipamiento* and to tap into Federal, State and Municipal resources to build such facilities. Public *equipamiento* here refers to:

- Buildings and open spaces, predominantly of public use, where activities complementary to living and working take place; these [facilities] provide the population with wellbeing and economic support services. Depending on the activities or specific services they provide, they are classified as follows: health, education, commerce and retail provision, culture, leisure and sports; administration, security and public services (H. Congreso del Estado de San Luis Potosí, 2013, p.8).

It is relevant to mention here that although public facilities are commonly publicly used, they can be privately owned. Also, the term refers to both buildings and open spaces.
The plan projected the construction of 70 facilities in the short term (between 2007 and 2009), 67 more in the medium term (between 2010 and 2012), and 54 additional facilities in the long term (between 2013 and 2015). Educational (i.e., primary and nursery schools mainly) and recreational (i.e., public spaces) subsystems account for the largest number of facilities.

In order to operationalize urban plans, public facility projections (along with projects such as infrastructure and transportation needed in other sectors) are charted in urban plans as strategic projects with specific institutions and actors responsible for their construction. The plan identifies over 30 public institutions from the municipal to the state and federal levels that should be in charge of building and managing *equipamiento*. However, only two state institutions participated in the elaboration of the plan.

**5.3 Construction begins**

Three months after the plan’s approval, on September 21, 2007, the governor inaugurated Ciudad Satélite (Villela, 2007) in a contested political environment. The media scrutinized closely and harshly criticized the proposal. Before the works started, on July 3, 2007, INVIES secured a large amount of federal funds from CONAVI to deliver 5,000 housing subsidies in a year. If INVIES failed to allocate the subsidies, it had to return the money. To launch the project, INVIES implemented a two-tiered strategy: in a first stage, the institution directly promoted the development of four macro-plots, absorbing most of the risks: it owned the land and subcontracted developers to build the houses and infrastructure needed, served as a guarantor for builders’ bridging loans and managed federal and state funds. In a second stage (implemented less than a year later), INVIES sold macro-plots to large developers and facilitated some of the administrative procedures to obtain subsidies and process construction permits. By absorbing most of the project

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11 Such as eleven nurseries, eleven primary schools, six community centers, four markets, one secondary school, one high school, an arts school, a library and a sports center, to mention a few.
development responsibilities in the first stage, INVIES sought to increase land values to then shift most of the risks (but also profits) to the private sector. Nonetheless, several factors collided and the project’s budget and timing increased considerably, resulting in a development that many (mostly the media) qualified as a failure (Martínez Benavente, 2009).

5.3.1 First stage: publicly-led housing development

To execute such a massive scale project, INVIES launched the construction of more than 2,500 houses in four macro-plots (see table VIII) along with the infrastructure needed: roads, sewerage, water treatment plant, a well, the water supply network and an electric substation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro-plot number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of plots</th>
<th>Number of dwellings built (October 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Satélite</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nuevo Jardín</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Macro 7</td>
<td>1383</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Macro 8</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,094</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,649</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s fieldwork

Infrastructural works (with the exception of roads) were subcontracted by INVIES to four local construction companies and built with federal funds (El Sol de San Luis, 2008). The construction of houses and roads was assigned to ten local developers and was financed through a bridging loan from Banco Interacciones with INVIES’ director, Jorge
González Hernández, as a guarantor. INVIES placed all funds (subsidies, advance payments to builders, land sales and housing down payments), along with the land in a trust administered by Bansefi (National Savings Bank).

This trust was signed first on July, 18, 2007 and subsequently modified two times (July 31, 2008 and September 10, 2008). Financial miscalculation and mismanagement of funds delayed the works as INVIES incurred a major debt. The institution owed money not only to builders but also to CONAVI, which agreed to defer INVIES’s promise to deliver the subsidies one year. However, when the term came INVIES was unable to return the money or demonstrate it had delivered the subsidies. As a result, INVIES was banned from tapping into Federal subsidies and was later sued by CONAVI.

At the end of De los Santos’s term as governor in 2009, INVIES donated 300 plots of Macro 8 to the Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM), one of the most powerful unions in Mexico, and signed a “Collaboration Agreement” with developers and financial institutions (González Courtade, 2009). This agreement aimed to provide developers with the certainty that the institution would comply with its obligations: INVIES committed itself to finishing the infrastructural works needed to continue building the project, the bank committed to lending more money to builders and INVIES added 4 macro-plots to the trust. If INVIES failed to comply with its commitments, the land would transfer to the developers’ ownership. Finally, the term to finish the works was extended from 2008 to 2012 (Martínez Benavente, 2010).
However, when De los Santos left office, in September 2009, the new administration took several months to re-launch the project. INVIES was not able to finish the works needed to build and sell the houses and, as a result, developers abandoned the site. In July 2010, the state’s audit office announced that INVIES had passive liabilities resulting from CS’s project of over 7.5 million dollars. Naif Kuri, the newly appointed director (from the PRI, De los Santos opposing party), declared that “Ciudad Satélite was a poorly planned project…works were adjudicated without public tender, they were overpriced and were the most expensive solution that could have been chosen…” (González Vázquez, 2010). To date (2015), 1,741 houses have been left unfinished.
In order to re-launch the project, Naif Kuri signed as a trustee, on May 19, 2010, the fourth modification to his predecessor’s trust fund. In this modification INVIES promised to pay, within 18 months, the 60 million pesos the institution owed to builders, with a 7% compensation rate and a 7.3% annual interest. To pay this amount, INVIES took on the task of promoting and selling the houses, backing out of its original offer of exchanging debt for land (Ochoa, 2012). Kuri argued that this exchange would have been unattractive to developers since the real estate values were very low. Throughout 2011 INVIES slowly re-started the works and re-branded the project to regain buyers’ credibility. In February 2011 Naif Kuri announced INVIES was going to offer 1,600 subsidy-eligible houses in Ciudad Satélite that year (INVIESc, 2011): “currently we are working on Macro plot 7, but all of them [referring to the macro-plots], have the services the population needs, like water, electricity, telephone, sewerage, public transit, security, commercial centers, banks, church and sport and leisure facilities” (INVIESb, 2011). Nevertheless, on June 30, 2011 CONAVI sued INVIES and banned the State from tapping into federal subsidies. This action prevented sales to unaffiliated workers and limited INVIES to selling the houses to INFONAVIT beneficiaries, contrary to INVIES’ initial ‘hard-to house’ target population. In response, INVIES reinforced its marketing strategy and opened three offices, one in their headquarters, one on site, and the last one in the Alameda, SLP’s transportation hub. According to Kuri, close to 30 people requested information per day at these selling points: “we left behind the times when nobody inquired about Ciudad Satélite”, declared the INVIES director in March 2011 (INVIESa, 2011). In that same month INVIES delivered 83 houses, with a further 50 in May and 20 in October. By January 2012 Kuri declared that sales were slow and stated that 2,400 houses were occupied12. Given the comparatively small number of housing sales, when the trust fund’s

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12 According to fieldwork conducted in the summer of 2013, 1,373 houses were occupied in Ciudad Satélite, around 1,000 less than what Kuri declared in January of the same year.
modified deadline to pay INVIES’ debts (November 2011) came, INVIES could not pay the developers. As a result, Naif Kuri left office in March 2012 and Macrina Martínez substituted him. Work was suspended throughout 2012 and it was not until September 2013 that INVIES put 1,309 houses in Macro-plots 7 and 8 back on the market (El Expres, 2013). However, Macrina also left office to become the State planning director in July 2014 and Manuel Foyo Mejía became the new director of INVIES.

Five years after work started on Ciudad Satélite, INVIES owed close to 60 million pesos to builders and federal institutions. It had changed director four times, signed four different agreements with developers and taken on the task of marketing and selling the houses to pay its debts. When De los Santos left office, the political drive that launched the project faded and many irregularities were discovered. The new administration sued some members of INVIES’s former staff for corruption, mismanagement of funds, group conspiracy and fraud (El Expres, 2012). Local newspapers reported that since 2010, González Hernández, former INVIES director, has been the subject of an arrest warrant for fraud related to the CS project. Additionally, the State’s Audit Office fined him 117.8 million pesos (8.8 million USD) and banned him from public office for 20 years. He is currently a fugitive in the U.S and the San Luis government is processing an order for his extradition (El Pulso, 2014; Pacheco, 2010; Antena San Luis, 2014). Also, in 2012, two INVIES functionaries were arrested for abuse of power and criminal association (Expres, 2012).
5.3.2 Second stage: privately-led housing development

Less than a year after the works started, in June 2008, INVIES changed its development strategy and put 230 hectares of land on the market (El Sol de San Luis, 2008). Having absorbed most of the risks of launching the project, it set out to sell macro-plots to private developers (see figure 5). In this second phase developers were placed in charge of building the necessary infrastructure within the macro-plot, developing the houses and selling them.

Figure 5. Macro-plots developed in the second stage.
Source: Adapted from SEGOB, 2007b
To encourage developers to invest in CS, INVIES agreed to donate the land for free if developers built the infrastructure works needed. Additionally, INVIES made it easier for developers’ to obtain building permits (INVIES & Dynámica, 2008; Martínez Benavente, 2008). Under this scheme two national construction companies developed land in CS. Dynámica, a developer from Guadalajara, acquired eight macro-plots (macro-plots 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12) with a total of 199.75 hectares.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro-plot number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Number of plots</th>
<th>Number of dwellings built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>CTM</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>El Manantial</td>
<td>Dynámica</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>El Manantial</td>
<td>Dynámica</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Urbivillas del Real</td>
<td>Urbi</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>1,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,139</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,968</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s fieldwork

Initially, Dynámica planned to build close to 10,500 houses (interview with INVIES staff member, August, 2012). Urbi, one of the three Mexican building companies listed on the stock market,\(^\text{13}\) acquired five macro-plots (macro-plots 4, 15, 16, 17 and 20) to build 7,000 houses (Obras, 2009). Urbi initially planned to build 1,660 dwellings in macro-plot

\[^{13}\text{Urbi was founded 31 years ago and has built more than 430,000 houses in 39 Mexican cities (Urbi, 2013).}\]
15. Finally, the Mexican Workers Confederation (CTM) acquired part of macro-plot 8 with a capacity of 300 plots but to date it has built only 52 houses.

**Dynámica builds “El Manantial”**

Dynámica formally acquired the land to build El Manantial in June 2008 and promptly started work (INVIES & Dynámica, 2008). The company first developed part of Macro-plot 8 and Macro-plot 9. By August 2009, the first houses were sold and the first residents arrived in October 2009 (Interview conducted with Dynámica staff member, October, 2014). According to INVIES staff, by 2010, 350 houses had been sold (INVIES, 2011i), and by May 2011, 800 (INVIES, 2011f). However, these figures contrast with those of a Dynámica staff member who stated in an interview that only 400 houses had been sold by 2011. By mid-2012, the company suspended work due to financial problems linked to the housing crisis and debts with INVIES. As a result, they closed their San Luis headquarters at the end of 2012, left the site in March 2013 and stopped paying for the maintenance of their on-site show house in September 2014. In total, Dynámica built 634 houses and left approximately 160 at different construction stages. When the company left, it transferred undeveloped macro-plots to its creditors (lenders and suppliers) to cancel its debts.

**Urbi builds “Urbivillas del Real”**

Urbi developed “Urbivillas del Real” (Urbivillas from here on) in Macro-plot 15 with a total of 1,660 houses. The works started in 2009 and the first houses were ready in 2010. Urbi adopted a stronger marketing strategy than INVIES, selling a ‘lifestyle’ instead of a house and competing with the institution for buyers. Strong marketing, fast construction and a product that sought to differentiate itself from the rest of Satélite allowed Urbi to build and sell 884 houses in approximately two years (interview with Urbi’s Community Development Manager, March 2012). However, this trend was interrupted in
May 2013 when Urbi made the news: “Housing disaster: Urbi, Homex and Geo Houses at the verge of bankruptcy” (Zona Lider, 2013). Urbi failed to pay its debts and as a result was sued by five international financial institutions. This situation was the tip of an iceberg that showed the collapse of a business and housing development model that was no longer sustainable, i.e., the massive construction of economic housing. Starting in 2000, technological advances in the building sector, abundant financial resources for both producers and buyers of housing, land availability, and fiscal incentives to accumulate land and build affordable housing all combined to stimulate the construction of massive housing developments in the urban periphery. Urbi is one of the most innovative development companies of affordable housing. In partnership with other building companies it developed an industrialized system that allows the company to build 24 houses per day (Urbi, 2010). With this rate of construction, Urbi was able to sell an average of 31,000 houses per year nationally between 2009 and 2012 (Urbi, 2013). This model entered in a downward spiral in 2008, when the financial crisis slowed housing sales dramatically and increased unpaid mortgages. In response, Urbi’s planning director announced a “defensive strategy” to face the global crisis: increasing the construction of social housing (for which there were acquisition subsidies) so that it represented the 94% of their income and reduced the production of residential housing (i.e., housing for higher income groups and for which no governmental subsidies are available) from 15 to 6% (Urbi, 2008).

Nevertheless, while Urbi was opting for a massive social-housing production model, policy changes gradually promoted alternative housing solutions such as the rental market, housing renovations and extensions and densification through vertical housing, negatively affecting Urbi’s investments. These changes accelerated the crisis faced by Urbi, which finally collapsed in 2013. This year was particularly difficult for large developers given that the presidential elections delayed administrative procedures and hence housing credits and subsidies were delivered later in the year. In addition, the new Urban Development
Ministry (SEDATU) strongly discouraged the massive production of housing. In February 2013, Peña Nieto (the newly elected president) announced the new Housing Guidelines upon which INFONAVIT’s 2014 subsidy regulations were based (DOF, 2013). These regulations encouraged developers to build within newly defined *contention perimeters* (closer to the city), closer to existing public *equipamiento*, and to develop vertical housing. These regulations affected large developers whose land reserves were outside those perimeters and whose development model was based on the massive construction of a horizontal housing model such as Urbivillas. Under these conditions, the three largest developers in Mexico faced the threat of bankruptcy; however, Urbi was the most affected given that it focused its investments almost entirely on affordable housing. According to Urbi’s April 2013 quarterly report, compared with previous periods, house sales decreased by 85% (Torres, 2008). In this context, Urbi started a financial restructuring process whereby it took bankruptcy protection measures to be able to pay its guarantors. In consequence, work on Urbivillas was suspended at the beginning of 2013, when Urbi reduced its on-site staff from around 15 people to 4 and focused on finishing and selling the houses that were already built (interview with Urbi’s Community Development Manager, May, 2013).

In sum, both macro- and micro-economic conditions affected the development of Ciudad Satélite, as well as the changing political and policy contexts at both local and national levels. Shifting the development scheme towards the private construction of houses allowed INVIES to act as a facilitator; in the words of an INVIES staff member: “Normally the Institute only promotes housing, it doesn’t produce or market it; Ciudad Satélite is an exception. However, it is slowly delegating those responsibilities; an example of this are the macro-plots developed by private builders” (August, 2012). Nonetheless, private developers became INVIES’s housing sales competitors given that the Institute had taken on the development and marketing of the first stage of the City. Public sector
processes and budgets are much more constrained than those of the private sector and INVIÉS was not able to offer extra bonuses to attract buyers, readily change providers to reduce costs or invest in community initiatives as Urbi did (interview with INVIÉS Projects Manager, February, 2012). Regardless, macro-economic factors and policy changes affected what looked like a promising development (Urbitellas) and both Urbi and Dynámica lost the land they acquired to the banks when they for failed to pay their debts or develop the land as contracted.

**Summary and conclusions**

CS’s megaproject was born out of a strong political will and the power to implement it. The project faded, however, with the end of the De los Santos administration; it is currently still developing but at only a very slow pace. The table below shows actual development against initial benchmarks. In the first stage, INVIÉS planned to build 32,000 dwellings by 2015, but built only 2,649, in four macroplots. In the second stage, INVIÉS privatized development and the two companies that invested in the City also lagged far behind their initial housing construction targets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Number of dwellings initially planned</th>
<th>Number of dwellings built (October 2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INVIÉS</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>2,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynámica</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbi</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: done by the author with the support of INVIÉS
The City’s development process highlighted some of the flaws that constantly dog the Mexican planning system. Namely, the lack of articulation between those who create urban plans and those – institutions, citizens or investors - in charge of implementing them and the tendency to treat planning as a product (where plans are used as tools to justify urban development) and not as a process (where alliances are made and participation takes place).

Paradoxically, CS was first designed and then planned. Both the modifications to higher level plans and CS’s Partial Plan were drawn up after the land was already acquired and the firm had designed the project. This shows how plans were used as tools to justify the mega-project. The PP justified the urban development of an isolated area of unused land by excluding other uses such as agriculture or cattle raising and defended the feasibility of the project based on water availability and road connections to the city.

The planning process also shows how knowledge can be produced and framed ad hoc. This was demonstrated by De los Santos administration’s strategy of using overestimated population projections to justify the project and of changing the metropolitan plan strategies with arguments that contradicted its intentions, i.e., to avoid concentrating housing for homogeneously poor groups and thus reproducing their exclusion. Knowledge manipulation was also a constant throughout the development process as the authorities increased their production and sales numbers.

The project shows a gap between the marketing strategy, the planning process, inter-institutional coordination and public participation. CS was marketed as the city of tomorrow, a garden city and a development pole, promising a better life for the working class in an ordered and fully served development. Proximity to jobs, public equipamiento, green areas, public spaces and services were central elements to the marketing strategy and were also the main premises under which CS was designed and planned. These premises, however, were not reflected in CS’s public equipamiento planning. The City
would house 132,000 people. With this population, CS should be ranked as a state-level urban center and hence be granted all the services and *equipamiento* needed to be independent from the capital city. Nonetheless, it was planned to depend on San Luis Potosi’s existing urban area for several facilities such as bus stations, theaters, universities, museums, hospitals, nursing homes, attorney general’s office, graveyard and funeral parlor. Furthermore, the planning process left out most of the institutions in charge of building and managing facilities, as well as potential beneficiaries of the project. In other words, the actors in charge of bridging the provision and management of public *equipamiento* were not involved in the planning process.

The construction process was beset by many challenges facing both public and private sectors due to macro- and micro-economic circumstances. INVIES tried to absorb most of the development risks by giving developers access to free land, credits and subsidies, but financial miscalculation and mismanagement delayed execution of the project and saddled INVIES with a large deficit. House sales were slower than INVIES initially expected and the slow pace at which public *equipamiento* and jobs were developing did not help. On the other hand, private housing development also faced many challenges. At a macro-economic scale, a sustained period of housing production, boosted through subsidies, was interrupted when economic crisis slowed demand. In addition, housing policy changed in 2013 to emphasize compact cities, densification and access to existing *equipamiento* and infrastructure. This shift affected developers whose land reserves were in the periphery and discouraged investment in places like CS. Finally, at a micro-economic level, even if CS offered the cheapest housing product in the market, families prefer to rent closer to the city or to buy in CS but not live there (absent owners rent or abandon the house with the hope that land values will raise they will be able to sell with a profit). As a result, housing sales are slow and abandoned, vacant and dilapidated housing is a common sight in the City.
6. LIVING IN CIUDAD SATÉLITE

Introduction

I haven’t seen any changes. On the contrary, it is getting worse, many residents abandon their houses…The developer fooled us when they showed us a video and a model to sell us [the houses]…but it is our fault, we shouldn’t accept a house like this, I see people dissatisfied…in three years [since he moved], I haven’t seen any changes, on the contrary, there are more street dogs, we still lack public lighting…we have to make developers accountable…here we had 20 families and now there are only 12, this is a ghost town(Interview with Alex, El Mananatial Resident, June, 2012).

Alex’s ‘ghost town’ perception of Ciudad Satelite was echoed by other residents who constantly referred to the City’s abandonment. This perception is fed by the high percentage of unoccupied houses, the lack of public equipamiento and neglect of open space, among other things. This reality contrasts with the promise of a garden city, a city of the future, marketed on the promotional video.

Under these conditions, life in Ciudad Satélite presents challenges for residents, such as long commuting distances to access services and job opportunities, limited local equipamiento and growing burglary and violence. These challenges have a negative impact on residents’ quality of life and household economy. Some of these challenges are linked to the very conception of a City located beyond the built-up area, far from existing services and planned to be occupied by a homogeneous impoverished population. However, when these characteristics are coupled with the lack of correspondence between what was planned and what was actually done, the result yields a poorly serviced
and connected City, built at less than 10% of its capacity\(^1\). Despite these conditions, CS is the least expensive housing option for young families eager to acquire a property. The possibility of owning a house endowed with all the basic services and infrastructure (electricity, water, sewerage and paved streets), in a ‘country’ environment is attractive for many INFONAVIT beneficiaries. As a result, the City is slowly growing and residents are organizing to demand the garden city they were promised. The strategies both residents and developers use to encourage organization and participation are directly linked to the City’s planning and development history as well as to the socio-economic and political context in which these are implemented. In this chapter I describe the general and socio-economic characteristics of the three case studies selected: Satélite, El Manantial and Urbi. Subsequently, I analyze the implications of Ciudad Satélite’s planning and development processes for the life of residents and the way they organize to demand services and *equipamiento*. Finally, I discuss the community organization models of each case and the strategies actors use to advance their interests.

### 6.1 Sub cases’ general characteristics

Currently, Ciudad Satélite comprises seven neighborhoods. Satélite and El Manantial were built and sold first; subsequently Nuevo Jardín, Urbivillas and Centenario; and finally, Macros 7 and 8 (which are still being developed). Satélite, Nuevo Jardín and Macros 7 and 8 were built and sold under the public development scheme (see Chapter 5), Urbivillas and El Manantial under the private development scheme and Centenario was developed by a union (see Figure 6).

\(^1\) According to the plan, 32,000 dwellings should have been built in the City by 2015. By the end of 2014 however, only 2646 (8.2%) of the houses were built.
This research focuses on Satélite, El Manantial and Urbivillas. These sub cases were selected on the basis of their size, age and community organization. As a result, the neighborhoods chosen are those with the largest number of houses sold, the oldest, and those with a stronger organization. These cases also present variability in terms of development strategy and actor leading development (i.e., public and private).

Satélite is the oldest neighborhood in the City. Satélite’s first 422 houses were delivered to new buyers on September 19, 2008, a few days before the Governor’s fifth annual report. However, housing sales were slower than expected. A local newspaper reported that potential buyers did not find “the offer adequate for the price demanded” (La
Jornada de San Luis, June 22, 2009). As a result, only 15 houses were inhabited as of January 2009. These numbers sharply increased in 2009, but decreased in 2010 and 2011, and plummeted in 2012 and 2013. Figures show a similar trend in El Manantial and Urbivillas but sales picked up in 2010 for the former and in 2011 for the latter (see Table XI and Figure 7).

2 The last round of survey data was collected during the summer of 2013. As a result, data for that year is not complete. However, all three neighborhoods show a downward trend from 2011.

### TABLE XI

PERCENTAGE OF RESIDENTS MOVING INTO CIUDAD SATÉLITE PER YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>El Manatial</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>22.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>35.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s fieldwork

Figure 7. Year residents moved in
Source: author’s fieldwork
As of 2013, Satélite was 74% occupied, El Manantial 50% and Urbivillas 42%. As a result, Satélite is not only the oldest but also the most densely populated neighborhood.

Urbivillas was growing steadily until Urbi went bankrupt. However, when the three neighborhoods are fully occupied, Urbivillas will house more people than Satélite and El Manantial together. As the figures show, Urbivilla’s land size and number of dwellings per hectare are considerably higher than the other two. Also, plots in Urbivillas are smaller (90sq. mts) than in Satélite and El Manantial (120 sq. mts).

### TABLE XII

CIUDAD SATÉLITE’S GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>El Manantial</th>
<th>Urbi</th>
<th>Ciudad Satélite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macroplot hectares</td>
<td>20.79</td>
<td>15.53</td>
<td>34.50</td>
<td>70.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of plots</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>1774</td>
<td>4077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density (houses per hectare)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of dwellings built</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>1261</td>
<td>2726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of people per household</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2431</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>2078</td>
<td>5812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population projected</td>
<td>3457</td>
<td>2565</td>
<td>6891</td>
<td>12913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage occupied</td>
<td>74.13</td>
<td>50.79</td>
<td>42.43</td>
<td>55.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Author’s fieldwork and Ciudad Satélite’s partial plan

Differences in density reflect developers’ urban design choices: Satélite and El Manantial followed the original ‘garden city’ housing layout according to which blocks are interspersed with open spaces and residents acquire larger plots. Conversely, Urbi maximized the number of plots by reducing their size and the area of open space. Despite these disadvantages, Urbivillas housing sold quicker than Satélite and El Manantial, and it was not only being occupied faster, but also attracting wealthier buyers. The next section
describes residents’ socio-economic characteristics, previous and current living conditions and occupancy rates. The last section analyzes the impact of planning development and residents’ socio-economic characteristics for the community organization models of each neighborhood.

6.1.1 Residents’ socio-economic characteristics

Initially, CS’s marketing target was non-affiliated buyers (i.e., independent workers): in other words, people traditionally excluded from social housing because they are not registered with a housing institution and must therefore depend on commercial loans. Independent workers can voluntarily affiliate to IMSS and INFONAVIT through a program called crezcamos juntos, ser formal te conviene (let’s grow together, formality is good for you, INFONAVIT, 2015). Nonetheless, the tax payment formalization required by the program discourages potential beneficiaries working independently from signing up, as many do not pay taxes. Additionally, INVIES made an agreement with a bank to provide loans at competitive interest rates (between 7 and 17%, compared with INFONAVIT’s 6 to 10%) and did not demand a formal paycheck as proof of income. The majority of buyers (69.1%) between 2008 and 2013 were, nonetheless, blue collar workers affiliated to INFONAVIT or similar institutions, while only 20.8% are independent workers (see table XIII).

According to the INVIES project manager (January, 2010), buyers failed to comply with all the bank mortgage requirements (which included an official ID, social security number, and credit and tax payment history) and as a result most people buying homes were those who could acquire their mortgage through INFONAVIT. In fact, in 2011 the percentage of INFONAVIT mortgages processed by INVIES in Ciudad Satélite was larger, he reported, than in San Luis Potosi (88% in CS compared to 68% in San Luis Potosi).
In other words, only 12% of mortgages in CS were obtained through bank loans or other means (survey data confirms this figure). As a result, INVIES failed to reach its initially targeted population.

CS is nonetheless one of the least expensive social housing options in San Luis and as such, the City houses a sector of the population that could not otherwise have access to property. The most affordable economic housing in the national market targets households earning between 2 and 5 minimum salaries. In CS, more than 50% of residents reported an average household income of less than 2 minimum salaries per month. Close to 40% of residents reported earnings between 2 and 3 and the remaining 10% four or more (see Table XIV). Both the mode and the mean income in Ciudad Satélite are below the State average for San Luis Potosí: according to IMSS figures, affiliated workers in the state of San Luis Potosí earn an average of 4 minimum salaries per month (INEGI, 2015). In sum, while INVIES failed to provide housing for non-affiliated workers, it accommodates the poorest sector of workers who can access a mortgage.

### Table XIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation of head of household</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar workers</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent workers</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student and unemployed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, N/A, missing</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey
### TABLE XIV

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>El Manatial</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>Ciudad Satélite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age of household head</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-35</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-55</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 or more</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational attainment of household head</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational College</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of household</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couple (no children)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-headed</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household income</strong>&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 or less (less than 2 minimum salaries)</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000-6,000 (2-3 MS)</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000-9,000 (4-5 MS)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,000-15,000 (6-8 MS)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 15,000 (9 or more MS)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tenure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey

---

<sup>3</sup> The minimum salary per month in 2013 was MX$1,866=US$139.9 (SAT, 2013)
Private property is central for young parents who want to acquire assets to start building the family’s wealth. Ciudad Satélite’s population is characterized by young household heads between 18 and 35 years of age, with 10 years or less of education (up to secondary school), living in nuclear families and earning low household incomes. The table below shows that, compared to Satélite and El Manantial, Urbivillas has a larger percentage of young household heads, with higher educational attainment. Even if nuclear families predominate (i.e., couples with children), the percentage of couples is considerably higher in Urbivillas than in the other two neighborhoods. Finally, the household income mode in Urbivillas is 2 to 3 minimum salaries; otherwise, it is generally less than two. This is also the neighborhood with the highest rates of ownership. Conversely, Satélite is characterized by older household heads, the highest percentage of household heads earning 2 or less minimum salaries (60.3%) and the highest percentage of household heads that did not finish primary school (5.5%). Finally, El Manantial presents the highest percentage of single-headed households (12.6%) and the lowest ownership rates (74.1%).

In other words, while Satélite and El Manantial present very similar socio-economic characteristics, Urbivillas attracts wealthier, younger and better educated residents. As will be explained in this chapter, Urbi’s ‘residential life concept’ plays an important role in attracting better-off families. The supply of housing in CS competes with single-family housing located closer to the city of San Luis Potosí. However, the houses closer to the city are smaller (90 m² vs 120m2 in CS) and more expensive (approximately US$18,800 versus US$13,500 in CS). Low prices (31.8%), large plots and ‘nice houses’ (23.3%), and a peaceful living environment (23.3%) were the most common responses residents gave when asked why they chose to buy their house in Ciudad Satélite. For Andrea, Urbivillas resident and mother of two toddlers, security and the possibility to buy a large plot were decisive:
We moved to Ciudad Satélite because my husband was looking for security, I mean for something private, with controlled entry, and well we only saw this development and my husband liked the plot because not all developers offer what we got for an affordable price (July 2012).

Security linked to the privatization of space emerged as a recurrent theme in interviews. Many residents reported wanting to close their streets in the future, once they organize with neighbors and collect the money to put up a gate at the entry. As a result, the privatization possibility offered by CS’s block layout is attractive for buyers. However, in only one case have residents actually privatized the block with an entrance chain during the day, although they remove it to allow for the police to be able to surveil the block at night.

Security is also central for Brittany⁴, a resident of Urbivillas. However, she links security to image preservation rather than to privatization:

[W]e liked the project, there is no vandalism, no graffiti, we cannot change the facades and kids can play in the street until late (July, 2012)

Living in a peaceful, country-like environment was frequently mentioned as an asset. According to Marcia, Satélite resident:

I like it in here because it is very quiet. Sometimes, we even have wild horses around! Also, the schools are very close. Ciudad Satellite was the best option for us, because there is no crime (Interview conducted in January, 2012).

Finally, residents praised the project’s design and infrastructure:

⁴All the names used in this dissertation are all pseudonyms, to secure participants' confidentiality.
I liked the project because, unlike San Luis, it has wide roads...the utilities are very good, like the PVC pipes, all underground, and the water system. The project is functional and the houses are well equipped with all the necessary services (Mr. Martinez, Satélite resident, December, 2011).

Conversely, few residents (12.4%) said they bought their house in Ciudad Satélite because it was the only option available for them (6.6%); because they wanted to own a house (3.1%); or because they had believed in false promises (2.7%).

Adriana’s reply shows how central private property is for her, despite the peripheral location:

Before, I lived much better downtown but we were renting and now this is our house so I am not thinking about leaving (Satélite resident, March, 2012).

Adrian, an Urbi resident, explained why he could not buy elsewhere:

We looked at another development...but we couldn’t get a credit for a house there. I was earning good money but my boss registered me with INFONAVIT with the minimum salary. That’s why I only had a few points. But here in Urbi the salesman managed to get me a credit (July, 2012).

In sum, acquiring a house in Ciudad Satélite is a positive experience for many residents. However, owning a house and enjoying adequate utilities and infrastructure does not meet all their needs. Services and equipamiento are also central. As a result, CS’s current conditions disappoint residents who bought their house thinking the City would develop the site as promised.

6.1.2 Comparing previous and current conditions

The first families arrived in the city in 2008 (3.3%) but most (78.4%) arrived between 2009 and 2011. Prior to moving to the City, more than half (53.5%) of the residents rented and 20.9% lived with their extended family. They typically came from
other social housing developments (52.8%) or from informal settlements (22.5%) (See Table XV).

### TABLE XV
PREVIOUS HOUSING CONDITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous housing</th>
<th>Satélite %</th>
<th>El Manatíal %</th>
<th>Urbivillas %</th>
<th>Ciudad Satélite %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With family</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lent</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social housing</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help housing</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey

According to Olga, a community leader from Satélite:

Ciudad Satélite is a good project that helped many families who were renting or lived at home [with extended family] but their relations had gone sour and here they found a new way of life (December 2012)
Figure 8 Satélite

Figure 9 El Manantial

Figure 10 Urbivillas
Close to two thirds respondents (64.6%) consider that their current house is better than the previous homes they occupied; slightly more than three fourths (76.6%) that their monthly total expenditure on is the same or worse; and more than half (53.9%) that the distance they have to travel to work is worse (see table XVI). In sum, while residents are satisfied with their property, for at least a third of the population, the City’s location and lack of local work opportunities impose additional strains on their budget and family lives.

TABLE XVI

PREVIOUS AND CURRENT CONDITIONS IN CIUDAD SATÉLITE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between previous and current</th>
<th>Better %</th>
<th>Same %</th>
<th>Worse %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly household expenditure</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to work</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s survey

For example, Alicia, a Satélite resident, travels an hour and a half on public transport to go to work. Her husband had passed away a year before I met her and she had to start working full time to support her two children, aged 8 and 9. When I arrived to schedule a meeting with her, the children were home alone waiting for their mum to come back from work.

In addition to distance, respondents’ satisfaction rates decrease sharply when infrastructure and equipamiento are included. As the table below shows, even when infrastructure and public transit were the highest rated, fewer than 40% of residents considered they had improved. By the same token, between 50 and 90% of respondents reported that their access to public facilities and private services (such as private doctors,
dentists and other professional services) is worse. This satisfaction figures show how, while Ciudad Satélite may fulfill a housing and basic services need, it fails to provide residents with adequate urban living conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between previous and current</th>
<th>Better %</th>
<th>Same %</th>
<th>Worse %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure*</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transit</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community facilities</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional services</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day care</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Water, sewerage and electricity

Despite of their facility needs, residents prioritize those that already exist but need improvement such as shops and other commercial facilities, health, education, and parks (the conditions of these are discussed in the following chapter). They do not accord such high priority to *equipamiento* that is not yet in place, such as sports centers, daycare centers and professional services (such as private doctors, dentists, accountants and lawyers).
Satélite resident Jorge described the City’s needs as follows:

In Ciudad Satélite we need a graveyard, a high school, a church, sports fields, and a hospital; we are not two people anymore...we are many. We also need a nice shopping center to buy groceries. Ciudad Satélite was supposed to be self-sufficient! (Jorge, February, 2012)

Jorge’s claim echoes the fact that, while the City is slowly growing, public facilities and services are not developing. As a result, the current conditions are far from what was sold to residents in the promotional video:
Ciudad Satélite, an authentic city macro-project proposes a strategic development plan that will be a land use model where housing, infrastructure and services and large open spaces will co-exist...the 50 hectares-urban center will house the main square, sports and administrative areas, health facilities, school areas for basic and high education, in addition to land for religious uses, restaurants, hotels, housing, cultural areas, a theater, museum and cinema (Gobierno del Estado, 2007).

Both the location of the City and the lack of *equipamiento* fail to attract new residents. Hence, even after the three neighborhoods were fully sold, occupancy rates remained low. Irene, a cluster representative from Satélite, manifests her concern:

> [W]e are abandoned here, they told us that the houses were going to have everything and there is nothing...sometimes people even prefer to leave(February, 2012).

Irene’s concern is reflected in falls in the Satélite and El Manatial occupancy rates between 2012 and 2013. In this period, Satélite lost 2 percentage points of occupants and El Manatial, 7%. Conversely, Urbivillas’ rates increased by almost 20 points in the same period. The age of the developments explains this difference, given that Urbivillas was still under construction and sales were in full flow when the data was collected. Other studies have shown that abandonment rates decrease gradually every year (CIDOC & SHF, 2011). On average, 30% of INFONAVIT-funded houses remained vacant during their first year, 18% the second and 16% the third. At a national level, in 2011, 26% of INFONAVIT housing, financed between 2006 and 2009 remained unoccupied⁵. Compared to these figures, El Manantial and Urbivillas are below the national mean; Satélite and El Manantial’s show the inverse trend with vacancy rates increasing and, while Urbivillas’ occupancy rate is sharply increasing, it is far from achieving the 16% average.

⁵ According to a satisfaction survey conducted by the institute, abandonment was linked to the location of the house and lack of utilities (CIDOC & SHF, 2011).
In addition to service scarcity and location, low occupancy rates may also be explained by double ownership. According to Jorge:

Ciudad Satélite should have been for people in need, we live here because we need the house but people that abandon their houses don’t. I think more than 50% of these people own houses in San Luis and own a second home in Ciudad Satélite that they either abandon or rent (Jorge, Satélite resident, February, 2012).

While some residents leave to be closer to services, others bought a second house in Satélite and are neither moving in nor renting it. This yields low occupancy rates that affect residents who invested and live in the City. Vacant houses put children at risk, degrade the image of blocks, and promote the presence of graffiti, housing invasions, vandalism, crime and theft, not to mention weed and garbage accumulation also attracting different types of wild animals. As a result, residents concerned with the image of their blocks sometimes organize to maintain vacant houses. In the words of Silvano, Urbivillas cluster representative:

I told my neighbors: if we have already tidied up our open space why don’t we do the same with the houses?...it is the block we live in ...I am not waiting for the neighbor who hasn’t set foot in the place for seven, eight months because I am the one affected, I will get the spiders and the vipers’ nest, the problem will be for everyone, not only for the [absent] neighbor (August 2013).
In a context devoid of a legal framework to enforce vacant housing maintenance and of authorities and developers facilitating safe living conditions and dealing with abandoned houses and absent owners, residents take the issue on their own hands and organize to clean other people’s properties. Likewise, residents organize in different ways to bid for and provide services and to carve spaces for the community. The next section analyzes the different community organization configurations of each neighborhood and the strategies actors use to advance their interests.

6.2 Community organization

Community organization in the three neighborhoods follows three main models. First, the top-down model consisting of a formal civil association ruled by a residents’ board and legally registered with a public notary. This model is promoted by developers seeking to formalize community organization processes in their developments. Secondly, a hybrid model whereby residents organize a junta vicinal de mejoras or residents’ upgrade committee (hereinafter RUC), also represented by a board and registered with the Municipal Social Development Department. This is the ‘official’ municipal avenue for public participation concerning public services. Third, a bottom-up model consisting of block-level organized groups in which a leader represents a cluster of families. Leaders are often part of the RUC’s board. In sum, these models complement each other and allow for residents to organize both at the block and neighborhood levels. Even when organization at a City-level could strengthen residents’ claims, it has remained issue-specific.

As in many other communities, organization in Ciudad Satélite faces many context-specific challenges: lack of jurisdiction, political disempowerment, weak social networks and trust and poor relationships between neighbors. These are not, however, linked only to the complex political, legal and financial history of the city but also to the housing policy
changes that have taken place in the last 25 years, paving the way for private developers to increase their decision power over housing developments.

**Jurisdiction**

As shown in the previous section, a complex political and financial context characterized the development process of the City. Throughout this process, some developers abandoned the City (i.e., Dynájica) and others (i.e., INVIES and Urbi) left construction works unfinished and sharply reduced the resources invested in community initiatives, maintenance and utility payments. As a result, residents re-organized, assumed increased responsibilities (e.g., for open space maintenance) and endured the consequences (e.g., lack of public lighting and garbage collection services). Additionally, developers left a jurisdictional void by which the administration of the City has not yet been transferred to the municipality. According to the Municipal Public Lighting Norm, “for the development of housing areas to be municipalized⁶, they have to be 100% built, to possess the infrastructure needed for the provision of public utilities and to be at least 60% inhabited” (Municipio, 2002). Another option is to municipalize part of the development (H. Congreso, 2012). In all cases the developer starts the procedure and is responsible for utility provision and maintenance until the municipality takes over. In line with these norms, Satellite already meets the occupancy requirement and Urbi could be partially municipalized. None of the developers has, however, started the municipalization process. Given the state of the works in CS, both developers prioritize investments to promote housing sales, putting off the costly infrastructural work needed to comply with municipalization requirements. In the case of El Manatial, Dynájica left without even initiating the procedure. As a result, Ciudad Satélite is still under the jurisdiction of

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⁶The municipalization of a development refers to the formal act by which developers hand over to the municipality the public *equipamiento* and infrastructure (e.g., roads, utility infrastructure and streetlight posts) built by the former in good working condition. From this moment on, the municipality is responsible for maintaining them and providing residents with the public services needed (H.Congreso, 2012).
developers that are either absent or bankrupt and, therefore, not responsive to residents’ needs. In parallel, the municipal government (in rivalry with the state government) hands all residents’ complaints over to INVIES, which has not been able to secure resources to municipalize developments, given the history of corruption and financial mismanagement throughout the planning and construction stages. Withholding the City’s jurisdiction also allows INVIES to control what, how and when housing and equipamiento are built. As the next chapter will show, this limbo hinders most community initiatives to acquire create services.

There is, then, no accountability and as Jorge (quoted at the beginning of the section) and many others stated, they feel abandoned. Residents are also confused because they pay property taxes to the municipality yet do not benefit from its services. Lola, a Satélite resident, expresses these concerns as follows:

[T]hey [INVIES] are supposed to pay [property taxes]…people say that because it [the neighborhood] is not liberated, I mean is not handed over to the municipal government, we shouldn’t pay and over there [in San Luis] they tell us that we do… that paying helps us here but what help? we are adrift (March, 2012).

Lola also mentioned that CS is in an administrative void and as a result, they have to manage different procedures, such as tax payment, construction and retail permits, in different entities, such as San Luis’ municipality, Pozos (the nearby county) and Zaragoza (the neighboring municipality):

[W]hen you go there [to San Luis] they tell you: ‘no, you have to go to Pozos’; they are completely confused, no one knows where we belong…At other times they also say we belong to Zaragoza…they blame each other and say ‘pay me, I’ll solve your problems later’ (idem).
Conversely, the lack of jurisdiction and public administration also generates opportunities or ‘cracks in the system’ that residents use to their advantage. This is the case of building permits and liquor licenses:

[T]hey haven’t asked for building permits yet; lots of people build without a permit; they should get a lawsuit; like a woman down in el Manantial, she is giving out beer permits allegedly signed by the Zaragoza mayor; these permits are very expensive and people are already selling beer. Luckily there are no inspectors here. Store owners are hanging the permits from their doors but they don’t even have a reference number (Carmen, Satélite resident, March 2012)

In sum, CS’s blurred jurisdiction affects residents in several ways: first, they have no one to hold accountable for the City’s lack of services and both developers and authorities pass the buck from one to the other. Second, residents are undertaking many of these responsibilities at their own expense while paying property taxes that do not lead to investments in the community. Finally, administrative procedures are confusing and time-consuming for residents.

**Political disempowerment**

Ciudad Satélite lost its political and economic momentum when De los Santos left office. According to Satélite resident Jorge:

I think the project would have gone OK if the PAN [De los Santos’s party] were still in power. The plan was marvelous but they lost interest when the administration changed. I think that’s why the project ended…I was shown a promotional video and I didn’t stop to think twice, I thought: ‘either San Luis or a wonderful place’ and well, I chose here (February, 2012).

The ‘wonderful place’ residents were promised became just one more instance of that which the municipal plan had criticized: a peripheral concentration of housing for the poor with limited services. This concentration of disadvantage dis-empowers residents not
only economically but also politically. Reduced resources and long distances to public offices discourage residents’ initiatives and demonstrations. Local demonstrations are fruitless in a context devoid of institutions that people can hold accountable on site. Demonstrating in San Luis’ main square or at the administrative offices, as other groups do to get political attention, is expensive and time-consuming. In an interview, Sra. Houston, community leader in El Manatial, mentioned how she and her neighbor Gretta both had to use personal resources to pay for one trip to San Luis whenever they filed a letter of complaint or visited a public servant (March, 2012).

The City’s isolation also reduces residents’ chances to build a political network outside their neighborhoods. In only two cases did cluster leaders have previous working experience in political organizations enabling them to draw on key contacts when needed.

**Social networks and trust**

In a context where political networks of support are weak, local relationships are central. Building them can, however, be a lengthy process. For the last three decades, buying an affordable house has been an individualized endeavor, whereas before the 1990s, housing was allocated through unions and organized groups and, as such, collectively negotiated and occupied (Puebla, 2002). As a result, social networks in newly constructed housing developments are commonly built from scratch. Six years after the first houses were occupied in CS, residents are still consolidating their network of relationships. Although interview participants repeatedly mentioned having problems with their neighbors, close to 40% of survey respondents reported having at least one friend or family member in their neighborhood. While the majority of residents (87.1%) report that their relationship with neighbors is the same or better in Ciudad Satélite than it was in their previous neighborhood, Satélite residents depict their relationships in a more positive light than do Urbivilla residents. In Urbivillas, the more recent development, more than half
(55.1%) of respondents have a friend or family member in the neighborhood, compared with 36% in El Manantial and 28.8% in Satélite. In all cases one relationship is more common than a more extended network of social relations (see Table XX).

A context of poverty and need also tends to promote the consolidation of support networks and community organization. The main issues residents organize around are those that directly affect the domestic sphere (i.e., health facilities, water services, garbage collection, public lighting and open space maintenance).

**TABLE XX**
FAMILY AND FRIENDSHIP TIES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship with neighbors</th>
<th>Satélite %</th>
<th>El Manantial %</th>
<th>Urbivillas %</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Have friends or family in Ciudad Satélite | | | |
|------------------------------------------| | | |
| Yes                                     | 28.8 | 36 | 55.1 | 39.3 |
| No                                      | 71.2 | 64 | 44.9 | 60.7 |

| Number of friends or family | | | |
|-----------------------------| | | |
| 1-2                         | 37.5 | 71.4 | 55.5 | 50 |
| 3-4                         | 25   | 14.3 | 25.9 | 24.2 |
| 5-6                         | 25   | 14.3 | 3.7  | 13.7 |
| More than 6                 | 12.6 | 0    | 14.8 | 10.3 |

| Distance to respondent's house | | | |
|-------------------------------| | | |
| Close                         | 25.2 | 24 | 44.7 | 32.1 |
| Far                           | 9.9  | 16 | 10.5 | 10.8 |
| N/A                           | 64.9 | 60 | 44.7 | 57.1 |

Source: author’s survey
Given that more than half of the women work at home (survey data) they are the most involved in community organizing; however, few have previous experience. With the exception of the two community leaders mentioned before, few cluster representatives have organizing and petition-writing experience or knowledge of laws and regulations. For these women, organizing their blocks and formalizing initiatives has been a learning curve. Leaders are bridges between neighbors and authorities and, as such, they undertake activities at different levels. At the block level they have to assess local needs, conceive and plan solutions to solve those needs, collect and manage money, organize people and build relations of trust. Outside the block, they act as advocates to attract attention and resources, deal with administrative issues, relate to politicians, public servants and the media. Referring to her experience with Satélite’s first civil association, Lola, a board member, asserts:

[T]he association’s formalization process was half way through but it wasn’t finalized. After the notary public it has to go to the public registry and after more or less a month they officially recognize it…I learned a lot from this experience (March, 2012).

Even if this learning curve is necessary, support from experts could provide them with the necessary tools to avoid mistakes, build trust and elicit participation. Residents repeatedly talked about leaders mishandling neighbors’ money collected for different issues (e.g., maintenance and open space construction), lack of transparency and mistrust. On the other hand, leaders expressed how challenging it was for them to promote participation. In the words of Gretta, El Manantial community leader:

[I]t is very hard to get people to participate. People are happy when they get a benefit but then they just conform and do nothing. If we have an initiative, people support it with signatures but they don’t move a muscle (March, 2012).
In sum, the individualized allocation of housing tends to promote the development of social networks from scratch in new housing developments. Networks in Satélite are gradually consolidating. In Urbi, the youngest development, relations seem to be denser. This may be a reflection of Uribilllas residents’ satisfaction level, as a result of which they attract friends and family into the neighborhood.

Mistrust and lack of participation are two of the main challenges leaders face. These stem, among others, from administrative mismanagement, lack of community organizing experience and a weak participatory culture.

**Relationship between neighborhoods**

If community organizing presents challenges at the neighborhood level, these are exacerbated at the City level. Residents rarely visit other neighborhoods and leaders seldom work with the leaders of other neighborhoods. Contact among residents takes place in specific locations such as the school, the tortilleria, the church (for Sunday mass), the health center and the water rates payment office. Also, on only few occasions have residents participated in joint petition-signing to demand services. Such is the case of a petition to request extended service hours at the health center, promoted by Olga, a Satélite leader. However, these collaborations have not yielded meaningful partnerships.

When asked if people from other neighborhoods were participating in the market project, another of Olga’s initiatives, Delia, a cluster representative, replied:

> We don’t know, in fact, at the meeting there are only people from Satélite and I don’t even know if the other neighborhoods have representatives or not; well, I know that Urbi, Nuevo Jardín and Satélite do…but I don’t know if they are working or not…we’ve never had a meeting where someone said: let’s invite people from other neighborhoods! (February, 2012).
It was only recently (in 2014) that Satélite residents participated in two demonstrations led by El Manantial leaders to demand water, given that the service had been scarce for several weeks and more school furniture given that new children were registering and desks were not enough. Despite these initiatives, leaders prioritize community work within their neighborhoods over City-wide initiatives. Even if some acknowledge the need to create alliances and work together, others fail to recognize that communities have needs in common. Delia, a block representative, told me about her experience at one of the community meetings with INVIES organized by Satélite cluster leaders:

Lots of people [from Nuevo Jardín] had problems with their houses and when they knew we organized meetings with INVIES, they came up here and complained: ‘I don't have electricity in my house!’…and people [from Satélite] replied: ‘go solve your problems in Nuevo Jardín!’ and wouldn't let them participate here so it would be very difficult for the 4 neighborhoods to come together…they rejected our closest neighbor, more so Urbi and El Manantial…They did the same for the catechism…and have done so with everything even though we’re all living in the same community!!! (February, 2012).

The failure to work together has also resulted from social prejudices towards each other. When I asked Olga if Satélite representatives worked with people from other neighborhoods she replied:

[W]e don’t want infections …El Manantial is full of graffiti and gangs…why would we want people from another neighborhood in here? We know there are drugs over there so why bring them here?…we are not working with Macro 2 [Nuevo Jardín] either, we are already consolidated whereas Macro 2 has very few families and their needs are different. They complain about the quality of their houses and we would have to hear all that (December 2012).

Interview respondents from Satélite repeatedly stated that El Manatial is worse-off than their neighborhood. On the other hand, they constantly praised Urbivillas and
perceived it as higher-end housing. By the same token, Urbi residents look down on other neighborhoods. The quote below reflects the perception of Satélite, reported by Andrea, an Urbi resident: “We’ve been told that there are lots of punks in Ciudad Satélite…they even broke into Urbi’s houses, many people said burglars were from Satélite” (July, 2012).

These perceptions are not only linked to socio-economic differences but also to Urbi’s branding strategy. Even though survey data confirms that Urbivilla’s residents earn more and are more educated than the rest, social differences are not sufficiently marked to justify such perceptions: 88.6% of Urbivillas households earn 3 minimum salaries compared with 92% in Satélite and 94.7% in El Manantial. These perceptions also stem from the ‘residential lifestyle’ image Urbi builds around its developments. In the words of Tita, an old Satélite representative:

I think that the problem with Satélite is that it was developed by the government. Further up is Urbivillas, they [referring to Urbi] thought right away of a small commercial center…in no time, they put together commercial spaces. Over there it is well taken care of while here it is degraded. Several neighbors have transferred their mortgage and left (January, 2012).

Tita expresses a general belief that private is better (this was true before Urbi’s bankruptcy, but changed radically thereafter) and highlights the importance residents give to *equipamiento* and services and to good maintenance. Construction of two facilities (a community center and unfinished commercial center), maintenance of public spaces and vacant houses, ornamented facades and strong marketing are Urbi’s strategies to brand a ‘residential lifestyle’. This lifestyle discourse is reflected in Urbivillas residents’ perception of others:

[W]e are getting them [Urbivillas residents] used to the residential life…but they are becoming very snobbish because when they go to school with people from the other neighborhoods, differences become visible, the people from Urbivillas are
more demanding and critical and they think poorly of the others and there is a rift (Ilse, an Urbi community worker, May, 2013).

However, as shown before, this discourse also permeated the perceptions of residents from Satélite and El Manantial. In sum, prejudices about each other reflect lifestyle discourses (supported by maintenance, image and facility construction) more than actual socio-economic differences. These prejudices along with a failure to identify common needs (Urbivillas residents believe their needs are very different from other neighborhoods) and the lack of shared spaces to organize, hinder possibilities to advance initiatives at the City level.

Through different strategies and community development models, block representatives and leaders in Ciudad Satélite navigate through the different challenges involved in community organization. As shown in this section, these challenges stem from different factors: from policy design and implementation to social relations. In all cases, however, the contested planning and development context of the City influences the way residents organize, the initiatives they are able to advance and the strategies they use. In the next section I analyze the community organization models of the three neighborhoods.

Additionally, I approach community organization from three different perspectives: 1) through the implementation of a government open space regeneration program in Satélite; 2) from the bottom-up in El Manantial and finally; 3) around a ‘residential lifestyle’ in Urbivillas.

6.2.1 Community organization in Satélite

Satélite was the first development in the City and INVIES’s showcase neighborhood. The institution not only maintained certain open spaces and placed public *equipamiento* (i.e., schools, health center and grocery store) close to the neighborhood but also intervened in the formation of a short-lived resident-led civil association. In parallel to
INVIES’s gradual retreat, this association changed its board and finally dissolved, giving way to a residents’ committee. This committee is organized in clusters, each represented by a leader. Together, they have worked on different initiatives, not without conflict, given that leaders’ strategies are diverse and sometimes contradictory. This section discusses some of the challenges involved in community organization, focusing in particular on the implementation of an open space upgrading program.

From Civil Association to Residents’ Committee

INVIES promoted the formation of the first organization, the Asociación Civil de Colonos de Ciudad Satélite (Residents’ Civil Association of Ciudad Satélite, hereinafter RCA). Nevertheless, it was an autonomous, resident-led community organization (interview with Delia, a Satélite cluster representative, February, 2012). One of the main objectives behind its formation was to take over some of INVIES’s managerial responsibilities such as open space maintenance and police surveillance once the development was municipalized. To this end, the association’s board drew up a constitution and signed it before a public notary; however, the association was not officially registered in the municipal registry and as such not legally recognized as an association.

Some interviewees think the RCA was well organized and that it ran a range of activities (such as an annual marathon), supported by INVIES’s on-site sales staff. Others argue that it was not representative of all blocks and that members of the board mishandled residents’ financial contributions. Delia, a current cluster representative, argues the following:

[T]hey [the RCA board members] didn’t want to help us and didn’t want to quit because they received a salary. On top of that, that committee was never elected by residents; since they came first, they self-proclaimed and, as the development grew, they kept looking after the wellbeing of their streets and blocks and they didn’t attend to our needs. They wanted to obtain a personal benefit and
we argued that there is no personal benefit, no way! If you are going to work you do it for your neighborhood not for economic advantage (February, 2012).

RCA board members were never charged with corruption but internal frictions pushed for the formation of a new, albeit short-lived board. Finally, in October 2011, the association dissolved and a RUC (Residents’ Upgrade Committee) was formed. In addition to internal and personal frictions, residents disagreed with the figure of an association, commonly used in high-end housing developments such as gated communities for managing maintenance fees. Current representatives repeatedly argued that the constitution of the first association characterized CS as a ‘middle class development’ and, as such, it had limited access to governmental programs:

[W]e are registered as middle class and we don’t have the right to demand CONASUPO [extinct institution in charge of subsidizing food and distributing stamps], nor aid for seniors nor scholarships and no access to oportunidades either [program that targets people in extreme poverty] - because the development is middle class! In other words, because we have money! But that was before. That’s why we asked them [first board association members] to quit so that we can have a different committee registered with the government (February, 2012).

Moreover, respondents agreed that a RUC is more appropriate for the neighborhood since it is an entity recognized by and dependent on the municipality while an association is independent from the government.

Satélite’s RUC is composed of 17 cluster representatives from which six board members are elected. Olga, the RUC president, calls for meetings once a month. In the meetings she addresses neighborhood issues related to services and equipamiento following a tight agenda:
The meetings are attended by whoever can and whoever wants to, I don’t keep an attendance list; but then they [absent representatives] have to accept whatever is agreed among attendees. I don’t think people here are used to working like this; so they are surprised, I think they like to gossip and expect our meetings to be like that but no, I go over pending issues and we go (Olga, March, 2012).

Olga and a group of motivated women and a few men have organized community initiatives for about three years. Olga worked for a political party where she supervised over 2000 women. Therefore, she is experienced in legal and administrative procedures and, as a result, is a valuable asset for the community. Prior to moving to Satélite, Olga lived in the State of Mexico until she decided to sell her house and invest in three houses in Satélite where she moved in with her family. With some of that money she also opened a family business where she and her children run a cybercafé and sell presents, stationery and food. Her business is centrally located by the bus station on the main avenue. This puts her at a vantage position not only to attract customers but also to observe the neighborhood’s movements. As a result, she is in contact with a wide range of residents and acts as the community’s ‘eyes on the street’. One day for example, she saw how people from the health department were carrying under-used furniture out of the health center so she immediately called INVIES’s staff who negotiated its return. From her business, she also manages a welfare program that distributes powdered milk to families. Olga’s tasks as president are varied: she does ground work to recruit representatives, mediates conflicts between residents, writes petitions, contacts institutional representatives and calls and facilitates RUC meetings. However, she avoids asking for money since this has proven to cause many problems. Mistrust is not only related to money: Olga has also met resistance when it comes to sharing personal information. In an effort to collect information residents could use to attract government programs based on population counts, Olga led a City-wide community census initiative but participation was
poor. According to Olga: “...I’ve tried to encourage cluster representatives to have this information available but many times people ask me about the use I’ll make of the information…” (Olga, March, 2012).

Together with the RUC, Olga has led different initiatives to attract public equipamiento to the neighborhood, such as a project for a public market and a sports center and a petition to extend the health center service hours (see chapter 7). These initiatives follow Olga’s cautious approach; nonetheless, not all board members share her point of view:

One of the board members proposed we do a protest to be heard, but that is very tiresome; you discredit your neighborhood. Ciudad Satélite is a beautiful project, we are not going to squeal like pigs to attract attention when we know they [government officials] are butchers, I don’t want to expose our human misery to entertain others...I’ve had frictions with this woman, she works differently and wants to hold a demonstration for everything. I don’t have time to do that; I arrange everything by phone and go out as little as possible because I have a business to run (Olga, March, 2012).

Olga’s quote not only highlights a clash between different strategies to negotiate demands but also a fear of exposure. Carmen, a cluster representative further develops this point:

[W]e have to raise our voice so that people hear that we are in need but then we are negatively affected because people [new residents] won’t come. They’ll say: ‘there is a water problem, there are these other problems!’ So it is a two-edged sword for us. I really love my house and my neighborhood but sometimes you look again and say ‘my goodness we are really lacking many things!’ (Carmen, March, 2012).

Residents are constantly reminded by institutional representatives that, in order for them to obtain equipamiento and services and more resources to flow into the community,
the City needs to populate. Therefore, representatives such as Carmen and Olga fear that openly exposing the City’s needs will discourage newcomers.

In addition to writing petitions, meeting with INVIES’s on-site staff is a resource commonly used by Satélite residents. Nonetheless, even if this possibility lets residents hold the institution accountable, meetings rarely produce results. Jorge, a Satélite representative, prefers other strategies:

\[ \text{In meetings [with INVIES], people shouted and cursed but no one did anything [referring to INVIES]. I’ve obtained more things in one-on-one discussions with INVIES’s sales staff. If they don’t pay attention I threaten to send a crowd over to hassle them (February, 2012).} \]

Jorge’s statement shows that representatives hold different views on how to organize the community and that initiatives are atomized. In 2014 the RUC seldom met. Olga kept busy with a new restaurant she had opened in the neighborhood and INVIES left its on-site offices, outsourced housing sales and moved its show houses to Macro 7. As a result, residents lost the direct contact with INVIES they had enjoyed for years and community organization activities slowed down. Finally, in 2014 a group of residents participated in a couple of demonstrations organized by El Manantial leaders.

In sum, changing the association into a committee was not without problems. However, residents believed that being seen as an ‘association’ tagged them as a middle-class development, ineligible for governmental programs. Therefore, the RUC was an official alternative that provided residents with an umbrella structure under which they could work together from different standpoints and philosophies.

Neighborhood-level organization is underpinned by organization at the ground level, which also presents many challenges. The following section identifies some of the
challenges residents faced in the implementation of a government program targeting open space and façade maintenance.

**Organizing around a government program**

Olga keeps an updated record of representatives and their housing clusters. On a map, she identified the location of representatives and clusters in seventeen house clusters (see Figure 12).

![Figure 12. Organization of clusters](image-url)
These community leaders work with families clustered in groups that do not always coincide with block layout. The smaller cluster groups 27 houses and the larger 106 (between 17 and 91 occupied houses). In some cases, cluster members meet once a month for an update on neighborhood affairs and to organize around open space maintenance and special celebrations (e.g., festivities and birthdays). In others, they only meet to address specific issues (e.g., public lighting). The degree of participation varies greatly but representatives generally complain that encouraging attendance is challenging.

Cluster residents also meet to apply for welfare programs. Even if most such programs target individual beneficiaries under the poverty line (i.e., lacking the resources to fulfill basic needs); institutions often request a neighborhood representative to present applications. Working through a representative saves residents individual trips to file their applications and eases institutional procedures. In addition to sending applications, representatives also help potential beneficiaries with basic procedures such as obtaining an ID. Currently, residents benefit from three programs funded by the federal government: 70 y más, Liconsa and Oportunidades. Through these programs the elderly receive a pension (42 USD a month), and low-income families can buy subsidized milk and receive money to meet health, nutrition and education needs. Additionally, residents have received blankets, food, toys and trees from other institutions, albeit not on a regular basis.

Programs such as Oportunidades prioritize individuals living in marginal areas (as defined by SEDESOL). This explains residents’ disagreement with the ‘middle class’ characterization of the neighborhood on the RCA’s registration. The measurement of marginality, however, is not linked to a neighborhoods’ organizational model. Instead, institutions (i.e., SEDESOL) define marginal areas based on census and urban data. According to SEDESOL, Satélite is not marginal and hence is not entitled to most area-based public programs. These programs target settlements deprived of basic infrastructure (most of which are informal) and, although CS lacks many services and public
equipamiento, the basic ones (street paving, water, sewerage and electricity) are in place (Interview with SEDESOL staff member, March, 2012). Additionally, the municipality is the entity responsible for applying to area-based programs but CS is not municipalized yet.

INFONAVIT’s program ‘Recovery and Rehabilitation of Neighborhoods’ (hereinafter Rehab) does, nonetheless, support social housing residents’ initiatives to maintain their developments. Rehab targets “…developments financed by INFONAVIT with urgent problems, by means of social and physical interventions…” (INFONAVIT, n.d).

The main objectives of the program are to: 1) promote resident participation and strengthen their community organization; 2) increase security through public space improvement; 3) promote the construction of spaces that encourage identity production and; 4) increase the surplus value of houses and improve community economic development (Idem). The program is initiated by a request from an organized community. If granted, a community organizer and a ‘community architect’ coordinate residents’ efforts and conduct participatory workshops to design the project. In Satélite, residents of three clusters organized and applied for funds. Delia, a cluster representative, talks about the implementation of the program:

[W]e met and sent a petition to INFONAVIT. We received 10,000 pesos (750 USD) to buy something for our gardens and we had to divide it into three spaces so each of us got very little, about 3000 and something [pesos]…we built a grill and a gazebo in one space. In front of where we live we cooperated and bought a slide and a grill and in the third space we helped build a small shrine [to place the statue of the Virgin Mary] (March, 2012).

In Delia’s block, residents agreed upon a project and matched INFONAVIT’s scant resources to buy children play equipment (see Figure 13). Even if they were satisfied with the results, the equipment did not last long:
The issue was that, since we were the only ones with play equipment, our space was saturated with children and the equipment broke so we are figuring out how to repair it and make it stronger...another [representative] asked for grass and the other for a grill with a roof that is completely broken. The issue here is that we need sturdy things and they are expensive...the roof just flew off! The winds are very strong here (Delia, March, 2012).

Delia highlights the importance of ongoing efforts to maintain open spaces. The institution seeds money hoping the community organization drive endures after the project is built. Hence, INFONAVIT programs do not include maintenance funds. In many cases residents organize to tidy up open spaces but they rarely contribute to expenses for repairs, as needed for the play equipment or the roof of the grill. Brenda lives in the block where the fallen roof was built. She and her husband donated construction materials and their own labor (see Figure 15). She narrates her experience as follows:

[T]he project was done by a woman from another block; she was appointed by INFONAVIT and decided what to do: she subcontracted with someone from Mexico, recommended by INFONAVIT and built a project just to muddle through...Afterward [when the project was finished], she wasn’t held accountable. The problem was that we didn’t organize ourselves; people wouldn’t come out and this lady did what she wanted on her own...the roof looks ugly and it is dangerous, we want to pull it down, we don’t use it, it doesn’t protect us from the sun, the grill is badly placed; we had several projects, and we already had a sketch when Jacinta [the organizer] came, but the neighbors were disillusioned with the project and the enthusiasm faded (January, 2012).

Neighbors’ lack of organization resulted in the intervention of an outsider who could not deliver the project they imagined. The gazebo under which children could play and residents could hold meetings resulted in a dangerous roof that is currently half fallen down.

This experience shows how implementing these projects requires both a readily available community organization structure and expertise to manage both participation and resources within tight institutional time frames.
Figure 13. Grill and games

Figure 14. Pedestal

Figure 15. Fallen roof
Program times are not always in line with community times. In the third block, for example, neighbors organized late and as a result they had to return unspent funds. When Angie, an early childhood stimulation worker, and her neighbors were called to participate in Rehab very few people showed interest. Therefore, she undertook the administration and benefited from the program’s funds even though she is not affiliated to INFONAVIT:

[P]eople didn’t want to work, including INFONAVIT beneficiaries...we have around 50 houses here but only about 8 people worked...and none of the people who worked are registered but we took the opportunity and put up a garden, grass, plants, trees and at the end, with the remaining money, we bought paint and painted our house facades (March, 2012).

Angie’s block was the only one that applied the resources obtained to maintaining private properties. Generally, however, residents prefer to invest the money in public spaces. In addition to painting facades and landscaping, Angie and her neighbors also built a small shrine for the Virgin Mary (see Figure 14). As time passed, interest faded but residents were left with the equipment to continue maintaining their open space:

[W]e are only three neighbors left out of the eight who were involved before...the man over there looks after and waters the plants because we have the hose and he is the leader, that’s why it is pretty here, it is maintained (Idem).

Rehab is one of the few area-based programs to which Satélite residents can apply. The program aims to promote community organization and economic development through public space improvement. In Satellite the program was applied in three open spaces with mixed results. In all cases, however, organizing at the block level to implement a public program was challenging for residents whose community organization structure is still in the making. Rehab objectives were partially met. After less than a year,
both the play equipment and the roof were broken, affecting the overall image of blocks.
Conversely, project leaders were left with tools they continue to use to maintain their spaces. Programs such as Rehab lack resident training and follow-up components to be adequately implemented, and they have no medium-term plan that includes ongoing resources to finish and maintain projects in order to sustain them in the long run.

6.2.2 Community organization in El Manantial

[N]o one is interested in us…INVIES makes promises but then nothing. I went to a meeting where the INVIES representative almost got beaten up because he wasn’t giving any answers, he always said the same so I don’t go to those meetings anymore (Gretta, president of the residents’ committee, March, 2012).

Since March 2013, when Dynámica left, El Manantial residents have been struggling for accountability. However, they are faced with an out-of-State absent developer and blurred institutional jurisdiction. In this context, residents have used different strategies and addressed a wide range of institutions to demand services.

Unlike INVIES or Urbi, Dynámica did not work with residents to organize the community. In fact, when I asked Nancy if Dynámica implemented community programs in its developments she replied: “…no, on the contrary, the less we had to work with residents, the better…” (October, 2014). As a result, residents organized from the bottom up. First, two leaders organized an informal committee: Mrs. Houston, an older woman, was in charge of writing and submitting the neighborhood’s’ requests to politicians and public servants and Greta, a young mother, knocked on neighbors’ doors asking for their support.

Like Olga (Satélite’s committee president), Sra. Houston had previous experience of community organizing and political participation. She worked in a civil association on issues related to freedom of information, democracy and public participation. Therefore,
she was well connected and knew how to navigate the political system. Together, the two women wrote six letters requesting services and *equipamiento*, infrastructure works, utilities and the municipalization of the development (see table below).

#### TABLE XXI
FIRST COMMITTEE LIST OF REQUESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Addressee</th>
<th>Petitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05-July</td>
<td>INFONAVIT</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (police, public transit, street market, open spaces); infrastructure (sewerage and public lighting); housing-related issues (fencing, waterproof roofs, solar heaters and water reservoirs); and municipalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-sep</td>
<td>DYNAMICA</td>
<td>Public lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-oct</td>
<td>DYNAMICA</td>
<td>Efficient water service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05-Apr</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (health center, sports center, open spaces); Infrastructure (street paving and public lighting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-may</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (tot lots); Infrastructure (street paving and public lighting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08-Dec</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (administrative office and police post, public space maintenance); Infrastructure (public lighting)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: El Manantial’s RUC

Although these letters were addressed to public institutions at different levels, Dinámica remained their main target until 2010. In their requests, residents sought to hold the developer accountable and framed their claims as those of deceived clients. The excerpt below was addressed to INFONAVIT, the federal housing institution, in an attempt to denounce Dinámica’s practices and request the institution’s intervention:
We bought [our houses] from Dynmica but the firm doesn’t stick to its promises. We turn to your precious intervention so that the above mentioned developer, who has been deaf, attends to our requests. We have channeled our complaints to Dynámica and INVIES but no one solves anything, they just drag their feet (July 5, 2010, Neighbors Committee).

From these letters, the most pressing needs faced by El Manantial residents are public lighting, better and more regular public transport, paving the street that leads to the schools path as well as the provision of public facilities such as tot lots (small playground for children) and a sports and community center.

Public lighting is one of the most contentious services. The cables that fed the main street with electricity were stolen during the construction works. This provoked security concerns among residents.

We address this letter to you [to Dynámica’s representative] in all kindness so that you keep your word and provide us with public lighting…it is a danger for our children, for Dynámica workers and all of us…will you pay us for everything that can happen to us during the night?...we expect a reply soon, thank you (September 11, 2010, Neighbors Committee).

Gretta and Mrs. Houston did not receive any reply from either public institutions or from Dynámica. Further, when the developer left, it stopped paying for public lighting within blocks and, as a result, most of the development remains in darkness throughout the night.

In 2013 Gretta and Mrs. Houston fell out and Gretta organized with other neighbors to register a junta vicinal or residents’ upgrade committee with the municipality in October 2012.

**Organizing around service claims**

RUCs are citizen organisms that group between 100 and 600 households. Their main objective is to “…work with the municipality on plans and programs and to request
the public services needed from different institutions, always striving to improve the quality of life of the community members they represent” (H. Ayuntamiento, 2009: 19). Gretta narrates the experience of forming a RUC:

Our residents' committee will be three years old in October [2015]. People from the municipality came to invite us to [do] what??, we had a meeting, registered and got our credentials...We used to meet often to talk about the electricity service, we wrote petitions and made a work plan. We also organized meetings in every block with at least 4 members of the board (December, 2014).

### TABLE XXII

**RUC STRATEGIES AND RESULTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>Blocked Dynámina's lorry</td>
<td>Replacement of electrical transformer, Public lighting, lower water charges, eviction of squatters, municipalization, commercial and community centers, open-air gym, public spaces and vacant housing maintenance</td>
<td>Signed agreement Dynámina did not honor Cleaning of green areas, tree donation, temporary electric generator, reduced water connection fees, census of squatter homes, dog-neutering campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>Press release</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>Demonstration at the Mayor's administrative unit</td>
<td>Garbage collection</td>
<td>Municipal garbage collection service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>Road obstruction</td>
<td>Additional teachers and furniture for primary school children</td>
<td>Afternoon shift and new desks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>Siege of the water rate payment offices</td>
<td>Lack of water for a week</td>
<td>Water service renewed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on El Manantial RUC documents
El Manantial’s RUC is led by a board of 6 women residents. Together, they use different strategies to frame their claims such as visits to public servants, media exposure, public protest at the municipality, road obstruction, a siege at the water offices and the ‘kidnapping’ of a Dynámica lorry (see table XXII).

These strategies were often accompanied by a written petition. Between 2012 and 2014 the RUC wrote over 15 petitions (see Table XXIII). In all cases, the most ‘visible’ strategies were those that attracted more attention and yielded more positive results. This is the case, for example, of the press release organized by the RUC at the end of July 2014.

After meeting with Gretta in San Luis, a journalist visited El Manantial. The next day he wrote on the front page of a local tabloid: “Ciudad Satélite is forgotten: burglaries, gangs, invaded houses, cracks on the walls and lack of services: Dwellers suffer” (Vazquez, 2014). The article referred to CS as an “insecure ghetto” and challenged the statements of the State’s Secretary General who claimed that the project was viable and would not be a problem for the next administration. In parallel to the periodicazo, residents wrote three letters (see table XXIII: July 30, August 1 and 6, 2014), addressed to the Governor, the Public Security Ministry and INFONAVIT. In these letters, residents asked the institutions to restore the public lighting service on the main avenue and four more blocks, evict squatters, clean vacant houses (see Figure 17), reduce water bills, build a community and a commercial center and municipalize the neighborhood.

7 This is how residents refer to the event. Literally, periodicazo means to hit someone or something with a newspaper. In this context it refers to a harmful press release.
### TABLE XXIII

**LIST OF RUC REQUESTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Addressee</th>
<th>Petitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05-nov</td>
<td>Electricity Commission</td>
<td>Electric service reparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-nov</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (tot lots, commercial center, sport center and health services); infrastructure (public lighting); donations (trees and grass, food, construction materials and Christmas presents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-nov</td>
<td>DYNAMICA</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (garbage collection, sports center, commercial center, land for a church, public space and vacant housing maintenance, greening, community center); infrastructure (sewerage and public lighting, telephone and internet services, street pavement); housing-related issues (fencing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-feb</td>
<td>State Congress</td>
<td>Public lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-feb</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>Public lighting and general services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-mar</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Public lighting and municipalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24-oct</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>Public lighting and electric service reparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-abr</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Public lighting and municipalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-may</td>
<td>State government</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (garbage collection, vacant housing maintenance, public transit and street-dog shelter); infrastructure (public lighting); municipalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-jul</td>
<td>State government</td>
<td>Public lighting, support with occupied houses and municipalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01-ago</td>
<td>INFONAVIT</td>
<td>Vacant house maintenance and support with occupied houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-ago</td>
<td>State government and Public Security office</td>
<td>Services and <em>equipamiento</em> (commercial and community centers, open-air gym, public spaces and vacant housing maintenance); infrastructure (public lighting, reduce water payments); housing-related issues (electric services, access to housing renovation programs, paint over graffiti, support with occupied houses); and municipalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-oct</td>
<td>INVIES</td>
<td>Public lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-oct</td>
<td>Water Commission</td>
<td>Irrigation of open spaces with recycled water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-oct</td>
<td>State government</td>
<td>Restoring the water service, public lighting and the Governor's visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-dic</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Support for open space construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: based on El Manantial RUC documents
Two days after this *periodicazo*, residents were visited by the public security secretary and INVIES’s director. Representatives resorted to palliative measures: INVIES cleaned Gretta’s block and planted trees, as well as donating 40 trees to the community, and lent them an electricity generator to provide power for the festivities in honor of the local saint. The representatives of these institutions also contacted the Water Commission and the Health Ministry. As a result, residents obtained a water connection fee reduction for new comers and a stray-dog neutering campaign. The health service extension request was denied by the Health Ministry secretary who argued that the number of people in CS was not yet sufficient for an extended service (this topic is discussed in the following chapter). Finally, INFONAVIT representatives also visited the neighborhood and conducted a census of squatted houses but there was no follow up.

In sum, even if some of the strategies used drew the attention of politicians and public servants, immediate responses characterized the institutions’ strategies to silence residents. In other cases, agreements to address residents’ demands were signed but not honored and demands such as the municipalization of the neighborhood or the provision of *equipamiento* such as the commercial and community centers have not been addressed.

Lastly, and on a more positive note, demands also promoted changes, such as the paving of the school road, an additional shift and extra furniture at the school and more efficient public transport and garbage collection services (figure 18 shows the problems associated with the garbage container system).

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8This is the case of Dynámica’s lorry blockage, when the driver tried to leave the neighborhood with the developer’s remaining belongings, residents blocked its passage and forced a representative to sign an agreement to replace an electrical transformer. This agreement however, was not honored.
Figure 16. Dynamica's installations

Figure 17. Vacant housing

Figure 18. Trash containers
In addition to tangible results, these community organization experiences also show a learning curve and changes both in residents’ petitions and discourse. Public lighting, water-related services and public *equipamiento* have been residents’ constant requests. While issues related to the quality of the housing were prevalent in the first years, the municipalization issue gained importance since 2013, close to Dynámica’s departure (figure 16 shows Dynámica’s former on-site installations). After four years of written petitions, residents took a more proactive stance in 2014 and tried more aggressive strategies. Petitions not only demanded services but also requested quick replies and in some cases even threatened with ‘more extreme measures’. Also, throughout the process residents used political changes to their advantage and built a network of resources (politicians, public servants, journalists). The discourse read in the petitions shifted through time. First, residents argued that the city was rapidly growing and therefore services were needed:

Ciudad Satélite is a newly created city. As a consequence, its development, construction and occupancy by low income families is progressive and every day its activities accelerate…because of this, the lack of services is more and more evident (December 8, 2011).

After less than two years, disappointment, tiredness and a sense of abandonment is read:

Through this letter we ask you to follow up the petitions we handed INVIES…we haven’t received any reply and because Ciudad Satélite is a ghost town we expect you to reply soon (February 11, 2013).

Requests are often framed as deceived clients and responsible citizens paying their property taxes and contributing to the maintenance of the neighborhood, other times,
welfare discourses underline demands for donations such as Christmas presents for children, trees or materials to restore houses. On several occasions the letters referred to children and youth as the most affected population. Also, a direct link between social problems and the built space is established (e.g., drug use and lack of sport facilities).

The RUC was handed three official replies to their requests. All of these communications use a legal discourse to transfer the responsibilities to other institutions.

Even if the RUC’s activities promoted changes, the participation impetus faded when a different political organization infiltrated the neighborhood. In the words of Gretta:

[W]e don’t meet anymore because a political group entered and many people adhered... They came here to recruit people and now neighbors don’t want to collaborate. I make them sign a compromise letter saying they will clean [streets and open spaces] but currently there are only about three blocks organized (December, 2014).

In October 2015 the RUC’s board was renewed. In the meantime, current board members continued knocking on doors and proposing initiatives to improve their children and neighbors’ quality of life.

6.2.3 Community organization in Urbivillas

[W]e were left to oblivion; they [referring to INVIES] focused a lot on Ciudad Satélite and we were left aside...I can even show you, we went to the state level and they rejected our petitions...[saying:] ‘you cannot ask me anything because you still belong to the developer’. And the developer says: ‘I cannot give you any information or provide you with a service because I am broke’. And so they put the blame on each other (Silvano, Urbi, August 2012).

Silvano’s complaint describes a paradoxical situation: Urbivillas residents are not supported by INVIES since Urbi acquired the land and privately developed it. Hence, it is responsible for the development until the municipalization process is concluded. However,
Urbi is at the verge of bankruptcy and as a result is not able to maintain public spaces or sustain the community development work it started. Before its financial crisis, Urbi managed most public services such as garbage collection, public lighting and open space maintenance. After this, however, Urbi retreated its on-site staff and trimmed maintenance expenses, shifting this responsibility onto residents (see figures 19 and 20). Before the crisis Sonia jokingly said:

"Urbi maintains our green areas, I hear people from Satélite complaining a lot because they don’t even get their garbage collected, here in Urbivillas they even sweep our streets (July 2012)."

After the crisis Silvano, a condominium representative, stated:

"The problem was that they couldn’t manage maintenance anymore but couldn’t leave us hanging in there either; so they started to cut on expenses bit by bit. If you came before February this [referring to public spaces] looked beautiful but after February it went crestfallen…now it is slowly becoming what it was (August 2013)."

Legally, it is Urbi’s right to shift public space maintenance responsibilities onto residents in blocks sold as condominiums. This land tenure regime frees both the municipality and developers from these responsibilities. This regime is common in high-income gated communities or vertical housing where tenants necessarily share circulation spaces and other services. In horizontal social housing, however, condominiums are recently gaining increased popularity despite the additional costs it imposes on residents: 70% (878 houses) were sold under the condominium regime. Slightly more than 30% of Urbivilla’s housing (383 houses) will be municipalized.
Figure 19. Public park maintenance

Figure 20. Open space maintenance

Figure 21. Resident-built grill
Under a condominium regime, residents not only buy their private property but also their block’s public spaces and the responsibilities attached to it (Congreso del Estado, 2015). As a result, owners are obliged to clean and maintain open spaces, pay for utilities such as public lighting and irrigation as well as for reparations. Out of these expenses, public lighting is the most expensive. Since Urbi stopped paying for utilities, condominium residents lost the service and accumulated moratorium payments. In April 2015, San Luis Potosi’s condominium law was amended. In line with this amendment, the electric company can charge individual households under this regime with the payment of public lighting proportionately divided by the number of owners. This however, has not yet been implemented in Satélite. According to this law, social housing condominiums are eligible for municipal programs to build infrastructure, as well as for municipal services such as garbage collection, public security, street paving and public light bulb change. However, since the development is not municipalized they do not have these rights yet.

Despite its disadvantages, the condominium regime is attractive for residents that aspire to ‘live well’. When asked if he though residents want to dissolve the condominium, Silvano replied:

[H]alf does and half doesn’t…we got used to ‘living well’…we are more secure, the green area is ours and we can look at it and say ‘it is pretty’. I’ve noticed that in popular neighborhoods like the one I used to live in, green areas are anything but green, so if I compare we are in heaven…if we dissolve the condominium we have to donate open spaces to the municipality and this can build commerce or whatever (Silvano, Urbi, August 2012).

In this statement, Silvano highlights several points. First, living under a condominium regime means residents own and thus have the right to produce their public space: in other words, even if they have to spend money and time, they can decide what to do with their public spaces (within the norms and for the common interest, see figure
This advantage also alleviates the fear of being deprived of public spaces if these belonged to the authorities. Second, under this regime residents can privatize their block (i.e., restrain access to outsiders with a fence). Combined, the possibility of embellishing open spaces and privatizing seems to align with Silvano’s conception of ‘good living’. This conception is also in line with Urbi’s residential life concept, through which the developer markets “…integral developments, inhabited by people responsible for their care and conservation to create a harmonious environment.” (Urbi, n.d.).

The residential lifestyle Urbi markets is based upon moral values that appeal to order, good behavior, civic responsibility and community solidarity: “…Our communities promote participation, organization and integration values, aiming to improve the quality of life and promoting good neighbor practices in a secure environment that will increase the value of your property…” (Urbi, s.f.). Urbi seeks to communicate these values through two interlinked components: the physical environment and community organization. Urbi pays special attention to the architectural and urban design of developments, as well as to their maintenance. Across the country, all of Urbi’s developments are designed with a similar architectural language. With the aid of different figures, this language makes reference to high-income housing:

We undertook the task of building the most distinctive developments in the market. Our Californian style-architectural concept, combines textures, colors, tiling and forged window guards…Our developments’ dwelling image and urban facilities stand out because they create a top-level residential atmosphere. This aesthetic sense and harmony promote the joy and pride of owning a beautiful house and the pleasure of life (Urbi, n.d.).

In addition to these ‘Californian style’ ornaments, Urbi also characterizes its developments as secure and functional:
[S]treets and avenues’ layout is designed based on the security of the family, with natural control of the traffic and smart signage. Interior parks have all the attributes to facilitate recreation and conviviality (Urbi, n.d.).

However, even if Urbivillas’ architectural language is more ornamented than Satélite and El Manantial, the latter offer generous open spaces. Conversely, Urbi sought to maximize the land profit by reducing the size of public areas and densifying the housing layout. Regardless, Urbi was able to sell its housing quicker.

Maintenance of the overall image of the development is another of Urbi’s residential-life principles. In an effort to maintain developments clean and looking good, Urbi uses different strategies: First, it invests the company’s resources on cleaning, landscaping and watering parks, public spaces, and sometimes also private properties (such as vacant houses); Second, Urbi provides a code with norms residents commit to when they acquire their house; Third, Urbi also provides residents with a pre-authorized house-extension executive project in case they want to build housing extensions. This project is aligned with the original house design thus complying with Urbi’s intention to keep a homogeneous image. Finally, Urbi also organizes residents and trains them to administer the maintenance of open spaces and private properties. Ilse, Urbi’s Community Integration Coordinator summarizes these points as follows:

[W]e search surplus value, if we have a good image we also have more value, but residents don’t seem to understand and say: ‘why should I keep my house well painted?’ That’s why we ask them to preserve the style of the houses, use the same materials and finishes and preserve the same color range. When we sell [the house] we also provide them with an executive project called ‘dream growth’ [crecimiento sueño] to build a house extension. With these pre-authorized plans, already revised by an architect, they can expediently obtain the construction permit at the delegation of Pozos (May, 2013).
However, residents rarely obtain construction permits (Carmen, Satélite resident, March 2012), and heterogeneous housing extensions are already built in Urbivillas (see table XXVI in chapter 7). Even if these extensions are scarce compared with Satélite and El Manatial, these are likely to increase when Urbi leaves. Adrian, Urbivillas resident comments on the matter:

“When the development is liberated and residents committees are in control, I will expand my house towards the front, even if just with a canopy, and I will expand and open my business [towards the street] (Urbivillas, Adrián, July 2012).”

Adrian opened an ‘illegal’ store installed in his house. When Urbi leaves, it aims to grow their business and announce it to attract clients. Nonetheless, currently, Urbi prohibits land uses other than housing. Claudia, Urbi’s Community Work Manager states:

“When newcomers get their property titles they also sign a covenant promising to abide by the rules, so that they cannot change their facades or build…We also fight against image deterioration, we don’t accept stores, they only think about becoming richer (April 2012).”

In response to these norms, Adrian’s dream to ‘become richer’ is on hold. He hides his store behind doors despite the need for commercial *equipamiento* in the neighborhood. When Urbi leaves, neighbor committees will probably be less stringent than Urbi. Nonetheless, by-laws remain a resource committees can use to preserve the neighborhood’s ‘residential life-style’. Furthermore, residents also exert social control, especially those that adhere to the concept:

“We chose this neighborhood because we liked the project…here you cannot change facades but not everybody respects the rules, we have to tell them...
off. If they want to extend their houses they can do it towards the back or upwards (Sonia, Urbi resident, July 2012).

In addition to regulating what and how people can build, and to what uses they can put their houses, covenants also define conviviality norms and maintenance obligations. These intend to promote spaces “...inhabited by families that live together and integrate in harmony, conscious that their home is not limited to their own house...” (“Urbi Users’ Manual”, s.f.). Notwithstanding, applying these norms has presented challenges at different levels. According with Claudia:

The community master plan is based on the residential life concept. Residents abide by conviviality rules to create a healthy family environment. They follow a self-management model that promotes new habits among neighbors...We constantly remind residents that the neighborhood raises its land value through an image of organization and culture, but this requires a state of mind shift (April 2012).

Among the obligations residents acquire when they buy a house in Urbivillas is:

“...the will to adopt a different and better lifestyle...” (Urbi, n.d.). Ilse explains some of the reasons why promoting a new ‘state of mind’ to adopt a ‘better lifestyle’ is difficult:

Approximately half of the residents come from San Luis and the other half from Zaragoza [the closest town]. Residents from Zaragoza bought the house as an investment or because their kids study in San Luis...they are used to a rural lifestyle [vida de rancho]...in the beginning, newcomers build a fence and raise chicken and I say to them: 'I don’t recommend you to do that, it is a matter of sanitation since houses are very small’...When they arrive we tell them: ‘here we try to maintain houses looking like this [she points to a neatly homogeneous block]...however, some people are very attached to their costumes and prefer to go back to their ranchos. It is a very strong cultural shock...For the sales department image is very important so we need people to integrate (Idem).
In other words, Urbi not only created a discursive framework around its residential life concept but also the physical, organizational and legal frameworks to promote a behavioral change. Within this framework, Urbi intends to ‘produce’ residents that adapt to their neighborhood and comply with strict norms if they want to change it. However, Urbi staff is aware that providing the framework will not necessarily produce the expected results:

People have to change on their own so that their neighborhood is maintained...we don’t educate families, we bring in the elements that render the neighborhood inhabitable (Interview with Claudia, Urbi’s social work coordinator, April 2012).

In order to ‘bring in’ these elements, Urbi implements a community master plan that includes not only the housing layout and design but also the provision of public equipamiento and the strategies to build it. Urbi’s general strategy consists of a mixed scheme by which Urbi, the public sector, NGOs and residents match resources to build and manage equipamiento. This results in public-use facilities owned by the residents’ association (instead of the municipality) and managed either by them or by an NGO. Under this scheme, Urbi built in Urbivillas a community center and plans to construct a sports center (see the community center case in chapter 7). Claudia’s statement supports this point:

In my opinion, developers can’t just build houses waiting for father government to build equipamiento. You have to manage these and produce the necessary knowledge about the programs one can access to pull resources...Urbi always had this scheme, I also worked for [another developer] but they only build houses...while Urbi used to sell 200 houses, [the other developer] sold 50 (April 2012).

Urbi’s proactive approach to providing equipamiento highlights three central issues. First, providing equipamiento is aligned with the residential lifestyle that seeks to improve
residents' living conditions (albeit from a particular perspective not always in line with residents' needs); second, even if Urbivillas residents share facilities (such as schools) with other neighborhoods, Urbi seeks to differentiate itself from others by providing its own services, without depending on INVIES or other public institutions for their provision; lastly, providing *equipamiento* is also part of a marketing strategy by which Urbi’s minimal investment has an impact on housing sales.

In sum, though the years, Urbi has transformed social housing into a marketable product that appeals to high-class values, appearance and lifestyle. To achieve this, Urbi ornaments houses under a Californian style, elaborates and implements a master plan to provide public facilities, landscapes and maintains open spaces and provides residents with norms to control both their behavior and changes to the built environment. Central to these strategies is the participation of residents to abide by the norms, exert social control over neighbors and maintain both the private and public spaces. To these ends, Urbi played a central role in organizing the community. However, after its 2013 crisis, Urbi reduced its on-site staff from around 15 people to 4, stopped the construction of new housing and focused on finishing and selling existing houses. As a result, both budget and community organization staff were sharply cut and residents were left to organize themselves, maintain their public spaces and pay for public utilities such as street lighting and garbage collection.

**Organizing around a ‘residential life-style’ in Urbivillas**

We seek the common good and the development of our community. You and your family’s participation are central to create a harmonious environment and a healthy coexistence...the community's quality of life depends greatly on the participation, work and involvement of all neighbors and their families (Urbi, n.d.).
Organizing the community is a central task in order to maintain a ‘residential lifestyle’. Urbi promotes a self-management model by which residents take on the responsibility of maintaining their neighborhood and respecting the norms. To this end, Urbi’s community organizers work hand in hand with residents to organize neighbors committees. Together, they organize activities for residents, such as workshops (e.g., first aid and handicrafts) and summer camps, provide services such as fitness classes and train residents to address administrative issues with the authorities once they leave. Through this work, Urbi sets an organizational structure of condominium-level committees whose leaders are part of a neighborhood-level association. This association is registered before a public notary, holds its own bank account, can issue receipts and is eligible for tax-deductible donations (RUC’s are not attributed these rights). UBR, Urbivillas civil association, is currently represented by Urbi’s directors and supported by Silvano, appointed honorary internal president. However, when all the houses are sold, residents will become partners of UBR and then will eventually form one association per condominium (Claudia, April 2012).

Currently, there are 9 resident committees, eight are under a condominium property regime and one under a public regime (see figure 22).

According to Ilse, URBI’s community worker, four of these committees are already very well integrated “they work on their own” she states (May, 2013). Both the association and committees have the following responsibilities:

- Guarantee that maintenance fees are covered, promote that internal norms are respected, seek consensus and communication amongst residents, organize activities to promote residents’ participation, manage access to different institutions and organizations’ programs and services…provide information about the use of resources and work plan progress…manage and monitor administrative and maintenance activities (Urbi, s.f.).
In other words, through this scheme, Urbi aims to lay the foundations of a well-organized community able to maintain the residential standards it markets. Representatives, however, confront similar challenges than those faced in Satélite and El Manatíal, namely, lack of participation and mistrust. These, paired with low incomes, affect maintenance payments, one of the issues condominium representatives struggle the most with:

[S]ome people say: ‘but I bought my house’ and I say: ‘yes sir, you bought your house but here [in the residents' manual] it says [paying] is a rule; we are under a condominium regime and you are ruled by the statutes of our internal
norm…additionally, you signed a promissory note where you commit to paying maintenance fees’ (Silvano, August, 2013).

Silvano’s experience may also suggest that in addition to the lack of payment capacity, residents are not used to paying maintenance fees and are ill informed about the commitment they acquire when buying a condominium house. Ilse affirms residents resist to pay because they are used to depending on the municipality for maintenance and public utilities:

[People coming from Zaragoza are used to receiving everything from the municipality…and we all have to pay fees but they say: ‘why should I give you if you are the one supposed to give me?’ Urbi’s vision is not to depend so much on the municipality since they have no resources to clean the streets and so on; that’s why we promote residents self-management (Ilse, URBI’s community worker, May, 2013).

Urbi advances an entrepreneurial strategy to maintaining the neighborhood in a context where municipal services are deficient. This perspective however, is also immersed in a context where residents earn low incomes, community organization is on the making and the condominium regime of individual family dwellings is recent. Therefore, neighbors resist to paying an additional maintenance monthly fee for tasks traditionally assumed by the municipality.

Failure to cover maintenance fees is a problem common to many social housing developments. Studies (Schteingart & Graizbord; 1998, Maycotte, 2014) have demonstrated how, through the years, condominium housing (mostly vertical) deteriorates and neighbors face many organizational problems to maintain their properties. As a result, from 2012, INFONAVIT implemented a program called ‘mortgage with services’ hipoteca con servicios (hereinafter HIS). Through this program, housing beneficiaries can voluntarily authorize the institution to deduct maintenance fees and property taxes directly
from their payroll (INFONAVIT, “Hipoteca con servicios”). Subsequently, INFONAVIT collects the fees and surrenders their administration either to residents associations or to an external maintenance company. The program seeks to secure payments to maintain condominiums at least while residents pay their mortgages (30 years).

Urbivillas was the first neighborhood to be enrolled in the program in San Luis Potosí. However, it was implemented at a later stage and, as a result, condominiums house a mix of enrolled and non-enrolled residents. As a result, while committees’ treasurers are able to secure the payments of enrolled residents, they often fail to secure those from non-enrolled residents. Additionally, non-enrolled owners of vacant houses rarely volunteer their fees nor maintain their front yards or contribute to the maintenance of common spaces. As a result of these inequalities, committee representatives often have to mediate disputes between enrolled and non-enrolled residents in addition to spending a considerable amount of time encouraging residents to pay their fees. Moreover, the amount paid by enrolled and non-enrolled residents is often different. While INFONAVIT determines the amount paid by enrolled subjects, the neighbors’ committees define the fee for non-enrolled neighbors. In many cases the former is more expensive than the latter. In Salvador’s condominium for example, non-enrolled families contribute with a $100 (7.5 USD) fee while HIS families pay $145 (10.9 USD). This is how Silvano approaches the issue:

I tell [enrolled] people: ‘what do you prefer? That they [non-enrolled residents] don’t pay a thing or that they pay $100’...[and they reply] ‘but we pay $130, $145’ and I say:....’you have all the right to tell them [non-enrolled residents] I am so sorry but even if you have no money you committed to paying for maintenance and signed so I can legally proceed’ and they [enrolled residents] can ask me as a civil organization [i.e., as UBR’s internal president] to hire someone to come and collect all late payments (August, 2013).
Salvador acknowledges that there is a payment difference among owners but he is also aware of the challenges involved in paying and collecting the fees. Hence, he intends to convince enrolled neighbors that paying less is better than paying nothing while at the same time he coerces debtors both socially and legally into paying their fees. Undoubtedly the program will be more successful when all neighbors participate under equitable conditions.

In sum, Urbi markets a residential lifestyle that requires a strong community organization component to be maintained, especially when Urbi leaves the development. Nonetheless, Urbi's bankruptcy pushed residents to prematurely assume much of the maintenance, utility payment and organization tasks Urbi previously assumed. The community in Urbivillas is organized into two levels: at the condominium level residents organized committees represented by a leader. At the neighborhood level Urbi registered a civil association called UBR. This association is still controlled by the developer with the aim of eventually handing it over residents. Salvador, a condominium representative, was appointed UBR's internal president but his decision power remains limited. Four out of eight condominium committees are organized and working. Community organization structures have several functions, such as collecting and administering maintenance fees, and organizing cleaning and maintenance, making sure that the rules are respected, organizing community activities, promoting neighbors' participation, managing institutional access to programs and services and building accountability. While organizing community activities and applying to governmental programs and services is infrequent, organizing around maintenance is the committees' most common activity. Collecting the fees has been the committees' treasurers' greatest challenge due to different factors: lack of payment capacity, government dependency, failure to understand the relevance of payments and mistrust. Failure to pay becomes even more problematic given that there are different types of owners: those that pay their fees directly to the committee and those
enrolled in INFONAVIT’s Mortgage with Services program. The latter deduce their maintenance fees directly from their payroll and often pay higher fees. As a result, committee leaders have to mediate between punctual payers and debtors.

**Summary and conclusions**

The City’s current conditions present many challenges for residents. Planning a city in the periphery for a population whose overwhelming majority earns less than three minimum salaries resulted problematic in a context characterized by poor inter-institutional coordination, financial miscalculation and corruption. In addition to traveling long distances to access jobs and services, residents live in a context where local public *equipamiento* is scarce and services are often inefficient. As a result, even when residents manifest satisfaction with their properties, the city’s location and lack of local *equipamiento* affect their budget and commuting times. Furthermore, satisfaction rates sharply decrease when survey respondents compare previous and current public facility conditions. Under these conditions, many families have moved out to rent or vacate their properties. In 2013, slightly more than half of the housing stock (already sold) was vacant. The presence of abandoned housing deteriorates the image of neighborhoods and promotes correlated problems (e.g., presence of graffiti, vandalism and burglary). Under these conditions, residents organize to maintain common spaces and claim services and public *equipamiento*. Occasionally, neighbors also organize to clean vacant houses.

Residents’ organization presents challenges in all three neighborhoods. Some of these are linked with the City’s complex history, others with housing policy and others with interpersonal problems. Amongst the most salient is the lack of jurisdiction, political disempowerment, weak social networks and lack of trust as well as a poor organization at a City-wide level.

CS is in a jurisdictional void that stems from developers’ failure to hand the administration of developments over to the municipality. Legally, developers are
responsible for maintaining developments until they are municipalized. CS however, is neither municipalized, not taken care of by developers, with the exception of Urbi and INVIES who maintain open-regime areas and selected (i.e., the most visible) avenues and open spaces respectively (this is developed in chapter 7). In Urbi’s case, selling most of its housing under the condominium regime allowed the developer to privatize the space and hence be freed from its responsibilities early on in the development process. In both cases, responsibilities shifted over residents, unable to request municipal support.

Conversely, keeping the overall jurisdiction of developments, allows both Urbi and INVIES to decide what, where and how to build *equipamiento*. This is specially the case with INVIES who currently owns not only the housing macro-plots but also the land reserved for *equipamiento*. In sum, developers have not municipalized the neighborhoods but neither do they fully assume their service and maintenance responsibilities. Conveniently, however, they are keeping their jurisdictional right to decide over the development of *equipamiento* in the City. In parallel, residents have also taken this jurisdictional void to their advantage, by working within the cracks of the system, i.e., to build, open stores or sell liquor without permits. By the same token, even when residents organized under the condominium regime pay additional costs to maintain their common spaces, they are entitled to privatize or decide over them.

In a blurred jurisdiction context, residents constantly strive for accountability but seldom find answers. Both institutions and developers hand residents’ petitions over one to the other and rarely does one assume the responsibility of attending to their requests.

In addition to jurisdiction, weak social networks and political disempowerment also affect community organization. CS residents are building their social networks from scratch. Beneficiaries obtained their mortgages individually and as a result they do not know their future neighbors. However, networks are slowly consolidating. Community organization in this context has been challenging for leaders. On the one hand, they strive
to build trust and elicit residents' participation. On the other, the City's location and residents' limited resources weaken their capacity to build political relations and attract attention. Moreover, most leaders lack organizing experience and training and support are not available. Finally, the prejudices residents hold of their neighbor developments as well as the failure to recognize shared needs, hinder the potential benefits derived from working together. Even if neighborhoods have specific needs, the lack of public equipamiento is a constant residents’ often complain about. However, the data shows that El Manantial and Satélite are the communities that, through different strategies, have confronted the authorities and struggled the hardest to get the services and equipamiento they need. However, it was until recently that people from both neighborhoods jointly demonstrated over issues that affected all CS residents. Conversely, Urbivillas’ residents have limited contact with people from other neighborhoods and their organizational efforts are mostly focused on common space maintenance.

In fact, Urbivillas keeps the organizational model promoted by the developer, consisting of a civil association (AC) in charge of organizing residents, implementing the norms, administrating maintenance fees and bridging residents with institutions. Currently, UBR (the civil association) is managed by Urbi’s representatives with the aim of handing it over to residents once Urbi leaves. In Satélite, INVIES also promoted this model but residents rejected it under the belief that being represented by an AC would tag the neighborhood as middle class and hence restrain residents’ eligibility for governmental programs. While this perception may be misinformed\(^9\), it is true that associations are part of an organizational model characteristic of middle and high income developments. This perception and internal conflicts resulted in the dissolution of the association and in the formation of a new committee (RUC, Residents’ Upgrade Committee). RUCs are

\(^9\) Program eligibility is based on census and urban data on equipamiento and services. As a result, the characterization written on the association’s registration act is not influential.
participatory organisms officially recognized by the municipality. Nonetheless, in contrast with ACs, RUCs lack a fiscal personality and as a result board members are not able to open a bank account or deliver tax deductible receipts in exchange for donations. Satélite and El Manantial registered each a RUC with a 6 member board representing the neighborhoods. Complementing this neighborhood-level organization, all three developments are also organized at a cluster-level, i.e., with cluster leaders that represent a cluster of houses or a condominium before the RUC or the AC. The implementation of Rehab, INFONAVIT’s public space upgrading program in Satélite, shows that organizing at this level also presents many challenges. Among these, building trust and accountability and encouraging neighbors to participate are salient. In the case of Urbivillas, collecting maintenance fees has been one of the greatest challenges.

In all cases and at both levels (i.e., neighborhood and cluster), leadership proved to be central to push forth community initiatives. Experienced leaders both in Satélite and El Manantial were key in carving spaces to be heard. However, the strategies to carve these spaces differ significantly. While Olga, Satélite leader shows a more conservative approach, Gretta, El Manantial leader, uses provocative strategies to attract attention. Olga fears that by exposing the City’s needs, potential housing buyers will be discouraged to come to CS, thus threatening the population growth they need to demand more services and *equipamiento*. This discourse has been advanced by public institutions arguing that *equipamiento* will only be built once there is enough population. As a result, Olga has mainly resorted to written petitions and meetings with public servants and politicians. Conversely, El Manantial leaders have attracted the media, protested to the municipality, obstructed the road and sieged the local water offices, in addition to petition writing. Although achievements can be hardly attributed to any specific strategy, the most visible were those that attracted more attention and produced quicker results. While some of these results responded to residents’ requests (e.g., school furniture and additional shift),
others were palliatives to calm residents’ demands (i.e., donation of trees and cleaning of Gretta’s block). Throughout these processes, leaders have learned to tailor their discourse, to reach different institutions and assess opportunities when they present. In parallel, both petitions and claim framing have changed. While housing-related issues were predominant during the first years, the municipalization and provision of *equipamiento* acquired relevance through the years. Petitions also reveal residents’ gradual disappointment and sense of abandonment. El Manantial residents’ first petitions were addressed to Dynámica and INVIES, but the lack of responses pushed residents to address subsequent petitions to eight different institutions. Satélite and Urbivillas residents often resorted to their developers INVIES and Urbi; however, these too retreated gradually since 2013. Before its retreat, Urbi had a strong presence in the community. The developer’s ‘community integration managers’ worked hand in hand with condominium representatives to provide different services and to organize the community so that it can efficiently maintain the neighborhood after Urbi is gone. However, Urbi’s bankruptcy forced neighbors committees to organize and self-maintain their common spaces prematurely.

When Urbivillas’ residents buy their house under a condominium regime, they buy into the residential lifestyle Urbi brands. Residents aspire to a better quality of life and to see their assets increase their value. Through the residential lifestyle branding, Urbi taps into this aspiration. Nevertheless, to fulfill it, residents not only have to organize for maintenance and pay their fees on time, but they also need to change their behavior in order to comply with Urbi’s standards. To these ends, residents receive a Users’ Manual defining conviviality protocols, as well as construction and land use norms. These norms are enforced by Urbi’s staff, through condominium representatives and through neighbors that adopted and reproduce the same discourse. Community organization in this context plays a central role because it allows Urbi to train residents to maintain the same living standards it markets. In parallel, norms provide the legal tools to encourage compliance.
Despite these efforts, residents also contest this discourse through everyday practices such as building without permits and opening ‘illegal’ family stores.

In addition to organizing the community and setting the legal framework in support of the residential life style concept, Urbi also utilizes the physical aspect of its developments to convey a residential image. Californian style ornaments, landscaped open spaces and privately-owned public equipamiento are essential components of this image. Urbi adopted an entrepreneurial approach to providing equipamiento and maintaining developments, heavily dependent on private investment. In a context where the municipal administration fails to efficiently intervene, this approach makes sense if the developer assumes the costs. However, when these are shifted onto low income families, the implementation of the residential concept is put to the test.
7. PROVIDING EQUIPAMIENTO

Introduction

Providing equipamiento is central to the marketing strategy of Ciudad Satélite as well as to its urban design. In fact, out of the approximately 730 hectares of land for development, 490 were tagged for housing land use, around 60 for green areas (linear park and green space) and 180 for public and private facilities (see figure 23).

Figure 23. Housing, public facility and industrial land uses
In other words, one third of the city’s extension was planned for public space and services. This is atypical for social housing developments given that the local urban norm requires a 10% of land for public *equipamiento*.

Additionally, every housing block has an open space and generously designed streets. These large areas, however, sit empty nowadays. Out of the 191 public facilities projected for completion by 2015, only 9 are either built or in partial use. Additionally, private commercial services (i.e., family shops) are spread throughout all three neighborhoods but are not adequate to fulfill the current demand.

Ciudad Satélite’s current living conditions are in harsh contrast with the ‘garden city, the city of the future’ sold on the promotional video. Not only does the provision of *equipamiento* lag behind but also do the funds to maintain and manage the existing infrastructure. In a context of failed planning, financial miscalculation, restrained budget and political corruption, the actors involved in the production of this mega city are striving to maximize available resources. In this chapter, I seek to understand how the City’s planning, development and community organization processes, analyzed in previous chapters, affect the provision of *equipamiento*. Further, I unveil some of the paradoxes behind the provision of facilities and finally I analyze how the actors involved resort to different strategies to meet their ends.

### 7.1 Building *equipamiento* in the City

On August 31, 2009, a few days before his last brief as a governor, in a public ceremony, Marcelo de los Santos inaugurated the healthcare center, the schools, the accessing bridge, the supermarket, the water treatment plant and the electric substation. To build this infrastructure, 18.3 million dollars were invested. In the same event, he also donated the land for the church to the archdioceses, and inaugurated the supermarket. In this ceremony González Hernández (then director of the INVIES) stated:
Today, CS is a fact. The first families residing in the development and those that are continuously coming have all the basic services and on-site works such as water, sewerage, electricity, streets, public security, schools and health center, public transit and the first commercial establishment to fulfill their basic needs (El Sol de San Luis, 2009).

All of these were central to fulfill the State’s promise to build a city on what was before barren land.

In addition to publicly led facility construction, Urbi built two more facilities in Urbivillas: a community center and a small commercial center located at the entrance of the development. Both facilities are fully built but not open to the public.

Figure 24. Location of public facilities
Currently, out of CS’s ten facilities, two are in use (police station and water management office), five are underutilized (health center, supermarket and the schools), two are not open (Urbi’s community and commercial centers) and one is partially built (the church) (see table XXIV).

TABLE XXIV
CIUDAD SATÉLITE’S FACILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Area (sq mt)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>SA* 4</td>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>9,330</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>SA 4</td>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>SA 4</td>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Supermarket</td>
<td>SA 1</td>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>910</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commercial center</td>
<td>Urbi</td>
<td>Not opened</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family shops</td>
<td>All three neighborhoods</td>
<td>In use</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>7,434</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Convenience stores</td>
<td>All three neighborhoods</td>
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<td>Street market</td>
<td>SA 4</td>
<td>Not working</td>
<td>Private</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open spaces</td>
<td>Local open spaces</td>
<td>All three neighborhoods</td>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>Public/covenant</td>
<td>40,088.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public open spaces</td>
<td>Urbi</td>
<td>In use</td>
<td>Covenant</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>SA 4</td>
<td>Underutilized</td>
<td>Public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community facilities</td>
<td>Community center</td>
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<td>Not opened</td>
<td>Covenant</td>
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<td>Church</td>
<td>SA 3</td>
<td>Partially built</td>
<td>Private</td>
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<td>Public admin.</td>
<td>CEA bureau/pumping station</td>
<td>SA 4</td>
<td>In use</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>4,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ciudad Satélite’s master plan provided by INVIES.
*Service Area (SA)
In addition to these facilities, family shops and plots reserved for nearby commerce (i.e., developer-provided commercial spaces) are spread across neighborhoods. The former are multiplying in all three neighborhoods while the latter are not built yet. The market and street market are projected but not built or functioning yet and finally the church is partially built (i.e., a shrine and a cross are built on the site). In the next sections I analyze each facility system, in order to understand how the City is meeting residents’ needs and what roles are actors undertaking to provide for these needs.

**7.2 Education**

**7.2.1 Building castles: Schools as a marketing strategy**

The schools opened in August 2009 offering all grades. This is exceptional since the school infrastructure in San Luis Potosí is built once the population demand justifies the investment. According to the former director of the Municipal Institute of Planning of San Luis, the average time elapsed between a housing development is approved and the time the first school provides services is 7 years (November, 2013). In Ciudad Satélite, however, it took 2 years for the schools to open from the time the plan was published and one year from the time the first houses were sold. This is an exceptional case of political power meeting financial resources to make possible the provision of oversized facilities in a social housing development still under construction; as Mr. Codina, IEIFE project manager stated:

> [I]n the Case of Ciudad Satélite the governor said: ‘we need schools to attract people and sell houses, so we started building them with FEAM 2008 funds” (November 2014).

FEAM is a federal fund managed by the state’s education ministry (hereinafter SEP). SEP’s planning department allocates the funds across municipalities prioritizing high
population areas that are rapidly growing, with education needs and the potential to provide a regional service. According to Mr. Codina, budget always lags behind pressing needs. Schools in Satélite, however, received the full investment and were built and equipped even when the population demand was very low:

[W]e used to say: but there are other children that have nowhere to go [to school], but it didn’t matter, the funds were already allocated...even developers used to say: ‘but this is not going to work’ [referring to the housing sales], but they were instructed to build houses quickly.

To date, the schools’ generous infrastructure is partially used. Comparing her children’s school in San Luis Potosi to Ciudad Satélite’s primary school, Delia, a resident and mother of two stated:

[T]his [Ciudad Satélite’s primary school] is a castle, even if we started without desks. Over there [in their old school], we started without classrooms, they used to build one every year and the director used to say: ‘if I have 60 children in second grade and no classrooms they all have to fit into one’ but here [in Satélite] we have lots of classrooms and they don’t allow the community to use them (February, 2012).

However, the students’ population is gradually growing. The primary school, for example, has 18 classrooms (3 of which are not yet in use), a big library room, a soccer field, 2 basketball courts and 3 courtyards. The secondary school has also 18 classrooms (only 5 in use) 2 labs and 6 workshops (which are not equipped). Both the number of staff members and students has grown through the years. In the primary school only 4 teachers were in charge of approximately 85 students the first year. By 2011 there were 8 teachers and by 2012 15 teachers and 448 students (Paty, primary school teacher, May, 2012). In the same vein Mr. Toledo, the secondary school director told us that the school population has multiplied from 49 students in the first year to 210 in the third year.
According to M. Codina (IEIFE Manager), the school’s increasing demand is not only local but also regional. He posits that the schools’ large infrastructure and the easy (even if long) commute attract students from neighboring towns as well as from the capital.
The inverse happens with Ciudad Satélite’s high school adolescents who opt to either quit due to the lack of local schools or to attend a neighboring school for which they have to invest on transportation.

Ciudad Satélite’s developers promoted the City as a services and opportunities regional pole, masking its peripheral location on wild land with the promise of a fully-equipped garden town. In this context, the construction of schools is central to market the city and attract buyers. Proximity to large schools is an incentive for young families with children who seek to own a house at an affordable price. These families however, currently face restrained options to educate their children and find it difficult to send their adolescents away to pursue high school education.

7.2.2 Large schools but short functioning budget

The monumentality of school buildings was nonetheless disentangled from a functioning budget and even if they are constantly referred to in the marketing discourse, neither developers nor INVIES invest on them. According to Mr. Toledo:

For each housing sale, a percentage should be allocated to the schools and we haven’t received anything from them [developers]; they come and visit us, ask for our needs, feed our hopes but give us nothing...they [developers] promise good quality education: we have a secondary school with modern installations, we have a primary school with modern installations but never look this way to understand our needs; rather, they communicate their needs and tell us we are selling more houses but haven’t given anything to the school... In any country, businesses would see this as an opportunity to invest in something that will yield fruits but they don’t see things this way (March, 2012).

In sum, even when schools are constantly referred to in the marketing discourse, they are not considered in the running budget. In this context, developers are concerned with their own developments but fail to support their insertion into the larger urban context.
INVIES has facilitated the urban integration of the schools by promoting the construction of the main road that connects the schools but has not provided any other type of support.

Schools face a budget shortage to afford maintenance, pay utilities, buy furniture or equip the labs. As an example, neither the secondary school’s 2 labs (biology and physics), 6 workshops or computer labs are equipped or in use. As a result, Mr. Toledo set-up low-investment workshops such as cooking and beauty for which students must bring their own materials. In the primary school, the library room is not in use because the school has no resources for books. They received a donation but according to Paty the books were not adequate for elementary school children.

Maintenance and utilities are covered by parents’ ‘voluntary’ contributions paid as a registration fee per student. However, this is not mandatory and many parents fail to pay. To define the amount of the contribution, the director exposes the school’s needs to the parents’ association. This association is composed of 10 parents and a three member committee that supervises the association’s expenses. Together, they prioritize the school’s needs, calculate the annual fee needed to fulfill those needs and administer the funds. Fees commonly pay for water and electricity consumption and for the janitor’s salary, along with a mixed contribution either of working time or cleaning products from mothers and students. If needed, parents also pay for infrastructure such as roofs to cover courtyards, reparations or furniture replacement. However, as a new school in a growing development the most pressing needs are centered on furniture and equipment acquisition to allow for new students to integrate and new installations to be put to use, as well as on hiring new staff to grow existing groups.

Restrained contact with housing developers does not facilitate the budget planning tasks needed to foresee student body increases in relation to housing sales. As Paty points out:
I've requested a statistic [from developers], because we are going nuts, but they say they do not know. I am under the impression that they do not want to provide any information (May, 2012).

As a result, planning for group enlargements or requesting new furniture and additional staff to open new groups is a hurdle for directors. This also affects newcomers who find obstacles when trying to enroll their children in schools:

[W]e are saturated...we have 448 desks...if a new child comes we will have to ask him to bring his own chair and desk because we don’t have any more (Ibidem).

In sum, the parents keep the school functioning and SEP covers teachers’ salaries and furniture. However, several factors hinder budget flows: limited parents’ paying capacity, the general shortage of institutional resources allocated to new schools, the lack of support from private and public developers and the gap between the rhythm at which the city is growing, the planning capacity to foresee future needs and the long administrative times needed to receive public funds.

### 7.2.3 Schools as a community resource

Parent associations have an active role in dealing with issues linked to the school administration; this role is nonetheless detached from other decision making processes involving the school. Directors are responsible for the school installations, staff and equipment. This leaves little room for parents to participate in other school management activities or to use the installations as a community resource.

When Paty arrived to Ciudad Satélite she organized a soccer tournament and training lessons for children in the afternoon but soon after the director shut the initiative off:
I feel that what those children need is to be busy, but everyone [referring to the other teachers and the director] saw it [the development] very isolated and all they wanted was to come back to San Luis [after work] (idem).

She also proposed math classes, cheerleader and zumba classes for girls: “…my project aimed to organize lots of workshops for all the community” (idem). She identifies the need to provide afterschool activities for youth and children, involve parents in community activities, facilitate psychological assistance to families and promote income generating activities:

Ciudad Satélite needs to become more urbanized because they are isolated, forgotten…they even tell me: we don’t have anything, they forget about us here, they don’t pay attention to us! (May, 2012).

The school, with its oversized installations, could be a community resource given the lack of community centers or sport installations; however, its use is restrained to school hours. Referring to this, the director of the secondary school, Mr. Toledo tells us that due to budget constraints they cannot pay afternoon personnel to offer after school activities. However, he organizes a soccer tournament right after school (between 2 and 3 pm). He also said that they try to organize activities for parents but have a poor attendance:

[W]e have organized some activities in the afternoons but parents don’t participate, because they are all blue-collar workers and if they do not switch shifts they are not paid…so they don’t have time to attend talks…so for example this Friday we invited them to pick up the grades…out of 180 parents 105 came. We sat them in an empty classroom, on the students’ desks…and gave them a talk that the director of Yakult, a successful entrepreneur, delivered for the teachers in Mexico. I got it by email and synthesized it from 23 pages to the four most important points on how to be a good quality person, family, professional, or business (March, 2012).
In sum, projects such as Paty’s depend on individual will to bear fruits and initiatives (e.g., the director’s), are top-down and sometimes even imposed on parents. In both cases, the use of the school as a community resource is not systemic and as a result, projects lack ongoing support, resources and endurance over time.

7.3 Commerce

Ciudad Satélite has three types of commercial *equipamiento*: 1) supermarket; 2) commercial center and; 3) Mom and pop stores.

The supermarket or ‘Max store’ is located in a 900 square meter plot in Satélite (see figure 27). This is the largest commercial establishment of the City, offering a diversity of products such as groceries, gardening and building tools and stationery. Inside, a small bakery, a *tortilleria*, a water purifier\(^1\) and a pharmacy also offer a variety of products.

\[\text{Figure 27. “Max” store}\]

The store opened its doors in 2009, and serves local residents, construction workers, INVIES on-site staff and industry employees. Even if the store has increased the

\[^1\) Establishment where bottles of water are re-filled\]
variety of products over time, it remains a limited and expensive option for residents. Additionally, walking to the Max store can be challenging in a car-oriented urban context.

Alicia, Satélite residents tells her experience:

[W]hen I can and have money I go to San Luis to do my grocery shopping. If I don’t have much I buy at the Max but it is expensive and the walk is heavy because the sun is very strong and there is nowhere to hide from it (March 2012).

A limited offer, expensive prices and a poor, not consumer-friendly environment results in residents’ overwhelming preference (92.1%) to travel to San Luis to buy their groceries, compared to a low percentage (7.5%) that shops locally. Amongst the most popular options to buy in San Luis are: shopping centers (20.2%), downtown (17.6%) and the closest grocery store (13.9%).

Traveling to buy groceries offers residents a wider range of products at lower prices but affects their budget. Residents spend a median of $30 (1% of the $3,000 or less salary earned by more than half of the population) on transportation for every trip to buy groceries.

Cathy, an El Manantial resident, and mother of two states:

I buy my groceries at one of my neighborhood’s corner shops. The Max store is very expensive and going to San Luis is complicated. We have to carry our girls and the groceries so we only go once a month. In San Luis I buy diapers and vegetables...that’s why we barely eat meat other than chops. Instead we eat beans, rice, processed soups and egg (June 2012).

Limited and expensive local choices promote poor feeding habits. In the words of April, a Satélite resident:

Ciudad Satélite is a food desert, there isn’t a butcher. Also, people have no money, they soon run through their wages, they get through la quincena [fortnightly pay] very quickly; I see only two or three families coming back from shopping [from
San Luis, no more. We need a place where we can buy meat and healthy things. If we continue depending on local stores we are going to have a serious malnutrition problem in the long run (March 2012).

While San Luis remains a viable offer (for some) to buy healthy food at reasonable prices, local shops fulfill many of residents’ daily needs.

7.3.1 Family shops and convenience stores

The number of family shops increases every year. However, residents complain that the offer remains limited and expensive. Family shops are typically set in living rooms or rooms and shelters built ad hoc in the front yard. Hence, they tend to be smaller than 6 sq meters.

Authorities and developers disapprove family shops because they lack sanitation, building and land use permits, promote overcrowding, and deteriorate the image of developments.

In consequence, through different, unsuccessful strategies they have tried to ban them. One such strategy, more proactive than prohibitive, was to plan for both small convenience stores (i.e., shops built on small plots of commercial land use located inside of housing blocks) and large commercial centers to fulfill the need within assigned spaces.

Figure 28. Commercial spaces
Under this logic, small plots of commercial land use within housing blocks are being sold in Satélite and a small commercial center was built by URBI. Conversely, large businesses are not yet built mainly because the electric line is not working properly and potential customers are not yet sufficient to generate profits (Interview with INVIES engineer, December, 2012).
URBI’s commercial center is located at the entrance of the neighborhood. Here, a large shop and 5 small ones were built but are not functioning yet (see figure 31).

Figure 31. URBI’s PLT commercial center. Source: Joanna Martinez

Claudia, URBI’s Community Development Coordinator describes the commercial center as follows:

It was designed following the ‘BMT’ concept - bread, milk and tortillas [PLT in Spanish]. The idea was is to provide people with the basics within a short distance: it’s a convenience store. They [URBI's managers] were thinking of bringing in a chain store but it is expensive so it doesn’t match the clients’ means. Maybe they’ll try to attract a Supercheap, but these kinds of stores come in once there are around 2,500 inhabited houses, but we are trying to get them to take the population of the whole of Ciudad Satélite into account. For now, we are lending one of the show houses to a concessionary with low prices on groceries (April 2012).

Another strategy to control family shops is to regulate both housing modifications and the activities allowed in the house. With this purpose, developers and INVIES provided newly arrived residents with a code of conduct and a set of norms. According to URBI’s ‘Users’ Manual’:

In order to maintain a homogeneous urban image, house owners can only modify their properties based on a list of modifications pre-authorized by URBI…Under no circumstances should these goods [referring to houses] be used for activities other than housing…such as: grocery stores, stationers, restaurants, coffee shops, shoe shops (URBI, n.d.).
In fact, URBI has been one of the most stringent developers to enforce the code. URBI’s community development manager is in charge of contacting residents who infringe the norms. In her words: “We don’t force people, we talk to them or leave a notification but we don’t send the police or anything like that…” (April, 2012).

In addition to this, they work with block representatives to address these issues in their weekly meetings.

Figure 32. Front yard extensions

Figure 33. House with several modifications
Despite these strategies, Urbivillas still has plenty of houses converted into shops, as well as houses with extensions (see Figures 32 and 33). The percentage is low compared to Satélite and El Manantial, but Urbivillas is also the youngest neighborhood. In fact, the figures show Urbi’s considerably higher increase in shops between 2012 and 2013. These numbers are likely to increase through time, more so now that Urbi’s staff was reduced and budget for community control cut (see the Table XXV).

TABLE XXV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAND USE</th>
<th>Satélite %</th>
<th>Manantial %</th>
<th>Urbivillas %</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>94.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public <em>equipamiento</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show houses</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s fieldwork

Built extensions are more common in Satélite (18%) than in El Manantial (6.6%) and Urbivillas (3.5%) (See table XXVI). Extensions not always host commercial spaces, housing enlargements are also common. However, the heterogeneity of changes shows that stringent control over private property is hard if not impossible. Likewise, percentages are likely to rise in the coming years due to household growth, capacity increase and ‘illegal’ shop spread.
TABLE XXVI

HOUSING EXTENSIONS 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>El Manantial</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extensions to the house</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls and fences</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s fieldwork

‘Illegal’ family shops fill a market niche that ‘legal’ shops leave unattended and they provide viable economic options for entrepreneurial families that want to increase their household income and for women who seek local options to work.

Adrian, Urbi’s business owner described his experience as follows:

Right now there is only one legal shop but the owner overcharges. They told us there will be a market at the entrance of the neighborhood. Retail spaces there will rent between $3500-$4500, too expensive for us, how can I open a stationery shop with those prices?

Adrian opened a stationery shop at home with no visible signs outside. People know of it from word to mouth through neighbors or through his children’s classmates:

I sell $100 or $150 pesos a day……Because it is not allowed, I keep my door shut and people knock. I got a notification from URBI and soon after they came to tell me I couldn’t have a business at home and I replied: I don’t have a sign up and you sold this house to me so this is my property. From the pavement in, I can do whatever I want. Please understand: I am unemployed and having my own business is much better than being out there stealing food to eat (July 2012).

Hence, even if they are considered illegal, a combination of local demand, poverty and opportunity promote the proliferation of family shops. Currently, the largest percentage of these shops (34.5%) sells basic products such as prepared food and groceries, while the remaining offers beauty related services, construction materials, house ware, stationery, clothes and sports gear (see table XXVII).
TABLE XXVII
COMMERCIAL LAND USE 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>El Manantial</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groceries and prepared food</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groceries</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House ware</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s fieldwork. Other: Clothes, sports and stationery.

Family shops fulfill some of the residents’ needs; however the offer remains limited and prices are generally high. When asked if there were family shops in her neighborhood, Urbi resident Andrea responded:

There is a legal one that is allowed by the developer and there are small shops all over Ciudad Satélite… Unfortunately I sometimes buy from them and I say unfortunately because they overcharge. For example, the small half liter bleach bottle is ten pesos here while Aurera [bigger grocery store 10 kilometers away] sells the two liter bottle for 12.5 pesos…In other words local shop owners take advantage …with fruits, vegetables, dairy goods and general groceries (Andrea, Urbi, July 2012).

The added costs of buying locally and commuting to get groceries reflect on residents’ public *equipamiento* and services choice of priorities; 24.2% of survey respondents declared that commercial services are the number one priority, followed by health (17.7%) and education (12.1%). However, some residents manifested their concern for the financial stability of family shops if a big grocery store was built in the City: “…the
ideal would be for local people to open their businesses, what is the point of outsiders taking the money away?..." (Jorge, Satélite, February 2012). A market initiative is, in this respect, a viable option to both complement the supply of family shops, instead of competing against it, and creating local job opportunities.

7.3.2 Market

Markets (mercados) were often mentioned by residents as one of the commercial priorities in the city. Markets traditionally offer healthy food (meats, vegetables and fruits) at low prices. In Satélite, residents organized to demand different governmental authorities for support to acquire the land and build a market. The objective of the demand was twofold: to address an unmet service need and to open local job opportunities to families and business owners interested in investing on a commercial space. In the words of Olga, a Satélite community leader:

We need a market, they [INVIES] gave us a donation area\textsuperscript{2} up in the mountain [in an amenity area far from Satélite] but who’s going to bother to go to market up there? We requested somewhere nearby but we haven’t been allocated anything (December 2012).

Olga shows me a letter, dated March 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2011 where residents request INVIES the land and financial support to build the market. The letter had three attachments: two options of commercial spaces layout and signatures of residents interested in buying a space. The layout was done by Olga’s architect friend on two different pieces of land centrally located on commercial land use:

\textsuperscript{2} Donation area refers to land developers are obliged to bestow in favor of municipalities to build public equipamiento when developing a housing complex. According with the Urban Development Law of San Luis, this area must be 10% of the total developable land.
The project has 120 commercial lots and restrooms. The lots are small: 2.5 mts by 3 mts. To buy them we would need to pay $500 pesos a month. We are not asking to be given them for free! I would like to have a lot that costs up to 50,000 pesos [3,748 USD]; if it costs any more than that I couldn’t afford it. We’ve discussed the price of the land. INVIES would sell it to us for 550 or 580 pesos [between 41 and 43 USD] a square meter; they wouldn’t give it to us for free. They [INVIES staff] donated land to the church but they haven’t yet legalized the transfer (Olga, Satélite community leader, December 2012).

Olga’s statement shows that: residents are well-informed and organized and that they have discussed the project with professionals. Land ownership is clearly of concern to residents, and they are aware that if INVIES continues to withhold tenure, they will not be able to get any municipal support; Olga’s statement also shows that residents frame their demands as those of coming from clients and not as those of coming from welfare recipients.

Markets in San Luis are owned by the Municipality who rents individual commercial spaces at a very economic fee. Satélite residents are working under a community model for which there is no funding available. Residents have limited economic resources to build a community-owned market, given that bank loans do not support such community projects and hence depend on some sort of governmental financial support. Nonetheless, the project cannot be publicly owned (and hence financed) by the municipality since INVIES (i.e., the state’s government) still holds the jurisdiction of the City. In addition to INVIES, Olga also delivered a copy of the letter to the State Economic Ministry but did not find support. Currently, the negotiations are on hold and INVIES is not willing to sell or donate land for community projects.

7.3.3 Street market

In addition to a market facility, a group of residents organized to negotiate the permit for a once- a week- street market. Residents proposed to locate a community-managed market at the entrance of Satélite, in a central location to serve the three
neighborhoods. However, disputes among neighbors broke the project apart. A group of residents (local business owners) opposed the project arguing that street vendors claim property rights on land that does not belong to them, leave a lot of garbage after them and are very hard to evict (Alicia, Satélite resident, July 2013). Conversely, project supporters argued that a street market would benefit both consumers and local market vendors' economy and would bring healthy food into the City. The disputes stopped the permit negotiation and instead of a street market, two small street businesses sell produce once a week in Satélite and Urbi and a truck loaded with fruits and vegetables offers its products across the neighborhoods.

7.4 Open spaces

The distribution of open spaces in the three case studies responds to the stage they were developed at. First stage neighborhoods, Satélite and El Manantial, were built under the original “Garden City” scheme. According to this scheme, each group of blocks or privada has an open space at the center (see figures 34 and 35). Open spaces in these neighborhoods are structuring elements around which the housing is laid out. In the words of ZYMA’s staff member:

[T]he idea was to provide the project with quality of life and dignity. We tried to develop this idea through green spaces. Green spaces were the most important elements for us. We tried to design urban forms that promote communication… Something I like a lot about the project is that almost every plot, every house is facing a green area. This was not easy to achieve and we had to deal with larger open space coefficients. We could do this because Satélite is a new town project (José María, a ZYMA’s staff member, December 2011).
Figure 34. Open space in El Manantial

Figure 35. Open space in Satélite

Figure 36. Open space in Urbivillas
In Satélite and El Manantial, the size of open spaces responds to variations in block layout, ranging between 120 and 1,800 sq mts. Urbi, on the other hand, followed a different layout, according to which open spaces are divided in two: 1) Public open spaces, which house facilities used by all neighborhood residents (such as Urbi’s central park) and 2) Local open spaces, which are smaller and are used only by the residents surrounding them.

Urbi planned two public open spaces along the main entrance road. The first, located by the community center, offers 1,837 sq. meters of green areas, a tot lot and basketball courts. The second, located south of the first, is not built yet and is planned to offer a 2360.5 sq. meters sport facility. Urbi plans to municipalize the first space and donate the second to the residents’ civil organization to be managed by the community.

Local open spaces in Urbi (9 in total) are spread across the neighborhood (see figure 36). Conversely to Satélite and El Manantial, Urbi’s local open spaces are not centrally located with respect to blocks; instead, these are located at the extreme of them, occupying what would otherwise be housing plots (see figure 37).

Figure 37. Open spaces
Source: Author’s fieldwork and INVIES
In other words, Urbi’s local open spaces are a subset of the housing layout. These commonly occupy between 4 and 12 housing plots and 50% of these range between 401 and 800 sq mts.

In sum, Urbi follows a more aggressive market logic than Satélite and El Manantial whereby square meters of land were maximized by reducing the housing plot sizes (from 120 sq mts to 90), increasing the density (from 41 houses per hectare in El Manantial and Satélite to 51.4 in Urbi) and reducing the number of open spaces. As a result, Satélite and el Manantial offer 4.7 sq mts of open space per inhabitant, while Urbi offers 0.42 in average. In other words, Urbi offers less than ten percent of the open space area offered in the other two neighborhoods. In all cases figures are below the World Health Organization’s recommendation of a minimum of 9 square meters per person.

### TABLE XXVIII

**CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL OPEN SPACES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Ciudad Satélite</th>
<th>El Manantial</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of open spaces</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total green area (sq meters)</td>
<td>16,268.11</td>
<td>12,179.89</td>
<td>11,640.09</td>
<td>40,088.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest area (sq mt)</td>
<td>213.87</td>
<td>118.39</td>
<td>298.18</td>
<td>210.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest area (sq mt)</td>
<td>1,801.41</td>
<td>1,794.75</td>
<td>3,429.73</td>
<td>2,341.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of areas of less than 400 sq mts</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>35.29%</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
<td>21.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 401 and 800</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
<td>29.41%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>48.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 801</td>
<td>20.83%</td>
<td>35.29%</td>
<td>33.34%</td>
<td>29.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s fieldwork

---

3 Open space per inhabitant=square meter of open space/(number of houses*average people per household)
7.4.1 Urban design elements: landscaping, maintaining, building, furnishing and leveling

Open spaces present great variations depending on their location within the neighborhood, on the number of vacated houses around them, developers’ investment and neighbors’ level of organization and resources invested on them. Open spaces located closer to main neighborhood accesses are better preserved due mainly to two factors: 1) developers invest more in their design and maintenance because they are more visible and; 2) the housing around these spaces presents higher and longer rates of occupation. In other words, only those areas that were the most visible, around the show house and main entrance to the neighborhood, were furnished, landscaped and maintained by developers in the three neighborhoods. Nonetheless, all of them were provided with a peripheral sidewalk, access ramps and street lighting. Throughout the years, most open spaces remain barren, but some are changing mainly through neighbors’ efforts and only in the three cases mentioned in chapter 6, open spaces were intervened through Rehab, INFONAVIT’s upgrading program.

Planting greenery and generally maintaining open spaces are the most common tasks neighbors undertake. A few open spaces have nonetheless been equipped with tables and benches, barbeque grills, small altars and shade roofs but these remain a minority. Finally, only in one case have neighbors made efforts to level their open space.

Landscaping

By far, the most common activity related to open space intervention is planting. Greening open spaces greatly impinges on the quality of the space and demands less resources than furnishing, leveling or building. Landscaping is central to developers’ marketing strategies. In all three cases, developers invest more in planting and grooming the most visible open spaces, such as those found at the entry of neighborhoods or along
important corridors. Landscaping is also central for residents who perceive greenery as contributing to the embellishment of the neighborhood, helping shade the streets and reduce harsh winds. As a result, both developers and residents make efforts to plant and keep some open spaces green. Delia, a Satélite cluster representative narrates her experience:

I told my neighbors that first of all, this green area is ours...I collect 10 pesos (less than a dollar) every week for maintenance... Here neither INVIES nor the government is going to say “Here are some trees for you to plant”... well they might do but why ask for things and wait to be given them when we can do it for ourselves? So we organized a community tree donation. A few neighbors brought 10 trees each and planted them. I got the tools and helped and when my neighbor saw me she came out and then another one but in the end there just weren’t enough to us to do the work or pay for it... We are lucky we did actually manage to make a small garden so when people pass they say it is pretty here, because the trees catch their eye (February 2012).

Developers’ overall control and degree of intervention is crucial to understand the type and layout of the vegetation planted. In Urbivillas for example, the developer had a stronger control over open space layout and maintenance than in the other two neighborhoods. This is reflected in the type of greenery implemented: high maintenance plants such as grass and flowers are predominant in Urbivillas (see the table below). Conversely, low maintenance desert vegetation is predominant in Satélite and El Manantial. Trees and bushes are common in all three neighborhoods (see figures 38 to 40).
Figure 38. Satellite landscaping

Figure 39. El Manantial landscaping

Figure 40. Urbivillas landscaping
Many of these were donated by different institutions through time. As the chart below shows, only three spaces lack vegetation. Two of these are found in El Manantial and one in Satélite. Finally, only one resident in El Manantial maintains a vegetable patch. Nonetheless, his neighbors state that youngsters destroy and steal the plants. When prompted, women declare being interested in planting their own vegetables; however, they would prefer to do it in their own front yards instead of in open spaces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Satélite &amp; Manantial</th>
<th>% (N=42)</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>% (N=12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grass and ground cover plants</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert vegetation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trees and bushes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flowers and other plants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edible plants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No vegetation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s observation and mapping fieldwork.

Not only does the type of vegetation change in the three neighborhoods but also its disposition and urban design. In Satélite trees and bushes are mostly located at the center of the spaces, while in El Manantial these are commonly found at the perimeter and in front of houses where neighbors maintain them individually. In many cases, neighbors with well-maintained front yards also maintain vegetation in the open space in front of their properties.
Desert vegetation is more present in El Manantial. In this neighborhood, close to 60% of spaces have a yucca at the center planted by DYNAMICA. In comparison, 20% of spaces in Satélite and 8% in Urbi have some type of desert vegetation.

In Satélite and El Manantial landscaping does not follow a premeditated design. Both the type of species planted and their disposition is defined individually according to neighbors’ tastes, availability of plants and maintenance capacity. Before Urbi’s bankruptcy, Urbivillas’ open spaces were designed, planted and maintained by the developer and only in a few cases neighbors planted additional species.

**Maintaining open spaces**

In all three case studies residents are responsible for the maintenance of their open spaces. This activity presents neighbors with different challenges, such as organizing, building trust relations, and collecting fees.

As a result, not all open spaces are well maintained. In fact, two thirds present garbage or dirt, weed, debris or construction materials. The table below shows that more than half of the spaces (53.7%) are relatively clean and mown (good maintenance), 18.5% are bushy (regular state of maintenance) and 27.8% lack maintenance (lots of weed, debris and garbage). In Urbivillas, 75% of open spaces are well maintained, 62.5% in Satélite and 27.8% in El Manantial. Data, however, were collected before Urbi’s collapse and hence when the developer played an active role in watering, cleaning and mowing open spaces. Urbi’s maintenance tasks included those traditionally undertaken by residents, such as sweeping the street and cleaning unoccupied houses. This however, changed when Urbi faced its financial crisis. Currently, Urbi occasionally maintains common spaces under the open tenure regime and main roads’ median strips. In Satélite, INVIES also undertakes these activities selectively. The institution also maintains median strips in El Manantial but residents are in charge of all open spaces since Dynámica fled.
To maintain open spaces neighbors either organize cleaning brigades that work individually or together, or collect money to pay someone else to do it.

Implementing these strategies aids in preserving a regular level of maintenance but is also challenging. Lack of interest and availability are the most common problems that residents report:

We started collecting money for the games but then got into lots of trouble. The local deputy was going to lend us a hand and Kuri [INVIES director at the time] was going to put half [of the cost] but my neighbors collected the money twice because they didn’t keep a registry so the project failed…I got tired of trying and after all, people always end up saying things. I also did a campaign to clean abandoned houses but my husband and I were the only ones working. People tell you they will help and in the end never come out (Bere, a Satélite block representative, February, 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE XXX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPEN SPACE MAINTENANCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of maintenance</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>Manantial</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage and dirty pavements</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debris and construction materials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of spaces</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s observation and mapping fieldwork.

On the other hand, collecting maintenance fees has derived in transparency problems and lack of trust. Furthermore, the large amount of unoccupied housing and general shortage of financial resources puts additional strains on residents that take on maintenance tasks. For instance, neighbors complain that water bills are high and
watering open spaces can be burdensome, not to mention paying for maintenance.

According to Carmen, Satélite resident:

I assigned one tree for every two neighbors so that when one can’t look after it the other does it. We’re watering trees with two liters of water a day because we’re trying to make our open space look nice and green. Of course we don’t even think about having grass because the water is very expensive [and grass is a luxury in the desert]. We would love to have a nice garden but when you have a water meter it’s expensive (March, 2012).

Rarely do owners of unoccupied houses contribute to maintain their open spaces or clean their front yards. These tasks are in many cases undertaken by neighbors to avoid noxious animals and to preserve the image of the block.

**Building and Furnishing**

In Satélite, close to 60% (n=16) of the areas have no urban furniture while three areas have benches installed by developers and six have been intervened by residents who built barbeque grills, picnic tables, tot lots, a roof and a thatched awning (see figure 41).

![Figure 41. Thatched awning in Satélite](image-url)
Residents’ interventions resort to different strategies. In three cases, residents tapped into INFONAVIT’s Rehab program to buy materials and hire workers to transform open spaces (see chapter 6). In the three remaining cases, residents organized and donated money, work, furniture and materials. Open spaces equipped with tot lots and furniture are used by all residents and hence residents manifested their concern with free riders not willing to contribute but using the spaces anyway:

[W]e gave money for the tot lot and it’s already a mess...people who didn’t give anything for it still come to use it anyway but we can’t deny their children access. They have every right to use it even if their parents don’t want to act responsibly (Satélite, Carmen, March, 2012).

### TABLE XXXI

**URBAN FURNITURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban furniture</th>
<th>Satélite</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Manantial</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Urbivillas</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light posts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benches</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot lots</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roof</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grill</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapels/ Virgin shrines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubbish bin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public phone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s observation fieldwork

**Leveling**

Some open spaces in Satélite and El Manantial (15 in total) have level changes. Four of them present light changes, of less than 50 centimeters, while eleven spaces have changes of between 50 cm and 2.3 meters, forming, in some cases, mounds higher than a
person’s height. The origin of these mounds is not clear. While some neighbors affirm that these are formed by debris from the housing construction, INVIES staff argues that they result from the land’s irregular topography (see figures 42 and 43).

According to Sandra, a Satélite resident:

To explain the high level of our mound, Alberto [INVIES on-site salesman] told me that it is part of the original topography, but I saw my house since they were building it and the open space was flat...so I asked Alberto: ‘how do you
explain that we bumped into concrete pieces while digging the mound? Do you think stone is processed oil? We’ve also found a shoe, or will you tell me it is a fossil?’ And he did not know what to say anymore (Interview with Alicia, a Satélite cluster representative, March, 2012).

Regardless of the slopes’ origin, both scenarios remind neighbors of their current abandonment. Additionally, level changes also compromise the use of open spaces by children:

Dolores [INVIES staff member] told me: ‘but kids can play a match up there’ and I replied: ‘oh yeah? Why don’t you bring your tennis shoes and you and I play a match up there, if kids can then we can as well’. ‘I don’t think so’, she replied (Idem).

As a result, some privadas organized to dig and move the debris. In the words of Sandra:

[W]e’ve been organizing ourselves to take the debris away. We break the stone and INVIES helps us with a van to transport the debris away, to the unbuilt land behind Nueva Jardín [the next-door neighborhood]. We want to transform our green area because if it remains like this maybe INVIES sells it to build commercial spaces but if there is a green area then it is our property (Alicia, Satélite block representative, March, 2012).

The work Alicia and her neighbors started shows how residents organize to appropriate their open spaces moved by the abandonment generally perceived. Neighbors are also moved by the aim to improve the conditions in which their kids play outside and the fear of being deprived by the Municipal government of their public land. Initiatives like this are nonetheless money and time consuming. After several weekends of work, Alicia and her neighbors realized it would take them close to a year to finish the leveling task. Therefore, they tried to organize to rent a bulldozer but disputes arouse around money contributions and as a result the task remains unfinished.
In sum, public spaces reflect the abandonment people report as well as the organization capacity of neighbors and the state of the private property. It is around public space maintenance and construction that small communities (at the cluster scale) form and build bonds around common issues. Also, it is in the public space that individuals, groups and institutions become visible. Hence physical traces such as planting, implementing furniture and up keeping open spaces are central to asserting this presence.

7.5 Healthcare

The healthcare center is a 1.4 hectare facility located in service area 4. The center was built during the Marcelo de los Santos administration and inaugurated along with the schools and the Max in August 2009. As with schools, the health center is a large facility partially used. Its infrastructure was built for future needs but its operating budget is small (see figure 44).

Sara, a Satélite resident explains that the number of people living in the City does not justify yet the allocation of a larger functioning budget for the center:

The health center is attended by a general doctor and a nurse, it is very well equipped, with an x ray room, dentist office, psychologist office, and the space for an ambulance, all they need is more people to invest more on it (Carmen, a Satélite resident, March 2012).
Carmen is reproducing the Health Department’s arguments justifying the lack of investment in the center based on scarce demand. According to a local newspaper: “The health secretary denied that the unit’s services are insufficient. They will increase once the residents’ population increases, he stated…” (Bernal, 2011).

However, neither residents nor bureaucrats have accurate statistics to support the arguments. As explained in chapter 6, Olga, president of the residents’ committee in Satélite, has encouraged cluster representatives to keep updated records of their neighbors’ demographics but residents show concern about the way in which the information will be used and, as a result, fail to respond (March 2012). According to official statistics, Ciudad Satélite has 1,448 people living in 412 houses (INEGI, 2010). This is considerably low compared with our population estimates yielding 5,833 inhabitants living in 1,473 occupied houses. Furthermore, according to the representative of Ciudad Satélite’s industrial consortium, INVIES gave them a figure of 10,000 inhabitants (meeting observed on May, 2014). This figure was calculated based on the number of houses sold (close to 2,800) and the average population (3.5 inhabitants per household). However, our field work shows that close to half of the houses are not inhabited. In sum, authorities tailor their discourse using demographic figures at will: low figures (i.e., low service demand) justify the lack of investment on public equipamiento and high population counts are used by INVIES as an asset (i.e., potential workers) to attract industrial investment.

Regardless of the population counts, residents and staff state that the health center’s service hours do not meet the City’s demand. According to a local newspaper:

"The lady in charge of security informed that they [the center’s staff] schedule 20 appointments per day but these are insufficient for the amount of people that seek medical attention: ‘The next day they [patients] come earlier, otherwise they lose their appointment again’. She admitted the center should attend more people but as of now, one doctor cannot attend everyone (Bernal, 2011)."
Currently, the center’s service hours are from 8 to 3. During this time, a doctor and a nurse attend patients with scheduled appointments and patients on a first come first served basis. These patients queue early in the morning to take a turn for a same-day appointment. In addition to a reduced service for the actual demand, the center is short on equipment and materials and as a result, emergencies are referred to larger nearby hospitals. Finally, the center lacks an ambulance. As a result, in case of an emergency, residents have to wait for an ambulance from a nearby town.

In this context, some residents declared that a well-equipped health center is the top public facility priority. April, a Satélite resident explains:

[T]he most important facility for us is a hospital with more doctors…we need pediatricians, dentists, psychologists and ambulances, if something happens to us they should at least be able to get us out of here! (March 2012).

Residents’ dissatisfaction with the center’s reduced service hours, lack of staff and equipment is sarcastically framed by Delia, a Satélite resident as follows:

Why do we have such a large health center without services? We only have a doctor coming from 8 to 3 in the afternoon, so I tell my neighbors: you can only get sick in the morning, don’t even think about feeling bad in the afternoon because there is no service…why do we have a center that looks like a castle if it is empty? I am not expecting it to be a 100% because not everyone goes there, we have people with other insurances, however, this is the closest we have and we need to know that at least in case of an emergency we’ll have first aid attention (February 2012).

In addition to pointing out a harsh reality, Delia mentions another of the center’s service paradoxes: it serves beneficiaries registered at the ‘voluntary insurance’. This insurance serves a sector of the population (such as informal and self-employed workers) that is not affiliated through work to a healthcare system such as IMSS or FOVISSSTE. This responded to INVIES’s initial intention of housing to the ‘hard to house’. Nevertheless,
accessing bank loans was not achievable for this sector of the population and hence, close to 90% of beneficiaries acquired their house through workers funds and are affiliated to a different healthcare system (IMSS). As a corollary, most of the residents seeking local healthcare have to either pay for the consultation, at the risk of not being attended at all, or duplicate their insurance and affiliate to the voluntary system.

In order to demand extended service hours and to manifest their complaints about the center’s services, residents conducted a satisfaction survey and collected signatures. Olga was in charge of distributing and collecting surveys and of contacting the authorities with residents’ petitions:

I am waiting for an appointment with the health secretary to request a service extension. With this purpose we collected a big packet of opinion surveys. Even if we didn’t ask for names, several residents decided to sign showing their discontent and will to be heard...People is not happy with the doctor’s service neither with not having 24 hour medical attention...people have been denied the service even if they are very sick because they are not registered at the voluntary insurance or because they are registered at the nearby town. The doctor has no right to do this!...it is illogical that they [referring in general to the authorities] build a clinic here [meaning a voluntary insurance clinic] if they are selling the houses to people that are mostly insured with IMSS; it is illogical (Olga, Satélite, March 2012).

However, some members of the community showed concern over the authority’s reaction to the petition:

[F]or me it is very comfortable and very special to have a health center because there are places where people are worse off and we don’t take care of it. I sometimes ask myself if it will be in our favor to give those surveys in or if the person with the authority will simply say: doctor, nurse, cleaning lady and vigilant, come away from Ciudad Satélite because we will close the center and that’s it! (Delia, Satélite, February 2012).

Delia’s concern shows a perception of disempowerment vis a vis the authorities, and a concern related to voicing residents’ demands.
Regardless of the complaints, interview participants acknowledged that the center’s staff has done efforts to provide community services in addition to medical attention such as preventive health workshops and fitness classes. Classes have been unsuccessful so far, due to both monitors and participants’ attrition. Residents attribute attrition to the large distances that discourage not only fitness monitors but also school teachers from working in Ciudad Satélite. On the other hand, the limited offer of classes fails to meet participants’ needs. According to Delia, a Satélite resident:

[A] fitness instructor came but then she disappeared so they [referring to neighbors] decided to play a cd and encourage people to exercise. But they were younger and faster and many of us couldn’t follow up, so the elder participants left, because they couldn’t keep up with the rhythm (Delia, Satélite, February 2012).

Finally, El Manantial and Urbivillas’ participants also complain about the long distances they need to walk to reach the center, located in Satélite.

Alternative private options to keep healthy, such as fitness classes and private medical attention are not yet available to Ciudad Satélite residents. According to Bere, a Satélite resident:

[Having a private doctor in the neighborhood would be a very good idea, even if we have to pay more for the consultation…on the face of an emergency everybody would pay (February, 2012).]

In sum, local health services in Ciudad Satélite are very limited. The public hospital only works in the morning and there are no local private alternatives. As a result, residents have to either travel to their affiliation hospitals or duplicate their insurance.
7.6 Community facilities

7.6.1 Community center

San Luis’ mayor inaugurated this 1,600 square meter, centrally located, community center in December 2011 (see figures 45 and 46).

Figure 45 Front view of the community center

Figure 46 Community center
Urbi donated this facility to the community as part of its residential life concept. Legally, Urbi is not required to build *equipamiento* within the development since they bought donation land elsewhere\(^4\). Nonetheless, URBI’s managers are aware that having nearby public *equipamiento* attracts new buyers and increases the amount of subsidy they can get for the house.

Paradoxically, however, the infrastructure is completely built but the center remains closed: “We are going to break in, URBI built this facility for us. It is ours and we have the right to use it! Who is going to chase us out if we do?” (Community meeting October, 2013). These were the words of Pancho, a cluster representative, at one of the meetings with Ilse, URBI’s community intervention coordinator. In the interest of the company, Ilse tried to dissuade them from breaking in but representatives were angry because the center had been sitting empty for almost two years. Instead, residents use one of URBI’s show houses where they attend to different community activities.

Initially, a daycare center, built with public funds, was going to be developed on the site but the winner of the public bid failed to use the money. Instead, URBI partnered with a non-profit called Enlace Comunitario AC to build a community center: URBI donated the land, the project and on-site supervision and the association and the municipality paid for the construction. In the words of Claudia, Urbi’s social work coordinator: “Urbi deduces these donations from taxes, don’t think we are giving them for free, this is also a business…” (April 2012). Once built, Enlace was going to subcontract another local nonprofit to provide services on site. URBI worked under this scheme in Tijuana with a food pantry non-profit. Claudia continues: “…the idea is that in the end, people from the community manage the project, but this is only an idea, there is not a fixed plan, or

\(^4\) According with San Luis’ urban development law, developers are required to donate 10% of the land for public *equipamiento*. However, they also have the option to negotiate with the municipality and donate the same amount of land elsewhere. In CS, INVIES requests developers to buy their donation land in the central facility area.
perhaps the maintenance company will do it…” (Idem). Nonetheless, Pancho and Ilse’ exchange, shows Urbi is not ready to let the community manage the center.

In sum, the community center is fully built, but Urbi’s financial problems affected its community development initiatives and as result, the project to bring a non-profit was halted. Meanwhile, the developer withholding the right to decide over the center and refuses to let residents manage it.

7.6.2 Religious services

Two catholic priests and a group of residents have been active at organizing worship spaces in the neighborhoods. Together, they resorted to different strategies to produce these spaces such as street occupation and construction of visible symbols. These strategies allowed the actors involved to build community ties around common interests, attract external resources to the community and match them with local efforts to create a neutral space where residents from all neighborhoods meet.

Currently, residents attend Sunday mass on a hill where the former governor ‘donated’ a piece of land to the church. The donation was announced in 2009 along with the construction of the schools, the health center and the Max store: ‘The current priest was sent by the bishop to build a parish’, a resident told me. However, the land title has not been granted yet to the archdiocese and as a result it is not ready to invest on the land. Despite tenure insecurity, both residents and priests invested a considerable amount of time, energy and resources on building and maintaining a 5 meter high cross and a shrine (see figure 47). In the words of Mateo, a community organizer in Satélite:

At first, we attended mass on a concrete plate developers built on site to wash their dump trucks. There, we used to put up wooden lumbers and a tent to protect ourselves from the weather conditions but we struggled because the wind was constantly bringing the tent down…we would like to build a temporary roof but the wind discourages us…now we attend mass at the shrine (February 2012).
A four square meter shrine and a 5 meter high cross were built on site with both local and external donations collected by residents and the priest. For the construction, local parishioners donated either materials or labor hours. They inaugurated the works on March 13th, 2011 and started building the cross.

Mass takes place once a week on site. The shrine serves as a backdrop for a temporary altar improvised with a folding table and a cloth. The choir sits beside the altar and parishioners in front. Between 150 and 250 people attend mass. This number has increased more so now that the priest attends the City regularly.

Delia, Satélite resident, narrates her experience:

[W]e suffer [from the lack of investment in a church] because mass is at five and it is very cold or sunny. When it is cold we freeze and when it is hot we burn... A neighbor volunteers his van full of stools so if you get one you sit, otherwise you stand (February 2012).

All of the religious utensils used in mass and the furniture were acquired through donations. Mateo stores them at home and transports them to the site every Sunday. He and his wife are the first ones to arrive to clean and prepare the place: “it is not a burden, we enjoy doing it” he states.

A highly venerated statue of the Holy Lady of San Juan de los Lagos, preserved inside of the shrine, was also donated to the community. In Mateo’s words:

The shrine’s Virgin is one of only seven copies of the Holy Lady of San Juan de los Lagos in the country. We went to San Juan to buy a smaller statue but the priest over there offered this one for $60,000 [close to $4,000 USD] and a benefactor donated the full amount. People from San Juan donated the clothes, earrings and wig; I think you only have to throw a stone for people to start contributing (February, 2012).
Mateo refers to the importance of visible acts of organization to encourage participation. In this vein, the construction of the cross and the shrine sparked a participatory process that strengthened the community ties and allowed residents to build an ambitious common vision of their worship space.

San Juan de los Lagos has been one of the most important pilgrim sites in the country since the XVIII century. Every year, around February the 2nd and August 15th
thousands of people attend the site to celebrate the Holy Lady’s festivities. Residents in Satélite worship their copy of the Holy Lady and envision building a 500 people church that can become a pilgrims’ destination in the future (Interview with the priest, February, 2012). In fact, February the 2nd became the official celebration day in Ciudad Satélite (see figure 48). For the past two years Mateo has organized a pilgrimage, a fair with games, rides, food stands, music and several masses to celebrate the day. Organizing this three-day event has been challenging, according to Mateo:

[P]eople used to be very mistrustful but bit by bit we’ve earned their trust through different initiatives. I organized everything around the festivities and published on the priest’s monthly bulletin how much we collected and how much we spent…we have a committee and two ladies helped us collect the money but people used to close the door on them…but us [him and his wife], they respect us (Idem).

In addition to organizing the festivities, Mateo and his wife are also in charge of the choir and Satélite’s catechism group. This group of children, between 6 and 15 years of age meet every Saturday in preparation for their first holy communion. There is one catechism group in every neighborhood and the couple is in charge of the Satélite group. For these purposes and with INVIES permission, Mateo and his wife occupy an abandoned, half-built two-story house in Satélite. There, older adolescents, trained by the couple, prepare around 80 children. Children sit on stools and carpets that Mateo brings every week. Divided in small groups, they occupy most of the house’s spaces, some of which are unsafe due to the lack of railings and presence of construction materials.

Mateo is also in charge of the choir. He and his family have played in the morning at another parish’s choir for the past 18 years. It was there that they met the current priest who, aware of their skills, encouraged them to organize a choir in Ciudad Satélite.
For more than two years, they have taught children to sing and play instruments such as the guitar, mandolin and tambourine. Currently, around 25 children proudly wear a blue uniform to sing and play at the 5 pm mass. This is one of the few after-school activities that children from Ciudad Satélite have access to. According to Mateo, the choir is not only an activity that keeps children busy but also one that provides them with additional skills and encourages them to do well in other areas. In Mateo’s words:

More than just singing, the choir is an activity that has helped lots of children [mainly girls]. We encourage them to have good grades, teach them good manners and incentivize them with prices. For example, we take children that behave well to another choir to sing, however, we can only take a few in our car...people here earn the minimum [referring to parents’ challenges to take their children out], me as a business man I earn a bit more...Children cling to us because we listen and let them participate, people are astonished by the way in which they obey us but that’s because we reward them...we teach them how to play and sing and don’t ask for a penny back. My father taught me to play and that’s why I like to teach, I like to have people around. When I was sick the girls cooked, packed and distributed the beans I normally sell to family stores. Even if the beans weren’t in the best of shapes, people bought them because they were aware of the girls’ efforts to help me (February, 2012).

Mateo also mentioned that children draw their parents to attend mass and hence strengthen the religious community. Through their engagement in religiously-related activities, Mateo and his wife became community organizers and references in the City. In their work, consistent engagement and accountability are central to earn residents’ trust. These activities facilitate the production of spaces where people can meet, share rituals and build community ties.

In addition to community organizers and volunteers, priests are also key actors in the community. They are assigned to a parish by the archdiocese and rotated depending on existing demand. The two priests assigned to Ciudad Satélite have done great efforts to build a religious community from scratch. In Delia’s words:
He [the priest] works with neighborhood representatives; he strives to bring the neighborhoods together. He organizes week-day masses within neighborhoods, in the street, where everyone is invited...we've organized mass twice here [in her block's open space], the first time the priest told me: did you invite people? And I said yes, I put up a few ads but people did not want to come and he replied well, never mind, even if it is only you and me we'll have a mass and suddenly the neighbors came out...he is very positive this priest (February 2012).

To build a religious community in Satélite, priests had to do ground work, build trust and appropriate space for temporary activities. Even if the archdiocese is not ready to invest on the land, the priests facilitated the leverage of local and external resources to launch the construction of the two important symbols, the cross and the shrine. These mark a place invested upon and used by parishioners despite harsh weather conditions and lack of storage space to leave furniture.

7.7 Public administration:

7.7.1 Water management office

The water management office (CONAGUA from here on) is a 4160 sq mt facility located next to the health center, in service area 4 (see the map in figure 24). This is the only administrative facility on site. Here, around 15 staff members collect water payments and manage the water and sewerage system (see figures 49 and 50).

Currently, one well supplies three elevated reservoirs from which water is distributed through a pressurized system. This system is rare in social housing developments where houses are traditionally furnished with an individual water tank on the roof. In this case, residents often build underground cisterns to feed roof tanks in case the pressure is not enough to fill them. The roof tank system allows residents to have their own water reserve and control it as needed. In case of shortage, this system also allows residents to buy water from private companies to fill their tanks. The pressurized system, on the other hand, requires high cost booster pumps to provide the pressure needed and
long term high energy consumption to pump water and keep constant pressures. Also, it makes supply vulnerable to power breaks and authorities’ efficiency to maintain the system.

From an urban design perspective, the pressurized system allows for a ‘cleaner’ urban image devoid of visually perturbing water tanks on roofs. While the pressurized system is more expensive than the traditional one at the urban level, it is less so at the housing level. This is very relevant since implementing a pressurized system allowed developers to save on housing construction, where they get most of their profits from.

Figure 49. CEA offices

Figure 50. Water treatment
Conversely, the costly urban infrastructure needed to implement the pressurized system was partly subsided with public funds.

In sum, implementing a pressurized system allowed developers to save on housing infrastructure and improve the image of developments at the cost of residents' dependence on the authorities' provision. In fact, they often complain about low water pressure, shortages, and high utility fees, manifesting their fear with regards to future water scarcity. In the words of Brenda, Satélite resident: “…we have leaks and reparations very often and even if we can inquire about these at the local facility, they don’t give us a solution…” (January 2012).

In response to these problems, residents have written petitions to the authorities and demonstrated on the premises. As Brenda states, not all requests are efficiently taken care of, however, having someone to hold accountable on site is very relevant in a context of accumulated disadvantages linked to added transportation costs to access public services, absence of authorities and blurred jurisdiction.

7.8 Security

7.8.1 Police station

The State police is located on the main entrance road, in service area 2. This 800 square meter facility is installed in a former INVIES warehouse. The police occupied a house in Satélite (see figure 51) for three years and moved to the warehouse at the end of 2013 (see figure 52).
The exterior of the station was furnished with a barricade and the interior adapted to house approximately 10 policemen on five units (motorbikes, and vans) and in two shifts (day and night time).

The police presence in the City is important for residents but many complain that the service is not efficient, especially in Urbi and el Manantial, the farthest neighborhoods from the station. In the words of Andrea, Urbi’s resident:
When there is a burglary they [the police] come and remain for a couple of days but then they forget and disappear until another incident happens. They are also very, very slow, when we were robbed we called the 066 [the emergency number] with no answer, my husband had to take the bus down to the police station... In the end the patrol came and gave us a local number to dial (July 2012).

Policemen monitor the neighborhood, attend emergencies and also provide prevention workshops on topics such as domestic violence and community surveillance. They promoted residents’ use of a whistle to alert neighbors of suspicious activity, but the initiative was only implemented in a few blocks. In other blocks short-lived security committees were formed by residents in order to deal with conflicts between neighbors, but these were dissolved due to internal conflicts.

The most common crimes in the City are linked to domestic violence, drug abuse in the streets, burglary and vandalism. In many occasions residents referred to the high amount of unoccupied houses, the lack of public lighting in some sectors of the city and the lack of after school activities for adolescents as direct contributors to crime. According to Carmen, a Satélite resident:

If the child and the adolescent have no leisure space what is he going to do? He will misbehave. On the contrary if he starts to play soccer and basket with friends his ideas will change, but if he is only sitting down doing nothing he'll say: what shall we do? Let’s brake in (March 2012).

In addition to insecurity, mistrust and lack of support among neighbors was commonly referred to by residents. Viri’s testimony manifests not only mistrust towards some members of the community but also towards policemen. Additionally, she also refers to the lack of community support to solve common problems and the vulnerability of children immersed in a context where parent presence, public spaces and afterschool activities are scarce or inexisten:
I’ve been at home because my neighbor robbed me last week and I can’t go out because she can break into my house again. People complain a lot about this woman [she refers to the burglar] but she hasn’t been caught red handed. People say she pays policemen so if you accuse her up there [at the police station] she finds out and threatens you. Next time I am going to tell her: ‘here, I give you my house keys, so that at least next time you break in you don’t have to break my window’…” and she continued: “…there are lots of burglaries in el Manantial and the police knows. This woman corrupts minors to rob houses, little boys between 6 and 7 years. I couldn’t do anything because I didn’t want to put my child at risk and nobody supports you [referring to her neighbors]. Everybody is locked indoors and no one helps you. I don’t want to move out because I bought my house, and I love it but I am not happy here anymore (March 2012).

Even when residents manifest their mistrust towards policemen, most agree that increased police presence is a priority. In addition to policing, privatizing to increase the perception of security is also a common desire amongst residents living in privadas and condominiums. However, privatizing comes with attached costs (such as expensive security systems) that residents have not been able to assume. As a result, only one privada in Satélite placed a chain at the entrance to discourage outsiders from coming in and protect children playing in the street. However, the chain also keeps away the police patrols. Lola, resident of this privada narrates her experience:

[W]e placed the chain about a year ago to protect children because they [outsiders] used the unoccupied houses to drug themselves or have sex. In the mornings when only women are at home cars with polarized windows used to come around so we thought: if we put a chain, thieves will not dare to take it off and come in, normally they just want to quickly look around and run…There are plenty of kids in the privada and people know that if the chain is on they have to lower their speed when they come in. We also made an internal set of rules…However, the police told us that in case of need they will not come in if the chain is on and I told them: but it is not locked, you just have to lift the hook, but they refused, so we lift the off chain during the night (March 2012).

In other words, the policemen discouraged neighbors’ privatization efforts under the threat of their retreat. In sum, the police presence matters to residents who have little
accountability and local presence of other institutions and whose community relations are weak. Also, in a context where vandalism and abandonment are part of the landscape, the presence of an authority is reassuring.

**Summary and conclusions**

*Equipamiento* is commonly a quality of life indicator since it facilitates access to opportunities, fosters spaces of encounter, promotes economic activities and promotes self-fulfillment. Not only does *equipamiento* benefit residents but it also contributes to housing sales by increasing the amount of public subsidy beneficiaries can get and attracting buyers. In Ciudad Satélite, great efforts were made to provide residents with basic education and health services. As previous chapters describe, this was achieved through a strong political power in charge of coordinating different actors and resources. As power faded, the interest and investment on public *equipamiento* in the City stopped but housing sales continued. In other words, the City is populating slowly but public *equipamiento* is not being provided. Additionally, as this chapter showed, not only is the public facility offer limited but in some cases also inadequate due, among others, to short management budgets, lack of staff and inter-institutional coordination, and rigid facility use policies. In this context, all actors involved in the provision of public *equipamiento* (i.e., developers, authorities religious associations and residents) try to maximize their gains while reducing the costs through different strategies. The analysis on the provision of public *equipamiento* in Ciudad Satélite unveils how:

**The state government**

1) Builds castles (as residents referred to oversized *equipamiento*) but fails to maintain them
2) Controls the land and thus controls what facilities get built, where and how
3) Strategically maintains open spaces to market the city
Developers
4) Maximize the land use and privatize the public space to shift maintenance responsibilities
5) Build private facilities and organize the community to manage them
6) Ban ‘illegal’ family shops in the name of sanitation and good image

Religious associations
7) Carve flexible spaces to conduct religious activities and build community symbols
8) Move community resources to provide residents with services

Residents
9) Organize to claim for services
10) Create local opportunities to thrive
11) Grasp on-site opportunities to frame claims
12) Reproduce main stream discourses

These strategies however, are immersed in a complex political, institutional and economic context and as such their implementation is filled with paradoxes, some of which are summarized below.

1) **Building castles**

The school infrastructure and health center in Ciudad Satélite are symbols of the social contract between the governor (main driver of the project), buyers and developers. These oversized facilities served to attract new comers, market the city and fulfill a basic need for young families. The school construction shows the governor’s outreach power to build large facilities in an institutional context where similar projects take a long time to materialize. This power, however, disappeared with his administration and failed to ensure ongoing resources for facilities to function adequately. As a result, school parents cover many of the functioning costs and principals and teachers face many shortages. By the
same token, the health center only offers half-day services and is short on staff and equipment. Both budget shortages and top-down control prevent such large spaces from being used as community resources. Sitting half empty, the schools and the health center could provide residents with spaces to discuss, do sports and organize, in sum, to capitalize on the infrastructure to benefit a community with many needs. This shortcoming makes evident the institutional disjuncture between public facility construction and management as well as the dislocation between institutional services and community services.

2) **Holding the power through land**

INVIES holds a strong decision power in Ciudad Satélite through land ownership. This allows INVIES public servants to negotiate with anyone proposing to invest on advantageous terms, as well as to control what is built. The example of the church shows how relevant it is for residents to secure tenure in order for external investments to flow into the community and how lengthy can be to negotiate land donations with the authorities. Regardless, residents remain positive and envision the construction of a pilgrims’ sanctuary to worship their holy Mary in the future. Along the same lines, the example of the market shows how owning the land gives INVIES the power to block a community-based project.

3) **Strategic use of open spaces**

Open space design and maintenance is part of INVIES’s strategies to market the City. Following Ciudad Satélite’s original garden city concept, Satélite and El Manantial open spaces structure both the urban and the housing layout. However, the current conditions of a large proportion of spaces reflect the gap between the plan and its implementation. In fact, currently, the most visible spaces are the best maintained both by residents and by INVIES but many remain wasteland. In this context, open spaces echo,
on the one hand, the overall abandonment of the City by both authorities and developers and, on the other, the organizational capacity, resources and interest of neighbors.

4) **Maximizing land use and privatizing public space**

In Urbivillas, open space design and management is also strategically used for marketing purposes. In this case, their production responds to three logics: 1) maximization of plots for sale, 2) privatization of space in autonomous ‘condominiums’ where residents own their open space and are therefore responsible for its maintenance; 3) autonomy from the rest of the City and non-dependence on INVIES. Urbi planned to provide, within the neighborhood, the essential *equipamiento* for residents to access basic services such as a commercial center, sports area, community center and local open spaces. Most public facility provision responsibilities are undertaken by Urbi in the short term but in the long these will shift over to residents. In fact, after Urbi went bankrupt, residents assumed open-space maintenance and utility payments. This ‘privatization’ not only of space but also of responsibilities trims developers’ maintenance costs and facilitates the municipalization of the development since it curtails public areas. The condominium system allows residents to privatize the space at the cost of additional payments they have to cover. Given that some of these payments, such as street lighting, are costly, none of the blocks are lit up at night. Central to this privatization scheme is the community organization structure promoted by Urbi in hopes of ensuring that the development will be maintained and public *equipamiento* self-managed.

5) **Building *equipamiento* and organizing the community to manage it**

The community center is an example of Urbi’s strategy to secure the private provision of *equipamiento* in its developments. In this case, Urbi partnered with a nonprofit to build and temporarily run the center to finally turn management over to residents. This strategy is part of Urbi’s residential life concept whereby it seeks to promote self-managed
communities able to administer and maintain *equipamiento* independent from the State. Under this concept Urbi also seeks to fulfill residents’ needs while attracting new buyers and increasing the amount of INFONAVIT subsidy per house. Paradoxically, the center was fully built but Urbi withholding the power to decide over its use and, to the residents’ disappointment, it has been closed for several years.

6) **Defining illegality**

In addition to the provision of *equipamiento*, the residential life concept also includes urban image beautification. Under this concept, land uses (mostly commercial) that can hinder the image are banned from the City and considered illegal. Despite their ‘illegality’, family shops are proliferating across the three neighborhoods. This business type allows families to access economic alternatives and women to work while staying at home. On the other hand, they fulfill a market need that ‘legal stores’ are not meeting. In addition to this, developers and authorities fail to acknowledge the importance of family shops as community resources in a context of insecurity and deprivation. They are spaces of encounter and community organization as well as the ‘eyes’ of the street knitting together the public and private realms. Despite these advantages, developers and authorities ban them arguing that they lack building, land use and sanitation permits, promote overcrowding and damage the homogeneous urban image of the neighborhood. To control their spread, commercial land tagged for local shops was developed, as well as regulations restricting commercial land uses and controlling housing extensions. These mechanisms have, however, failed to achieve their goal.

7) **Creating flexible spaces of worship and building community symbols**

From a bottom-up perspective, the case shows how, in the face of inadequate places to conduct religious activities, residents appropriate and adapt spaces such as waste land, abandoned houses and streets to attend mass and teach the catechism.
However, these temporary appropriations present different challenges such as unsafe conditions for children, lack of utilities such as electricity or water, exposition to weather conditions and costs linked to furniture transportation, among others. In addition to temporary appropriations, building visible symbols such as the cross and the shrine shows how relevant it is for a community that invested money, time and energy, to build physical places to state their presence and appropriate space. Analyzed as a process, the construction of these elements helped strengthen the community ties and partner with external benefactors to attract resources.

8) **Moving community resources to provide services**

The priest and community leaders are keystones to attract resources and organize the community. Their role acquired strengthened importance in places such as Ciudad Satélite that lack community spaces, services and activities for children. Through these activities, religious leaders earn the trust of neighbors hence becoming facilitators of community change and social capital construction. Religious spaces in the City bring people from the different neighborhoods together and foster activities that require neighbors to organize. The catechism and choir provide children with opportunities to acquire additional skills, attend an afternoon activity and socialize with other children. Additionally, the holy Mary’s festivity, organized by residents, has become an event that encourages community bonding and identity. These activities, however, could be supported by an adequate infrastructure that fosters community organization and identity building.

9) **Organizing the community**

Community organization presents many challenges. The case of the shrine showed how residents distrust their neighbors and how community leaders have to put in place accountability mechanisms to earn their trust. Open-space maintenance also shows how
the lack not only of resources but also of interest undermines community initiatives. Moreover, the street market example shows that community interests are heterogeneous and finding common ground to negotiate is not always feasible. Finally, INVIES and Urbi also contribute to depoliticizing community activities by organizing the community from above and individualizing residents’ claims. Despite these challenges, community organization in CS is intermittent but constant in response to a context of accumulated needs.

10) Creating opportunities to thrive

In addition to organizing around service provision, residents also organize to create local opportunities to thrive. The spread of family shops shows how, through an incremental strategy residents start to individually fulfill a latent need despite INVIES and Urbi’s prohibition. Collectively, they also sought to fulfill a nutrition problem and create local economic opportunities through the market project. This project shows that the community is organized, informed and has professional support. It also shows that they mobilize their claims through different outlets, even if none of them are fruitful. Residents have a project and are ready to invest on it. However, this requires start up financial support and land allocation; both of which authorities are not in a position to grant. In this context, businesses owners have the option of opening ‘illegal’ shops in their houses or, if their budget allows, buy a piece of commercial land to develop an individual business. Nonetheless, both options de-politicize collective organization.

11) Grasping on-site opportunities to frame claims

As seen in chapter 6, residents employ a wide range of strategies to claim for services. Most of these require them to travel to San Luis at their own expense given that most authorities are in the capital. For local strategies to yield results, the media coverage is needed. Only in the case of water shortages and cuts are residents able to protest on-
site given that the water management office is the sole administrative facility in CS. In a context of exclusion and political disempowerment, the presence of this public administration facility is very relevant even if not all requests are efficiently taken care of.

**12) Reproducing the authorities’ discourses**

Residents’ service provision claims are also contested and sometimes imbued with fear and the authorities’ discourses. This is shown by the health center extended service request that residents handed over the authorities. In this case, residents resorted to a signed petition to request that service hours be extended. The petition was signed by many residents but some of them manifested their concern about the possibility of authorities closing the health facility as a result of the complaint. The authority rejected the request and claimed that the population demand is not enough to justify the investment in the clinic. In opposition, residents argued that patients are denied the service on a daily basis due to the center’s reduced working hours. This petition needs to also be understood in a context where local alternative medical options are not yet available and people have to commute to be attended. Despite this, the interview data shows how residents adopt and reproduce the main stream discourse by blaming the reduced service on low population counts.

The reproduction of mainstream discourses is also reflected on residents aim to privatize their blocks and to strengthen the police presence in neighborhoods. The importance residents confer to the police presence, despite the mistrust they also manifest towards them, is contradictory. This responds to a combined context of neglect and abandonment, lack of activities for children and adolescents and of public spaces (e.g., parks, community centers) to strengthen the community relationships. Contrary to a strong social fabric reinforcing community ties, community watch and surveillance, mistrust and
lack of support is experienced by residents. As a result, the police presence and the privatization of the space are responses to residents’ perception of insecurity.

In sum, through different spatial, discursive, and administrative strategies all actors involved in the provision of *equipamiento* in the City try to advance their interests. By the same token, power, resources and organizational capacity are some of the factors that define which strategies advance and which fail.
Chapter 8: Governmentality Assembled in Ciudad Satélite

Introduction

Ciudad Satélite as we know it now is the result of a multiplicity of forces (i.e., economic, political, social) coming together in space. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this dissertation unveiled the web of events, actors and strategies used to exert power and advance the development of a massive housing project at the outskirts of the city of San Luis Potosi along with the actions and reactions of forces on the ground. This chapter unearths and tears apart the changing ‘constellations’ of rationalities, strategies and technologies actors assembled to govern planning, policy implementation, everyday life and the provision of equipamiento in Ciudad Satélite (Ong, 2005). The main objective of the chapter is to demonstrate how different governmental rationalities ‘rub shoulders’, and how governmental strategies that seek to exert power and govern space and knowledge production come together and stemmed new arrangements. This analysis also sheds light on some of the paradoxes that result when “global abstractions” meet with “local specificities” and when governmental programs meet reality (Collier, 2006, p. 400).

The chapter is structured in three sections or assemblages: Assemblage 1 addresses the governmentality of policy, planning and implementation; Assemblage 2 analyzes the governmentality of everyday life; and Assemblage 3 examines public facility access and management. In each of these sections, I present a summary of the research findings, structured in accordance with the theory, and then I summarize and map these findings in accordance with the analytics of assemblage described in chapter 2 (section 2.7.2).
8.1 Assemblage 1: governing policy, planning and housing production in Ciudad Satélite

Social housing development in Mexico is closely related with international policies that have dictated, at least from the 1980s onwards, how the sector functions. International policies, however, present variegated implementations when they meet political, social, economic, public administration, legal and planning specificities.

In this section, I seek to identify the values and spatial rationalities underpinning social housing production, the role of residents as subjects of government, and the way in which housing scarcity is framed so as to render it imaginable and subject to intervention. Further, I unearth the different strategies used to understand, represent and intervene in reality in CS. Finally, I analyze how different technologies of government were used to produce knowledge, govern subjects and advance, even if modestly, reactive strategies.

8.1.1 Summary of findings

Neo-liberal governmentality: Re-scaling, rolling back, rolling out and rolling over

Mexican housing policy has undergone considerable changes since the 1970s, when laws, plans and institutions to regulate urban development were put in place. From 1972 to 1988, housing policy was characterized by strong state regulation along with weak intervention on the part of international organizations. Subsequently, during the 1990s, the state was deregulated, resulting in a stronger intervention of international organizations, private developers, builders and financial institutions in what was called the sector’s ‘modernization’.

As the literature suggests, this ‘modernization’ process entailed the ‘rescaling’ of housing policy, as well as changes in the role of the state (Swyngedouw, 1995, p.1999).
During the first stage, both the federal and state governments intervened directly on different aspects of social housing production such as land allocation, design, promotion, management and credit assignation. During the second stage, however, Mexico became the second worldwide WB lender in the housing sector (Boils, 2004). As a result, Mexican housing policy adhered to the international institution’s precepts, drastically re-structuring the sector. This implied that housing institutions became managers of housing production, shifting many of their former responsibilities over to private developers and financial institutions. In parallel, local governments also acquired increased power through urban planning and access to development funds directly from the federal government.

Programs drafted by meta-government agencies and implemented at a local level have nonetheless variegated local implementations (Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009). Re-scaling in Ciudad Satélite was a failed endeavor and, contrary to what the literature suggests, did not entail the empowerment of local authorities. CS’s urban design and planning process were directed by the state government and were related to a strong political will to build ‘the city of the future’. Additionally, due to the financial risks involved in the development of a city from scratch, the state also intervened in the design and construction of the first 4 macro-plots. This interventionist strategy was intended to change during the second stage, when INVIES, the state housing agency shifted the risks (and gains) towards private developers by releasing macro-plots for them to develop. Nevertheless, macro-economic changes as well as low housing sales affected the activities of the two private companies that were investing in CS to finally stop the works. As a corollary, INVIES was left with two unfinished developments.

At a national level, the role of the different governmental agencies involved in housing was restructured to de-regulate the sector. As a corollary, the federal housing agencies and their local offices previously controlling where and how social housing was
built ‘rolled back’ from many of their responsibilities and instead strengthened their financial functions. In parallel, these institutions crafted different mechanisms to roll out and govern local agencies at an arm’s length (Dodson, 2006; Dean, 1999). They did so for instance, in the form of providing bridging loans. Some of these responsibilities were shifted over to private developers and financial institutions (including risks and gains). At a local level, state and municipal agencies acquired enhanced responsibilities to implement federal policies and plan urban development.

Findings from this research indicate that, due to the scale of the project, the financial risks involved and the amount of resources needed to launch it, the State of San Luis Potosi rolled over to exert tight control over CS’s development. This means that, instead of retreating and delegating responsibilities, INVIES controlled the urban planning process of the city, coordinated its first development stage, and took on responsibility for the consequences of the second stage’s failure as well as most of the financial risks the project entailed. The state’s stranglehold stepped over the municipal authority, legally entitled to carry out these tasks.

**Governing housing production**

Governmental changes and re-scaling affected social housing production in at least two ways: it changed the quality of housing produced and further promoted the construction of massive developments on and beyond the outskirts of cities. Increased responsibilities allowed the private sector to play a central role in deciding where and how to build housing. Market and profit logics underpinned such decisions, promoting the construction of massive, peripheral developments. Peripheral land is generally less expensive and found in large plots. Building in peripheral locations not only reduces the cost of the land but also facilitates the construction of massive developments, generating economies of scale that bust developers’ profits. Another trend that started with the
weakening of public housing institutions in the 1980s, (i.e., the lower quality of the houses both in terms of material quality and size), was further advanced by developers trying to reduce construction costs and maximize profits.

As a consequence, the number of massive peripheral developments increased sharply from the mid-1990s. Equipamiento in these developments, however, is not built at the same pace, affecting residents’ quality of life and increasing the need to commute and the cost of doing so. Despite the housing’s remote location and poor stock of amenities, demand was stable; however, a large percentage of the stock was later abandoned; most of this abandonment took place after the 2008 crisis when many workers lost their jobs and failed to comply with their mortgage payments (Torres, 2008). Paradoxically, while demand was decreasing, construction subsidies rose and, hence, construction continued. The gap between supply and demand finally took its toll on the companies such as Urbi that had dominated the sector and whose main source of profit was social housing construction. This development made evident the crisis of the social housing sector and pushed the current federal administration to craft new mechanisms to control (at a distance) the development of dormitory towns. These mechanisms do not coerce developers nor impose restrictive rules. Rather, they incentivize developers to produce ‘sustainable communities’. Examples of these mechanisms are INFONAVIT subsidy requirements provided to future buyers of developments that promote densification, are close to existing equipamiento and infrastructure and that use green technologies. These requirements, however, were set in place after Ciudad satellite was developed. Municipalities have also crafted their own mechanisms to ensure that both the quality of the housing and the development are met. Examples of these are enhanced requirements regarding the housing guarantees that developers must provide to their clients in order to ensure the durability of constructions. At the urban scale, strict municipalization requirements ensure that the urban infrastructure built by developers is in neat condition
for municipalities to take it over. In sum, through these ‘control at a distance’ mechanisms
governments at different scales try to guide how and where social housing is developed.
Ciudad Satélite, however, was developed at the aid of the governor’s direct intervention.
The development of the City was used by the governor as a political strategy to gain
visibility, open clientelistic opportunities and incentivize the local economy by providing
contracts for local builders. Nevertheless, even if a strong political arm backed the project
and pushed for the construction of four oversized facilities, when the political drive faded
and financial irregularities were uncovered, the development of the City slowed down
dramatically.

Findings from this research also show the local consequences that stemmed from
the application of a failed housing production model, i.e., housing abandonment and poor
living conditions. These factors coupled with an economic crisis affected the City and in
particular Urbivillas whose development halted. The changes to the federal housing policy
promoted by the current administration put at risk the flow of subsidies for a development
that is outside any contention perimeter\(^1\). However, INVIES was able to secure subsidies
arguing that the whole City was authorized before the policy change. The municipal
government, excluded from all the phases of the project, is using municipalization as a
strategy to avoid taking over the responsibility of a failed project. As a result, both INVIES
and private developers are responsible for the maintenance of public spaces and for
providing public services such as lighting and garbage collection until the developments
are municipalized. Nevertheless, one developer is shifting responsibilities on to residents
by privatizing blocks under the condominium regime.

\(^1\) Densification, compact growth and development of inner-city land are examples of federal
policy changes. These are explained in chapter 4.
**Framing social housing needs**

Social housing policy addresses a sector of the Mexican population that is next to the poorest. Although it is not an antidote to urban informality, social housing policy seeks to reverse a settlement trend that characterizes a large proportion of the population (Connolly, 2008); indeed, it seeks to avoid disorderly, poorly built settlements on illegal, at-risk, and unserviced sites. For this, policy changes have favored the construction of new housing and promoted private property. By integrating buyers into a formal system of mortgages, they are expected to capitalize their assets, and integrate into a social system that overvalues private property and ascribes moral virtues to proprietors. In these societies, housing needs are central items in governmental agendas. As such, calculating housing scarcity has become a governmental tool to justify budget allocation for housing programs. The Partial Plan of CS used scarcity as a banner to justify the construction of the City. However, the population projections used to calculate scarcity were above real population growth numbers (see section 5.2.2). Additionally, high land values, infrastructure problems and disorderly urban growth were additional motives to develop an orderly, fully served and planned City (Poder Ejecutivo del Estado, H. Ayuntamiento de San Luis Potosí y H. Ayuntamiento de Soledad de Graciano Sánchez, 2007, p. 3). Framing reality in these terms, however, obscured the fact that the City itself was promoting urban fragmentation and the construction of costly infrastructure works based on a planning instrument that was only partially implemented.

**Governing housing consumption**

In line with World Bank policies, changes to the housing sector promoted buyers’ increased participation in ‘responsible’ housing consumption through mortgages and savings for down payments. In parallel, subsidies were sharply reduced and mortgage payment compliance closely scrutinized. These changes also promoted the construction of
new housing, to the detriment of other interventions such as housing renovation or informal neighborhood upgrading. They gradually left out of the picture the poorest sectors of the population, concentrating on those able to comply with increased payment requirements. Along these lines, Ciudad Satélite was conceived to tackle the raising housing needs of the ‘hard to house’, i.e., informal workers and the poorest blue-collar sectors of the workforce. While this objective was partially attained in the first stage of the development, bank’s increasingly restrictive mortgage requirements led to increasing numbers of houses being acquired with INFONAVIT credits.

Housing policy changes also included the de-politicization of housing allocation: while formerly housing was allocated through unions and organized groups, currently, individuals choose their place of residence. This shift individualizes transactions and forces community bonds to be built from scratch around the specific demands and limitations of the new type of housing. Buyers’ freedom of choice has fostered some competition among developers and incentives to diversify housing products. However, competition remains limited because the housing deficit is still large. Hence, individuals’ freedom to choose is still limited for those with less acquisitive power.

CS is among the few housing options available for the poorest workers qualifying for a credit. It offers a 45 sq. meter house and a larger-than-normal plot of 120 sq. meters. Despite these advantages, sales are slow, and INVIES has undertaken different initiatives to enhance them. These strategies include an improved marketing strategy, subsidies for buyers and the progressive consolidation of the neighboring industrial area. Marketing is used by INVIES as a technology of commodification to direct residents’ consumption. Through this technology, however, INVIES sold a bunch of promises and a vision of a garden city, a city of the future that did not materialize. Its market-oriented strategies actually failed to address the root causes of housing abandonment of peripheral conjuntos:
connectivity and lack of *equipamiento*. Addressing these aspects emerges as a major need and better strategy.

**Controlling the planning process**

Ciudad Satélite’s planning process shows how planning practice can be used to justify political decisions and to foster the production of technical knowledge to frame and produce reality at will. CS’s partial plan was crafted after the political decision to develop it was taken and the urban design of the city was complete. Ciudad Satélite is an extreme case that sheds light upon the flaws and paradoxes within the Mexican planning system. Planning practice in Mexico is characterized by its focus on plans as legal tools that justify public works, instead of on the process itself (Iracheta, 1997; Gutierrez, 2011). CS’s partial plan was not an exception; it translated into legal terms the governor’s power to implement a mega-project. The planning process left out key public actors (such as municipal, health, education and social development institutions) and included only two state institutions (INVIES and SEDUVOP) who secretly crafted the plan but lacked control over aspects that are the responsibility of the parties excluded from the process. The wide gap between what was planned and what was actually built in CS, both in terms of the number of houses and of *equipamiento* provided, point to the pressing need to, on the one hand, involve a wider range of public and social actors in planning processes, and on the other, incorporate legal agreements between these actors that record budget allocation commitments and willingness to participate in plan implementation. Poor public participation in the elaboration of the plan also highlights the ineffectiveness of current mechanisms to involve citizens in key urban development decisions. Plan makers are legally required to open public consultation processes only after plans are drawn up. The outcomes of consultation processes are then technically evaluated and integrated only if they are deemed adequate. This type of participation legitimizes the planning process but
rarely capitalizes on the potential benefits of including different actors in urban
development decisions.

**Governing knowledge production**

Plan making in CS clearly defined who the powerful actors were in the process and
who could produce knowledge and frame reality so as to justify an expensive and
unsustainable project. Planning, in this context, was used as a political tool validated by
technical knowledge (including fourteen feasibility studies by private consultants; see
section 5.2.2). Knowledge production and tailoring of discourse were central in the
production of the partial plan and in aligning the Metropolitan plan with the governor’s
project. This was done despite the fact that the rationale of the project contradicted the
original principles of the Metropolitan plan (i.e., to avoid the concentration of ‘housing of
the same size and value for one type of household’, Poder Ejecutivo del Estado, 2007a, p. 88). Despite this, CS’s Partial Plan frames the City as a regional urban pole providing all
the services needed by its population and that of neighboring localities – services and
amenities which did not in practice materialize.

According to the plan, CS is a regional hub, needed to solve the problems that
stem from the construction of “…affordable housing…in reduced spaces and in remote
places, cut off from secondary and tertiary services…” (Idem: 3). In other words, by
developing this ‘urban pole’, the partial plan promised to address the very problems that its
implementation (or lack thereof) actually exacerbated. In this context, planning failed to
meet implementation and public administration realities and rationalization failed to ground
its aspirations on attainable objectives. It was abstract planning at its best.

Ciudad Satélite would challenge most definitions of what a city is: namely, a space
with all the services and amenities needed for residents to carry out their daily activities
locally and a place that, among other things, accommodates diversity. Discursively, CS is
a service pole; however, the plan fails to endow the city with all the services and public *equipamiento* that a settlement of its intended size should have. Therefore, even if all of its facilities were built, the city would remain functionally dependent on the capital of the state. Further, the city was designed for a homogenous impoverished sector of the population, offering very little housing, economic and social diversity. As a result, the very strategies of the plan, not to mention the reality of its implementation, contradict its discourse.

During development, knowledge production was also central to portraying a thriving image of the project and attract buyers. Housing sales numbers and population counts were systematically inflated in media declarations and meetings with representatives of the industrial sector interested in investing in the city.

In sum, the political rationalization that promoted the development of a highly visible but costly project was contradictory and based upon objectives that were not instrumentalized to ensure their attainment. As a result, the City aggravated the same problems (e.g., urban fragmentation and poor quality of life) it sought to tackle.

**Governing space: Spatial diagrams, governmental schemes and environmental causalities**

Social housing, and specifically *conjuntos habitacionales*, seek to generate environments where basic needs are met (water, sewerage and electricity) and where residents can improve their quality of life in accordance with middle class values (such as order and cleanliness). In other words, built within the policy is a vitalist rationality that seeks to create an environment in which ‘human evolution can unfold’ (Huxley, 2007, p. 780). Furthermore, orderly, fully served *conjuntos* are thought to generate environments conducive to ‘radical transformations’ in the behavior and aspirations of residents (Schteingart & Graizbord, 1998, p. 9). In CS these environments were generated under spatial schemes that sought to control the territory, discipline residents and govern the
population. Zoning, monumentality, hierarchy, location, structure and typology were key components of these schemes.

CS sits on a former ejido designated as silvestre (wild-land) use area. Changing CS’s zoning from wild- to urbanized-land within the metropolitan plan enabled the creation of the City’s partial plan. The City was nonetheless planned as an isolated ‘urbanizable’ area surrounded by agricultural uses. Given that the surroundings are not designated as suitable for urban development, land speculation was discouraged. The arguments that justified the development of this isolated area of land were based on access to infrastructure (electricity, sewerage and a main road) and on the fact that other potential uses such as agriculture and stock rearing were not profitable. These arguments could also, however, be applied to the neighboring land. Nonetheless, planning did not consider the City’s surroundings, failing to acknowledge the regional repercussions that such a project can have. In sum, zoning was used as a tool to justify the development of CS but planning was not used as a tool to foresee and manage the regional effects of this new town—or the challenges it posed on residents for that matter.

CS’ design is intended to promote communication between people, different land uses and different modes of transport; it was meant to provide the City with large green areas that democratized the use of space. The opportunity to design a city from scratch allowed designers to project a space free from “…the vices and pre-determinants of something given and pre-established…” (idem) and as a result convey strong spatial statements. This opportunity also allowed designers to test on-site spatial principles that foster middle-class environments for the working class and to apply urban design models in the form of a ‘humanized monumentality’ inspired by two very different sources such as Brasilia and San Luis’s colonial center.

Monumentality is built into the urban design via wide streets, large open spaces and ‘castle-like’ facilities. These elements are hierarchically classified to rationalize and
increase the efficiency of connectivity, urban flows and service coverage. The location of these elements also reinforces their hierarchy. Such is the case of the central space which is planned to house large public and private *equipamiento* and open spaces. The City’s street structure is not only characterized by its monumentality and hierarchy but also by its form. Winding roads are characteristic of high-end gated communities. Urban designers resorted to this form to create attractive streets. Conversely, straight, visible, easily policed and controlled streets are characteristic of social housing *conjuntos*. Therefore, CS’s street design appeals to “higher-end, people-centered” urban design (ZYGMA’s staff member, December, 2012). Finally, a homogeneous housing typology is intended to portray order and cleanliness. While these precepts were preserved in the general layout of plots and the construction of the first 5 macro-plots, changing the development model in favor of private developers deprived INVIES of control over urban design in the interior of the macro-plots. An example of the result is Urbi’s design with narrower streets, fewer and smaller public spaces and denser housing. Meanwhile, the application of design concepts intended for middle-class settlements and gated communities to the design of affordable housing for the poor, while trying to entice buyers into highly disciplining environments (through mechanisms such as homogeneity and regulations), proved rather unfeasible for a population with meager resources.

Ciudad Satélite is an example of how urban models and planning ideas travel and face contextual challenges as they are implemented on-site. These contextual specificities are further analyzed in the following section, with the aid of the analytical guide proposed in chapter 2.

8.1.2 Analyzing the governmentality of housing access in Ciudad Satélite

The table XXXII summarizes the research findings as they relate to the governmentality of policy implementation, plan making and development of Ciudad
Satélite. Housing access in Ciudad Satélite was determined by federal housing policies shaped by World Bank requirements. However, their implementation was tightly linked to the City’s political context.

The case showed how the way in which problems were framed (cognitive dimension) stemmed from mainstream discourses on housing scarcity and social housing as the most viable solution to house the poor in orderly, dignified developments. However, the implementation of policy promoted an unsustainable housing production model (i.e., that of massive, peripheral dormitory towns), commonly reproduced during the 1990s and subsequent decades.

Findings highlight a tight knit bond between Foucault’s governmental components: knowledge, power and space. As the summary table below shows, these components were assembled through a wide array of strategies and technologies of power. Knowledge played a central role in framing and producing a reality that justified, as a viable solution to a ‘pressing’ housing need, the construction of a mega-city. In this context, power had the tools to produce and frame reality, as well as to control who could produce it. Furthermore, power was also exerted through a combination of sovereign and governmental technologies to control space (e.g., zoning), shape the materiality of space (e.g., monumentality and typology) and regulate urban interactions within it (e.g., urban structure and hierarchy).

The case also shows, however, how power configurations are not fixed; on the contrary, actors found ways to exert power at different points in time either by shifting their strategies or through reactive tactics and practices. The Mayor’s office municipalization denial is an example of this.
## TABLE XXXII

ASSEMBLAGE 1: THE GOVERNMENTAL COMPONENTS OF POLICY, PLANNING AND HOUSING PRODUCTION IN CS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognition: How are problems framed? What is desirable?</th>
<th>Moral form</th>
<th>Epistemological character</th>
<th>Idiom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values underpinning social housing production: private property, dignity, health, order</td>
<td>Nature of the subjects governed: housing consumers as political subjects, responsible and free citizens</td>
<td>How reality is framed as to render it imaginable: housing as a pressing need, fulfilled through newly built social housing, urban chaos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial diagrams: Dispositional and vitalist spatial rationality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculation: What can be made possible?</th>
<th>Strategies to understand reality</th>
<th>Strategies to represent reality</th>
<th>Strategies to intervene reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Producing and framing knowledge ad hoc: feasibility studies justifying the City’s construction, discourse tailoring and controlling who gets to produce knowledge</td>
<td>Covering-up reality: Overestimating population projections and inflating housing sales numbers.</td>
<td>Building a city from scratch, using a two-tiered development approach.</td>
<td>Sovereign, disciplinary and bio-power schemes of government: Zoning, monumentality, hierarchy, location, structure and typology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experimentation: How to govern?</th>
<th>Subjectification technologies</th>
<th>Spatial technologies</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Controlling space through: Regulatory practices: contention rings, subsidies, DUIS certificate. Segregationist practices: acquiring peripheral land and generating economies of scale Denying municipalization and selling houses under condominium regime</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consumer preferences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
8.2 Assemblage 2: governing everyday life in Ciudad Satélite

Ciudad Satélite was projected to address the very problems it currently promotes, i.e., the peripheralization of low-income families in poorly served dormitory towns. Living in this type of development has been challenging for residents who have to spend additional resources to access basic services and commute to job centers. As a result, developments met with high rates of abandoned houses and related problems such as vandalism, theft and perception of insecurity. Governmental strategies, in this context, sought to provide residents with the tools to self-manage and organize to build thriving communities. In parallel, the built environment provided conditions that aimed to conduct behavior in line with governing agents’ programs. This section analyzes the governmentality of everyday life in Ciudad Satélite and unearths the nuances and paradoxes that stem from the will to govern this type of development.

8.2.1 Summary of findings

Ciudad Satélite’s current living conditions

Ciudad Satélite’s actual conditions differ by much from the garden City INVIES envisioned and marketed and from the partial plan’s population and public amenity projections. Even if the City is slowly growing, residents face major challenges such as long commutes to jobs and services. The enthusiasm that attracted residents since 2008 faded sharply after 2013 when Urbi’s bankruptcy was announced. As a result, by the time this research was conducted, residents manifested a sense of abandonment, reflected in the large number of vacant properties. Survey findings show that, while residents are content with their property per se, satisfaction rates sharply decrease when they compare previous and current access to equipamiento. Considered in isolation from the costs related to commutes and lack of services on site, Ciudad Satélite is among the least expensive housing options in the City. It has provided young households with the
opportunity of acquiring property in a culture where ownership is reflective of good
citizenship values and personal achievement (especially among men). Initially, the project
targeted households earning between 2 and 5 minimum salaries that had no access to
mortgages from public institutions such as INFONAVIT. Nevertheless, while the
overwhelming majority of households earned between 2 and 3 minimum salaries
(according to residents’ self-reported incomes), most bought the house with an
INFONAVIT credit.

The social characteristics of households from the three developments studied are
similar (mostly young families); however, Urbivillas’ residents are slightly wealthier.
Despite these similarities, differences in perception were found between them. Satélite and
El Manantial residents look up to Urbivillas and praise the private developers’ efforts to
build *equipamiento* and maintain the development. Urbivilla’s residents try to avoid
contact with people from other neighborhoods other than where they have no choice in the
matter, in relation to schooling and medical attention for example. Satélite and El
Manantial residents have participated in common initiatives but these remain limited. As a
result, community organization at the broader City level is limited to occasional issues
demanding immediate attention (such as water provision). By contrast, organization at the
neighborhood level is active and has been used by developers as a governing strategy.

**Governing the population**

Housing policy changes at a national level have changed how social housing
residents are conceived: from welfare beneficiaries to housing consumers. This change is
reflected in several aspects of the process through which residents obtain the house:
buyers are obliged to be ‘responsible citizens’ and save to cover a down payment (to add
to their own and their employers’ regular financial contributions), and they are ‘free’ to
choose their place of residence (within the constraints of affordability and supply). Social
housing policy not only seeks to integrate citizens into a mainstream culture where private property is a maxim but also into a system where residents’ behavior is expected to meet community values (as defined by the policy) in the name of the so-called public good.

The cases studied showed how community has been used by developers and public institutions as an arena to govern life (Dean, 1999). Findings also revealed the wide array of technologies used to work between individuals’ subjection and subjectivity in order to produce responsible, self-managed subjects (Cruikshank, 1993).

Federal institutions such as INFONAVIT use technologies of citizenship to govern residents at a distance. The implementation of Rehab in Satélite showed how community organization, training and empowerment are built into program’s requirements as a way to force residents to assume responsibility for what the development did not provide. However, the gap between the program’s objectives and the short life of the spaces residents intervened highlights a programmatic gap that needs to be addressed. By the same token, INFONAVIT’s mortgage-with-services program coerces residents into paying fees for the maintenance of common space fees through their mortgages, thus reinforcing the trend by which municipalities delegate these responsibilities to residents. In this way, services previously provided by developers or municipalities become part of the housing package to lower production and maintenance costs and to streamline the responsibilities of municipalities.

Public and private developers also assembled an array of technologies to govern residents in the desired directions. Imagineering was a central strategy used to create a marketable image of a community that actually did not exist. The image of the city thus portrayed was that of a garden city, a city of the future, reminiscent of traditional Mexican old towns but monumentally modern. In parallel to marketing, a discourse around community values was produced by both federal institutions and local developers to make it evident to buyers what was expected of them. These values are explicitly expressed in
INFONAVIT’s neighbors’ organization manuals and in CS’s by-laws: social responsibility, respect, solidarity, inclusion and honesty (INFONAVIT, 2010). By-laws are pieces of regulation that seek to promote residents’ behavioral changes in the interest of the type of community envisioned from above, and dreamed by residents and in line with developers’ immediate objectives (i.e., preservation of real estate values and positive marketing). In other words, developers provided residents with the tools to auto-regulate and promote the behavioral changes needed to create what they called a convivial space.

The adoption of a certain type of community values is applicable not only to social relations but also to the built environment (i.e., respect for the original image of the development). As a result, respecting the image of order that developments promote includes regulating not only public space activities but also modifications of the private realm such as housing extensions and land use changes. Findings suggest that some residents, mainly those involved in community organization, adopt these values, do not perceive them as thwarting their own freedom and help developers enforce them. Others do not, however, agree with restrictions that restrain what they can or cannot do with their private property. In this context, community leaders and developers’ staff act as mediators to ensure by-law compliance and solve disputes among residents.

Engineering (i.e., producing a community and providing it with the tools to self-manage), was also a central strategy to govern subjects in the cases studied. Both community organizing and community development were used to achieve these ends. Before its bankruptcy, Urbi, for example, exerted a tight control over residents’ behavior as well as over the built context through community building. With a community development manager on site, Urbi organized activities for residents (such as summer camps, handcraft and Zumba classes), trained them to write petitions to service providers and to administer the UBR. Urbi’s staff also enforced by-laws and mediated conflicts among residents. In Satélite and Urbi, developers organized civil associations whose representatives were
trained to eventually take over these tasks. In other words, training and empowerment were used as tools to ‘arm’ residents to be masters of themselves (Cruikshank, 1993). In Satélite’s case, however, the association was dissolved and residents formed their own RUC. RUCs seem to respond better to residents’ organization schemes in contrast with traditionally high and middle income associations that have more attributions but at the same time additional legal and financial responsibilities. In the case of Urbivillas, UBR, the neighborhood’s community association, is still controlled by the developer. In the three cases studied cluster-level organization was central to addressing local issues, especially those related to open-space maintenance.

Urbi’s ‘residential life concept’ sheds light on the variety of strategies that were implemented to govern residents. This concept leaned on subjectifying technologies and community imagineering and engineering to mold residents’ behavior (e.g., marketing, by-laws, community organization, service provision, and leader empowerment). As a result of the vision thus created, Urbivillas attracted wealthier residents (compared with Satelite and El Manantial) as well as buyers from the neighboring town who bought a second property as an investment.

Interview data suggest that developers define residents as a population that requires intervention in order to integrate it into the built environment they offer and the community they strive to create. According to Urbi’s community development staff, residents ‘misbehavior’ is attributed to their ‘rural’ background. Residents bring their ‘rurality’ into a pre-designed, homogeneous, orderly and clean development by raising chickens, planting corn and hanging laundry in their front yards. Developers condemn such behavior arguing that it produces sanitary problems and damages the image of the development. Additionally, Urbi staff attributes residents’ generalized failure to comply with common space maintenance fees to their traditional dependency on the state for the provision of services such as street cleaning and public lighting fee-payment. As a result,
according to Urbi, residents need to adopt a ‘better lifestyle’ when they buy a social housing dwelling. For this, developers provide tools that facilitate the mind shift residents need to adapt to a middle-class lifestyle in a space built for them (for a lengthier discussion see section 6.2.3). In addition to the prejudices towards people with rural backgrounds, and in line with the literature, Urbi’s staff discourse shows how subjectifying and responsibilizing residents relies on sanitation, an ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ factor, and pushes residents to adopt middle-class values for the benefit of the community. Additionally, by focusing on how subjects should adapt to a built context, it obscures the fact that perhaps it is the context which is not adapting to social needs, rather than the opposite. Instead of changing a system, the developers’ approach strives to change individuals to fit within their preconceived molds. This gap between produced and lived space promotes the need to familiarize the space and participate, even if latently in its production (Perera, 2009).

**Governing space**

Social housing, as a governmental space, seeks to discipline low-income populations through an orderly and homogeneous built environment. Therefore, developers are generally concerned about preserving this image after residents move in. Findings suggest that the materiality of developments is a central consideration in the production of an environment that reflects middle-class aesthetics and maintains housing prices. Out of the three cases studied, Urbivillas is the most compelling. Urbi seeks to materialize its residential life concept through Californian-style ornamentation as well as an orderly urban structure that, according to the developer, reflects security and functionality. Urbi’s straight street structure and organization of dwellings in blocks is intended to facilitate community organizing. Maintenance also proved central to keeping developments looking as originally did. In addition to creation the conditions for residents to maintain their
houses and open spaces through both legal and subjectification technologies, prior to its bankruptcy, Urbi invested its own resources in cleaning common areas and vacant houses, landscaping and watering.

Maintenance of the private realm is as important as upkeep of public spaces. Therefore, Urbi used a proactive approach to control how residents extended their houses. When buying, Urbi provided residents with ‘dream growth’ plans, pre-authorized by the municipality. These plans contained the design and technical specifications of housing extensions that residents could build in accordance with Urbi’s desires. However, findings suggest that residents rarely obtain housing permits or follow Urbi’s specifications.

Housing policy changes in Mexico promoted the commodification and passive consumption of a particular concept of housing. In this context, developers gained decision-making power and crafted new strategies to maximize their profits. Urbi, for example, replaced the City’s original street design (i.e., with wide, winding streets) and plot layout with narrower streets, more and smaller, housing plots, and fewer and smaller open spaces. In sum, the urban design of Urbivillas allowed the developer to increase the number of saleable square meters to boost profits.

Finally, findings also show how land tenure was used as a strategy to control space. Selling a large proportion of Urbivillas under the condominium regime allowed Urbi to shift maintenance and service provision responsibilities onto residents. Although these responsibilities entail financial burdens, residents welcomed this tenure model since it allows them to privatize their block and decide over their shared open spaces.

**Everyday practices and residents’ tactics**

Just as residents adopt the condominium tenure system as beneficial to them, reproduce the developer’s discourse on urban image maintenance and good behavior, and adapt to the context produced for them, they also adapt the context to their conditions and
resist imposed governmental programs. My research revealed the strategies used by developers and governmental agents to control residents’ resistance. It also highlighted the nuances of residents’ resistance and adaptation strategies, according to which some groups compliantly adopt governmental discourses (e.g., Urbi’s leaders), while others latently resist them and some openly confront them (e.g., El Manantial leaders).

To keep resistance and participation within controllable bounds, governmental agents resorted to a variety of strategies. The research showed, for example, how community organization was promoted from above and geared towards common space maintenance and service provision, depoliticizing it. But residents built their own organizational schemes while also engaging in challenges such as political empowerment and City-level communication.

Shifting responsibilities to other institutions was also a resource used by governmental agents to avoid taking on board residents’ demands, as was providing palliatives to dissipate their anger.

Access to information on residents’ demographics proved central to controlling resistance. Institutions relied on obsolete population counts to justify their lack of investment in additional public equipamiento. In this context, they called for further sales to attract new residents in order to justify further investment. Along these lines, some community leaders refrained from publicly revealing the needs of their community and thus portraying a negative image of the City. Instead, they tried to produce knowledge and use it to claim services and public facilities and obtain access to public programs. The intention of Satélite leaders to conduct a community census was central to their ability to frame claims. The initiative was thwarted, however, by resident mistrust.

While some community leaders avoided public demonstrations, others resorted to a variety of tactics to demonstrate their discontent. In line with the literature, findings show how residents' informal tactics of space production seized opportunities and relational
circumstances towards this end (Perera, 2009). El Manantial leaders, for example, organized neighbors to demonstrate each time a new INVIES director was appointed and used personal connections to attract the attention of politicians, public servants and the media. Residents deployed a variety of tactics to communicate their needs: petition writing, visits to public servants, media exposure, public protest, road obstruction, besieging government offices and appropriating developers’ property. The tactics that generated more and quicker results were the most aggressive ones (i.e., siege, exposure and occupation). However, they often resulted in quick fixes: either temporary solutions or palliatives (such as tree and Christmas present donations).

In time, residents’ tactics became more proactive and aggressive but only on a few occasions did they result in alliances amongst neighborhoods.

In their claim-making, residents framed themselves as deceived clients and responsible citizens and tax-payers. This language is aligned with governmental agents’ discourse. At other times, however, a welfare discourse re-emerged, for instance in residents’ demands for donations (e.g., Christmas presents for children).

Finally, residents’ petitions highlighted the way in which residents link space to social problems. For example, residents attributed problems such as vandalism and burglary, to the conditions of the built environment, the state of vacant houses and the lack of *equipamiento* for youngsters.

In addition to overt manifestations, residents also familiarized space through covert and latent tactics. Without directly contesting or avoiding imposed governmental programs, residents carved out spaces of adaptation, redefinition and negotiation (Perera, 2009). Findings showed how, for instance, despite developers’ stringent forms of control, residents managed to build housing extensions to their taste and to open ‘illegal’ shops. These tactics aided with some of the City’s services gaps and challenged developers’ notions of style and good living. Neighbors’ resistance to paying maintenance fees for
services traditionally provided by the municipality (such as street lighting and garbage collection) also questions a housing sale model (i.e., condominium) that seeks to place additional financial responsibilities on low-income residents.

8.2.2 Analyzing the governmentality of everyday life in Ciudad Satélite

Table XXXIII summarizes the research findings as they relate to the governmentality of everyday life in Ciudad Satélite. From federal to local, findings link modes of cognition, calculation and experimentation at different levels. Findings also show how, according to the logic of assemblages, different governmental strategies were implemented in the cases studied to govern residents and control space production. Under this logic, these two governmental realms (i.e., population and space) need intervention in order to sustain the current housing model. The governmental idiom used attributes abandonment and image deterioration to resident neglect, discounting the inherent problems that result from building dormitory towns. As a corollary, subjectifying residents contributes to the production of responsible citizens who adhere to community values and regulate their behavior for the common wellbeing. These values appeal to order and middle-class living standards.

Space, in this context, contributes to the implementation of governmental programs mainly from two rationalities: generative and material. Through space, programs of government seek to generate environments conducive to ‘good’ citizenship behavior that appeal to ‘good’ living standards. This rationality is reinforced through the material characteristics of space which are attributed to specific causalities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognition: How are problems framed? What is desirable?</th>
<th>Epistemological character</th>
<th>Idiom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral form: Values underpinning social housing production: private property, dignity, health, order</td>
<td>Residents are defined as: A population that needs training and guidance to embrace a ‘residential lifestyle’</td>
<td>How reality is framed as to render it imaginable:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial diagrams: Generative spatial rationality seeking to generate spaces conducive to ‘good’ citizenship behavior.</td>
<td>Responsible and free consumers of housing</td>
<td>Conjuntos habitacionales are abandoned and residents contribute to their degradation. This affects housing values and sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material spatial rationality seeking to govern subjects through the space’s physical characteristics</td>
<td>Homeowners responsible for their community wellbeing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculation: What can be made possible? (knowledge, schemes of government)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategies to understand reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing and framing knowledge: Community census initiative, authorities use of obsolete population counts to justify lack of investment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Experimentation: How to govern?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subjectification technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community as the territory of government: top-down community organization and development, engineering and imagineering community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etho-power: pushing forth middle-class values Technologies of citizenship: training and empowerment Contractual governance: using mortgages to secure maintenance fee payment (Rehab) Regulatory technologies: by-laws</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
In this assemblage, strategies to understand, represent and intervene in reality were implemented with the aid of multiple technologies linking knowledge production, subjectification technologies and spatial technologies. Urbi’s residential life concept is such an example. In this case both residents’ behavior and the production of space were governed through technologies as varied as land tenure, community organization, by-laws, residents’ training and space grooming.

Findings helped to identifying the gaps between the production of abstract space and lived space. Governing proves to be a constantly failing endeavor and as such, implementing governmental programs is filled with paradoxes. Residents’ overt confrontation and tactics to familiarize a space built for them highlight these paradoxes.

8.3 Assemblage 3: governing facility access and management in Ciudad Satélite

Facilities are fundamental components of housing developments. These spaces were key to the City’s planning and development processes: they served both government agents and developers as marketing tools to attract buyers. In parallel, equipamiento fulfilled some of the newcomers’ daily needs. Nevertheless, while housing continued to be built, the provision of equipamiento came to a halt after the governor’s administration ended. As a result, the City’s facility provision lags far behind housing construction, not to mention planning projection. Governing the population in a context of facility scarcity is a challenge for governmental agents, who deploy an array of both sovereign and governmental strategies to manage equipamiento and to control their construction. Residents, on the other hand, have also implemented several tactics to assert their presence in space, familiarize it and contribute to its production. This section analyzes the assemblage of governmental strategies and tactics actors employ to secure the provision of services, manage equipamiento and include their voice in the provision of facilities.
8.3.1 Summary of findings

The provision of public *equipamiento* in Ciudad Satélite lags far behind the plan’s projections. Even though the City is slowly growing, public facilities are not being provided. Therefore, areas zoned for *equipamiento* and open spaces remain barren, reflecting the abandonment reported by residents; only those open spaces strategically maintained by developers (i.e., the most visible), and those intervened by residents show signs of work. In addition to open spaces, ten facilities have been built in CS but not all of them provide service.

Five different strategies to provide *equipamiento* can be teased out from the case study: First, the schools, the health center and Max store resulted from the exercise of the governor’s sovereign power to make plans agree with public budgets. This strategy allowed for the construction of oversized facilities offered even before demand was consolidated. Second, Urbi, a private developer, sought to avoid depending on the state for the provision of *equipamiento* and matched public and private resources to build a commercial center and a community center which are not, however, as yet open to the public. Third, independent households opened ‘illegal’ corner shops offering a variety of products. Fourth, organized residents built a worship space and temporarily appropriated spaces for religious activities. Finally, the state government installed two basic service offices for police and water management services.

Despite the variety of strategies agents employ to provide public *equipamiento*, the number of current facilities lags far behind the plan’s projections and fails to fulfill the City’s current demand. Paradoxically, while some existing facilities are oversized and sit half empty (i.e., schools and health center), the City lacks other basic *equipamiento* such as community and day care centers, libraries, sport centers and high schools. Furthermore, budget constraints, lack of staff and inter-institutional coordination and rigid policies do not
allow for existing facilities to provide an adequate service nor to be used for other community and after school activities.

Basic *equipamiento* is essential for marketing. In peripheral developments such as CS, finding local school options, for example, is fundamental for young families. Despite this, both public facility providers and developers seldom work together. Not only do developers fail to contribute towards public facility enhancement: they also fail to share sales information that could be used by public administrators to plan for budget and furniture needs.

*Equipamiento* is also fundamental to improve residents’ quality of life. Findings suggest that the insufficiency of local *equipamiento* increases residents’ transportation and consumption costs and promotes unhealthy eating habits. Furthermore, the dearth of *equipamiento* also affects traditionally disadvantaged population sub-groups. The absence of day care centers, for example, reduces women’s chances to leave the development to work. Developments devoid of libraries and sports facilities restrain children and youngsters’ after-school activity options. Finally, abandoned open spaces and lack of community centers hinder community building.

**Governing the population**

Governing the population in a context of facility scarcity is a challenge for governmental agents that put in place an array of both sovereign and governmental strategies to manage facilities and to control their spread.

Residents, as a population to be governed, were treated both as active citizens and as targeted populations (Dean, 1999). Active residents manage their *equipamiento*, organize around their provision, take on *equipamiento* maintenance and comply with related fees. To govern active residents at a distance, both governmental agencies and developers provided them with tools such as by-laws and training (e.g., prevention and community-
policing workshops) to self-manage. Furthermore, these agents built an etho-politics around community wellbeing (see assemblage 2 for further analysis) and, through marketing and community organization, made it clear to residents what the community expected from them. Nevertheless, the additional responsibilities residents acquire are only attached to increased decision-making power/responsibility insofar as it relates to the management of local open spaces. School-related decisions and the management of Urbivillas’ *equipamiento* are still controlled by governmental agents. Residents as a targeted population are subject to strategies of control such as surveillance (e.g., by Urbi’s community worker), specifically as residents’ activities relate to commercial activities.

**Governing space**

*Equipamiento* is fundamental for marketing and for fulfilling residents’ service needs. As a result, it is not only its provision that is important but also its spatial disposition and materiality.

The provision of public *equipamiento* was part of the promise the governor needed to fulfill in order to build credibility around such an ambitious project. As a result, placing *equipamiento* along the main axis and in a central location with respect to the first neighborhoods that were built provided the visibility and hierarchy needed to attract buyers. Additionally, the ‘castle-like’, oversized facilities built during the governor’s administration were also in line with the project of developing a new city and a regional pole. However, after the governor’s administration ended, these large facilities were not allocated the budget needed to function properly.

Ciudad Satélite was also marketed as a garden City. In Satélite and El Manantial, the large area of open spaces reinforced this concept. In these neighborhoods, open spaces are interspersed between housing blocks. Their location, at the center of all blocks, facilitates community organization around their maintenance. Paradoxically, a large
proportion of these spaces remains unused. Location was also taken advantage of in Urbivillas but, unlike the other neighborhoods, this neighborhood includes fewer and smaller open spaces, located either in condominiums or in central areas. These spatial strategies were used by the developer to facilitate the organization of blocks into privatized condominiums and to maximize its profits by reducing the total area public space. Urbi nonetheless took advantage of open spaces to create a groomed environment, reminiscent of gated communities. The developer landscaped and maintained these areas, especially the most visible ones.

Urbi’s disciplinary scheme conveys order and homogeneity. These spatial attributes are intended to inculcate a ‘grammar of living’ in residents, in accordance with the developer’s etho-politics. In this context, family shops threaten homogeneity. Authorities and developers disapprove of this type of shop because they allegedly lack sanitation, contravene building and land use permits, promote overcrowding, and undermine the development’s image. They have therefore sought worked to ban such shops through a range of unsuccessful strategies. One such strategy, more prescriptive than proscriptive, was to plan the inclusion of both small local shops and large commercial centers to meet the residents’ need within these formally allocated spaces. Another strategy was to implement and police compliance with stringent regulations banning commercial uses of residential areas. These strategies to control the developments’ spatial image proved, however, to be inefficient in a context of scarce resources, limited commercial interest and a captive demand, promoting the proliferation of family shops.

In addition to controlling commercial activities, Urbi also controlled the provision of other basic facilities such as a community and sports centers. In order to avoid depending on government agencies for their provision, Urbi assumed most of these amenities’ building costs and offered to match NGO and neighbors’ resources for their management. Such amenities contribute to marketing Urbivillas and facilitate access to subsidies. As
land owner, Urbi enjoys full decision power to determine how they should function. Paradoxically, however, both the commercial and community centers are complete but remain closed and Urbi refuses to let residents manage them. Instead, the developer lends residents a show house for community activities.

INVIES too used ownership as a strategy of spatial control. The City’s lack of jurisdiction has allowed the State institution to retain control over land development. This means that INVIES holds the power to decide where, when and how facilities are built. Lack of tenure security, on the other hand, discourages external agents from investing in public facility building (e.g., the archdioceses).

**Everyday practices and residents’ tactics**

So far, findings have shown how residents are included in the production of space when it comes to sharing costs. In this context, residents carve out spaces to negotiate the terms under which government programs are imposed on them and, in parallel, employ opportunistic space production tactics. These tactics range from enacting consumer rights, community organizing around service provision, familiarizing and appropriating space and reclaiming space production either overtly or latently.

Consumer preferences in Satélite demonstrate that providing only one ‘formal’ grocery shopping option for residents is not enough. Residents prefer to bear the costs of commuting or buying from an expensive family shop rather than walking to a poorly supplied but still expensive formal shop. ‘Illegal’ family shops are more expensive but also more accessible than formal ones. They therefore fill a niche that neither big grocery shops nor the local Max store can fill. Residents open these shops in their houses as acts of latent contestation that challenge prohibitive by-laws and question the appropriateness of such by-laws.
Conversely, residents also resorted to tactics of open contestation to hold one of the few public institutions on site accountable and to demand service provision (this issue is further discussed in assemblage 2). Nonetheless, residents organize not only to demand services but also to provide them. Findings show how organizing around religion yielded valuable results, such as providing after-school activities for children (e.g., music classes for choir members) and creating spaces of worship where residents from the three neighborhoods can meet. In addition to community organizing, residents and priests employed different tactics to attain these results: they temporarily appropriated space in the street to teach children the catechism and to hold mass. Additionally, these actors built visible symbols to assert their presence and appropriate space (i.e., the shrine and cross). Finally, through acts of ritual appropriation (i.e., Our Lady’s festivities), CS’s catholic community promoted a sense of identity.

Findings showed the complexities of community organizing around service provision (as shown for example in the case of the street market). Nevertheless, they also showed how visible acts of organization such as those around religion can stimulate and increase residents’ participation.

Space appropriation was also related to the privatization of blocks to create a sense of security. This tactic was constantly mentioned by residents as a future aspiration but was in fact only implemented in one case.

Residents’ acts of appropriation serve to familiarize an abstract space produced for them. Public space, in this context, provides the grounds on which subjects and communities become visible. Built symbols such as the shrine help to assert the communities’ presence in space. In addition to building symbols, findings show how residents familiarize open spaces through landscaping, maintenance, furnishing and leveling. These environmental changes are also in line with community values that promote a sense of wellbeing.
Finally, in addition to familiarizing space, residents employed other tactics to contribute to space production. Namely, they produced knowledge to claim service improvements (e.g., in the satisfaction survey for the health center) and sought external support (e.g., consulting architect about the market project).

Residents’ tactics were opportunistic and time-dependent. They rarely included systemic intervention strategies or forms of knowledge production. Conversely, community organizing proved to be a strategy to which residents consistently resorted and which improved through time.

8.3.2 Analyzing the governmentality of facility access and management in Ciudad Satélite

The table below summarizes the research findings as they relate to the governmentality of facility access and management in Ciudad Satélite. The data show how the values underpinning the provision of *equipamiento* follow the same etho-politics used to govern planning, policy and everyday life in CS. In line with this etho-politics, strategies to affiliate subjects were geared towards providing them with the tools to self-manage while keeping participation within controllable bounds.

The provision of *equipamiento* in the case studied was essential to lend credibility to an ambitious project and to avoid reproducing the problematic dormitory-town model of social housing production. Intervening strategies, in this context, resorted to sovereign, disciplinary and the exercise of governmental power. Sovereign power was need to secure funds and build oversized facilities in a context where institutional budgets are very limited.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognition: How are problems framed? What is desirable?</th>
<th>Mouse: Epistemological character</th>
<th>Idiom</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral form values underpinning the provision of <em>equipamiento</em>: efficiency, health and order</td>
<td>Nature of the subjects governed: Active citizens who manage and maintain their <em>equipamiento</em>; Targeted population that needs disciplinary intervention</td>
<td>How reality is framed as to render it imaginable: Peripheral <em>conjuntos habitacionales</em> can be cities if the necessary facilities are provided to meet residents’ service needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial diagrams: Location and physical characteristics used to render <em>equipamiento</em> visible and hierarchically predominant</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculation: What can be made possible?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies to understand reality</td>
<td>Strategies to represent reality</td>
<td>Strategies to intervene reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producing and framing knowledge ad hoc: Covering lack of investment by claiming that demand is insufficient</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experimentation: How to govern?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subjectification technologies</td>
<td>Spatial technologies</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Equipamiento</em> as a technology of marketing</td>
<td>Controlling space through: Privately built <em>equipamiento</em>; Size and location to increase profit making and facilitate organizing the community around maintenance; Open space grooming and maintenance; Land-use restrictions, and provision of specialized spaces; Land ownership</td>
<td>Organizing the community; Outreach and external resource matching; Ritual and temporary appropriation of space; Building visible symbols; Familiarizing space; Latent contestation through ‘illegal’ stores; Holding local institutions accountable; Producing knowledge to demand more and better services; Privatizing blocks to make residents feel safer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship technologies: training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contractual technologies: by-laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>Etho-politics around community wellbeing</td>
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<td>Source: Author</td>
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</table>
Disciplinary strategies were implemented to secure the maintenance of *equipamiento* and of the overall image of the developments and, finally, governmental strategies worked through residents’ subjectivity in order to guide their behavior and voluntarily reproduce governmental objectives.

Experimentation, in this assemblage, shows how governing the realm of facilities in CS has been a task proactively assumed by residents and controlled by governmental agencies mainly through spatial tactics.

**Summary and conclusions**

In this chapter I analyzed the governmental components of the exercise of power in planning, policy, everyday life and the provision of *equipamiento* in Ciudad Satélite. The assemblages analyzed link global and local and shed light on the paradoxes of implementing top-down programs of government on everyday realities. The analyses show how the three assemblages are interdependent. Planning and developing the City resulted from localizing international and federal programs. Nevertheless, when top-down programs met local realities, governing on the ground was tailored to a context of slow growth and multiple needs.

The national and international etho-politics underpinning the production of social housing is first adopted by intermediaries (developers) and then by subjects (residents). Etho-politic technologies work through subjects’ subjectivities in order to guide their behavior in accordance with governmental objectives. Community in the cases studied was the preferred territory of government to subjectify residents.

Making residents responsible for the management of their own lives and their communities was a common theme of all three assemblages. However, residents were also defined as a problematic community that needed reform. As a result, strategies to intervene in reality resorted to all three forms of power: sovereign, disciplinary and governmental.
The spatial rationalities identified through the analysis used space to create environments where development and the good life (as per middle class standards) were portrayed (vitalist diagram). Space was also used to generate an environment capable of aligning residents’ behavior with a communitarian etho-politics (generative diagram). Finally, spatial disposition and materiality were the key to producing such environments. In line with these rationalities, space was used to govern the territory (sovereign scheme), subjects (disciplinary scheme) and populations (bio-power scheme).

Knowledge was used to govern in all three assemblages but played a central role throughout the planning process of the City. In this case, knowledge framed and produced a reality that justified the construction of the mega-city as a viable solution to San Luis Potosí’s scarcity of housing. Furthermore, power produced reality and controlled who could access and produce knowledge.

In the domain of experimentation, and under the logic of assemblages, the analysis also teases apart the ‘constellation’ of ‘interacting’ strategies and technologies actors mix and match to advance, negotiate, adapt to and contest governmental programs (Ong, 2005).

The figure below (Figure 53) locates assemblages at the intersections of the governmental realms analyzed. Assemblage analyses show that in all three cases, agents implemented strategies to govern the three realms: space, population and everyday practices. However, certain realms predominated. The figure synthesizes these intersections and locates the realms where assemblages concentrated.

Findings show how, through policy and planning, governmental agencies directed their efforts to governing space and the population of potential buyers (assemblage 1). Power exertion to govern life in CS (assemblage 2) resorted both to subjectification technologies (i.e., governing through community, etho-power and technologies of citizenship) and the implementation of everyday tactics to organize the community, contest
and compliantly adapt to top-down governmental programs. Finally, governmental agents focused on spatial technologies to guide residents’ behavior and in turn residents implemented a variety of tactics to appropriate and familiarize space (assemblage 3).

Figure 53. Intersections between governing realms and assemblages

In sum, using the logic of assemblages to link global and local and to understand the changing configurations of government, this analysis sought to unearth the way in which power, knowledge and space intermesh, as inseparable components of government.
9. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This research seeks to bring to light the multiplicity of technologies used from above and below, by state and non-state actors to govern the provision of equipamiento in massive social housing developments in Mexico. I specifically focus on the subjectification and spatial technologies used by governmental actors and the tactics implemented by residents to define where, what and how equipamiento is provided. In Chapter Eight I summarized my findings and applied the logic of assemblages to examine how actors put together subjectifying and spatial technologies to govern others. Under this logic, I structured my findings in accordance with the three processes I analyzed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven: 1) planning and development; 2) everyday life; and 3) the provision of equipamiento. In this chapter, I cut across assemblages to address my research questions and examine how power, knowledge, space and everyday practices combine to govern the provision of equipamiento in CS and what the resulting contradictions are that can help me inform policy- and space-making practices. In the second section of the chapter I identify research contributions, and in the third limitations and possible avenues for future research.

9.1 Answering the research questions

9.1.1 Research question 1

- How do actors involved in the provision of equipamiento in social housing developments in Mexico assemble rationalities, strategies and technologies to exercise power?
The rationality behind the production of social housing relies on the definition of a dignified living space traditionally constrained to the house. However, the detrimental consequences of building massive housing developments deprived of equipamiento, is pushing policy makers to engage in efforts to integrate the urban scale. In the cases discussed, high rates of abandonment testified to the failure of a massive housing production model that has supposedly ‘benefited’ thousands of Mexican families but has in practice cut them off from access to job opportunities and burdened them with additional consumption and commuting costs.

Policy changes to revert these problems include institutional and legal changes, as well as mechanisms implemented by governmental agencies to control the way in which housing is developed. Federal agencies, for example, resort to different strategies to govern local agents at a distance and to promote the development of ‘communities’ rather than dormitory towns. With the aid of incentives and subsidies, the federal government has promoted the densification of existing urban centers, the diversification of the social housing supply and the provision of equipamiento in housing developments. The implementation of these strategies, however, relies on local agents, primarily municipalities in charge of urban growth. Findings show that State governments hold strengthened power and that local urban politics provides the opportunities for different agents to impose their power. The case examined here shows how the governor exerted his sovereign power to control the planning, design and development stages of Ciudad Satélite. Indeed, he used his political power to leverage resources to buy the land and build costly infrastructure to make it viable, to have the municipal council approve the initiative, and to draw up an urban plan to justify the project and back it up with technical reports.

The case shows how the state used knowledge to produce reality and justify the project. Planning was among the main tools the governor used to provide credibility to the project. The plan also served as a tool that legally backed the governor’s spatial intention
to domesticate a large piece of undeveloped, underused land. Building costly infrastructure (i.e., main roads, wells, an electricity substation and a water treatment plant) allowed him to transform an area of under-used ejido land into urbanizable land and transform space to accommodate his ‘City of the Future’.

Findings showed that space was central to ground the governor’s intentions. I used Rabinow’s (1982) schemes of government to understand how the territory and its residents are governed in conjunction. Under a sovereign scheme, Ciudad Satélite was designed as a ‘humanized monumental’ City. The wide streets, the equipamiento and the large area of land set aside as open space and parks all speak of monumentality. Additionally, the layout and block design copies the model of high-income gated communities. In addition to portraying sovereign power, the City’s design was also used to discipline the population: a homogeneous image that stems from the endless repetition of one housing prototype portrayed order and integration. Space was set aside for commercial activities and by-laws prohibited residents from undertaking such activities in their homes in order to avoid damaging the image of residential blocks and thus preserve the intended visual and moral order. In sum, spatial technologies to govern the population were tightly linked to technologies of subjectification aimed at training residents to preserve the original image of developments and thus contribute to increasing land values.

Findings showed that producing communities and using them as a territory to govern (Dean, 1999) is closely related to producing spaces that support the community values or etho-politics used to govern residents. Residents, in this context, are no longer beneficiaries of housing programs but developers’ clients, ‘freely’ consuming a product. They are expected to behave as ‘active citizens’ who manage their equipamiento, organize around the provision of equipamiento, take on responsibility for facility maintenance and pay the relevant service charges. Findings showed, however, that the responsibilities acquired were limited to open spaces and decision-making power over other facilities such
as schools and Urbi’s community and commercial centers was reserved for governmental agents. Paradoxically, residents were also limited in their self-help possibilities, as illustrated by the banning of ‘illegal’ shops in the home or ‘illegal’ housing extensions and the close surveillance developers exert to control their spread.

The link between space and community is clearly exemplified by the wide array of spatial and subjectifying technologies used by Urbi to implement its residential life concept in Urbivillas. With the aid of urban design and architectural ornament, Urbi intended to portray, through the physical form and materiality of the development, a middle-class image to attract social housing buyers. In parallel, Urbi engineered the community by organizing residents and training them to maintain this image. Finally, technologies of contractual governance reinforced the legal implementation of Urbi’s intentions. By-laws and condominium land tenure provided residents with the tools to self-manage and provided Urbi with the opportunity to shift maintenance responsibilities onto residents. The power of this approach is demonstrated in the feeling of superiority expressed by Urbi’s residents vis-à-vis people from other neighborhoods, despite the fact that their neighborhood had less open space than the others.

Providing public *equipamiento* and maintaining the image of public space has been central for governing agents to market the city. Sustaining these activities over time, however, was challenging for INVIES and Urbi in a context of economic instability fostered by low housing sales and national economic crisis. Governing through community, as a result, proved to be a governmental project that could only be implemented in contexts of economic stability.

Even when governing through community was taken on primarily by local agents such as developers and housing agencies, federal programs also sought to promote community organization around public space maintenance. Community organization is built into programs, such as Rehab, in the form of a requirement for communities to apply
for funds. This requirement, however, has not been reinforced with training or follow-up. In the end, the type of community organization that is encouraged by governmental agents fails to promote self-determination and the power to negotiate better conditions; Instead, it is used to pass on to residents the responsibility and cost of maintaining public spaces and taking on unpaid management roles.

In sum, actors involved in the provision of *equipamiento* in the case studied assembled technologies to control both the territory and the population through urban planning, as a tool to produce reality and justify an ambitious project: through urban design and architecture, as tools to produce environments conducive to desired behaviors and through community as the preferred ‘territory of government’ to implement governmental agents’ etho-politics.

### 9.1.2 Research question 2

- How do residents’ strategies, tactics and everyday practices contribute to the exercise of power and the provision of *equipamiento* in Ciudad Satélite?

My research findings show that even when residents are subjects of government, they are anything but passive recipients, consumers or reproducers of governmental programs. With the tools available and the opportunities that availability presented, they carved out their own spaces of participation and negotiated the terms under which they were subjected. Findings also show that while, in some cases, residents reproduced governmental discourses, in many others, they reinterpreted and appropriated these discourses to the extent that they played to the residents’ advantage.

At times, residents reproduced governmental discourses as a result of misinformation. Interviews revealed how they bought into institutional discourses justifying the lack of investment in public *equipamiento* in the City as a result of low demand. In other words, while institutions used outdated population counts to justify the lack of
investment, residents, unaware of this, and not knowing planning norms, used the same language to explain why their living conditions failed to improve. Aware of the importance of updated information, leaders tried to produce information but were unable to conduct a community census due to the suspicion of fellow residents. Findings reveal how governmental discourses that justify the lack of investment on low housing demand also discouraged residents from demonstrating publicly, out of fear that portraying a negative image of the city would put off potential purchasers. In this way, discourses ended up disciplining residents into the ways of government.

My findings also showed that residents (mostly those who participate in community organization activities), reproduced developers’ discourses seeking to promote the residential lifestyle concept advanced by the latter. Enticed by developers’ claims, residents adopt the community values engineered by developers to promote a convivial environment and a homogeneous and orderly urban image for the benefit of all. But in actuality, underlying these claims are restrictions to private property extensions and prohibition of entrepreneurial activities. Without confronting developers or discourses openly, however, shop owners seized the opportunity to meet a need and cater to a captive population of consumers, in practice violating established regulations. Additionally, residents contested the image of order and homogeneity developers promoted by familiarizing both private and public space. They did so by extending their homes in accordance with their own tastes and economic possibilities, without construction permits and without following Urbi’s ‘dream growth’ extension plans. Through different tactics, such as landscaping and building symbolic elements, residents familiarize abandoned open spaces and reaffirm their presence in the public realm. Residents also employed tactics of ritual and temporary appropriations of space in order to build a religious identity and make up for the lack of equipamiento to hold mass and carry out religiously inspired community activities.
In addition to these spatial tactics, both governmental agents and residents employed community organization as a strategy to gain power and to exert it to control the development and management of *equipamiento*. In all three areas residents sought to formalize their organization activities by constituting either a civil association or a residents’ association recognized by the municipality. Despite this similarity, the sub cases presented different organizational models that reflected residents’ choices—at times contradicting the wishes of developers or government agencies. In Urbivillas the developer organized the community primarily to maintain open spaces, keeping community participation within controllable bounds. In Satélite, INVIES tried to organize the community through a civil association but failed and residents formed a grassroots RUC instead. The RUC’s activities were, nonetheless, monitored by INVIES. This may explain the current leader’s conservative approach to demand-making. Finally, El Manantial presented most needs given that residents were left with limited facilities and a dysfunctional urban infrastructure when Dynámica left. Therefore, grassroots leaders were openly contesting and demanding more and better services, facility construction and infrastructure investment. From writing petitions to occupying public administration offices, leaders used different tactics to assert the community’s claims. The most aggressive tactics yielded the quickest results; however, concessions tended to be mere palliatives to silence the residents’ claims.

I conclude, against top-down expectations, that community organization was a strategy commonly used by residents both to familiarize space and to reclaim the right to insert their interests in spatial production practices. Community organization from above served to depoliticize participation while grassroots organization was contestatory but seldom strong enough to assert its voice.

In sum, while residents reproduced governmental discourses that use individual responsibility and community values as banners to maintain developments and increase
housing sales, they familiarized space as a way to define the terms of their own subjection and they employed different tactics to exert power and obtain *equipamiento*. That is, they adapted and appropriated space and openly claimed the right to produce it.

**9.1.3 Research question 3**

- What governmental and space-making problems arise from the will to govern the provision of *equipamiento* in Ciudad Satélite?

Governing tends to failure; therefore, governmental programs are almost continuously put to the test and re-designed. Social housing policy, understood as a governmental program, is no exception. While it seeks to render the sector more efficient, meet the population’s housing needs and benefit the economy, especially in the financial and construction sectors, it has promoted the reproduction of massive dormitory towns lacking adequate access to *equipamiento* and local job opportunities at the outskirts of cities. To counter this model, Ciudad Satélite was planned as a ‘City’ and as a regional service pole. These intentions, however, met with a series of realities that in the end appear to have reproduced the same scheme; first was the homogeneous economic character of its inhabitants; second, resource flow and political interest in and commitment to the City faded after the governor left office; third, corrupt practices undermined the project both financially and politically, slowing production and housing sales; and fourth, following the requirement of population and development thresholds for the provision of services such as education, entertainment and health on site, the City lacked many basic services and operated de facto as a dormitory town for the poor. As a result, the City perpetuated the very problems it sought to address: i.e., it sought to meet a pressing housing need and to provide adequate living conditions for low income earners. Both housing development and the provision of *equipamiento* were very slow and are still far from achieving the plan’s projections. According to federal norms, the City’s current
population counts actually justify the construction of daycare centers, a community
development center, a library, a public market, a family health center, sports centers, a
post office, a graveyard and municipal administration offices. Maliciously or not,
governmental agencies nonetheless used outdated population counts to justify the lack of
investment in *equipamiento* and to focus exclusively on building and selling houses.
Paradoxically, residents enjoyed access to a reduced number of oversized facilities such
as schools and a health center that were only partially used and not adequately funded to
function properly. This resulted in problems such as inefficient service and under-use of
space and equipment. Moreover, the restrictive administrative policies of these oversized
facilities limited their use for other community activities.

Even though residents are framed as free, self-regulated and responsible citizens,
their control over facility management remains limited. In Urbi, residents controlled open
spaces under the condominium regime at the cost of paying for expensive street lighting
and of taking on responsibility for maintenance. Through acts of appropriation, Satélite and
El Manantial residents also controlled open spaces under the jurisdiction of developers but
feared that these could be assigned different uses once the neighborhoods were
municipalized. Management of built *equipamiento* was controlled by governmental agents
such as school staff and the developers. Despite the fact that residents paid property
taxes entitling them to public services, the parents committee assumed the responsibility
of paying for school utilities and maintaining the schools in other ways. These
responsibilities did not, however, bring increased decision power over school-related
issues, as the director retained this power.

*Equipamiento* built by Urbi (the commercial and community centers) was used by
the developer to market the neighborhood. However, even though these were fully built,
they were not used and Urbi refused to let residents use them or take control of them. As a
result, they sat empty despite the need for community space.
Residents’ tactics to familiarize space highlighted the contradictions built within the aim to control their behavior and to maintain Urbi’s residential lifestyle’s image of order and homogeneity. The intention to maintain order by separating residential and commercial land uses and banning family shops limited the economic opportunities of families and stay-home women. Furthermore, this prohibition was nonsensical in a context where ‘formal’ shops were very scarce and commercial equipamiento was needed to meet the demand of a pool of captive consumers.

Urbi’s desire to maintain the homogeneity of space was also questioned by residents’ familiarization practices. Encouraging residents to build according to the developers’ ‘dream growth’ concept by providing them with housing extension plans pre-authorized by the municipality made no sense in a context where residents rarely sought construction permits. Moreover, in homogenized developments, residents sought to differentiate themselves from others by personalizing their dwelling and adapting it according to their needs and desires, imitating middle- and high-income neighborhoods.

By-laws compiled the intentions and community values that developers and housing agencies intended to use to govern communities. Research findings suggested, however, that these are rarely legally enforced and as a result, constituted weak instruments of governance.

Finally, the findings also showed that while governing through community and providing equipamiento went hand in hand given that they were used by governmental agents to market developments, both were dependent on financial stability and housing sales. In other words, they remained secondary to housing development and as such mechanisms were needed to secure their provision and ongoing maintenance for the benefit of the people living in these developments.

In sum, Ciudad Satélite reproduced the housing model it was intended to counter, providing residents with poor living conditions. Paradoxically, most of the Garden City’s
open spaces were abandoned, oversized *equipamiento* was partly used, Urbi’s private
facilities were not used and residents had little ability to decide over the management of
*equipamiento* but were the main contributors to their maintenance. Finally, developers’ aim
to control the image of the developments resulted in their banning commercial uses that
were very much needed by residents.

9.2 Research contributions

9.2.1 Theoretical contribution

This research is located at the intersection of space, knowledge and the exercise of
power. I used Foucault’s writings on governmentality to understand the workings of power
in my case study. Specifically I sought to understand the rationalities and tools employed
by different actors to advance their interests as they relate to the provision of *equipamiento*
in Ciudad Satélite.

In this dissertation, I have contributed to the literature on housing and
governmentality by addressing three major research gaps concerning: 1) everyday
accounts of counter-governmentalities; 2) *equipamiento* as a central component of
everyday life in housing developments and; 3) the interactions of power-knowledge and
space in a particular country and setting.

While there is a growing literature on counter-governmentalities in contexts of
informality and poverty (see for example Appadurai, 2002 and Roy, 2009), this theme has
not previously made an appearance in the literature on formal housing schemes such as
Ciudad Satélite (i.e., public and council housing and MPEs). The literature on formal
housing is limited especially when it comes to studies of residents’ tactics to produce their
lived space. Instead, it has focused primarily on neoliberal governmental practices and
top-down subjectification of residents and tenants. While this research also uses this top-
down governmental approach, it addresses residents’ counter governmentalities through the study of their everyday practices and tactics to familiarize a space produced for them.

The existing literature on housing and governmentality barely refers to the provision of amenities. My research has shown that controlling the provision of equipamiento is essential for residents, housing agents and developers. In contexts characterized by the lack of local equipamiento, this becomes central to marketing the neighborhood and attracting newcomers—as well as addressing the daily needs and quality of life of residents. Along these lines, this research has unveiled the wide array of subjectifying and spatial technologies of government used by actors to control the management of equipamiento, provide or deny access to residents, and appropriate space to meet service needs.

In addition to filling these two gaps in the literature, this research has also contributed to the study of governmentality in formal housing developments. In line with existing literature (Flint, 2003; 2004; Dodson, 2006; McKee & Cooper, 2008), this research shows that neoliberal programs of government (i.e., international agencies’ policies) define, through means of distant control, how housing is developed. However, the research also showed that these means of control lose effect when they meet with local bastions of power such as the governor’s. In the case, the power located not within the municipality, as urban governance policy suggests (Swyngedouw, 2005), but within middle-rank state agencies. These power elites controlled urban development and found cracks in the system to impose their agendas and implement ambitious projects such as Ciudad Satélite.

In line with the work of scholars of governmentality, findings from this research have highlighted how community is used as a territory of government. The literature on middle- and high-income MPEs has studied how governmental agents engineer and create images and morals around community and how they use these strategies to govern
residents and attain their marketing objectives. This literature, however, fails to address how these governmental strategies play out in contexts of poverty and facility scarcity. Findings from this research suggest that controlling social housing residents’ behavior to maintain an image of order is challenging in a context where residents strive to familiarize and adapt a space produced for them to address their unmet basic needs, to fit their realities and to differentiate their residential areas’ from those of others. In line with the literature, my findings highlighted how housing agencies and developers simultaneously treat residents both as free, self-managed subjects and as a targeted population requiring intervention.

This research sits at the intersection of two streams of research within governmentality studies: the socio-political stream addressing subjectification practices and the geographic stream studying spatial governmentalities.

Socio-political theories on governmentality focus on practices of domination and as a result fail to provide insight into how residents also exercise power not to avoid domination but to negotiate the terms under which they are dominated. Fostering a discussion between Foucault’s governmentality and De Certeau’s everyday practices allowed me to understand how power is exercised at all levels of society, from both above and below. Further, De Certeau’s everyday tactics provided me with the tools to unveil the contradictions generated by the will to govern. Together, governmental projects and everyday practices helped in understanding the logics through which space is produced in Ciudad Satélite.

The geographic approach to governmentality gave me tools to show how space is fundamental to any governmental project. Space is endowed with environmental causalities that seek to govern residents and to guide their behavior. With the aid of this framework, I identified the spatial rationalities behind agents’ strategies and the spatial scales at which they exercised power. This body of literature, however, provided limited
resources to understand how the material characteristics of the built environment, such as architectural styles and ornament, foster the creation of environments conveying a middle-class image and the moral values developers use to guide residents’ behavior. To fill this gap I added a fourth diagram to Huxley’s (2007) triad and used it to analyze how the form and size of *equipamiento* (in addition to their disposition, structure and hierarchy) are used to exercise power.

Finally, with the theoretical perspectives used, and based on Miller & Rose (2008), this research contributes to the analytics of governmentality through a framework that unveils the different components of governmental practices on the three theoretical axes I used: governing the population, space and everyday life. To build this framework I used Ong & Collier (2005) and Miller & Rose’s (2008), concept of assemblage to understand the verticality (from global to local) and horizontality (mix of technologies) of governing practices. This logic brought to light the problems and paradoxes generated when international neoliberal programs of government are locally implemented and helped to understand the complex aggregation of governmental practices that public agencies, developers and residents used to react, adapt and advance their interests in specific contexts.

**9.2.2 Policy implications**

In line with current housing policy changes in Mexico, this research has acknowledged governmental agencies efforts’ to meet part of the country’s housing need, but has also highlighted the perverse consequences derived from resorting to the construction of massive, peripheral housing developments to attend to it. The case of Ciudad Satélite shows how, even when these types of developments are planned to provide residents with adequate living conditions, the reality of their implementation rarely meets planning projections. As a result, planning, public administration and housing policy
need to align to promote the development of more compact and diverse developments, located closer to existing *equipamiento* and job opportunities. Along these lines, mechanisms to encourage the development of sustainable communities such as the DUIS are liable to fail if local urban reforms are not implemented in parallel (I expand on this in the next section).

Housing policy in Mexico is re-scaling (i.e., distributing previous governmental tasks across different agents) for the benefit of private actors and local public agents. Unlike most cases in which private developers decide where and how social housing is built, Ciudad Satélite is an outlier case in which a powerful public agency took control of its development. The governor, with the aid of State-level public institutions, chose the site, secured the land, planned its development, and secured the funds to launch the works. While positive policy lessons could derive from this process, the City reproduced the same problems of dormitory towns developed by private interests. Therefore, instead of reproducing CS’s scheme, housing agencies should consider securing land reserves of small pieces of land adequately located and develop social housing under a different scheme. The massive housing production model has proven to be a failure countrywide. Therefore, policy should strive to promote better located, smaller and more diverse developments. Additionally, other housing actions, such as housing rehabilitation, secondary housing market promotion and community-based housing development need to be prioritized, even though they might mean less profit for the construction sector. Diverting policy in these directions can, on the one hand, promote the development of existing, better served and located housing stock, and, on the other, promote the incorporation of residents into the production of their living space.

Social housing production is depoliticized and as a result organized groups have little impact on the production of their living environment. Residents who figure as mere consumers of a finished product have equally little say in the matter. Through the analysis
of residents’ tactics of spatial adaptation, appropriation and familiarization, this research has highlighted the gaps between developers and governmental agencies’ power practices and residents’ everyday practices. Specifically, my research has questioned governmental agents’ intentions to preserve order by restricting housing extensions and commercial activities. In this sense, policy that promotes live-work environments and supports self-built housing extensions can foster the production of adaptable spaces. Developed from a perspective of total control, Ciudad Satélite has demonstrated the impossibilities and contradictions involved in governing practices and provides evidence supporting calls for more flexible and participatory approaches to publicly-assisted housing.

Finally, the research also shows that even when the condominium tenure system is embraced by residents who aspire to privatize their block, the additional costs it implies are not affordable for low-income residents, at least in relation to open-space maintenance and street lighting costs, the issues arising in this case. Conversely, the added responsibilities residents acquire through this scheme absolve developers and municipalities of the need to provide public services. As a result, the condominium legislation needs a reform such that municipal governments cover the public service costs that social housing residents are unable to cover if developers offer this tenure regime to house purchasers.

**9.2.3 Planning practice and community development**

This experience shows that once political interest in the project faded, the public institutions in charge of providing these facilities failed to invest in the City. This failure highlights a gap between planning and its implementation. Furthermore, it highlights the limitations of the exercise of sovereign power and calls for inclusion and interinstitutional coordination in planning and policy implementation.
Ciudad Satélite is an extreme case that highlights the cracks built into the planning system and the opportunities available to exclude actors from plan-making. First, planning remains a discursive tool to justify the allocation of resources and comply with federal requirements. CS’s Partial Plan (PP) was used by the state government to produce knowledge and justify an ambitious project. The decision to build a city had already been made, as had the decisions about its location and characteristics. Therefore, the plan reproduced what Mexican planning scholars have long criticized: planning is used as an end and not a means to guide urban development (Iracheta, 1997; Garza, 1989). In other words, the planning process is not used to create alliances, promote interinstitutional coordination, include social actors or sign agreements between public institutions and private and community stakeholders but rather to impose schemes. Conversely, planning is used to produce instruments that legally back pre-conceived urban projects.

Additionally, CS’s planning process shows how the current planning legislation promotes participatory processes that could be characterized as legitimizing governmental decisions and excluding citizens from planning practices. Therefore, changes to the planning legislation are needed to institutionalize participation on the part of both governmental agencies and social actors such as unions and NGOs. In theory, this already happens in Mexico: Mexican cities have planning committees with representatives from different sectors. Cracks in the local urban legislation nonetheless allow for clandestine procedures such as those by which Ciudad Satélite was promoted. Satélite findings showed how the two state agencies that drew up the plan, not only excluded social factors also failed to include public institutions in charge of providing equipamiento and urban services. As a result, the City’s needs were not built into their budgets. Therefore, it is vital to link housing policies and planning in order to match residents’ needs with planned facility provision. From a process perspective, plans should promote not only the participation of given actors but also their commitment to implementation. As part of
the planning process, for example, signing formal agreements between municipal institutions, state governments, citizens and public facility providers (e.g., educational and health authorities) might contribute to securing resources to maintain existing facilities and build those needed. These types of mechanisms also offer citizens the tools to hold public institutions accountable.

9.3 Limitations and future research

There are several limitations to this research. The theoretical framework provided the analytical tools to understand the workings of power in the Ciudad Satélite context. Findings showed that the case is not a clear cut example of governmental practices. Instead, governmental agents in the cases studied, employ different forms of power that resort not only to technologies of distant control but also to technologies of domination. The development process of Ciudad Satélite was characterized by the imposition of power, corrupt practices and lack of interinstitutional coordination. Most of the literature on housing governmentality, however, stems from contexts that are very different from my case study (e.g., UK, Australia). Therefore, the political specificities of the Mexican context call for the need to question the theoretical framework with literature from similar regimes.

The data collection process also shows limitations. The research was conducted three years after the governor’s period ended and as a result, many of the public officials who participated in the project were no longer in office. One of the former INVIES directors is the subject of an arrest warrant for financial mismanagement related to the development of the City and three other staff members have also been under investigation. As a result, access to key informants from the public sector was challenging. Furthermore, most interview participants from this sector were not willing to disclose information or elaborate on their answers. Access to information on the project’s trust fund, land transfers, and sales figures was limited and therefore I had to rely on secondary sources such as NGOs working on freedom of information, press releases and INVIES’s official statements.
Additionally, the research offers a snap shot of a fast developing City. Future research is needed to understand the changes that CS’s neighborhoods experience over time. A comparative analysis between CS and other peripheral social housing developments would shed light on whether the lag between housing development and the provision of equipamiento is generalized, or whether it is restricted to the contentious political context that characterized CS. This type of study would allow us to determine whether the time elapsed between housing construction and the provision of equipamiento is usual and to consider policy strategies that might enable agencies to meet residents’ needs in a more timely fashion.

The fact that data were not stratified by neighborhood also limits the interpretation of results. Satélite residents were much more accessible and ready to be interviewed and surveyed than residents from other neighborhoods and, therefore, their perspective may be overrepresented. Stratifying the survey sample could have improved its representativeness. Along the same lines, including more participants from Urbi and El Manantial could provide a more accurate analysis of residents’ perspectives in all three neighborhoods.

This exploratory research used survey results to understand residents’ socio-economic characteristics with the aid of descriptive analyses. The data provide the opportunity to use inferential statistics to understand relationships across variables such as residents’ characteristics and facility priorities, providing material for future research.

Research on INFONAVIT programs such as Rehab and HIS is needed to understand the impact that these federal programs have on local contexts. The implementation of HIS in Urbivillas, for example, revealed the conflicts that arise between enrolled and non-enrolled residents living in the same block. Along these lines, further research is needed to understand how federal policies are implemented and whether or not their strategies to control local agents and attain the desired results are effective.
Additionally, research on public transportation and on the impact of the developing neighboring industrial area is needed to understand residents' access to equipamiento outside CS, how local job opportunities are benefiting residents and how the presence of the private sector has an impact on the local power configuration. Finally, research on different developers' strategies to govern through community is needed to further analyze the contradictions that stem from their technologies in order to inform policy.

I conclude by emphasizing that, to reverse the dormitory town model reproduced across the country, federal agencies need not only to promote sustainable communities through subsidy incentives but also to promote legal changes to promote community participation, interinstitutional coordination and appropriate budgeting so that social housing residents are secured adequate access to amenities from the outset, as well as the right to co-produce and co-manage those amenities.

Housing development and consolidation are lengthy processes. Eventually CS will consolidate and become part of to the growing State capital. This however, will be attained at the cost of current residents' hardships and further social segregation.
APPENDICES

A. OBSERVATION REGISTRY SAMPLE
B. BASE MAPPING

B.1 SATELITE’S LAND USE
B.2 EL MANANTIAL’S LAND USE
B.3 URBI'S LAND USE
C. SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Encuesta de Investigación sobre Dotación de Equipamiento en Ciudad Satélite

Clave: 
Fecha y hora: 
Observaciones: 

Información personal

1. Sexo
   - Femenino
   - Masculino

2. ¿Es usted el/la jefe/a de familia? (Si la respuesta es no pasar a pregunta 5)
   - Sí
   - No

   Relación con jefe de familia:

3. Que edad tiene?
   - Menor de 35
   - Entre 36 y 55
   - 56 o más

4. ¿Cuál es su nivel educativo?
   - Primaria
   - Secundaria
   - Preparatoria
   - Carrera técnica
   - Licenciatura/posgrado

   Si participante no es el/la jefe/a de familia:

5. ¿Cuál es la edad del/la jefe/a de familia?
   - Menor de 35
   - Entre 36 y 55
   - 56 o más

6. ¿Cuál es el nivel escolar del/la jefe/a de familia?
   - Primaria
   - Secundaria
   - Preparatoria
   - Universidad
   - Postgrado

Información del hogar

7. Desde hace cuanto vive en Ciudad Satélite?
   - 2009
   - 2010
   - 2011

8. Cuántas personas viven en la casa?
   - 1 o 2
   - 3 o 4
   - 5 o 6
   - Más de 6

9. Cuántos adultos? Cuántos menores?

10. ¿En que tipo de hogar vive?
    - Nuclear (padres e hijos)
    - Pareja sin hijos
    - Unipersonal
    - Extenso (Abuelos, tíos...) Solo un padre e hijos

11. ¿Es usted el/la propietario/a de la casa o esta rentando?
    - Estoy pagando la casa
    - Estoy rentando
    - Me la prestan
    - Otro

12. ¿Qué actividades económicas realizan los miembros de su familia?
    | Actividad                  | Madre | Padre | Hijos | Otros |
    |---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
    | Laborios primarios        |       |       |       |       |
    | Comerciante               |       |       |       |       |
    | Empleado                  |       |       |       |       |
    | Profesional independiente |       |       |       |       |
    | Obrero o artesano        |       |       |       |       |
    | Estudiante                |       |       |       |       |
    | Otro                      |       |       |       |       |

13. ¿Dónde usted que su salario familiar asciende a:
    - $3,000 o menos
    - Entre $3,000 y $6,000
    - Entre $6,000 y $9,000
    - Entre $9,000 y $15,000
    - Más de $15,000

Información sobre vivienda y colonia anteriores

14. En donde vivía antes de mudarse a Ciudad Satélite?
    - En casa propia
    - Rentaba
    - Con familia
    - Otro

15. Cuantas recamaras tenía su vivienda anterior?

16. Con cuantas personas vivía?

17. ¿En que tipo de barrio o colonia vivía?
    - De interés social
    - De auto-construcción
    - Barrio histórico
    - Otro

18. Por que decidió mudarse?

19. Por que a Ciudad Satélite?
20. Tiene amigos/amigas y familia en Ciudad Satélite? Cuantos?

21. Viven cerca de su casa? 
   - Sí
   - No
   - Más o menos

22. En relación a su vivienda anterior, como calificaría Ciudad Satélite
   - Relación con sus vecinos
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Cercanía a su trabajo
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Su gente
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Su casa
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró

Financiamiento

23. Por qué medio obtuvo el crédito para su casa?

24. A cuántos años?

25. Cuanto paga mensualmente de hipoteca o renta?

26. Cuanto pago de enganche?

Servicios

27. En relación a su vivienda anterior como calificaría los servicios en Ciudad Satélite
   - Servicios comerciales (tiendas de abarrotes, ferreterías)
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Servicios educativos (escuelas, bibliotecas)
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Servicios de transporte
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Servicios de salud
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Servicios deportivos
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Guarderías
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Espacios comunitarios
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Plazas, parques, jardines y áreas de recreación
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Infraestructura (agua, luz, gas, teléfono, drenaje)
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró
   - Servicios profesionales (dentistas, abogados, docis)
     - Empeoró
     - Siguió igual
     - Mejoró

28. Mencione 3 servicios, en orden de prioridad, que le gustaría tener en su colonia (como escuelas, museos, bibliotecas, gasolineras, cementerios, etc.)

29. En donde compra la mayoría de su comida?

30. Cuanto tiempo le toma llegar a donde compra la mayoría de su comida y cuanto gasta en transportarse?

31. Si la madre trabaja y tienen hijos pequeños: Quien los cuida?
   - Familiares
   - Guardería
   - Otro

32. Si van a guardería: Cuanto tiempo le toma llevarlos?
   - 15 minutos o menos
   - Entre 15 min y media hr
   - Más de media hora

33. Utiliza los parques de Ciudad Satélite?
   - Sí
   - No
   - Por qué?
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06/2011-07/2011 Research Assistant, Nathalie P. Voorhees Center, UIC, Chicago IL

08/2009-12/2009 Research Assistant, Nathalie P. Voorhees Center, UIC, Chicago IL

05/2007-08/2009 Research Assistant, City Design Center, UIC, Chicago IL

**Professional**

05/2008-08/2008 Intern planner, GEA Vallotton et Chanard architectes-urbanistes, Lausanne, VD, Switzerland


**Conference presentations**

02/2016 RESURBE (INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON URBAN & REGIONAL RESILIENCE); Adaptive governance: the DUIS certification in El Rehilete Guanajuato

09/2015 XXXVIII Encuentro Anual de la red Nacional de Investigación Urbana (RNIU); La informalidad urbana como forma de vida en las periferias de las ciudades: Caso Colonia Tierra Blanca, San Luis Potosí, SLP; Xalapa, Ver.
04/2015 AAG; Selling a residential lifestyle in peripheral social housing developments: following the ‘residential life’ dream, Chicago, IL.

09/2014 International Conference Natural Resources and Sustainable Development Goals for Latin America; Community-Universities Collaboration in Social innovation and Sustainable Projects: the Cases of Ciudad Satelite in Mexico and Morevia in Medellin, Colombia; San Luis Potosí, SLP.

04/2013 ASINEA; Complejidad urbana, ciudades sustentables y territorio en la región Centro – Occidente de México. Estudio comparativo de cuatro ciudades coloniales: Aguascalientes, León, San Luis Potosí y Zacatecas; Xalapa, Ver.


04/2012 UAA, Public Facility Provision in Massive Social Housing Developments: The Case of San Luis Potosí, Mexico; Pittsburg, PEN

05/2011 Primer Coloquio Internacional en Fragmentación y Segregación Socio-territorial en América Latina; Planeación y relaciones de poder en desarrollos de interés social aislados: el caso de Ciudad Satélite, San Luis Potosí; Cuernavaca, Mor.

04/2009 MPSA, The production of the informal space through policy in San Luis Potosí; Mexico, Chicago, IL

03/2009 AAG, Understanding Informality as a [socially] Produced Space; Las Vegas, NE.

Publications


Honors

06/2014-05/2015 PROMEP dissertation writing scholarship
09/2013-01/2014 PROMEP scholarship to new tenure track professors
09/2012-09/2013 FURS studentship
01/2007-12/2010  CONACYT scholarship- PhD studies
10/2001-09/2003  CONACYT scholarship- Masters studies