Down But Not Out:
The Unemployed in Chicago during the Great Depression

BY

CHRISTOPHER C. WRIGHT
B.A., Wesleyan University, 2003
M.A., University of Missouri-St. Louis, 2007
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston, 2010

DISSERTATION
Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2017

Chicago, Illinois

Defense Committee:

Leon Fink, Chair and Advisor
Lynn Hudson
Robert Johnston
Jeffrey Sklansky
Erik Gellman, Roosevelt University
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have helped make this dissertation possible. Leon Fink personified patience as he waited years for me to decide what I was going to write about, encouraging and advising me along the way. His incisive comments on various drafts led to significant improvements—and I owe the study’s title to his genius for catchy (frequently punny) turns of phrase. I’m indebted to all the wonderful archivists at UIC, the Chicago History Museum, the University of Chicago, the Newberry Library, the Harold Washington Library, the Tamiment Library at NYU, and the FDR Presidential Library, who often suggested fruitful avenues of research. I’m also grateful to the graduate students and professors in the UIC history department who helped me formulate a research agenda and encouraged me at times of flagging confidence. The members of my dissertation committee (Leon Fink, Robert Johnston, Jeff Sklansky, Lynn Hudson, and Erik Gellman), who had the unenviable task of reading this sprawling document, gave thoughtful and probing criticisms that will be of great value, in particular, if I decide to turn this odd assay, this odyssey, into a book.

I must also thank my friends and family for bucking me up in moments of gloom, when I was stricken by self-doubt. More than once I was tempted to give up, but my parents, especially, boosted my morale sufficiently so that I could keep plodding along. It’s unlikely I could have completed this project without their (multidimensional) support.

In addition, I should thank someone who has been a sort of distant and unwitting mentor since my mid-twenties: Noam Chomsky. If Nietzsche was right that “your educators can be only your liberators,” Chomsky is the quintessential educator, as he is the quintessential scholar-activist. Only Karl Marx has had a greater influence on me, and Marx, unlike Chomsky, doesn’t
answer emails from strangers. Over the years I’ve found it useful to have my idiosyncratic instincts and inclinations validated by someone with the moral and intellectual caliber of Chomsky.

In the end, though, apropos of “acknowledgements,” and apropos of worry over a society that is hastening towards atomized inhumanity, I would simply invoke Peter Marin’s notion of the “human harvest,” which he describes as follows:

Kant called the realm of connection the kingdom of ends. Erich Gutkind’s name for it was the absolute collective. My own term for the same thing is the human harvest—by which I mean the webs of connection in which all human goods are clearly the results of a collective labor that morally binds us irrevocably to distant others. Even the words we use, the gestures we make, and the ideas we have, come to us already worn smooth by the labor of others, and they confer upon us an immense debt we do not fully acknowledge.¹

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I: Overview</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II: Hardship</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: Coping</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV: Relief, Part I: “Shelter Men”</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V: Relief, Part II: Governments, Unions, and Churches</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI: Collective Action</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SUMMARY

The clearest and most powerful lens through which to view society is the Marxian lens of class conflict. In the dissertation I apply this lens to the study of the unemployed in Chicago during the Great Depression, specifically of their experiences and struggles to survive in a hostile political economy. Scattered through historical scholarship are many partial accounts of the social history of the Depression’s victims, but none that focuses, comprehensively, on the city of Chicago. Nor does any propose quite the interpretation adopted here, which sheds earlier assumptions of the “passivity” and “apathy” of the long-term unemployed in favor of emphasizing the implicit and explicit anti-capitalist radicalism and working-class consciousness of the unemployed poor. They were not merely bewildered lost souls blown hither and thither by the economic gale; on a large scale, they tended toward resolute resistance against miserly relief financing, cruel bureaucratic procedures, police protection of private property, capitalist prioritization of high profits above social welfare, and the very fact of mass economic insecurity itself. On a relatively unpolitical level, working-class neighborhoods persevered through an essentially communistic sharing of resources and mutual self-defense against the depredations of the dominant social order. But on a more political level, millions followed the Communist Party and other far-left organizations in an attempt to compel Congress to pass the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Act in 1935, one of the most popular bills of the decade not in spite of but because of its socialistic nature. Running through the dissertation is a dual polemic against idealist social philosophies and the Gramscian interpretation of capitalist society as relatively coherent and culturally/ideologically integrated. Instead, I emphasize the role of class struggle and the violence that emanates from it as the main guarantors of social order. In the end, my
hope is that this study may illuminate current and future social conflicts and possibilities, as I argue that the American political economy is now in a state analogous to that which precipitated the Great Depression.
Introduction

Mark Twain showed characteristic wisdom when he remarked, supposedly, that while history does not repeat itself, it rhymes. The most recent evidence for this thesis concerns the state of the world economy, the “fundamentals” of which are not “strong” (John McCain’s erstwhile optimism notwithstanding). In many respects, the Great Recession of 2008–9 rhymed with the Great Depression of the 1930s, as political and academic commentators have pointed out.\(^1\) Even more ominously, contemporary economic trends continue to rhyme with the trends that preceded and precipitated the Great Depression. All indications are that the world is headed for another such cataclysm, although of course it will not follow the contours of the last one. This grim prognosis is the reason I thought it would be worthwhile and timely to reconsider the experiences of the long-term unemployed in the United States—more specifically, in Chicago—in the Great Depression; for the ranks of our own unemployed are about to swell dramatically.

In the first chapter I parenthetically draw parallels between the political economy of the late 1920s and that of the present, but I’ll make a few more remarks here. The central point is the old Keynesian one, which originally was the old socialist and Marxian one (until Keynes appropriated it and made it respectably bourgeois and mainstream): economic growth at a compound rate cannot continue indefinitely when aggregate demand is weak. David Harvey said it well in 2010, in the thick of the Great Recession: “A synoptic view of the current crisis would say: while the epicentre lies in the technologies and organisational forms of the credit system and the state-finance nexus, the underlying problem is excessive capitalist empowerment vis-à-vis labour and consequent wage repression, leading to problems of effective demand papered over

---

by a credit-fuelled consumerism of excess in one part of the world [the West, especially the U.S.] and a too-rapid expansion of production in new product lines in another [e.g., much of Asia].”

The problem of excessive capitalist empowerment and consequent wage repression remains, and is essentially the problem of the late 1920s, when American Communists, among others, were predicting an economic collapse on the basis of old “underconsumptionist” and “overproductionist” arguments.

Wherever one looks, one finds parallels between the past and the present. The explosion of consumer credit in the late 1920s (mentioned in the following chapter) has been dwarfed by the explosion of credit since the 1980s—an explosion necessary because of the broad-based stagnation and decline of American workers’ income over the same period. But expansion of credit with no corresponding expansion of income cannot continue indefinitely, as the economic collapses of 1929 and 2008 showed. Since the Great Recession ended, income inequality in the U.S. has continued to rise, as it did in the 1920s: for example, between 2009 and 2012, the top 1 percent captured 95 percent of total income growth. As before the Depression, unproductive speculation on the stock market, sustained by financial bubbles, has in the last 40 years become an increasingly favored form of investment by the titans of capitalism, even as deindustrialization has left millions of Americans without stable work and is contributing to the erosion of the middle class. Organized labor has suffered enormous defeats since the 1970s, as it did in the 1920s, to the point that union density in the private sector is now what it was in 1930 (a little less than 7 percent). And so on and on one can list the parallels—the pathologies.

---

2 David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital, and the Crises of Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 118.

In short, there is every reason to believe that we’re entering an era of prolonged economic stagnation punctuated by crisis, an era structurally analogous (in some ways) to the Great Depression. The obvious question, then, is—What can we learn from the past about how the future will unfold, and about how we can make the future unfold in a positive way? This being an academic work of history, I will not discuss these questions much in the body of the work. I have already done so, in any case, in another book, Worker Cooperatives and Revolution: History and Possibilities in the United States (2014), where I also show how a few revisions to the doctrines of orthodox Marxism can and should inform, in interesting and productive ways, the strategies of left-wing activists in the 21st century. Nevertheless, I hope that this dissertation at least indirectly illuminates our current historical moment, with regard both to its dominant features and to the possibilities that lie dormant within it.

Much has been written about the history of the unemployed in the United States—although perhaps not as much as one would think, given the importance of the topic. One of the most notable studies is Alexander Keyssar’s Out of Work: The First Century of Unemployment in Massachusetts (1986), a pioneering social history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that includes discussion of politics, organized labor, “spontaneous” collective action by the jobless, and ways that people coped with losing their livelihood. While only a few pages are devoted to the 1930s, the implicit recognition throughout the book of the agency and dignity of people who suffered the ignominy of unemployment is something I have tried to emulate in this study, even to emphasize.

One reason Keyssar does not discuss the Great Depression at length is that so much had already been written about it. Well-known books by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., William

Leuchtenburg, Lester Chandler, Irving Bernstein, Robert McElvaine, and many others had flooded light on the plight of the unemployed in those years, while far less was known about the century preceding the 1930s. On the other hand, much of the earlier scholarship had been rather dismissive of the jobless, treating them as basically passive, apathetic, and apolitical.\footnote{I give examples at the beginning of chapter three.} It showed little interest in “ordinary people” on their own terms, in reconstructing their lives and struggles and thoughts, instead making sweeping, and sometimes unflattering, generalizations about them. Of course, since this scholarship was usually national in scope and focused on the most important political and institutional currents of the Depression, it could hardly be expected to do justice to the variegated tapestry of people’s experiences. Local studies would be better adapted for that.

One such work is Joan M. Crouse’s \textit{The Homeless Transient in the Great Depression: New York State, 1929–1941}, published in the same year as Keyssar’s book. This is an exemplary study of one category of the homeless unemployed, which reconstructs not only the dynamics of the state’s relief administration—and the effects of its partial dismantling in late 1935—but also the experiences and attitudes of both transients and the public as it related to them. The influence of the “new” (by now old) social history is evident in Crouse’s sympathetic treatment of that despised category the non-resident unemployed, in all their diversity and frustrated dignity. Indeed, by the 1980s and ’90s one is hard-pressed to find historical scholarship that does not valorize the experiences of “ordinary people” to the same degree that they were devalued in an earlier time.

The work of James Lorence, for example, takes seriously the organizing of the unemployed that went on throughout the 1930s, instead of dismissing its significance as some earlier histories had. However, Lorence focuses not on the rank and file of the movements but on
the most prominent activists and institutions that led the organizing. Thus, in *Organizing the Unemployed: Community and Union Activists in the Industrial Heartland* (1996), he gives “an exhaustive analysis of the Michigan unemployed movement in all its phases and expressions” from the early Depression to the Second World War, but an analysis primarily of institutional activities and interrelations—between local and state governments, left-wing political parties, unemployed organizations, and industrial unions such as the UAW (which by 1937 was heavily involved in organizing the jobless). ¹ Social history is largely absent. Likewise, in *The Unemployed People’s Movement: Leftists, Liberals, and Labor in Georgia, 1929–1941* (2009), Lorence is concerned mainly with the activities of leaders and institutions, although he does devote considerable space to discussion of race relations and the tribulations of African-Americans. He also more explicitly argues than in his book on Michigan that “the presumably inarticulate gained a voice” and effectively pressured authorities. “[T]he Depression crisis,” he states, “taught the unemployed to combine to speak with one voice; and the result was an increase in governmental responsiveness under pressure from below.” ² This is quite a different emphasis from that of earlier “top-down” scholarship.

For instance, one might contrast it with two articles written decades earlier, one by Daniel J. Leab and the other by John Garraty. The first, published in 1967 and titled “‘United We Eat’: The Creation and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930,” has valuable information on how the Communist Party organized the jobless, how Unemployed Councils were structured, and what Communists thought of their successes and failures in rousing the public, but it takes a somewhat condescending perspective toward the jobless, treating them as little more than a semi-apathetic mass that had to be organized from the outside. Garraty’s article, published in 1976 and

---

² Lorence, *The Unemployed People’s Movement* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2009), 6, 228.
titled “Unemployment during the Great Depression,” has a different and broader focus but shares the “condescending” attitude of Leab’s. In brief, Garraty relies on novelists of the day, reporters, autobiographical accounts, and sociological studies to argue (in part) that the vast majority of the unemployed in Europe and the U.S. were demoralized, politically passive, hopeless, and ashamed of their unemployment. After a paragraph in which he acknowledges that many protests did occur, he concludes that they were “sporadic, unfocused, and to a considerable extent merely rhetorical.” Such an interpretation, while doubtless partly true, can certainly be contested as an oversimplification; and I do so contest it in chapter six.

An exception among pre-1980s scholarship is that of Roy Rosenzweig, who in the 1970s wrote a series of articles on Depression-era activism among the Communists, Socialists, and Musteites. The content of his three essays is clear from their titles: “Radicals and the Jobless: The Musteites and the Unemployed Leagues, 1932-1936,” “Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression, 1929-1933,” and “‘Socialism in Our Time’: The Socialist Party and the Unemployed, 1929-1936.” Like Leab, he is more concerned with the organizers and the institutions they helped form than with rank and file members; however, he paints a nuanced and sympathetic picture of the latter that attributes more agency to them than most previous historians had. He flatly rejects William Leuchtenburg’s judgment (in Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal) that “most of the unemployed meekly accepted their lot,” insisting on the contrary that “the jobless employed a number of spontaneous survival strategies such as informal and formal cooperative movements, family and neighborhood networks of assistance, individual and group looting of supermarkets, coal bootlegging, determined searches for work,

---

and innovative stretching of income.” His articles substantiate this point in relation to political and semi-political activities, by showing that in many cases it was the ordinary members of the Unemployed Councils, Workers’ Committees, and Unemployed Leagues who pressed for more radical action and even had to be restrained by the ideological leftists. In Chicago, the Workers’ Committee quickly came under the control of the grassroots unemployed, who founded dozens of locals with thousands of members all over the city; and the same was true, though perhaps to a lesser extent, of the Unemployed Councils.

On the whole, then, it is not hard to find historical scholarship that discusses the unemployed in the Depression. Two works on Chicago must also be mentioned: Randi Storch’s *Red Chicago: American Communism at its Grassroots, 1928–1935* (2009), which has some material on Communist organizing around relief policies, eviction fights, and police brutality, and Lizabeth Cohen’s *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (1990), which has a chapter on how local institutions such as benefit societies, building and loan associations, churches, and welfare-capitalist employers ultimately failed to protect the unemployed from the ravages of economic collapse, causing them to turn to the federal government and the New Deal. However, it should be evident by now that virtually none of the historiography takes a direct and sustained look, over the entirety of the Depression decade, at the social history of the long-term unemployed, which is what interests me. Certainly it does not do so with regard to Chicago, as a local study. This strikes me as a rather gaping gap in the literature, a gap that ought to be closed. Whether I have successfully done so in this dissertation is for the reader to judge.

---

One might ask, however, why this “gap” in the historiography is something to be closed in the first place. What is there to be learned by a history of the experiences, the survival strategies, and the various modes of resistance of “the unemployed” in Chicago in the Depression? On one level, the answer is the same one that can be given as regards any piece of historical writing: it fills in details, adds to our fund of knowledge, makes interpretive connections that have not necessarily been made before. Not all scholarly perspectives or agendas are very interesting, but they do, at least, present information that can be used by other writers.

But of course one wants more than that bare minimum. And one wants more than merely the fact that the U.S. currently has such a bleak economic future that analyses of the 1930s will soon be of particular interest again. What one wants are arguments that challenge conventional patterns of thought (or scholarship) and portray history in a new light. So the question here is, what are the conventional patterns of thought that I want to challenge?

Social history since the 1970s has done much to counteract posterity’s “enormous condescension” towards the forgotten masses by reconstructing their lives, their agency, to some extent restoring the dignity that the dominant society denied them in life and later in death. Numberless works have followed in the democratic and humanistic spirit of E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class (1963), showing how people found ways to resist, even to construct their own relatively autonomous subcultures. This vast scholarly project, however, has arguably not gone far enough, in at least two respects. First, as I’ve said, there has still not been enough attention to the huge and socially significant category of the long-term unemployed in all periods of U.S. history. Instead, there are works on other subjects that, at most, overlap with unemployment; or there are works that address unemployment in one chapter
and then move on to some other topic. But unemployment has been such a central part of the
history of capitalism—being one of the most widely shared, and most debilitating, of
experiences—and is so integral to an understanding of the system’s functioning, that it deserves
a whole literature of its own, not just in public policy but in social history too.

Perhaps more importantly, historians have not really plumbed the depths of people’s
opposition to the dominant society. A virtual library of historiography has been written on the
subject of explicit political and economic resistance, especially in the form of labor unions and
social movements, but more can still be said about subtler types of resistance and
nonconformism. In particular, the anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian dimensions of people’s
behavior and thoughts can be further explored. If capitalism means private ownership of the
means of production, private control (by the owners or their representatives) over the workplace,
production for the single purpose of accumulating profits that are privately appropriated by the
owners, and such tendencies as ever-increasing privatization of society (an outgrowth of capital
owners’ extension of their control and ownership to ever more social domains), the mediation of
more and more human interactions through market processes, and commodification of
increasingly many things, including human labor-power, nature, ideas, and public goods like
education and health care—all of which tendencies have become increasingly pronounced in
recent centuries, except when held in check by popular movements or other countervailing
forces\(^9\)—then it can be shown that the vast majority of people have, in various ways and often
even unknowingly, opposed it. Much of labor history, of course, has this implication, though it is
not always made clear. Thus, I think historians should do more to show the extent to which
people are ambivalent, even hostile, towards dominant institutions, practices, ideologies, and
values. This anti-Gramscian emphasis is one of the guiding themes of my dissertation.

On the most basic level, for instance, everyone acts in a rather “communistic” way, as the anthropologist David Graeber points out.\(^\text{10}\) Even corporate executives, not to mention people less integrated into market structures, ordinarily act according to what Graeber calls “baseline communism.” For, if communism means “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” (as Marx defined it), then it simply means sharing, helping, and cooperating—giving to others in need what you’re able to give them, even if it is only advice, assistance at some task, sympathy or emotional support, or some money to tide them over. Friends, coworkers, relatives, lovers, even total strangers constantly act in this way. In this sense, in fact, “communism is the foundation of all human sociability”; it can be considered “the raw material of sociality, a recognition of our ultimate interdependence that is the ultimate substance of social peace,” as Graeber says. Society is held together by this dense anti-capitalist fabric, into which the more superficial patterns of commercialism, the profit motive, and greed are woven. One might even reverse the typical judgment of apologists for capitalism: not only is capitalism not a straightforward expression of human nature (supposedly because we’re all naturally greedy, as a Milton Friedman or a Friedrich Hayek might say); it is more like a perversion of human nature, which is evidently drawn to such things as compassion, love, community, respect for others, and free self-expression unimpeded by authoritarian rules in the economic or political sphere. Capitalism is parasitic on “everyday communism,” which is but a manifestation of human needs and desires. In short, insofar as there is a “hegemony” of capitalist culture and ideology at all, simple reflections such as these—even apart from historical analysis—already show that it must be quite superficial compared to the underlying substratum of human sociality, which expresses itself in frequently anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian ways in every moment of the day.

Everyday communism, however, has historically been especially pronounced among the lower classes—the peasantry, industrial workers, struggling immigrants, the petty-bourgeoisie—who have relied on it for survival in hard times and even in normal times, and who, moreover, have not been as deeply integrated into commercial structures and ideologies as the elite has. Social history has done much to illuminate the “communism” (without calling it that) of the American working class during its many formative decades, through description of the thick networks of voluntary associations that workers, especially immigrants, created among themselves, and of the “mutualist” ethic to which they subscribed in the context of their battles with employers, and of the vitally public character of their shared culture up to at least the 1940s.  

All this was very much anti-capitalist and anti-the dominant ideologies of the day, whether individualism, the “open shop” idea, Social Darwinism, or imperialistic nationalism. The long-term unemployed have tended to be ignored in this historiography, so in the third chapter I try to show in what respects they, too, acted in communistic ways. For unemployment did not produce only atomization, as is commonly supposed; it also gave rise to the opposite, community. And that is what is most interesting to study.

The Gramscian notion of hegemony—which James C. Scott defines as the idea that “class rule is effected not so much by sanctions and coercion as by the consent and passive compliance of subordinate classes”—has been criticized repeatedly and should, I think—if watered down from this strong formulation—be relegated to the status of little more than an

---


important qualification to the truths of a “vulgar Marxism” that assigns overwhelming explanatory power to brute economic and political coercion, and to interest—primarily class-determined—rather than values or consciousness (which tend to reflect economic position). Before defending this statement, however, and elaborating on its relation to my dissertation, I want to make a suggestion that pertains to “bottom-up” social history as a whole, to its very raison d’être. To my knowledge, the radical political scientist Thomas Ferguson’s challenge, in 1995, to social historians has never met with a response:

Perhaps in reaction to the last generation of “consensus historians,” many recent studies of American history make a determined effort to discuss the often very painful daily-life experiences of ordinary people. This research has produced many significant works that amount to a powerful indictment of conventional pluralist theories of American politics. But while I am totally in sympathy with efforts to “assert the dignity of work,” “reveal the thoughts and actions of the rank and file,” or show ordinary people as “active, articulate participants in a historical process,” and similar aims, I am very skeptical about this literature’s frequent unwillingness and inability to come finally to a point. That ordinary people are historical subjects is a vital truth; that they are the primary shapers of the American past seems to me either a triviality or a highly dubious theory about the control of both political and economic investment in American history.\(^\text{13}\)

In other words, why do we do social history in the first place? What are the general truths we are trying to establish? Admittedly, there need not be such truths at all. The project of unearthing the lives and thoughts of people whom history has tried to bury in oblivion—the “voiceless toilers” from time immemorial, upon whom have been built great civilizations that “despised them and [have done] all [they] could to forget them,” to quote G. E. M. de Ste. Croix—\(^\text{14}\) is an intrinsically noble endeavor, a kind of moral crusade to be waged for its own sake. It would be nice, though, if there were also certain truths we were trying to illustrate in our reconstructions and analyses.

It seems to me that there is one such truth above all, which is implicit in much historiography but ought to be made explicit: the Gramscian idea of hegemony, as defined a moment ago, is wrong. Any emphasis on consent, consensus, culture, ideology, shared values, “discourses,” or some such concept as being what secures the obedience of the lower classes and so explains the perpetuation of a given society is at best highly misleading. If labor history, blood-sodden, conflict-saturated, shows anything at all, it shows that. This, I think, is the best answer to Ferguson’s question about the overarching purpose or implication(s) of this type of social history. The point is not that ordinary people are the primary shapers of the past, for, as Ferguson says, this is either a truism or completely wrong (since surely the economic and political elite, which possesses incomparably the most resources, has more direct power than “ordinary people” over the paths that history takes). But the anti-Gramscian point is both substantive and true, as I’ll argue presently. It has the merit, moreover—if explicitly emphasized by historians—of elevating bottom-up social history to an even higher moral level, for it implies that people are not mere receptacles for propaganda, slavish beings with easily inscribable \textit{tabula rasas} for minds, but rather have to be \textit{coerced} into a subordinate status because of their

essentially independent and freedom-loving nature. Thus, to the degree that historians reject the
tendency of thought known as Gramscianism and embrace a more traditional Marxian view that
highlights struggle, the use of force, violence, the conflict between rich and poor, and the soft
compulsion of institutional structures, they can pride themselves on their knowledge of serving
both morality—or, better, “humanism,” a belief in the inherent dignity of all people—and truth.
If, that is, they accept the following arguments.

First, I must point out that even though it is not necessarily common in recent
historiography to bandy about such notions as cultural hegemony or consent or the masses’
ideological submission to their masters—and so this whole fuss I’m making about the Gramscian
tendency of thought might seem pointless or dated—in fact the methods of some postmodern
scholarship tend to imply an idealism much more extreme than that of Gramsci (who was, after
all, a Marxist). While this is not the place for a sustained critique of postmodernism,\textsuperscript{15} it is
relevant to observe that the postmodern fixation on discourses, language, “vocabularies,” culture,
“society’s imaginary,” and subjective identities, as opposed to objective class structures,
institutional relations, class struggle, control over the means of producing wealth and of physical
coercion, has implications that are more Gramscian than Gramscianism itself. For, to the extent
that one emphasizes phenomena of ideology and consciousness as explicating the nature of
social dynamics, one implies that people’s subordination to the powerful is a product either of (1)
their conscious choice, (2) their being too incompetent to rise through their own individual
efforts into the ranks of the elite, or (3) their being brainwashed by culture and dominant
ideologies. To the degree that one denies the primacy of economic structures in determining
social relations, preferring the idealistic mode of explanation, one is forced to invoke such

\textsuperscript{15} See my Notes of an Underground Humanist (Bradenton, FL: Booklocker, 2013), chapters one and two; Willie
Thompson, Postmodernism and History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Richard J. Evans, In Defence of
unattractive options in order to explain inequalities of power. This fact is ironic, since one of the guiding ideals of postmodern historians is their recognition of the agency and dignity of ordinary people (by, for example, relating, without judgment, how people see themselves and interpret their actions).\textsuperscript{16} Being unaware of the logical implications of their idealistic perspective, they are unaware that the interpretation that attributes most rationality and dignity to people is a Marxism that treats idealist considerations as little more than an important afterthought.

Postmodernism, however, is but the most recent manifestation of the idealism that has always afflicted mainstream intellectual culture, even back to the Enlightenment—or rather back to antiquity, when Plato viewed the world as consisting of shadows of ideal Forms, Hindus and Buddhists interpreted it in spiritual terms and as being somehow illusory, and Stoics were telling “the slave in the mines that if he would only think aright he would be happy.”\textsuperscript{17} Such idealism is no surprise, since people (intellectuals) whose institutional function is to produce words and ideas are naturally going to think that words and ideas are of exceptional importance, and that bodily needs and processes of material production are vulgar and uninteresting. Moreover, from a Marxian perspective it makes perfect sense that mainstream intellectuals would propagate ideologies that distract from class struggle and class structure, because the dominant interests in society—viz., wealthy individuals and institutions, which are dominant because they have the most control over the most resources—are not going to support, and indeed will try to suppress, interpretations that draw attention to their wealth and power by showing how it operates, how it has been acquired, and how it is inversely related to the power of ordinary people. In other


\textsuperscript{17} W. W. Tarn, \textit{Hellenistic Civilisation} (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927), 298.
words, a materialist analysis that foregrounds class conflict and the exploitation of subordinate classes threatens the given distribution of power, so it will incur the wrath of the powerful and will tend to be “filtered out” of intellectual institutions.\textsuperscript{18} “Politically neutral” or idealist scholarship, unchallenging to the wealthy, will therefore predominate. One recalls that before the reign of postmodernism there was the reign of the liberal consensus school of historians such as Louis Hartz, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Oscar Handlin, and Daniel Boorstin, a school that makes one think of a bourgeois version of Gramscianism in its emphasis on the socially cohering force of a relative consensus of values among all classes.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, “the fashionable theory of economic nondeterminism” of politics and society about which Gabriel Kolko complained in the 1960s has in fact been fashionable since at least the 1940s, and will probably continue to be so until class-based social movements again reach the level they attained in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{20}

In defense of the Marxism that guides this dissertation, a few general statements may be offered. The explanatory primacy of class over other variables can be established on simple \textit{a priori} grounds, quite apart from empirical sociological or historical analysis. One has only to reflect that access to resources—money, capital, technology—is of unique importance to life, being key to survival, to a high quality of life, to political power, to social and cultural influence; and access to (or control over) resources is determined ultimately by class position, one’s

\textsuperscript{18} There are many examples of intellectuals whose careers have been damaged or destroyed because of their radical scholarship. In one egregious case, Thomas Ferguson was denied tenure at MIT explicitly because of his materialist writings. See Peter Mitchell and John Schoeffel, eds., \textit{Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky} (New York: The New Press, 2002), 243.

\textsuperscript{19} The radical historian Jesse Lemisch devastatingly criticized this school in his 1969 paper “Present-Mindedness Revisited: Anti-Radicalism as a Goal of American Historical Writing Since World War II,” published in 1975 (as \textit{On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in the American Historical Profession}) by an obscure independent press because it was too left-wing to make it into establishment journals.

\textsuperscript{20} The quotation is from Gabriel Kolko, \textit{The Roots of American Foreign Policy} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 81. A recent example of such economic nondeterminism is Odd Arne Westad’s highly regarded book \textit{The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), which argues, implausibly, that “the United States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics” (my italics), rather than by economic and strategic considerations of power. Kolko’s and Walter LaFeber’s works are excellent correctives to the liberal idealism of a Westad.
position in the social relations of production. The owner of the means of production, i.e. the capitalist, has control over more resources than the person who owns only his labor-power, which means he is better able to influence the political process (for example by bribing politicians) and to propagate ideas and values that legitimate his dominant position and justify the subordination of others. These two broad groups of owners and workers—an analytic classification that, of course, simplifies and abstracts from the complexities of the real world in order to create a model that can facilitate understanding—have opposing interests, most obviously in the inverse relation between wages and profits. This antagonism of interests is the “class struggle,” a struggle that need not always be explicit or conscious but is constantly present on an implicit level, indeed is constitutive of the relationship between capitalist and worker. The class struggle—that is, the structure and functioning of economic institutions—can be called the foundation of society, the dynamic around which society tends to revolve, because, again, it is through class that institutions and actors acquire the means to influence social life. Marx was therefore right to contrast—albeit in metaphorical and misleading language—the economic “base” with the political, cultural, and ideological “superstructure.”

It may be of interest to note, incidentally, that Marx was far from the first writer to prioritize class struggle. Aristotle’s Politics already has a definitely materialistic bias, treating it as a truism that “class” (to use an anachronism) is of foundational significance to society. More

---

21 The base/superstructure controversy has spawned an entire literature, but the previous sentence in the text is really all that’s needed to end the controversy and establish the meaning and validity of the Marxian metaphor. Of course the economy is the “base” and everything else the “superstructure.” After all, culture and politics and ideologies are not somehow the product of spontaneous generation; they are brought into being by particular actors and institutions. And in order to bring into being the forms and content of a culture and politics, one needs resources. The production and distribution of resources, in particular material resources, takes place in the economic sphere. So, the way that resources are allocated according to economic structures—who gets the most, who gets the least, etc.—will be the key factor in determining, broadly speaking, the forms and content of a given culture and politics. The interests of the wealthy will tend to be disproportionately represented. —In the entire literature (not all of which I’ve read), I don’t recall ever encountering this simple and decisive, commonsensical argument.
recently, James Madison was, in essence, a proto-“historical materialist,” as is clear from his famous *Federalist No. 10*: 

[T]he most common and durable source of factions [he writes] has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views.

Charles Beard went so far as to say that *The Federalist* “is in fact the finest study in the economic interpretation of politics which exists in any language; and whoever would understand the Constitution as an economic document need hardly go beyond it.”

The quotation from Madison indicates that, strictly speaking, the idea of class conflict denotes more than just the conflict between worker and capitalist (or master and slave, etc.); it extends to conflicts between economic subdivisions of the dominant class(es). In the dissertation, however, I disregard this extension of the concept, since it is of little relevance to my subject.

An enormous amount of scholarship shows the explanatory power of the Marxian framework that uses class, or class struggle, to understand the world. Even ideologies of race,

---

nation, and gender are largely a product of class—of slavery and its aftermath in the U.S., of European imperialism, of attempts by the Victorian upper class to control working-class women’s lives and sexuality.\(^{24}\) In the case of religious fundamentalism in the U.S., for example, historians have shown that since early in the twentieth century, and especially since the 1970s, conservative sectors of the business community have subsidized right-wing evangelical Christianity in order to beat back unionism and liberalism, which have been tarred and feathered as communist, socialist, godless, etc.\(^{25}\) More generally, for centuries the ruling class (which is to say the aggregate of those who occupy the dominant positions in a society’s dominant mode of production, and so have shared interests) has propagated divisive ideas of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and gender in order, partly, to fragment the working class and so control it more easily and effectively. It is true, again, that such arguments—that all Marxist or “economistic” arguments—simplify, abstracting from complicating factors; and mainstream scholars typically consider this fact to be a weakness of Marxism, a sign of unsophistication. The pejorative label “reductivism” is flung at any argument that explains a set of phenomena in economic terms, especially in terms of class struggle. Somehow, it is considered an intellectual vice, and not a virtue, to simplify for the sake of understanding. After all, the world is a complex place, and in order to understand it one has to simplify it a bit, explain it in terms of general principles. As in the natural sciences, a single principle can never explain everything; but, if it is the right one, it can explain a great deal.


Since this is an important point for my dissertation, which gives pride of place to class struggle, it deserves a more extensive defense than the preceding three sentences. I will yield here to Noam Chomsky, whose eloquence is unsurpassed. The following is an excerpt from an interview:

*Question:* But you're often accused of being too black-and-white in your analysis, of dividing the world into evil élites and subjugated or mystified masses. Does your approach ever get in the way of basic accuracy?

*Answer:* I do approach these questions a bit differently than historical scholarship generally does. But that's because humanistic scholarship tends to be irrational. I approach these questions pretty much as I would approach my scientific work. In that work—in any kind of rational inquiry—what you try to do is identify major factors, understand them, and see what you can explain in terms of them. Then you always find a periphery of unexplained phenomena, and you introduce minor factors and try to account for those phenomena. What you're always searching for is the guiding principles: the major effects, the dominant structures. In order to do that, you set aside a lot of tenth-order effects. Now, that's not the method of humanistic scholarship, which tends in a different direction. Humanistic scholarship—I'm caricaturing a bit for simplicity—says every fact is precious; you put it alongside every other fact. That's a sure way to guarantee you'll never understand anything. If you tried to do that in the sciences, you wouldn't even reach the level of Babylonian astronomy.
I don't think the [social] field of inquiry is fundamentally different in this respect. Take what we were talking about before: institutional facts. Those are major factors. There are also minor factors, like individual differences, microbureaucratic interactions, or what the President's wife told him at breakfast. These are all tenth-order effects. I don't pay much attention to them, because I think they all operate within a fairly narrow range which is predictable by the major factors. I think you can isolate those major factors. You can document them quite well; you can illustrate them in historical practice; you can verify them. If you read the documentary record critically, you can find them very prominently displayed, and you can find that other things follow from them. There's also a range of nuances and minor effects, and I think these two categories should be very sharply separated.

When you proceed in this fashion, it might give someone who's not used to such an approach the sense of black-and-white, of drawing lines too clearly. It purposely does that. That's what is involved when you try to identify major, dominant effects and put them in their proper place.²⁶

Karl Kautsky said something similar when he wrote, in *Foundations of Christianity*, “[T]he task of science is not simply a presentation of that which is, giving a faithful photograph of reality, so that any normally constituted observer will form the same image. The task of science consists in

observing the general, essential element in the mass of impressions and phenomena received, and thus providing a clue by means of which we can find our bearings in the labyrinth of reality.”27

Likewise, Jean Jaurès wrote in his classic history of the French Revolution, “In every order of questions, in every order of facts we must attempt to draw out the most general idea. We must seek the largest and simplest concept under which we can group the greatest number of orders and objects, and we will thus little by little extend our net over the world… In all times and places, under the infinite and overwhelming diversity of particular facts, science through a daring operation perceives and draws out a few decisive and profound characteristics. And it is this clear and relatively simple idea that it tests and develops through observation, calculations, and by the ceaseless comparisons of the extension of the act and the extensions of the idea.”28

This is the method of the true scientist, both the natural and the social scientist.

The postmodern academic agenda of “problematizing” “narratives”—especially “meta-narratives” like the Marxian approach to history—has had many salutary consequences for our understanding of the world. Simplifications often are superficial. But not always: sometimes they are much deeper than the “complications” that scholarship revels in, which distract from essential general insights into how power works, and how class is the basis for the institutional infrastructure that regulates social behavior. Just as it is of little interest to problematize for the sake of problematizing—as is done all too frequently—so the mainstream scholarly aversion to general truths, to generalities as such, is wrong.

The class-focused perspective in fact allows us to understand how the approach to history that heeds only the particular and not the general—the exception at the expense of the rule—could have become dominant in the first place. It has to do with how postmodernism itself—i.e.,

---

an emphasis on the particular, the fragmented, the single exception, and the subjective, the imagistic, the discursive, the self-interpretations of actors (as if self-interpretations are always correct and not usually deceived)—could have become the reigning paradigm in the humanities. The key, to repeat, is that this approach to writing history does not challenge the dominant interests in society, the main power-structures, the “ruling class” in traditional Marxian language, so it will be allowed and encouraged to proliferate. The explanation of postmodern particularism—“every fact is precious; you put it alongside every other fact”—really is similar to the explanation of its idealism. Again, regarding the idealism: the reason someone like Foucault could become an inspiration for mainstream scholarship is that his works attend to everything except class: discourse, knowledge, consciousness, the body, the state.29 Such anti-Marxism, being politically safe, is always good for having a stable and successful career, especially in a time (post-1970s) when organized labor is on the decline, such that there is no powerful political constituency to subsidize and promote materialist scholarship. Foucault was appropriate to a time when big business was decimating labor, the rise of feminism was turning cultural attention to the body and sexuality, conservative ideological attacks on the overweening power of “big government” made it appropriate for intellectuals to study the history of the state’s attempts to control “discourses,” etc. To many intellectuals, class struggle seemed to have disappeared. Of course, this perception was only a symptom of the intensification—and triumph—of class struggle on the capitalist side and its substantial defeat on the labor side.30

29 To see how explanatorily impoverished, even confused, such a scholarly focus is compared with the focus on class, contrast Foucault’s famous Discipline and Punish with the Marxist classic Punishment and Social Structure (1939), by Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer. While the latter explains, the former merely describes (badly and obscurely).

In a similar way, the historiographical agenda to problematize Marxian common sense by treating class as merely a “social construct,” a subjective identity not different in kind from gender or race or sexuality, as if objective institutional structures do not exist—and so arguing that Marxian explanations are “unsophisticated” because of all the little factors they ignore—is essentially just a way of enforcing mainstream ideologies and thus serving the masters, the corporate sector and wealthy university donors, most of whom certainly do not want general truths about class, wealth, and power to be propagated. Scholars may not be aware of these facts or have such motivations in mind when ignoring class or criticizing its analytic prioritization, but this is the effect that doing so has, and this is the main institutional function of postmodern intellectual agendas.

As a result, I depart from academic orthodoxy in this dissertation, preferring to illustrate general truths about the conflict between (relatively) rich and (relatively) poor that roughly determines social dynamics. I am interested in the particular less for its own sake than for its broader implications. The foregrounding of class at times gives the book a polemical tone, as in some passages on the service that Chicago’s police force regularly rendered the business community, but it is a logical fallacy to think that a slightly polemical tone indicates that a work has abandoned the “disinterested” pursuit of truth in favor of advancing a political agenda. For one thing, “tone” can always be separated from the actual arguments that are made: e.g., in the case of Chomsky’s writings, the morally outraged tone does not entail that the facts he unearths and the arguments he makes are false. Secondly, it simply happens to be the case that certain truths about how the world works are not morally acceptable, so that by describing them, even in

---

neutral language, one cannot avoid giving the impression of partisanship. There is no reason, after all, to think that the revelation of historical truth must necessarily shine a positive light on the rich and powerful. The contrary would be more likely to be the case. Therefore, it is far from being a counterargument to left-wing writing such as Chomsky’s or Howard Zinn’s or Gabriel Kolko’s that it seems partisan or polemical, for this is what one would expect of a true description of a world in which power is concentrated in the hands of a small elite that, quite rationally, pursues its own interests. Indeed, from this perspective, the lack of a partisan tone in most mainstream scholarship suggests (though does not entail) it has not penetrated to essential truths about how society works. 31

In short, I think it is time for historians to, in some respects, problematize the ceaseless problematizing and return to basics. Which means returning to a non-Gramscian Marxism, or at least a Marxism that relegates considerations of culture and hegemony to a decidedly subordinate place. Many arguments can be given in favor of this type of Marxism, and many have been given, especially in a book published in 1980 called The Dominant Ideology Thesis, by Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan Turner. This book is essential reading for a just evaluation of the Gramscian concept of hegemony, and I cannot hope to reproduce even a fraction of its arguments here. One should also read the last chapter of James C. Scott’s classic Weapons of the Weak (1985), which builds on the analysis given in the earlier book. In the following I will sketch only a few general arguments, after which I will discuss the 1930s in relation to a paper that presents a perspective different from my own: Melvyn Dubofsky’s well-known and provocative “Not so ‘Turbulent Years’: A New Look at the 1930s,” published as a chapter in a book edited by Charles Stephenson and Robert Asher called Life and Labor:

---

31 For more thoughts on recent historiography, see my paper “A Critique of Current Historical Scholarship,” at www.academia.edu.
Dimensions of American Working-Class History (1986). Last, I’ll provide a brief summary of each chapter in the dissertation.

The first point to be made is that the foundation of social order is, in fact, violence and the threat of violence. Perry Anderson makes the point by imagining what would happen if the threat vanished. While a kind of consent may ordinarily prevail in our society, it is “constituted by a silent, absent force…: the monopoly of legitimate violence by the State. Deprived of this, the system of cultural control would be instantly fragile, since the limits of possible actions against it would disappear.”32 One can imagine how differently people would behave if there were no police force or military or security guards or prisons. Surely the poor and even many in the middle class would quickly overrun the property of the rich—neighborhoods, banks, mansions—and take what they could, or distribute it among themselves. This fact already suggests that most people’s ordinary “consent” to the system of rule that exists is basically prudential and not ideological, not an indication that they think prevailing hierarchies are legitimate. Later I quote unemployed men in the Depression who had no moral compunctions whatever about stealing, refraining from doing so only because of the possible consequences to their families and themselves.

The threat of state-sanctioned violence is so ubiquitous that we hardly ever notice it or stop to think about it. It hovers over even the hallowed groves of academe, seemingly so peaceful and idyllic. David Graeber muses on the fact that “graduate students [are] able to spend days in the stacks of university libraries poring over Foucault-inspired theoretical tracts about the declining importance of coercion as a factor in modern life without ever reflecting on the fact that, had they insisted on their right to enter the stacks without showing a properly stamped and

validated ID, armed men would have been summoned to physically remove them, using whatever force might be required.” In any given context, if one doesn’t behave in the proper way then one can expect violent repercussions. Violence is the ultimate arbiter—as generations of workers and activists have learned to their cost, and as the history of capitalism shows all too clearly. In a late capitalist society—hyper-bureaucratized, hyper-regimented, hyper-regulated—it does not take long for young people to internalize this fact and, as they age, to adjust their behavior accordingly.

However, while the (unconscious) adjustment of behavior to conform with dominant social structures is in part determined by the ever-present threat and reality of violence, it is also determined simply by the “dull compulsion of economic relations,” to quote Marx. And not only economic relations: all institutional relations. If one wants to participate in society, one cannot escape them. Speaking of capitalism, Max Weber observed that the economy “is an immense cosmos into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to him…as an unalterable order of things in which he must live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic rules of action.” To survive, one has to get a job, cooperate with bureaucracies, buy the commodities on offer, obey the dictates of certain authorities, in general conform. But this does not imply endorsement of the structures and values to which one must conform.

The three preceding paragraphs are sufficient to answer the old, “grand” sociological question of how societies manage to function when they are so riven by conflicts between groups and between individuals. For this purpose, it is not necessary to invoke ideologies or culture or

---

hegemony or “false consciousness” at all. One has only to recognize that (1) the means of violence are overwhelmingly in the hands of the wealthy and those who (directly or indirectly) serve them, whose interest is in maintaining the given distribution of power, and (2) the dominant social structures have a “compulsory” dynamic of their own, even apart from the physical violence that is always on hand to back them up. Even if every member of the subordinate groups perfectly understood how he was exploited and dominated and saw through every mystifying element of the dominant culture, we can see how he would still be inclined to “fit in” in order to survive. Unless his oppression was unbearable, it would make perfect rational sense for him not to risk everything by overtly challenging the institutions that enforced his subordination. To an outside observer it might look as if he were a victim of false consciousness or viewed the system of inequality as legitimate and just—or, alternatively, were discontented but deplorably “passive” or “apathetic” or “apolitical”—when in fact he was merely a rational person with insight into the functioning of power and the probable consequences of flouting its authority.

Of course, most—or all—people in history, including most intellectuals and most members of the ruling class, have not had a scientifically lucid understanding of the world or a perfectly consistent and rational system of values and beliefs (if that is even possible). We are all brought up in a cultural and political environment opaque with myths, deceptions, rationalizations, legitimizing rituals, every technique of obfuscation imaginable. No one is impervious to such influences; we all, surely, have elements of incoherence and false or deluded consciousness in our (mostly unconscious) individual ideological framework. So it is necessary to consider the Gramscian question of consciousness, particularly in relation to subordinate classes.
Before continuing, however, it may be noted that there are senses in which this question is not very interesting. For one thing, people’s reports of their beliefs tend to be quite superficial, which makes it hard to draw conclusions from them about the “consciousness” of the masses. What someone says he believes—and even what he privately thinks he believes—is clearly context-dependent, stimulus-dependent, mood-dependent. In one moment, perhaps after hearing a conservative politician speak, he may think that “big government” is society’s main problem; in another moment, perhaps after hearing a progressive politician speak, he may think that government should regulate the economy much more aggressively, and that the country needs a single-payer national health insurance system. In one moment he may think that the government should nationalize “too-big-to-fail” banks, or even that all businesses should be owned and run by the people who work in them and not by investors or their representatives; in another moment he may think that such ideas are absurd and unrealistic. It is notorious that polling results depend on how questions are phrased. In many cases, what people think they believe may be contradicted by their actions and by other statements of theirs. For example, millions of Americans might say that the free market should be the overwhelmingly dominant mode of social regulation even as they complain about the increasing costs of public education, the cost and inadequacy of private health insurance, the limited availability of public transportation, the limited number of public parks in their city, and so forth. In such cases it might be tempting to say they have a “divided consciousness,” but it is evident that what they really would like is a more extensive and better-funded public infrastructure, not a dismantling of public resources in favor of the market. It is only because the “free market” has acquired positive associations in mainstream culture and politics that people might say they support the expansion of its range, not understanding what such support logically entails.

---

In general, people are far from having acute insight into what they believe and value; and both their “real” (often implicit, not explicit) and reported beliefs and values are far from being consistent with each other or over time.\textsuperscript{37} Human consciousness is not exactly an exemplar of lucidity and (self-)honesty, as Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud understood (which is why they were less interested in consciousness as such than in uncovering its hidden grounds and determinants, the \textit{hidden meaning} of conscious states). Self-deception is extraordinarily common, frequently taking the form of merely superficial or nominal adherence to a system of beliefs just because it is a socially accepted thing to believe in. When polls say that 71 percent of Americans in 2014 identified as Christian, what does that mean?\textsuperscript{38} How does one interpret that finding? How many of these people consciously regulated their lives according to a Christian ideology, and how many used the label “Christian” without its having a perceptible effect on their behavior or values? How many would in fact reject most Christian doctrines, or ideas that have come to be associated with Christianity? One can ask comparable questions about people who consider themselves patriotic, or who say they believe in the “free-enterprise system,” or who identify as conservative (or liberal), etc. These sorts of questions, which challenge the meaningfulness of people’s reports of their values and beliefs, can pose problems for a Gramscian or idealistic type of analysis.

It is not even clear that most people have much in the way of determinate beliefs at all.\textsuperscript{39} And certainly it is doubtful that beliefs, to the extent that they exist, tend in and of themselves to be important regulators of behavior. The world consists, by and large, of pragmatists who do not ordinarily exhibit sustained interest in ideologies or abstract ideas, who may think about such

---

\textsuperscript{37} Nicholas Abercrombie et al., \textit{The Dominant Ideology Thesis} (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 141–144.
\textsuperscript{38} Pew Research Center, “America’s Changing Religious Landscape,” May 12, 2015, at \url{http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/}.
\textsuperscript{39} Abercrombie et al., \textit{The Dominant Ideology Thesis}, chapters 5 and 6.
things from time to time but then continue to participate in society in a pragmatic and realistic way, treating it (society) as more or less given even if they find many of its features absurd or repellent. We all must, to a large degree, accommodate ourselves to the world and live in it on its terms; that is part of what it means to become a mature adult. But such accommodation is a very weak form of “consent” indeed; for it is a consent into which we are forced, on pain of ostracism, physical starvation, and legal punishment. In a world of such extreme institutional obstacles to effecting change, it is sensible and natural for people to devote their energy to tasks of survival and recreation (through available, or “hegemonic,” channels like movie-watching, television, and spectator sports) rather than active political dissent or the crafting of considered opinions on issues of moment—even if, to repeat, at bottom they might believe society to be horribly unjust and in need of radical change.

Nevertheless, despite the nebulosity, contradictoriness, and half-formed character—and the pragmatic and basically “reactive” character—of an individual’s and a group’s political and cultural consciousness, it can hardly be denied that popular attitudes do, in some sense, exist and have consequences. It is the business class’s understanding of this that explains its intense efforts since the early twentieth century to shape the public mind, to indoctrinate people with conservative ideologies.⁴⁰ One of the arguments I make in this dissertation, then, is that the long-term unemployed in the Depression, contrary to what scholarship has often assumed, were not generally apolitical, that in fact they tended to have a definite left-wing politics. Sometimes this politics was expressed in protest marches, sometimes in “eviction riots,” sometimes in fervent support for Franklin Roosevelt, but most often simply in “the tenacity of self-preservation,” to quote James C. Scott’s characterization of Malaysian peasants in the 1970s. As with these

exploited peasants, so with the unemployed in Chicago forty years earlier we can see “in ridicule, in truculence, in irony, in petty acts of noncompliance…in resistant mutuality, in the disbelief in elite homilies, in the steady, grinding efforts to hold one’s own against overwhelming odds” a radical-left politics, a kind of class struggle and implicit consciousness of class interests against the rich, albeit one handicapped by the distinctively American absence of a major labor party in the national political arena. In certain contexts, even self-preservation can be a political act.

When the poor aided the poor, and when the unemployed joined their more fortunate employed fellows on the picket line, and even when people grumbled about the absurdity of a social order that would deprive healthy men of the opportunity to make a living, an intrinsically subversive anti-capitalist mentality was manifesting itself. The mechanisms of “hegemony” had in part broken down: the legitimacy of the social structures that determined the U.S.’s political economy was being denied, and people were “taking matters into their own hands” by one means or another. This was far from unprecedented, of course. In fact, Immanuel Wallerstein was probably right that “it is doubtful if very many governments in human history have been considered ‘legitimate’ by the majority of those exploited, oppressed, and maltreated by their governments… Governments tend to be endured, not appreciated or admired or loved or even supported.” Nonetheless, the 1930s did signify an eruption of counter-hegemonic thinking and behavior (including among the—rarely examined—unemployed), as the class struggle burst into the open.

Historians have sometimes downplayed the radicalism or revolutionary consciousness of the masses during the 1930s, preferring to emphasize the basic stability of the political economy,

---

42 Quoted in Abercrombie et al., *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, 156.
the conservative character of the New Deal, the relatively small numbers of people who became members of the Communist party, and the channeling of popular discontent into the Democratic Party. For example, in their 1977 article “Unemployment, Class Consciousness, and Radical Politics: What Didn’t Happen in the Thirties,” Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman argue that few American workers at the time were politically radical or “fully” class-conscious, in the sense of identifying with a class and believing that the interests of that class were opposed to the interests of others. Despite the Depression, they were in most cases optimistic about the long-term future and still favored the “American dream” of advancing through hard work and risk-taking.\textsuperscript{43} Such interpretations are lent support by the writings of liberals in the 1930s who were disappointed, even bewildered, by what they saw as the passivity of most of the unemployed. Sherwood Anderson represented these views when he argued in 1936 that “There is in the average American a profound humbleness. People seem to blame themselves.”\textsuperscript{44}

In his aforementioned paper, Melvyn Dubofsky presents a sophisticated version of this “pessimistic” perspective. While acknowledging that the 1930s was in many respects a uniquely turbulent decade, he reminds us that workers to some extent remained divided by nationality, race, and religion, and that the majority almost never acted in a notably “militant” way. He quotes from Robert and Helen Lynd’s 1937 study of Muncie, Indiana: workers’ ambitions were “largely those of the business class: both are caught up in the tradition of a rising standard of living and lured by the enticements of salesmanship.” They “worshipped” the automobile as the symbol of the American dream, and preferred going for a drive to attending a union meeting.

\textsuperscript{43} One is tempted to remark, however, that, if defined this way, the “American dream” was surely attractive not only to Americans but to people all over the Western world, and perhaps throughout much of history in many different societies. The concept of “success through hard work” is hardly an American invention. Nor should commitment to the “American dream” be assumed to preclude commitment to left-wing ideas and causes. See Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, “Unemployment, Class Consciousness, and Radical Politics: What Didn’t Happen in the Thirties,” Journal of Politics, vol. 39, no. 2 (May 1977): 291–323.

\textsuperscript{44} Quoted in Anthony Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933–40 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 38.
“Fear, resentment, insecurity, and disillusionment,” the Lynds wrote, “has been to Middletown’s [i.e., Muncie’s] workers largely an individual experience for each worker, and not a thing generalized by him into a ‘class’ experience.” Thus do the Lynds and Dubofsky embrace the Gramscian point of view that foregrounds cultural hegemony, especially in relation to “Middle America.” Dubofsky admits that the situation is somewhat different in more urban environments such as New Haven, where, according to a study by E. Wight Bakke in 1940, workers did not share the drives of the business class and did have a collective sense of their own class. “‘Hell, brother,’ a machinist told Bakke, ‘you don’t have to look to know there’s a workin’ class. We may not say so—but look at what we do. Work. Look at where we live. Nothing there but workers. Look at how we get along. Just like every other damned worker. Hell’s bells, of course there’s a workin’ class, and it’s gettin’ more so every day.’” Nevertheless, in New Haven, too, there was an absence of collective militancy, in large part because of workers’ realism about what was possible. “They regularly had had to adjust their goals to actual possibilities,” Dubofsky says, “which almost always fell far below their aspirations. As one worker after another informed Bakke, life involved putting up with it, grinning and bearing it, and using common sense to survive.”

This conclusion, it seems to me, gets to the crux of the matter. It certainly is possible to overestimate the class consciousness and militancy of America’s working class in the Depression. And it is surely the case that the lower classes, now and a century ago, tend to be integrated into the “dominant culture” in many respects, just as they are not integrated in many other respects. The question is to what extent we should emphasize their (and our) indoctrination with the ideas and values of the ruling class, and to what extent we should emphasize, in

---

contrast, their (and our) independence, their rationality and understanding, their opposition to the hierarchies of power, their realism and pragmatism. I have argued that the Gramscian perspective, as an explanation of why capitalist society continues to function and why people do not continually rebel against its many injustices and indignities, must be subordinated to an explanation that simply invokes the threat of violence and the dull compulsion of institutional structures. Prudence and realism, that is, are better explanations of people’s broad “conformism”—in the 1930s and today—than mass delusion and indoctrination (“false consciousness,” “hegemony,” or whatever term one likes). In this study, therefore, I choose to highlight people’s rationality and realism, as well as their courage and opposition to dominant practices and values, rather than the ways in which they may have submitted to mainstream culture and accepted its commercial and individualistic values. This strikes me, moreover, as a more interesting interpretation than the Gramscian one put forward by Dubofsky and the Lynds in relation to Muncie, Indiana.

In the sixth chapter of the book, for example, where I consider the collective action of the unemployed, I address one of the major ways in which historians have downplayed the radicalism and class consciousness of Americans in this period. It has sometimes been remarked in the historiography that most of the unemployed were far less responsive to abstract Communist slogans about socialist revolution or ending imperialist wars than efforts to win concrete gains in such forms as increased relief appropriations and better conditions in homeless shelters. Most of the time, it was not the nuances of Communist ideology that attracted people but (1) Communist actions in defense of the poor and (2) programmatic goals like national unemployment insurance and a shorter workweek. One might say, then, that people had the equivalent of a “trade-union consciousness” (concerned with “bread-and-butter” issues), not a
“revolutionary consciousness.” And this conclusion may be largely correct, provided one recognize that no working class anywhere in the world has ever been different in this regard. As James C. Scott says, “the rank-and-file actors in most, if not all, revolutionary situations are in fact fighting for rather mundane, if vital, objectives that could in principle—but often not in practice—be accommodated within the prevailing social order.”46 Better wages, better treatment, more control over production, perhaps a house of one’s own with some land—these are the sorts of demands that most often animate people, whether in the United States in the 1930s or Germany or Russia twenty years earlier. Barrington Moore has shown that factory workers in Russia just before the October revolution had as “pragmatic” a consciousness as any patriotic American might have had at the time, wanting, among other things, an eight-hour day, a minimum wage, severance pay in case of dismissal, and better toilet facilities. “The whole thrust of these demands,” Moore sums up, “was to improve working conditions, not to change them… Once again we see that the workers’ idea of a good society…is the present order with its most disagreeable features softened or eliminated.”47

So, first of all, we should give up the remnants of American exceptionalism that seem present in Dubofsky’s paper, and in the “pessimistic” way of thinking about American workers that it represents. The main way in which America has been exceptional is simply in the brutality and aggressiveness of its capitalist class as compared to that of other countries.48 With such an incomparably formidable adversary, it is hardly surprising that organized labor and the Left in the U.S. have frequently fared worse than their counterparts in France, Italy, England, and elsewhere. (Incidentally, like most social historians, Dubofsky plays down this crucial aspect of

46 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 341.
American society in his attempt to explain the failures of the Left in the 1930s, instead invoking “trade-union opportunism, corporate co-optation…New Deal liberalism,” and “the inability of most workers and their leaders to conceive of an alternative to the values of marketplace capitalism.”49

But secondly, whatever left-wing intellectuals have thought about the ideological unsophistication or lack of class consciousness of the masses, the fact is that the skeptical attitude most Americans displayed toward Communism and “revolution” in the 1930s was in many ways more sensible, rational, and healthy than the ideological fanaticism—or, in more positive language, “theoretical consistency”—of committed Communists themselves.50 Was the skepticism in part a product of “bourgeois cultural hegemony” and hence “conservatism”? One can make that argument if one wants. But given conditions in Stalinist Russia, and given the prospects for a Communist revolution in the United States, and given the utopian nature of the ideology being proselytized and the frequently intolerant and offensive behavior of the proselytizers, the most natural conclusion is simply that the majority of unemployed and poor Americans were too clear-headed to throw themselves into a nationwide Communist movement (or the attempt to build one). They were hard-headed realists—ironically more so, in certain respects, than the Marxist dreamers who prided themselves on their realism. “Ordinary people” tended to stay close to the material foundation like good Marxists were supposed to, issues of survival, material comfort, achieving concrete gains, eroding the power of the rich (for instance by supporting FDR, as they saw it) without necessarily seeking to overthrow the entire social

50 As it happens, even the most doctrinaire Marxists among them were not theoretically consistent, and did not really understand Marxism or have the type of class consciousness that “sophistication” requires. I establish this in chapters four and six of Worker Cooperatives and Revolution. The fact that even Leninists, who have always prided themselves on their theoretical sophistication, have an essentially incoherent ideology shows what a chimera is the notion of “correct” consciousness as opposed to the consciousness corrupted by bourgeois hegemony and incoherence. There can be no litmus tests in these matters.
order, a goal they understood to be hopeless and deluded. Nor, again, was this true only of the American working class. The reason that the ideal of workers everywhere has usually been “the present order with its most disagreeable features softened or eliminated,” and not the overthrow of this order and creation of a new one, is that most people have a healthy common sense and a suspicion of utopian nostrums. Not that they are too indoctrinated by mainstream culture to think clearly.

This is not to say, however, that people are without ideology, nor that in their own ways they cannot be quite extreme left-wing radicals. The political program of an astonishingly broad swath of the American populace in the 1930s would, if enacted, have constituted in effect a revolution without a revolution. Upton Sinclair’s End Poverty in California campaign, Huey Long’s Share Our Wealth program, Charles Coughlin’s overwhelmingly left-wing radio broadcasts in 1934 and 1935 (“Capitalism is doomed and not worth trying to save”), and the immensely popular Lundeen Bill, introduced in Congress in 1934 and 1935 in opposition to the more conservative Social Security Act, all amounted to full-on class war against the rich. But also in more subtle ways—as I show throughout this study—the unemployed in Chicago had a rather mature understanding of class conflict, if typically an understanding that incorporated attitudes of political cynicism and resignation to the largely individualized (or at least family-centered) nature of survival in urban America. Such attitudes were thoroughly rational and realistic; nevertheless, I particularly try to highlight the ways in which people overcame their isolation and built community even on the basis of “atomizing” unemployment.

In a longer study I might have included a chapter that generalizes beyond the Great Depression to argue that the large majority of people have a primarily left-wing, in some ways even anarchist and Marxist, ideological framework (though of course one full of inconsistencies

---

and lacunae). This is not a difficult argument to make. For instance, one can use polls to show that the American public has social democratic values. Even in the 1980s, when conservatism was ascendant in politics and elite culture, the public remained broadly left-wing. On environmental regulation, a major poll in 1983 found that 58 percent of people supported the radical proposition that “protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of cost.” Another 1983 poll found that 74 percent supported a jobs program for the unemployed even if it meant increasing the size of the federal deficit. In 1986, 66 percent of the public thought that “government should spend money now on efforts similar to those of the Great Society programs to help the poor people.” Large majorities supported keeping regulations on industrial safety, offshore oil drilling, auto emission and safety standards, and the teenage minimum wage. In 1979, 79 percent of the public thought there was too much power concentrated in the hands of a few large companies for the good of the nation. More recently, a Pew Research Center poll in 2015 found that, while only 27 percent of Americans are bothered “a lot” by the amount they pay in taxes, 61 percent are bothered a lot by the feeling that the wealthy do not pay their fair share. Eighty-four percent thought money has too much influence in political campaigns. In early 2015, 75 percent of Americans supported raising the federal minimum wage to $12.50 by 2020 (and 63 percent wanted it raised to $15). A year later, 58 percent supported replacing the Affordable Care Act with a federally funded healthcare program providing insurance for all Americans, and 59 percent of likely 2016 voters supported the radical idea of expanding Social Security to Americans of all ages “so that everyone has a guaranteed minimum income.” By and large, it seems that most people are far more leftist than the business, political, and intellectual elite.\(^{52}\)

\(^{52}\) Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American*
Instead of exploring these matters, however, I confine myself to elaborating on Robert McElvaine’s argument that the 1930s saw a shift leftward in the values and practices of the American people, a shift towards community, cooperation, and generosity. I also accept Lizabeth Cohen’s argument that the Depression caused workers and the unemployed to turn from welfare capitalists, local charities, and ethnic associations to unions and the federal government as guarantors of economic security. Where I go further than she is to argue (in chapter six) that this shift in attitude is another indication that, despite their demoralizing experiences, the unemployed tended to be far from apathetic and apolitical, that in fact it was common for them to have a more sensible and realistic politics than many of the Communists who tried to organize them. They knew that the world is not a just place, that it was hopeless to try to create a workers’ government or to construct a classless utopia. In their own way they were fighting against a bourgeois ideological hegemony by insisting, through protest marches and letters to politicians (among other means), that the government must radically intervene in the economy to curb the excesses of capitalism. Ordinary people decisively rejected the old ideology of “limited government” and paved the way for the New Deal. (As we’ll see, most wanted a much more radical version of the New Deal.)

I should note, though it is probably already evident, that in this dissertation I somewhat reconceptualize the idea of class struggle, broadening it in several ways. Above I equated the term to “the structure and functioning of economic institutions,” by which I meant the objective

---

antagonism of interests between capitalist and worker. This “objectivist” understanding of the concept, while implicit in Marx’s writings, amounts to an appropriation of Ste. Croix’s use of it in his magnificent 1981 study of the ancient Greek world quoted earlier. Ste. Croix points out that class struggle need not involve collective action or activity on a political plane, and it need not even be accompanied by “class consciousness” or an awareness of “struggle” at all. But furthermore, on the basis of this understanding I extend the notion even further and treat the efforts of the poor and the unemployed to survive in a hostile world as themselves a manifestation of class struggle, and as being implicitly political. For—to be somewhat glib—they certainly involved struggles against authorities and their (class-based) prioritization of “fiscal austerity” (to use an anachronistic term), and they grew out of class. Working-class efforts to survive, and to resist, were and are essential products of exploitative class dynamics. They also frequently involved collective solidarity, the solidarity of the poor with the poor. In contexts of severe deprivation, the mere fact of surviving can be a type of resistance to dominant social structures, a way of asserting oneself against realities of class and power that are, in effect, organized to crush one under the boot of the ruling class or even, in some cases, to erase one’s existence. For most people, fighting daily for the survival of their family and collectively fighting employers or relief authorities or pro-business political policies are not sharply separated activities, the latter belonging to “class struggle” and the former not. Such distinctions are artificial and arbitrary, mere intellectual contrivances. The whole existence of the poor tends to incorporate a kind of generalized and diffuse class struggle and class consciousness—perhaps not a theoretically sophisticated consciousness, but a realistic one.

I’ll elaborate on these arguments in later chapters, when I discuss the “class consciousness” of particular (types of) actors. It may be noted here, however, that such ideas

recall James C. Scott’s arguments in (among other writings) his 1989 paper “Everyday Forms of Resistance,” where under the broad category of the paper’s title he lists acts such as “foot-dragging, dissimulations, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion, pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder, [and] anonymous threats.” “These techniques,” he observes, “for the most part quite prosaic, are the ordinary means of class struggle.”\textsuperscript{54} Against the charge that he makes the concept of class resistance overly inclusive, Scott marshals a number of arguments, for instance that when such activities are sufficiently generalized to become a \textit{pattern} of resistance, their relevance to class conflict is clear. (As we’ll see, activities like pilfering, dissimulation to relief authorities, false compliance with unreasonable conditions for receiving relief, and anonymous threats against state legislatures, not to mention collective protests, were indeed generalized patterns of resistance among the Depression’s unemployed.) We might paraphrase Scott’s definition as follows: lower-class resistance is any act by a member of a given class that is intended either to mitigate or to deny claims made on that class by superordinate classes or to advance its own claims (e.g., to work, land, charity, or respect) \textit{vis-à-vis} these superordinate classes. Even when workers shirk on the job or when the poor try by any means to obtain resources for themselves, class resistance to dominant institutions and inegalitarian value-systems is occurring.

The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter one I provide a brief overview of the Great Depression and its effects on Chicago, and then, at the end, summarize again some of the main arguments I’ll make in later chapters. The second chapter is different from the others in saying nothing about the \textit{agency} of the unemployed, consisting instead of a litany of the woes they had to endure. While not much is said explicitly about the machinations of Chicago’s political and business elite, most of what is discussed serves as an implicit critique of the class

priorities of this elite that was happy to sacrifice the well-being of hundreds of thousands on the altar of “lower costs.” The reader may notice parallels between the political agenda of “economy” during the Depression and the agenda of “austerity” in our own day.

In the third chapter I explore some of the dimensions of people’s active ness, specifically the ways in which they coped physically and emotionally with the tragedies that had befallen them. Having been virtually outcast from many of society’s dominant institutions, the unemployed had to reconstruct their lives even in the midst of their collapse. In most cases this would not have been possible if the poor had not been munificent in giving aid to one another—a feature of Depression life that has still not been exhaustively analyzed. Indeed, David Graeber is surely right that the disciplines of anthropology and history could do more than they have to illuminate the myriad dimensions of “everyday communism” that have always formed the bedrock of society. Ideological blinders have prevented us from studying, even from seeing, the deep-rooted modes of cooperation and generosity that not only make society possible but, as I have argued, frequently amount to powerful forms of class solidarity. In addition, I examine the many ways in which the impoverished unemployed constructed their own modes of recreation, from sports to gambling to dancing. General studies of life in the Depression, such as David E. Kyvig’s Daily Life in the United States, 1920–1940 (2004), James R. McGovern’s And a Time for Hope: Americans in the Great Depression (2000), and Robert McElvaine’s The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941 (1984), broadly describe the forms of recreation and popular culture that Americans indulged in during these years, but they do not focus on people without work, nor on a particular location (Chicago, in this case). A local study permits greater depth.

The fourth chapter is devoted to “the unattached,” who often had to live in flophouses or public shelters because they could not afford their own rooms. Not until late 1935 did the relief
administration provide outdoor relief, or home relief, for most of the unattached, and even then thousands still used the free shelters that remained open or the cheap flophouses in the Hobohemian district. I describe in detail the miserable conditions in which “shelter men” lived, the conditions that amounted to a form of class war calculated to humiliate and degrade the poor. (Whether policymakers and administrators had intentions of class war in mind is beside the point; the institutions they served functioned so as to beat down the poor, as this study bears out.) Shelter clients tended to be well aware of class structures and of the conflict between rich and poor that determined U.S. politics. They even organized to press for changes in shelter administration. Thus, I focus on what shelter men thought of their situation, and on how they coped with being the objects of a cruel and inhumane policy.

In the following chapter I discuss three types of institutions that had an impact on the unemployed: governments, unions, and churches. With regard to the first, I illustrate what a low priority the well-being of the poor was to the Chicago and Illinois governments by recounting the dreary story of relief financing from 1930 to 1941, which is to say the story of how the elites of the business and political worlds singularly failed to provide for the millions of Illinoisans thrown out of work. As a wealthy state that periodically even had budget surpluses, Illinois certainly could have afforded to be more munificent than it was in the funds it diverted to relief. That it wasn’t testifies to the degree to which class conflict determines politics. Unions and churches, on the other hand, frequently showed striking compassion for, and solidarity with, the unemployed, although their inadequate resources prevented them from being as effective as they might have been. The main reason I include a section on unions is simply that very little scholarship addresses the question of how unions in Chicago engaged with both their out-of-work members and the broader unemployed population. Indeed, little scholarship addresses the
question as it relates to any place in the country, not only Chicago, although James Lorence’s 
aforementioned works on Michigan and Georgia are notable exceptions.

Originally I had intended to include a chapter on outdoor relief, to complement the 
chapter on indoor relief. I wanted to investigate what it was like to be on relief: what the 
procedures were, how they changed over the years, what humiliations had to be suffered, what 
the different types of work relief entailed and what people’s attitudes toward them were, what the 
grievances were of people working on CWA and WPA projects, how individuals (as opposed to 
groups) resisted the injustices they continually experienced, etc. I came to realize, however, that 
such a chapter could be a book in itself. Nor, probably, would the payoff be worth the effort of 
writing it, because so much other scholarship already discusses these issues (though admittedly 
not as a local study of Chicago). Standard general histories of the Depression and the New Deal 
provide answers to the questions I had in mind, and it was unlikely that a monograph on Chicago 
would significantly challenge their interpretations. In any case, I was less interested in relief for 
its own sake than in clients’ responses to it, particularly their resistance, and I already planned to 
devote the last chapter to a consideration of the collective action of the unemployed. So in the 
end I decided it made little sense to write an enormous chapter on home relief, and substituted 
for it the one I have just described, which consists, in effect, of a contrast between the relative 
inhumanity of the dominant political economy and the relative humanity of the subordinate 
political economy of unions and churches. Historians have not sufficiently emphasized the 
degree to which niggardly relief was a political choice rather than an economic necessity.

In the sixth chapter I follow this account of the politics of relief with a discussion of the 
politics and activism of the unemployed. Again, much has been said about this subject in 
 writings by Roy Rosenzweig, Daniel J. Leab, James Lorence, Randi Storch, and Franklin
Folsom, the latter in a popular book called *Impatient Armies of the Poor: The Story of Collective Action of the Unemployed, 1808–1942* (published in 1991). But there is no systematic discussion of the social history in Chicago, and barely a mention of the second half of the 1930s. My main concern, to repeat, is to highlight the realism and the militancy of ordinary people, to undermine the myth of their dominance by mainstream indoctrination. Especially when material comforts fall away and people sense that they are being treated unfairly, radicalization can happen very quickly. The “self-blame” of the unemployed was not such an utterly dominant reaction as many historians have thought. And even when there was self-blame, anger at an unjust society was not infrequently present as well. Such anger helped motivate the radicalism that emerged on local and national scales, a radicalism of both “form”—including widespread occupying of private property, sit-ins at relief stations and legislative chambers, constant demonstrations and hunger marches, collective thefts—and “content,” i.e., the policy goals that, in fact, were in essence revolutionary. In our own time of social crisis, high unemployment (see page 60), and slowly building mass struggles, it is useful to recall how class-conscious and rebellious people were the last time society was at such a fever pitch of polarization.

Throughout the dissertation I try to make distinctions—to the extent that the sources allow—between subcategories of the unemployed, such as ethnicities and income levels. The most obvious distinctions are between African-Americans and whites, especially native whites, because the hardships of blacks were on a more acute plane than those of whites. Not surprisingly, then, blacks were more frequently militant and class-conscious—and of course race-conscious—than whites. Nevertheless, unemployment united as well as divided, in part through efforts of the Communist party to bridge racial divisions.
In short, with this dissertation I’m trying both to fill a few gaps in the historiography and to put forward an interpretation of the unemployed in the 1930s that rescues them from posterity’s condescension. To adopt Marx’s famous dictum, they were not only “made” by their circumstances, by their misfortunes; they also made their own history, and made themselves as they made history. Through personal and collective struggle they refused to let the political economy cast them aside as so many “redundant” pieces of human scrap metal. Their legacy, in fact, is the legacy of class struggle against overwhelming odds.
Chapter I
Overview

In retrospect, it is easy to observe the clouds gathering before the whirlwind was unleashed in 1929–30. In early 1928, the Salvation Army in Chicago had a breadline of from 200 to 600 people every day. “The horde of ’boes and panhandlers infesting the Loop,” one writer complained, “makes New York’s Times Square parasites seem like a coterie of philanthropists in comparison.” A more sympathetic entity, the United Charities, appealed desperately for funds with which to help the unemployed, the many thousands of men in Chicago who had been out of work for months. Eviction notices coming to the attention of the United Charities had, by February 1928, increased from about ten a month to 200 or 300. Job-seekers streamed in from Detroit, from the South, from depressed agricultural areas of the Midwest, exacerbating the problem such that already in the fall of 1927 there were at least 100,000 jobless in Chicago. The following March, the Communist Unemployed Council of Chicago led a demonstration of hundreds around City Hall who carried banners declaring “Our Children Are Hungry” and “200,000 Men Out of Work in Chicago.” Mounted police swung clubs, yanked speakers down from their perches, and arrested leaders, until the gathering was dispersed and the frightened noonday shoppers could resume their business.¹

Unemployment lessened that year as the weather warmed, but it was clear, or should have been, that underneath the glittering façade of this second Gilded Age was a deep economic rot that was affecting millions. In the spring of 1928 the American Federation of Labor estimated

that an average of 18 percent of its membership was unemployed—12 percent in Chicago, 23 percent in New York, 36 percent in Cleveland. And since this elite minority of workers could get help from unions in securing and keeping jobs, the percentage among the unorganized was certainly higher. A study by the National Resources Committee estimated that 12 percent of workers in 1927, 13 percent in 1928, and 10 percent in 1929 were jobless, though many more must have experienced the condition temporarily and even more worked only part-time. Seasonal fluctuations grew more severe in the late twenties, but even in “good times” work was unsteady for perhaps a quarter of the working population. By 1928, intellectuals and social workers around the country, even internationally, had become alarmed at the growing incidence of joblessness and lengthening of its periods for individuals: the Belgian economist Henri de Man, for example, concluded that one of the most marked characteristics of modern industrialism was the rapidly growing class of permanently unemployed, and a Boston conference of the National Federation of Settlements in June 1928 declared that the greatest threat to the contemporary family was unemployment.²

More than a year before the Depression began, one researcher collected hundreds of harrowing case-studies of unemployment in a book, called Some Folks Won’t Work, that became a national bestseller. Typical of them is the following laconic set of notes on an African-American family in Chicago:

---
Painter and decorator. Two children, one married. Son aged nineteen, truck driver, unemployed. Fine couple, hard working and provident. Formerly always able to weather dull seasons with savings. Had been able to pay $2000 down on $5000 house, and had paid off all but $1700 in monthly installments when unemployment struck them… Wife has helped by cooking out and taking care of confinements. Took in boarders. Car laid up. Payments on house and union dues lapsed. Insurance carried by accumulated dividends. Enough money borrowed from friends to save house. Food cut to $4 a week for three people.3

So it went for many millions of people in 1928 and ’29 (and earlier).

Why was the prosperity of the “Roaring Twenties” so fragile and superficial as all this? Why was it to culminate in the greatest depression in the history of capitalism? The main reasons were already understood by liberals and, especially, leftists of the time, years before John Maynard Keynes systematized some of their ideas. Central to them was the growing inadequacy of mass purchasing power in the U.S., in large part a consequence of the sickly state of organized labor.4 Income and wealth inequality, for example, approximated the pathological extremes of our own day, with the top 0.1 percent of families in 1929 receiving as much as the bottom 42 percent. The top 0.5 percent of Americans also owned 32.4 percent of all the net wealth of individuals. Poverty was widespread, 12 million families—more than two in five—having incomes below $1,500, which itself was (according to the Brookings Institution) $500 below the income required to supply basic necessities. Seventy-one percent of families in 1929 earned less

3 Calkins, Some Folks Won’t Work, 44, 45.
4 Trade union membership had by 1929 declined from a wartime peak of 5 million to less than 3.5 million—out of a labor force of 49 million. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in the Great Depression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 25; Bernstein, The Lean Years, 55. (The reader will notice that the latter number equates to the seven percent private-sector membership rate of 2010.)
than $2,500. The weakness in consumer demand implied by such facts as these contrasted ominously with the stunning rise of productivity during the 1920s, manufacturing output per labor-hour leaping 72 percent and output per unit of capital 52 percent. With productive capacity increasing precipitously and aggregate demand much more slowly, capacity utilization was inevitably declining—overcapacity rising, in other words—and markets were becoming saturated by the end of the decade. Sooner or later, out of businesses’ efforts to maintain profits, these trends had to manifest themselves in reduced investment and heightened cost-cutting, which meant, e.g., employee layoffs and wage-reductions, which only reinforced the underlying macroeconomic problem of low demand. A vicious circle thereby developed, in which the capitalist solution to the problem of shrinking markets served to exacerbate the problem. By mid-1929 this process, and the resultant downturn in business activity that would usher in the Depression, was underway.⁵

Communist analyses of the economy in the late twenties were prescient and are of lasting value. They were grounded in the insight that—in Marxian language—“the most basic contradiction of capitalism [is] the contradiction between the growth of productive forces and the lagging behind of the markets.” Out of their compulsion to increase profits lest they be swallowed up by competitors, businesses have to raise labor productivity relentlessly, which is accomplished through technical and organizational innovations that make possible the employing of fewer workers, the deskilling and thus cheapening of the labor-power that remains, the speeding up and intensifying of the work process, successful offensives against labor unions, and other means of reducing costs and increasing output. The dysfunctional consequence of these imperatives is that fewer and fewer people have the money to buy the greater output that is

---

possible, a fact that, as was just mentioned, causes businesses to cut back investment and squeeze workers even \textit{more} in order to maintain profits. (It is at this point, as Keynes and other liberals argued, that the government has to step in to boost demand and so keep capitalism functioning, which, in the context of the Great Depression, it finally did on the necessary scale during and after World War II.)\textsuperscript{6}

The fantastic technological achievements of the 1920s, which included electrification, automotive transport, and mass-production innovations, were therefore partly responsible for the precarious foundations of the economy and the resultant severe depression of the 1930s. “Technological unemployment”—i.e., people’s loss of work due to mechanization and automation—was bemoaned by commentators from the political center to the far left. William Green, head of the AFL, observed in 1929 that in the steel industry seven men could now cast as much pig iron as 60 could before, and one man could as efficiently operate open-hearth furnaces as 42 under old methods. In the machinist industry one unskilled worker could replace 25 skilled ones, while in textiles, 3,000 replaced 5,100. Because of such tremendous productivity advances, manufacturing employment in the twenties not only didn’t noticeably expand but may even have shrunk, as did the labor force in the extractive industries such as agriculture and mining. Work in the white-collar and service sectors, by contrast—which was frequently more insecure, low-paying, and temporary than in manufacturing—expanded 45 percent. This was, however, far from sufficient to absorb industrial workers laid off by mechanization or other causes, as a Brookings Institution study in 1928 concluded. Of 754 workers surveyed who had been laid off in the preceding twelve months, 344 had still not found permanent employment, and the large majority of the total had been out of work for more than a quarter of the year. The temporary

jobs secured by 234 included road building, selling newspapers, clerking in stores on Saturdays, and mowing lawns.\textsuperscript{7}

Exacerbating the problem of finding employment was the huge influx of rural inhabitants into cities. The agricultural depression that had begun in 1921, a result of global overproduction of crops, forced millions off the land—according to some estimates about four million between 1920 and 1929. Again, advances in productivity ironically had deleterious consequences, in that the increased use of trucks and tractors on farms made superfluous a large proportion of the agricultural labor force. These years also witnessed African-Americans’ Great Migration north, which brought tens of thousands more people to Chicago’s overflowing Black Belt, and many more to Detroit, New York, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and other cities. Indeed, it seems that in general it was large cities, not smaller towns, that attracted rural migrants, which of course put extra pressure on the job market, wages (downward), and welfare agencies in these places. More and more, people had to shift from city to city in search of work.\textsuperscript{8}

One of the factors that enabled economic growth to continue for years despite the growing size of this “precariat” (as it would be called today) was the enormous expansion of credit. Buying products in monthly or weekly installments because one could not afford them became a massive practice for the first time ever. By the end of the decade, 60 percent of cars and 80 percent of radios were sold on credit. Neighborhood shopkeepers routinely had to extend credit to their loyal customers, trusting that their bouts of unemployment would be temporary. The superabundance of credit in the U.S. economy (and the Federal Reserve’s easy-money


policy in 1927) also encouraged rampant speculation in the stock market, highly leveraged buying of stocks just to resell them at a higher price, a game that proved so lucrative and became so elaborate in its rules that Wall Street consumed mountains of surplus capital from around the world that could have been more usefully invested in productive enterprises. America’s millions of superfluous workers would have appreciated more factories as opposed to more speculative gambling. But on the scale required that was out of the question, in light of saturated markets and ever-lower rates of return on productive investment. So the gambling continued, the self-feeding confidence bubble expanded…until finally in late 1929 it popped, when the stock market crashed. Colossal amounts of wealth were destroyed, business confidence was shattered, credit contracted, bankruptcies began to spread as profits declined, hundreds of thousands of workers were laid off as investment fell, and the “deflationary spiral” slowly dragged the economy almost to a standstill in early 1933.9

The depression was deepened and lengthened by a remarkable confluence of factors—intra- and inter-national—that are too numerous and involved for us to review in depth here. Unprotected and unregulated corporate and banking structures were highly vulnerable to a stock market collapse and its repercussions in the (curtailed) spending and investment of the wealthy. American businesses’ cutting back of purchases of raw materials from other countries had a devastating impact on their economies and their own ability to serve as foreign markets. The international tariff war set off by the U.S.’s Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 further hampered world trade and discouraged recovery. Outmoded dogmas of noninterference with free markets and the necessity of balanced budgets made things worse throughout the Western world. The political and economic legacies of World War I worsened the depression as well: for example, the

postwar reparations and war debts problems created instability in the international economy, which the U.S. only aggravated when its lending abroad—which during the twenties had boosted foreign economies and their capacity to import American products—declined starting in 1928 (when stock market speculation became more attractive than lending). In addition, the restoration of the international gold standard in the mid-twenties proved quite damaging, by forcing central banks to defend their currency’s gold parity against speculators. This entailed, for instance, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s deflationary policy of raising interest rates in the early thirties, which discouraged investment and deepened the depression. Only after countries had left the gold standard did they have the freedom to cut interest rates and enact expansionary policies. –In short, the Great Depression resulted from (1) certain endemic tendencies of capitalism, notably overproduction and underconsumption; (2) the breakdown of the relatively unregulated and un-Keynesian form of capitalism that had been more appropriate to conditions in the nineteenth than the twentieth century; and (3) a perfect storm of ill-advised policies and unfortunate aftereffects of the world war.10

As already stated, however, things were bad enough even before the Depression began. This was obvious from a Senate committee’s hearings held in the winter of 1928–29 to investigate the causes and possible remedies of unemployment, by then a subject of national concern. Among the committee’s final recommendations were that adequate statistics of unemployment be collected, that government at all levels plan ambitious public works to stabilize employment, that the feasibility of a system of old-age pensions be studied, that the

United States Employment Service be reorganized, and that the federal government coordinate the building of efficient employment exchanges on state and municipal levels. The necessity of a more effective organization of such exchanges, intended to bring together businesses looking for workers and workers looking for a job, was clear from testimony given at the hearings. For example, an industrial relations expert testified that in Pittsburgh he had seen “hundreds, if not thousands, of job-seekers milling around, hour after hour, and day after day, from one factory gate to another, in the utmost of despair and with frequent exclamations against society in general and the Government in particular—yet all the time with other factories hardly a mile away looking for workers!” The hearings thus illuminated both the urgency of the unemployment situation and the chaotic, haphazard nature of the country’s response to it. Nevertheless, it appears that the committee’s findings were almost wholly ignored.\(^\text{11}\)

The year when the economy was to start its downward spiral began fairly auspiciously, though not magnificently. The steel industry was booming in early 1929, with capacity utilization rates of nearly 100 percent in Chicago. Railroads were doing vigorous business, and the retail sector was showing more activity than the previous year. More telling, however, was the sorry state of the construction industry, which, together with automobiles, was one of the two major foundations of American economic growth. Building construction in Chicago for the first six months of the year was 35 percent less than at the same time in 1928, when it hadn’t been stellar. High unemployment rates among Chicago’s 112,000 building workers led to unions’ (unsuccessful) demands for the five-day, forty-hour week, which they expected would make jobs available to a greater number of workers than had them at present. By August the nation’s biggest industries, motor vehicles and iron and steel, were scheduling cutbacks in output, since in

their earlier optimism they had acquired larger inventories than they could now dispose of. Because of numerous forward and backward linkages, these cutbacks tended to shrink the country’s economic activity as a whole, a process that fed on itself until, after the stock market crash, the situation grew dire in the winter. In fact, already in the spring of 1929 the family welfare societies in industrial cities were staggering under an increasing load of unemployment relief. “Not in years,” reported one administrator, “have charitable organizations been so burdened with the care of needy families in their own homes.” By the following spring things were far worse.¹²

Unfortunately, statistics on unemployment of the time are so unreliable that, even after decades of scholarship on the subject, all we can give are educated guesses. Sifting through the many estimates that have been proposed since the 1920s makes for an intolerable degree of confusion. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, which have been accepted by most historians, are as follows. (The numbers are in thousands.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labor Force</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Unemployed rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>49,180</td>
<td>47,630</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>49,820</td>
<td>45,480</td>
<td>4,340</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>50,420</td>
<td>42,400</td>
<td>8,020</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>51,000</td>
<td>38,940</td>
<td>12,060</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>51,590</td>
<td>38,760</td>
<td>12,830</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>52,230</td>
<td>40,890</td>
<td>11,340</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Labor Force</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Unemployed rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>52,870</td>
<td>42,260</td>
<td>10,610</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>53,440</td>
<td>44,410</td>
<td>9,030</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>46,300</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>54,610</td>
<td>44,220</td>
<td>10,390</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>55,230</td>
<td>45,750</td>
<td>9,480</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>55,640</td>
<td>47,520</td>
<td>8,120</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>55,910</td>
<td>50,350</td>
<td>5,560</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers seem too low. For one thing, they contrast wildly with estimates by the National Resources Committee in 1937. Some difference between the two is to be expected, since the latter excludes from the labor force “enterprisers, self-employed, and unpaid family workers on farms,” taking account only of people who would ordinarily be paid by someone else. On the other hand, other methodological parameters of the NRC study would tend to understate the number of unemployed; for instance, it was not possible to include all the people who had dropped out of the labor force—or simply didn’t try to enter it—because of discouragement. In any case, the NRC’s unemployment percentages for the years 1929 to 1935 are, respectively, 10, 19, 32, 45, 47, 42, and 41. Indeed, given the massive numbers of women and children who in the 1930s tried and would have liked to obtain employment—because of the primary wage-earner’s difficulty in doing so—but much of the time were unable to, it doesn’t seem outrageous to conclude that fully half of the nation’s (potential) labor force in the 1930s was regularly jobless or worked only a couple days a week.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Weintraub, “Unemployment and Increasing Productivity,” 69, 70.
Historical precedents also cast doubt on the standard estimates of Great Depression unemployment. In 1900, a year of relative prosperity, unemployment affected 22.3 percent of the labor force, with a mean duration of 3.6 months. Between 1908 and 1922, the average jobless rate for unionized workers in Massachusetts was 7.7 percent. Between 1896 and 1926, the jobless rate in manufacturing, transportation, and the building trades was 10.2 percent—12.1 percent from 1920 to 1926. Similarly, Robert and Helen Lynd’s classic *Middletown* revealed that in the “typical” American city of Muncie, Indiana, more than a quarter of a sample of workers had been laid off in the prosperous year of 1923, while during the first three-quarters of 1924—a year of recession—62 percent had at some point been jobless. It is hardly credible, then, that unemployment in 1929 was only 3.2 percent, especially considering that social workers across the country complained about being overwhelmed by demands for relief even in the spring. And if that number is wrong, the others probably are too.14

Franklin Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security, whose numbers are somewhat more reliable, estimated that 15,071,000 people were jobless in March 1933, the worst month for unemployment in U.S. history. Irving Bernstein states that “On the day that Hoover left the presidency, March 4, 1933, one out of every three wage and salary earners in the United States was totally without work and there is no way of knowing what proportion of the others were on part time.” That’s a reasonable statement, although, again, if one includes in the labor force everyone (including women and children) who is looking for a job or would like a job but is too discouraged to seek one, the proportion was surely more like 40 percent than 30. After all, even the Committee on Economic Security arbitrarily excluded certain categories of people from its

calculations: for instance, unemployed professionals were not counted, nor were people leaving school to seek work who had never had a job. If such categories are counted, the National Research League estimated that unemployment rose from 1,250,000 in September 1929 to 17,900,000 in March 1933, and was still as high as 14 million in late 1935. The Labor Research Association calculated that if people on federal work relief were included (because of private industry’s inability to absorb them), there were almost 17 million jobless in late 1935.\footnote{Bernstein, \textit{The Lean Years}, 254, 316, 317; Anne Page, \textit{Employment and Unemployment, 1929 to 1935} (Washington: Office of National Recovery Administration, 1936), 12, 13; Jerome B. Cohen, “The Misuse of Statistics,” \textit{Journal of the American Statistical Association}, vol. 33, no. 204 (Dec., 1938): 664.}

In any event, governments nearly always underestimate unemployment—understandably, because it is not in their interest to publicize poor economic performance. Even in our own day, when statistics are incomparably more reliable than in the 1930s, official unemployment figures are far below what they should be, since they do not include people who want a job but are too discouraged to keep looking, or those who are forced to work only part-time. If one includes these, the real unemployment rate in June 2013, for example, was not 7.6 percent, as the government reported, but (at least) 14.3 percent.\footnote{Dan Diamond, “Why The ‘Real’ Unemployment Rate Is Higher Than You Think,” \textit{Forbes}, July 5, 2013.} Accordingly, we should be skeptical when we read the official numbers on the Depression. Especially given that millions of part-time workers were counted as employed—and the part-time/full-time ratio grew much higher as the crisis deepened—things were worse than the numbers suggest.

Heavy industry was hit hardest in the thirties, and so Chicago, being a center of industry, suffered terribly. During the worst times it practically ceased to function. Its construction industry was utterly devastated: in January 1930, when 38 percent of the AFL’s members in the industry nationwide were unemployed, the percentage in Chicago was 45. By the end of 1932 that figure was 70 percent, and higher for unorganized workers, as shown by the fact that
nationally the total loss of construction jobs between 1929 and 1933 was 82 percent. Only 137 residential units were built in Chicago in 1933, compared to 43,000 in 1926; in the entire period between 1931 and 1938, only 8,000 units were built. Thus, the housing market simply collapsed. The concomitant collapse of the nation’s automobile production slashed the demand for steel and many other products of light and heavy industry, such that by December 1932, Chicago manufacturing as a whole had an employment level half that of the monthly average between 1925 and 1927. Indeed, a year earlier, in October 1931, already 624,000 Chicagoans were out of work—an astounding 40 percent of the labor force, making Chicago’s plight far more severe even than New York City’s.17

Illinois was savaged by the Depression, more so than most states. Out of a total of 3,185,00 gainful workers, the number of unemployed rose from about 300,000 in the spring of 1930 to more than 1,500,000 in January 1933. Only Michigan and a few other states had this official rate of approximately 50 percent unemployment. Aside from some ravaged mining areas downstate, nowhere were things worse than in Chicago, which in January 1933 had probably over 850,000 jobless out of 1,560,000 gainful workers. Perhaps a third of the others—throughout the state and the country, in fact—worked only part-time. Payrolls plummeted even more steeply than employment because of both this use of part-time labor and drastic reductions in wage-rates. Admittedly, not all industries were equally affected: in Illinois, among the ones that suffered least were food, chemicals, and textiles; printing, public utilities, clothing, and trade (wholesale and retail) were harmed more, and metals, machinery, and wood products had the sharpest

declines in payrolls and employment. Nevertheless, the unfolding cataclysm touched everyone, and destroyed many.\textsuperscript{18}

The differential impact on various categories of people illustrates the raging social and economic inequalities of the time. In Chicago, while African-Americans were about 7 percent of the population in 1932, they constituted over 20 percent of the unemployed. In many cases they were laid off specifically just so whites could be hired. In the bleakest months of the Depression, the Black Belt was a cauldron of misery, poverty, and despair, with unemployment approaching 90 percent in some sections. Bank failures were more widespread and devastating there than elsewhere in the city, causing the already tiny black middle class to further shrink. Nor was the situation helped by the fact that 40,000 more blacks entered the city during the thirties, fleeing the collapse of the southern cotton economy and rampant discrimination in the administering of relief. For most of them, not even the traditional low-status, low-paid jobs of servant work and manual labor were available. In 1935 almost half of black domestic servants, a third of semi-skilled workers, and at least a fourth of the unskilled were still without jobs. Indeed, even in 1940, when the country was benefiting from the war boom, 26 percent of black men above 14 years of age were seeking work while being supported by local relief or the WPA, or simply the generosity of friends and neighbors. Only the U.S’s entry into World War II would finally banish, for a time, the chronic unemployment and underemployment Chicago’s blacks had endured not merely since 1929 but in fact since they first made the trek up north years earlier.\textsuperscript{19}


African-Americans were far from the only disadvantaged minority in Chicago, though they were the worst off. The foreign-born, who made up a third of Chicago’s population, were likewise in dire condition. As elsewhere in the country, the fact that immigrant workers were disproportionately uneducated and unskilled, not to mention frequently untutored in English, made them and their families especially vulnerable in the case of an economic downturn. On average they were already poorer than native whites, and because fewer of them belonged to unions their jobs were more insecure and seasonal. Thus, for example, the large Eastern European community was almost wholly sucked into the economic mire. No systematic and reliable data exist on immigrants in Chicago, but impressionistic accounts from knowledgeable observers paint a grim picture. Out of about 220 Bulgarian families scattered in the city, it was reported around 1935 that only ten were in “comparatively good” condition, the rest—40 of which were on relief—being “miserable.” The larger Yugoslav population—of “well over 60,000”—was similarly scattered in small groups around Chicago, and perhaps as a result seems to have been a little worse off than the Polish and Czechoslovak communities, which were more tightly knit. Nevertheless, the majority of wage-earners in the latter communities as well remained out of work for long periods, so that their wives and children had to take whatever part-time jobs they could find. The number of Lithuanian stores, factories, and workshops in Chicago fell by half during the Depression, and the Lithuanian Alliance of America was forced to evict countrymen who had defaulted on their mortgages. Many of the Poles, Lithuanians, Slovaks, and Mexicans who worked in the meatpacking industry—and so usually lived in the smelly, noisy, filthy Back-of-the-Yards neighborhood—were not immediately affected by the downturn in 1930, because meatpacking did not collapse to the degree that steel and the agricultural equipment industry did. Consumer demand for meat remained more stable throughout the thirties
than industrial demand for capital goods. However, underemployment quickly became a major problem for these packinghouse workers, as companies adopted “share-the-work” plans—called “share-the-misery” plans by their employees—that entailed reduced hours and extended layoffs.20

Mexicans were treated even worse by the Depression than other immigrant groups were. In 1930 there were 20,000 of them in Chicago, concentrated in three neighborhoods: Back of the Yards, the Near West Side, and the smokestack-filled South Chicago. By 1940, due to voluntary and coerced repatriation, 20 percent had returned to Mexico. No other immigrant group in Chicago had a higher rate of unemployment than Mexicans, but in addition they had to deal with the evil of aggressive nativism. Conservative organizations like the American Legion and the Immigrant Protective League negotiated cheap train fares to Texas in order to facilitate removal of Mexicans, and everyday incidents of discrimination increased as Americans blamed Mexicans for “taking our jobs.” For instance, when a family applied for relief, the caseworker assigned to them was apt to discuss how much happier they would be in their own country; and landlords sometimes resorted to removing the doors and windows of apartments with Mexican tenants in order to encourage them to move without having to pay for a court notice. Given the enormity of their plight, what is surprising, perhaps, is only that more Mexicans during the thirties didn’t voluntarily leave Chicago behind.21

Other “disadvantaged” groups in the city and country included women, the very young, and those older than about 50. Unemployment was least common between the ages of 25 and 45, though even for these people it was regularly above 15 or 20 percent during the Depression decade. The unemployment rate for women, on the other hand, was often less than for men, in part because much fewer women were in the labor force—about a quarter of them on the eve of the Depression, constituting 22 percent of workers nationwide—but also because they could more easily get part-time and seasonal jobs. Moreover, the industries in which they typically worked were not so devastated as “masculine” industries like metals and machinery. Thus, in early 1931 24 percent of Chicago’s working women were jobless, a lower number than for men, which after 1933 got even lower (at times) as the domestic service and clerical occupations partially recovered. Needless to say, there was a discrepancy between the races: 20.4 percent jobless for native white females (in early 1931) versus 58.5 percent for blacks—although, interestingly, only 15.5 percent for foreign-born white women.  

Qualitative accounts of the early Depression in Chicago are scattered throughout the secondary literature, but they bear repeating in our own age of historical amnesia and threatened economic and social collapse. Briefly, between 1930 and 1933 a near-apocalypse occurred in Chicago and comparable industrial cities. In later chapters we’ll discuss in detail the city’s total incapacity to meet the crisis, in part a consequence of endemic fiscal woes and long delays in tax collection, but even anecdotal testimonies give a sense of the calamity. By late 1930 even the mainstream press, which for months had denied or downplayed the misery epidemic (and would

---

in fact continue to do so), was admitting that hundreds of women, mostly between 50 and 70 years old, were sleeping on park benches, under bushes, in doorways and hallways. Having lost their livelihood, they had been evicted by landlords and were forced to wander the city desperate for a meal and some shelter, eating out of garbage cans behind restaurants. Thousands of men were sleeping in parks on the lakefront or on the cold concrete underneath Wacker Drive. Too poor to pay 15 cents for a bed in a flophouse, they clustered together beneath the highway by the hundreds and built small fires with bits of broken wood picked up on vacant lots. As one observer picturesquely remarked,

Many of these men are hungry; those who have food share it with their friends under the rule of the road. As they huddle by their feeble fires, or sit, coat collar turned up and cap pulled low, staring at the blackness which is the river, there is a steady, quiet hum from overhead, where the automobiles skim smoothly along, carrying well fed men and women from one busy moment to another in their prosperous lives. Wealth on the upper level, hunger and misery below.\(^{24}\)

As has been amply related in historical scholarship, “Hoovervilles” sprang up in cities all over the country. In Chicago, one of them even sprouted in the city’s front yard, in and around Grant Park. It elected its own “mayor”—a disabled former railroad brakeman and miner—and had its Prosperity Road, Easy Street, and Hard Times Avenue. “Building construction may be at a standstill elsewhere,” the mayor remarked, “but here everything is booming… Ours is a communistic government. We pool our interests and when the commissary shows signs of depletion, we appoint a committee to see what leavings the hotels have.” Notwithstanding the

\(^{24}\) *Daily Worker*, October 30, 1930; Bruce Bliven, “No Money, No Work,” *New Republic*, November 10, 1930.
prime real estate around Grant Park, it was more common to find Hoovervilles in garbage dumps. In 1932, for example, “every single place where food remains were dumped” was an attraction for the city’s starving thousands.

In one case, in the midst of the most overpowering odor, where an ugly cloud of flies constantly buzzed over the grounds, more than 300 men made their “homes.” Here they lived, some of them in ramshackle huts, most of them in the fire-boxes of an abandoned kiln, part of which had collapsed and the other standing sections threatening to at any moment. For clothing they had the overalls and shoes which other people had cast off as worthless and which they had picked up. For water they walked a quarter of a mile to a railroad tank. For security they had definite knowledge of at least three deaths from garbage-eating at that one dump.25

In many cases people frequented garbage dumps without living there, waiting around all day for a fresh truckload, searching for food that they could take home to feed their families. More commonly used, however, were the accepted institutional means of assuaging hunger and homelessness, such as breadlines and shelters (including unsupervised private “flophouses”). The city bristled with breadlines at charities, churches, and shelters, by late 1930 at least 16 of them that each had from 500 to 3,000 men a day, shuffling along silently to get a bowl of “slop” or a two-day-old piece of bread. Even after the peak of the Depression had passed, twenty thousand homeless men were still regularly living in the twenty public shelters that Chicago provided. The buildings used for these shelters were schools, warehouses, abandoned factories, even the old county jail, all typically located in dilapidated areas of the city near the central business district.

25 New York Times, November 12, 1930; New Frontier, February 8, 1933.
As regards this glitzy business district—the Loop—the Depression half-emptied it out, as it emptied out houses and factories all over the city. Most of the Loop’s office-floor space and many of its stores were unoccupied in 1933, such that Chicago’s elite grew anxious lest the city present an unflattering façade to the millions of international visitors congregating for the “Century of Progress” world’s fair. The mayor had a clever solution to this problem: he called on property-owners and tenants to dress up vacant windows with either merchandise or exhibits of some sort, and to keep the windows lighted until at least 2 a.m. every night. It is unknown whether many tenants, who were not without problems of their own, heeded his plea.26

It is hard to imagine in the twenty-first century what the city must have been like and looked like in those dreary years of the early Depression, and later in the decade too. In newspapers one reads of groups of hundreds of homeless being driven in the freezing October night air to sleep in free shelters that quickly became overcrowded, such that hundreds had to curl up on the cold floor. Others were turned away and, shivering, trudged on, finally finding shelter in police stations and other public buildings, where sometimes they were served coffee and sandwiches by the staff and housewives who had come to help. In the winter of 1930–31, the state-funded shelters that had been established (as opposed to the private ones) served an average of 13,400 meals a day and lodged 4,000 men. So ubiquitous were breadlines, panhandlers, and “professional beggars” already in early 1931 that civic and business groups in the North Loop started a campaign to rid Michigan Avenue of them. “It is getting so that a person can hardly walk a block without being approached for money,” one man complained, going on to blame the public’s “mistaken ideas of charity” for the proliferation of beggars. (Giving them money only

encouraged them, he argued.) The campaign had considerable success: within a couple months all the breadlines on the north side had closed.27

In general, though, things only got worse as the years passed. More and more buildings had to be used to house men and women who were being evicted by the thousands every month; nor did it help that Chicago became a Mecca for many thousands of “transients” from all over the country, who valued it for its breadlines and free beds. Indeed, many of these people seemed to have a more cheerful attitude than unemployed Chicagoans did. As one (immigrant) said, “They feed you at the old county jail… If you got a dime you get meals, soup, bread, coffee, and a spring bed, for a week. If you got no dime, they feed you anyway, but you sleep on the floor.” The fact that life was not always miserable for the “hobo” is clear from the following description of the transient community that emerged in Grant Park and elsewhere in the city:

[The immigrant’s] neighbor was shaving himself at the fountain, using a one-inch pocket mirror and a safety razor… There were about 600 men in Grant Park, some making their toilets, putting out their laundry to dry, or patching their clothes. Most of them, however, were stretched out in the autumn sun waiting for the breadlines to form and apparently oblivious to the hazards of the coming winter.

…“Don’t worry about finding plenty to eat in this town, buddy,” [one man] said. “If you get tired of the garbage they hand you in these breadlines you can go out and hit the housewives up for a meal once in a while. That’s what I do. The police are very good about it.”

27 Chicago Tribune, October 21, 1930; March 5 and 15, February 22, November 24, 1931; December 24, 1932.
Of more than a hundred men questioned, at least 50 percent were either residents of other cities or small towns, where charity is limited, or homeless drifters who make Chicago their winter headquarters.

Most of the out-of-towners seemed carefree and confident of a winter that’s “at least better than working.” There were, on the other hand, many hard luck stories from Chicagoans.28

We’ll explore some of those stories in the following chapters, as well as conditions inside the shelters. One of the major factors influencing both of these things was the set of relief policies by the city and the state. While transients may not always have known it or been personally troubled by it, there was in fact an almost continuous relief crisis in Chicago during the early thirties—and after 1935 too, when the federal government withdrew from “this business of relief,” as Roosevelt disdainfully called it. In this respect, Chicago was little different from most industrial cities in the country, and most towns and rural communities. The only difference, perhaps, was in the severity—and the massive human repercussions—of its financial crisis. Of all cities in the country, it was surely the one least prepared for the Depression, because of its chaotic finances, delayed tax collection due to legal controversies, and absurdly high rates of tax delinquency among the wealthy. In June 1930, for example, there was a tax payment backlog of 20 percent for 1928, 40 percent for 1929, and 50 percent for 1930, causing the city to be on the verge of bankruptcy. It could not even afford to pay its employees, much less offer adequate relief to the poor; schoolteachers, firemen, policemen, and others went unpaid for months at a time—at one point (in 1932 and ’33) more than eight months, for teachers. A disproportionate burden of relief, therefore, fell on private organizations like United Charities, Catholic Charities, the Salvation

28 Chicago Tribune, October 1, 1931.
Army, the American Red Cross, and the Jewish Social Service Bureau. They were overwhelmed.  

It may be useful here to give a brief, anticipatory overview of the contours of relief in Chicago throughout the decade. As industry after industry collapsed in 1930 and ’31, the relief needs of hundreds of thousands of applicants became so unmanageable by the city and county that the state had to step in in manifold ways; in particular, in early 1932 it created the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission (IERC) to oversee the finances and administration of relief. Soon even this agency, not having enough money at its disposal, proved inadequate to the task, so Mayor Cermak of Chicago desperately appealed to the federal government, panicking lest social unrest reduce his city to chaos. “It would be cheaper,” he pointedly remarked, for Congress “to provide a loan of $152,000,000 to the City of Chicago, than to pay for the services of Federal troops at a future date.” Chicago did not get nearly that much money, but by the spring of 1933 it and Illinois had received about $55 million from the federal government’s Reconstruction Finance Corporation, more than any other state. It was very far from sufficient: thousands of state residents were near starvation and thousands more would experience that condition in the following years, despite the various state taxes (regressive sales taxes) and bond issues that were passed to pay for relief. The federal government, too, renewed its commitment to alleviating states’ distress in May 1933, when, under the Roosevelt administration, it formed the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) to give grants and establish uniform national regulations for the administration of relief. The IERC estimated that in October 1933 402,000

Chicagoans (and 866,000 Illinoisans), or 11.9 percent of the city’s population, were receiving relief of some kind. Many more needed it but, voluntarily or involuntarily, did not get it.\textsuperscript{30}

Fearing another winter of unbearable suffering and civic unrest, the federal government created the Civil Works Administration in November 1933. Not exactly a work relief program because it did not require that the people hired be on relief rolls, it nonetheless gave jobs to over 4 million unemployed men and women until it was phased out (despite its great popularity) in the spring. It was so successful that it inspired, in 1935, the even grander Works Progress Administration, which continued until 1943. Over 100,000 people in Cook County, and 225,000 in Illinois, found employment with the CWA, which not only lessened the burden on relief agencies but also injected some much-needed purchasing power into the economy. Until the end of 1935, FERA continued to subsidize and help administer both direct relief (i.e., the provision of cash or, more often, grocery orders directly to “clients”) and work relief, thus preventing the system from sinking into sustained crisis—although for the inundated caseworkers who each attended to one or two hundred families on relief, it must have seemed like it was always on the verge of doing so.\textsuperscript{31}

The years after 1935 were characterized by great success and dismal failure, in fact tragedy on an epic scale. The Works Progress Administration has been justly celebrated for its many concrete achievements, including taking a total of 8.5 million people off the relief rolls and putting them to productive work. On the other hand, its successes disguised great failures. The unemployed population on relief had been divided into two categories: the employable and the unemployable, i.e., the elderly, the disabled, and the orphaned. Only the employable were to be


hired by the WPA, the others being forced to turn to state and local public assistance agencies for whatever help they saw fit to give. This was not a great change from the situation before the New Deal, when such “deserving” poor had traditionally been cared for—inadequately—by their communities. With the early New Deal many of them, like the able-bodied unemployed, had received federal emergency relief; but this ended in 1935, when the WPA was created, FERA was dissolved, and the federal government withdrew from administering and providing grants for direct relief. Once the provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 were implemented, the situation of some of these unemployables did improve, since federal grants were now given to states in order to assist the aged, the blind, orphaned and disabled children, and poor single (mostly white) mothers. (Federal benefits were also given directly to some people over 65 years of age who fulfilled certain conditions—which was the aspect of the law that came to be known colloquially as “Social Security.”) Aside from the “Social Security” program, though, each state was allowed to give whatever level of assistance it desired: for example, in December 1939 Arkansas gave $8.10 every month to families with dependent children, whereas Massachusetts gave $61.07. So, depending on where one lived—and what race one belonged to—one was given either miserly or munificent grants by the state. Moreover, several categories of people were exempt from the old-age benefits program, including domestic workers, agricultural laborers, casual workers, and public employees.

Arguably, however, the greater tragedy than the federal government’s semi-neglect of “unemployables”32 was what happened to the able-bodied unemployed who were not hired by the WPA (or PWA or CCC): they, too, were left to the mercy of states and localities. The Roosevelt administration simply washed its hands of them. Nor were they a negligible minority:

32 Many of whom, such as the malnourished, those who suffered from nervous strain, and others whose ailments were temporary and had been caused largely by the Depression itself, were quite employable.
even at its peak, the WPA left millions of employable people on the local relief rolls, being unable to hire them because of its insufficient budgets. All these people, in addition to the many millions of able-bodied unemployed who were not on relief at all, were consigned to a hell somewhat reminiscent of that they had endured from 1930 to 1933, before the federal government had stepped in to fund the large majority of relief nationwide. It is true that the Social Security Act contained provisions for unemployment insurance; unfortunately, just as much discretion was left to the states as in the case of grants to “unemployables.” Each state could determine how much compensation to give and whom to give it to, with the consequence that large numbers of the jobless ended up not being eligible for insurance at all. Illinois did not even start giving benefits until mid-1939, and in many cases their inadequacy was such that they had to be supplemented with relief anyway. –In short, after 1935, the unemployed could only hope that the elites of their state and community would help them in even remote proportion to their plight—which was impossible, or not desired, in many states and localities that could not handle the financial burden, or chose not to. New Jersey actually resorted simply to issuing licenses to beg.33

Thus, federal oversight of relief was abandoned in the second half of the 1930s, and Illinois, once again, was left to fend for itself—which it did badly. It turned out to be quite incapable of taking care of its unemployed, partly because its industrial economy effectively did not recover until the 1940s. Of course, neither did the country’s economy as a whole. Between 1935 and 1937 business conditions briefly improved, but the upswing was decidedly less pronounced for the middle and lower classes. Some of the best commentary on these matters was

provided by the Labor Research Association, whose work historians have almost wholly ignored because of its left-wing bias. The group’s monthly *Labor Notes* observes, for instance, that labor productivity in manufacturing was, on average, 23 percent higher in 1935 than in 1929, as a result of better machinery and the increasing speed and intensity of work. In part because of such improvements in productivity, but more because of the New Deal’s stimulating effect on economic activity, corporate profits steadily rose from 1935 to early 1937; even Chicago’s steel industry began to recover. With orders from the automotive industry rising, steel’s capacity utilization rose to 80 percent in late 1936, much higher than at any time in the previous five years.\(^{34}\)

It seems, however, that the effects of this business upturn on employment were not quite as wonderful as historians have sometimes thought. If one counts people on federal work relief—WPA, PWA, and CCC—as unemployed, the numbers of the jobless from late 1932 to early 1938 were approximately as follows:\(^{35}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>On federal work relief</th>
<th>Unemp., excluding those on work relief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1932</td>
<td>16,783,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>16,783,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1933</td>
<td>16,138,000</td>
<td>599,000</td>
<td>15,539,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1934</td>
<td>16,824,000</td>
<td>3,007,000</td>
<td>13,817,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1935</td>
<td>16,658,000</td>
<td>2,486,000</td>
<td>14,172,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1936</td>
<td>14,751,000</td>
<td>3,792,000</td>
<td>10,959,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1937</td>
<td>14,825,000</td>
<td>2,223,000</td>
<td>12,602,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1938</td>
<td>16,456,000</td>
<td>3,462,000</td>
<td>12,994,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{34}\) Labor Research Association, *Labor Notes*, vol. 4, no. 12 (December, 1936): 1; *Chicago Tribune*, December 21, 1936.

\(^{35}\) Labor Research Association, *Labor Notes*, vol. 6, nos. 1 and 6 (January and June, 1938).
These numbers also include young workers remaining in school longer than they otherwise would have as a result of the Depression, as well as people moving to farms because of their inability to find jobs. Even if one uses the lower numbers in the right-hand column, the proportion of unemployed never fell below about 20 percent of the labor force in the second half of the decade. Again, probably at least a third of the others worked part-time.

As is well known, the limited recovery of the country’s economy came to a crashing end in late 1937 and 1938, because of the government’s return to fiscal conservatism, the Federal Reserve’s tightening of credit, and the beginning of the Social Security payroll tax in 1937, which took $2 billion out of the pockets of consumers. The stock market plummeted, corporate profits plunged nearly 80 percent, steel production sank to one-fourth of its mid-1937 level, and unemployment rose to about 25 percent (notwithstanding the government’s lower estimates). In desperation, Washington reintroduced deficit spending, for example by expanding the WPA, and eased credit, which restored some measure of economic vitality in 1939. The prescriptions of liberals and leftists were thus strikingly validated, and the ideas of fiscal conservatives apparently refuted. Nevertheless, because the world is ruled not by ideas but by economic interest and power, the agenda of big business and its representatives in Congress quickly came to the fore once again: in late 1939 Roosevelt and Congress rediscovered the virtues of balanced budgets and retrenchment of social spending, and cut appropriations for work relief and other social programs. For instance, a rule was instituted that people who had worked on WPA projects for eighteen consecutive months had to be terminated, which led to the laying off of 775,000 workers. (A survey showed that three months later, 87 percent of them had still not found private employment.) Instead of social spending, Washington rallied around an issue with bipartisan support: the increase of military appropriations, in preparation for possible entry into
the European war. This—and the war itself—was of benefit to the economy, preventing it from sinking again into the doldrums of 1938, but it was of far greater benefit to the corporate sector than to the unemployed or the poor.  

These misérables were now, indeed, no longer “the forgotten men”; they were remembered—but repudiated. Much has been said in historical scholarship about the federal government’s consistently scandalous treatment of sharecroppers, tenant farmers, rural laborers, and domestic workers, but less attention has been devoted to the fate of the long-term jobless as such in the late thirties. In few places, surely, were they worse off than in Chicago or Illinois. Both state and city were wildly irresponsible in caring for the destitute, refusing to provide the necessary finances and administrative apparatus to make possible efficient and effective relief. The relatively successful relief policies and financing between 1933 and 1935, when FERA was in substantial control and periodically came to the rescue of the poor when the state refused to, ended in late 1935, from which point Illinois entered a period of semi-chaos in the provision of relief. Starting in July 1936, the administration of relief was devolved from the IERC to 1,454 local units (towns, cities, and counties) throughout the state, and the state legislature took measures to compel localities, particularly Chicago, to assume a fair share of the financial burden. As one historian observes, the Chicago City Council had been “blatantly negligent” in paying for its own relief needs, and for the remainder of the decade, even when deprived of state

funds, it continued to show little compassion for the poor—except when forced to by the threat of public disorder. The city and state lurched from crisis to crisis, barely managing to scrounge up more money whenever it appeared that thousands would starve to death if something drastic were not done, somehow navigating the muddle of relief agencies and jurisdictions that constituted the state’s welfare system. In July 1938 the IERC regained some supervisory authority over the wasteful and inefficient local relief jurisdictions, but the system remained decentralized, hence subject to periodic crisis and the whims (and frequent inhumanity) of local authorities. Finally in 1943, too late to deal with the emergency of the Depression, some sanity was restored when the Illinois Public Aid Commission—which had succeeded the IERC in 1941—took over administration of Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, and the county welfare departments, thus effectively ending the fiasco of decentralized relief.38

Unfortunately, many human casualties were littered along this tortuous road to sanity. There is no telling how many people needed relief from hunger and poverty, but between July 1936 and July 1938, an average of 500,000 Illinoisans were on the relief rolls each month (not counting those dependent on the WPA, CCC, or NYA (National Youth Administration), or receiving mothers’ aid pensions, Old Age Assistance, or aid for the blind). The corresponding number for Chicago was approximately 217,000. These numbers mean little, though; more important are the conditions in which relief recipients (and others less favored) lived. They were not exactly sumptuous. The Chicago Relief Administration had established that the absolute minimum to sustain a family of five was $59.65 per month; accordingly, this was set as the “100

percent relief budget.”39 As it happened, though, in the later years of the 1930s this minimum budget—or “the 100% skeleton budget,” as a Chicago church committee called it—was rarely granted to relief recipients. Instead, they were expected to survive on anywhere from 65 to 85 percent of it, an expectation that tended to produce a public outcry that occasionally convinced the City Council to appropriate more funds. Even so, the starvation, malnourishment, and many cases of rickets, pellagra, beriberi, and scurvy that proliferated among the Chicago poor led the City Club, a top business group, to denounce the “appalling picture of distress and suffering.” “[Those on relief] would get more if they were prisoners,” the organization said in a report. That is surely no exaggeration, as the following typical description suggests:

William Linneman and his family…have been on relief for about three years and have gone through the usual course of misery most families on relief experience: not enough food, shortage on grocery orders, refusal of special diets when needed, gas shut off—no stove all last winter, poor living quarters, continual fighting for clothing, shoes; always fighting for the bare necessities of life almost always denied them by the relief authorities. This all contributed to and brought about the present condition of Mr. Linneman.

He is suffering from anemia—malnutrition and other diseases. He is 6 feet tall [and] weighs 96 pounds (the weight of a normal child of 12)...40

---

39 The United Charities determined that $81 was necessary for subsistence for the same-sized family that the CRA allowed $44, which made the CRA budget 54 percent of the UC budget. The latter, in turn, was 65 percent of the “health and decency” budget of the U.S. Children’s Bureau.
The authorities were refusing to give him his special doctor-prescribed diet, and they refused the $37 it would have cost for twelve injections that were necessary to save his life. Meanwhile, he was spitting blood. What his ultimate fate was, and whether the authorities finally relented, is unknown. –And this was in 1935, before things had really deteriorated in the late thirties!

The uninterrupted disaster of collective deprivation in Chicago’s “economic basement” from 1929 (indeed earlier) until 1942 was not passively accepted by the deprived. Irving Bernstein was right to call the 1930s “the turbulent years,” but he was wrong to limit that designation to the New Deal period. The first three years of the decade were just as turbulent, just as protest-charged, as the later years, in some respects more so. The Communist Party was by far the most active organizer of unemployed protest, chiefly by means of its thousands of Unemployed Councils all over the country, but other entities played a non-negligible role as well. In Chicago, the Workers Committee on Unemployment, initially organized by members of the Socialist Party, emerged in 1931 as an important rival of (and occasional collaborator with) the Unemployed Councils, helping people resist evictions, publicize relief grievances, pressure government for more generous relief policies, and agitate for passage of radically social-democratic laws at the state and national levels. Together, at their peak in 1932–33 these Communist and Socialist organizations had between 100 and 200 locals in Chicago and tens of thousands of members, with tens of thousands more followers who participated regularly in gigantic demonstrations and eviction “riots.” We’ll observe later the attacks of fear and panic that seized the city’s wealthy when such disorder crested at the trough of the Depression—reactions that were an effective indication of the very real militancy of the poor.

Nationally, while the Socialist Party was much less involved in unemployed organizing than the Chicago Workers Committee was, other institutions proved effective at harnessing
discontent. Around the time of the (remarkably spontaneous) Bonus March to Washington in the summer of 1932, Father Cox’s Jobless-Liberty Party was a serious contender for the allegiance of the cast-off multitudes. The Industrial Workers of the World established Unemployed Unions in industrial centers like Chicago and New York, though the group’s lack of resources prevented it from achieving the success of the Communists. More consequential were the organizations that A. J. Muste was associated with, the Conference for Progressive Labor Action (CPLA) and the later American Workers Party. The many Unemployed Leagues that the CPLA helped found were concentrated in Ohio and Pennsylvania rather than Illinois, with smaller statewide federations in West Virginia, North Carolina, and New Jersey. In addition to all these regional or national organizations were the thousands of smaller bodies around the country, most of them self-constituted by the jobless with no imprimatur of higher-level political parties, that had anywhere from ten to thousands of members or followers and engaged in self-help, protest, neighborhood-wide sharing of resources, organized cooperation, looting, theft, bootlegging (especially of coal), and any other necessary activity not countenanced by the authorities. The nationwide totality of this activity amounted to a society in semi-upheaval.41

In the second half of the thirties some of these groups lost strength and others were born. In particular, the Workers Alliance of America (WA) was formed in March 1935 to bring together all the major unemployed organizations in the country and coordinate their activities. It was judged more efficient to end the fragmentation, competition, and political sectarianism, and in any case this was in the Communist Party’s Popular Front period, so even the Unemployed Councils set aside their differences with the Socialists and Musteites and joined the federation in 1936. The various state Workers Alliances that already existed—the Illinois one had grown out

of the Chicago Workers Committee—and the Unemployed Leagues, Relief Workers Unions, CWA unions, and nonpartisan local and state groups, all united in a grand alliance encompassing 400,000 workers or more. It had many successes, though, arguably, not momentous ones. Relief everywhere remained subpar, WPA wages were generally low, and the federal and state governments later on ignored the protests and pleas of the WA and repeatedly cut funding for relief. Ultimately, after the Communists gained control of the WA in 1939, some organizations split off in disgust to form the unaffiliated Workers Security Federation—and the Illinois Workers Alliance became the Illinois Workers Security Federation. This change, however, did not increase its effectiveness. In the end, both the WA and the WSF petered out ingloriously in 1941.\textsuperscript{42}

Notwithstanding the many tragic defeats that the unemployed movement suffered—no different in this respect, surely, from every other radically democratic movement in history, all of them arrayed in the battlefield against forces possessing incomparably more resources and ruthlessness\textsuperscript{43}—the number and variety of people and institutions it united in struggle are staggering. Not only far-leftists or the poor, but unions, churches, charities, settlement houses, African-American institutions like the Urban League, liberal groups and politicians, and many in the middle class. It was a time of authentic populism, focused not merely on union organizing of industries or African-American rights in the South but \textit{the abolition of economic insecurity itself}, as manifested first and foremost in joblessness. This is indicated, for example, by the remarkable nationwide outpouring of support for the radical Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance


\textsuperscript{43} See Patricia Cayo Sexton, \textit{The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America’s Unique Conservatism}. 

82
Bill introduced in Congress by Representative Ernest Lundeen in 1934 and ’35, largely written by members of the Communist Party, and intended as an alternative to what became the Social Security Act. It provided for unemployment insurance for workers and farmers (regardless of age, sex, race, or political affiliation) that was to be equal to average local wages but no less than $10 per week plus $3 for each dependent; people compelled to work part-time (because of inability to find full-time jobs) were to receive the difference between their earnings and the average local full-time wages; commissions directly elected by members of workers’ and farmers’ organizations were to administer the system; social insurance would be given to the sick and elderly, and maternity benefits would be paid eight weeks before and eight weeks after birth; and the system would be financed by unappropriated funds in the Treasury and by taxes on inheritances, gifts, and individual and corporation incomes above $5,000 a year. It easily rivaled the most social democratic laws ever proposed in Europe. It was endorsed by “more than 2,400 locals [in fact about 3,500], and the regular conventions of five International and six State bodies of the American Federation of Labor; practically every known unemployed organization; thousands of railroad and other independent local and central bodies, fraternal lodges, veterans’, farmers’, Negro, youth, women’s and church groups…[and] municipal and county governmental bodies in seventy cities, towns and counties,” in addition to millions of individual citizens who signed postcards and petitions in support of it. The terror it inspired in the wealthy ensured that it never had much chance of becoming law, but the point is that it united millions of Americans approximately along class lines and across barriers of race, ethnicity, sex, age, occupation, and even political ideology. In itself, however, its popularity was but a spectacular manifestation of the immense movement, the veritable crusade for social and unemployment insurance that swept up millions in effective class struggle.44

For the 1930s in the U.S. were not defined only by dismal economics, wretched poverty, and the whole litany of human degradation sampled in this chapter. At least as importantly, the decade was defined by the “fundamental shift in the values of the American people” that it brought about. The historian Robert McElvaine has explored this shift (in chapter nine of *The Great Depression*), but even in America’s mainstream understanding the Great Depression has been, or was, associated for a long time with the resurgence of anti-capitalist values: sharing, community, solidarity, the rejection of acquisitive individualism, the struggle for a *moral* economy. It was the twentieth century’s great backlash against the driving capitalist forces of greed, privatization, marketization, mass dispossession, property rights over human rights—the backlash that grew out of this economy’s crash into literal and moral bankruptcy. For a time, the advance of privatization was interrupted, even reversed. Thus, far from universally atomizing, mass unemployment also united, drawing people out of isolation to help each other and create shared public spaces. This is the legacy of the 1930s that we would do well to remember in our own precarious economic times, our age of hyper-privatization and -atomization, which has so many parallels with the political economy that precipitated the Great Depression.45

In the following, accordingly, I will focus not only on the dreariness and horrors of Depression life in Chicago, or the failure of policy to ensure compassionate care for the destitute, or the oligarchic structure of Chicago’s political economy that determined policy priorities. More positively, I will examine the shift in popular values and practices that occurred, including the eruption of a well-nigh anarchist—truly anti-authoritarian—populism among the downtrodden and the institutions that came to represent them. The mass rejection of capitalist

---

practices and values was more thoroughgoing and significant than most historians have realized; to suppress it required real discipline on the part of mainstream institutions, notably business, government, the press, and, crucially, the police. I’ll say less about the repression than the anti-capitalism, but the great significance of the former should be clear at certain points, particularly in chapter six. Doubtless the social discontent was most often channeled into relatively “non-revolutionary,” non-Communist outlets, for most Americans had a healthy skepticism of the Communist Party—their rejection of it, as stated earlier, was not merely a symptom of “bourgeois indoctrination,” but grew out of an eminently rational analysis of social and political possibilities in the U.S. Given their correct understanding of the realities of power, the majority of the unemployed were in fact surely less deceived than the radical activists who sought to rouse them into revolution. Still, the degree to which they rejected the prevailing political economy is striking.

It is also an illustration of the shallowness of mainstream indoctrination, and hence the shallowness of the Gramscian or idealistic perspective I discussed in the Introduction. Whatever adherence—always partial and qualified—people may ordinarily exhibit to mainstream culture and ideologies, it tends to break down rather quickly upon a change in material conditions. That is, with a change in material interests comes a change in values and consciousness. With the onset of unemployment, as we’ll see, families that had had a patriarchal structure were apt to abandon prevalent gender norms and become more cooperative and egalitarian (though not always without emotional conflict). People who may have thought American capitalism had some moral legitimacy could easily switch their ideological allegiance over to a left-wing critique of capitalism. Even among people who were in a position to help and were not themselves as badly off as others, it was quite typical to reject what workers in the 1840s had
already denounced as “the new Spirit of the Age…gain wealth, forgetting all but self,” and instead to provide others with money, food, gifts, or lodging, or even to advocate on behalf of the poor for major changes in political and social structures.\textsuperscript{46} Such things highlight the merely “skin-deep” quality of bourgeois cultural norms (indoctrination)—even, to some extent, among bourgeois status groups themselves, for many middle- and upper-class women in Chicago went to great lengths to help the poor in these years.

In short, in the following pages I try to emphasize the \textit{humanity} of humanity, except insofar as structures of class and power reward inhumanity. Unfortunately, however, we must begin with the inhumanity and the suffering, in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{46} Quote from Norman Ware, \textit{The Industrial Worker, 1840–1860: The Reaction of American Industrial Society to the Advance of the Industrial Revolution} (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1924), 25.
Chapter II

Hardship

“Any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich.” So said Plato in the fourth century B.C.; so say many social critics in the twenty-first century A.D. And so was certainly the case in the 1930s, of no city more than of Chicago. At the same time as the Daily News was reporting on high society and high fashion—embroidered dinner frocks, gold mesh peplums, debutantes attending balls dressed in gowns of white chiffon with silver sequins—the Daily Worker was reporting of Chicagoans dropping dead from “pure hunger,” police officers killing black men protesting an eviction, and thousands of children suffering from acute malnutrition and consequent disease. The jobless and the poor were not likely to receive much consideration from a city legendary for its political corruption, its gangsterism, its violence and police brutality, where the wealthy class of bankers and businessmen was largely refusing to pay its taxes in the early 1930s—so much so that in one year, for example, Silas Strawn, head of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a multimillionaire, paid a property tax of only $120, and many other big businessmen paid taxes as low as $20;—a city where, for the sole purpose of preventing a rise in taxes to pay for relief and social services, “a group of bank presidents, department-store heads, and chiefs of manufacturing companies” could openly take control of the government for a brief period in 1932 and force cuts in “extravagant” expenditures. In such a city, it is not surprising that the suffering among the jobless should be “immeasurably worse than in any other section or city” in the country, to quote a contemporary observer. Nor is it surprising that, in light of the blithe disregard of the wealthy, “the real burden of this crisis [should be] borne not by any relief agency, but by the poor sharing
with the poor,” as stated in a 1932 report by the Chicago Workers’ Committee on Unemployment. “Small merchants, landlords, milkmen, school teachers, who have little or nothing themselves, are straining their own resources to the breaking point to help their neighbors, relatives, and friends.” Ironically, such anti-capitalist practices were what enabled the capitalist city to survive the Depression.¹

Before considering the means by which the second city, the city of the poor, tried to keep body and soul together, it is necessary to describe exactly what that city had to endure. Of course it was not a homogeneous entity; it was divided into races, sexes, ethnicities, and occupations. Since this is a study of the unemployed and not exclusively the poor, we’ll also have to consider the experiences of middle-class professionals who temporarily lost their jobs because of the economic downturn. Their physical deprivation was not always as extreme as that of “blue-collar” workers, but mentally their suffering—their frequent loss of status and self-respect, their boredom and frustration with a workless existence—could be even worse.

Chicago’s economy did not fully recover until 1943, one-and-a-half years after the U.S. had entered the Second World War. The cumulative experience of the city’s industrial workers is emblematic, revealing in perhaps exaggerated form trends in the broader economy. From a monthly average of 550,000 employed industrial workers in 1929, the average shrank to 332,000 in 1933 (which disguises great monthly differences in that year), then climbed, painstakingly and with interruptions, up to 540,000 in 1937, after which it fell to 438,000 in 1938, during the “Roosevelt recession.” This number is higher than the 1933 average, but, given that the size of the total labor force had increased in the intervening years, it is still abysmal. Even the 1929

figure was much lower than it would have been in a healthier economy. Finally in 1939 a
cyclical upturn began that, despite some hiccups in 1940, was comparatively resilient, leading
into the economic dynamism of the war years and the steep decline of the relief rolls between
1941 and 1943. In the periods of expansion, culminating in the expansion of the early 1940s,
payrolls tended to grow more dramatically than employment, which indicates that much of the
work being done in stagnant years was on a part-time basis (and often at extra-low wages). All
this goes to show that from 1930 until about 1941, the situation of the average industrial worker,
whether in steel or printing or chemicals or clothing production, was quite precarious, frequently
characterized by long spells of unemployment interrupted by part-time or, mercifully, full-time
work, which at any moment could lapse back into unemployment.2

Even workers in the packing industry, which was somewhat less depressed than most,
were granted no dispensation from the hardships and uncertainties of insecure employment. The
meatpacking “underemployment” problem mentioned in the last chapter persisted, off and on,
through the whole decade. (Indeed, it had by no means been unknown even before the
Depression hit.) As one man recalled, sometimes employees would report for work only to find
the doors locked. “No notice, nothing, just tough luck fellows. That’s the way it was and it
happened more than once. Two weeks, three weeks, sometimes only three days, but you never
knew when and for how long.” With the exception of black workers, who were apt to be laid off
for longer periods of time or simply replaced altogether, work for the 25,000 men and women
employed in Chicago’s stockyards and packinghouses was typically more regular but not much
more secure than for other manufacturing employees. For example, in March 1933, when
Chicago’s manufacturing employment as a whole was at 59 percent of its monthly average

2 Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1939, December 15, 1940, January 18, 1942, March 27 and November 6, 1943,
January 2, 1944.
between 1923 and 1925, it was at 76 percent in meatpacking. During much of 1934 it was significantly higher, but then in 1935 it dropped again, thousands of employees being laid off and thousands more working short hours. Nineteen-thirty-seven was a good year, seeing increased employment and higher wages, but, as in other industries, a severe slump hit in 1938 and 1939. And in the midst of all these larger fluctuations was the week-by-week and month-by-month uncertainty of work in a stagnant economy—and a seasonal industry.3

The plight of African-American workers, however, made that of whites seem enviable. The increased willingness of whites during the Depression to take unskilled jobs in the wretched meatpacking industry, because of inability to get better jobs elsewhere, led to a substantial loss of black labor in the one industry where, proportionately, it had been significantly overrepresented. The percentage of black packinghouse (and stockyards) workers in Chicago fell from over 30 in 1930 to less than 20 in 1940. But this sharp decline was not confined to meatpacking or even manufacturing: in every sector of the economy, the loss of black labor in the 1930s was much more pronounced than the loss of white labor—five times more pronounced in the case of professional and managerial work. Racist discrimination was so extreme that in years of economic expansion, when the mainstream press was full of employers’ complaints about a dearth of skilled labor, some of these same employers refused to hire skilled black craftsmen. And some trade unions with a monopoly over a particular occupation still, into the 1940s, refused to admit African-Americans as members. Largely because of such endemic racism, black women—who had a much higher labor force participation rate than white women (38 percent compared to 24 percent, in 1940)—continued through the 1930s to have better chances of finding a job than black men, since domestic work was more open to them. This

alone, however, could not keep families afloat. Approximately five out of ten black families in Chicago remained dependent on some type of government aid in 1940; and of people receiving direct relief the following year, 41 percent were black. “Between 1935 and 1940,” the authors of the classic *Black Metropolis* sum up, “the Negro proletariat seemed doomed to become a lumpen-proletariat.”

One way to gain insight into the characteristics of the unemployed, in terms of their industry, occupation, and duration of unemployment, is to extrapolate from data on relief recipients. In Chicago their number was never even close to the total employable jobless, but the data on them are at least suggestive. In particular, a study that the federal government conducted in May 1934 of workers on relief in 79 cities, including Chicago, is illuminating. If one corrects for probable differences in composition between the unemployed on relief and those not on relief, it was found, for example, that both in Chicago and nationally, occupations in the manufacturing and mechanical industries, especially building and construction, were overrepresented among the unemployed population; the clerical, professional, public service, and trade occupations were underrepresented; and the incidence of unemployment was, predictably, higher among unskilled than skilled workers. In Illinois in February 1935, 83 percent of workers on relief were manual workers (unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled)—which helps explain why 47 percent of African-Americans and 32 percent of Mexicans were on relief, compared to only 14 percent of whites. Professionals were least likely to be jobless: for instance, truck and tractor

---

drivers, general laborers, and chauffeurs were from three to six times as likely to be without a job as, say, advertising agents, proprietors, salesmen, and nurses.\textsuperscript{5}

A Chicago study based on census figures in 1931 gives more detailed information, summarized in the following tables. (In the later months of the year, the numbers of unemployed were higher than those listed.)\textsuperscript{6}

\textit{Total unemployed in 1931, by industry}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
Industry & Gainful workers & Unemployed workers & Percent unemployed \\
\hline
All industries & 1,558,949 & 450,244 & 28.9 \\
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & 3829 & 1765 & 46.0 \\
Extraction of minerals & 1221 & 344 & 28.2 \\
Manufacturing and mechanical & 624,951 & 251,884 & 40.3 \\
Transportation & 180,489 & 42,253 & 23.4 \\
Trade & 360,526 & 64,757 & 18.0 \\
Public service & 31,383 & 5258 & 16.8 \\
Professional work & 111,470 & 10,611 & 9.5 \\
Domestic and personal & 187,248 & 53,199 & 28.4 \\
Industry not specified & 57,832 & 20,173 & 34.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Men unemployed in 1931, by occupational group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gainful workers</th>
<th>Unemployed workers</th>
<th>Percent unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All occupations</td>
<td>1,152,108</td>
<td>353,980</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors and managers</td>
<td>123,926</td>
<td>8752</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>35,171</td>
<td>5158</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks and kin</td>
<td>227,392</td>
<td>41,107</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>260,818</td>
<td>105,305</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>197,894</td>
<td>72,414</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>167,313</td>
<td>95,749</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic servants</td>
<td>63,019</td>
<td>16,950</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Women unemployed in 1931, by occupational group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gainful workers</th>
<th>Unemployed workers</th>
<th>Percent unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All occupations</td>
<td>406,750</td>
<td>96,264</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors and managers</td>
<td>9702</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>2114</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks and kin</td>
<td>176,160</td>
<td>31,173</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>7400</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>87,801</td>
<td>31,057</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>8463</td>
<td>2853</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic servants</td>
<td>69,002</td>
<td>26,034</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of (former) occupations and industries among the unemployed stayed roughly the same through the decade. This is suggested, for example, by the fact that in September 1937,
manual workers constituted about 56 percent of the employables on Chicago’s relief rolls, service workers 26 percent, and professionals, salespeople, and clerical workers 17 percent.\(^7\)

Information on the \textit{duration} of unemployment is equally interesting, since it is an extremely important variable with regard to people’s well-being and prospects for reemployment. Naturally, any data based on relief recipients are going to be skewed, since, as a rule, only people who had been jobless for a long time made the wrenching decision to give up their independence and apply for relief. Still, perhaps the majority of Chicago’s unemployed were on relief in May 1934, the month of the federal study, so the information is of some interest. The study measured two variables: how long it had been since people had last worked for one month at their \textit{usual} occupation, and how long it had been since they had worked for one month at \textit{any} job (excluding work-relief jobs). In both cases, the period of unemployment was extraordinary: regarding the former, the national average was 30 months for men and 20 months for women, while for the latter it was two years for men and a year-and-a-half for women. These numbers, though, conceal as much as they reveal. For instance, metal manufacturing workers, whether female or male, tended to be out of work longer than those in more seasonal industries associated with the service sector, trade, or textiles; and so cities in which metal manufacturing predominated had the longest average times of unemployment. Thus, the median duration of joblessness (in relation to one’s \textit{usual} occupation) in Chicago—as of May 1934—was an incredible three years. Nationally, about 30 percent of the men and 35 percent of the women on relief had been unemployed less than one year, while over 60 percent of the men but less than 50 percent of women had been unemployed from one to five years.\(^8\)  

\(^{7}\) C. R. Thompson, “Analysis of Occupational Characteristics of Employable Persons Receiving Relief from Chicago Relief Administration During the Month of September, 1937” (Illinois State Department of Labor, 1937), 9.  
\(^{8}\) Palmer and Wood, \textit{Urban Workers on Relief}.  

94
Local studies tell a similar story. A 1935 survey found that 40 percent of the 74,000 experienced employable workers on relief in Chicago had last had a non-relief job in 1931, 38 months earlier. Outside Cook County, by contrast, only 22 percent had been unemployed so long. A 1937 survey of the Chicago relief rolls determined that 46 percent of the cases had been on relief for more than four years, most of them without any break. It is true that more than half of these people were, or had become, “unemployable” (from old age, disability, mental illness, or the need to stay at home to take care of children), but the data show, at any rate, that unemployment was apt to last a very long time, especially for unskilled workers. By 1939, thousands of men had been out of work for six or seven years.9

White-collar workers may have been better off than most in the industrial sector, but this fact was of little consolation to the many who did suffer. Teachers, clerks, architects, engineers, musicians, actors—thousands of all these “privileged” Chicagoans were laid off, sometimes for years. Or they simply didn’t receive pay for months at a time. The saga of public school teachers in the early thirties is especially tragic. I’ll return to it briefly later, but here I can outline the story, which is merely a dramatic version of what happened to many of Chicago’s municipal employees in the first five years of the Depression. Tax collection had been suspended between 1927 and 1929, as taxable property was being reassessed, but the city had continued to spend money from the sale of tax anticipation warrants, thereby accumulating large deficits. They were further accumulated by the reassessment’s lowering of property valuations in Chicago, which meant there was less taxable income when collection was finally resumed. Worst of all, a tax strike by large property holders from 1929 to 1932 utterly crippled the city’s finances, so exacerbating deficits and starving Chicago’s treasury—which was simultaneously under attack

---

from the economic crisis—that in April 1931 the city declared it could not pay its 14,000 teachers. Between May 1931 and May 1933 they were paid for only *four months*, while continuing to work and indeed generously paying for hungry schoolchildren’s lunches. Teachers placed much of the blame for their years-long ordeal on the banks, which up to April 1933 were refusing to buy the tax anticipation warrants that were, for the moment, the only way for the city to pay its employees. Even after the new mayor Ed Kelly prevailed on banks to lend the Board of Education some money in April 1933, it was to give teachers but a fraction of what they were owed. Only in August 1934 was Kelly finally able to give them all their back pay, when he secured a loan of $25 million from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.10

And yet the teachers’ trials were far from over. In a move that seems eerily parallel with the political economy of the present, the city forced years of austerity budgets on the school system, pleading high deficits. It closed junior high schools and two-year colleges, reduced the number of kindergarten classes by half, increased teaching loads 40 percent and enlarged class sizes, shortened the school year by a month, cut teachers’ salaries 23.5 percent, curtailed physical education and music instruction, and laid off 1,400 teachers. These cuts were but one piece of a citywide program of retrenchment, which also involved the closing of nearly all evening schools, the ending of summer schools, the abolition of community centers, and the reduction of playgrounds. Such trends operated all over the country, though Chicago was a particularly egregious case. To quote an observer in 1933:11

---


One or more phases of school service have been eliminated or curtailed in more than half of the city school systems of the nation. Conservative estimates indicate that by the end of the school year kindergartens will be reduced or eliminated in at least 170 cities, night schools in 120 cities, schools for handicapped children in 170 cities, art instruction in 100 cities, music instruction in 160 cities, school nurses in 135 cities, home economics or manual training or both in 145 cities, and physical education in 160 cities.

Another writer concluded that “public education is threatened with something little short of an absolute breakdown in vast areas of the country.” Just between 1931 and 1933, school budget reductions in small cities outside the South averaged 33 percent, even as nationwide enrollment was increasing by almost 200,000 students. Whether the continually invoked justification of “fiscal health” necessitated such austerities is debatable: more than one knowledgeable commentator attributed the cuts to a hostility among the wealthy to public education as such, noting that most of them sent their children to private schools, and that the costs (in high taxes) of these expanding public schools “had become unendurable to those [among the rich] who had no use for them. The crash of ’29,” he suggested, “provided the pretext for the declaration of war.”12 Certainly tax delinquency was an enormous problem throughout the Depression: many cities and towns all over the country collected but a quarter to a third of the taxes levied. Nor, in most cases, did they do anything to raise taxes on those who could most afford to pay. In any event, these severe cutbacks—which ironically helped stimulate popular

---

12 One might draw a parallel with the present day: the crash of 2008 provided a pretext for the (ongoing) international dismantling of public resources like education and the welfare state. See, e.g., John Wight, “UK austerity: ‘Diverting money from poor to rich under guise of economic crisis,’” *RT*, June 26, 2013, and Barry Sheppard, “‘Debt crisis’ pretext for attack on working people,” *Direct Action* no. 34, August 2011.
protest, supported by Franklin Roosevelt, for an expansion of the federal government’s role in society—had clear consequences with respect to the earnings and employment of many thousands of workers around the country.\textsuperscript{13}

In fact, it bears emphasis—as will be argued in chapter five—that the misery of the poor and the unemployed in the 1930s was made possible by one circumstance above all: the \textit{unwillingness} of government on the local, state, and federal levels to provide aid in sufficient amounts. “The public clamor for tax reduction and economy in government in some sections of the country,” a liberal writer remarked in 1932, “has risen to the point of hysteria. ‘Business can no longer stand the burden of government.’” So goes the popular refrain all too frequently, the singers forgetting that the reason government expenditures have been forced upward in the past two years is that industry has laid its burden upon the doorstep of government. Cities, towns, villages, counties assumed the responsibility for feeding the hungry whom industry would no longer feed.” The gospel of “economy” (austerity) and budget-balancing that was preached by Chambers of Commerce, Businessmen’s Associations, the National Association of Manufacturers, Real Estate Boards, “taxpayers’ associations” like the Civic Federation of Chicago, and lobbying groups for bankers, and was echoed by their media mouthpieces like the \textit{Chicago Tribune}, became a near-religion for local and state governments, preventing them from truly “assuming the responsibilities” that industry had laid at their doorstep. When even police forces, schools, health departments, and libraries were being downsized, there was little chance that relief for the poor would be expanded sufficiently to meet the crisis. The federal government, too, was deeply susceptible to balanced-budget thinking, as generations of liberal historians have lamented. Not only in the Hoover years but also the Roosevelt years, especially

in the last third of the Depression decade. The typical liberal explanation for this fact, however, is superficial: it was not merely “intellectual error,” an outmoded adherence to old dogmas or a rigidity of economic thinking that kept Roosevelt and many of his colleagues in the grips of the conservative ideology; it was, rather, their being embedded in a particular institutional context, which required that they largely heed the will of the economy’s corporate sector. When Roosevelt and Congress approved pared-down budgets, or cut appropriations for the WPA and other work-relief programs, it was under pressure from big business.\textsuperscript{14}

All the way up to the 1940s, Chicago’s budget was subject to the discipline of austerity. Substantially raising taxes on the rich, or even collecting all the money that had been lost through tax delinquency (a phenomenon that deprived the Cook County governments of almost $400 million between 1928 and 1937), was off the agenda. Thus, in 1938 Mayor Kelly boasted before a meeting of business leaders that that year’s corporate fund expenditures—i.e., funding for such services as public safety, public health, sanitation, and transportation—were lower than their level in 1927, despite the population increase of 350,000. And he promised an austere 1939 budget. As we’ll see in chapter five, the Chicago Relief Administration, which oversaw relief in the second half of the decade, was continuously starved of funds—not because of Illinois’s poverty, for it was one of the wealthiest states in the country, but because adequate unemployment relief was simply not a priority for the city’s and state’s governing institutions.\textsuperscript{15}

The last thing to note before we consider the hardship of Chicago’s economic outcasts is the level of overall unemployment from 1930 to 1939. The following table gives (conservative)


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Chicago Tribune}, November 11, 1938, April 21, 1939.
government estimates of monthly averages for Illinois, which we can assume are a few percentage points below the levels in Chicago:\textsuperscript{16}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated unemployed</th>
<th>Percent unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>468,728</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>810,221</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1,214,746</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1,170,821</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>945,896</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>884,984</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>732,599</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>511,473</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>891,828</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>798,494</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These percentages suggest what it must have been like to be a wage-earner then. No wonder it seemed to people that precarious living was the new \textit{permanent} condition, that there was no prosperous future on the horizon.

**Physical hardship**

**Hunger and disease**

In January 1932, in the depths of the Depression, the Chicago Workers’ Committee on Unemployment (WCU) organized a series of public hearings to draw attention to the suffering of the jobless multitudes. Almost two hundred people testified from the Humboldt Park area, South Chicago, the South Side and the West Side African-American districts, and several other heavily affected areas. The testimonies, some of which were reported in Chicago newspapers and subsequently summarized in a WCU report entitled “An Urban Famine,” are valuable for giving human content to the statistics mentioned above.

The first and most obvious condition spotlighted was the lack of physical necessities. “The situation,” the Workers’ Committee reported, “bears all the earmarks of a famine… Malnutrition is prevalent and starvation is far from unusual.” Needless to say, this was the case all over the country. In early 1935, for example, the United States Department of Labor reported that 25 percent of American children were undernourished, in some areas 70 percent. According to a survey of 59 cities, one out of seven families with children, or 14 percent, bought no fresh milk at all. Another study of eight cities found that families with a fully employed member had 66 percent less illness than those of the unemployed. Children, tragically, suffered the worst. In late 1933, a hundred charity and welfare organizations in Chicago participated in a fundraising drive to address the rising tide of malnutrition among preschool children. One charity official noted that “we find such evidences of malnutrition as poor posture and lack of muscle tone, and eyes no longer bright”; rickets (“soft bones”), anemia, diphtheria, scurvy, and tuberculosis became more common than they had been a few years earlier, as parents could no longer afford nourishing food. Teachers, in fact, frequently volunteered to feed schoolchildren out of their own pockets, as many as 11,000 children in Chicago every day. But this was merely a palliative. One health expert estimated in late 1931 that perhaps 35 percent of Chicago schoolchildren were
suffering from malnutrition. “Nothing is more heartrending,” he remarked, “than to see the malnourished, hungry child, in spite of this physical defect and the pangs of hunger, making a futile effort to concentrate on his lessons with dizzy head and gnawing appetite.” Children in school were regularly sleepy, underperforming, subject to fainting spells, and reluctant to go out to play at recess—perhaps in part because then they would have to bear the sight of the more well-off kids eating delicious meals. Luckily teachers’ compassion could sometimes come to the rescue.\textsuperscript{17}

It is heart breaking [said one teacher] to watch the children at recess look longingly at their favorite luxury, a “hot dog.” I saw several ragged children watching the more fortunate ones eating them the other day. They seemed so hungry and wistful. I reached down in my pocket for several nickels and fed the lot of them. They had a real feast.\textsuperscript{18}

Such generosity was possible even when teachers had not been paid for a few months; but after eight months or more of absent paychecks, famished schoolchildren had either to suffer stoically or hope that private institutions would undertake a fundraising campaign on their behalf. The \textit{Chicago Tribune}, for example, sponsored a Hungry School Children’s Fund to solicit donations from the public—tens of thousands of dollars. Unfortunately, none of this money was available for Chicago’s unpaid teachers, who, aside from a brief period when they were paid in


scrip, were left to waste away along with thousands of the unemployed. Such stories abounded as of a single woman living for weeks only on graham crackers and milk, another on bread and coffee, a third who had lost her home on Lake Michigan and now was in danger of starving and losing her single-room apartment, and many others who had fallen into the clutches of high-interest loan companies. By the summer of 1932 (or earlier), hundreds of teachers were walking to school everyday or hitch-hiking because they could not afford transportation; hundreds were rushing to second jobs immediately after class ended; and at least 600 were “in the hands of charity organizations—and were it not for these charity organizations, they would be starving in the streets,” as the editor of the Chicago Herald and Examiner put it. “Stories of starvation and penury,” one school official stated, “—and there are no milder words that fit the situation—are heard on every hand.” (And yet the worst thing of all was teachers’ inability to pay for schoolchildren’s lunches any more. “To see children hungry under our very eyes is unbearable.”)\(^\text{19}\)

There have been hundreds of accounts of the misery of the 1930s, but somehow one does not fully appreciate the apocalyptic character of those years, particularly 1931 to 1933, until immersing oneself in documents from the time. It was simply an obscenity when Herbert Hoover declared, “No one is actually starving.” In reality, as early as October 1930, the head of Chicago’s Bureau of Public Welfare admitted that 12,000 Chicagoans were starving—this in the “world center of the surplus of foodstuffs,” as an outraged writer commented. (“Other Chicagoans are also worried,” he noted. “There is a 200,000,000 bushel surplus of wheat and they cannot find anything to do with it.”) By mid-1932 there were at least 20,000 men in flophouses and breadlines every day, a number that continued to increase. Even the Gold Coast,

\(^{19}\) Chicago Tribune, October 4 and 20, November 2, 1931, and April 10, 1933; Biles, Big City Boss, 23; testimony by Victor Watson, Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 4592, Senate, 72nd Congress, 1st session (June 4, 1932), 40; Daily Worker, October 16, 1931.
one of the richest areas of Chicago, saw hunger and poverty: a thousand men from this neighborhood ate in the breadlines food that cost 4.5 cents a day. Contrary to what the mainstream press stated—and what some historians have assumed—death by starvation was not particularly rare in the United States, even in Chicago. The Daily Worker reported such deaths periodically; for example, on April 10, 1931 several black unemployed workers died of starvation in their chapel on the South Side, having spent hours waiting for food in the church’s breadline. Conditions on the South Side were rapidly deteriorating in 1931, but that did not stop some flophouses and breadlines there from closing in the spring, or the ones that remained from giving out less food than before—for instance, only one loaf of bread to each person three times a week. (Conveniently, there was an undertaker next door to this three-times-a-week chapel, to “take care of the starved-to-death workers.”) Hospitals around the city became so overcrowded with hunger patients that sick workers and their children were constantly turned away.\(^{20}\)

As we know, conditions kept worsening up to 1933, even when that must have seemed scarcely possible. Relief had to be cut repeatedly because of lack of money and lack of “political will” to address the problem—a euphemism for the business elite’s desire to keep relief at low levels.\(^{21}\) The costs of this policy in lost lives and social disruption, which continued to accumulate, were such that between 1931 and 1933 even the mainstream press and high-level politicians like the mayor insisted, again and again (at moments when relief was in danger of collapsing), that hundreds of thousands were on the verge of starvation. One reads headlines—sometimes exaggerated—like “Chicago Crisis Worst Since the Fire of 1871,” “Half a Million in Chicago May Face Early Starvation,” and “600,000 Near Starvation in Chicago.” But even these

\(^{20}\) Frank Palmer, “12,000 Starving in Chicago,” Federation News, October 18, 1930; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 4076, Senate, 72nd Congress, 1st session (June 20, 1932), 15, 16; Daily Worker, April 18, September 10, 1931.

\(^{21}\) See chapter 5; also Piven and Cloward, Regulating the Poor.
alarmist headlines contained some truth. Daily, people were dying of hunger and resultant disease in flophouses, hospitals, shacks, and claustrophobic apartments, in neighborhoods from the steel-working South Chicago to the meatpacking Back of the Yards to the Loop-laboring Near North Side. Some families had to resort to such barbarities as eating their cat, a practice reminiscent, incidentally, of what was going on in the Ukraine at the same time, under conditions of imposed famine.22 Others, particularly single men, simply wasted away until their stomach “had shrunk to the size of a goose egg” and they died—as happened to Marion Whittenberg, a 65-year-old unemployed stockyards worker who died of hunger in December 1931, having been denied food several times by the United Charities. “Whittenberg,” the Communist Hunger Fighter reported, “ate garbage to keep alive. He was evicted several times. At the time of his death there was no heat in his room, no electric light and no gas for cooking.” Garbage-eating, in fact, was a continually practiced device for staying alive, and for feeding one’s family—though the city looked upon it none too kindly. To discourage the poor, the city was wont to run big tractors over staple foods dumped in landfills to mash them up, making them inedible to the hundreds of starving people hoping for scraps.23

The plight of single men, friendless and homeless, frequently compelled to roam the country in search of a job and stimulation, has been much discussed in the literature on the Depression, but that of single unemployed women less so. They had it even worse. “According to the reports of social workers,” we read in one account, “food is the first thing that goes when a woman is up against it, and appearance and clothes are the last… They know that 60 percent of their chances of getting a job depend on their appearance.” Whether in their teens or their forties, they tended to “half-starve themselves,” in part out of a remarkable stubborn pride that

kept them from applying for charity until they absolutely had to. Disdaining breadlines and soup kitchens as “degrading,” many of these independent women, formerly middle-class, even “postponed medical care when it was urgently needed.” They roved and scrounged, taking part-time jobs, temporary jobs, eating free meals in restaurants that offered leftover food and taking free rooms in hotels that could not fill themselves otherwise. Bread, coffee, an occasional fruit, and whatever else they could find constituted their daily fare.24

Even the jobless who were lucky enough to have homes rarely had an adequate diet. For those who had been unemployed more than a couple months, starchy foods were the mainstay. In Back of the Yards, for example, many families subsisted on potatoes, stale bread dampened with water and covered with sugar or mustard, and sauerkraut (at least among Poles). One family bought a dozen cakes for a dollar and lived on that and coffee for a week. In general, consuming bread and coffee, and potatoes, was a common method for Chicagoans to stave off starvation. Those who qualified and were willing to go on relief often did better than others, for, when the relief budgets were low, food was the last thing to be sacrificed. By 1932, with the help of state funding, the Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare gave a monthly ration of staples, canned goods, milk, beans, oatmeal, and so on, plus two grocery orders each month. (Families were able to exercise some limited choice regarding the food they “bought” with the grocery orders.) It was a monotonous diet—and the way the monthly ration was disbursed, through a “commissary” system, was especially humiliating—but on the whole it kept families from being tortured with hunger, most of the time. The ideal was that every day, each member of the family would have a pint of milk, bread and cereals, oranges or canned tomatoes, potatoes, and another vegetable. Two to four times a week there were supposed to be dried beans, a fruit, eggs, and meat, fish, or

---

cheese. This ideal was rarely met, in part because families did not always choose the most nutritious foods, but, given limited funds, officials and caseworkers made impressive efforts to approximate it as closely as possible. Still, the public need and the relief apparatus were so gigantic that families were constantly complaining about inadequacies, such as food orders that had not been received, or ration boxes from the commissary that had rancid bacon, coarse flour, and loaves of bread that had been mashed because of poor packing.25

As the Depression progressed and the state and federal governments stepped in with more funds, more of the unemployed were able to go on relief. In Chicago, only 11 percent of families whose heads were unemployed were on relief in April 1930; this number increased to 29 percent in January 1931, then fell to 18 percent in September—for 1931 was the year in which the economy truly began to hemorrhage jobs—and then rose to 32 percent in January 1932. With interruptions, it continued to increase thereafter. These families, then, tended to have at least a minimal amount of food security, although the nutritional component was usually substandard. The situation improved with the establishment of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), especially after October 1933, when the government started distributing surplus foods to relief clients, in addition to the food they were already receiving. This program lasted the rest of the decade.26

That circumstance was fortunate, for there were moments in the second half of the thirties when Chicago relief was virtually shut down, and the only thing families had to eat was the surplus commodities distributed by the federal government. This was the case, for example, in

26 “Estimate of Minimum Relief Requirements for Chicago for Fiscal Year October 1, 1931–September 30, 1932,” United Charities Papers, Chicago History Museum, box 8, folder 2.
late May and early June 1938, when funds ran out, forcing 91,000 people to subsist on beans, rice, potatoes, and flour. Food allowances were temporarily cut 32 percent in the fall of 1937: they averaged nine cents per meal per person, which was actually less than that provided for dogs at local animal shelters. But, for many, the usual situation between 1937 and 1940 was little better than during such crises. After the federal government had in late 1935 stopped financing direct relief, average monthly relief grants in Chicago—though subject to wild fluctuations, and varying with the size of the household—had decreased from $38.65 to $28.62, and were even lower in 1939 and 1940. In every month in 1939, grants were between 85 and 65 percent of the budget that the Chicago Relief Administration (CRA) had declared the minimum for subsistence. Moreover, regulations on administrative costs prevented the CRA from employing an adequate number of caseworkers: in 1938, a single social worker might have a load of 300 cases to periodically check up on and provide with material and emotional assistance, whereas in New York City a caseload ranged from 55 to 75. “Criminal neglect” of Chicago’s families on relief was the inevitable result. Investigators reported that instances of “actual starvation” were not rare; social workers had to “witness children starve,” and physicians diagnosed patients on relief as suffering from “slow but persistent starvation.” Thousands of Chicagoans not on relief fared even worse.27

A Chicago alderman estimated in August 1939 that over 200,000 people in the city were slowly starving because of inadequate relief. (About 490,000 people at the time were dependent on either direct relief or the WPA.) A few months later, Lea Taylor, head of the Chicago Commons settlement house, insisted that “people really are starving” on the West Side, and that

this was responsible for deaths from tuberculosis and pneumonia. The inadequacy of relief in 1939 was such that thousands of families desperately applied to private charities—which had dramatically reduced their general relief caseload years earlier—to supplement their public relief income or to tide them over until their delayed CRA check arrived. In many cases they used their food money for rent, to avoid eviction. Large families from South Chicago to the Near West Side sometimes received only $30 or $40 per month, which did not even cover their food budget, much less rent and everything else. Black families on the South Side survived on neck bones and dried beans. Even men who had been lucky enough to get off direct relief and take a WPA job frequently found it difficult or impossible to pay for rent, clothing, light, gas, and food for their family on the pitiful monthly wage of $55 for unskilled workers.28 (Some WPA workers received a supplement to their wage; others did not.) Joel Hunter, the head of the United Charities, was so appalled by the misery that engulfed Chicago in late 1939—indeed, throughout the year and into the next—that he wrote a long, pleading letter to the governor that began, “I feel that this is the most important letter I have written…”29

One of the things that upset him most was the new Illinois law, which had gone into effect in late 1939, that declared that only people who had resided in a given township or county for three consecutive years could receive public relief. Hunter considered it an arbitrary and discriminatory enactment that needlessly brought hunger and misery to thousands of Chicago families and unattached individuals, many of whom had lived there their whole lives except for a brief period when they tried to obtain employment in a different state, then had returned to

28 To understand how inadequate that wage was, consider that the minimum standard income for a family of three—and most working-class families were much larger—was generally considered to be $1,500 per year. That translates to $29 per week, or $116 per month. So, $55 for an unskilled WPA job was not exactly munificent. Alice Theresa Theodorson, “Living Conditions of Fifty Unemployed Families” (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1935), 8, 9.
29 Speech by Alderman Paul H. Douglas, August 8, 1939, in Frank McCulloch Papers, box 6, folder 1; Chicago Defender, October 21, 1939; “Public Hearing on the Relief and WPA Situation in Chicago”; “Meeting of District Supervisors,” July 24, 1939, and letter from Joel Hunter to Governor Henry Horner, October 31, 1939, United Charities Papers, box 10, folder 2; Chicago Tribune, October 17, 1940.
Chicago—only to be punished by being made ineligible for relief. In anguish they turned to private charities, but the demand was so overwhelming that the majority could not be helped. Nor were they eligible for the WPA or the new Food Stamp program, because they had to be on direct relief first. How, therefore, many of these non-resident families survived is something of a mystery, though doubtless it involved the generosity of friends, relatives, and neighbors. Hunter and other welfare officials waged a battle up to 1941 to change the three-year residence law—testifying before the legislature, filing a suit with the Illinois Supreme Court, writing letters to government officials—but in the end they failed. Hunger stalked the land, with the permission of city councils and the state legislature.\textsuperscript{30}

Such tragic tendencies were not unique to Chicago. Contrary to old liberal myths of steady progress for the poor under the New Deal, one third of the nation was still “ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished” in 1940. Indeed, according to a study by the Citizens’ Committee of Planned Parenthood, about a third still lived at or below a bare subsistence level ten years after the 1929 crash. Another study, in late 1939, concluded that “few even of the middle third [of the country, in income] are able to enjoy what is customarily called an American standard of living.” Seventy-one percent of children in cities belonged to households that had incomes “inadequate or barely adequate to supply the minimum necessities for growing children.” Even leaving out families on relief and workers earning less than $500 a year, one study found that between 1934 and 1937, about half of white workers’ families in 43 industrial centers did not have adequate diets.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} In United Charities Papers, box 10, folders 2 and 6: letter from Joel Hunter to Neil Jacoby (head of the IERC), November 17, 1939; Non-Residents Hearings of the Congressional Committee on Interstate Migration, July 26, 1940; United Charities bulletin no. 226 to district superintendents, August 1940; letter from Joel Hunter to James Douglas, May 20, 1941.

\textsuperscript{31} Chicago Defender, April 15, December 23, 1939; “America’s Low Income,” Labor Notes, October 1939; “Workers’ Diets Inadequate,” Labor Notes, May 1939.
As already stated, mass hunger was typically attended by mass malnutrition and (less so) disease. Like most things associated with the Depression, this fact was most dramatically and suddenly manifested in the early years. The head of the Jewish Charities of Chicago, one of the best-funded agencies that took good care of its clients, said in December 1931 that visiting nurses were discovering in almost every home “a problem of illness that is unmet.” All of the charity’s dispensaries were overcrowded. The inadequacy of health facilities—and of relief resources devoted to medical care—remained a major problem in metropolitan Chicago throughout the 1930s, though it was especially acute in the years of crisis that bookended the decade (1930–33 and 1938–40). For one thing, the city and county had not a single public clinic for the ambulatory sick in need of general care, unlike New York City, Los Angeles, Boston, Philadelphia, and Minneapolis, which had extensive municipal clinic facilities. Inadequate private clinics, supported by donations, the Community Fund, and payments from private and public welfare agencies, were left to care for the large majority of the ambulatory sick poor. These people frequently had to travel long distances to stand in line for hours, just to be told, perhaps, that the place was too crowded to accept them. For many, it was only when they became seriously ill that they could be taken care of: a police patrol wagon might then be called to take them to Cook County Hospital.\(^\text{32}\)

As for the number of poor people needing care: it is partly indicated by the fact that visits to the twelve clinics that ministered most to poor outpatients doubled within a few years after the Depression began, reaching almost a million annual visits in 1935 and staying approximately at that level for the rest of the decade. This, of course, does not include hospital visits, at-home care, or the many thousands who needed help but did not receive it. It was especially difficult to

accommodate patients who needed diagnostic work-up like X-rays, laboratory work, or electrocardiograms, because clinics were booked too far ahead. Even for simpler cases, though, hospitals were so overcrowded from 1938–40 that they regularly had waiting lists of 400, 500, 800 patients and more, which meant that sick people might have to wait months or over a year for care. This was similar to the Depression’s early years, except that “the ridiculous anomaly of the economic system”—tremendous unused supplies despite tremendous need to use them—was more obvious in the first half of the decade. Even in 1934, government hospitals were still overflowing at the same time that non-government hospitals were half-empty, because of patients’ inability to pay for service. So there remained unemployed nurses and impoverished physicians while masses of the poor were in dire need of attention.\footnote{\textit{Chicago’s Sick and the Lack of Clinic Facilities}; Mary Diran, “Medical Care Given to a Group of Clients of the Unemployment Relief Service” (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1935), 6; Babette S. Jennings, “Health Services in Chicago,” in \textit{Social Service Year Book, 1934}, eds. Linn Brandenburg et al. (Chicago: Council of Social Agencies, 1934), 54.}

Especially before the state and federal governments had taken over responsibility for relief, spending on medical care by some (not all) welfare agencies was pathetically insufficient. Of necessity, most of the money they gave had to go for food. The United Charities, for example, which in 1928 provided medical care and clothing, had by 1931 practically eliminated those items from relief. Such financial exigencies, which persisted in a milder form even after the federal government had begun to fund relief, led to the “desperate” plight of patients needing dental care and dentures: simply stated, they were as likely to be ignored as to receive care. Teeth removed, dentures were denied. Clients in pain regularly had to wait months for the relief agency to give them a referral to a dentist; others who had “badly decayed” teeth might have to wait over two years. In 1936 it was estimated that 90 percent of Chicagoans were afflicted with dental disease, and only 25 percent received adequate care. These problems corresponded to
national trends, for according to a 1936 survey by the American Dental Association, between 87 and 99 percent of all elementary school children in the U.S. had decayed teeth and were in need of treatment.\textsuperscript{34}

In fact, even during the era of FERA, from mid-1933 to 1935, knowledgeable commentators declared it an “indisputable fact” that at least half the country—and well over half of Chicago, we might add—was without adequate medical care. Unemployed single women, for instance, while indefatigably pursuing a job, were apt to “indefinitely postpone” medical treatment for the fatigue, malnutrition, and illnesses from which they were likely to suffer. According to one study, this was the case for 61 percent of them. Things were worse, of course, for certain minorities and low-income groups, such as Mexicans. Garbage was infrequently collected in Mexican neighborhoods, rats roamed the streets (as in many areas of the city), and in general, according to one physician in 1930, “insufficient food, poor housing, crowding…everything [was] ideal for the development of many diseases, among which tuberculosis occupie[d] the most important place.” A nurse elaborated: “The Mexican children have rickets badly, are skinny and undernourished. They don’t get enough sunshine. They live in dark little rooms and the children are not allowed on the streets.”\textsuperscript{35}

As usual, though, no one suffered worse than African-Americans. For the whole decade, outpatients had one main resource, a clinic at a black-owned private hospital on the South Side (Provident Hospital), which could not meet more than a small fraction of the need. The situation was especially pitiful considering blacks’ high susceptibility to illness, because of their poverty.

\textsuperscript{34} Clorinne McCulloch Brandenburg, “Chicago Relief and Service Statistics, 1928–1931” (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1932), 70, 72; “Chicago’s Sick and the Lack of Clinic Facilities”; Diran, “Medical Care Given to a Group of Clients of the Unemployment Relief Service,” 74; Mary E. Murphy, “Health Services in Chicago,” in \textit{Social Service Year Book,} \textit{1936}, 77; \textit{Chicago Daily News,} August 18, 1936.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Chicago Tribune,} December 3, 1934; “The Effects of Unemployment on the Personality of Women,” 4; Mark Reisler, \textit{By the Sweat of Their Brow: Mexican Immigrant Labor in the United States, 1900–1940} (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 107, 122.
For instance, a reporter for Harry Hopkins, head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, observed in 1934 that the incidence of tuberculosis was remarkably high among Chicago’s African-Americans. The jobless black person, he said, “has no money for medical service at the incipiency of his disease; moreover, he is compelled to double up in already overcrowded houses which have no running water, are insufficiently ventilated and devoid of sunshine, and have only one unspeakably filthy toilet for several families.” The public health department apparently did nothing for such cases, partly because, again, there were not nearly enough facilities for hospitalization. The municipal tuberculosis sanitarium had a waiting list of 800 black patients, but in the previous year (1933) not one black person had been admitted. It is no surprise, then, that the death rate from tuberculosis among African-Americans in Chicago was seven times that of whites—290 per 100,000 people—though in the U.S. as a whole it was only four or five times higher.\(^\text{36}\)

Needless to say, as relief standards in Illinois deteriorated after 1935, so did the health of hundreds of thousands of people. The ludicrously high caseloads of Chicago’s public relief workers, in part a result of the state legislature’s arbitrary decree on July 1, 1936 that only eight percent of relief funds in Chicago could go to administrative costs, ensured that clients’ medical needs would be neglected. (After July 1, 1938, the spending limit for administrative costs was raised to 10 percent. But this still did not permit sufficient improvements in office procedures and facilities, or the hiring of a sufficient number of caseworkers to reduce their loads to a manageable size.) Few home visits, either for investigation or for the rendering of specialized services, were possible. The situation was aggravated by the fact that medical workers, too, had

huge caseloads. As a result, people with serious medical and dental needs got no attention even after repeated and desperate pleas, or they had to wait years for, e.g., dentures or minor amenities like special types of shoes. When physicians wrote an order for a client to take to a relief station so that it would give him a special diet or shoes or a mattress, it was far from guaranteed that the client would receive the item or service even after months of fighting and badgering the station. He was told to come back the following week, or to wait in the office for hours for a supervisor who never showed up, or threatened and bullied. If he went to the relief station day after day to solicit help for a sick daughter or wife at home, he was lucky if a nurse was eventually sent to his home to examine the patient. There were simply not enough personnel, and not enough resources.37

In November 1939, the Chicago Committee on Adequate Relief published an open letter that, in its outrage at the immorality of civilization, could almost have been written by one of the Old Testament prophets. Screaming that “WHILE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ARE BEING SPENT IN CHICAGO AND ILLINOIS FOR SPACIOUS HIGHWAYS, BEAUTIFUL PUBLIC BUILDINGS, [AND] EXPANDED PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS,” it condemned authorities for the fact that, according to the Illinois State Health Department, death rates were on the rise. Among other circumstances, it reported the findings of a recent study that had compared 800 fee-enrolled students at the University of Chicago with 7,000 relief family enrollees with the Civilian Conservation Corps. “The 800,” it summarized, “had good postures, good complexions, sound teeth, firm muscles, straight legs and backs,” while “the 7,000 were rampant in defective teeth and hearing, curvature of the spine, pallid complexions,” and signs of scurvy and rickets. There

could scarcely have been clearer evidence for the \textit{class} basis of health, or for the enormous disparities between poor and middle-class.\textsuperscript{38}

One could cite similarly damning reports \textit{ad nauseam}. To give another example, in 1937 a thorough study was conducted of the 12,500 unattached women (45 percent of whom were African-American) currently on the rolls of the Chicago Relief Administration. Thirty percent of the women were over 65, but they were excluded from the study because they would be receiving Old Age Assistance, a program separate from the CRA. Among the findings relevant to medical care were that there was great need for an outpatient department at Cook County Hospital, and for branches around the city, because the private clinics (which the CRA paid in order to provide services to its relief clients) continued to be overwhelmed eight years after the Depression had begun. Of the women studied, the CRA classified only 30 percent as employable, the rest being temporarily or permanently unemployable because of disability or physical or mental illness. (The most common conditions were syphilis, arthritis or rheumatism, cardiovascular problems, and disability due to menopause.) But there were no programs of rehabilitation, and recommendations for special diets or larger food allowances were regularly disregarded by relief authorities. A little over half who were sick were receiving care.\textsuperscript{39}

Such facts as we have surveyed here should already suggest that, whatever they may have thought about their own intentions and motivations, political and economic authorities acted with relatively little regard for the poor. For, despite possessing ample resources (as we’ll see), they spent far less money on relief than the situation called for. Particular leaders may well have been dismayed at widespread suffering, but the institutional context in which they were embedded,

\textsuperscript{38} “Open Letter and Report of the Chicago Committee on Adequate Relief,” November 1939, Committee on Adequate Relief, Graham Taylor Papers, Chicago History Museum, box 53, folder 2378.

\textsuperscript{39} Byrne and Hillyer, \textit{Unattached Women on Relief in Chicago}, 39.
organized as it was around a political economy of class war, prevented them from diverting sufficient resources to social welfare programs.

We should keep in mind, incidentally, that the low standards of health and nutrition in the Depression were not a drastic departure from the past. The health of those with a low income was certainly worse than it had been, but it had never been up to decent standards. As we saw in chapter one, in the late 1920s 40 percent of American families had annual incomes at least $500 less than the accepted minimum (of $2,000) to supply basic necessities. According to a 1925 study, over two-thirds of unskilled or semiskilled workers in Chicago did not make enough money to give their family a standard of living equal to the minimum relief budget. And that was in a year of prosperity! Even when supplementary earnings by a wife or children were included, 45 percent of families surveyed were still unable to meet the requirements of the relief budget. In other words, a large number of people would have been better off if they had left their jobs and gone on relief. Certainly their nutrition intake would have been better: it was found that nearly all families of unskilled or semiskilled workers had an inadequate diet, lacking sufficient calories and sufficient amounts of protein, calcium, iron, and phosphorus. Almost two-thirds spent less on food than they should have, but even those who spent more than was allotted by the relief budget did not always select foods with the best nutritional value. Just as today, however, this choice of nutritionally deficient foods was not necessarily the result of carelessness; rather, in general it “may require considerable ingenuity on the part of the housewife”—or it may not even be possible—to select foods that are cheap and at the same time nutritious. It is not the fault of the housewife if healthy foods are expensive.40

---

Shelter and clothing

In the abovementioned WCU report on the 1932 hearings is a succinct paragraph that sums up the housing woes of hundreds of thousands in that dark time: “The housing situation is critical in at least two aspects, eviction and crowding. People have been unable to pay rents for many months and landlords cannot carry them any longer. Evictions hang over the heads of thousands of families. Many families have already been forced to move a number of times. Charities are very seldom paying any rents. Many families have been forced to move into very small quarters or have moved in with other families with resultant serious overcrowding.” Behind these colorless sentences was a level of chaos and misery to which only Charles Dickens could have done justice.41

First of all, even before the Depression, the housing conditions of most Chicagoans were awful or mediocre. To quote an investigator, in the 1920s no less than the 1930s, “great masses of people still live[d] in very miserable homes and in conditions of almost unbelievable discomfort for this modern period—without the accepted conveniences of modern life, without bathrooms, without a single private toilet for family use, with broken and frozen plumbing, occasionally without a sink, sometimes sleeping in windowless rooms, in dark rooms, in cellars and basements, in attics, in rooms many times illegally overcrowded.” The sprawling tenement districts on the West Side, the North and Northwest Sides, the South Side, South Chicago and the Calumet region, submerged in palls of smoke and safely segregated from the pleasant wealthier neighborhoods, home to working-class African-Americans, Mexicans, Poles, Jews, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Greeks, and two dozen other nationalities—these tenement areas may have been less infamously congested than the tenements of New York, but they were not less dilapidated or

primitive, or congested inside. In most areas, well over 75 percent of the tenements still inhabited in the 1930s had been built before 1902, and so were largely unaffected by a tenement-house code enacted in that year that was meant to improve conditions. Instead, the buildings deteriorated year after year, landlords refusing to modernize them as they awaited the “business invasion” that would raise land values and require the demolition of old houses. Frame tenements in particular, as opposed to brick-and-stone dwellings, had often been built hastily after the Great Fire of 1871 and so were unpainted, dingy, dark, and “unfit for the kind of homes that twentieth-century standards of decent living demand.”

These wood frame dwellings constituted a large proportion—from 45 to 95 percent—of the housing in many neighborhoods, such as Back of the Yards, the Hull House area, the Lower North Side, the Near South Side, South Chicago, and, in the northwest, the Polish St. Stanislaus district. Some of them were still in good condition in the 1930s, but most were not. Wood is ravaged by time and weather, and so “everywhere [were] rickety porches, stairs, and sheds, rotting clapboards and shingles, grimy [and] smoke covered,” in addition to ubiquitous vermin and the scourge of rats. Some families in the Hull House neighborhood, which was populated mostly by Italians and Greeks, actually slept with guns under the bed to shoot the rats in the night, and hung food from the ceiling to protect it. The buildings in the worst condition were typically in black neighborhoods on the South Side, but even in immigrant neighborhoods conditions were frequently appalling. It is true that sanitation had improved since 1900, with more adequate plumbing facilities. The provision of sinks, for example, was almost universal. On the other hand, it was not unusual for a single sink to be used by all the tenants in a house (several families), or for broken plumbing to make sinks temporarily unusable, so that water had

---

to be carried over from an adjoining house. In 1925, 58 percent of low-income houses and apartments canvassed did not have bathrooms, so all the water for cleaning and bathing was carried from the sink (often located in the hall). Toilets were far more common than bathtubs, but in the mid-thirties almost a third of apartments still had no toilet—contrary to regulations. Instead, the toilet was in either the yard, the basement, the hall, or under the sidewalk, in all of which cases privacy was severely compromised. This was especially so in Pilsen and Pullman—habited, respectively, by Bohemians, Slovaks, and Croatians (in Pilsen), and Poles, Serbians, Greeks, and Italians (in Pullman)—where the majority of toilets were not inside the apartment. Thus, in the gelid Chicago winter people might have to trudge outside or down into the basement to use the common toilet, hoping vainly that it was not frozen and could flush.43

For many families, most modern conveniences were lacking. Central heating was frequently absent, in the winter necessitating that families huddle around the coal stoves in their kitchen, the only heated room in the apartment. Families on relief, especially, were likely to be without a gas stove or electric light. Some lived in the basement, damp and dark and poorly ventilated. Poor ventilation was in fact common, because of small or absent windows, or the placement of windows so that they opened upon a narrow passageway between buildings that shut out air and light. Many of these evils were magnified in the case of furnished rooming houses, which provided accommodation (usually temporary) in rundown apartments of one or two rooms, and which by the 1930s had colonized large sections of the city. The buildings—sometimes old deteriorated homes of the wealthy—might be huge, housing sixty or a hundred families, or they might be smaller, but most of them offered far from desirable abodes, especially for children: many without electricity or even gas, filthy and vermin-infested, full of dark halls

and dirty, broken furniture, provisioned by one or two common toilets and sinks for the whole building, presenting abundant fire hazards, these apartments epitomized the “city of the poor.” For even a moderate-sized family to live in a single room was surely demoralizing: to quote an investigator, “parlor, bedroom, clothes closet, dining-room, kitchen, pantry, and even coal shed are here combined in one room where the cooking, eating, sleeping, washing, and all the family life go on.” Nor was it morally uplifting that these rooming houses could be located in the vice districts, so that “little children saw prostitutes and their so-called patrons coming and going through the common hallways.”

Over 600,000 Chicagoans regularly lived in rooming houses in the late 1920s, and probably more during the Depression. Irregular employment and financial necessity were common reasons for people to live there, as well as the desire for freedom, or for few responsibilities and light housework, or for drink and drugs. It seems that American-born whites and blacks, and not immigrants, were most likely to inhabit these degraded places; “transients” were frequently found there, and clerical workers (especially on the Lower North Side), and “all sorts of shipwrecked humanity,” including many single men and women who stayed for a few weeks or months and then moved on. This was notably the case in the “Hobohemia” that lent a colorful and cosmopolitan character to the outskirts of the Loop. Around West Madison Street near the river, North Clark Street, and South State Street, in districts overlapping with slums, tens of thousands of the most diverse nonconformists congregated and lived, a marvelous panoply of humanity—hoboes, peddlers, panhandlers, bootleggers, artists, soapbox orators, migratory workers, criminals, “dope fiends,” prostitutes, bohemians of every conceivable provenance. Amidst the cabarets and saloons, the dance halls and bars, the radical bookstores,

---

the welfare agencies and employment agencies, were scores of ramshackle lodging-houses, flophouses where guests slept on the floor or in bare wooden bunks, and homeless shelters for single men. One gets a sense of the scale of these Loop-proximate slums from the fact that even before the Depression, between 300,000 and 500,000 migratory men passed annually through these districts, which—on the Near North Side and in “Little Hell,” east of Goose Island—were also the home of small colonies of Persians, Greeks, Poles, Jews, Sicilians, and African-Americans. A sociologist has left us a memorable description of Little Hell in 1929.45

Dirty and narrow streets, alleys piled with refuse and alive with dogs and rats, goats hitched to carts, bleak tenements, the smoke of industry hanging in a haze, the market along the curb, foreign names on shops, and foreign faces on the streets, the dissonant cry of the huckster and peddler, the clanging and rattling of railroads and the elevated, the pealing of the bells of the great Catholic churches, the music of marching bands and the crackling of fireworks on feast days, the occasional dull boom of a bomb or the bark of a revolver, the shouts of children at play in the street, a strange staccato speech, the taste of soot, and the smell of gas from the huge “gas house” by the river, whose belching flames make the sky lurid at night and long ago earned for the district the name Little Hell—on every hand one is met by sights and sounds and smells that are peculiar to this area, that are “foreign” and of the slum.46

Such was the world that is gone, the bursting-with-energy but stricken-with-poverty world. One can easily imagine the chaos of housing conditions in such a world, a not-yet-standardized place that thrilled with the kinetic energy of heterogeneity.

In addition to rooming houses and flophouses and cheap hotels was the widespread phenomenon, popular among immigrants and African-Americans, of a family’s taking in lodgers in order to supplement the chief wage-earner’s income and meet high rents. In 1925, for example, a study found that over 40 percent of Mexican and black one-family households had lodgers. Almost a third of low-income native white households, too, took in boarders. This practice only intensified in the Depression, as unemployment made it even harder to pay rent. A housing shortage, moreover, had plagued Chicago for decades, as tens of thousands of men and families streamed in from the Old World and the American South, offering up their bodies and their lives to the leviathan corporations that refused to invest in adequate housing for their workers. Homeless men, laborers by day and wanderers by night, shacked up in boarding-houses or flophouses or a small room set aside for them in some family’s apartment. Sometimes whole families would be taken in as lodgers, or 25 single men would live with a family in a five-room apartment, which caused overcrowding, uncleanness, and a complete lack of privacy. Strange men might sleep in the same room as the daughters of the household; two or more people might sleep in the same bed; or the kitchen might be converted into a bedroom at night. The housewife, of course, would typically have much more work to do if she took in lodgers, cleaning and cooking for them, but it was judged worthwhile if they could help pay the rent.47

Conditions in some of the Chicago slums were so bad that politicians and the mainstream press took chagrined notice of them, bewailing their mutilation of the city’s image. Visitors

47 Hughes, Living Conditions for Small Wage-Earners, 13; Abbott, The Tenements of Chicago, chapter 11; Reisler, By the Sweat of Their Brow, 106.
entering Chicago on trains would get a “closeup of Chicago’s worst—abandoned shacks, backyards full of rubbish, chimneys that lean at crazy angles, broken windows stuffed with rags, trash heaps in unkempt alleys, and homes that have little to distinguish them from the trash heaps.” On the eve of the Depression people were living in buildings that had been “condemned” fifteen years earlier, or that in 1901 had already been denounced by inspectors as “dilapidated and neglected.” These slummy areas, to repeat, were not a negligible portion of the city: they constituted a third or more of it, according to one estimate in 1941. The Chicago Plan Commission conducted a study in 1939 of nearly every dwelling in the city and found 23 square miles of “blight,” declaring that a third of the city’s apartments and houses were substandard. In fact, in the 1940s the Black Belt, an area less than five square miles on the South Side that contained most of the city’s black residents, had the highest population density in the world, higher than Calcutta, India: 90,000 people per square mile.\footnote{Chicago Tribune, May 5, 1929, November 3, 1941; Washington Post, May 19, 1929; Mary Faith Adams, “Present Housing Conditions,” 20, 21; Thomas A. Guglielmo, “White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890–1945” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2000), 286; Chicago Defender, August 7, 1943.}

In short, both before and after the Depression, Chicago’s housing situation was not exactly exemplary. It was even worse, however, in the 1930s, for the obvious reason that it was even harder than before for people to pay for a place to live. The most dramatic manifestation of this problem was the surge in evictions. Historians and even casual readers are familiar with the stories of bailiffs throwing families’ furniture onto the street as the children or women cried and men pleaded, despairing of the future; but these cases of sensational drama accounted for a small minority of the tens of thousands of people who were forced out of their homes. Usually the process was more peaceful, if almost equally tragic. Sometime after the tenant had failed to pay his rent, the landlord would give him an ultimatum: hand over the rent within five days, or you have to leave. If he still received no rent, he filed a suit with the “Renters’ Court,” which issued a
summons that specified the hour and day when the tenant would have to appear in court for a hearing. Rarely did the tenant attempt a defense; the judge, therefore, had no choice but to order him to leave his home, giving him from five days to fifteen or twenty. If the tenant disobeyed the judge’s orders, the landlord could file a writ of restitution with the bailiff’s office, which was then served on the tenant to inform him that he would be dispossessed within 24 hours. The landlord had to pay a fee to actually have the bailiffs evict a family; if he could not afford the fee, there was no way to enforce the writ, and the tenant, effectively, was able to stay. Tenement landlords were often quite poor themselves, and so were unable to pay fees to evict nonpaying tenants.49

The number of eviction suits filed with the Renters’ Court between 1928 and 1935 is shown in the following table:50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Suits filed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>23,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>21,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>28,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>39,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>56,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>56,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>38,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>41,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 Ibid., 433.
The number of tenants who were forced to leave was much higher than indicated in this table, for two main reasons. First, the large numbers of people evicted from rooming houses did not pass through the Renters’ Court; they could simply be locked out of their furnished room. Second, landlords were able to use extra-legal means to pressure people to leave; for instance, they could remove a tenant’s windows in the middle of winter, or turn off the gas and electricity or even the water (though that was illegal). On the other hand, the number of evictions that bailiffs actually carried out was much smaller than the numbers in the table: in 1932, for example, there were about 4,000, and in 1934 almost 2,000. This is about the number, also, in the first eleven months of 1938, when 31,495 suits were filed.51

The stories of these families, most of them subsisting on relief, that had to move again and again because they could not pay their rent do not make for pleasant reading. In 1933 a Chicago social worker gave poignant testimony before the U.S. Congress:

I remember one very unhappy woman sitting in the renters’ court, and when the eviction order was issued and it was necessary for her and her children to go on the street again she wept very quietly. She was very self-restrained, but she began crying, and said, “It is just moving, moving, moving. I can get on very well with the relief food. I am very glad to have it, although it is not the food I was used to, but it is the moving, moving, moving,” and all the children began to cry, causing a very great disturbance in court.

We [welfare workers] have a great many cases of this kind.

I remember one little boy who was in court and was very much surprised
and a little disturbed by it, and he said, “We are just like gypsies, always moving
all the time,” and that situation, of course, is very demoralizing to children.\(^{52}\)

Children found ways to adapt, though. A settlement worker in 1933 was struck by something she
observed at a nursery school: “Some sort of game was going on,” she reported, “to the
accompaniment of make-believe tears, groans and harsh orders and much violent shifting around
of toys. ‘It’s Eviction,’ explained [a] worker ruefully. ‘They’re playing Eviction. They don’t play
keeping-house any more or even having-tonsils-out. Sometimes they play Relief, but Eviction is
the favorite—it has more action and they all know how to play it.’”\(^{53}\)

Their skill at that game is no surprise: some families moved as many as six times a year.
According to another settlement worker, “Not only is their furniture pretty well used up in the
course of a year, what they have, but their self-respect is torn to shreds. And again the neighbors
know the family has been evicted. Without any cash relief [as opposed to mere grocery orders],
oftentimes it is difficult to secure cash to pay an expressman to move their furniture, and again
and again we have seen families moving their furniture by hand, three, four and five blocks
away. They move one piece at a time, down the street, dragging it along.” How it happened that,
apparently, few families spent a night or two literally on the street is explored more in the next
chapter, but, in brief, it was usually the generosity of neighbors, friends, and relatives that came
to the rescue. In one case a family’s furniture lay on the street for two days as its owners stayed
with a friend; in another—a family that was not receiving relief and had no hope of beds for the
night—a neighboring landlady took pity on the forlorn group sitting on the sidewalk and let them

\(^{52}\) Testimony by Edith Abbott, *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 5125*, 261.
stay in a vacant room for the weekend. It seems that the sight of an absolutely destitute family, hopeless and friendless, almost always called forth sympathy and aid, at least by others in the lower classes. “There were many illustrations,” wrote an investigator, “of the old saying that ‘only the poor are kind to the poor, and those who have little give to those who have less.’”

Those who had much, however, were especially cruel to African-Americans, who, throughout the Depression, suffered evictions more often than other groups. Landlords (mostly absentee) on the South Side sometimes had it easier than those in white neighborhoods, because they did not always have to go to court to evict black tenants. Instead, they colluded with bailiffs, likely with the help of small bribes, to evict people without having to go through the legal hassles. No wonder that “eviction riots”—large protests and coordinated resistance to the casting of furniture into the street—were more common and militant in black neighborhoods than white. The situation was especially explosive in the summer of 1931, when rampant evictions on the South Side culminated in a massive demonstration that left three men dead, killed by police. Finally awoken to the desperation of the black poor, supposedly being roused to insurrectionary fervor by Communists, Mayor Cermak declared a temporary moratorium on all evictions. They resumed again soon enough, though, increasing in frequency until 1933.

What was the role of the relief agencies in all this chaos of evictions and nomadism and homelessness? Why didn’t they pay the rent that their clients could not afford? Simply because they, too, lacked the money. The eviction crisis was especially acute during the year and a half following December 1931, when public and private relief agencies declared a rent moratorium as

---

55 Minutes of superintendents’ meeting, August 6, 1931, United Charities, box 8, folder 1; Daily Worker, August 5, 1931; Chicago Tribune, August 5, 1931.
a desperate way to save what money they had for the provision of food. They decided that more important than paying rents was preventing people from starving to death. Thus, social agencies’ spending on rent for their relief clients plummeted from 28 percent of their budget in December 1931 to one percent in February 1932. This “no-rent” policy was in fact operative, for a time, in most large cities around the country. In Chicago, the usual relief policy during this period was to pay rent only when a family had been evicted and was moving to a new apartment; and then it was only for one month. After that, the family was again thrown into an agony of uncertainty, of endless prevarication with the landlord, of wondering whether the electricity or heat would suddenly be turned off after a couple months of rent-in-arrears.56

In addition, particularly during the eighteen-month rent moratorium, there was the dismaying need to deceive landlords in order to find a place to sleep. Understandably, landlords became reluctant to rent to tenants on relief, knowing they would probably get only one month’s rent. So the prospective tenants, frantic to find a new apartment in the several days between receiving their five-day notice and being booted out of their old home—or perhaps looking for a place the very day of being evicted—often decided that the wife, not the husband, would have to seek out a new landlord, to pretend that the husband was at work. “Does your husband have a job?” she would be asked. “Yes,” she would have to answer, and then embellish with lie after lie. Or she would give the name of a male relative who was working. Many women felt it was unconscionable to engage in this dissimulation, to “inflict” themselves on another unsuspecting landlord who, far from receiving rent after the first month, would have to pay fee upon fee to evict them, or simply be stuck with another charity case that he or she could not get rid of. The relief agencies, for their part, knew that such deception was constantly going on, but apparently

56 Ibid., 446, 447; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 5125, 259.
neither discouraged it nor actively abetted it, knowing it was an inevitable evil as long as they could not pay their clients’ rent.\textsuperscript{57}

Had all the landlords been money-grubbing predators preying on people’s desperation, one might shed no tears for them. In fact, the larger landlords were good at protecting their interests, by making prospective tenants fill out applications. But many were poor themselves, immigrants who had years ago bought houses that were still heavily mortgaged, families who sometimes lived in the smallest and darkest room in the building because they could not rent that one out. A common motive for buying was the sense of status, the pride of “owning” a home—the American dream of being a solid, sturdy citizen. Some families were so large, with ten or twelve children, that it was hard to find anyone who would rent to them, so they were forced to buy a building just to have a place to live. Other homeowners/landlords simply wanted security for their old age. But too often during the Depression these investments backfired: with less income from rent, and in many cases having lost their own jobs, landlords could no longer make payments on their mortgage and were dispossessed. Or they sank deep into poverty and ended up on the relief rolls themselves, either because most of their rooms were vacant or most of their tenants could not pay, and it was too costly to evict them. Moreover, the compassion that so many landlords displayed interfered with their pecuniary self-interest. The following testimony from the 1932 hearings mentioned above is typical:\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{As a landlady, I don’t know whether the tenants are suffering worse than I am or not. I have one tenant who has been out of work twenty-five months… The}

\textsuperscript{57}Abbott, \textit{The Tenements of Chicago}, 448–453; \textit{Chicago Tribune}, October 6, 1932.

daughter’s health has failed her. I have seen the wife go from a well-developed woman to a shadow. I have watched that man’s face until it seems that he is almost a maniac because of the fact that he does not know which way to turn. I have helped them and I am still helping them… [He was placed at a relief station, where they said] “We cannot do anything with your rent unless they evict you.” I had to spend the money for eviction and give him the notice finally, [after which the relief agency said it would pay one month’s rent for him, though he owed two years’ worth]. They are giving them, at intervals, something to eat and I am trying to keep a shelter over them. I hope to do that until I am evicted, which may come anytime in the future, for the man who holds the mortgage said that he could not wait any longer, and I may be in the bread line with the rest of them.

Not infrequently, tenants on relief were given more and better food than their landlords could afford. There were even cases in which a landlord and his tenant received relief from the same agency. —The absurdity of this whole system is evident, and was appreciated by the relief agencies themselves. What they were effectively doing was to commandeer private property (usually that of the upper working class) to house the poor—which led to terrible physical and mental hardship for their “clients,” inflamed the resentment of landlords and financially ruined many, and added to the stresses of overburdened and over-criticized relief workers.

Fortunately, the relief agencies’ rent moratorium did not last the whole of the Depression. Officially, their rent policy was liberalized somewhat in May 1933, fifteen months after the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission had taken over administration of statewide relief. In practice, though, rent payments remained inadequate until November 1934, when the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration insisted that they be considered a regularly budgeted item. Even after this, the usual $25 maximum monthly allowance for a family’s rent varied according to the availability of funds. At times payments almost ceased altogether, for example in May 1935, when FERA temporarily withdrew funding from Illinois because of the state’s shameless irresponsibility in paying for its own relief needs. And again in the winter of 1935, rent payments were reduced. And yet again payments ceased briefly in the fall and winter of 1936 and 1937, due to yet more relief crises. This pattern continued in the following years, whenever the state and local governments were once more struggling to scrape together a few more millions of dollars, meanwhile doing whatever they could to shift the blame and the burden to each other. In most of these cases, bailiff-conducted evictions of “delinquent” tenants shot up, to as many as 100 or more every day in November 1937; evictions from rooming houses were even more frequent. The Black Belt suffered the worst, predictably, which provoked huge protests on the South Side in 1937. But by then the brief and relatively humane era of FERA had come to a premature end, so little was done to address protesters’ grievances. Delinquent unemployed tenants continued to be evicted en masse from 1938 to 1940, if rarely on quite the level of 1932; and many landlords continued to receive only half the rent or none at all, depending on the state of relief finances that month.59

The Depression’s eviction epidemic was not only a terrible problem in itself; it also contributed to that other crisis, the appalling conditions of housing for the poor and the long-term unemployed. Families that could not afford an apartment of their own frequently moved in with relatives or friends, which could lead to congestion, uncleanness, and lack of privacy.

Compounding this was the common practice, especially in the Black Belt, of landlords’ partitioning apartments into two or three or seven tiny “kitchenettes”—with one or two rooms—for one or more families each, so as to bring in more rent. If overcrowding was bad in the 1920s, it was dreadful in the 1930s. But now a new element was added, to make living conditions even less bearable: landlords who were receiving no rent or inadequate rent might not make repairs on their buildings, so plumbing stayed out of order, janitor service might be withdrawn, toilets and sinks and ceilings leaked badly, furnaces and pipes were not fixed. The city of the poor rotted, as the city of the rich closely guarded its riches.\footnote{Abbott, \textit{The Tenements of Chicago}, 464–468; Mary-Jane Grunsfeld, \textit{Negroes in Chicago}; \textit{Chicago Defender}, October 2, 1937.}

The quintessential city of the poor was Chicago’s Black Belt. And the quintessential symbol of the Black Belt was the kitchenette apartment. Let us defer to Richard Wright in describing it:

\begin{quote}
The kitchenette is our prison, our death sentence without a trial, the new form of mob violence that assaults not only the lone individual, but all of us, in its ceaseless attacks. \\

The kitchenette, with its filth and foul air, with its one toilet for thirty or more tenants, kills our black babies so fast that in many cities twice as many of them die as white babies. \\

The kitchenette is the seed bed for scarlet fever, dysentery, typhoid, tuberculosis, gonorrhea, syphilis, pneumonia, and malnutrition.
\end{quote}
The kitchenette scatters death so widely among us that our death rate exceeds our birth rate, and if it were not for the trains and autos bringing us daily into the city from the plantations, we black folks who dwell in the northern cities would die out entirely over the course of a few years.

The kitchenette, with its crowded rooms and incessant bedlam, provides an enticing place for crimes of all sort—crimes against women and children or any stranger who happens to stray into its dark hallways. The noise of our living, boxed in stone and steel, is so loud that even a pistol shot is smothered.

The kitchenette throws desperate and unhappy people into an unbearable closeness of association, thereby increasing latent friction, giving birth to never-ending quarrels of recrimination, accusation, and vindictiveness, producing warped personalities…

“Innumerable killings, particularly throat-cuttings,” took place in some of these dark buildings, where drugs and moonshine were peddled, sometimes by children on behalf of their parents. Buildings meant for six families might house 24 instead, parents sleeping in the same bed as children, in rooms barely ventilated. Many places, also, were without heat, and the light and gas had been shut off, so people had to rely on candles, kerosene lamps, and cooking with coal. On the other hand, in some areas it was not unusual for buildings that had been converted into

---

kitchenettes to be better kept up than older buildings, such as frame tenements, that had not been so converted.62

A 1938 study by the Chicago Housing Authority shined a light on the abysmal conditions that Richard Wright described. In a survey of housing units between 31st and 51st Streets, and between LaSalle Street and Cottage Grove on the west and east, it was found that 67 percent were without standard facilities, including central heating, gas, electricity, an unshared kitchen, and a private bath. Half of the remaining apartments were “dark, filthy, badly planned, infested with vermin and rodents, or in need of repairs.” Thousands of families on the South Side did not even have running water. Nor were the moral conditions fostered by such environments wholesome: as we’ll see in the next chapter, the number of sex delinquency cases among young women, particularly young black women, increased in the 1930s, the majority of the delinquent acts occurring in kitchenettes. Investigation of 100 cases disclosed that the average age of the girls was 14 years.63

One reason for the rise in prostitution was, of course, the “sky-high” rents that African-Americans had to pay, despite low property values. It had always been the case that the city’s most recent immigrants had paid the highest rents for the poorest apartments. Now that Mexicans and blacks were the most recent arrivals, it was their turn to pay exorbitantly. For example, the Mexican colony in the Stockyards district, which faced vicious racism from the neighboring Poles, Irish, Slovaks, Germans, and Lithuanians, paid correspondingly inflated rents. In the mid-1920s, a Mexican family (with 17 lodgers) living in a six-room rear apartment paid $27 a month, when an identical apartment in the same building that was occupied by an Irish family rented for

62 “Effect of the Depression in the area bounded by 47th, 51st, South Park, and the New York City Tracks,” Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 5125, 262; Edith Marie Hunter, “The Evolution of Chicago’s South Side within the Last Fifty Years” (M.A. thesis, Northwestern University, 1942), 85.
63 Chicago Defender, March 12, 1938; Atlanta Daily World, November 13, 1937.
$20. Mexican tenants of an old rotting cottage paid $21, while Poles who lived in a similar nearby cottage that was in better condition paid only $10. Comparable injustices prevailed in the South Chicago and Near West Side colonies.  

African-Americans, however, faced not only racism but also a housing market particularly skewed in favor of landlords, because of high population density and an extreme housing shortage. In the 1930s, when kitchenettes sprang into widespread existence, landlords sometimes charged $35 to $40 or more a month per room, especially in the second half of the decade. Thousands of tenants on the South Side conducted rent strikes and sit-ins in 1937 to protest higher rents, but again two years later landlords coordinated another increase, even in the midst of record-high relief loads and stratospheric black unemployment. These policies might have been somewhat justified if owners had been making improvements to their deteriorating property, but they were not; 95 percent were absentee landlords, who knew that their property would be rented regardless of its condition.  

The third major physical consequence of poverty and unemployment, after hunger/malnutrition and inadequate shelter, was the deterioration or absence of clothing. This curse did much to shatter self-esteem, disrupt children’s recreation and school life, and impede even adults’ social and work lives. A thorough monograph has yet to be written on all the dimensions and repercussions of the mass clothing crisis of the 1930s. For it lasted the whole decade, from 1930 to 1941.

Impressionistic accounts are not hard to find. “In the cities,” one author observed in 1932, “in the cold months, children have had to wait days and sometimes weeks for shoes. Frequently children are found wearing misfit second-hand shoes, which injure their feet, forced on them by the public welfare office. Older children are prevented from working for lack of shoes. Poorly clad children are ashamed of their appearance and sometimes go and hide as one enters the house.” Frequently children were too ashamed to go to school because of their shabby clothes, or they could not go because the soles of their shoes were worn through. When they did go, they were apt to fight over safety pins or other clothing items. “A safety pin is very precious now,” a Chicago social worker testified before Congress in 1933. “[Children] need pins to pin themselves together because their clothes are vastly more ragged than has ever been known in any city before and they have to pin together their wretched clothes and children quarrel over the possession of a pin.”\(^6^6\)

The situation was not always much better after a family had gone on relief. A study in 1940 of families in New York (not including African-Americans) who were on home relief and WPA found that 50 percent could not clothe themselves adequately. This was a severe handicap in job searches: “men came to the office for an interview wearing patched trousers, frayed collars, and shoes with holes in the socks.” (The next sentence in the study is striking: “Many men were further handicapped by lack of teeth.”) Some people recalled that when they were on home relief it was “practically impossible” for them to get clothing, since the monthly allowance in their budget for clothes went from $0 to $5, even in the case of a family of eight.\(^6^7\)

One investigator described conditions in Chicago in the relatively good year of 1934:

---


During the early part of 1934 clothing was supplied through the Red Cross center. Families received wrong sizes, or only some of the things they had ordered… Then in the summer came instructions that the Red Cross had closed temporarily for the summer, and all clothing orders were to be discontinued for that period. For months thousands of [unemployed] workers could not get shirts, socks, dresses, underwear, etc. Then with the fall, a new system of giving the unemployed orders on department stores was instituted. But at the same time case-workers were instructed that funds were limited and clothing was to be ordered on an emergency basis only… And since clothing is of the cheapest kind, the adequacy with which the unemployed will be clothed can be imagined.68

This description exaggerates, for the Red Cross at this time was supplying only half the clothing of relief clients in Cook County, not all of it. Nevertheless, the broader point holds: Illinois’s political authorities were willing, in fact from the beginning to the end of the Depression, to let families on relief go without adequate clothes. That this policy of underfunding relief was a choice and not a product of necessity will be demonstrated in chapter five.69

According to a 1936 study of relief in Chicago, most complaints that relief clients submitted about clothing orders had to do with the long delays that occurred before their requests were filled. In a typical complaint in late 1934, a father of seven young children stated that an order had been submitted “about ten times” with still no success: “No action has been taken by [the] worker except to send one dress for each child, but now heavier ones are needed, especially

69 Chicago Tribune, May 3, 1934.
by the two in kindergarten.” Two months later, the requested clothing was finally supplied. In another case, the relief office answered a complaint with the statement that its funds were sufficient to issue clothing only for schoolchildren and working members of families—and that belatedly. No one else could get clothes, at least at that time when funds were low. But through the whole decade it was usual for funds to be even lower than they were then, in late 1934.70

The humiliation of being without adequate clothing—or adequate shelter, food, or health—leads into our next subject, the psychological pain that the long-term unemployed had to endure.

**Mental hardship**

The physical suffering of the jobless was bad enough, but in some respects the mental suffering may have been even worse. It doesn’t require profound imaginative powers to consider the psychological implications of being without paid work for months or years. *Homo sapiens* is not like other species of animal, content to loll about aimlessly when not eating or sleeping, satisfied as long as its stomach is full. Uniquely, human beings are *restless*, driven insatiably towards self-confirmation, self-activity, a kind of ceaseless urge to “objectively” confirm their sense of self-worth. They need a purpose, an existential project, something that gives their life meaning; they need to feel like a useful member of the community, be it the small community of the family or the great community of humankind. Their happiness consists in perceived validation of their self-worth; and if they feel unvalidated they may be depressed or suicidal, as though their life is “meaningless.” In a capitalist world structured around the virtual necessity to have a job in order both to make money and to participate in social life, these deep-seated human

---

desires will be satisfied (especially for men) typically through employment—not least because this allows one to provide for one’s family, thus making one essential to the well-being of others. If employment is not forthcoming, neither, most likely, is sustained psychological validation. One may lose the respect of one’s family, one’s friends, and ultimately oneself. Life becomes suffused, perhaps, with despair.\(^71\)

A vast sociological and psychological literature on the unemployed has accumulated since the Great Depression, which we cannot review in depth here. Writers have suggested typologies of the long-term unemployed, constructed psychological explanations of their behavior, and proposed “stages of adjustment” that people experience after weeks and months of being economically outcast. The usefulness of all this scholarship, particularly for historical writing, is debatable. In the 1930s, for example, one writer described three types of unemployed: the anxious, who suffered mostly from the fear of future insecurity; the “apathetic,” who had lost confidence and appeared to have become “indifferent”; and the unresigned, who refused to accept unemployment and were critical of society. Another distinguished “the unbroken” from “the broken” (resigned) and “the distressed” (bitter and hopeless). More elaborate classifications have been proposed as well.\(^72\)

Perhaps more interesting than such typologies are the stages of adjustment that have been theorized. According to a study in 1938, “all the writers who have described the course of unemployment seem to agree on the following points: First there is shock, which is followed by an active hunt for a job, during which the individual is still optimistic and unresigned; he still


maintains an unbroken attitude. Second, when all efforts fail, the individual becomes pessimistic, anxious, and suffers active distress; this is the most crucial state of all. And third, the individual becomes fatalistic and adapts himself to his new state but with a narrower scope. He now has a broken attitude.” Some of this language, in being value-laden and overly general, is objectionable and has been abandoned by more recent research; the “stage” model has tended to persist, though, at least into the 1980s. “Optimism–pessimism–fatalism” has been the usual longitudinal classification of the mentality of the long-term unemployed. It seems plausible, but of course any “stages” hypothesis simplifies enormously, disregarding differences due to class, occupation, race, age, sex, and an individual’s psychological makeup. For our purposes, such psychological theories are not of great value.73

A study of families in a previous Depression, that of 1921–22, summed up certain consequences of unemployment rather well: “[Lowered morale] was a persistent phenomenon that permeated every manifestation of the Depression. Among the jobless breadwinners of families it took a variety of forms under different circumstances: strain and friction within the family, loss of ambition to seek work, occasionally desertion of family, temperamental upheavals, loss of mental balance even to the point of insanity, development of lawless habits, begging, the fostering of bitterness against the government and social institutions in general, or sheer laziness from the discontinuance of sustained application.” Studies during the Great Depression regularly came to similar conclusions. One, for example, observed that “various conditions of the Depression have caused broken homes. These result from the death of a parent under hardships; from family desertion by father or mother; from the inclination of parents to

give up their children when they are powerless to care for them; from well meaning attempts to meet the unemployment situation by separation of husband and wife for the time being.” A collection of case-studies summed it all up in this terse statement: “What, above all, unemployment does to people is to take the spring out of them.”

For families, a common cause of conflict was the shift in gender roles sometimes consequent upon the father’s loss of a job. As with so many things in life, gender is determined largely by control over material resources. When the father made the money, he had the most prestige and authority; when he lost his job and his wife or children brought home the money instead, he tended to lose his authority. For example, with respect to the Polish district in Chicago west of Goose Island, it was observed that the “autocratic domination” of the father had been “profoundly shaken” by the Depression. The unemployment that overwhelmed this Polish community—which consisted mostly of industrial workers—undermined families’ typically patriarchal, authoritarian structure. As a high school principal put it, “the prestige of the former wage-earner is lowered by asking working women or children for spending money—for beer, cigarettes, or carfare.” Chafing against their loss of status, husbands might become “more inclined to quarrel, more brutal, and irritable,” as wives complained, or they simply grew sullen and withdrawn. In some cases they sank so low in the eyes of their wife and children that they were not even consulted regarding family decisions, and were all but ignored most of the time. “I certainly like my mother lots more,” one girl told an investigator, “for she buys me everything.” Another man found that with his constant presence at home, his children paid hardly any attention to him and rarely even greeted him anymore. The men did not always rebel against

---

their loss of status, becoming instead pliable and passively resigned, as in the sad case of this Bulgarian man.75

…[T]he father does not count anymore in the family [after four years of unemployment]. The children call him now by his first name and the father has resigned to his new position and seems to be content, only hoping that he will die soon so he would not eat the children’s food, so there would be more for them. Whenever I [a friend] visit the family and I offer to buy something for him, the father refuses to accept it, saying “better save it for my funeral.” …He recently declined to accept my offer to buy him glasses so he can read and use his time in this respect. He feels he is an unneeded stump in the family.

For men more attached to traditional notions of masculinity, the psychological shock of emasculation could be unendurable. After all, to quote an investigator, the unemployed man usually saw himself as “fail[ing] to fulfill the central duty of his life, the very touchstone of his manhood—the role of family provider. The man appear[ed] bewildered and humiliated… [Before the Depression,] every purchase of the family—the radio, his wife’s new hat, the children’s skates, the meals set before him—all were symbols of their dependence upon him. Unemployment changed it all.” The feeling of being superfluous, a wasted person discarded from society, drove some to that final tragic act, suicide. One Polish man, for instance, could not

abide the contempt of his wife and daughter-in-law, and asked for ten dollars from his wife so as to leave the city. When she refused, he killed her and then himself.\textsuperscript{76}

For some men it was not only being unable to provide for their family that devastated them: it was the thought of their wife’s providing for the family. That was intolerable. As a social worker observed, “Profound, indeed, must be the importance of the role of the provider for the man’s self-esteem to cause him to say, ‘I would rather starve than let my wife work.’ Or, ‘I would rather turn on the gas and put an end to the whole family than let my wife support me.’” One Anglo American man was quite relieved when his wife lost the job that his unemployment had made her take. He told an interviewer that if she had kept it they would have drifted apart; in fact, he would have left her. “The whole thing was wrong. She was not the same; he was not the same. It was awful to have to ask her for tobacco, or to have to tell the landlady, ‘My wife will come, and I will pay you,’ or to be expected to have the dinner ready when she came home…”\textsuperscript{77}

Thus, it was not only Poles or Eastern Europeans who had patriarchal traditions and suffered from the deterioration of accepted gender norms. These norms were remarkably similar across cultures, ethnicities, races, and regions of the U.S. While patriarchal attitudes varied in strength between nationalities and, especially, individual families, it was common for the man’s frequent loss of status and authority—whether partial or complete—to result in a dysfunctional marital relationship. This aspect of unemployment in the Depression has been so widely studied that we need not go into great detail here. What was true of families in New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco was true of families in Chicago. The litany of marital woes is long: some wives of unemployed husbands lost respect for them, fell out of love with them, grew disgusted


\textsuperscript{77} Komarovsky, The Unemployed Man and His Family, 76.
and irritated by the man’s constant presence in the home, decided that he had no personality and was uninteresting, resented him for refusing to do any housework, resented him for supposedly not trying hard enough to get a job, and so forth. Husband and wife “scolded and nagged” each other over petty issues, fought more frequently over treatment of the children, grew mutually bitter and hostile over the perceived irresponsibility or lack of support from the other, even became prone to violent outbursts of too-long-suppressed rage and frustration. Not uncommonly, sexual activity was cut down or eliminated, usually on the wife’s initiative but sometimes on the husband’s. One Jewish woman, for example, “had always hated ‘it’ but never felt that she could do anything about it. [She supposed sex was her husband’s ‘right’ as long as he was providing for her.] But now, ‘thank God,’ it was possible for her to sleep apart from her husband.” Other women found their husbands less sexually attractive than before, in light of their economic failures and personal humiliations. Sometimes the men felt so emasculated by their failure, or so depressed and lethargic by their inactivity, that it was they who did not want to continue sexual relations.78

Comments made to social workers were revealing. One woman, an Anglo American, said bluntly that “when a man cannot provide for the family and makes you worry so, you lose your love for him. A husband has to have four qualifications—first, second, and third he should be able to support the family, and fourth he should have personality.” Her own husband had none of these qualifications. Things were even worse in another family, in which the father told an interviewer he didn’t “care a damn anymore… As far as I am concerned the kids can do what they please, and the wife, too, for that matter. It’s just like I said, ‘Love flies out of the window when money goes.’” One study of 471 husbands in Chicago found that 25 percent of marriages

78 Eli Ginzberg, The Unemployed, 77. See also—in addition to works cited immediately above—Samuel Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld, Research Memorandum on the Family in the Depression (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937).
that had been afflicted by unemployment for less than a month were unhappy, whereas 40 percent were unhappy if unemployment had lasted more than six months. On the other hand, some researchers argued that families that became very dysfunctional during the Depression had in most cases not been stable or healthy to begin with. Thus, another Chicago study concluded, perhaps with a touch of oversimplification, that “Well-organized families, even when greatly affected by the Depression, continued organized; unorganized or disorganized families became further disorganized.” In fact, “the family that was harmoniously organized became more unified [by the Depression] and the members more loyal.”\(^79\)

In the less fortunate families, though, alienation between husband and wife could become so extreme that separation or divorce was the only solution. The number of divorces in Cook County actually decreased between 1930 and 1933, then rose again, by 1935 reaching approximately its level before the Depression and staying there (or slightly below) for the rest of the decade. But the decline in divorce was a result of couples’ lack of money, not of marriages’ becoming happier. Social workers felt that separations increased in the early years of the Depression, and statistics showed that fewer children in 1933 than in 1930 lived in two-parent households. The number of new marriages plummeted in the first four Depression years, then rose to a peak in 1937, then plummeted again in the next two years, because young men could not hope to support a wife if they could not get a job.\(^80\)

In many families, the man’s relationship not only with his wife but also with his children suffered. Having lost the power of money, he lost some or all of his power over his kids, especially the adolescents. Without the ability to bribe them (with gifts, etc.) to behave in certain ways, and without commanding the same respect he had when employed, they tended to disobey


\(^80\) *Chicago Tribune*, June 2, 1939; “Broken Homes,” Burgess Papers, box 81, folder 4.
him. They would spend more time with their friends away from the home, they might refuse to do household chores, they would associate with unsavory characters he disapproved of. Some fathers grew so irritable and violent that their children readily obeyed them, but only out of fear. Even when they still respected their father, there was, understandably, some disappointment and even shame. “One of the most common things,” one man remembered decades later, “was this feeling of your father’s failure. That somehow he hadn’t beaten the rap. Sure things were tough, but why should I be the kid who had to put a piece of cardboard into the sole of my shoe to go to school?”

In 1934, students at the University of Chicago studied how the Depression had affected immigrant families in Chicago. People with connections to the Yugoslav community, for instance, reported that, since the vast majority of immigrants had been poor peasants before they came to Chicago, they were able to tolerate present difficulties “with much resignation and good will.” Less easy to tolerate was children’s habitual disobedience, starkly different from how the parents themselves had acted as children in Yugoslavia. “Prior to Depression [sic],” said one knowledgeable Yugoslavian, “when father was the sole bread winner and children much younger, he was ordinarily able to exercise much of his parental authority. At present, when his chances for employment are nil and children are the bread winners, situation is entirely different. There are few Yugoslav homes where parents still have the last word, although as a rule Yugoslav children are more home loving than for instance Polish.” While “affectional ties” in Yugoslav families had, in general, “loosened” because of the Depression, it was typical for extended families to stand by their members and help them despite their own troubles. This was

---

the case, of course, for many immigrant communities. The following observations, as well, apply to more than just Slavs or Yugoslavs:

The most depressing thought of Yugoslavs in this city, as well as of other Slavic groups, is feeling of social insecurity. While in the old country, on their small farms, although often hungry and never dressed well, they felt security of their soil, their little gardens and homesteads. They realize industry here is not able to give them such security and with much despair think of fatal “forty” when they are “too old” to work. Some of them, however, are confident that this prolonged depression will solve the question of social security—through proper legislative measures.  

Most did not have such far-sighted confidence, and so suffered from a scourge dreadful to the human mind: a dearth of hope. Social workers found this to be just as true of Anglo Americans as of immigrants. For many mothers, one author concluded, “the most serious strain was their gnawing fear that they would never escape from their present predicament.” The future was a wasteland of “constant harassment”: walking long distances to save a penny or two on purchases; helping children to get along on very little; washing and ironing everything, even heavy sheets, themselves (which they might not have done pre-Depression if they belonged to a middle-class family); constantly repairing clothing and furniture fabric; trying to cheer up their disconsolate husbands; in many cases, cooking and cleaning for boarders. Unemployed fathers may at times have nearly lost their minds from boredom, but few mothers had that luxury. And

---

82 “Yugoslavs in Chicago and Depression,” Burgess Papers, box 131, folder 4.
yet, as if all their housekeeping duties were not burdensome enough, some of them also had to suffer silently, perhaps, of the death of hope.\textsuperscript{83}

An unemployed social worker wrote a description of her experience that is worth quoting at length, in part for providing a middle-class perspective. It is the more poignant in that she had no dependents, was not responsible for parents or wife or children, and did not face the dreaded choice of starvation or charity, like so many others. But her experience was wrenching even so.

\begin{quote}
\ldots I kept telling myself, \textquote{Here is the leisure you have been craving for so long…} Now if ever is the time to learn the stores and to enjoy window-shopping, to bring your correspondence up to date, to visit your friends.

But somehow the savor had gone out of everything. It was hard to settle down to reading. Why write to friends till you had something to tell them? It was the same with visits. You grew tired of saying, \textquote{Nothing yet}; it touched your pride… You began to remember some sage articles of good advice, some well-laid plans to use the leisure of the unemployed by enticing them into classes. They had seemed excellent at the time. Now you began to understand why they wouldn’t work.

You understood now the basis for the complaints of a friend who taught English to foreigners. Her classes always fell off when work was slack. She had never been able to see why. \textquote{That is the very time they should come. They’re not tired. They could come to class fresh and rested and have lots of time for home study. Instead, they don’t come at all. Just shiftless, I call it. If they had any real ambition—! And then when they get jobs they come stringing back!” You could
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{83} Ginzberg, \textit{The Unemployed}, 80, 81.
explain it to your friend now. The poor souls, of course they couldn’t settle down
to study, worried and uneasy as they were!

…[More than a month passed.] A dead weight hung in my chest. It took
away the taste for food. Sleeping became difficult. My weight reached a new low.
A failure, done for, finished! The years ahead looked very dark—just down and
down…

I tried distraction. The movies seemed more inane than ever. A good play
helped for the time being, but the weight came back with added impetus as the
curtain fell, and moreover theaters were one of those expensive luxuries that must
be curtailed. Music was too introspective a diversion to be helpful, and constantly,
throughout the music or the play, went the undertone, “You’re wasting time,
precious time. This is your time to use. Back to your desk, work, work!” The fact
that I had no regular, useful occupation drove me desperately to compensate to
myself by producing something that I could say was worth while; and yet, when I
reached my desk, the worry and uncertainty and wavering faith in myself sapped
the flow of energy that might have gone into creative work and left only a trickle.

…Why did I find relief [in volunteer work] and not at the theater, with the
children and not in a book? The answer seemed clear. In the volunteer work and
with the children I was again of some use. I could help some one. Some one
turned to me, needed me. The feeling of inferiority no longer overwhelmed me, I
still amounted to something… 84

---

Being denied an opportunity to feel useful naturally led to the shame that was common among the jobless, whether middle- or lower-income. But, of course, those formerly in the middle class—if they stayed jobless for a long time—were even more affected by their loss of status and income than those in the working class. The man did not only lose status within the family; the whole family lost status relative to its former position and to the lucky ones who still had a job. A wife might grow resentful of her husband for losing his job and thereby destroying the comfort to which she had become accustomed. The husband, in turn, resented her resentment. She might leave him to rejoin her family, or he deserted her and the children, or possibly they were able to adapt to their new circumstances. Another possibility, however, was suicide. Business and professional people were more likely to kill themselves because of unemployment than skilled workers or common laborers were. In most cases, to quote an analyst from 1934, “the breaking point comes when people who have been accustomed to comfort are reduced to extreme hardship, with the added connotation of personal failure, bred into us by our training in ‘rugged individualism.’” A study of suicides in Seattle is suggestive: while there were 70 percent more suicides in 1932 than 1929, those ascribed entirely to economic and financial causes were nearly four times as many.\(^{85}\)

In this discussion of mental suffering it remains for us only to address two more topics: the rise in social atomization that grew out of mass unemployment, and some of the negative consequences of unemployment for the mental well-being of children and young adults. These topics are closely related, for, with fewer opportunities—because of less money—to interact with peers, to go to movies or concerts or buy nice clothes for dances or go on dates, the youth could grow restless, depressed, profoundly “alienated.” And insofar as some children were unable to go

to school or to participate in extracurricular activities because of the absence of clothing or transportation fare or for some other reason, their social integration and mental development were likewise handicapped.

On the most general tendencies of atomization, it may suffice to quote the following paragraph from an investigator in 1940:

[Unemployment] cancels many of the opportunities usually related to leisure. No social role is substituted for those gone with the job. The very chance to appear in any role before one’s fellows is reduced by the curtailing of contacts. The furtherance of economic security through trade-union and club membership is given up or postponed. The indirect security of a well-integrated family is lessened by the reduction of recreational events which help to bind the members of the family together. The reality of citizenship has been reduced by the loss of contact with organizations which participate to some extent in the larger interests of the community. The formal clubs, lodges, and trade unions through whose programs and affairs a man learns something of the larger issues in the community and gets a training in democracy—all these have been curtailed. Moreover the excursions which at least bring the worker in contact with a larger world than his own neighborhood have been severely cut down. The activities through which he might broaden his understanding of his part in the life of the community, such as reading and lectures and discussion groups, seem not to have been increased. He spends more time at home, and frequently the newspaper has
been stopped and the radio sold, so that even this source of contact with the larger world is reduced.\(^{86}\)

This conventional wisdom undoubtedly has much truth to it, though we’ll see later the degree to which it is overstated. A study specifically of Chicago observed that “Families that previously attended church regularly stopped because they lacked appropriate clothing and had no money to contribute. Club memberships were dropped, motion pictures became an impossible luxury, and friends and relatives could not be visited unless they were within walking distance, as there was no money for carfare. The removal of the telephone increased the isolation. Young people especially felt the lack of adequate clothing and were sensitive about all social contacts.” It was even worse in winter, when people would huddle in bed all day for lack of fuel and clothing. Outside, a deathly silence hung in the streets.\(^{87}\)

The want of decent clothing, especially among the working class, accentuated the isolation, the atomization of unemployment. Mothers complained to investigators about how they “sat in the house all day and never got out anywhere”—because of the lack of money, but also their ragged clothes. “I haven’t lost my pride yet,” said one. “I still want to be neat and clean and to have decent shoes on my feet!” The constant cooking and washing and sewing and scrubbing did little to alleviate the monotony of this truly “privatized” existence. “I get discouraged. A person waits day in and day out and nothin’ happens. My husband is disgusted.

\(^{86}\) Bakke, *Citizens Without Work*, 16, 17.

Sometimes he says he’ll go to the lake and drown himself. I’m always worried that he’ll do that some day.”

Trends of atomization were accentuated by the economic storm’s battering of the ethnic community, which had been so vital and vibrant in an earlier generation. Lizabeth Cohen expounds on this thesis in *Making a New Deal*, arguing that the weakening of ethnic and religious institutions in the 1930s helped usher in the age of industrial unionism and the welfare state. The former institutions no longer provided the security or sense of collective identity they once had, and the latter institutions took their place. Implicit in this argument is recognition of the epochal social change that heralded the heyday of the nation-state era between the 1930s and the 1960s: the relative decline of local and “personalistic” attachments in comparison to the rise of a broader but more atomized and diffuse sense of national belonging. These trends had been operating for centuries, but with the crisis of the 1930s and its resolution in the corporatist-Keynesian political economy of the 1940s and after, they reached their culmination. Political, corporate, and union bureaucracies manifested an unprecedented gigantism, extending their tentacles into every corner of society to regulate and control it, trying to indoctrinate populations with ideologies that subordinated all else—ethnicity, religion, occupation, local community—to the claims of nation and capitalism. Thus, insofar as the Great Depression and mass unemployment partially atomized and undermined the semi-insular ethnic community, this dovetailed with, and helped bring about, the maturation of the corporatist nation-state. That is to say, “the unemployed” were not the only ones who suffered the fragmentation of community;

---

ultimately everyone did, with the decline of localism and the eventual consolidation of sprawling corporatist bureaucracies.\[89\]

The demise of many neighborhood shopkeepers is a well-known example. In the 1920s, Karl Marx’s predictions about the dismal fate of most of the petty-bourgeoisie still could have seemed mistaken, given the proliferation of local merchants and storekeepers who were frequently good friends with their customers. They would regularly give them credit during hard times, trusting that because of their personal relationships they would be paid back; and such special treatment often induced customers to continue patronizing these neighborhood shops rather than the emerging chain stores. By the 1940s, however, it was clear, or should have been, that Marx had been largely right all along: most of the petty-bourgeois eventually succumbed to wage-labor, and the economy came to be utterly dominated by oligopolies.\[90\] Between 1930 and 1935 in the U.S., for instance, 750,000 independent enterprisers in industry, trade, and the professions were wiped out (about one in five), including 500,000 storekeepers. This translated into a partial loss of the vitality of local ethnic life, as—among other things—the chain store supplanted the trusty neighborhood merchant who could no longer afford to extend credit.\[91\]

It is easy, however, to overestimate the waning of ethnic and racial ties—clubs, churches, charities, the many immigrant “societies” that existed for every conceivable purpose, whether financial, educational, social, athletic, cultural, or religious—that took place under the two shocks of the Great Depression and the U.S.’s restriction of immigration in the early 1920s. The

---


\[90\] Where Marx went wrong was in his failure to predict the welfare state and Keynesian stimulation of demand, which emerged as capitalist remedies to these trends of class polarization and working-class immiseration. See my *Worker Cooperatives and Revolution*. Now that the welfare state is in decline across the West and class polarization is peaking again, it has become clear that the real problem with Marx was that, in a sense, he was 150 years ahead of his time.

\[91\] “Middle Class Hit By Crisis,” *Labor Notes*, September 1935.
membership of many of these non-commercial organizations did decline in the 1920s and especially the first half of the 1930s, but rarely was the decline catastrophic. It was even partly reversed in the late thirties and forties. Civil society remained vibrant, with frequent parades, festivals, public picnics, union events, and constant church activities (there were 500 churches in the Black Belt alone). To some extent the Depression even stimulated these, as we’ll see. Those who suffered from material deprivation invented their own modes of association, and rebelled in their own ways against the atomizing tendencies of unemployment.92

But these tendencies were indeed prominent, affecting not only the jobless themselves but also their children. In fact, even apart from the intrinsic consequences of unemployment, Chicago youth were driven towards atomization by the Depression, in particular by the policies that the Depression provided a pretext for big business and government to impose on the city. Closing playgrounds, excluding children four to five years old from kindergarten, closing Crane College (throwing 3,500 students onto the streets “with no opportunity to continue their courses and no employment open to them”), and enacting all the other reactionary policies mentioned earlier certainly did nothing to enhance social integration. Juvenile delinquency increased in the early years of the Depression, although statistics from the time may not be reliable because of the slashing of government budgets and the large amount of crime that never made it to the attention of the police or the press. What is certain is that Chicago’s Black Belt had the highest juvenile crime rate in the city—21 percent of youth delinquents in 1930 were African-American, and over 20 percent of African-American boys between 1933 and 1940 were involved in delinquency—because of overcrowded schools, inadequate recreational facilities, broken homes, and high unemployment. When asked by city officials in the 1930s why black youth were committing


156
more crimes than ever, a minister in Bronzeville replied curtly, “wipe out vice and give my people jobs!”

While some reactionary government policies exacerbated the atomization and alienation of youth, it was overwhelmingly poverty and unemployment that were responsible for these trends. Unfortunately it is difficult to give statistics on this, partly in principle—for how does one “measure” alienation?—but also because of the paucity of data on school attendance, church membership, the closing of social programs and recreational outlets, etc. We know that throughout the 1930s thousands of young people attended school irregularly. We know that many of Chicago’s churches lost a third or more of their income in the first half of the decade, which led to cuts in youth outreach programs and contributed to declining membership. We know that some young people, albeit a small minority, fled their homes and roamed the country in search of work and adventure. All this suggests atomization, but it is impossible to be very precise about such a condition or to give figures on it.

The Depression’s most tragic effect on youth was that it disrupted life paths and career paths. It was a colossal wall suddenly erected between the present and ambitions for the future. The young may not always have been immediately resentful for having to drop out of school to help support their family, but if they were still working in a dead-end job two or three years later, unable to resume their education, unable to get married and start their own life, they were likely to be bitter. Frequently relief agencies required that if a family were to receive relief, the children who were of an appropriate age had to financially contribute, so as to reduce the burden on the

---


94 “Effect of the depression on religion in the area bounded by 47th, 51st, South Park, and the New York Central tracks, as reported in an interview with the Rev. J. B. Redmond,” Ernest Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1.
agency. (This was in keeping with the typical policy that one could receive relief only after exhausting all other resources.) This demand amounted to a demand that the child postpone independence. A young Chicagoan of 20 expressed his frustration in a letter to his family’s caseworker in 1934:

…You see, it is only natural for every mature animal to wean himself from his parents on reaching maturity; and at some time there comes to every normal man the urge to marry and rear a family of his own, that is to say, I am not an economic unit of the family and should have the opportunity to work for my own living. Of course, I believe in helping my folks; I have done it on a part-time job while attending college, but such help is not really help but sharing the poverty. If the relief agency is going to hamper the progress of young people by forever tying them down to their parents, their own future families will be dependent upon society. It is both economically unfair and socially unjust to expect me to continue to support my family.95

Or consider the story of Mary O’Rourke. “She left school after the eighth grade, found a job, and helped support the family for a year. Then she fell in love and married. Her husband’s income was sufficient to support himself and his wife, and he objected to Mary’s working, but her family needed her help, so she took a job against his wishes. Presently his business took him to another city. Mary was torn between the desire to go with him and to stay by her family. She stayed. After a year and a half she lost track of her husband, and three years have now passed

since she heard from him. She is bitter and her frustration is reflected in her work and in her social relationships."\textsuperscript{96}

Even worse than being tied to a low-paying job to support one’s family was having no job, or educational, prospects at all, a reality for many thousands of Chicago youth. The terrible and ironic thing was that at the very moment that more teenagers were dropping out of school to find full-time work, far fewer jobs were available. But if, as a result, these temporary “dropouts” who could not find work decided to resume their education—if, that is, they were able to find a means of traveling to the school and obtaining appropriate clothing—the schools sometimes could not accommodate their return anyway, especially if it took place in the middle of a term. There were already too many students (and too few teachers), even after thousands had left school. As for job opportunities, the \textit{Monthly Labor Review} reported that even in the relatively prosperous year of 1937, 41 percent of Americans between 15 and 19 years of age who were in the labor market were either unemployed or engaged in “emergency work.” The corresponding number for those from 20 to 24 years old was lower—24 percent—but this was still higher than for any older age group, including between 65 and 74. Clearly the Depression hit the youth hardest.\textsuperscript{97}

“Truly,” wrote one reporter, “the amount of shoe-leather these youngsters spend in their job-hunting is pathetic. They trudge from factory to factory, from shop to mill. They wait and hope, go home sick at heart, and rally their courage and their optimism to march out again, until they get too tired to try any more.”\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
In addition to the despair of having no future was the stifling of present desires, which must have been made even more painful by consciousness of the unfairness of it all, of the fact that other young people were satiating their hearts’ desires even while one had to restrict one’s own consumption to little more than subsistence levels. Let one young woman speak for the millions:

…I have two dresses to my back, for work and Sundays too. As for the house, the only good piece of furniture we have is the kitchen stove. I can’t bring my friends to a house where they can’t even sit down… Why, we haven’t had a rug on the floor for four years. I don’t think you would feel differently if you were in my shoes and had to work every day and sit at home and look at four walls every Saturday and Sunday and start all over again Monday. I haven’t any girl friends because I can’t dress the way they do. I can’t go anywhere because I haven’t any money. If I knew this existence was only for a short time I wouldn’t feel this way, but it’s been like this for over three years, ever since I started working, and we’re worse off now than when I started.  

Another young Chicagoan wrote a similar letter, complaining that while working for the American Medical Association at $60 a month, she had in the past two years been able to buy for herself precisely four things: a pair of shoes, a summer dress, a blouse, and a hat. All the rest went to her family. “Would you,” she asked her caseworker, “or any other girl of 21 like to live on this budget for two years? Wouldn’t you like to be able to see a show with the girls you work with once in a while? So would I, but I can’t.” She was able to pay her family’s gas and

99 Quoted in Brooke, “Youth Engulfed.”
electricity bills by frequently going without lunch. But the relief agency continued to insist that she tolerate this existence indefinitely, sacrificing herself. Her caseworker reported all this in an article that ended, appropriately, “We [relief workers] are denying [the youth] the right to education, recreation and marriage, and to a normal chance to develop and maintain their capacity for complete living. They are bewildered, baffled, engulfed.”

It is true that there were sometimes perks to being the only one in the family who worked. As a 20-year-old boy said, “I certainly enjoy being bossy. Because I’m working I get the best things to eat, the best light to read by, the best bed to sleep in, and everyone has to do as I say.” In the Brady family, where the father had been the archetypal authoritarian before losing his job, the 17-year-old son Henry became the new boss, because he was employed. His mother gave him more food than his father, he was allowed to go out whenever he wanted and spend whatever he wanted, and he was rarely punished even for treating his father with contempt (e.g., by casually tossing a couple of pennies at him out of “generosity”). Some mothers expressed worry to caseworkers that their working son would leave home (perhaps as their husband had); to forestall that, they treated him with extreme consideration, for instance by ordering younger children to obey their older working brother(s) and not “talk back.”

But all this only spotlights the familial disruption and disorientation that could attend the father’s unemployment, and illustrates, once again, how a simple change in class conditions has tremendous repercussions for other spheres of life. Gender norms are disrupted, authority patterns are upset and new ones established, emotional conflicts multiply and intensify, old values and ideologies collapse. “We live in a material world,” to quote Madonna, a world structured overwhelmingly by material and economic processes. To a large extent, the poor live

100 Ibid.
in a different universe than the rich; and Plato was right to distinguish the city of the poor from that of the rich. While there are institutional connections between the two cities, the types of experiences, lifestyles, economic pressures, suffering, and interpretations of the world that predominate in the respective communities tend to differ. What goes on among the poor is of little concern to the rich and vice versa, except insofar as it bears on the power and well-being of the rich and vice versa. This explains how, at the same time that so much of the country was living in poverty and unhappiness, the goal of “the rich” could, in effect, be to increase poverty and unhappiness, by enacting austerity policies at the local, state, and federal levels—except when the victims of these policies collectively behaved in such a near-revolutionary way that the rich were compelled to grant concessions. I’ll elaborate on these points in chapters four through six. For now, though, having described some of the hardships that the long-term unemployed had to endure, let us look at how they met them.
Chapter III
Coping

Many commentators during and after the 1930s were inclined to make sweeping negative generalizations about the long-term unemployed. They were seen as almost universally passive, apathetic, despairing, and atomized, something like an inert mass of lost souls. One observer in 1933 writes, “The acquiescence of the unemployed…is what impresses us. To be sure, there are mutterings and bursts of sullen resentment and an occasional riot, but the prevailing attitude up to the present time has been submissive.” Another declares baldly that “the unemployed man and his wife have no social life outside the family. The extent of the social isolation of the family is truly striking. This refers not only to formal club affiliations but also to informal social life.” A sympathetic investigator states, “their lives, made difficult by unemployment, [are] barren of amusement. One has the general impression…that one day’s work and idleness is just like that of the next; that the wife never quite catches up with her duties, that the children get along as best they can, and that the husband, who when working comes home tired, ready to read the paper and to go to bed, when out of work, is equally tired at night, having done nothing of greater consequence than walking the streets all day.”

Scholarship since the thirties has frequently painted its pictures in similarly dreary hues. For example, William Leuchtenburg sweepingly states that “without work, without hope of work, [the jobless man] spent his days in purposeless inactivity,” quoting the opinion of a contemporary observer that “These are dead men… They are ghosts that walk the streets by day. They are ghosts sleeping with yesterday’s newspapers thrown around them for covers at night.”

---

1 Williams, Human Aspects of Unemployment and Relief, 8; Komarovsky, The Unemployed Man and His Family, 122; Friedman, “A Study of One Hundred Unemployed Families,” 13.
Irving Bernstein concludes, strangely, that “melancholia and defeat had [by 1932] overwhelmed not only the jobless but also those who sought to infuse spirit into them.” In Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s words, “people were sullen rather than bitter, despairing rather than violent.”

As we saw in the last chapter, such interpretations are by no means wholly false. They have a kernel of truth, but they state it in a tendentious and exaggerated form. Some of the long-term unemployed did, of course, succumb to abject despair and even suicide; but most did not. In fact, there are historians who draw almost the opposite conclusions from those just quoted. Anthony Badger, for instance, insists that “What characterised the American workers’ response to unemployment was tough-minded realism. Such stoicism and resilience might militate against political radicalism but it did not signify self-blame, indifference, or hopeless despair.” James T. Patterson rejects the notion that poverty produced an apathetic lower class, quoting George Orwell’s description of similar conditions in England: “It may be that the psychological adjustment which the working class are visibly making is the best they could make in the circumstance. They have neither turned revolutionary nor lost their self-respect; merely they have kept their tempers and settled down to make the best of things on a fish-and-chip standard.”

Even one of the 1930s’ writers quoted above admits that “Acquiescence is…largely a name for an impression the observer gets, not a description of the psychological condition of the unemployed. Though they may appear to acquiesce, that does not describe their state of mind. Essential in this is the desire to work, the habit of being given work by an employer and of submitting to his directions, the idea of a right to work, a contempt for laziness, a sense of

---


injustice at not being able to get work when a man knows that he is not lazy, an aversion to asking for charity, which traditionally has been the recourse of the worthless, and finally, an uncertainty about the present unemployment situation.” This characterization, as we’ll see, while still formulated in quite general terms, has at least as much truth to it as the negative ones quoted above.⁴

Indeed, that the long-term unemployed tend to have a truly despairing, passive approach to life was already denied by one of the pioneering studies on which much later research was based. Published in 1933, Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community investigated how an Austrian town of 1,486 people had adapted to the unprecedented crisis of having nearly all its men out of work for years. The authors found that the majority of families subject to long-term joblessness had a realistic resigned attitude as opposed to despairing or apathetic: it entailed “drifting along, indifferently and without expectations, accepting a situation that cannot be changed. With it goes a relatively calm general mood, and even sporadically returning moments of serenity and joy. But the future, even in the shape of plans, has no longer any place in the thought or even dreams of these families.” Despite the unremitting material deprivation, these were fairly well-ordered households with children who were, on the whole, well looked after. In fact, one of the most common statements heard from jobless fathers in any country or city, not only Marienthal, was that nothing, not even starvation, was more unbearable than to see their children go without food or new clothes. A Chicago man bluntly told an investigator, “If relief won’t give me enough I’ll do almost anything. My children are growing and they have to eat.” Another said, “I don’t mind being hungry myself, but it’s hard to see the wife and kids without enough to eat. And sometimes you get mad and holler just because you

⁴ Williams, Human Aspects of Unemployment and Relief, 12.
feel so bad.” Such statements hardly indicate apathy; on the contrary, they evince outrage, unselfish concern for others, and the determination to scrape by for the sake of one’s family.  

In this chapter, accordingly—and in later ones—we’ll consider Chicago’s Depression-era unemployed from the perspective of their *activity*, unlike in the previous chapter. Because of what they had to endure, they were frequently compelled to adopt a stance of courage and even semi-heroism, for the sake of loved ones. The material in this chapter and others will also serve to illustrate what I mentioned earlier in the study, the shallowness of bourgeois cultural and ideological hegemony, together with people’s essential “pragmatism” or “realism.” In the tasks of survival and day-to-day living, the socially disadvantaged are, on both implicit and explicit levels, constantly resisting, improvising, calculating, cooperating, rationally using whatever devices are available to take what they can get from an oppressive and—as they well know—unjust political economy. The struggle of living-while-poor is a *class* struggle, and as such is necessarily opposed to the dominant society. Indeed, it is a direct and immediate outgrowth—so direct and necessary as to be practically an integral component—of “the” class struggle, the antagonism of interests and continuous underlying conflict between dominant and subordinate classes. It need not entail a lucid or theoretically sophisticated “class consciousness” among the poor, inasmuch as such consciousness is not necessary or useful to people concerned with life and death; but the struggle does tend to entail at least a latent awareness of oneself as belonging to a group or groups that have grievances and interests in common, as against the privileged and the rich. As we’ll see in chapter six, it does not take much for the seed of this awareness to flower into a more militant class consciousness.

---

Many historians of the Great Depression have discussed how people found ways to survive. Indeed, that would seem to be all but an obligatory subject of analysis in any general treatment of those years. General treatments, however, do not often go into great depth; and, to my knowledge, none does so with regard to the unemployed of Chicago. Even Lizabeth Cohen’s celebrated Making a New Deal only obliquely explores the topic, for her focus is on the local and ethnic institutions that failed those who relied on them. Of recent scholarship, the book that says most about these matters of survival and consumption in the U.S. is Susan Porter Benson’s Household Accounts: Working-Class Family Economies in the Interwar United States (2007), which, as she states, “explore[s] working-class consumption through the prism of the family.”

Her study covers some of the same ground as this chapter, although its focus is not solely on the unemployed or Chicago (or, for that matter, the Depression). Perhaps most interesting for our purposes is that Benson’s work supports one of the central contentions of this dissertation, that class is a uniquely important variable in interpreting and explaining both social dynamics and people’s behavior. As she says,

I set out…to write a history of working-class consumption, hoping to find both evidence of working-class immersion in a national culture of abundance and documentation of distinct racial-ethnic patterns of consumption. I found neither…

[W]hen it came to confronting the market, ethnicity became a kind of second-order influence; some groups, in some places, turned more to one strategy than to

---

another, but the difference was more one of degree than of kind, and all drew on a common array of strategies.  

This is what I found in my own research as well: it is very difficult to make meaningful distinctions between ethnicities or races, except in a few special cases that will be mentioned later. I should note here that I was unaware of Benson’s study while writing the bulk of this chapter, and was surprised, to say the least, to find that she had anticipated some of its themes. Nevertheless, there is enough that is different so that my account is not a mere replica of hers. In particular, hers does not share an explicit emphasis on the relative autonomy of the culture of the “lower orders” from that of the upper, the Marx-inspired emphasis on the elements of creativity, realism, adaptability, solidarity, and anti-capitalist generosity in working-class culture.

It is true, of course, that people living in modern societies can hardly avoid some degree of integration into mainstream institutions and value-systems. To use the language of Jean-Paul Sartre, such involvement is inseparable from the “facticity,” the background condition over which we have no control, of existing in a rather integrated mass society. Our lives are shot through with passivity: we have no say in where or when we are born, no say in what practices and ideas we are indoctrinated with at an early age, no say in the necessity to participate in society in order to earn a living, little say in what the institutions are that provide the context in which we live. The second thought in Marx’s famous line from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte articulates the passive element of human life: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances they have chosen, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”

---

7 Ibid., 6, 7.
Thus, no one is wholly autonomous, and everyone’s “consciousness” is “contradictory,” having been formed by a diverse and mutually inconsistent array of influences.

On the other hand, the first five words of that quotation suggest a critique of the Gramscian emphasis on hegemony and indoctrination. People are, after all, free and creative. Even slaves have the inner freedom of their own mind, and the possibility of committing perpetual small acts of resistance. The very *spontaneity* of human consciousness and behavior, which is its freedom, signifies continuous rupture, and is itself already a kind of underlying “resistance” to static authority. It is the *dynamism* of individuality, especially of a group of individualities, that makes it necessary for authority constantly to readjust itself and its relation to subordinates in order to maintain its power. Authority is always under existential threat.

In the following we’ll encounter some of the examples of class-determined resistance mentioned in the Introduction (in the quotations from James C. Scott), such as stealing from businesses. But, again, we should not think of such acts alone as constituting “resistance” or “class struggle.” Rather, they were just another tactic that people used to get by, i.e., to struggle for more resources for themselves, their loved ones, and often others in similar circumstances. It was *all* in the mode of rational self-assertion and multidimensional solidarity against a hegemonic order.

Later in the chapter I will also discuss some of the ways that the long-term unemployed were able to enjoy themselves despite their troubles. The point, again, is to illustrate human spontaneity and independence—independence from mainstream indoctrination, from mental dominance by “superordinate classes.” To paraphrase Marx, people made their own recreation, though not always in circumstances of their own choosing. In the company of others, they tried to ward off the evils of ennui and despair that were apt to arise from unemployment and poverty;
and the vitality of life in the poorer areas of Chicago during this time of even-greater-than-usual poverty indicates that to a large extent they succeeded. For example, the Mexican colony in South Chicago overcame the atomizing effects of unemployment by embracing a shared passion for sports, particularly baseball, softball, and basketball. In fact, sports tended to unite communities—Irish, Italian, German, Hungarian, Greek—all over the city.

There is one significant type of “recreation” that I do not address in this chapter: religion. The chapter is simply too long to include a section on religion. I save that section for chapter five, in which I discuss the reciprocal interest that churches displayed in the poor and the poor displayed in churches.

**Surviving**

The strategies of staying alive, of continuing to find ways to eat and drink and have a shelter over one’s head when business and government treated one as “redundant” and unnecessary, were not much different in the 1930s than they had been in the 1880s. Indeed, they were not much different from devices resorted to even now when unemployment insurance runs out. Using up one’s savings, relying on earnings from a spouse or children, borrowing from relatives or friends or moving in with them, picking up odd jobs here and there, borrowing on life insurance policies, moving to a cheaper home, taking in lodgers (of course less common now than it used to be), going into debt with neighborhood grocers and shopkeepers, and so forth. There were also the avenues of institutional relief, whether public or private. In an “abstract” way we already know all this, the manifold ways people managed to persevere when mainstream society had turned its back on them. In an abstract way we know that the human species is
resourceful. What is interesting, though, is the concrete reality of this “scraping by,” and the intimate realities of people’s resourcefulness and pride.  

We must remember, incidentally, that hundreds of thousands of Chicagoans had been living on the margins before the Depression, and had already become accustomed to the kind of living described in the following pages. The irregularly employed, the part-time workers, the miserably paid, the disabled—they were familiar with the fine art of economic improvisation. The Depression only deepened their familiarity, and introduced the art to many thousands more.

A few short descriptions of how people adapted to long-term unemployment may serve to introduce the subject. Take, for example, the Buenger family, who lived in the Stockyards neighborhood. The father was laid off from a pipe manufacturing company in November 1930. “His wife found a job scrubbing floors at the Chicago Civic Opera for $21.50 a week. For three months the family managed on the mother’s income. In addition they accumulated debts with the grocer, who was a godfather of one of the children. They also borrowed small sums from friends. During this period they moved to a cheaper apartment… The location was almost the same, but in the new place there were only four rooms for eight persons.” After three months they applied for, and received, financial assistance from a settlement house, and began to receive food rations from the county, while continuing to accumulate debts for groceries and meat. The oldest daughter found part-time work that paid from $3 to $5 each week.

In the same neighborhood, the Wisniewskis fell into trouble when the 36-year-old father suffered a severe acid burn at work in May 1930 (he was employed by a company making freight cars). He failed to get workmen’s compensation, and he had virtually nothing saved in the bank and no insurance policies. So his wife had to ruthlessly slash the budget. No more music lessons

---

8 Alexander Keyssar, Out of Work, chapter 6; Cohen, Making a New Deal, chapter 5.
for the two kids; cheaper food; no money for clothing or recreation; and they moved to a smaller apartment. Her brother, who owned a farm, brought her milk, fresh vegetables, and butter, as her mother gave her $500 and clothes for herself and the children. After six months they accepted the need to apply for charity, as well as selling some of their furniture. Through the relief agency, Mrs. Wisniewski temporarily got a part-time job putting rubber holders on glass eye-droppers for five hours a day, though this earned her only $3 a week. Months later, in the summer of 1931, when relief funds were scarce, she found a job at Swift & Company as a “butler” in the cafeteria, for $6 a week. The couple’s roles had switched: the husband, who could not find a job, took care of the children and did most of the housework. Meanwhile, they had had to move again, and the children were at a new school they didn’t like. Mrs. Wisniewski had no idea how long her new job would last, and the family looked to the future with trepidation.  

Many people were able to go without charity entirely, for years. For example, Ralph, 53 in 1937, had been a carpenter but lost his job early in the Depression. With his savings soon gone and his wife ill, he sent her to live with relatives on a farm in Indiana and began to look for work. As stated in an article in the *Chicago Tribune,*

> …When he walked past restaurants he knocked on the windows. If no work was forthcoming he picked up a broom and began sweeping the sidewalk. He had one regular job: Emptying ashes each Friday night for two elderly spinsters. He walked four miles to their home, and the first night he received 75 cents in payment. “Shucks,” he said, “it ain’t wuth [sic] that much,” and returned 50 cents. The spinsters told their friends, and soon he was emptying a dozen ash cans.

---

10 Ibid., 99–101
No matter how menial the labor, Ralph took it. When he had a handyman’s job-for-a-day at $1, he became exultant. And for four years he existed. If at times he went hungry he never complained. Instead he proudly displayed seven cents in his wallet—car fare to the next job, when it came. It came a month ago, a regular job as janitor at $15 a week. And he sent for his wife.\footnote{Chicago Tribune, August 13, 1937.}

The following story, on the other hand, has elements of tragedy (and, at one point, almost comical absurdity):

A Polish father on the southwest side, a building contractor, entered the depression with head high. He had a large home, free of liens, and was worth $150,000. Overnight everything disappeared. Both he and his wife had nervous breakdowns.

The couple had four children, two girls and two young boys. The eldest girl, now 20, who had taken a brief business course, assumed all responsibility. “I have to,” she told the Illinois state employment service. “If a relief worker comes in our door my father will kill her.”

At night, when her parents were in bed, she went to neighborhood political meetings and did secretarial work, averaging 50 cents a night. Some weeks she made $4, and the family got along somehow. During the succeeding three years the gravest calamity was the father’s attempt to commit suicide by taking gas. He was revived, but the gas bill left them without food for a week.
Eventually the girl obtained work operating a machine in a factory at $9 a week. She was so well liked that when she left, a few months ago, to work in a dairy at $18 a week, her younger sister was given her position. The two boys, now 13 and 14, also have small jobs at last, and the family is still together.¹²

Last, here is the history of an African-American woman of 45 who had a sick mother to support. She lost her job as a postal clerk in 1934, after working for fifteen years, not long enough to be eligible for a pension. All she had was a few hundred dollars in the bank. She couldn’t find work: “my gray hair tells against me,” she sighed. Soon her savings were exhausted, but she still refused to apply for relief. “Instead she did sewing, when she could get it, for $1 or $1.50 a day, or tended children for 50 cents an afternoon,” managing to struggle along in this way for three years. At last, in 1937, she got a steady job as a housekeeper for a Beverly Hills family (near Washington Heights), for which she earned $8 a week. Her situation was helped by the fact that her mother started receiving monthly old age assistance checks in 1936, which paid for her special food and medicines.¹³

In short, each household met the Depression in its own unique way, although we can point to similarities and patterns in their approaches. The trials of unemployment forced them to use capacities for inventiveness that, arguably, had lain partially dormant in their earlier workaday existence.

Naturally, the first recourse of any household whose head was no longer employed was to use up some or all of the savings that had been accumulated in prior years. Among manual

¹² Ibid., August 21, 1937.
¹³ Ibid., August 14, 1937.
workers, it was rare for savings to be substantial, because of the hand-to-mouth existence and the typically large families. Nearly all had saved less than $200, in addition to having insurance policies of one form or another, often several per family. Even when hundreds of dollars had been set aside in banks, though—painstakingly accumulated over many years, years of scrimping and scraping, self-denial, frugal living to build up some security for the future—the money became useless when the banks failed in 1931 and 1932. Suddenly all that money and the psychological comfort it entailed vanished: what had required endless effort to create was destroyed with the closing of two august doors, as outside people cried and begged for them to reopen. These financial tragedies constituted yet another punch-in-the-gut for always-struggling working-class families, yet another mockery of “America smiles on hard workers” myths. Some people even thought that, in their geographical area at least, the collapse of the banks was more of a catastrophe than the widespread unemployment itself, because the bank closings wiped out middle-class savings. Dempsey Travis, a young African-American living on Chicago’s South Side, remembered later what happened to his uncle when the black-owned Binga State Bank was closed in August 1930. “Thrifty Uncle Otis became destitute with the turn of the examiner’s key in the front door of the bank. Otis Travis died in 1933, broke and broken-hearted, without having recovered one penny of his savings.” Other victims of bank closings lost their sanity and were institutionalized.14

The majority of the long-term unemployed had at least some small savings (aside from those invested in homes) they could initially draw on: certainly more than one fourth had bank accounts, and at least three fourths had insurance policies they might be able to borrow on or cash in. Many also, wisely suspicious of dominant institutions, had stashed away money at home.

---

However, of a hundred unemployed blue-collar families interviewed in June 1932, only one still had any bank or home savings left, and 76 no longer had any insurance at all. They had either borrowed up to the limit, cashed the policies in, or let them expire; and several fathers who had belonged to fraternal insurance societies had dropped out. Such societies had become much less useful now that so many of their members had ceased to pay dues; in fact, as Lizabeth Cohen describes, most ethnic societies either collapsed early in the Depression or had to dramatically curtail the benefits they offered members. The Slovene National Benefit Society, for instance, reduced benefits for sickness, injuries, and surgical operations as its funds depleted and its membership shrank (from almost 64,000 in 1930 to 48,000 by spring 1933). In general, then, insurance does not seem to have been of great value to most of the unemployed. This was especially the case with regard to the many low-income—especially African-American—families who had industrial life insurance policies payable on a weekly basis, usually very small policies with premiums as low as 10 cents a week. (An insurance agent made a weekly trip to their home to collect the money, often scamming people out of far more than they owed.) And since companies typically did not give this kind of insurance any loan or cash surrender value until the policy had been carried for many years, families could rarely get money out of it anyway.  

The decision to use up all or nearly all of one’s savings—in the desperate effort to avoid being a charity case—must have been agonizing for these people whose years of thrift had been directed towards a definite end, and not this one. An Italian man who came to a relief agency to beg for work had lived for six months on money he had spent two years accumulating, money

---

with which he had hoped to bring his wife and two children to the United States. A Jewish man had to exhaust the $80 that it had taken him four years to save. Another man had saved $1,500, but this he, too, consumed on rent, food, household expenses, and doctors’ bills before applying for relief. Countless families had hoped to buy a home (or were in the process of doing so) and live the American dream, or at least have some security in their old age…but because they had to survive in the present, they were forced to sacrifice future security.16

While savings were of use in the short term, in the long term—and immediately—the most essential adjustment was to cut down on living expenses. As soon as a family perceived that it would be difficult for its chief wage-earner to get hired again, it was apt to stop paying union dues and to end payments on installment goods. (Interestingly, companies did not usually reclaim the products that had not been paid for in full. Only for the most valuable goods, such as expensive pieces of furniture, was it worthwhile to do so.) As mentioned in the last chapter, working-class families quickly had to sacrifice many high-quality, expensive foods, instead eating starches and sugars. It was not uncommon, in fact, for families—at least in the early stages of unemployment—to try to pay all their large bills first, such as rent, coal, and gas, spending only the leftover money on groceries. “Payment of rent comes before anything else,” remarked one mother, “and I would rather have that clear than sufficient food.” Perhaps an odd attitude, but understandable in light of the dread of being evicted or of having to go deeply into debt. As the months wore on, though, and savings depleted, these fears lost their battle with reality: it was frequently the largest bills, particularly rent, that had to be sacrificed, since nothing was more necessary than food.17

---

The ways that most of the deprived economized have, unfortunately, been lost in the fog of history, memorialized only occasionally in the scattered remarks of journalists, social workers, memoirists, and letter-writers. The Bennett family bought a kerosene stove, cut in half their two-quart milk order, and “managed on one ton of coal this winter [1932].” The Flemings decided that if they slept late, two meals a day would be enough. The Sumner family had baked potatoes and salt for their New Year’s dinner, while the Samples “lived on crackers” for a year. The Parkers used no gas for seven years, and, like many, could not afford ice in the summer (only a small minority of Americans owned refrigerators) or repairs on such household equipment as the sewing machine. In most cases, it quickly became necessary to forego such luxuries as clothes-shopping, movie-watching, book-buying, and church-donating. In addition, “laundry formerly sent out was done at home; dental work was delayed; needed operations and medical treatment were postponed; baking was done at home; telephones were dispensed with.” Sooner or later, whatever could go, did.18

As custodians of the family economy, women were in charge of much of the economizing. A Polish woman who worked as a domestic laborer observed that her daughter needed good clothes for high school: “I make all the clothes for her—make things over if I get some nice dresses from my employers. Yes, I always see to it that Viola looks nice and the same way with every one in my family—no matter how poor.” Another woman remembered, many years later, a series of never-ending chores: “Sewing, patching, darning, mending. Handing down, cutting down, and making over… Ripping seams and remodeling old suits and dresses. Unravelling sweaters and using the wool to knit other sweaters as the children grew. Mending socks, stockings, underthings. Patching worn places, and then patching the patches.” Such

resourcefulness was necessary even for good housekeeping, since it was by no means easy to keep things looking nice when one lacked money for replacements. The few free minutes a woman had every day might be spent repairing old furniture. One study found that 70 percent of women whose families were on relief were “good” housekeepers (as opposed to “poor” or “passable”), an impressive proportion that may be explained in part by what an interviewer said of one Mrs. Horowitz: “She had always taken a good deal of pleasure in her home, and now it was almost her only pleasure. Her furnishings were lovely and looked like new, although Mrs. Horowitz said that she had had them for nineteen years.”

An indication of the gulf that World War II and the postwar period created between the old world and the new is given by the conditions, and the survival strategies, of the unemployed. From the 1880s to the 1930s, they did not significantly change. As in the 1880s, so in the 1930s “clothing was patched rather than replaced, insurance policies were dropped, sick children were treated with home remedies. Fuel expenses were reduced by keeping rooms unheated, by scavenging the streets for coal and wood, and by switching from electric to kerosene lamps or from lamps to candles… [As in the 1930s, so] during the depression of the 1890s, one family lived for ‘two weeks upon bread and molasses’; others purchased, for a few cents, the leavings from restaurants.” These quotations are from Alexander Keyssar’s *Out of Work*, which is about Massachusetts in an earlier era, but they could equally apply to Chicago in the Great Depression. The following *New York Times* article from 1933 could have been written in the 1890s:

---


Residents of Chicago within a radius of several miles from Lake Calumet are solving their fuel problem this Winter by helping themselves to a considerable supply of peat recently discovered along the northern shore of the lake. Each day the stream of traffic to and from the swamp increases and every kind of conveyance is used for transporting the peat.

...The neighborhood of the bog is dotted with huts built by men who were left unemployed when the surrounding factories stopped production. The huts have been constructed from materials gathered from the near-by dump. The peat fuel has been a godsend to this colony. It is removed in blocks or sods about three by four feet in dimension. After the blocks are dried in the sun to remove excess moisture, they are stacked in piles to be cut into chunks for burning as needed.

Thus, in general, every imaginable expedient was resorted to—sometimes on the basis of strangers’ kindness. Some families were allowed to live in basements or rear apartments in exchange for taking care of furnaces, doing odd painting or carpentry jobs, or just looking after an unoccupied house. Owners let people live in old garages, attics that had been unused, and carriage houses (old buildings for housing horse-drawn carriages) if they would “fix them up.” The rear of a store could become a rent-free home, albeit perhaps a cold, gas-less and electricity-less one. And many families, especially African-American, lived rent-free in buildings that had been condemned but not yet torn down. The most notorious of these was the so-called Angelus Building, a seven-story building on the Near South Side that had served as a popular hotel during the World’s Fair of 1893 but now housed “the most forlorn and destitute of all of Chicago’s great population of hungry and miserable people.” As an investigator wrote, “going from floor to floor
and through one dark hall after another, searchlight in hand, one could only think of Dickens and places like Tom-All-Alone’s in London in the middle of the nineteenth century; and it became necessary to remind one’s self often that this was the twentieth century in one of the greatest and wealthiest cities of the world.” Scores of families lived in this dark, cold, fire-hazardous, waterless building, secure at least from the threat of eviction, if nothing else.\(^{21}\)

The ranks of the truly extreme “economizers” included thousands, surely, who could relate to the experience of a “little old country Irish woman” in Chicago who lived for almost a week on a single quarter that a kind-hearted girl had given her. “It was this way,” she explained. “I bought a 9 cent can of tea and a 5 cent loaf of bread, and I got half a pound of sausage for 10 cents—you buy it just as you go over the bridge at Madison Street. And I had a nickel left, so I got a 5 cent tin of milk, and you see a spoonful of that will do for a meal.”\(^{22}\)

Of course, it was not enough to economize. It was necessary to raise money in whatever ways one could, short of full-time work (which wasn’t available). One method was to pawn belongings, from jewelry to furniture. In order to pay their rent, the Haymans, for example, pawned two diamond rings, two watches, a suit, and three coats. It was imperative that they keep up with their rent because they lived in furnished rooms, out of which the landlord could lock them at any time. Some families resorted to commercial loan companies and “loan sharks,” typically because they could not rely on relatives as others could.\(^{23}\)

Whether in the city or its suburbs, whether working-class or middle-class, whether black or white, the jobless regularly had to sell off their belongings one by one as they tried to eke out an existence for a few more months. A radio, an automobile, furniture, clothes, a wedding ring, another wedding ring, perhaps a store if they owned one, even (among many African-Americans)


\(^{22}\) Kathleen M’Laughlin, “Jobs pour in, but many more must still be found,” Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1930.

\(^{23}\) Elder, “One Hundred Applicants for Relief,” 86.
the mattresses on which they slept...piece by piece they parted with their past lives. When a relief worker arrived they might apologize for the bareness of their home, explaining that it was the price for having squeezed out three more months of “independent” living after all their other resources had been exhausted. But the relief worker was by no means always an understanding ally. Under pressure from her agency, she would often insist that every possible resource be used up before the family could be accepted for relief, a demand that could simply add insult to injury, as in the following case. 24

One of the sources of family pride for the R’s was a diamond ring which had been the gift of Mr. R to his wife at the time of their marriage. This diamond ring had formerly belonged to his mother, and before that had belonged to his grandmother, and it was the custom in the family to pass it on to the eldest son to give to his bride. The R’s had been keeping this diamond ring to give to their eldest daughter when she married. On her wedding day her husband would receive it from Mrs. R and put it on her finger. Thus would the family tradition be carried on. The relief visitor one day accidentally found that the R’s possessed this ring and forced them to sell it. Mr. R said, “It was either that or get put off relief, but believe me I would almost rather beg on the streets than to have sold that ring. There are some things that mean more to you than money and the diamond ring was one. Really, it seemed to me that our whole family was represented by that diamond ring.” 25

---

24 Janssen, “A Study of 363 Unemployment Cases,” 63; Elder, 66; Friedman, 151, 152.
Thus did bureaucratic cruelty pointlessly force people to continue selling off precious belongings even after they were on relief, or in order to get on relief. Objectively speaking, such demands served merely as gratuitous punishment for being unemployed.

A limitation of the tactic of selling belongings as a way to maintain economic independence was that they almost always had to be sold at a great loss, especially in the deflationary years of the early Depression. Furniture that cost $500 might sell for $50; a watch that cost $35 might sell for $5. More than a few people who tried to sell belongings gave up when they saw how little good it would do them. Often it made more sense simply to give items to a landlord in exchange for several weeks’ shelter.26

Needless to say, the most effective and popular way to raise money was to find any job one could, or to have one’s family members find a job. Single young women were perhaps the most courageous and determined of all. Frequently, at least in large cities, “white-collar girls” seem to have been even more loath to accept charity than most adult men, so proud were they and so highly did they prize their independence. Day after day they rose early in the morning to trudge the streets, spending as little as possible on food and transportation. According to one reporter, such a woman

lives as long as possible on her savings, trying all the time to find more work and going without enough food to save money for clothes. Then she turns to her friends—private borrowing is not quite so shameful—until she becomes too much of a burden. There are girls who for the past few months have risen every morning before dawn, to be first in the lines of applicants for any job that has been advertised, and when the early-morning rush is over and it is too late to hope for

26 Friedman, 151.
success, they must look for a place to sit, to wait until the day is over. That place is not easy to find, particularly in winter…

Some rode the subway all night because they had no money for rent: “you can stay on the subway indefinitely for a nickel, if you know the right places to change.” Or they rested during the day in the lounges of department stores, week after week. Many had to desert their possessions, since they could not drag bundles and suitcases all over the city. Others found it possible to band together and rent a kitchenette for a while, eating two small meals a day. Meanwhile, the stresses under which they labored were grinding away at their mental stability, so that when they finally did accept relief, one of the agencies’ greatest expenses was to provide them with psychiatric treatment.

And yet, externally, they were still able to maintain their appearance, on which everything depended. “They always manage somehow,” according to an observer, “to fix themselves up at the Salvation Army for about a quarter. It is pretty marvelous how vivid life stays in a woman, how she always washes her stockings and looks pretty clean, and has some powder for her nose, no matter how pinched and miserable she is. Women sometimes have an indestructible lust for living that is pretty hard to douse…” Unfortunately, despite all their efforts to find a white-collar job, many were compelled, in the end, to accept low-paying, low-status domestic work, for which they were ill-suited. But those were the lucky ones. Others succumbed to that last temptation and lowest degradation (as it was seen): prostitution. We’ll discuss this topic below, when we consider extra-legal means of surviving.

29 Ibid.
For all job-seekers, though, there was the same condition of day-after-day-after-day disappointments and slowly eroding hope. The diary of Olive Devies, divorcée, Chicago mother of a 19-year-old girl, provides a glimpse of the dreary repetitiveness of this life. Mrs. Devies did not work, instead spending her days sewing, visiting friends, going to church, and pursuing her hobbies (e.g., stamp-collecting). Her daughter worked as a typist downtown but was laid off in March 1940. In the following weeks, her mother’s daily journal entries typically begin in exactly the same way: “Marion left the house at 8 a.m. and spent the day in the loop looking for a job.” Almost every day. Weeks later: “Marion left the house at 8 a.m. and spent the day in the loop looking for a job.” Until 6 p.m. every day. One can picture this young woman wandering alone from employment office to employment office, scanning newspapers for promising job advertisements, window-shopping for “Help Wanted” signs, filling out applications, hungry and tired…and then getting up early the next day to do it all over again, for the twentieth time. At last, she secured an interview with the Belson Manufacturing Company, which hired her the next day. Sweet deliverance!  

Few were so lucky. The sociologist E. Wight Bakke, who studied the behavior of unemployed men in England and the United States throughout the 1930s, found pretty much the same thing wherever he looked. At first, confident belief that the unemployment would be temporary (except in 1932 and ’33, very dark years). While they were not always confident that the same firm would hire them back, they usually thought it would not be long before they found a job in the same industry. (This belief was certainly less common among African-Americans.) This positive attitude might last up to six months for about a third of the men, especially if they were skilled workers, even as the daily tramping and line-waiting and advertisement-answering and application-filling ate away at their initial buoyancy. Some walked ten or more miles a day.

---

30 Diary of Olive Devies, entries in March and April 1940, Special Collections, Harold Washington Library.
For skilled workers, it was a very gradual process for them to accept that they would have to “take anything,” however low the job’s status and wages were. But, after months of “up at five-thirty or six in the morning to start out again”—for the best time to find a job was in the morning—acquiescence in the need to lower one’s standards was almost inevitable. One man, a truck driver, spoke for all of them: “It isn’t the hard work of tramping about so much, although that is bad enough. It’s the hopelessness of every step you take when you go in search of a job you know isn’t there.” After such hopelessness, almost any job would be a great relief.31

Some job-seekers, both male and female, tried their luck with the private and public employment agencies. The applicant first registered at the central desk, after which he or she was referred to the proper division for the kind of work he was seeking. He was then interviewed regarding his experience and qualifications, to assist the agency in finding him work. His registration card would be placed in the “active” file for two weeks or a month, and then—if a job hadn’t been found—it would be placed in the “inactive” file, unless he renewed his application by notifying the agency that he was still available for work. Meanwhile, the agency was continually receiving orders for work (usually by phone), not only from businesses but also from housewives in need of domestic labor. And it would solicit employment orders as well, through phone calls and personal visits to businesses. A placement officer selected from the active file one or more of the best qualified candidates for a particular job offer and then called them (or sent a telegram if they didn’t have a phone), to interview them one more time regarding this particular job offer—if, that is, another interview was thought necessary—and to give them

an introduction card to present to the prospective employer. Frequently the employer was not satisfied with the applicant, and a new one had to be selected.\textsuperscript{32}

While they were useful institutions, employment agencies were not very popular. Only a minority of the unemployed used them, and the agencies were able to place only a minority of the applicants. For example, in a typical week in the second half of 1931, the Illinois public employment agency in Chicago received over two thousand applicants but secured jobs for only about 700. (Women usually had more success than men.) The service did get more effective with time, as more workers became familiar with it and business conditions improved in the second half of the decade. In 1936, for instance, it was able to provide jobs for 74,000 of the 118,000 people who registered with it for the first time (which does not include earlier registrations that had been kept active into 1936), while in 1937 it placed 91,550 of approximately the same number of registrants. On the other hand, in 1938 and 1939 the employment service placed only about 45,000 applicants each year, because of the sluggish economy.\textsuperscript{33}

As for the impressions that most men had of the employment agencies, especially in the first half of the decade, they are summed up by what one wrote in his journal in April 1934:

I register [with the agency], but they say not much chance today; maybe a week from today. I go out. Tony grabs my arm. He says, “Work?—there is no work. I go to the Employment Office. I stand and wait. Soon—my turn. I give the girl my card. She takes it, turns it over and over in her hand. Bluff—just to take


up time. By and by, she gives it back. ‘Sorry, nothing today.’ I say, ‘But I no
work in three years, with seven children, what do I eat?’ She reply, ‘Come back
again, maybe soon there will be something.’ It is the big bluff.”

Jim joins us at the foot of the stairs. He’s mad too. “God, I’m disgusted
with this place, and everybody else is that I know. Some fine day a mob’s going
to drop down on this place and tear it apart…”

Looks as though I’d be better off to depend on the grapevine. Word gets
around plenty fast if they’re taking men on any place.34

This was in New Haven, but studies of Chicago indicate the same attitude. One in 1932, for
example, reported that only five out of fifty unemployed men in the Stockyards district had
registered with the Illinois Free Employment Bureau, and only one had registered at private
employment agencies (which charged little or nothing for registration but were to collect a
week’s pay if they found the applicant a job).35

There were eight public employment agencies in Chicago (plus one each in Evanston,
Cicero, Oak Park, Chicago Heights, and Des Plaines), scattered in various neighborhoods around
the city. African-Americans used a separate branch on the South Side, which was located in two
poorly ventilated, badly equipped narrow store buildings—until late 1935, when it was moved to
a much larger and better-equipped office building. Major improvements in the employment
service took place that year and in 1936, as more money flowed in from the federal and state
governments: staffs were enlarged, standards and procedures improved, facilities expanded, etc.
More businesses and workers became aware of the service as it publicized itself extensively. It

34 Bakke, The Unemployed Worker, 168.
even helped people with disabilities find jobs, and, in alliance with the National Youth Administration and other New Deal programs, gave vocational counseling to people between 16 and 20 years of age. A number of other organizations in Chicago supplemented the work of the Illinois State Employment Service, including the Jewish Vocational Service, the YMCA and YWCA, the Masonic Employment Bureau, and the National Reemployment Service. Nevertheless, despite this impressive social infrastructure, most of the jobless continued to use their own more informal methods of seeking employment.36

The most popular way to find work was to inquire with former employers, since they tended to hire men who had already worked for them. But the implication of this fact was obvious: in the worst years of the Depression, there was little point in applying for a job if the company did not already know you. Over and over again, men were asked, “Do you know anybody inside?” “No.” “Well, I don’t know if there’s much use in you filling out this application then, but you can try.” When you could not even get hired by a former boss, there was virtually no chance of being hired by someone who didn’t know you. –And yet men kept trying, month after month. In 1940, people who had been on relief for seven years were still trying. “I’m a-lookin’ all the time for my husband to get something to do,” an African-American mother of six told a reporter in late 1940. “He still goes a-lookin’ all the time. He ain’t got no soles on his shoes, walkin’ and walkin’ and walkin.’” To earn his relief money he worked ten days a month “wrappin’ up rat poison.” Somehow, after seven years, discouragement still had

---

not gotten the best of this family, according to the wife. “That’s all we can do—just live in hopes, that’s all.”

Another method of securing work was through friends or relatives. Even neighbors might be willing to use their influence to try to get one hired by a friend of theirs. Political connections could get be of great use too, as in the case of an Italian man who spent so much time in 1933 volunteering with Democratic political clubs that he secured several favors from party officials. His young son wrote a letter to President Roosevelt to protest his family’s miserable living conditions, especially considering that “my father works hard for the Democrats, too.” Roosevelt’s secretary wrote back, telling him that things would be taken care of; and, sure enough, the family’s treatment by relief agencies soon improved and the father was accepted for work relief (admittedly, not a job in the more valued private sector). In fact, his connections to local politicians enabled the man to send his children to a better school and to get a $5 weekly raise.

In most cases, if men found a job at all it was only part-time or temporary work. Usually this amounted to little more than an “odd job,” or, say, a week- or two-week-long version of such. One might even say that the 1930s was the decade of the odd job, the expedient that served to salvage some modicum of income and pride. Undertaken usually through the initiative of the sufferers themselves, but not infrequently through the initiative of friends, relatives, neighbors, or simply concerned citizens who wanted to help a stranger, odd jobs speckled Chicago’s social landscape like never before or since. People routinely called employment agencies to report little jobs they needed done, such as windows washed, bookcases made, furniture painted, wood chopped for fireplaces, or having storm windows put in. Especially in the Depression’s early

---

37 Marcia Winn, “Negro Mother’s Plea: Give My Husband A Job!” *Chicago Tribune*, October 17, 1940.
38 Bakke, *Citizens Without Work*, 149, 150.
years, a popular column in the *Chicago Tribune* regularly pleaded on behalf of the unemployed for more job requests to be sent in. “Whatever you may suggest around your own or your neighbor’s home,” ran one column in early 1931, “there is a skilled workman awaiting the call. Whether the furnace needs discipline, or the ashes need to be removed, whether the lock on the garage has been broken, or the back yard needs raking…or the broken window sash yawns for repairs, there’s a man equipped to handle it and scores of youngsters who could be fed if each householder heeded the things that require doing.” The *Chicago Defender*, too—a popular newspaper for African-American readers—asked people to call the Chicago Urban League or other social agencies to advertise odd jobs.\(^{39}\)

Unfortunately, there was not an efficient way to connect the city’s tens of thousands of little tasks that needed doing with the job-seekers who could do them. A *Tribune* investigation in January 1933 found that “the door-to-door method of asking employment [could] no longer be used by men looking for temporary work,” because housewives were refusing to open their doors to strangers. As one woman said, “the newspapers are filled with stories of housewives or maids who have opened their doors to strangers and found themselves held up.” Mayor Cermak was so impressed by the *Tribune* report that a few days later he ordered the city’s forty district police stations to serve as the intermediary: people could call the station, and the police would assign the job to a “person of good character” they knew who was in need of work. (Cermak also urged people to take their old clothes, shoes, and toys to police stations, so that they could be renovated at the House of Correction and then distributed to the poor.) The American Legion, too, notified the press that it could provide the names of “reliable men” who would be willing to undertake any work that was needed.\(^{40}\)

---

\(^{39}\) *Chicago Tribune*, November 1, 1930, February 1, 1931; *Chicago Defender*, October 25, 1930.

\(^{40}\) *Chicago Tribune*, January 1, 3, 4, 1933.
Still, in this relatively un-bureaucratized age, most of the activity happened through informal channels. In studies from the time we read of one man who occasionally put in window panes for neighbors for 50 cents, another who was able to earn hundreds of dollars periodically painting houses and doing repair jobs, and a chemist who found a temporary position as a statistician. African-American men sometimes picked up bottles and “junked,” as they called it (selling them for a penny or two to the “junk man”), while white men were more apt to hang around garages, hoping to get a job parking cars, washing windshields, or changing tires. Men might make from ten cents to ten dollars a day (occasionally), if they were lucky. One energetic young electrician made $48 in four months: $30 he earned from rewiring the telephone system in a bank, $8 from shoveling snow, and $10 from catching rats with his hands in a large dairy, at five cents apiece. The following account of a carpenter’s efforts describes how another energetic man adapted:

Mr. Kittinring…said when he was first laid off, he decided he would keep looking around and going from place to place trying to find something, even if it were “digging ditches.” After trying desperately to find work, he became discouraged and sat around the house, “doing nothing except mooning around and looking at the four walls until he was half nuts.” He tried walking up and down 63rd Street looking in the windows, but that didn’t satisfy him. He suddenly decided he was becoming “soft, lazy, and shiftless,” and he’d have to find something to do for himself. He thereupon decided to ask his friends if he couldn’t cut down some of their trees. He gathered together three or four of his unemployed neighbors and they started a campaign of tree-cutting in the neighborhood. They received $1.00
a tree and they shared the money and the wood, which they used as fuel. Mr. Kittinring said, “It ain’t much, but it makes you forget about the depression and then you can fill in the evenings doing jig-saw puzzles.”

Throughout the decade men were called back to work by their former employers, but usually the jobs were very short and the amount of money received almost negligible from the standpoint of meeting the family’s needs. It might even be barely above slave wages: for example, in 1933 there were men in Chicago working ten or twelve hours a day for 50 or 60 cents in total, and others earning $14 a week after working 80 hours in a radio factory.

Some men, on the other hand, became household entrepreneurs: one earned a dollar a week making “paper novelties” out of tissue and cardboard, assisted by his five children. They usually worked (at home) from noon to two or three in the morning. An unemployed Polish architect made and sold pieces of furniture, while his wife found part-time work in a tailor shop and accepted orders for making dresses and coats. A former butcher tried to sell goods from door to door; an electrician sold ferns that he dug up in the forest; a truck driver peddled eggs; a construction engineer tried truck driving on his own account. One man became a lunchroom proprietor, others went into business as painters, and a salesman did farm labor and carpentering. In general, whatever way to earn a little money a man could think of, he tried.

As we’ve seen, however, despite all the efforts of the chief wage-earner to find work, his wife and children often had to help provide for the family. They could find part-time and

---

temporary jobs more easily, largely because more low-paid service occupations were open to them than to adult men. Their preferred methods of finding work were not very different from those of the former chief wage-earner. Young people did not have much respect for employment agencies, as a Chicago study in the early 1930s found. A house-to-house canvass of 3,242 youths between 16 and 20 reported that only 16 had obtained their jobs through employment agencies, while 640 had gotten them through friends or relatives, 375 had applied directly to the employer, and 46 had answered ads in the paper. But most were of the opinion that “answering ads is a waste of time and carfare, and most of them are fakes anyhow.” The boys and girls who tried the agencies tended to be the best educated, and they did usually find some sort of work, whether merely a paper route or a job wrapping roasts in a butcher shop on Sundays.\textsuperscript{44}

For boys between about 13 and 16, paper routes seem to have been the most popular job, while many girls secured work as mothers’ helpers. Young girls were preferred as domestic help over women in their thirties or forties—for older women were seen as “set in their ways,” while girls could be molded—but girls certainly rarely enjoyed working as servants. They would rather have worked in factories and had freedom at the end of the day. In fact, strangely enough, there was sometimes a shortage of domestic help in Chicago during the Depression decade, because the wages most housewives offered—$6 a week or less—were too low to interest young applicants (while the older women who would have accepted them were not wanted). On the other hand, many girls working as maids received free room and board, which compensated for the low wages. Other common occupations for young women included stenographer, telephone operator, saleswoman, and waitress. Studies found that daughters’ employment could be critical

\textsuperscript{44} Maxine Davis, \textit{The Lost Generation}, 127, 128.
to family pride and independence: with nearly all her income going to the family, a working girl could mean the difference between the family’s being on relief and being self-reliant.45

It was not rare for boys even younger than 13 to contribute, albeit marginally, to their family’s income. One survey found that a third of young boys in Back of the Yards earned money to give to their parents, even if only two cents or ten cents a week. Some collected and sold brass, copper, iron, rags, and paper, taking a wagon through alleys to pick up whatever junk they could find, which they would sell to the “junk man.” Others would steal bags of newspapers and bulletins from men hired to distribute them—when their backs were turned—and sell them a couple months later to the “paper man.” One boy earned a dime occasionally carrying coal for someone; a 10-year-old earned 35 cents a week scrubbing a doctor’s office; another earned thirty cents every Saturday for washing two large trucks. Some boys ran errands, while others helped sell vegetables from wagons six hours a day (for 25 cents in total). Two 14-year-olds helped deliver milk on milk wagons, one of them getting up at 3:00 every morning and making less than a dollar per week for his services. Such jobs were similar to those of many African-American boys, who sold newspapers or worked all night on milk wagons, carrying the milk to each house because the drivers were “too lazy” to do it, according to one report. The consequence was that in school the next day they tended to sleep through classes, exhausted from the previous night’s work.46

Even in more prosperous areas than the Black Belt or the West Side, families sometimes had to rely on child labor. In the residential suburb of Evanston, for example, a 1931 survey of

---

46 E. Clinton Belknap, “Summer Activities of Boys Back of the Yards in Chicago” (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1937), 38, 39; “The effect of the depression in the area 47th to 51st, South Park to the New York Central tracks, as reported by Mrs. Margaret Bradburn, truant officer for the Colman and Farren schools,” Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1.
363 unemployed families found that children worked in 42 of them, 26 of which were white. A 13-year-old African-American boy had an early-morning paper route for which he received $15 per month, then worked as an errand boy at a drug store until school started in the morning, and returned to it after school until 10:00 at night. For $3 a week, a 14-year-old girl worked as a mother’s helper after school every day for three hours. Two young Italian sisters had to drop out of school so they could earn $1.50 every day working on men’s coats at home. Other kids left school to work as, say, shoe shiners or “stock boys” in department stores. Some were the only source of income for their family.47

Typically, however, families derived more income from the mother’s work than the children’s. Not that women were usually paid much. By 1940, one fifth of all women in the country who worked for wages were domestic servants, who on average earned less than $8 per week even in New York City, where they were paid the highest. Wage discrimination against women was endemic. A Polish woman in the stockyards district scrubbed the floors of Union Station for $10 a week; another helped support her family by sorting pickles at $15 a week (for two months in the summer of 1930); a third worked as a waitress for $15 a week, when her husband had formerly earned $50 as a railroad car repair man. (This couple had to put their 18-month-old baby in a foster home in order for the wife to work; but her job soon caused her to develop an arthritic condition, making her unable to continue, which finally persuaded the couple to do the unthinkable and apply for relief.) It was common for immigrant mothers to work part-time at night cleaning downtown offices, a not-very-remunerative job. Even less remunerative were the odd jobs that women took, such as doing housework for neighbors or friends.48

---

African-American women had it worst of all. In 1940, almost half of the women who did domestic service in Chicago were black; most of these were supplementing their relief checks with surreptitious “day’s work” that paid very little, in part because of the additional competition from over 10,000 white women who wanted such jobs. Most of the personal service done by black women and men, however, was not in private homes but in hotels, lodging houses, brothels (as maids), athletic clubs, and other such institutions, which usually paid more than housewives did but not enough to sustain a family on. It was common for black women in the Depression to have a “regular” job that might pay them $6 or $8 a week, then to supplement this with one or more domestic-service jobs at $1 or $2 a week (possibly only working one day, or one morning, weekly at each), and on top of this, perhaps, to get relief, because of their husband’s unemployment. Other women were not fortunate enough to have a regular job, instead being forced to offer their services at so-called “slave markets”—“street corners where [black] women congregated to await white housewives who came daily to take their pick and bid wages down.” An experienced stenographer who had to offer her skills for $3 a week at the West Side slave market described her situation as follows:49

It is an area on the West Side of 12th St. near Halsted. A large number of girls go there daily and hire themselves by day to the highest bidder. The more enterprising would solicit—others would wait to be approached. Many days I worked for 50 cents a day and no carfare—one meal was given. I then applied for relief. After suffering more embarrassment and humiliation I was refused relief because I could now and then get jobs at the “slave market.” Having no references, it was hard for me to get a good job.

49 Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 242–249.
African-American women were also the most likely to try that other, socially maligned option: prostitution. The number of professional prostitutes (employed by well-organized brothels) in Chicago had decreased by 70 percent or so in the two decades before 1933, and even in black neighborhoods it declined during the Depression, following business trends. But many more young women, sometimes as young as 12 or 13, temporarily became “amateur” prostitutes in the 1930s, to earn a few cents or a dollar here and there. One police officer estimated in 1932 that prostitution in Bronzeville had increased by 20 percent in the previous two years, an average of a hundred girls being picked up by police every month. But this number far understates the extent of the activity, since it was constantly going on in the dark corners of kitchenette apartments, sometimes by housewives in the presence of their children. It could even be sanctioned by husbands, who were evidently willing to get income from whatever source they could. Knowledgeable sociologists estimated that every building in lower-class areas of the Black Belt was likely to contain some prostitutes, who, according to disapproving housewives who lived in the same buildings, might even “stop in the entrance or any place and have a man!”  

For some women there were other motivations to sell their bodies than simply the need to eat, or the inability to get a job because of their skin color. High-school students who were arrested for “street-walking” complained that the only work they could get was as maids or waitresses, or in hotels; and this, because of the low status and the low wages, was far from appealing. “When I see the word maid,” said one, “—why, girl, let me tell you, it just runs through me! I think I’d sooner starve.” Another woman, who had lost her white-collar job during

---

50 Chicago Tribune, January 3, 1933; “Effects of the depression on prostitution” and other reports, Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1; Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 596–599.
the Depression, tried working as a maid but soon turned to prostitution: “I didn’t want to do housework,” she said. “Here I had been in some kind of office since I was fourteen years old. Now why should I start scrubbing floors at this late date in life? I tried first one thing and then another, and I couldn’t make a hit of it, so…” From this perspective, the turn to prostitution seems less like tragedy than an assertion of individuality, a refusal to be thrust into the degradation to which social norms would consign one. For hardly any work at all, one could make more money than from hours of filthy, back-breaking scrubbing of floors or servile serving of meals to white people; and one could then buy some of the finery that this same white society judged as a criterion of human worth. For some women, certainly, it was desperation that drove them to occasional prostitution, but for others it was pride.51

Women of all ethnicities, not only African-Americans, turned to prostitution, but statistics are lacking. Doubtless it was usually a minuscule minority, smaller than in the Black Belt. The West Side and the Near North Side had vice districts of gambling, drug-peddling, and prostitution, but it was not only in these places that amateur prostitutes would ply their trade. The following account by a social worker (from 1934) describes another avenue open to ambitious and frustrated young women:

I have seen young girls turn into first-class prostitutes as a means of supplying themselves with better clothes and getting more to eat than is allowed in the “relief budget.” One attractive Polish girl in particular snatched at the world’s oldest profession after she had been thwarted in her hunt for a job which would give her a decent living standard. This girl is very attached to her home and mother and when she could not find work deliberately set out to make friends

51 Drake and Cayton, 598.
with a man [she] met in the lobby of an exclusive Chicago hotel. After being away from home for several weeks she returned with a goodly array of fashionable dresses and a pair of oxford glasses which she had seen a caseworker wear and decided she would like to have. This girl of good intelligence reasoned that a life of prostitution is easier than starving on relief rations... Her mother hasn’t the remotest idea as to how she gets her clothes, but is under the impression that her daughter has a good job in a hotel.  

There were, of course, risks in embarking upon the world’s oldest profession: for example, this Polish girl contracted syphilis.

Disregard for social conventions and legal straitjackets was not confined to some women’s embrace of prostitution. It was far more widespread than that. Across the country, petty theft and bootlegging of coal and other materials shot up in the early years of the Depression, though they declined after 1933. We’ll never know the extent of “criminal” activities undertaken by those who had lost a stable means of income, since most of the petty property crimes did not make it to the attention of the police—and even those that did were usually not reported by the press, for fear of emboldening other would-be defilers of the sanctity of property. But from scattered hints, we know that Chicago overflowed with working-class defiance of the laws of the rich.

One simple form of defiance occurred in people’s own homes: when companies turned off the gas and electricity because of nonpayment of bills, residents broke open the padlocked outlets and got the services for free. Usually this act was accompanied by a sense of entitlement

---

rather than shame, since, after all, its ‘perpetrators’ knew that other families were living in luxury, and their own economic difficulties were systemically and not personally caused. One study stated bluntly, “such purloining from an impersonal business concern was not considered dishonest.” At public hearings on unemployment in 1932 and 1933, men even spoke with pride of their flouting of the law. “The other day my gas was shut off,” one said. “I went to work and shut the meter off and plugged in and got gas. I have stolen coal,” he continued. “You may wonder how that has affected my mind. A year or two ago if I had seen somebody holding up somebody else I might have risked my life to stop it. Today, I would say, ‘I hope he has a big fat politician by the neck and kills him or a big fat banker.’” We cannot know how many families illegally used gas or electricity in their homes, but the fact that men were willing to brazenly admit to it in public hearings suggests the practice was not uncommon. Even when people were unwilling or unable to do it themselves, the local Unemployed Council or some other group might come in and do it for them.54

Much more frequent, and more frightening to authorities, was theft that occurred outside the home. The very paucity of accounts in the mainstream press can be considered testimony to the frequency of theft in cities, for this silence could only have come from fear lest even more people join in. (It is never a smart idea, after all, for authorities to advertise popular defiance of the power of the propertied.) And yet some left-wing journalists did buck the trend. A writer for The Nation, for instance, reported the following from Detroit, in the summer of 1932:

There have been minor riots and threats of worse disturbances. Petty thievery is increasing. Windows of small retail shops are smashed at night and relieved of

their goods. Children from the poorer districts have taken to snatching bundles from customers coming out of grocery stores. They run off to barren homes with their booty, or eat it themselves in out-of-the-way alleys. More frequently, grown men, usually in twos and threes, enter chain stores, order all the food they can possibly carry, and then walk quietly out without paying. Every newspaper in town knows of this practice and knows that it is spreading, but none mentions it in print.⁵⁵

As a much larger city than Detroit, Chicago certainly saw far more thievery—which was probably the main reason Mayor Cermak made his famous remark in 1932 that the federal government had a choice: it could send either relief or troops.

A Communist leader of the jobless later observed that “mass street demonstrations and other gatherings of the unemployed were followed by their participants swarming into nearby restaurants, eating their fill, and then departing with advice to the cashier to ‘charge it to the mayor.’” (This happened in Chicago, for instance, on January 13, 1931.) Some of the more spectacular thefts included food riots in New York City, and occasions such as the incident when 1,100 men waiting in a Salvation Army breadline saw bakery goods being delivered to a nearby hotel and promptly raided the trucks to help themselves. In St. Paul, Minnesota a group of unemployed workers invaded a packinghouse and made off with hundreds of hams and sides of bacon. In Oklahoma City in January 1931, hundreds of men charged into a grocery store and

took all the food, having just paraded through the city in protest at authorities’ failure to distribute relief. Such collective thefts happened very frequently in the early thirties.\footnote{Franklin Folsom, Impatient Armies of the Poor: The Story of Collective Action of the Unemployed, 1808–1942 (Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1991), 240, 241; \textit{Daily Worker}, January 14, 21, 1931.}

Later, we’ll discuss the activities of “gangs” of youth, who were responsible for some of the more serious thefts but who were more often motivated by the desire for excitement and adventure than by the necessities of survival. Their crimes, however, constituted a minority of the total. Even in places where there were few or no organized gangs, including many areas on Chicago’s South Side, such forms of theft as purse snatching, pickpocketing, stealing packages from trucks, and ganging up on peddlers and storekeepers were relatively common, especially in 1931 and 1932. It was usually young people who committed these kinds of crimes; but adults were not above thievery if it would help their families. Men stole coal from coal yards, both to heat their homes and to sell it so as to buy other necessities. Immigrant mothers told of shoplifting stockings or even curtains from department stores, and of asking their children to steal things. Sometimes the thefts went awry, in which case the press might report them. For example, in two separate incidents on November 26, 1930, two fathers—“driven to desperation by the hunger of their children”—were killed trying to steal turkeys for Thanksgiving, one by police bullets as he fled the butcher’s shop, the other by the proprietor as he crawled through a window he had smashed with a brick. In 1935, a teenager was shot dead trying to steal a bottle of milk off a porch for his infant nephew, who had been crying for two days out of sheer hunger. One can only assume that such thefts were occurring constantly in Chicago the whole decade.\footnote{\textit{The effect of the depression in the area 47th to 51st, South Park to the New York Central tracks,” Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1; John Evans, “Gangs of Boys Part of City’s Poverty Growth,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, December 11, 1931; Friedman, “One Hundred Unemployed Families,” 177; Report by Harriet Lesniak, Burgess Papers, box 131, folder 4; report by president of Local #5 Unemployed Council, December 24, 1934, ibid.; \textit{New York Times}, November 27, 1930; \textit{Washington Post}, August 4, 1935.}
Equally significantly, they were “quite generally approved” in communities on the South and West sides, as social workers reported and as was evident from interviews and public hearings. Contemplating crime was the new norm. “People are ready to take money,” an unemployed father said in 1932. “They say they are going out to do this and that. I am often tempted to go myself, but I think, ‘I have a family. What if I am pinched?’ So I don’t go, but you can hear talk of robbery on any street corner. Not one would refuse to steal a ten-dollar bill if he saw a man walking down the street with one.” Another: “We’re honest people, never went in for graft and got our money by really working… Now we have nothing left. We’re beggars. I’m going out and get a gun.” Another: “I wouldn’t mind taking money from a wealthy employer who has wrenched money from his employees…” And so on—thousands, surely. Race and ethnicity were of little consequence here: the combination of physical hunger and moral outrage levels distinctions, so that inconvenient social norms are sloughed off and all that remain are the realities of class and the imperatives of survival.  

“Everyday communism”

We have yet to consider probably the most important factor in enabling people to cope with the eleven-year-long crisis: the commitment of relatives, friends, neighbors, and the poor to helping each other. Sometimes, yes, they would steal from one another, as just mentioned; much more often, they gave to one another. Of course, this was not some sudden efflorescence of generosity with no precedents in history. Rather, it grew out of the most durable and necessary dynamics of human history, the tendencies I mentioned in the Introduction that the anthropologist David Graeber has dubbed “baseline communism.” The fetish of “privatization”

58“An Urban Famine,” 1932, p. 11, McCulloch Papers, box 4, folder 1; Friedman, 177, 178.
that has, in a whirlwind of “creative destruction,” remade the world in recent centuries has had to be *forced* on those at the bottom, who resisted it—and never more than in the 1930s.

In every region of the country and every social context—urban or rural—suffering people showed a striking degree of compassion and, often, solidarity. In a book of personal histories, for example, a woman from Ivyland, Pennsylvania states, “My memories from the Great Depression are of unbelievable love, courage, and sharing”—as in the case of the neighbor who fed the woman’s family once a week for years, or the other neighbor who cut down every tree on his property to provide firewood for several families. In Lakeland, Florida, there is the story of the old woman who owned a general store along a highway, where she frequently saw individuals and entire families shambling along, pieces of old automobile tires tied to their feet in place of shoes; so she would invariably invite them to her house and give them a meal, even give them goods from her store, until finally she could not keep the store anymore because of her too-selfless generosity. One person simply states, “Families were a lot closer [than they are now].” A Mexican man from South Chicago recalls, “At that time people were more together. Mexican people would help each other without expecting anything in return.” A woman from Selma, Alabama sums up: “I’ll never forget those years: neighbors helping neighbors, sharing whatever good fortune came their way; doctors rendering services regardless of patients’ finances; and worship with friends whose faith far outdistanced their troubles.”

Indeed, “everyday communism” was so ubiquitous and taken-for-granted that it is hard to make interesting distinctions regarding its practice between races and ethnicities, or to do more than merely give examples of what was happening constantly all over Chicago and the U.S.

---

Statistics about such things as how often and in what ways friends and relatives helped each other are not available. Insofar as generalizations are possible, they may be only of the sort exhibited by these comments by a welfare association on Polish families in Chicago, in 1934: “The depression appears to have little effect upon family bonds. Misunderstandings may lead to temporary severances, but when any one member is in serious trouble, differences are forgotten and each member displays as much interest as he did before financial troubles developed. The degree of interest does not depend upon the effect of the depression, but upon the effect of early training and [the] family’s attitude; in other words, each individual family reacts differently, but as a whole, the Polish family displays a marked consciousness of responsibility towards each of its members.” But this was just as true of other immigrant peoples, as well as of Anglo-Americans and African-Americans.60

For example, people who lived in the countryside regularly provided their city-dwelling relatives with milk, eggs, butter, and fresh vegetables—frequently hundreds of dollars’ worth over just a few months. Working-class parents on Chicago’s West Side told investigators of receiving anywhere from $1.50 to $300 in cash from family members and friends, often as gifts, not loans. More typical were gifts in the form of food and clothing, but even then, this might represent a substantial drain on the resources of the givers, who not infrequently were themselves unemployed. A survey in 1933 of 119 jobless families found that 49 had received this kind of help from friends and relatives, in addition, sometimes, to receiving shelter. For the expedient of moving in with relatives was common, despite making for cramped and uncomfortable living quarters. Of 363 families in Evanston, 50 percent had received help of some kind from relatives,

---

60 Report by the Polish Welfare Association, Burgess Papers, box 131, folder 3.
13 percent moving in with them—by April 1931, that is. It is likely that in the following years the proportion of people receiving shelter increased.\textsuperscript{61}

The sharing of shelter usually proved mutually advantageous. A twenty-year-old woman who moved in with her widowed older sister, the mother of three young children, was able to escape from an unpleasant stepmother, while the rent she paid was of use to her sickly and sporadically employed sister. They “help[ed] each other out, as can,” the young sister said. A married couple with three children rented part of their house to a childless couple with whom they shared meals, one of the wives cooking weekday suppers and the other cooking breakfasts and weekend meals. Altogether, in working-class areas of Chicago shared housing was virtually the norm, especially among women: a 1932 study of women employed in the slaughtering and meatpacking industry, for instance, found that 31.4 percent lived in two-family dwellings and 60 percent in multifamily dwellings. Susan Porter Benson comments that, while in some respects less flexible than single-family housing, “multiple-unit dwellings allowed kin and friends to live in close proximity without directly sharing living space, making it easier to pool domestic labor such as laundry, child-minding, cooking, and house-cleaning.”\textsuperscript{62}

Similarly, it was most frequently among women that goods were shared or exchanged, because women were in charge of the household economy. Both during and before the Depression, in the more “prosperous”—or rather, less depressed—years of the 1920s and earlier, working-class female friends and relatives were munificent in their exchanges of gifts. Case-studies from around the country provide countless examples. An Anglo woman in Massachusetts told an interviewer in 1930 that she and her husband had spent “hardly a nickel” on clothes ever


since they were married fifteen years earlier, since her mother and friends had regularly given her clothing that she had been able to “make over” for the children so as to look new and fashionable. An unemployed Italian family in Pittsburgh received clothes from relatives and shoes and stockings from a teacher. In Little Rock, Arkansas, a saleswoman bought shoes and clothing for a neighbor’s child so she could go to school. A woman in Philadelphia received a stove from a neighbor and coal from a settlement house, which allowed her and her child a measure of comfort at home. A Mexican family that moved to San Antonio received a houseful of furniture from friends, and eked out an existence with beans brought by the husband’s father from the warehouse where he worked. An African-American couple deeply in debt for their house mortgage, taxes, medical care, and furniture told a Women’s Bureau agent that “the only way they can meet all these payments and ‘not starve’ is by depending on the food that relatives (on a farm in Maryland) send them every week.” One could fill volumes with such examples.63

The experiences of the Allen family in Chicago are representative:

A friend who worked in the stock yards [in the early 1930s] brought them bacon and inexpensive cuts of meat; another friend gave them a dozen cans of macaroni; someone else supplied ice. A friend gave Mrs. Allen a coat that had been left at her house and never called for. Mrs. Allen’s sister also came to her aid and, through an exchange of services, both benefited: Mrs. Allen mended for her sister, and the sister made clothes for her; the sister bought fruit, and Mrs. Allen canned all of it, retaining some for her work [as an amateur cook]. Money was also borrowed from friends and relatives to the extent of about $900.64

63 Benson, Household Accounts, 126–139; Elderton, Case Studies of Unemployment, 58, 98, 99.
64 Cavan and Ranck, The Family and the Depression, 118, 119.
Friends and relatives were far from being the only recourse. A survey of one hundred unemployed families in Chicago found that 75 had received gifts both from people close to them and from landlords, neighbors, janitors, bakeries, grocery stores, former employers, schools, church organizations, societies and various national alliances, and even the *Chicago Daily News*. A survey in 1934 of 1,654 single women on relief found “ample evidence of the consideration shown by landlords, more frequently landladies,” since all but a handful of the women were in rent arrears of from one to twelve months. In a case in Chicago, a family’s gas had been shut off, and the neighbor, who didn’t know them, sent in money for the gas bill “so they could heat the baby’s milk.” In another case neighbors collected $105 on behalf of a family that was about to be evicted. This type of help was extremely common: Communists working in Unemployed Councils reported that “in many instances we found neighbors collecting money among themselves to help a family threatened with eviction.” Sometimes neighbors provided unemployed families with food for the holidays; or they regularly gave them food baskets, with food collected from around the community. But so as not to hurt the recipients’ pride, they might do it an oblique way: they would set the basket down at the front door at night, and knock on the door and quickly leave.65

In general, the importance of neighborly magnanimity cannot be overstated. When relief ran out, it was often neighbors who kept each other alive. The findings of a study in 1932 of four hundred Philadelphian families are worth quoting at length, since they apply to neighborhoods in Chicago as well:

---

[Regarding the provision of food,] the outstanding contribution has been made by neighbors. The poor are looking after the poor. In considerably more than a third of the four hundred families the chief source of actual subsistence when grocery orders stopped was the neighbors… Usually it was leftovers, stale bread, meat bones for soup, a bowl of gravy. Sometimes the children are asked in for a meal. One neighbor sent two eggs a day regularly to a sick man threatened with tuberculosis. This help was the more striking since the neighbors themselves were often close to the line of destitution and could illy spare the food they shared. The primitive communism existing among these people was a constant surprise to the visitors. More than once a family lucky enough to get a good supply of food called in the entire block to share the feast. There is absolutely no doubt that entire neighborhoods were just living from day to day sharing what slight resources any one family chanced to have.66

Such practices constituted, in effect, a benign and unconscious type of class struggle—collective resistance to capitalist values and to a political economy that was structured so as to snuff out millions of economically superfluous working-class families. Mutual support and solidarity like this were certainly in no way emanations of the dominant culture; they had autonomous, organic roots in the lives and communal heritage of subordinate classes, and, as we’ll see later, easily manifested as explicit collective resistance to the ruling class.

It was common in many parts of Chicago for families to grow food in gardens, whether in their backyard or in public spaces cleared for that purpose. In South Chicago, Mexican families grew tomatoes, corn, squash, and hot peppers on a large public plot of land bounded by 95th

Street and 103rd Street, which was also used by whites and African-Americans to pick mushrooms and mustard leaves. At harvest time, family fiestas were held in which the fruits of their labor were shared with neighbors and friends, the remaining crops to be canned for use in the winter.67

Institutional, as opposed to personal, generosity was almost equally striking—except among political and large business organizations, i.e., the dominant power-structures. Churches, settlement houses, charities, fraternal societies, trade unions, and hundreds of civil society organizations that united in groups like the Federated Council of Professional and Business Women to aid the unemployed (by providing food, clothes, meals, and temporary jobs) all had, in the aggregate, a momentous effect on the well-being of the poor—even into the later years of the decade, when the government had taken over nearly all relief functions. Even the Renters’ Court sometimes gave money to the families who appeared before it day after day. One year the judge collected from his friends over $2,000, from which he paid the rent for some families, while for others a collection might be taken in the courtroom. From five to fifteen dollars a day was raised by passing the hat. We’ll say more about the subject of institutional generosity in chapter five.68

The “communism” that enabled people to survive and even to stay off relief extended, in a sense, to neighborhood storekeepers. As Lizabeth Cohen has emphasized, thousands of unemployed families in Chicago relied on the local merchant to extend credit, as he regularly had in the 1920s. This was one of the reasons they continued to shop at his store instead of the cheaper chain stores that were springing up around the country. The amounts of credit that

grocers gave—and not only to their fellow countrymen—often with little expectation that they would be repaid, beggar belief. We read of an Italian family getting $184 worth of groceries on credit, a German family getting $125, and a Polish family getting $325. Storekeepers reported giving credit to fifty families over two-and-a-half years, and of being owed $3,500. Mexicans in South Chicago were able to get most of their goods on credit through the entire Depression, including from merchants of a different ethnicity than they. To some extent it was in the interest of grocers to keep giving more credit, since if they discontinued it they might lose customers, but it is clear that often it was also done out of a sense of loyalty, duty, and compassion for people who were experiencing a crisis, and with whom relationships had been built over years. As Alex Keyssar says, extending credit was an “expression of social bonds and conventions, of a culture that valued mutual aid and mutual obligations.” The cold capitalist logic of the chain store was not that of the neighborhood merchant, enmeshed in ethnic networks and communal ties, animated by other impulses than insatiable pecuniary gain. The following stories from Philadelphia in 1932 would have been familiar to hundreds of merchants in Chicago:

John Nigro, a baker, was sued for debt a few days ago. His accounts receivable totaled $5,000. He could collect none of them; he knew when he was letting these bills run up that he was dispensing charity, but he continued to provide relief for his neighbors until he himself went to the wall. In the same neighborhood another shopkeeper, pointing to a bill of $200 that was owed him, said: “Eleven children

---

in that house. They’ve got no shoes, no pants. In the house, no chairs. My God, you go in there, you cry, that’s all. What can you do? Let them go hungry?”

Still, by the fourth winter of unemployment, as many independent shopkeepers themselves were in dire condition because customers continued not to pay their bills, credit had in most cases dried up. This sort of commercial generosity, like that of friends and family, had its limits, when resources ran out and the former giver became another receiver.

It was not only extending credit, though, that depleted the resources of merchants; it was also their continual provision of free goods to people, outside any commercial context at all. Grocers all over the city fed several people every day during months of acute crisis, when there was even more begging than usual. Milk wagon drivers were another group that was noted for its generosity. One driver explained the usual practice: “We donate every week through the union. The unemployed milk drivers are paid first and what is left goes to the milk fund. In addition to that, we often help out some of the families on our routes. I have figured for the last five months [that is, the second half of 1931] that four or five dollars a week goes out. I leave the milk. It goes into the book and I pay for it…” In addition to the thousands of children who got their milk this way, many thousands more got food and clothing through the generosity of their (unpaid) teachers, as mentioned in the last chapter. The aid was not only informal: in the 1930–31 school year, for example, teachers and pupils gave $110,000 to the School Children’s Aid Society, to distribute shoes, clothes, and food to the poorer students. Nor did teachers refrain from helping each other, as by informally collecting money for colleagues even worse off than they

---

themselves. There is no way to tell how common this practice was among coworkers
everywhere, in any given job.71

Some of the most impressive generosity existed among the poorest of the poor, such as
African-Americans in the slums of Chicago’s Black Belt. The anti-capitalist mentality went
beyond the simple sharing of resources, which was the norm even in many middle-class
neighborhoods. Social workers sometimes were struck by the scarcity of “wild children” in the
slums, children with no guardians, especially in light of the family desertions—usually by
fathers—that happened in the area. The explanation is that black families regularly took in stray
children and adopted them as their own, adding them to the unruly brood already crammed into a
small home. Whether or not this practice was a heritage of rural and communal living in the
South, it was certainly unusual, for very few whites acted similarly. Indeed, so “communal” was
the environment in many African-American neighborhoods that stray children would simply
wander into apartments and, a little while later, be added to the family. Somehow, ways were
found to feed them and take care of them.72

While such informal adoption of children seems to have been very rare among whites, it
was much less rare for poor whites to temporarily welcome strangers into their households. One
settlement-house worker writes in her memoir (in 1934), “our neighbors never hesitated to share
their meagre quarters when need arose.” As one example among many, she tells the story of two
young mothers who met in the maternity ward at a hospital. One of them, Mary, confided to the
girl in the next bed (Dorothy) that she had no home, and nowhere to go once she left the hospital.
So Dorothy invited Mary and her baby to live in her own tiny tenement quarters with her

71 “An Urban Famine,” 17; New York Times, July 12, 1931; Chicago Tribune, December 16, 1930, October 20,
1931; New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1932.
72 “The effect of the depression in the area 47th to 51st, South Park to the New York Central tracks, as reported by
Mrs. Margaret Bradburn,” Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1.
husband and newborn baby. The (unemployed) husband gave up his half of the family bed to the stranger and slept on a narrow couch, and Mary’s baby slept in the kitchen in the carriage that Dorothy and her husband had proudly provided for their own baby. “But there was only good will shown to the guest,” the settlement worker remarks, “and a determination to ‘make out the best we can.’”

People who had been summarily evicted frequently found solace in the homes of neighbors. One young woman returned from giving birth in a hospital to find that she had been dispossessed and her husband had deserted her, taking most of the household goods with him. Fortunately a neighbor, who was herself receiving relief, opened her door to the deserted, homeless girl, and shared everything she had with this young mother and her child. Such compassion among fellow sufferers ensured that very few evicted families ever spent a night outside or were consigned to the hell of homelessness.

One must also mention the communism that existed within the immediate family. Needless to say, a communist mentality is the very foundation of a healthy family life, as it is of a healthy social life; for cooperation, love, sympathy, the sharing of resources, are present in any non-dysfunctional relationship. But in families that were not torn apart by the Depression, these things became even more pronounced than they had been. This was most obvious with regard to children’s sharing of income with their parents. But they also frequently took on more household duties, especially if their mothers had to work. Even working-class boys participated in domestic chores, large percentages (20, 30, 50 percent) washing floors and dishes, sweeping the sidewalk, emptying the garbage, chopping wood to be stored for winter, caring for younger children, washing clothes, and “keeping Dad from getting drunk while mother is at the Yards working.”

---

74 Ibid., 39.
The participation of boys in these activities somewhat defies gender stereotypes, and shows how adaptable families could be.75

Their adaptability, however, is especially indicated by fathers’ willingness to take part in “feminine” domestic tasks. A Chicago study published in 1938 found that “men who had never before helped about the house and who perhaps belonged to cultural groups that regarded housework as derogatory to a man’s status welcomed housework and became able assistants to their wives.” Apparently, a large proportion of men from even the most patriarchal of cultural backgrounds, such as Eastern Europe, soon grew willing to do laundry, go shopping, help with cooking, and take care of the children, activities they may (in some cases) have considered hopelessly beneath them only months earlier. Some, indeed, welcomed them, as things to occupy their time. It was not rare for unemployment actually to improve family ties, as the father developed greater respect for his wife’s duties and abilities, and as family members spent more time with each other. “Unemployment itself,” a sociologist wrote, “frequently acts as a stimulus to a more successful organization of family life than formerly existed.” It is known, after all, that in moments of crisis communities are as apt to unite as to disintegrate, displaying impressive solidarity while drawing on deep reserves of psychological resilience.76 Testimony after testimony from the 1930s gives witness to the durability and frequent intensification of family ties under the impact of the Depression. “For the Polish family,” a priest in Chicago says in 1934, “depression time is the time for sharing the most essential things in life; therefore, generally speaking, I will say that the family affectional ties are strengthened not weakened by

75 Belknap, “Summer Activities of Boys,” 39, 40; Glen H. Elder, Jr., Children of the Great Depression, 64–69.
the depression.” For every case-study of a family teetering on the brink of collapse, there was a family that burst the shackles of gender norms and adapted.77

A working-class Polish woman remarks, “The days that I work my husband stays home and takes care of the housework and gets the meals ready. He helps me wash clothes in the evening and Viola [the daughter] does the ironing after school.” An Irish father took on all the heavy housework such as scrubbing the floors and washing clothes (though he refused to hang them out to dry, afraid of people seeing him). Mrs. Levin had arthritic pains, so her husband did the shopping and helped with the washing and cooking. Mr. Page, a former truck driver, was “helpful in the house, devoted to [his wife], cheerful, and a great help with the children.” “Of course [his wife] wants him to get a job,” an interviewer noted, “but she hates to think of losing his companionship during the day.” Even Mr. Shea, who drank and sometimes beat his wife, helped around the house when he felt well enough, and did most of the shopping because of Mrs. Shea’s difficulty climbing stairs. Mr. McCarthy did all the cooking and baking and took great pride in his skill, noting that his father had taught him, just as he was teaching his son. Of an unemployed white American family, a caseworker observed simply, “in the home there is delightful harmony and cooperation,” the children, too, being “wonderfully sympathetic” and avidly helping their parents.78

Even among men who were employed, assistance with household tasks was not necessarily rare. Women’s Bureau agents conducting surveys noted that sometimes when they entered a home they found husbands preparing supper, who apparently felt no embarrassment when a stranger saw them doing so. Information on these matters is sketchy, but it seems that,

depending on the category (ethnicity, employed or not, etc.), between perhaps 20 and 40 percent of working-class husbands in urban contexts provided substantial help with household chores, especially cleaning, dishwashing, and childcare. Eastern Europeans were often particularly helpful, Germans and Italians a bit less so, and English and Jewish immigrants least of all. But, again, data are so lacking that these are mere educated guesses. Susan Porter Benson concludes that in the 1920s and ’30s, “working-class men participated in housework to a far greater degree than conventional historical wisdom allows.”

In families that had been well-integrated during normal times, unemployment sometimes even caused the father’s status to rise, at least in the eyes of young children. He was able to show more interest in them, play with them more often, and acquire more effective control over them by sharing in their daily activities. For their part, they were likely to show sympathy for his frustrations and troubles. The following incidents illustrate this:

When asked whether she would like to have her father go back to work, one 7-year-old girl answered, “It’s better both ways. If he worked we would have more money, but if he doesn’t work he can play with us.” One father says that when the children notice that he is worried, they try to entertain him with stories about school. If there is nothing to tell, he can see that they are making up stories just to keep his mind off his worries. A boy, aged 13, said that whenever he sees that his father is worried, he asks him to criticize his drawings. It is harder, the boy said, to distract his mother from worrying, but father gets interested in showing him how to improve the drawing and forgets his worries at least for a while.

79 Benson, Household Accounts, 45–49.
80 Komarovsky, The Unemployed Man and His Family, 90, 91.
There has always been a tendency for commentators and historians to emphasize the family- and community-fragmenting aspects of the Depression, because those were the most obvious and dramatic. But far more interesting, and equally or more important, were the communistic phenomena that have been briefly surveyed in this section. With regard to any particular context, it is largely these that should occupy the social historian and the anthropologist, since it is these that are conventionally underemphasized—being contrary to mainstream ideologies in a capitalist society—and that are, ultimately, what keep society functioning.

* 

Through all the means that have been discussed in this chapter, people were able to postpone reliance on relief for very long periods. For many, that was the categorical imperative: 

*not to beg for relief. Maintain independence and self-respect.*

Despite the hardships, despite the frustrations of looking for work endlessly and having to take odd jobs whenever one could and having to scrounge, and the humiliations of asking to borrow more money from friends and relatives, and being almost unable to face the grocer again because of the shame of enormous debt, and even requiring that one’s wife and children play the masculine role by working—at awful, degrading jobs, perhaps preventing the children from attending school—despite all the grinding stress, 

*deny the need for charity.*

For that, supposedly, was to admit defeat. Some men even killed themselves rather than apply for relief.
As we saw earlier, some people who had lost their jobs were able to stay off relief the whole Depression, through ingenuity, luck, and spartan living. But those cases were exceptional. Even that of Mr. Hardy, a labor foreman, was highly unusual: he managed to wait three years and seven months before applying for relief, with the help of $800 he had saved and twenty insurance policies he cashed in. The absence of children in his family was also an important factor. For example, Mr. Aukus, a truck driver with six children under nine years of age, had to apply for relief five weeks after being laid off. Mr. Floyd actually received relief when he was still working one day a week, because the previous year and a half of part-time work had exhausted his resources. According to a survey of 101 families that had previously earned good wages, 29 had experienced over a year of unemployment before applying for relief; 14 had been unemployed between six months and a year before the relief application; and the rest (57 families) accepted relief after less than six months of unemployment. Another survey of 87 blue-collar Chicago families found that 18 managed to go longer than a year before asking for relief. So, in general, it is safe to say that a substantial minority, perhaps a quarter or a third, of unemployed white Americans and immigrants in Chicago did not turn to relief for a year or more, sometimes three or four years. (The situation was of course different for most African-Americans, who had fewer resources than whites.) This may even be an underestimate, for according to E. Wight Bakke three quarters of the unemployed in New Haven did not apply for relief until they had been out of work two or more years.81

One might argue (as many historians have) that this extreme reluctance to go on relief was merely a manifestation of Americans’ “traditional individualism,” more specifically of their indoctrination with bourgeois values and inability to create an alternative working-class culture

---

(as Melvyn Dubofsky alleges). More charitable, though, would be to argue that independence and self-reliance—where self is defined not individualistically but in terms of family, extended kin, friends, neighbors, community, fellow workers—were hallmarks of a relatively independent working-class culture that were not incompatible with the ethic of mutualism that David Montgomery describes in *The Fall of the House of Labor*. In a broader sense, to value independence from institutions that pry into one’s most intimate personal affairs in a degrading and condescending way, as relief agencies did, with the implication that one is incapable of financial responsibility, is neither bourgeois nor working-class but simply *human*, arising out of the natural desire to freely determine oneself. From a Marxian perspective, on the other hand, working people’s aversion to going on relief is perfectly compatible with the class attitude of hostility towards arbitrary authorities such as the boss, the foreman, government, and any institution that oppresses and dominates. A culture of “capitalist individualism” need not have anything to do with it.

And yet despite popular hostility towards intrusive authorities such as relief agencies, we’ll see in chapter six that it was possible for millions of people very early in the Depression to demand statist collectivism on a scale that would have been scarcely conceivable a year or two earlier. Their valorization of self-reliance did not prevent tens of millions from advocating a system that in some respects would have been quintessentially socialist.

**Re-creating**

*Informal recreation*

---

Contrary to what one might think from reading some reports of the time, recreation for most families severely affected by insecure employment during the 1930s did not consist only of sitting at home and staring at the wall. Lack of money did not entail lack of recreation, although it did limit the forms of fun that could be indulged in. Fortunately, it isn’t only the financially secure who are able to enjoy life.

Writing a paper on the topic, a student at the University of Chicago summed up the transformation from 1929 to 1934 in one sentence: “Play and recreation,” she observed, “have become more simple and wholesome.” This was true even for families that had some (small) means of income. Before the Depression there was an element of “grandeur” to recreation, as formal dinner dances were, for many young people, weekly or biweekly occurrences, and groups would have dinner at a hotel and then spend the night “gadding about” (as the student put it) to night clubs. “Now,” she said, “a crowd gathers at someone’s home, plays bridge or dances, has a simple lunch and calls it [sincerely] an enjoyable evening.” Such changes symbolize that which perhaps most set the Depression decade apart from the rest of the twentieth century: it was the era of (partial) de-commercialization, de-commodification, and, in a sense, de-privatization. Simply by adapting to a broken economy, people asserted their autonomy vis-à-vis mainstream commercial practices.83

One way this autonomy manifested itself was in the frequent substitution of outdoor activities for indoor activities. Whereas a few years earlier, young people had favored night clubs, movie theaters or plays, and other kinds of commercial entertainment, now they substituted “nature play” (as one young woman put it)—if, that is, they had access to nature of some sort, whether parks or rivers or forests. In the environs of Chicago, it was common for

83 “Recreation and Depression” (a student paper), 1934, Burgess Papers, box 177, folder 2.
children and teenagers to pack up some food and hike to a spring to have a picnic, or go on a jaunt through the woods and splash around in a river, maybe frog-hunting. Hiking grew popular, as did camping (with the encouragement of settlement houses and New Deal programs). A “bicycle craze” emerged as well, in part because many could no longer afford automobiles or the fare for streetcars. By the mid-1930s, it was estimated that over 100,000 bikes were used in Chicago.84

The city had a quite extensive network of recreational facilities and relevant social institutions. For example, the Depression-stricken Near West Side (largely Italian) had eight public playgrounds, five parks, three public libraries, about 130 churches, 24 public schools, and several settlement houses (most famously Hull House). Back of the Yards had four parks and playgrounds (plus the usual tennis courts, swimming pools, bowling alleys, baseball diamonds, bath houses, etc. that were located in parks), three libraries, nine public schools, and about 30 churches. Not even black neighborhoods on the South Side were altogether deprived of such resources: for instance, Washington Park had at least 34 churches, several youth organizations such as Boy Scouts, and its enormous namesake park, which included 11 baseball diamonds, 15 softball fields, an archery range, hockey fields, 25 tennis courts, and other facilities. Churches, too, frequently had indoor and outdoor recreational facilities, e.g., gymnasiums, club rooms, billiard tables, volleyball courts, playgrounds, baseball diamonds, and ping-pong tables. (Ping-pong was an extremely popular sport in Chicago among both adults and youth.) Despite all this, however, the Chicago Recreation Commission found in its four-year-long investigation in the late 1930s that a “very considerable number of community areas” lacked recreational facilities, and that the city’s park and play facilities “should be multiplied several-fold in order to conform to well-accepted standards.” Only 64 schools had playgrounds. The Commission also found that

84 Miscellaneous student papers, ibid.; Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1937.
Chicago lagged far behind most other large American cities in the use of school buildings as civic centers, and recommended that schools more often be opened in the evening for community purposes and recreation.\textsuperscript{85}

Another inadequacy was that, partly because of budget cuts, there were relatively few organized recreational programs for youth and children at public institutions. Most public schools did not offer summer programs, and when they did they didn’t always include the workshop or handicraft classes that most appealed to boys. Parks’ programs were not much more satisfactory. In Back of the Yards, for example, the lack of personnel meant that sometimes the only “program” younger children could participate in was swimming. And because only a limited number of people were allowed in the pool at any given time, kids often had to stand in line for hours in the hot sun, waiting for the precious thirty minutes that they would be allowed to swim in the pool. Public libraries, likewise, had insufficient funds to buy new books or offer exciting programs. Such were the fruits of government retrenchment.\textsuperscript{86}

So, to a great extent, it was left to the young to create their own fun, within the constraints of their families’ limited income and the poverty of their neighborhoods. A 1937 study of Back of the Yards gives detailed information on how young boys—Mexican, Polish, Irish, German—spent their free summer hours, when they were not helping with housework or earning a little money for the family. About half of the boys interviewed had access to tools around the house, which they used to make such things as two-wheel scooters, wooden guns, foot stools, model airplanes, boats, and dog houses. A more popular pastime was to play ball at


the playground, which required only a ball and a bat, not even gloves. Most of the boys also had pets of some sort—dogs, cats, pigeons, guinea pigs, rabbits, and chickens. Their enjoyment of these animals fed their yearning to live in the countryside. “In de country a guy can be around de animals,” said one, while others followed up with “You can ride horses,” “Have fun chasin’ the chickens,” and “Feed the pigs.” “You can go fishin’,” “Sit under trees and read and eat apples.” “In the country—more fun. You can play baseball better there—no cars in the way and you don’t bust a window like we did a week ago.” Children tolerated the congestion of urban neighborhoods, but they did not necessarily enjoy it. (And no wonder, considering this description of Back of the Yards: “Congestion is everywhere present. The streets, the alleys, the vacant lots, ‘along the tracks,’ the parks, the University of Chicago Settlement playgrounds, every place is jammed with boys and girls, large and small!”)  

In addition to all the unorganized street- and park-activities—innumerable games (including card games, hopscotch, tag, hide and seek, kick the can, “spinning tops,” “rolling hoops,” and “Push ’em in de Hell” 88), wood-crafting, swimming, roller-skating, street hockey (often played with broomsticks and a smashed can), spectating at older kids’ ball games, teasing and flirting with the opposite sex—were such indoor activities as reading and listening to the radio. Girls, both older and younger, tended to stay inside more than boys, in part because they were given less freedom by their parents. If they had material, some high-school-aged girls liked to make hats and dresses and do embroidery. Across the city, it was common for teenage girls to read magazines and books for pleasure; fewer, but still a sizable minority, enjoyed listening to the radio—and it was not rare for financially struggling families to have radios. Of course the

87 Ibid., chapter 5, 104.
88 An 11-year-old described this game as follows: “try to push someone into the street; then the fellow that’s ‘it’ comes along and tickles you, sometimes maybe five minutes, if you laugh you go to hell—if you don’t laugh you go to heaven.” Belknap, “Summer Activities,” 86.
young who belonged to more well-off families also tended to like movies, plays, riding around in automobiles, shopping, and going to nightclubs; less fortunate girls simply took walks and visited their friends, which might involve such activities as playing cards, group singing, and dancing to music on the radio. More girls played baseball in lower-income neighborhoods than in wealthier areas like Lakeview (where it was more usual for them to play tennis, a typically upper-class sport). In the summer, needless to say, teenagers added such pastimes as swimming and sunbathing.\textsuperscript{89}

Not all the youth’s fun was “simple and wholesome,” however. Gangs of teenage and younger boys proliferated in the 1930s, as in the 1920s, especially in low-income areas. Most gangs did not routinely engage in crime—they were simply peer groups from around the block, which had sprung up around shared interests and frequently a common ethnicity—but it was not uncommon for their activities to straddle the line between licit and illicit. In between playing baseball and basketball, or lounging on street corners or playing marble and dice games (frequently involving gambling), they might fight members of another gang who had wandered into their territory. Gang rivalries could be quite fierce, so much so that merely going to a drugstore in another gang’s territory might get one beaten up. This had especially been the case in the 1920s and earlier, when teenagers told interviewers of times when they had lain in wait for hours for one of the “enemy” to invade the local block on his way to the meat market. By the 1930s these rivalries were waning, but even so, ethnic differences, as between Mexican gangs and Polish gangs, perpetuated a degree of hostility and suspicion.\textsuperscript{90}

Stealing was another favored form of recreation among gang members. Given the “gambling spirit” that inspired many gangs—the zeal for taking chances, for outwitting the law and “getting something for nothing”—stealing was a way of achieving status within the group, and of expressing the common ethos of opposition toward the established order. Shoplifting at department stores, for example, provided adventure and excited the admiration of peers. One technique was for a couple of kids to attract the attention of clerks while others filled their shirts or sweaters full of merchandise, which they passed to friends waiting outside the door, who then dashed away as the first group returned to load up again. The more enterprising and prolific shoplifters were able to make a lot of money reselling the stolen goods. On the South Side and in South Chicago, it was also popular to rob fruit trucks. One or more boys would “hop” the back of the truck when it stopped at a railroad crossing, throw off fruit to companions stationed along the road as the truck continued driving, and then jump off at the next crossing. The fruit was usually sold to get money for cigarettes, a dance, or seeing a movie.\(^9\)

More serious was the epidemic of car thefts in the early 1930s, and the theft of spare tires and other parts. The press reported that several thousand cars were stolen by “wayward boys” every month, until in 1934 a new municipal court was established just to deal with the problem. The activity of gangs was often responsible, but sometimes the boys, desperate for money, were employed by dishonest dealers who then sold the cars and their parts at cut-rate prices. –Thus, even into the late 1930s, property crimes were committed by many different sections and strata of the population, though none more so than the impecunious youth. WPA researchers observed that their young interview subjects were wont to have pockets bulging with small things like knives, pencils, whistles, and toys that they had snatched from stores; and some teenagers—

Mexican, African-American, Polish, etc.—told of stealing bikes, skates, and even coal from sheds (a rather elaborate project that required cooperation and advance planning). “Holdups” remained common the whole decade, and were frequently reported in sensationalist terms by the press. Why did so many of the young turn to crime? “Easy money,” was the laconic reply. “Nothing to it,” said one boy. “You stick a hand in your pocket and make ’em think it’s a gun. Then you stick a hand in their pockets and get their dough.”

These trends toward a greater incidence of juvenile delinquency were already clear in 1931, and—partially excepting the middle years of the decade, when the economy improved—continued into 1940 and beyond, particularly in African-American neighborhoods. “There has been an increase in armed robbery,” the black-owned Chicago Defender noted in 1940, “and bands of young hoodlums roam the streets insulting and attacking women, with little fear of arrest.” Murders were on the rise. Gambling flourished, hordes of teenagers bought liquor, knife fights and “shooting frays” were common, and discipline in public schools—which were severely overcrowded—was at best precarious. “Lawlessness within the schools,” the Defender complained, “has reached the point where students, even husky young athletes, have their coats, hats, and other property stolen and are afraid to identify the thieves even though they know them. Young hoodlums think nothing of entering the schools on occasion and actually running the classes.” Just in the previous few weeks, a student had been stabbed to death, boys had thrown acid on a teacher, a janitor had been shot, and “a teacher who had the temerity to take a gun away from a pupil was forced to return the gun at the point of a knife.” Such were the conditions and attitudes fostered by civic breakdown on the South Side of Chicago.

Aside from criminal activity, boys on the South and West Sides had a colorful repertoire of modes of adventurism. Many liked to swim in Lake Michigan, but since they lacked money they would sneak rides on streetcars to the lake, or they would try the riskier tactic of “flipping a ride.” This meant jumping onto the back bumper or the spare tire of a car when it stopped at a red light, then jumping off when the boy’s destination was reached or the car turned off his desired road. Children as young as five years old would hitch rides on the back of streetcars, sometimes seven or eight hanging on at a time. Another risky activity was the popular one of visiting the stockyards, which was forbidden and could be dangerous. According to an investigator,

Some [boys] liked to watch the cattle and play with the sheep and hogs; others liked to watch the “cowboys” as they herded animals from one pen to another or fed them hay or grain; some liked to dig in the debris to the north and west of the Racine Avenue entrance to find steers’ horns which could be taken home and made into useful or ornamental articles; others collected old brass and copper, which they smuggled out.94

One way to get in was to sneak through the gates when a shift ended and workers were flooding in while others flooded out. More creatively, “another group discovered that if they washed their faces, combed their hair, put on clean shirts, and then told the watchman at the gate that they were to meet a party of people at a certain packing plant in the Yards and make an educational

94 Chicago Tribune, August 11, 1933; Belknap, 66.
tour through one of the plants, the trick was accomplished, and the watchman glowingly let them pass."

During the summer, boys in South Chicago liked to take all-day trips to Calumet Park and go swimming and fishing, while during the winter those who owned skates would go skating on frozen prairies or in Bessemer Park. The city dump at 103rd and Pullman Streets was another popular destination: it was full of interesting and useful things, and one could engage in the sport of “rat shooting.” In fact, the dump was popular even with families and single adult men who could not get on relief, as a place to pick up old furniture, clothing, junk of all sorts, even spoiled food.

From the perspective of moralizing authorities, one of the most deplorable consequences of the Depression was the rise in sexual promiscuity, another form of recreation that so-called wayward youth and adults indulged in. Again, it was in parts of the city where social regulation had most broken down, particularly in the Black Belt, that “morals” were loosest. Between 1928 and 1933, more than 2,000 of the 25,000 African-American babies that were born in Chicago were illegitimate. Even before the Depression, between 1923 and 1928, from 10 to 15 percent of the black maternity cases in Cook County Hospital were unmarried mothers. But in the 1930s, “sexual delinquency” followed the trends in petty theft and violence, except more so: males and females, of whatever age, for whom marriage was not a suitable option whiled away the weary hours in fondling and sex, seeking comfort and companionship in the warm body of a fellow human being.

---

95 Ibid., 67.
A truant officer on the South Side observed in 1934 that the promiscuity resultant from overcrowding had spread even to children. As an illustration, she noted that in one elementary school for African-Americans, where the children were aged 11 to 15, there were four pregnancies in January 1934. At the same time, six other students were barred from school for being dangerously infected with syphilis. “It is not uncommon,” she said, “to find girls in the grammar school aged 12 or 13 frankly admitting that they are practicing prostitution.” Even children, or especially children, acted contrary to how authorities wanted them to—in both creative and personally harmful ways. In the context of a myriad of economic and institutional constraints, they asserted their independence and fought for resources as best they could.98

Adults tended to be less adventurous and determined in their quest for recreation than the young, but they, too, were by no means content to sit idly at home continuously and without end. It is true that one of the chief means of entertainment, as already stated, was home-centered: namely, listening to the radio. Boys, girls, adults, and families as a whole regularly relied on the radio for much of their intellectual and emotional stimulation, as people in more recent times have relied on the television. The family’s radio was enjoyed in the 1920s, but it was often cherished in the 1930s, as shown by the fact that the number of households owning radios increased rapidly between 1930 and 1935. In 1936, one in four black migrant families from the South owned a radio. Even families on relief frequently had a radio, as one of the few available means of communication with the outside world—and of distraction from the tedium of the ‘inside’ world. Fathers and sons were likely to listen to the ball game, and immigrant parents liked to listen to programs in their own language—to the great frustration of their children, who wanted to listen to American programs like Amos ‘n’ Andy, Tarzan, and Buddy Rogers. Boys

98 “The effect of the depression in the area 47th to 51st,” Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1.
complained in interviews that their parents tended to monopolize the radio, or only let them use it occasionally.  

However, that there were pronounced tendencies for the long-term unemployed to withdraw into their homes and sever some of their contacts with the outside world should not be seen as necessarily an expression of despair or defeat or “passiveness.” Or “apathy.” Rather, it was merely the most reasonable response to a dramatic change of conditions. If one could no longer afford to attend baseball games, one listened to them on the radio. If one could not afford to go to movies anymore, one stayed in and played cards with friends or family. Indeed, card games, particularly bridge, became even more popular than they had been, although they were now often played with no money at stake. As “fair-weather friends” dropped away, contacts with other friends, and frequently with relatives, became more intimate and “wholesome” than they had been before, when attending parties or dances was the norm. Some people even preferred the new style of recreation. “I can not say that I regret [the] changes,” wrote one young student, “for they have taught people the fine art of entertainment that is less artificial and far less planned and routinized. Last year my entire immediate family,” he said, “as well as Aunts and Uncles and Cousins gathered weekly at a public bowling alley to enjoy many good wholesome laughs as well as to strengthen our muscles. I can not remember before in my life that we all got together for such real fun.”

Whether reading, among the unemployed and insecurely employed, increased or decreased during the Depression is unclear, for conflicting tendencies were at work. Some

---

100 “Personal Observations.”
studies reported that it declined, in part because people could no longer afford to buy books and magazines, and in part because some unemployed men were too depressed to do much reading anyway. A survey of 200 unemployed families in New Haven, for example, found that reading had decreased slightly since more prosperous times. On the other hand, many libraries reported that their services were in greater demand than ever—even as budgets and personnel were being cut, especially in the early Depression. Between 1929 and 1932, 33 cities saw a 37 percent increase in demand for public library books, most notably for books on unemployment and industrial planning. Said one head librarian, “people are reading more and better books and a vastly greater number of people are reading.” Nationally, by 1933, it seems that one out of every eight men borrowing books was jobless—which was a much lower percentage than the unemployed’s share of the population—and one out of every six children borrowing reported that his father was jobless. The large majority of young boys in Chicago were not very enthusiastic about reading, but the ones who did read gravitated towards “all kinds of detective, wild west, love, and air story magazines,” which, lacking money, they frequently stole from stands or simply inherited from older siblings. Teenagers read more than children, of course, and girls in low-income families tended to read more than those in wealthier families.  

Adult men who were not well-educated or had not been in the habit of reading books before the Depression typically found other ways to spend their time, when not brooding at home. Unemployed African-Americans were not much different from whites: common answers to interviewers’ questions of what they did all day included playing cards, listening to the radio, “just sitting at home,” and “foolin’ around,” which covered such activities as dancing in informal house groups, congregating on street corners and in taverns and barbershops, “sex-play” in

---

kitchenettes or elsewhere, and “waiting tensely for the policy drawings three times a day.” This last was indeed largely unique to the Black Belt, and an important focus of intellectual and emotional energy for the entire community. The game called “policy” was a form of lottery, and as such was illegal, but by the 1930s it was such an enormous “racket” and was so integral to the South Side community that to abolish it was hopeless. Political bosses, court officials, lawyers, police officials, and the “ward machine” received hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes every year from the businessmen who owned and operated the 500-or-so policy stations (where bets were made) on the South Side. And many people even argued, not implausibly, that policy was good for the Black Belt economy, since it sustained hundreds of local businesses and provided employment to more than 6,000 people (many of them women), including clerks, accountants, doormen, janitors, bookkeepers, “bouncers,” and “writers.”

The most numerous policy employees were the so-called writers, who collected bets and wrote receipts for them that would be necessary to verify winnings later on. Some of them walking from door to door to solicit bets (usually in the poorer neighborhoods) and others situated in the policy stations, writers collected anywhere from pennies to dollars from people who gambled that a certain combination of numbers would be drawn from a drum-shaped container, called a “wheel,” that contained numbers from 1 to 78. The wheels were scattered around the South Side at strategic spots. Drawings from each of the wheels took place three times a day: twelve numbers were drawn from the 78 inside. Depending on how many particular numbers one had bet would be drawn—and bets were usually for three particular numbers, such as 4, 11, and 44—winners were paid at odds of from 100:1 to 3,500:1. But the real odds were much worse than this, and it was quite rare to win. Even so, the game was wildly popular on the

---

South Side, practically a collective obsession, with policy stations on virtually every block (though often hidden, because of their illegality). A huge and complex infrastructure existed to operate the game, and both policy stations and wheel locations were kinetic spaces overflowing with all the different kinds of operatives and excited players and paid-off policemen and bouncers to keep order. “Almost everybody on the South Side plays policy,” remarked one man, likely exaggerating; “if I could prove it, you’d find that eight out of every ten people puts in at least two plays [out of a possible three] a day.”

In a time as bleak as the Great Depression, it is understandable why people would become intoxicated by a form of gambling as cheap as policy, in which a thrill could be had for as little as a penny. Women were at least as fond of the game as men, sometimes gambling away money that would have been better spent on food. For instance, it was usually women who patronized spiritualists and séances in order to learn what numbers would be best to play. Hundreds of spiritualists dotted the social landscape of the South Side, sometimes giving séances for free, in incense-soaked rooms with Persian rugs and plush furniture. After prayers and mystical atmosphere-conjuring, the Madame in charge walked slowly around the table and spoke in hushed tones to each member of the audience. “The spirits bring me in touch with you, young man,” she might say to someone; “they give me a moving condition… Would you recognize an uncle in the spirit world? His name is William and he died because of some sort of lingering ailment. The spirits want you to take care of William.” As a participant comments in a report, “this is the visitor’s cue to play the numbers [in policy] for the name William. The fact that he has never had an uncle named William is immaterial.” “Dream books” were published for policy

---

players to interpret in numerical terms such names, as well as to interpret actual dreams, which players frequently used to divine what numbers to bet on. Random hunches, newspapers, license plates, and hymn numbers announced at church were also common inspirations for the numbers to be played.¹⁰⁴

Church authorities and various social organizations complained, year after year, about the effect of policy on the community, but little was done about it. “Every neighborhood in many sections of our city,” the National League of Justice lamented, “is infested. The laws and church yards are strewn with policy slips. Women take the last nickel or dime to play policy rather than buy a loaf of bread for their children. The conditions…are deplorable.” One woman expressed a common opinion: “Policy is a great detriment to our people… It tends to encourage other forms of gambling. In the alleys around here you’ll find little kids shooting craps. What can you expect when their parents play policy?” People who regularly attended church were likely to say that policy was immoral, since the church was against it, but they usually played anyway. Ministers bewailed the social evil (as they saw it), but nearly all were happy to accept money from their congregation that came from policy winnings.¹⁰⁵

The other “socially destructive” activity that the discouraged unemployed, especially men, periodically indulged in was alcohol consumption. I will say more about this in the next chapter, but here it may be noted that alcoholism was less common than one might think. The main reason, of course, was that people lacked money to drink regularly. A study of one hundred Chicago families observed that drink “rarely became a permanent method of escape, perhaps because increased poverty and the system of the relief agencies, whereby grocery orders and

food boxes were supplied but no cash, forced a reform in the habits of some of the habitual drinkers.” Another study found that alcoholism was much less common among Depression relief clients than pre-Depression clients: among the latter, 12 percent were severely alcoholic, compared to 2 percent among the former; and 94 percent of the former had no alcoholic symptoms whatsoever, compared to 82 percent of the pre-Depression clients. These numbers reflect the fact that a higher proportion of relief clients in the Depression than in the 1920s came from socially “well-adjusted” backgrounds. In short, a journalist’s impressions of men in Seattle in 1931 were likely of general validity: “There is very little drinking among the unemployed. Bootlegging, apparently, is a poor racket below the line these days. Out of hundreds of men I saw only one drunk… The bona fide jobless aren’t boozing.”

There is one last, very prominent type of recreation for the unemployed we should mention here, albeit only in passing. A contemporary investigator described it in colorful terms. In addition, she said, to maybe planting a garden, making furniture, making toys for the children, even making a bike in one case,

A man could also talk. He could stand at a street corner and talk. He could drop in to a friend’s house and talk… Meetings and street gatherings were also time-consuming. They served as an outlet for discouragement, bitterness, and unconsumed energy. They served, too, as a bolsterer of egos. It gave a man a sense of importance to stand in front of a crowd and to shout, to be on the organization committee, to tell other people what to do. And then it gave him a sense of direction. His feeling of living in an aimless, impregnable, unfeeling

---

universe was forgotten when he was appointed delegate to such and such a
gathering, and when he planned this and that sort of a protest meeting.

The enticements of political agitation or serving on some committee or other—perhaps one of
the forty or fifty community councils that existed in Chicago in the 1930s—were very real, not
only to some marginal malcontents but to many thousands of men and women from every ethnic
background, whether Greek, Lithuanian, Italian, white American, Mexican, or—most notably—
African-American. We’ll save this discussion, however, for the chapter on political activity.107

Organized recreation

While most recreation, as always, was informal, such institutions as settlement houses,
churches, charities, and New Deal agencies did orchestrate an incredible expansion of organized
recreation for the public, until by the end of the Depression decade a whole new “regime of play”
to coin a term) had evolved. By 1940, the intricate and extensive networks of cooperation
between the federal government, local public recreation bodies, and private social agencies bore
little resemblance to what had been the case only eight years earlier. Indeed, the relative lack of
coordination of Chicago’s recreational programs between 1930 and 1932 was already beginning
to change by 1933, under the impact of the New Deal and the increased flow of money it
entailed. What follows is a brief overview of some of the institutional innovations that evolved
under Roosevelt’s administration, after which we’ll look in more depth at settlement houses,
whose programs were representative of broader trends.

107 Friedman, “One Hundred Unemployed Families,” 174, 175; map of Chicago’s community councils, April 29,
1933, Lea Taylor Papers, Chicago History Museum, box 21.
In late 1933 the Civil Works Educational Service was created, as a part of the Civil Works Service (though in Chicago it was also sponsored by the Board of Education with the cooperation of the Council of Social Agencies). While lasting only until May 1934, when the Civil Works Service was discontinued, it developed 18 nursery schools for children under six and established a free junior college to replace Crane Junior College, which had been closed the previous year because of budget cuts. (A study found that most of the young men and women who attended this new college were from the manual-laboring class, were unemployed, and were of recent immigrant stock, especially Russian, Polish, and Italian. The study’s author concluded, “The large number of [students’] homes in which foreign languages are spoken indicates that parents coming from other countries have realized the advantages to be secured from higher education.”) After the end of the Civil Works Educational Service in early 1934, a new program called the Children’s Leisure Time Service—later the Chicago Leisure Time Service—was initiated under the aegis of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, though administered by the Council of Social Agencies. In brief, it was a work relief project: hundreds of workers were assigned to 57 social agencies (including settlements, neighborhood houses, churches, boys’ and girls’ clubs, and the YMCA and YWCA) in order to do such things as clear vacant lots for community gardens and playgrounds, and help administer summer camps and other activities later in the year, frequently in the agencies themselves. In the first summer alone, 61,000 children between 6 and 16 were enrolled in activities, 82 lots were cleared for playgrounds, and 250 community gardens and 686 backyard gardens were planted.108

Meanwhile, the federal government invested in adult education with its Emergency Educational Program, which in 1934 employed almost a thousand out-of-work teachers in

hundreds of locations in Chicago. The program continued in succeeding years, though with periodic interruptions due to lack of funds. One of its priorities was Workers’ Education, the major goals of which were to arouse a sense of community among workers, “to reach unorganized workers…to stimulate social action,” and to foster critical thinking about society and cultivate neighborhood leaders. This program lasted until 1939; and while continually attacked across the country by conservatives and business interests as being Communist and pro-unions, on the whole it met with striking success in Chicago. Labor groups, unions, religious organizations like the Jewish People’s Institute and the YWCA, and settlement houses all enthusiastically participated. English classes and citizenship classes were among the most popular—and only became more so as the decade progressed—hundreds of Mexicans, for example, taking advantage of them in the Hull House, Chicago Commons, and the Mexican Social Center on the Near West Side. Also popular were the many specialized classes in subjects like labor laws, labor problems, “training for union leadership,” teacher training, economics, U.S. labor history, theater and the arts, and—for women—cooking and sewing. (All classes, though, except for some domestic ones, were co-ed.) Many unemployed workers attended these classes, such as the young shipping clerk who had been fired after participating in a strike, and who brought his wife to a labor class so she could better understand why he was unemployed.  

Some courses, in fact, were exclusively for people who were out of work, such as the YWCA’s Practice School for Unemployed Office Workers, which had 3,000 students in 1934. With the help of New Deal money, moreover, programs that had already existed for (frequently jobless) older youth and adults were expanded. Some of the most important were the Boy Scouts, 

---

Girl Scouts, and Camp Fire Girls, the latter two of which increased their programs to include older girls; the Young Men’s Jewish Charities and the Catholic Youth Organization, both of which offered forums, classes, and vocational and professional guidance, in addition to the dances, clubs, and athletic opportunities that countless social organizations sponsored in Chicago; the YMCA, which increased services to young adults; and settlement house programs, which we’ll discuss shortly. Workers’ Education deepened and broadened in 1936 and ’37, as the Chicago Labor College, the Affiliated Schools for Workers, the Workers’ Alliance (a national organization that represented the unemployed), and the Workers’ Education Committee of the Chicago Federation of Labor coordinated their activities and interests through a new Chicago Workers’ Education Council. The public library, church organizations, men’s and women’s clubs, and universities—such as the University of Chicago, which had an Institute on Workers’ Education—all helped lead the “unprecedented” expansion of adult education in 1936, by organizing forums, discussion groups, lecture series, classes, and tours that related to “social issues of the day.” It is safe to say that a non-negligible minority of the people who participated in these programs belonged to the class of unemployed and part-time employed.110

Thus, by 1935–36, a byzantine but highly coordinated structure had evolved to organize much of Chicago’s non-commercial recreation and extracurricular education. The Division on Education and Recreation of the Chicago Council of Social Agencies oversaw a sprawling network of programs, while cooperating with the newly established WPA and National Youth Administration, both of which provided much of the (formerly unemployed) manpower to run the activities. The Chicago Leisure Time Service, for instance, became a work project under the WPA, in early 1937 supplying 750 recreation leaders to over 70 private agencies. (In July

1936—to take a representative month—there was a total attendance of 566,319 boys, girls, and adults in activities conducted by CLTS workers, most of those attending belonging to the “underprivileged” population.) The Chicago Camping Association, also under the aegis of the Council of Social Agencies, oversaw summer camps that typically attracted more than 25,000 children and adults per year. Every year, the Chicago Park District offered many classes and groups of physical education, arts, and crafts, in addition to more specialized and experimental programs like “garden clubs,” in which children and adults used plots of land in the parks to grow gardens. Facilities continued to expand on the basis of the New Deal’s largesse—more playgrounds being built, library space being added to boys’ clubs, thousands of city lots being cleared for play use, baseball and football fields and even a stadium being built, etc. Despite the unpredictability of government funding in the later years of the decade, private and public social/recreational organizations expanded, as ever more people took advantage of the programs on offer.\(^{111}\)

Even workers’ education, increasingly under attack after 1937, continued to grow until 1939, along with adult education as a whole. In 1939, for example, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers was able to organize a concert-lecture series for its members (including those unemployed); and the WPA’s supply of teachers helped keep many other programs that were run under union auspices growing until around 1939. In adult education more generally, 1938 and ’39 saw much greater tapping of the potential of radio, scores of Town Hall of the Air “listening groups” being organized by the Adult Education Council. Public forums and vocational education classes—both financed mainly by the federal government—likewise grew more numerous in these years, on occasion park facilities being used even for the discussion of

controversial political issues. Through the Community Forum Service, in 1939 900 speakers were furnished to 300 organizations practically without cost.\footnote{Gissenaas, “Recreation, Group Work, and Informal Education,” 69; Harleigh Trecker, “Recreation, Group Work, and Informal Education,” in Social Service Year Book, 1938, 73.}

All this flowering of a mature civil society, this quasi-improvisatory fashioning of a new mode of institutional structuring of recreation—which would, of course, continue to evolve and change in the 1940s and afterwards, frequently in less “public-spirited,” less worker-friendly, more corporatist and capitalist ways than in the 1930s—could not but affect even the more marginal groups in Chicago, the poor, the unemployed, the insecurely employed. Increased resources for every facet of public recreation meant increased opportunities for unemployed people and their families to rebel against alienation and atomization. To what extent the poor and the jobless took advantage of new opportunities is impossible to know, at least with any thoroughness or certainty; but according to studies, huge numbers of the underprivileged did in fact seize and expand upon the opportunities that had been presented them, and even created their own opportunities, their own organized recreation. After all, the majority of programs just mentioned—and we have scarcely hinted at the sheer abundance of them—were aimed at less-fortunate groups, not those who were materially well-off.\footnote{Belva Overton, term paper for Sociology 358, January 10, 1935, “The Effect of the Depression upon the Recreational Activities Offered at the Wabash Avenue YMCA,” Burgess Papers, box 177, folder 4.}

—With one exception: African-Americans. Much less was done for them than for groups closer to the mainstream, including immigrants, even Mexicans. A report by the Council of Social Agencies in 1935 stated the point concisely: “Organized recreational facilities are conspicuous by their absence in the Negro areas of Chicago.” Elaborating, it observed that “the institutional facilities are limited to the work conducted by church groups, a very limited number of small community centers, the YMCA, the YWCA, and the community services offered by the
school and library systems.” Even public parks were lacking: for the city as a whole, the population per acre of park space in 1925 was 507, while for black communities—with the exception of a couple neighborhoods on the South Side—it was anywhere from 1000 to 7400 people per acre. Only one or two underfunded settlement houses were located in predominantly black neighborhoods, and the ones that served neighborhoods in which there was a small black population, such as South Chicago and the Near North Side, catered mainly to whites. They were not places in which most black people would feel comfortable, especially given their racist pasts in the 1920s and earlier.114

African-Americans’ virtual exclusion from settlements is all the more unfortunate in light of the vitality of these institutions in the 1930s, the decade that—at least in terms of the sheer volume of activity—was perhaps their heyday. There were several dozen settlements in Chicago, located in the disadvantaged neighborhoods they served; among the more famous were Hull House, Chicago Commons, Association House, and the University of Chicago Settlement. Most were intimately involved in relief efforts, and many functioned as a center of neighborhood life. Chicago Commons, for example, located on the Near Northwest Side in a primarily Italian and Greek (but also Polish, Irish, and Mexican) neighborhood, was held in high regard by the thousands of people who lived nearby and could benefit from its services and leadership. It had several departments, including Mothers’ Clubs, Adult Education, Nursery and Kindergarten, Camp, Group Work, and Family Service, which dealt most directly with problems of unemployment relief. With the help of many volunteers, its residents and staff were able to

maintain a tightly packed daily schedule of activities, in addition to the invaluable relief services they provided to individuals and families for whom unemployment was causing crises.\textsuperscript{115} 

The work with young people (aside from very young children) was organized around clubs and classes, such as folk dancing, drama, gymnasium, cooking, dressmaking, handicrafts, music, and newspaper editing. Field trips were frequently taken to places of civic or cultural interest, and in the summer there were also camping trips to Michigan, where hundreds of kids could stay in cottages for a few weeks and participate in recreational activities. Year-round, play groups for young children were organized in the afternoons. We have already mentioned the offerings in adult education, but the mothers’ clubs provided hundreds of women with additional support, a haven from the harassment of being a working-class mother during the Depression. As a reporter said, “The weekly meeting of a Mothers Club”—and there were usually about ten such clubs at this settlement—“is in many cases the only chance a Mother has to leave her family and apartment and forget her complex problems.” The activities varied according to the women’s interests; for example, the Polish mothers’ club enjoyed choral singing, while in other clubs women sewed or played games and discussed children’s problems, or invited outside speakers to talk about important issues of the day. —With such a busy schedule, Chicago Commons was full of people—sometimes to the point of near-pandemonium—from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. or later, almost every day.\textsuperscript{116} 

In fact, one author estimated that in 1933–34, about 333,000 people, or 900 every day, participated in activities or used the facilities—four floors plus a basement. Outside groups and neighborhood organizations held meetings at the house, as many as 250 groups making regular

\textsuperscript{115} “Three Months’ Work at Chicago Commons,” 1934, Commons Papers, box 26, folder 1; Richards, “Chicago Commons and Its Neighbors.”

weekly or monthly use of it. And families held graduation parties and wedding parties there, among other events. Like other settlements and neighborhood houses, it was truly a pillar of social life, not some marginal institution run on a shoestring by a few idealistic do-gooders. (Its budget, paid largely by donations and fundraising events, was about $50,000, no paltry sum in the Depression years.) Every afternoon the house flooded with children and teenagers as soon as school ended, who would excitedly run to their clubs and classes or use the playground or game rooms. Very young children were so attracted to the Commons—and to Hull House and others—that they would sometimes spend the entire day there, just hanging around shyly in the background, in order to escape an unpleasant or boring home life. A worker at the University of Chicago Settlement remarked, in a not too flattering comparison, that “children gather like flies to the warmth and comfort of our rooms,” about a thousand attending clubs and classes every week, in addition to the many who just used the game rooms or enjoyed the house’s atmosphere.117

A Chicago Tribune feature article on settlements in 1932 gave a sense of the changes that had taken place since the Depression began. It reported that an “almost incredible increase of activity” had occurred in the previous two years. A huge corps of volunteers at the main houses worked three days a week to handle the overflow of people idled by the crisis; much of the work consisted of relief, such as giving them clothes made by other unemployed people in emergency workshops. Overall, attendance in clubs had doubled, or in some, such as the Italian women’s club at Hull House, sextupled. “Sewing and cooking instruction is clamored for by young and old,” the article reported. “English classes are tremendously popular, the library is always

117 Crews and Donlan, “A Study of Chicago Commons”; “Unemployment Among Our Neighbors” and “Unemployment at the University Settlement,” Mary McDowell Papers, box 3, folder 16; Lea Demarest Taylor, “Chicago Commons and the Challenge of Today,” in Graham Taylor, Chicago Commons Through Forty Years (Chicago: Chicago Commons Association, 1936), 207–236.
crowded, and the gymnasium and shower baths are kept in use almost incessantly.” Unemployed men gathered at the Hull House gymnasium each morning for exercise and then used the showers; frequently they returned at night for games, folk dancing, singing, and refreshments. The ones employed in the furniture shop stayed there much of the day, while others and many women worked in the weaving and pottery departments.\textsuperscript{118}

Not only Anglo or European whites were welcome at most settlement houses; Mexicans were as well. Work among Mexicans at the University of Chicago Settlement (in Back of the Yards) grew “by leaps and bounds” in the early years of the Depression, as one social worker said: already in 1932, Mexican groups at the settlement included two orchestras, a banjo-mandolin club, an art class, two adult athletic clubs, classes in the girls’ and boys’ gymnasiums, a mothers’ club, a sewing club, and courses in English and business arithmetic. In addition, the Polish unemployed men’s group inspired Mexicans to create their own such group, which soon had a membership of 600. In fact, by the late 1930s, Mexicans were the largest ethnic group using the settlement’s facilities. “I practically lived there,” recalled a man years later; “they had such terrific programs… It was a very important part of our lives”—for it was the only place in all of Back of the Yards that accepted Hispanics, even illegal aliens, without reserve. The South Chicago Mexican colony, unlike the colonies in the Near West and Back of the Yards, did not have a large settlement to help organize its recreation; as a result, many of its youth regularly went up north to participate in activities at the Hull House and University of Chicago Settlement. Some of the most popular were team sports, especially baseball, softball, and basketball.\textsuperscript{119}

Sports, indeed, were a crucial mode of entertainment for Chicagoans idled by the Depression. Among their indispensable functions was not only providing an outlet for pent-up youthful energies and giving participating individuals and families something to be proud of, to invest emotional energy in; they also helped unite and define communities, reinforced ties of friendship and extended family, and allowed people to rebel against enforced passiveness and the daily indignities of being poor in a rich man’s world. A Mexican man in South Chicago, laid off from steelworking, recalled what sports meant to him in the 1930s: “There was nothing, no work, no nothing. The only recreation was playing baseball and more baseball, basketball and more basketball. So we turned out a lot of great baseball players and basketball players.” “The entire [Mexican] community turned to sports,” a historian writes. It was largely the people themselves, rather than mainstream American institutions, who organized recreation in the Mexican South Chicago colony. Pickup games—baseball in the summer and basketball in the winter, at the South Chicago Community Center—were very common, and both young people and adult community leaders organized leagues centered in Bessemer Park. Mexicans had avoided this South Chicago park in the 1920s because of intimidation by other ethnic groups, but by the 1930s the flood of unemployed families who valued it for its beauty and its many facilities was irresistible. Baseball games regularly drew more than a thousand spectators. Mexican teams—basketball teams too—even traveled to other areas of the city and played against different ethnicities, which expanded young people’s mental horizons and awareness of other neighborhoods and groups. Over the course of a few years a remarkable sports infrastructure developed in South Chicago, with junior teams (playing other junior teams from around the city) coached by older boys who had their own leagues, adult men organizing their own teams, at least one all-girls league, and inter-neighborhood tournaments organized by the staff and volunteers at
the Chicago Park System, the Community Center, local churches, and the WPA-affiliated project Common Ground. These sorts of initiatives and activities were replicated in other Chicago neighborhoods.\(^{120}\)

It is a striking fact that despite the inadequacy of institutional and financial resources in the Depression, more people than ever participated in sports. In the early thirties, public parks—used for baseball, softball, basketball, volleyball, swimming, and tennis—were more popular than ever before, though they lacked funds for proper maintenance. Beaches and pools, in particular, grew crowded. A government survey in 1937 found scores of athletic clubs and hundreds of unsupervised social-athletic clubs that young people had organized, called “basement” clubs because their headquarters were usually rooms on the ground floor of residential or store buildings. Archery clubs in parks had grown in popularity, as had bowling, with an incredible nine hundred leagues and nine thousand teams in Chicago. Hundreds of independently organized softball, baseball, soccer, and basketball leagues, and thousands of local “scrub teams” like those in South Chicago, gave teenagers and adults alike opportunities to resist the atomization that unemployment and poverty could produce.\(^{121}\)

In addition to the unmatched vitality of sports, and the vitality that sports leagues helped impart to communities, it is worth remembering—notwithstanding Lizabeth Cohen’s provocative Making a New Deal—that the ethnically segmented clubs and societies were to a large extent still able to withstand the encroachments of mass culture in the 1930s. The same government survey just mentioned uncovered some telling statistics. The Council of Polish Organizations had


\(^{121}\) Todd, Chicago Recreation Survey, Vol. III, 117–124; Jesse Steiner, Research Memorandum on Recreation in the Depression, 41, 42.
an aggregate of more than 300,000 member agencies in Chicago (many of them commercial, however), from arts clubs and singers’ alliances to athletic groups, from welfare associations to churches. The Ukrainian Central Committee represented approximately eighty cultural, social, and economic organizations, while the city’s 52,000 Norwegians had over fifty such. For the Czechoslovak population there were five hundred clubs and societies; the 64,000 Lithuanians had “several hundred” such groups, and Hungarians about a hundred. Among Italians, there were several hundred mutual benefit societies alone, still alive in 1937 despite the financial devastation of the Depression. Dozens of folk dance groups from many different nationalities proudly exhibited their country’s traditions in festivals that the city sponsored.122

All this gives some indication of how dense and vibrant civil society was in these years of economic stagnation. Indeed, in some respects the stagnant economy contributed to communities’ vitality, not only by encouraging the sharing of resources but also by interrupting the forward march of privatization, marketization, and commercialization.123 As we have seen, public modes of recreation advanced; private and commercial modes receded. The Depression precipitated a huge expansion of the twin vocations of volunteering and social work, as millions of people embraced the opportunities to help their fellow man that the crisis and delegitimization of capitalism had created. In effect, an upsurge occurred of conscious and unconscious resistance, even in the form of recreation, to class oppression and capitalist dehumanization (especially as manifested in involuntary unemployment and enforced poverty). Popular institutions such as settlement houses took advantage of the weakened state of capitalism to press forward their agenda of working-class empowerment and communal self-expression.

---

123 On both this “forward march” and the 1930s’ popular backlash against it, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944).
In short, even the relatively mundane practices of working-class survival and recreation were, in some respects, implicitly premised on radical, humanistic values/ideologies quite opposed to the dominant culture of individualistic acquisitiveness, “Social Darwinist” market competition, and profit-driven exploitation of others. In the sphere of informal recreation, the working-class culture to which so many of the unemployed and insecurely employed belonged had, as it always has had, a relatively autonomous “spontaneity”: it was not straitjacketed by mainstream norms and propriety or bound by the morality that authorities sought to impose but pursued its own course, its sometimes “immoral” course according to the judgment of bourgeois respectability. In the sphere of organized recreation, the popular movements that will be examined in chapter six were able to push the state so far to the left that, arguably for the first time, it sponsored genuinely empowering and democratic educational and recreational programs like those that have been described here.

As we’ll see in the next chapter, even men who were consigned to the purgatory of public shelters managed to assert their humanity against both destitution and the authoritarian regime of relief to which they were subjected.
Chapter IV
Relief, Part I: “Shelter Men”

“I got my first taste of shelter life at 758 West Harrison, where application for admission to the shelters is made. I had to stand around outside a while before the doorman would let me in. When I got inside the building I found a lot of men sitting on benches. They were cursing the shelter, the shelter men, and the case workers. One old man sitting near me complained with curses, ‘There’s too much cock-eyed red tape around this place. It’s getting worser and worser every time I come up here.’ A younger man confided to me, ‘It took a lot of courage for me to come into this place; in fact I came up here three times before I went in and then only when a couple of friends came along who had been in before.’"

So begins an undercover investigation of the Chicago shelters in the spring of 1935. The picture that emerges from this and similar accounts is not only damning; it is, in places, rather horrifying. One reads of incredibly filthy bathrooms in one shelter, “plain dirt all over the floor, while urine that was old and strong smelling was running in small streams everywhere,” through which “it was necessary to wade” in order to use the facilities. Garbage cans, overflowing and pungent, were pointedly placed beside the long breadlines in which the men shuffled to get meals, many of the shufflers regularly expectorating into filthy spittoons that were placed in prominent locations. Sleeping every night in a packed room with 25 other men was another hardship, especially considering the cacophony of “snoring, sneezing, moaning, sleep-talking, and coughing” that kept one awake for hours. “Last night one man coughed so loud and so long that he woke everyone up. Finally a fellow told him, ‘For Christ’s sake shut up or get to hell out

---

of here!'” The blankets seemed to another reporter to be made of paper, which left the men shivering all night from drafts—drafts that did nothing to ameliorate the stench of perspiring bodies and disinfectants. Bedbugs and lice, fond of this environment, bit and crept all over their prone prey.²

There is some good scholarship on the homeless in the Depression, but more can still be said about the conditions of shelters and inhabitants’ responses to them, in particular their resistance to rampant dehumanization. Charles Hoch and Robert Slayton’s excellent New Homeless and Old: Community and the Skid Row Hotel (1989), for example, places Chicago’s Depression-era public shelters in a broad historical context and describes in some depth what “shelter men” had to endure, but says little to suggest that they were not totally undone by their miseries. Its approach, on the whole, is to describe what was done to them, not what they did. Nor does it say much about the evolution of relief policy in Chicago during the 1930s, focusing instead on the broader theme of the decline of the private sector in low-income housing and rise of the public sector. Kenneth Kusmer’s Down and Out, On the Road (2002), on the other hand, is a sweeping social history of homelessness in America that concentrates not on the evolution of low-income housing but rather on all facets of homeless life and society’s treatment of the homeless. As a comprehensive account, it highlights not only the suffering of the poor but also their activeness, even their “rebellious discontent.”³ Its analysis of shelter life in the Depression, however, is rather brief and, if anything, overly positive. Being a national study, it cannot delve deeply into matters on a local scale. The same is true of Todd DePastino’s Citizen Hobo (2003), which in any case is primarily a cultural history, focusing especially on how the (changing)

---

² Jesse Walter Dees, Jr., Flophouse (Francesstown, New Hampshire: Marshall Jones Company, 1948), 96, 97; Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 3, 4, 8.
racialized and gendered meanings of homelessness shaped popular understandings of social citizenship. The actual lives and struggles of shelter men are of peripheral significance to this work.

Joan M. Crouse’s *The Homeless Transient in the Great Depression: New York State, 1929–1941* (1986) is a more microscopic study, analyzing the relief policies, shelter conditions, and experiences of homeless non-residents in New York. In fact, it has much in common with this chapter, except that I concentrate on the experiences of locals rather than transients. Also, Crouse’s book does not have much of an argument—in which respect it is no different from many other excellent scholarly works—whereas I try to emphasize the resistance, resilience, and class consciousness (both latent and open) of shelter-sufferers.

Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to humanize a category of people who were (and are) treated as less than human merely because they lacked property. How did Chicago’s shelter men live, what were their backgrounds, what were their opinions and attitudes, how did the city’s relief policies evolve, how did those subjected to these policies fight against them? As in other chapters, an argumentative thread running through this one is that class struggle—though frequently only implicit, not collective and self-conscious—4—is the central determinant of social dynamics. This fact is borne out by an analysis even of the supposedly class-unconscious, apathetic, listless homeless population.

The argument will proceed as follows. First, I will give some information on the neighborhoods in which the homeless of Chicago mainly lived, near the Loop. More lengthy will be the sketch of the relief administration as it applied to these “unattached” men and women—

---

4 It is more often collective and self-conscious on the side of the business class than the working class, which has fewer resources and more obstacles to overcome. See, e.g., Alex Carey, *Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), and Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, *Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–60* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994).
both those who were residents of Chicago and, in the next section, those who were not. The bulk of the chapter, however, is focused on conditions in the men’s public shelters and how clients responded to them, how through individual and collective struggle they tried to make their lives more bearable. Due to limits of space and inadequate sources, I say little about both women’s shelters and the experiences of non-residents who participated in the Federal Transient Service, which was a relatively successful program that compared favorably with the systems of enforced degradation that were the local men’s shelters.

**Relief Administration**

For decades, Chicago had teemed with the homeless. Hundreds of thousands of “tramps,” “hoboes,” and “bums” passed through the city every year—the distinction between the three categories being defined by the famous radical Ben Reitman in a pointed way: “the hobo works and wanders, the tramp dreams and wanders, and the bum drinks and wanders.” In addition to these types were the thousands of local homeless (many of them considered “bums”), who, like the traveling hordes, lived alternately in flophouses, shelters, lodging houses, cheap hotels, and the like. Many were casual laborers working regularly or irregularly at unskilled work, day labor, and odd jobs, but large numbers were unemployable due to physical or psychological disabilities. At any given moment, the number of homeless men in Chicago (including non-residents) ranged from 30,000 to 60,000, being higher in the winter than the summer, reaching 75,000 in times of recession or depression.⁵

These numbers might not seem very high in a city of three million—in fact, they may be underestimates—but their concentration in a few areas around the Loop made the homeless and

---

semi-homeless quite a visible population. One might even say that several prominent neighborhoods on all four sides of the Loop belonged to the (semi-)homeless. There was the West Madison Street district near the Chicago River, known to the denizens of “Hobohemia” as the slave market because it was here that most employment agencies were located, where the men sought information on jobs near and far. Beggars, peddlers, the disabled, tired old men, gamblers—illegal gambling houses were often located on the second floor of taverns, shoe stores, or furniture stores—bootleggers, casual laborers, and other such types all mingled together here, where virtually no women or children were to be seen. It was to South State Street that the men went when they desired the company of women, for here was the playground: burlesque shows, cabarets, “Oriental” dancers. Men living in the cheap hotels and flophouses along this street and Van Buren or South Clark Streets were apt to take short jobs around the city periodically, a few hours a day, to accumulate just enough money to live on—vagabonds who had settled down and retired from the nomadic life, the “home guard” as they were contemptuously called by younger men still in thrall to wanderlust. This was also the area—especially south of Twelfth Street, where there were few whites—to which the relatively few homeless African-American men in the Black Belt gravitated.6

A third branch of Hobohemia was on North Clark Street and a few streets nearby, up north to Washington Square Park. Institutions that catered to the homeless and the “queer and exiled types” of the neighborhood proliferated: taverns, pawnshops, second-hand stores, theaters, cabarets, scores of rooming houses and run-down hotels, pool halls, barber shops, and innumerable small dance halls where prostitutes picked up customers or lonely men might buy a ten-cent ticket to dance with a girl. “At night,” reported an investigator in 1929, “North Clark Street is a street of bright lights, of dancing, cabareting, drinking, gambling, and vice.”

6 Ibid., 4–8; Kusmer, Down and Out, 157.
Washington Square Park was full of life as well, presenting quite a different aspect from its sanitized appearance today.\(^7\)

By day its benches are filled with men reading newspapers, talking, or just sitting in the sun. But at night, crowded along its curbstones, are gathered groups of men, often as many as a hundred in a group, listening to the impassioned pleas of the soap-box orator, the propagandist, and the agitator. All their arguments come down to one or the other of two propositions: the economic system is all wrong, or there is no God... After getting down from the soap box the speaker often will pass the hat, making his living by reading up on some subject or other in the library during the day, and speaking at night... Because of the constant and violent agitation from its soap boxes, night after night, Washington Square has come to be known as “Bughouse Square.”\(^8\)

In fact, while North Clark Street was the main drag of Hobohemia, much of the entire Near North Side swarmed with “derelicts” only a step or two ahead of outright homelessness. Bohemians, hoboes, prostitutes, and other types of non-conformists all rubbed shoulders with “marooned” families in rooming houses and immigrant families in tenement apartments, forming a great mass of unsettled humanity.\(^9\)

East of the Loop, too, were encampments of homeless men. Hoboes lived in little “jungles” of improvised shacks behind the Field Museum, next to the lake; and Grant Park was a


\(^8\) Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, 115.

\(^9\) Ibid., chapter 7.
popular place to sit in the summer and talk or read the papers—or, on the section facing the lake, to wash one’s clothes, bathe, sew, and mend shoes. As we saw in the first chapter, these traditions continued in the early Depression but on a larger scale, when Hoovervilles colonized the park.  

On the eve of the Depression, then, there were several well-established communities of “the unattached” north, south, east, and west of the Loop—in addition to the hundreds of more atomized homeless people scattered around other neighborhoods, particularly on Chicago’s west side. To help provide for (some of) these men, free shelters were maintained in the 1920s and earlier by welfare organizations and religious agencies, such as the Salvation Army, the Christian Industrial League, the Jewish Social Service Bureau, and the Central Bureau of Catholic Charities. The religiously affiliated shelters were known as missions, since in return for food, beds, and maybe some clothing the men were subject to appeals that they accept God in their lives, repent of their dissolute ways, and convert. (Interestingly, ex-hoboës testified that thousands of men did so convert every winter, and that some of them thereafter led permanently changed lives.) Intermittently there were also municipal lodging houses run by the Department of Public Welfare, where men received a bed, two meals daily, and medical care. –Until 1930, Chicago managed to make do on this somewhat haphazard arrangement.

It was in autumn of 1930 that the swelling numbers of men applying for assistance necessitated a change in policy. A Clearing House for Homeless Men was established on November 8, 1930 (under the auspices of the new Governor’s Commission on Unemployment

---

10 Anderson, The Hobo, 10, 11.
11 Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 40-51; Alvin Roseman, Shelter Care and the Local Homeless Man (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1935), 4.
12 In fact, policy ought to have changed by February 1930, when the Commissioner of Public Welfare made the incredible statement that the municipal lodging house, which served not only homeless men but also convalescents from Cook County Hospital, had been used by 65,000 men in the past four months. How this can be true is a mystery, since its bed capacity was only 120 men per night. Chicago Tribune, February 13, 1930. It may be that the commissioner was referring also to men who ate their meals there but did not sleep there.
and Relief), the function of which was to register the men who applied for assistance and assign them to a particular shelter. Civic groups and police distributed thousands of cards to panhandlers and unemployed men around the city directing them to the new Clearing House, which was also publicized by newspapers, with the result that a deluge of men soon descended upon the agency. Based on a short interview, each man was directed to one of the city’s permanent shelters or the seven emergency shelters operated by religious organizations and the Chicago Urban League, which ran one for African-Americans. By early 1931, Chicago had eighteen shelters for men, maintained by both private and public agencies and financed by the Governor’s Commission and later its successor, the Joint Emergency Relief Fund of Cook County. Most of them were located in the vicinity of West Madison Street’s Hobohemia.¹³

The numbers of men housed, at least temporarily, in these shelters varied greatly between seasons and as the Depression grew more severe. Between October 16, 1930 and June 1, 1931, 43,200 men passed through the city’s shelters; but the numbers dwindled in the spring, most importantly because the Governor’s Commission, having nearly exhausted its funds, could afford to keep running only two of them by June 1. In addition, fuller investigation revealed that many of the able-bodied unemployed had resources on which they could draw, so they were kicked out in favor of the aged and disabled. Some of those who left secured employment, but others began again to sleep in public parks or box cars. In the fall and winter, though, it proved necessary again to open more shelters, fifteen this time, including several more than before on the South Side. (As in the previous year, the shelters were financed by private donations, this time to the Joint Emergency Relief Fund.) But relief needs proved so overwhelming in the winter of 1931–

32 that the state finally had to step in in February and provide funds through the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, as the Clearing House assumed direct control of all the shelters except for those maintained by the city Department of Public Welfare and one run by the Salvation Army. Now that money was a little more forthcoming—and as thousands more Chicagoans lost jobs in 1932—the number of men’s shelters kept increasing, until there were 25 in November 1932.14

Thus, the number of people being cared for in shelters—including a minority who received meals only and not lodging, because they had their own rooms—climbed from 12,000 in October 1931 to 20,000 in February 1932, and then to 35,000 in January 1933. Later that year and in 1934 it decreased, so that shelters served an average of somewhat more than 16,000 men per month in 1934—which, however, doesn’t include the thousands of non-residents and transients who were cared for under a separate program established by the federal government in 1933. The numbers of resident men in shelters continued to decline in 1935 and ’36, to as few as 5,000 in July 1935, 2,000 in September, and only 100 in June 1936, when one shelter remained open in Chicago. It wasn’t that the economy was doing amazingly well by this point; rather, the administration of relief had changed. For one thing, some men had been transferred to WPA work camps. More importantly, nearly all were placed on home relief instead of shelter relief, because this was seen as less demoralizing than being herded like sheep in warehouses, old factory buildings, schools, and “cage hotels.”15

Statistical studies conducted at the time indicate who these men were who found themselves suddenly living (with some exceptions) in the old neighborhoods of Hobohemia, in many cases surrounded by alien elements—flophouses, burlesque houses, pickpockets, drunks. According to a 1932 study, very few were attached to families, being single, widowed, divorced, or separated. Their mean and median age was 43 (though it substantially increased in the summer, when younger men found seasonal employment or “struck out on the road” to look for work); 14 percent were African-American, and 39 percent were foreign-born—figures indicating that “homelessness” was disproportionately high among the black and immigrant populations. If one compares this study and another that was conducted in 1933, one finds that there was a tendency for unskilled workers to become a higher proportion of the shelter group, and skilled workers a lower proportion, as the Depression advanced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1932 study</th>
<th>1933 study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals, clerks, and salespeople</td>
<td>6.56%</td>
<td>6.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesmen, artisans, and semi-skilled workers</td>
<td>48.36%</td>
<td>34.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common laborers</td>
<td>45.08%</td>
<td>58.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A report in 1935 suggests that between 5 and 10 percent were the old type of beggar and bum, while 20 percent were a somewhat “higher” class of migratory laborer. This heterogeneity of the shelter population necessitated attempts at classification and distribution of groups of men to particular shelters. Young men and boys were assigned to one shelter, middle-aged and able-bodied men to another group of shelters, migratory laborers to others, white-collar workers to yet others, and so forth. The system was far from perfect, however, as a hodgepodge of men could
be found in most of the shelters (except for the white-collar ones, where, in accord with prevailing ideologies, inhabitants were treated better and on a more individualized basis). An especially egregious example was the lodging house devoted to “chronic alcoholics, drunk and disorderlies, epileptics, narcotic addicts, [and] mental subnormals,” together with a mixed group of able-bodied men over 50, all of whom were subject to the punitive disciplinary style of the particular superintendent.16

While men constituted the vast majority of the “homeless,” thousands of women, too, were left adrift by the economic tsunami, which necessitated expansions of shelter care. In the 1920s, a few options had been available to destitute women seeking help: a couple of shelters that catered mainly to mothers and children, the Emergency Bureau of the YWCA to counsel unattached and unemployed women, several religiously affiliated protective agencies, and so on. These institutions, however, which had always been inadequate, became pitifully so in late 1930, when the Chicago Council of Social Agencies declared that “a vast number” of women had been consigned to the streets by either their own unemployment or that of a father, husband, or brother. A Methodist church in the South Loop announced in November that it was opening a shelter for the winter to accommodate 300 or more women, apparently the first such in Chicago. But in order to bring order into the chaotic situation that winter it was necessary to do for women what had been done a few weeks earlier for men: establish a Service Bureau for Unemployed Women, as a parallel to the Clearing House for Men. Overseen by the Council of Social Agencies, this Service Bureau performed the invaluable functions of coordination between agencies, distribution of resources, approval of particular buildings as shelters (including one for African-American women), and, with the help of volunteers, interviewing and registering women

16 Men in the Crucible, vi; Roseman, Shelter Care, 9–11, 52; Beasley, “Care of Destitute Unattached Men,” 31, 32, 83, 84.
to send them to appropriate shelters. Payment for room and board at these places (at discounted rates) was made by the Governor’s Commission on Unemployment.17

The Service Bureau was disbanded in April 1931—having assisted 2,700 women in its four months of existence—as finances depleted and it was hoped that the economic crisis was ending. Those women who had not yet found employment were cared for by the YWCA, the Salvation Army, the United Charities, and other such private agencies. As unemployment figures continued to mount, though, a new and more permanent Service Bureau for Women was finally organized in October 1931, to serve as a central clearinghouse for women between 17 and 60 who were employable but in need of emergency relief. The Bureau itself ended up caring for about half of the women who registered with it, while the other half were sent to particular charities that had agreed to assist them. For example, the YWCA agreed to provide for business and professional women up to forty years of age, while the Church Mission of Help took care of younger women with behavior problems. Though agencies were still overwhelmed, almost to the breaking point, by the flood of needy women, at least now women did not have to go from charity to charity desperately seeking one that could help them. They had only to go to the Service Bureau, be interviewed and registered, and then be referred somewhere.18

In 1931 and ’32, when relief agencies did not have the money to pay rent for most unattached women to live in their own apartment, it was often necessary to resort to shelter care. But such care was known to be demoralizing, so as soon as the financial situation improved—with the entrance of the IERC and then, especially, FERA (in 1933) into the relief-financing

business—the Bureau began to end the use of shelters and pay for all, not only some (as before), of its clients to live in their own domiciles until they found a job.

Women’s shelters were quite different from men’s, far less impersonal and unpleasant. For one thing, they were smaller, frequently being women’s residence clubs that had been transformed for the purpose. More like dormitories than warehouses, they were relatively home-like, comfortable, and clean, in part because the residents themselves did housework in connection with their recreational and occupational therapy programs. They ate three meals a day, the same meals that the staff was served—fairly healthy ones based on the menus and recipes of trained dietitians. Unlike the men, women were allowed into their sleeping rooms at all times of the day. In fact, on the whole these shelters were pervaded by “a spirit of kindliness and consideration and an atmosphere of [relative] freedom” that male shelter clients could scarcely have imagined in their wildest dreams. What made such decent treatment possible was the fact that at any given time only hundreds, not tens of thousands, of non-family women were housed in shelters. Between late 1931 and mid-1933, on average about 600 women per month lived in the six to nine shelters in use, a far cry from the 15,000 or 20,000 men in comparable circumstances.19

Still, one must remember that there was a continuous flow throughout the Depression of thousands of women from their teenage years to their seventies, both “non-family” and with children, applying to public and private relief agencies, entering shelters and leaving, frequently being helped on a casework basis by exhausted social workers. It is difficult in retrospect to untangle the operations of all these byzantine bureaucracies. Altogether, including both women

and men, by 1934 a monthly average of 40,000 non-family residents were being cared for by relief organizations in Cook County: about 28,000 men and 11,000 women. Most of the men still received indoor relief (shelter care), while nearly all the women received outdoor relief (i.e., they could live in their own rooms). Public agencies took care of 97.5 percent of these clients, the rest being the responsibility of private charities. The massive administrative machinery that had evolved had various subdivisions: the public relief agencies of Cook County had in 1933 been integrated into the Cook County Relief Administration, which was responsible to the IERC, which in turn was responsible to FERA. The county administration supervised five agencies: the Unemployment Relief Service, the Field Service of the Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare, the Service Bureau for Women, the Service Bureau for Men (successor to the Clearing House for Men), and the Service Bureau for Transients, a federal program. Each of these institutions—as well as the private agencies, which cooperated with them—cared for specified categories of the unemployed.²⁰

Chicago’s relief administration, like the entire country’s, was constantly in flux the whole decade, as policymakers and bureaucrats managed the conflicting demands of the business community on the one hand, which tended to desire lower costs and more niggardly relief, and the unemployed and their advocates on the other, who fought for humane policies. In 1935 the latter group had a significant victory: most shelters were closed and the Service Bureau for Men abolished, its former “clients”—approximately 17,000 men at that point—being transferred to home relief, and hence to individual care. In principle, at least, this policy change was supposed to return single people to a more normal status in the community at the same time that it improved the quality of their care. The Unemployment Relief Service took over responsibility for the employables, while the Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare became responsible for

²⁰ Lenore G. Levin, “Care of Resident Non-Family Men and Women,” 26–30; Roseman, Shelter Care, 4, 5.
the unemployables. The Service Bureau for Women, too, was abolished, although this had little effect on the numbers of women in shelters, since by 1935 there were hardly any at all.²¹

While relief administration evolved again in 1936, these changes of 1935 were permanent. There was never again a return to the time when 15,000 or more men had to endure the miseries of “congregate care” in a few overcrowded buildings. From late 1935 to 1942, only one or two public shelters remained; and after 1942, even these were closed. The entire relief load of homeless men—only a few hundred by then—was again taken over by private agencies such as the Chicago Christian Industrial League and the Salvation Army, both of which maintained high-quality lodging houses with individualized treatment. Between 1936 and 1941, the monthly average of men lodged in public shelters was the following.²²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>3,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not to say, of course, that the numbers of single people who needed relief had shrunk to such levels. They were still quite high, ranging from around 20,000 per month in “good” times to over 40,000 in bad times. Nearly all were provided with home relief by the Chicago Relief

²² Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 143–149.
Administration, which had succeeded the Cook County Relief Administration in July 1936. Those who were not were men on the margins, such as transients granted shelter for a week or two, “bums” who couldn’t or didn’t want to go on home relief, men who had been evicted because the CRA could not afford to pay their rent, etc.  

In the following chapter we’ll discuss the shameful history of Chicago and Illinois’s financing of relief, which demonstrates what a low priority the well-being of the unemployed was to the state’s political and economic elites. Here, it remains only to recount the tale of relief for transients, who were an even lower caste than the unemployed as such.

_Transient Relief_

For the many jobless who ventured beyond their local community in the search for work or for adventure, the welcome that greeted them in the early years of the Depression was far from warm. Whether traveling within a state or between states, the town or city they arrived at wanted nothing to do with them. If they hadn’t lived there for at least twelve months, they were not residents, and so were not the community’s responsibility. One night’s lodging and a meal or two was usually the best reception they could expect. After that, they had to move on to the next town, and then the next and the next, riding freight trains or wearily tramping the dusty roads in their endless hunt for another meal and another makeshift bed. Hunger was their perpetual goad and their faithful companion.

Frequently police stood waiting to meet the hundreds of men and boys who disembarked from the box cars and took some of them to the police station to be identified. If there were too many, they would be sent out of town immediately. In the South, they might be put on the chain

23 Nesbitt, “Family Service and Relief,” 5; Chicago Tribune, October 1, 1937.
gang. Residents in many places were advised to call the police if a stranger came to the door to ask for food, so he could be arrested. A welfare officer from Philadelphia told a Congressional committee that “an arrest is a terrible experience… I have talked to young men on the road who have looked back on a forced night or two of police detention with a deep-seated horror.”

Large cities like Chicago had official policies similar to those of small towns, though not always as draconian. In 1931, for example, it was the policy of Chicago’s public relief administration to give non-residents shelter and food for a day or two and then send them on their way. In practice, however, it was far less clear-cut than this. For one thing, men could simply lie about their residential status, usually without consequences because investigations of their statements were rare. Moreover, if by some chance they were ejected from the public shelters, they could find succor in a mission or a flophouse (for fifteen cents or so) or some other private institution. And there were plenty of breadlines and soup kitchens around the city that served food with no questions asked—a fact that irked officials concerned about fraud and waste of resources. In general, Chicago authorities were helpless to stem the flood of transients from all over the country, or to change the city’s reputation among travelers as a “good town” that treated them relatively well.

From the transient’s perspective, one of Chicago’s assets was its numerous private organizations, like the Travelers Aid Society and the Family Welfare Association, that provided invaluable assistance to tens of thousands of travelers every year. The Travelers Aid Society primarily offered individual casework to all types of distressed and vulnerable people coming to the city, whether women or girls seeking lodgings, immigrant families who spoke no English, the elderly or disabled, runaway children, or unemployed men looking for work. Stationed in the

---

24 *Relief for Unemployed Transients: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Manufactures on S. 5121, 72nd Congress, 2nd session (January, 1933): 86, 113.*

25 *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 1931; Kusmer, *Down and Out*, 198, 199.
city’s crowded train and bus terminals, its workers stood vigilantly on the lookout for all new arrivals who appeared to need assistance. Some of the usual services the agency provided were to secure employment or lodgings, to connect people with relatives or friends, to arrange medical treatment, to give money for transportation, and to refer people to charities or relief agencies. The transient unemployed were traditionally not its main group of clients, but priorities changed in 1932 and ’33, especially since the Chicago World’s Fair brought many thousands more travelers in search of work. The number of people the Society helped in 1932 was about 35,000, more than usual; the number it helped in 1933 was 130,400. This fact sufficiently indicates the dimensions of the crisis in that year.26

By this time, Chicago’s relief policy had changed, in two pertinent ways. First, non-resident men—unemployed migratory laborers and other types—were being accepted into shelters by the Service Bureau for Men, which had an average monthly intake of 1,500 to 2,000 transients. Even more significant was the change in federal policy that took place in late 1933: a Federal Transient Program was established to reform the nation’s haphazard and inhumane treatment of interstate transients (who had lived in a particular state for less than twelve months). Each state was to establish treatment centers for transients at strategic places, which would be funded and partly overseen by the federal government. Illinois quickly set up seven such centers, and by the beginning of 1934 the new Cook County Service Bureau for Transients had assumed responsibility for all non-residents of the state residing in Chicago, including a small number of transient women and families. (Certain categories of transients, such as unattached juveniles and “intra-state transients”—who were residents of Illinois but not of the local community—were cared for by different agencies, for example the Travelers Aid Society and the Cook County

Bureau of Public Welfare.) In practice, of course, not all non-residents applied to the transient service; some continued to use the shelters run by the Service Bureau for Men, and others did not apply for relief at all.  

The quality of care for transients made possible by close federal oversight usually far surpassed the care that was given to men living in the congregate shelters that are described in the next section. Some non-family men and boys were housed in dormitories, often in their own individual rooms; but most were given outdoor relief—as many as 80 percent of the total individuals under care, by December 1934. All families and eventually all women received outdoor relief as well. Casework and psychiatric treatment were available to people who needed them, as was medical care. On the whole, the generosity of outdoor relief for transients did not differ substantially from that of relief for resident families: while not munificent, it tended to be at least adequate for health and moderate comfort. Men were also encouraged to live in the transient work camps that were established around Illinois, where they could work on projects similar to those of the Civilian Conservation Corps, activities that had great therapeutic and “rehabilitative” value. Transients were not eligible for the Cook County Work Relief Program, but they themselves did most of the work of maintaining the dormitories and the camps. And for those who lived in the dormitories, recreational and educational programs were organized—not always with great success, but their quality improved over time.  

27 Allan R. Carpenter and Mary Gillette Moon, “Care of Non-Family Men and Women,” Social Service Year Book, 1933, ed. Clorinne Brandenburg, 18; John N. Webb, The Transient Unemployed: A Description and Analysis of the Transient Relief Population (Washington, D.C.: Works Progress Administration, 1935), 11; Levin, “Care of Resident Non-Family Men and Women,” 27, 30, 31; Kusmer, Down and Out, 211; “Memorandum of meeting held to consider the division of field between the new Transient Bureau for Cook County and the Travelers’ Aid Society of Chicago,” October 14, 1933, in Welfare Council Papers, box 204, folder 2; “Another Year’s Activities: Executive Secretary’s Annual Report for 1935,” p. 2, Travelers Aid Society Papers, box 1, folder 4.  

The federal transient program was popular nationwide, among both the unemployed and the social workers who administered relief. It was the only time in American history when the federal government stepped in to rationalize and humanize treatment of the homeless unemployed, so it was necessarily “experimental,” like the New Deal as a whole; but it showed what the government could accomplish when not hamstrung by business-voiced objections to social spending. In 1934, a total of 30,005 cases were accepted by the Cook County Transient Bureau, which gives some indication of the program’s popularity. And yet in 1935, two years after its inception, the Roosevelt administration decided to terminate it, as it phased out the entire Federal Emergency Relief Administration in preparation for the WPA. The national uproar by activists, social workers, relief administrators, and many of the homeless unemployed did nothing to change Roosevelt’s mind: having, like Herbert Hoover and fellow conservatives, always been uncomfortable with federal responsibility for relief, he was determined that it should devolve again to the states and localities after the emergency of the early Depression had subsided. What this meant for most non-residents was that things returned to approximately the miserable pre-1933 state of affairs. A night or two in a police station, “two meals and a flop” in a municipal lodging house, arrest and sentence to the workhouse or the chain gang, or inadequate care from a private agency were all too typical. In some places transients were physically loaded onto trucks and dumped over county or state lines; in other places, armed guards met incoming trains and prevented transients from disembarking.29

---

As a major destination of travelers from all 48 states, Chicago could not afford to be quite as lackadaisical or as punitive in its policies as some smaller cities could. Set to be closed in December 1935, the Bureau for Transients stopped accepting new cases on September 20. People already under care were transferred to the Family Service Division of the Cook County Relief Administration, where their cases were to be treated on the same basis as those of Illinois residents. In the following years, missions and private lodging houses absorbed a small number of non-resident men, while others were lucky enough to secure jobs with the WPA (which took over the transient work camps). Some transients continued to apply at the Transportation Service of the IERC to be given transportation back to their hometowns—until July 1936, when funds for transportation ran out. Others were accepted into the few shelters that remained open in Chicago, whence eventually they would be returned to their place of legal residence. The relief crises of 1936 and the following years interrupted intake of, and service for, both non-residents and residents, as when the shelter program was curtailed in the fall of 1936 because of inadequate funds. A further restriction of care took place in September 1937, when shelter service to non-resident unattached men was limited to seven days, except in the case of illness. Some non-resident families and individuals, however, continued to receive outdoor relief through the Chicago Relief Administration (CRA). All in all, with the help of the state relief administration, and in a rather ad hoc way, the city managed to scrape by without consistently treating the transient unemployed inhumanely. 30

—Until 1939, that is, when, in line with the increasingly conservative mood of the country’s “power elite,” Illinois passed stringent new residence requirements for eligibility to receive relief. As stated in an earlier chapter, starting on July 26, 1939, in order to receive relief

from a particular city, town, or county in Illinois, one had to have lived there for the past three years. Thus, in one blow, thousands of families and many thousands of unattached individuals around the state were disqualified from receiving public relief. Suddenly private agencies in Chicago—the United Charities, Travelers Aid Society, Salvation Army, American Red Cross, Jewish Social Service Bureau, and others—found themselves deluged with requests for relief from desperate people with few or no resources left. In 1940 the Community Fund pitched in by providing a totally inadequate reserve fund of $4,975 to meet the needs of affected families. The long crisis somewhat abated in 1941, when the state legislature passed a law that continued the requirement of three years’ residence in the state for relief but reduced the required residence in a particular local jurisdiction to six months. This legislative amelioration, however, could not erase the incalculable suffering that the arbitrary 1939 law had already caused.31

In short, with regard to care for transients, the Depression decade ended somewhat as it had begun: in organized chaos, with needy people and their representatives clamoring to be heard by the rich and powerful whose overriding concern was to reduce the financial burden of public relief. As in the early 1930s, it was left to private charities to partly fill the gap created by the irresponsibility and incapacity of public authorities.

Shelter Life

If this book is essentially a case-study in the truth that class struggle, both implicit and explicit, is the fulcrum of society, then the conditions in Depression-era shelters are a case-study in the callousness of the ruling class. To the extent possible, the poor must be treated as criminals

and/or animals, to punish them for the crime of being poor and thus potentially dangerous. A graphic illustration of this guiding value occurred in 1938, when the Chicago mayor and high officials in the CRA and the police department endorsed the idea of fingerprinting all “inmates” (as they called them) of public shelters. It was thought that at least half the 2,100 men in the CRA’s two shelters would leave immediately if a fingerprinting expert appeared on the premises. The proposal was not enacted—probably because of questions about its legality, or simply the difficult logistics of carrying it out—but a month later Evanston put it into practice, quickly netting two one-time convicts. “Lock them up,” a police lieutenant ordered, “until we find out if they are wanted for crime.” Perhaps a somewhat backward logic, but illustrative of the authorities’ attitude towards the poor.32

It has been known for a long time that one of the main functions of relief is to discipline the labor force. That is to say, the frequent miserliness of relief policies, the degradation into which they have forced those among the poor who could not find employment, has—in the words of Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward33—served the purpose of enforcing work norms. “Work hard, work constantly, and get by on your own resources,” the lower classes are admonished, “for if you don’t, this is what awaits you!” Indeed, historically provisions for poor relief and for punishment of criminals have sometimes overlapped, as is demonstrated in Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer’s seminal Punishment and Social Structure (1939). It should hardly surprise us, therefore, that even in the middle 1930s, when mass popular unrest was forcing expansions of public welfare programs, relief remained grotesquely inadequate. Nor is it surprising that this fact was most dramatically manifested in the case of the “dangerous” population of unattached men who had lost the means to live in their own home.

32 Chicago Tribune, January 8, 9, 11, 12, and February 10, 1938.
The reader can doubtless imagine that life in Chicago’s shelters was no utopia, but it may be worthwhile to give some details, since they are largely absent in historical scholarship. One way to characterize these institutions is that they were effectively designed to turn their residents into “bums,” as a Tribune article put it. That may not have been an intention present in the mind of any policymaker or bureaucrat, but it was how they functioned, and the people who designed and implemented policy were certainly aware of it. Given that few major changes were ever made in these shelters, the obvious conclusion is that they effectively served their purposes as determined by the governments that funded them and the relief administration that ran them, an administration that, as we’ll see in the next chapter, itself was subject to pressures from the conservative business community. To the degree that it occurred, the transformation of men from active shapers of their own and society’s destinies into hopeless derelicts whose self-worth had been crushed not only crippled the spirit of rebellion in a disaffected group of men; it also provided a useful pretext to publicly demonize them (as the Tribune did, for example), to demonize public relief itself and argue for its dismantling, and to tar and feather, by association, the lower classes in general. It reinforced class prejudice and the Social Darwinistic self-justifications of the wealthy at the same time that it made more docile and compliant tens of thousands of once-spirited men, by tending to strip them of their humanity. From this perspective, shelter relief was a masterpiece of class politics.

Consider the testimony, from 1935, of an “inmate” of Chicago shelters:

Here [in shelters] privacy is a forgotten word. On a cold or rainy day, or during the evenings, men are crowded into the basement or assembly room—German, colored, Pole, Greek, Mexican, American, Irish, Russian, and every nationality…
Here also are degenerates, drunks, working men, bums, clerks, old men with all ambition gone, young men whose every ideal has been crushed, all herded together. One almost tastes the stench of unclean bodies, and the sulphur odor from fumigated clothes. For quite a while this lack of privacy nearly drove me nuts.\textsuperscript{34}

An investigator elaborated:

…There is a tendency to lose all personal sense of responsibility for getting out of the shelters, to become insensible to the element of time, to lose ambition, pride, self-respect, to develop a general lack of confidence, to avoid former friends, and to identify oneself with the shelter group. As a result of the loss of physical and psychological “front” and the engaging in the behavior characteristics of the bum, clients tend to adopt the attitude, “There is no use for me to try, for I look like a bum and act like a bum, and probably the public is right in thinking that I am only a bum.”\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, after months of living in a semi-prison because of being unemployed, one finally started to accept the role into which an elitist society had pushed one. According to the dominant society’s class values, if a single man could not earn enough money to live independently, he was basically a bum and deserved to be treated as such.

\textsuperscript{34}Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1935.  
\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.
It is true that some people, apparently, deserved better treatment. The few white-collar clients, mostly clerks and salesmen, lived in buildings that had been designed for residential purposes, and so were relatively comfortable. One or two men might sleep in a room, in some cases the kind of room in certain flophouses: a square wooden cubicle with chicken-wire mesh on top to prevent stealing and to let in air. These tiny rooms were the opposite of luxury, but at least they afforded some privacy. Furthermore, the beds actually had mattresses, sheets, and pillows. Men in the non-white-collar shelters had to sleep on an uncomfortable canvas army cot, usually without a sheet or a pillow; and when they did have a sheet, it was unlikely to have been washed in months and might be soiled with blood or fecal matter. For a short period (until funding ran out) some white-collar men were even allowed to live in their own rooms and were given $4 a week in return for one day’s work, so as to reintegrate themselves into their community. And yet despite such perquisites, caseworkers remarked that these higher-status clients were apt to have an even more adverse reaction to shelter life than those with more humble backgrounds.\(^\text{36}\)

Shelter inmates’ punishment began immediately, as soon as they stepped inside the intake center and began the hours-long wait for a two-minute medical examination. Interrogation by a caseworker was the next step—a rather pointless step in light of the fact that nearly every applicant was always accepted, and his references and details were almost never checked. One applicant gave a spirited complaint about this procedure: “Hell, they want to know when your grandmother died, what she died of, and why did ya let her die. They ask you a few questions, get up and chew the fat with someone, then maybe come back and ask a few more questions. Boy, when you go through all that red tape to get in here and swear that pauper’s oath, and swear

you’ve told the truth when you have told several lies, you’ve touched bottom. There’s no pride left.” Perhaps an exaggeration, but indicative at least of how the institution functioned—before you had even really entered it.37

The physical facilities of most shelters, bare and dreary, were not calculated to lift the spirits. Typically there was a recreation room in which people could sit and play cards or dominoes or other games, or stand or sit on the floor because the room was overcrowded, full of all types of men—native and foreign-born, the bum and the skilled tradesman, the ex-clerk and the ex-convict, even black and white38—packed together. Not much recreating went on here, though, as is clear from the following description of one such room (which was written, admittedly, in that most terrible year 1932):

In the auditorium was [a] group of men. If one walked among them, one was conscious of their apathy. One could feel their hopelessness and misery. Some were dozing on the seats. Others were lying asleep on the platform. A few checker games were in progress. Infrequently, a card game went on in a corner… One noticed a certain stillness in the place. It did not seem possible that so many men [in fact, hundreds] could be gathered together without some noise. Then the thought struck home that these men, for the most part, were not talking. They were sitting in dejected silence, and those who were talking did so quietly.

37 Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 2.
38 While there was a separate shelter for black men, every shelter had some whites and some blacks.
The day’s search for work had proved hopeless. There was nothing to do but tramp the streets or sit and brood, no money to buy amusement for the empty hours…

The recreation room, however, could be called pleasant compared to the “bull pen,” a dark, damp, dismal place located in the basement. Littered with cigarette butts, wads of chewing tobacco, crusts of bread, and discarded clothing, it had no furniture except some backless benches. Here was where men could escape supervision, where they could smoke, spit on the floor, drink, or sleep off a hangover. It was also where men were sent to be punished, if, say, they had failed to show up for fumigation that night, or if they had returned to the shelter intoxicated. During the day, the bull pen was frequently occupied by fifty or a hundred men dozing on the benches or the floor because they had been unable to sleep the previous night. “The great majority of them,” reported an investigator, “do not appear to be sleeping off a drunk, but rather merely so weary in body and in spirit that the oblivion of sleep offers them a haven.”

Laundry facilities usually included tubs, wash boards, soap, and a clothes dryer, although most men were none too fond of washing their clothes (despite having a very limited number of outfits). There were showers and wash rooms as well, full of grumbling men standing in line to wash or to shave. Interestingly, it seems that in most shelters it was not very popular to take showers: if one took more than three a week, he risked being called a “pretty boy.” “One cannot be known as a pretty boy; it is worse than being known as a dope head.” Many took a shower only once every two weeks. The toilets were usually far from clean, some missing seats. For the

---

40 Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 5–8; Roseman, Shelter Care, 10; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 97, 103, 104. These documents and page numbers are the sources for the following paragraph as well.
men’s belongings there was a general store room and sometimes a few individual lockers, but theft was so common that people carried around some of their possessions all day. As one said, “I have to carry my razor, soap, sewing kit, handkerchief, tobacco, matches, comb, extra pair of socks, tickets, and all this junk in my pockets, all day long. Believe me in the hot summer time this is no joke. But where am I to put it?” At night, some put their clothes and everything else of value under their heads as pillows, and for safe-keeping.

The sleeping rooms were so densely packed with cots that it was sometimes necessary for the occupant to crawl in from the head or the foot of the bed—which violated state health regulations. (As usual, the white-collar shelters were an exception.) And then, having gone to bed at 8:00 or 9:00, the occupant spent the night trying to get to sleep, until awoken at 5:30 or 6:30.⁴¹ Among the annoyances he would have to endure were the stuffiness of the air, the stench, the cold drafts from outside, the sizzling and cracking of steam in the pipes, the quarrels over opening or closing a window—“Put that window down!,” “Put that damn window up!”—and of course the lice. If he was sick in the morning he would be forced out of bed anyway and denied access to the sleeping room until 7:00 p.m., when it was opened again.⁴²

The health service seems to have been fairly well-organized, though the care provided was not always satisfactory. Each shelter had an infirmary, where a physician worked one-and-a-half or two hours a day and an orderly was present 24 hours daily. Medicine could usually be obtained from supplies at the infirmary, where there was also some (inadequate) provision for bed care. The Clearing House opened a small central infirmary in November 1931 for emergency cases and convalescents from all the shelters; by 1934 it had seven paid physicians, a part-time dentist, and nine full-time nurses, with 275 beds—more than all the shelters’ infirmaries

---

⁴¹ Men were allowed to stay out past 10:30 p.m., or in some cases midnight, only if they were granted a special pass. ⁴² Beasley, “Care of Destitute Unattached Men in Chicago,” 34, 35; Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 8, 9.
combined. A psychiatrist was added to the staff in 1934, in recognition of the thousands of shelter inhabitants who were mentally unbalanced or depressed; but the large majority of these cases could not even be examined, much less treated, due to the lack of resources. It is true that all the men had caseworkers (theoretically) who occasionally met with them, but, like the psychiatrist, these workers were terribly overburdened—and, moreover, usually lacked the training for psychotherapy. There is reason to think, too, that a great many undiagnosed cases of tuberculosis existed among the shelter men, in light of the constant spitting and coughing of many of them.43

In addition to medical care, clients were offered miscellaneous personal services for free, such as barber service, shoe repair, and tailor service. Unfortunately they were never adequate to meet the needs of the majority, especially since the staff had privileged access to them. The shoe repair service, for example, must have been constantly overcrowded, because the shoes that the men were supplied with were of low quality, causing blisters and infections. Clothing, too, was of “extremely poor quality,” to quote the Director of the Clearing House for Men, even after a Central Clothing Depot had been set up in May 1932. Prior to this, the clothing issued by the various shelters had been ill-fitting; the establishment of a central depot at least helped address this problem. But even then, clothing appropriations amounted to a dollar per year for each man—$50,000 for 50,000 men during the year 1931–32. What this meant concretely was described in 1934:

Even the most casual observer of the men in the shelter must notice how ragged the clothing of a large proportion of the men is. Some of them appear almost

---

43 Roseman, Shelter Care, 30–32; Second Annual Report of the IERC, 145; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 56–59; Men in the Crucible, 15–17.
scarecrow-like; with knees visible through trouser legs too far worn to repair; with
trouser seats patched and repatched with contrasting colors; with shirts so frayed
and tattered that it is difficult to understand how they remain in one piece; and
coats or sweaters so threadbare as to be no protection at all against the cold…
Fully three-quarters of the men in [one] shelter appeared to be so disreputably
clothed that their appearance would label them as “bums.”

Families on relief were given clothing and shoes of a higher quality, although even for them
supplies were inadequate.

Meal service, too, tended to be inadequate the whole decade. Until November 1934, most
shelters served only two meals a day, at 6:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. It was assumed that if the men
got hungry in the interim, they could go out and beg for food or find odd jobs. One Chicagoan
wrote of his experience early in the Depression: “After breakfast at our [shelter] we would hurry
over to another charity where we got some more soup and bread. Then we legged it forty-seven
blocks to the South Side where a church dispensed coffee and bread. From thence we rushed
back nineteen blocks to another church which started feeding [lunch] at eleven. If lucky, we got
around in time to get a second [lunch] at another place two miles further uptown. That left us
about two hours in mid-afternoon to rest, to panhandle tobacco money, or to read such scraps of
old newspapers as we were able to pick up.”

To add insult to injury, on cold days, when the “inmates” were allowed to stay indoors
the whole day because of the inclement weather, they could see their companions who had staff
jobs (as work relief) file into the dining room for a healthy lunch, and could smell the aroma of

44 Roseman, *Shelter Care*, 18.
45 Beasley, “Care of Destitute Unattached Men,” 37, 54, 55; Roseman, 18, 19; *Men in the Crucible*, 34.
cooking. Whether intended or not, such daily hunger torture was an excellent device for sapping the men’s energy and morale. The uneven quality of the food, and the carelessness of the service, was another such device. Particularly in the early years of the Depression, it was common for the food served at many shelters to be rotten or bug-ridden, and to be generally unpalatable because it had all been carelessly thrown together onto the plate, resulting in an unintended stew. On paper, the menu could look appealing, featuring fish, potatoes, beef, mutton stew, biscuits, vegetables, fruit, and coffee. In practice, though, it tended to be bland at best, as a reporter described his supper of cold beets, a tin soup bowl of beef stew, a tin mug of weak coffee, and unbuttered bread. Under tremendous pressure from social workers, activists, and the shelter men themselves, meal service was improved in 1934, most significantly by the addition of lunch, but also by providing a more varied menu and the possibility to have almost as much coffee and bread as one wanted. Nevertheless, the essence of the whole depressing meal-time experience remained: a man had no choice in what to eat; he was even assigned to a particular seat (a spot on one of the long backless benches in the dining room), possibly next to people whose table manners he found revolting; he simply shoveled in the food quickly and without conversation, mindful of the men still waiting outside; and, of course, to eat he first had to shamble along in a serpentine line for at least thirty minutes or up to two-and-a-half hours, three times a day. – Month after month of this.47

All things considered, the central fact of shelter life was regimentation. One author summed it up well: “When the man enters the shelter he learns the meaning of the word ‘line.’ He is a ‘linesman’; he lines up to see the caseworker; he lines up for his meals; he lines up to fumigate [every two weeks] and then to bathe; he lines up to wash, to shave, to use the toilet, and

47 Roseman, 15–17; Men in the Crucible, 36, 37; Chicago Hunger Fighter, December 26, 1931, February 27, 1932; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 105–108; Chicago Daily News, October 20, 28, 1932; Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 3–5.
to go to bed. ‘I spend,’ said one man, ‘half my waking hours either standing and waiting for something or sitting and waiting for someone.’ ‘Why in hell don’t they line us up against the wall and shoot us and get it over with,’ grumbled one inmate. Watchmen were always present to intimidate and challenge the men, especially drunks, who were frequently beaten—with clubs, sawed-off baseball bats, or lead pipes—and forced outside even in the cold night air. Signs posted on the walls warned, “Don’t Loiter Here—This Means You,” “Keep Quiet and Listen,” “Don’t Spit on the Floor,” and “Keep Out,” this last with an illustration of a fist striking a nose. The very walls, drab and unfeeling, were saturated with the atmosphere of bureaucracy and impersonal authority, of hours and hours spent every day in the lines—“lines eight blocks long to get food”—monotony and gloom and the same bleak routine day in and day out. “The place has approximately the same effect as a jail,” remarked a reporter. “It is the individual against the world. The monotony of the same old faces, ideas, arguments, line, nothing to do but sit, finally gets under the skin.”

An impartial observer of shelter life might have concluded that the whole point of the program was to infantilize the men, to deprive them of initiative, autonomy, and individuality. A total bureaucracy regulated every aspect of their lives, except in the hours every day when they were cast out into the streets (or left voluntarily). There was no need and no place for independent thinking. To make sure that inmates did not have to use their mind even to remember procedures and duties, bulletins with instructions were posted all over the building. The structural ideal was a kind of totalitarianism, power’s penetration of every recess of the mind to break down the personality and reduce it to the lowest common denominator, the apathetic former job-seeker, the inarticulate bum, the broken old man—to atomize, to isolate and make

---

48 Roseman, 7, 8; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 121–125, 134; Sutherland and Locke, 7, 14; Glenn H. Johnson, Relief and Health Problems of a Selected Group of Non-Family Men (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), 33.
anonymous, to fill with resentment and consciousness of inferiority. In some cases, “spies” even circulated among the inmates to learn of opinions and happenings, a fact that only heightened the atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. The rule of impersonality so shaped the men’s minds that they seldom cared to learn each other’s names, seldom inquired of past lives or personal business, and were sometimes almost insulted if their private lives were brought up. Many preferred not to talk at all but to sit alone, as they worried there was no escape from the “hopeless maelstrom” into which they felt themselves being pushed. Perhaps ironically, the non-Hobohemians—the white-collar workers, the skilled tradesmen, the steady unskilled workers—were frequently more despondent about the future than the habitual Hobohemians. “Not one man in ninety-nine,” some insisted, “who has passed forty years and has lived in these flophouses will ever make a comeback.” There were no jobs to be had, and even if there were, the men’s shabby clothing and their air of resignation—after years of fruitless job searching and months of living in a shelter—told against them. Their fate, it seemed, was to become “shelterized,” to internalize the bureaucracy.49

Even work relief, which social workers and some administrators hoped would empower and help “rehabilitate” clients, often did not have the desired effect. Beginning in June 1932, it took the form of projects for the Cook County Department of Highways, the Chicago Bureau of Streets, maintenance work done in the shelters, and, in the case of some (though not all) white-collar clients, clerical and professional work for the Chicago Public Library and the Board of Education. All men except the disabled and those who served on the shelter staff were required to work one five-hour day for each thirteen days of meals and lodging or, if the client needed meals only and not lodging, nineteen days of meals. Technically their five hours of labor got

them $3.25 in credit for shelter relief plus 25 cents in cash, but since they had already been receiving shelter relief for free in the preceding years, it seemed to many that they were really being paid only five cents an hour. They were slave laborers. “[This is] worse than slavery,” an African-American man complained to a labor reporter. “The officials order us around like prisoners. Slaves were worth money. The owners wanted them to live so they could work. Here they don’t care if you’re sick or if you die.” Nor did it help that the character of the work was not exactly edifying: even many white-collar men, not to mention the others, had to do such artificial “made-work drudgery” (as they disgustedly called it) as cleaning spittoons, sweeping floors, shoveling snow, and cleaning trash-filled alleys. This work-relief program continued until the summer of 1935.50

It is true that some men appreciated the opportunity to feel at least moderately useful. And of course they all did appreciate the 25 cents with which they could buy a razor, tobacco, soap, a lunch, or, in some cases, alcohol and sex with a prostitute. In an environment as degraded as the one described here, the little pleasures that could be bought with 25 cents would assume outsized importance, as precious links to the world of the living.

The Men

While the shelters tended to function as devices of dehumanization, the unfortunate men who found it necessary to live in them did not thereby cease to be men. Implicitly, and often explicitly, their humanity rebelled against the kind of treatment they received. At times they even organized to change practices, with some success; and their experiences gave most of them a

50 Beasley, “Care of Destitute Unattached Men,” 38–44; Roseman, Shelter Care, 20; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 82–85; Worker’s Voice, October 15, 1932; Sutherland and Locke, 101.
definitely left-of-center—and far from literally apathetic—political consciousness. They did not become only an undifferentiated mass of cattle, as they were frequently thought of, but remained individuals with their own distinctive pasts and futures, and personalities.

So, first of all, what were their pasts? Who were these men? By 1932 there were over fifty different nationalities and cultural groups represented in the shelters; 60 percent of the people were American, after which the most common group, constituting 7 percent of the men, was Polish. (A study three years later indicated that the immigrant population had risen to 50 percent.) Of all the continental European immigrants, who were about 30 percent of the total, the central European peasant was most highly represented. On the whole, half of the shelter men had already been accustomed to the Hobohemian culture, being either “bums” (habitual drunks, beggars, etc.), migratory laborers, or casual laborers rooted in Chicago, nearly all of whom had lived in flophouses and lodging houses in the main stem of Hobohemia. For the other half, including the steadier type of unskilled worker, it was more or less traumatizing to find themselves suddenly living with bums or—if he was an American—“damn foreigners.” The African-Americans who entered shelters had almost as diverse an occupational background as the whites, but in the aggregate there were nonetheless clear differences: far more black men had been engaged throughout life in odd jobs, and far fewer in skilled occupations; they were on average ten years younger than the whites (most of whom were middle-aged or older); and they had been more prone to alcoholism and gambling, although these habits were quite common among the whites as well. Interestingly, once they had begun shelter life, black men continued to
spend time with their non-shelter friends much more often than either the American or the foreign-born whites did.\textsuperscript{51}

As we have seen, the Hobohemians’ background was of raw living in the kaleidoscopic neighborhoods of West Madison, North Clark, and South State Streets. All ages, nationalities, and occupations, including some skilled and white-collar workers, were seen here—indeed, were seen even just on West Madison Street, which had a magnetic energy that both repelled and attracted. Its habitués were apt to swear, “I’m going to get off this goddamn street soon”—away from the petty racketeers, the drug peddlers, the drunks and their predators the jack-rollers (whose pastime consisted of beating up drunks and stealing from them whatever was worth stealing), the professional beggars and stick-up men—and they might even succeed in getting away for a couple of weeks, but almost always they returned, with the self-reproach, “I’ll be damned if I can stay away—what it is, I don’t know.” Part of it was the inexpensiveness of the area, where meals could be had for 15 or 20 cents. More important, though, was the companionship that could be found in the hotels and lodging houses, and the hash houses and restaurants. “Who the hell wants to stay out in a furnished room by himself?” remarked one man in protest against the idea of leaving the street. “I’d die of lonesomeness.” He would also no longer have access to the “street grapevine” through which he could hear about new jobs, “new rackets and the latest developments in how to get by.”\textsuperscript{52}

Contrary to the received wisdom, the people who lived on such streets—whether seasonally or all year long—were likely to prize their independence, thinking of themselves, in fact, as much more free and independent than their socially esteemed “betters” in the middle

\textsuperscript{51} Men in the Crucible, 62; S. Kirson Weinberg, “The Problem of Unattachment of Shelter House Men,” 1934, term paper for Sociology 310, Ernest Burgess Papers, box 184, folder 1, pp. 1, 84; Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 35, 65–67.

\textsuperscript{52} “West Madison Street,” 1934, Burgess Papers, box 135, folder 2.
class, who were tied down by marriage and the whole mundane existence of the mainstream. Often traveling all over the country, working as harvest hands, railroad laborers, lumberjacks, truckers, waiters in cheap restaurants, stevedores, or just panhandling and doing odd jobs whenever they could get them, the young and middle-aged men—even some of the older ones, who tried hard to “keep up appearances”—were wont to have a sort of defiant pride, a “don’t-give-a-damn” attitude (tinged with a certain sensitivity) about how the mainstream world viewed them. Conscious that they were seen as low-lifes, they regularly insisted to themselves and others, “I ain’t a damned bum!” This stubborn pride and love of freedom manifested itself in Hobohemians’ sometimes being even more intolerant of the regimentation and dependence of shelter life than non-Hobohemians: whenever they could, they left the shelters for flophouses or lodging houses, where they didn’t have to wake up, go to bed, and eat at prescribed times, or stand in long lines most of the day. This was especially true of “professional beggars” (technically a different category than bums)—who, incidentally, worked as hard at their jobs as many a skilled or white-collar worker.53

Having had less exposure to mainstream indoctrination than many non-Hobohemians, these people tended to be more independent-minded and realistic in their views about life and society than their “betters” were. Their attitudes had emerged relatively organically from their material conditions, and persisted through the years spent in shelters. Living hard, precarious lives ever on the edge of want, familiar with the policeman’s glare and even his truncheon, expert in the ways of class struggle—survival—on a visceral and personal level, “hobos” and their kin built their worldview on the foundation of a granite cynicism. Everything was a “racket”—religion, politics, business, relief administration. Missions, for instance, were not at all

popular for their treatment of their homeless beneficiaries as a captive audience that had to endure hours of sermons and prayers in order to get mediocre food. And “mission stiffs,” who frequented these institutions, were viewed with contempt. “Something that should be put out of business,” grumbled one shelter inmate, a middle-aged American who had been a migratory steam shovel operator, “is all missions and churches. What the hell good are they anyway? They don’t produce nothing. They are just like banks. They’re parasites.” The fact that, according to one study, about 40 percent of men in shelters seldom or never attended church because of disbelief or indifference to religion (as opposed to the 40 percent who had other reasons for not attending, such as poor clothing and lack of money) suggests just how anti-religious Hobohemia was; for the skilled and unskilled workers with steadier jobs more regularly attended church, at least when they had jobs.54

Politics may have been even more an object of derision than religion. In the political sphere, the deeply materialistic and realistic worldview of most Hobohemians manifested itself in two different attitudes: a far-left hostility to the dominant social order, and a cynicism about getting involved with politics at all. In the rare cases when these men voted, for example, they were apt to sell their vote to the highest bidder. “I might as well give my vote to the one who will pay me the most, for what does it matter?” one protested. “You’ll only get a rimming either way. They have you coming and going. The poor man doesn’t have a chance in this country; the cards are stacked against him. What chance has a bum got to affect the government? Even if his candidate is elected, he won’t be any better off. He might as well take the half dollar for his vote.” Such an attitude, forged in the crucible of street living, may seem objectionable from the

perspective of “civic duty,” but will be understood as perfectly rational from the perspective of real life.55

The other political attitude, the left-wing radicalism, had been most pronounced in the heyday of Hobohemia before the 1920s, when the IWW was at its height. A dense and vital counterculture had thrived nationwide, nourished by radical newspapers (Industrial Worker, Hobo News, Solidarity, Weekly People, Liberator, Voice of Labor, etc.), socialist literature (migratory workers were smitten with Jack London but also read Marx and Engels, Lewis Morgan, Paul Lafargue, Antonio Labriola, Gustavus Myers, and the like), songs by Joe Hill and other Wobblies, an entire folklore that glorified manly independence and resistance, and such institutions as far-left unions, radical bookstores, Bughouse Square and its duplicates in Seattle and Los Angeles and elsewhere, and clubs like the famous Dill Pickle Club in Chicago (where hoboes, artists, intellectuals, and radicals of every provenance could meet). All this declined in the 1920s, under the impact of wartime and postwar repression, the “machine age,” and the increasingly settled character of communities. Nevertheless, Hobohemia was far from finished by the 1930s, and neither was its left-wing, even anarchist, ethos. Casual workers with the attitudes of Carl Kolins, the steam shovel operator quoted above, were still very easy to find, even in the public shelters that functioned so as to beat the spirit out of a man:56

…Another thing I don’t like about the [Chicago] Tribune is that they’re always rapping Roosevelt. To read the Tribune you would think communism was a kind of deadly poisoning. Well, it is to those big fat grafters. They’ve got all the money

55 Sutherland and Locke, 67, 68.
they want—that’s why they don’t want communism or a liberal government. They want to keep us on the bum… [The radio priest Father Coughlin] is pretty good as far as he goes but, of course, he don’t want communism, though he is preaching the same thing except that he wants to keep the churches in. Naturally, he would, otherwise that would spoil his racket.  

Doubtless the Communist organizers who tried to reach men in shelters and flophouses, and the Party newspapers the *Daily Worker* and the *Hunger Fighter*, had something to do with such opinions. And it is true that many other Hobohemians were far from identifying as radicals, whom they called “wobblies,” “dirties,” and “chiselers.” The point is that the ideological background of this swath of shelter inmates was broadly left-wing, far more leftist, more laborite, than the Democratic party under Roosevelt. Even the men who were scornful of “radicals” tended to share their views about how American society operated and how it ought to operate. Understandably disillusioned with the political and economic system, these self-professed patriots and non-radicals would express their alienation by saying things like, “Give the country back to the Indians,” and by discussing such left-wing ideas as “production for use” with enthusiastic approbation.

In the few interviews we possess of these Hobohemian shelter men, they tend to seem rather far-sighted and clear-headed. Another example is the 37-year-old American who had traveled with a carnival much of his life. “What does the government care about these tramps down here?” he spat in disgust. “All they care about is to get them out of sight. The only reason they’ve got these [shelters] is because the bridewell can’t hold them all… I don’t think this country ever will come back again like it was. The only thing that could bring it back would be a

---

57 Interview of Carl Kolins.
big war.” Evidently, from a rough working-class life one could develop political instincts superior to those of many a professional intellectual.\footnote{Interview of Charlie by John Oien, November 28, 1934, Burgess Papers, box 135, folder 2.}

Of course, when one is a migratory laborer or a “home-guard” casual worker, politics is not one’s primary interest. One has enough to worry about in the day-to-day fight for survival. Consider the stories of some of the immigrants who found themselves in Chicago’s public shelter system, having run out of ways to “cheat” the institutionalizing momentum of the economic system. A sociologist at the University of Chicago recorded a few of these immigrants’ pasts in a 1934 report, two of which we’ll summarize here (the first in the man’s own words):

\textit{Case 1.} “When I live in Mexico, I have two brothers and one sister. My father was a carpenter. He support me for a while. Then I work on farm. In 1916 I say I come here. I work on Santa Fe railroad in Kansas City. I work there six month and live in a camp. In 1917 I hear an epidemic of flu kill father, mother, and all my family.

“I earn $1.65 a day on railroad in Kansas City. In winter I go to Montana and work on the Burlington six months. Then I went to Philadelphia on Pennsylvania Railroad. This job hold no more. I go to employment office. I go to see if I can get work, but I not able because the man want money.

“In 1921 I get job in Congress Hotel [in Chicago]. I work there eight or nine years washing. In 1930 I still work in Congress Hotel, then I get laid off.

“When I work on railroad, I live in camp with all the men. When I work in city like Congress Hotel, I live in rooming house… I start going around to look for work when I no work because I have no money to pay rent. No want landlord put me out. Come out by myself. When I can find no job, I have no place to go, so I go straight to shelter.”
Case 2. George W. was born in a village in Romania, where he made his living working on farms. Later his stepbrother, who had been in the U.S. for three years, sent him money to emigrate to Alliance, Ohio, where there was a Romanian colony. Over the next few years he traveled around the state, working on railroads, on a gas pipeline, in a tin factory, and for a transfer company unloading boxes from cars. He managed to save up $500 and returned to his native village, where he resumed his earlier routine on the farm. He could have married a girl there and settled down, but instead, seduced by the prospect of more money, he returned to America in 1911. For years he worked in steel mills in the Midwest, and then made spouts for furnaces in a steel plant; by 1920 he had amassed $2,500. Around this time he started making bad decisions, drinking moonshine, losing heavily at cards, and lending money to friends who did not repay it. Sick of his job in the steel plant, he came to Chicago—where, unfortunately, he found no steady jobs but worked on the railroad in the summer and was typically unemployed in the winter. He continued to play cards, drink heavily, see prostitutes, and visit gambling houses, activities that soon cost him what he had left of his $2,500. His church attendance became less frequent, and he lost touch with his relatives in Romania. In 1928 he was laid off from the railroad and never found steady work again; he had to settle for short irregular jobs, which necessitated that he move to a flophouse on West Madison Street. His health started to fail, he got depressed—was sustained only by his religious faith—moved in with a friend and then another friend, but finally had to apply to the shelter. “I look for work but I no get,” he told the interviewer. “Maybe in summer, I get work in the railroad. I walk around, read newspaper. I disgusted. I here broke. In old country, I be married and have good, big family.” Despair, yet, through faith, hope: “If I no feel no God, I do anything. I take gun and rob, steal. Go to jail. No
care. I afraid I face Jesus and don’t know what to tell Him. Have ’em hope. Maybe He do something yet.’59

This is what the class struggle, and daily resistance to the deadening grind of industrial capitalism, looked like for the ordinary worker. His “politics” was expressed in his stubborn will to live despite being treated as a brick in the subterranean foundation of capitalist civilization.

The “non-Hobohemian” portion of the shelter population was just as heterogeneous as the Hobohemian portion, but its members had tended to have more stable work and be less mobile than the men we’ve been discussing. Still, one cannot draw a firm line between the two categories, since in many respects they overlapped. The following story of a skilled worker with a middle-class background illustrates this:

Born in 1883 to a military officer in Denmark, Otto Jordenson became a skilled ornamental iron worker at the age of 20. Being restless, though, he spent five years traveling around Europe (working temporary jobs) and even taking a steamer to Africa, where he worked as a fireman on the ship. His return to his hometown lasted only a couple years, for his unslaked thirst for adventure took him to America next. Here, he worked first in Boston as an ornamental iron worker and then moved to Chicago, where he worked in a machine shop and lived in rooming houses. In 1917 he traveled to San Francisco, where he got a high-paying job in a shipyard—until the firm closed shortly after, sending him onto the road again. For a couple years he traveled up and down the Pacific coast, ending up as a machinist in a Seattle shipyard until an argument with his boss got him fired. Omaha, Nebraska, where his cousins lived, was his next destination, but

59 Both cases are from Weinberg, “The Problem of Unattachment of Shelter House Men.”
soon, tired of the road and hoping to settle down, he returned to Chicago and its
machine shops, where he earned a decent salary of $45 a week. He had a cultured
life, attending the theater and operas, reading books, and not drinking excessively,
though he did visit prostitutes and remained single. His last job as a mechanic
ended in 1930, when the company went bankrupt. For two years he lived in a
print shop and as caretaker of a building, but when the building was foreclosed on
he was compelled to apply to the shelter as a last resort. His relatives in Omaha
were unable to help him, being in the same financial straits as he.60

This man was fairly typical of the so-called non-Hobohemians in the shelters. Often their path to
the shelter had begun with marital problems such as divorce, separation, or the death of a wife,
which might result in excessive drinking or depression and the loss of incentives to work.
Physical disabilities or injuries were the decisive factor in other cases.61

For these people, the decision to apply to shelters was frequently agonizing, signifying as
it supposedly did their failure, their complete defeat and “social death.” Shelter men were
certainly more prone to self-blame than the rest of the unemployed. “If I hadn’t been such a fool
in the past,” a common sentiment went, “I would have had a job at the present time, or at least I
would have had some money saved up.” “If I had let drink alone I would have been all right.” “If
I had quit drinking and saved my money I wouldn’t be here now.” As one of the down-and-out, it
was hard not to at least partly absorb the dominant society’s contemptuous attitude towards the
down-and-out.62

60 This is my summary of an account in Weinberg’s study.
61 Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 70–86.
62 Ibid., 78, 91.
And yet, again, the self-blame was usually united with disgust for authority and a blaming of one’s problems on the fact that everything was a racket. (This was an idea that Communist organizers and newspapers spread, e.g., by arguing that the relief administration was graft-ridden.)

One man, for instance, prefaced an expression of self-contempt with a spirited critique of the relief administration:

As far as the shelter is concerned, it ain’t so bad—but the management. They’re all a bunch of damn rats, all of them without exception. If you understand the relief system it’s all based on graft, and all these case workers around here give a damn about is to draw their salary and make it as tough as possible for us, and the more they can squeeze out of us and the less they can give us, that’s just that much more for their own pockets. If you understand that principle you understand the whole relief system. The food is terrible. You have got to line up like a bunch of pigs and wait for hours at a time to get a dish full of that slop they throw at you—self-respecting hogs wouldn’t eat it. Though, of course, it’s good enough for us stiffs. Who are we anyway? We are nothing.

This was stated by a man familiar with Hobohemia, but it was an attitude that quickly spread to non-Hobohemians after they had entered the shelter. Their former respect for authority—qualified and partial as it always was—gave way to a subversive consciousness of being

---

63 To quote the December 26, 1931 issue of the Hunger Fighter: “Anyone who knows anything about Chicago business knows that everything connected with it is bound to be a racket of some kind. And so when workers begin to starve and freeze the business of giving them relief becomes another racket. The more underhanded a racket works, the better it is. Now, take Governor Emmerson’s Joint Emergency Relief Committee, for instance. First, it collects about nine million dollars from those workers who still have a cent or two left. Then it dishes out big gobs of this swag to all kinds of ‘charity institutions’ for them to hand out as they see fit…” In some respects, shelter men’s cynicism was the cynicism of Communists.

64 Interview of Carl Kolins.
oppressed and exploited (in work relief), and a belief in the fundamental irrationality of a social order that would deprive so many healthy men of productive pursuits. A type of radicalization—often a cynical and resigned, i.e. realistic and rational, type—tended to take place, even without sustained exposure to Communist organizers and publications. If a man felt that he had become a bum, he often blamed it on the shelters, not himself. “The shelters made a lousy bum out of me” was a common refrain. It became a general idea that the profit system had to be changed so as to provide work and security for the laboring class; men who made radical statements were widely applauded, though only a minority subscribed to Communism. (Most took the sensible view that this ideology was unrealistic and its adherents deceived about political possibilities in the United States.) Even those who had once been religious adopted the Hobohemian attitude: “the general consensus [in the shelters],” writes one investigator, “is that all religion is to be classed along with charity organizations as a racket.” In fact, some researchers who lived in the shelters as clients were themselves susceptible to the left-wing collective consciousness: “All one hears around this place is a constant discussion of government, the relief racket, and economic conditions until it naturally gets on one’s nerves and soon gets him down until he just sits back and waits for something to happen.”

And things did happen. In the early years of the Depression, when the Communist Party was most active in organizing the unemployed, well-attended meetings were held at many shelters. For a long time the auditorium in the Newberry Shelter was the scene of almost nightly meetings of an Unemployed Council committee, which functioned in part as a grievance committee that intervened with management on behalf of the inmates. According to a researcher, the Communists had a “large following” among the men and “exercised a potent influence over them.” Part of the attraction of the meetings was simply that they provided entertainment and

65 Sutherland and Locke, 152, 159–162.
opportunities for self-expression, as well as for solidarity and a sense of belonging. But it is clear that a large number of the attendees substantially agreed with the ideas on offer—the importance of class consciousness, of fighting for workers’ rights, of building a movement against capitalism, and more specifically of fighting to improve conditions in the shelters. “At the conclusion of the meetings,” the researcher noted, “the radical songs are sung—‘Solidarity,’ ‘We’ll Hang Hoover to a Sour Apple Tree,’ and the ‘Marseillaise.’ Misguided as it perhaps all is, it is rather a stirring sight to see men and boys stand erect at the end of the meetings and sing these songs with great emotional feeling.”66

Nor was it only a matter of meeting and singing. Shelter inmates organized to change administrative practices, and sometimes their efforts met with success. One of the few records of such activities is the Hunger Fighter, which periodically published short notices on “flohhouse” victories. In December 1931, for example, the paper reported that 200 men and boys at one shelter were granted some concessions when they overturned the tables in the cafeteria and threw the “slop” onto the floor, shouting that they wouldn’t starve to death quietly. Two months later this same shelter was granted more demands through mass action, namely the provision of linen towels rather than paper towels, and freedom to invite speakers to the nightly meetings of the “flohhouse committee” (part of the Unemployed Council).67

At other shelters grievance committees were formed to present demands to the administration: three meals served every day; a more appetizing menu; the provision of chewing and smoking tobacco twice a week for all men; and 18 inches of space between beds. A couple months later the paper advertised a few small victories, as when the Salvation Army was forced to fire a chef and serve better food, and when at another shelter the chairman of the flophouse

66 “The Drifting Unemployed: A Study of the Younger Unemployed at the Newberry Shelter.”
67 Hunger Fighter, December 26, 1931; Daily Worker, February 18, 1932.
committee showed the superintendent that there were bugs in the food, which convinced him to order healthier meat. In early 1932 a dramatic incident took place: several patrol wagons of police with tear gas and guns forced 500 men out of a shelter run by the Chicago Christian Industrial League after they had voted 493 to 7 against religious services, which they were being forced to listen to every night. And so it went at shelter after shelter, in these years—especially 1930–33—of radical ferment among the unemployed. The *Hunger Fighter* and the activities of Communists were well-known to, and well-feared by, relief administrators, as shown, for instance, by the time when an inmate’s clothing was destroyed by sulphur fumigation and he demanded new clothes, to no effect. “Okay,” he told the superintendent, “I’ll tell the reporter for the *Hunger Fighter* about this.” “No, no, not that!” the superintendent replied, and found a sweater, shirt, and coat for him.  

In May 1932 there was a particularly notable victory: after a shelter on Morgan Street was closed, the 400 homeless people who had lost a place to live sent delegations to the Central Clearing House for Men. The administrators there realized that the men would not be “bulldozed” so easily (to quote the *Hunger Fighter*) and quickly offered to take them all back.  

Men did not need Communist organizers to inspire them to take action. Despite the paucity of records of collective action in the shelters, a few suggestive stories remain. Here is one from a report in *The Nation* in August 1934:

> In South Chicago a bunch of sailors did shake off the shackles of the shelters. Twenty-five lake men, on the beach at Calumet Harbor, decided they didn’t like the flop-house [i.e., the public shelter]. They protested to the shelter manager,

---

68 *Hunger Fighter*, January 9, February 27, and March 12, 1932.
who threatened to call the police. They took their protest to the relief commission and sat down in the commission office, promising to stay there. Lake sailors are big, brawny lads, recruited from the farms of Illinois and Michigan and Wisconsin and Minnesota, and the relief commission needed its chairs. Now the seamen have their own shelter in South Chicago, run by themselves, financed by the FERA. Any case worker who goes near it must be prepared to answer rather than ask questions.\footnote{David Scheyer, “Flop-House,” \textit{Nation}, August 22, 1934.}

There is no telling how many similar incidents of collective resistance took place, even years after the heady days of 1932. On New Year’s Day that year, 200 men, disgusted at the particularly bad shelter food that night, went to restaurants and ate large meals without paying. A number of them were arrested, even after railroad workers present had offered to pay for the meals.\footnote{\textit{Chicago Hunger Fighter}, January 9, 1932.}

The highpoint of Communist influence in the shelters was probably in the spring of 1932, when, according to a former Communist, “it was very easy to organize a demonstration because all you had to do was send word through the flophouses that something is taking place and inside of a half hour you had ten thousand people out in the streets.” Surely an exaggeration, but a telling statement anyway. Almost two thousand homeless people held memberships in shelter committees at this time, and many more attended the meetings. As we’ll describe in a later chapter, working-class neighborhoods of Chicago in these months and years burst with class consciousness of both explicit and implicit types, which easily spread to—indeed, partly originated in—the Hobohemian districts and even many formerly middle-class people who now
lived in them. Few shelter men were committed to a Marxist ideology, but the majority were deeply aware of an antagonism of interests between authorities—economic, political, administrative—and the working or unemployed poor. Their own experiences had taught them this antagonism; Communist propaganda only drove the point home, heightened their awareness, and encouraged them to act on it. 72

The whole question of “class consciousness” that comes up in historical scholarship—‘How class-conscious were the workers?’ ‘Why weren’t they more conscious?’—has, perhaps, a rather straightforward answer. While few were educated in the niceties of Marxian theory, the working-class unemployed of Chicago, and the homeless, tended to be quite aware of class, and even, on some level, of the importance of solidarity in order to achieve gains. A researcher of Chicago’s shelters in 1935 observed that “If one goes into the assembly room on an afternoon or evening, he will hear men giving the capitalistic system hell in a big way. A dozen cure-alls are suggested as immediate remedies for the depression—communism, socialism, take the profits out of business, immediate payment of the soldiers’ bonus, old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, government work projects, and the like.” All such ideas were “in the air” at the time, and people were well aware of them and their premise, class conflict. One did not have to have incredible insight or belong to some revolutionary vanguard in order to understand, in a broad way, one’s class interests and the imperative to stand up and fight against the “boss class.” Franklin Roosevelt’s denunciation of “economic royalists,” after all, was not exactly an unpopular stance, in light of his crushing victory over Alf Landon in the 1936 presidential election. If most shelter inmates did not engage in continual struggles to influence relief policy or to defend the rights of the poor, it was not because they misunderstood their true interests or had been indoctrinated with capitalist ideologies, or were incurably “apathetic”; it was mainly

72 Beasley, “Care of Destitute Unattached Men,” 72; Storch, Red Chicago, 109, 110.
because the task of organizing large numbers of people is not easy, requiring energy and stamina that one no longer possesses after years spent in a public shelter. Furthermore, these people, naturally, were more interested in concrete improvements in their lives than an abstract ideology aimed at a distant future. Thus, to the extent that mass demonstrations and flophouse committee meetings did not substantially improve conditions, men drifted away from them.\footnote{Quotation from Sutherland and Locke, \textit{Twenty Thousand Homeless Men}, 13.}

But adherence to left-wing ideas and participation in “direct action” were not the only ways of asserting oneself in a demoralizing environment. In fact, the restlessness and protests of shelter inmates in late 1931 and early 1932 led to an important new program that ameliorated the boredom and unhappiness of the homeless: authorities created a Special Activities Division that could provide the men with some recreation and education, thereby, supposedly, rectifying the conditions that caused them to be “the ready prey of the agitator,” as an administrator said. (In this respect, the shelter men themselves were probably unaware of how successful their protests had been, since most would not have known that the recreation division was a direct response to their unrest.) Beginning in early 1932, the new department expanded during the next few years to the point that, by 1934, it conducted “motion picture shows, stereopticon lectures, vaudeville shows, boxing and wrestling exhibitions, orchestral entertainment, community songs, educational classes, handicraft activities, athletic competitions, games of various descriptions, libraries, and debates.” It operated in each shelter, and not only as entertainment: the homeless themselves staffed the programs—not least because it was discovered that among the homeless were musicians, song-and-dance men, and specialty performers. In fact, in April 1932 these men expanded their performances beyond the shelters, putting on a two-week-running minstrel show for the public called “The Breadline Frolics.” Sponsored by eighty civic and social clubs, the show was enormously popular, being covered by newspapers from the \textit{New York Times} to the
Los Angeles Times. Aside from the thousands of dollars it raised for the homeless, its most significant function may have been to apprise the public of the very real talent and intelligence that, because of the economy’s utter dysfunction, were consigned to shelters.74

The relatively “active” recreations, especially sports, were most popular with the younger men. During the winter it was ping pong, basketball, and boxing: for example, in two of the shelters “a number of boxing bouts and music and novelty acts staged in one of the congested and ill-ventilated basements would shake the rafters and induce long rounds of spontaneous applause.” In the summer it was outdoor sports: four shelters had baseball teams (Newberry had eight of them) and all had at least one softball team; twenty horse-shoe courts were maintained; and handball and volleyball games were popular at a number of shelters.75

It was also the younger men who were most interested in discussion groups and classes, especially the vocational ones—typewriting, shorthand, bookkeeping, etc. All categories of inmates, however, made frequent use of the shelter libraries (sometimes even the city libraries), despite the dim lighting and poor conditions. Thousands of books and magazines were donated every month to the Clearing House, which circulated them among the shelters. Newspapers and pulp magazines were by far the most popular, but technical and scientific literature was not ignored. A sympathetic researcher, impressed by the popularity of reading, pithily summarized its appeal to the homeless: “Reading provides an escape from the sordid and depressing situation of the shelters into the world of imagination. A story enables a man to identify himself with the successful hero of the tale, and serious study enables him to live in the future possibility of a higher and better status.” It should be recalled that workers, even the homeless, in the United States had always been avid readers. As the Chicago sociologist Nels Anderson stated in 1923,

74 Men in the Crucible, 19–24; Roseman, Shelter Care, 28; The Billboard, May 7, 1932; Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1932; New York Times, April 25, 1932; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 63, 64.
75 Men in the Crucible, 21.
“The homeless man is an extensive reader. This is especially true of the transients, the tramp, and the hobo. The tramp employs his leisure to read everything that comes his way. If he is walking along the railroad track, he picks up the papers that are thrown from the trains; he reads the cast-off magazines. If he is in the city, he hunts out some quiet corner where he may read.” Such traditions continued in the shelters, including among immigrants, who liked to read papers in their native language.76

A common practice was for men to leave the shelters early in the morning, say at 6:00, and walk to the nearest “L” station to get the morning newspaper. So many had the same idea that they had to stand in line at the station exit, where departing passengers, who had saved their paper for the unemployed men at these exits, would hand it over. Some of the men collected many papers this way, whereupon they returned to the shelter and sold each for a penny; but most simply took one for their own use, to pass the time and to maintain some connection to their old life.77

While the Special Activities Department had undeniably positive effects on the well-being of many shelter inmates, the large majority did not actively participate in its programs, in part because facilities and resources were terribly inadequate. For a while there was a small handicrafts program in which men could make rugs, belts, model airplanes, and other small articles, but it was discontinued in the summer of 1935 by a “business expert” who had been sent to Chicago to curtail expenses. (He ordered that all the equipment be taken to the furnace and burned.) For the majority of middle-aged and older men, however, the mindset fostered by years of enforced idleness was incompatible with such activities anyway, which were seen as mere childish distractions. Movie presentations were far more popular, as, to a lesser extent, were the

76 Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 104–107; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 62, 63; Roseman, Shelter Care, 29; Anderson, The Hobo, 185.
77 Sutherland and Locke, 94, 95.
card games and board games for which meager provision had been made in the dreary recreation rooms.  

Thus, even after the creation of the Special Activities Department, the principal forms of recreation remained extra-institutional and anti-institutional, the activities most conducive to escape from collective anhedonia: drinking, gambling, and visiting prostitutes. In a viciously class-structured world, these were what was left those on the wrong side of the divide. Considered vices by mainstream society, their popularity among shelter inmates was emblematic of these men’s extreme dis-integration from dominant ideologies and ways of life, bourgeois proprieties and hypocrisies. They chose their own path, adapting and resisting at the same time.

Gambling, for example, was far more than an act of desperation or despair: rather, it was a positive source of excitement, hope, and intellectual stimulation, as well as an implicit rebellion against the deadening influence of the shelter bureaucracy. Having been exiled from social, political, and cultural life, and being compelled to endure the institutionalized suppression of their personalities every day, shelter inmates enthusiastically embraced gambling as one of the remaining means of expressing themselves and resisting the complete extinction of their identity. “The gambling habit has been accentuated since shelter entrance,” a researcher writes in 1935. “The men are necessarily limited to small stakes, but they express as much enthusiasm and use as much energy in their gambling as do the patrons of expensive gambling houses.” Card playing and, especially, betting on horse races were the most common activities, the latter being done either among the men themselves—betting with razor blades, cigarettes, and other small items—or at cheap gambling places on West Madison Street. To quote an investigator,

---

78 Ibid., 106, 107.
The men consume much time and energy in doping the races. They pour [sic] over racing literature and racing results in the newspapers and talk for hours on the relative merits of the various horses, the ability of certain jockeys, the condition of the track, the crookedness of the stables and jockeys, and the odds on the horses. On the basis of their reading, conversation, and knowledge of the races, even though they may have little or no money to bet, they have a great time doping out how one should place his bets.\(^79\)

Clearly this activity was not engaged in solely for acquisitive purposes (as rational as those were), but also for “creative” purposes. As in the case of policy among African-Americans, elaborate systems were devised for placing the right bets. For some men, gambling became an obsession. “Such men eat horses, sleep horses, and talk horses all day long”: in fact, the races gave them a reason to live. What is just as striking as the intellectual energy they, and others, devoted to gambling was the astonishing persistence of hope among men who usually lost, the invincible conviction that sooner or later they would have a string of successes and accumulate enough money, perhaps, to leave the shelter. After years of unconsummated job searches and the humiliations of shelter life that have been described in this chapter, hope’s last refuge lay in

\(^79\) Sutherland and Locke, *Twenty Thousand Homeless Men*, 122, 124, 125. In interpreting the significance of gambling for these men, one recalls Noam Chomsky’s remarks on spectator sports in contemporary society: a major reason for the incredible popularity of professional sports, and the enormous amount of attention and analysis that people regularly devote to them, is that most other avenues for the exercise of collective intelligence are closed to the public. To quote Chomsky, “in our society, we have things that you might use your intelligence on, like politics, but people really can’t get involved in them in a very serious way—so what they do is they put their minds into other things, such as sports. You’re trained to be obedient; you don’t have an interesting job; there’s no work around for you that’s creative; in the cultural environment you’re a passive observer of usually pretty tawdry stuff; political and social life are out of your range, they’re in the hands of the rich folk. So what’s left? Well, one thing that’s left is sports—so you put a lot of the intelligence and the thought and the self-confidence into that.” Such was the function that gambling served among many thousands of Chicago residents in the 1930s. Peter Mitchell and John Schoeffel, eds., *Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky* (New York: The New Press, 2002), 99.
gambling. “If it wasn’t for the fact that the pony players always hope and constantly look for a future change in luck,” a shelter inmate observed, “many of them would commit suicide.”

There were other comforts too, however—if one had a little money, from work relief or begging or doing odd jobs. Visiting prostitutes was one. Sex-starvation was a curse for many of the men, since in their state they were hardly desirable to the kinds of women they had been accustomed to seeing. “I tell you that I feel sick when I am away from women,” one man said. “I am a married man, a father of children, and even the sight of a woman is helpful to me.” One solution, widely adopted, was masturbation. Another was to engage in homosexual practices, though probably less than 10 percent of the men turned to this form of relief. Some were able to drain their dammed lust by going on long walks the entire day, ten miles out and ten miles in, which so tired them that they gave little thought to women. Others chose a more immediate type of sublimation: ogling women in parks and on beaches. Oak Street Beach was a mecca for these men; they would spend much of the day there, sitting and dreaming and “wondering if the big blonde will come again today.” Young men even bought swimsuits and flirted with the girls, their self-confidence intact despite shelter life. Drinking was yet another escape from frustration.

But of course the most satisfying relief was actual sex, usually with prostitutes. It is impossible to know how many men, and with what frequency, resorted to this expedient, but a study in 1935 of 400 randomly selected men found that 40 percent made visits to prostitutes or other women, the average frequency being about once in six weeks. At between 25 cents and a dollar or two, these were prostitutes of a low status, sometimes middle-aged—but “an old woman isn’t so bad after her nose is powdered”—and not rarely willing to rob their clients of

---

80 Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 126–128.
81 Ibid., 128–132.
whatever they could, even false teeth. Men also visited African-American women, who were generally younger and cheaper.\textsuperscript{82}

Of the three “vices” in which shelter men most often indulged, drinking was the most widespread. Perhaps even more than gambling, drinking among the homeless was and is widely considered somehow pathetic or reprehensible or stupid, proving them to be worthless bums, since supposedly they should be using the money they get from begging and other sources to buy food or invest in their future. People rarely stop to reflect that after years of discouragement and alienation, one may simply want to feel good from time to time. Ordinarily, for those in the middle class, drinking alcohol is nothing but a means to have fun; for shelter inmates, however, it was more than that. Of course it can be thought of as a form of escape, but a more interesting and fruitful way to conceptualize it is as a type of resistance. One might recall in this context Bruce Nelson’s comment, in \textit{Workers on the Waterfront}, about the “drunken sailor” stereotype: rather than being nothing but an expression of a “childlike and irresponsible” nature, as the condescending mainstream has thought, seamen’s tradition of drinking was “an expression of powerlessness, a reflection of alienation and rebellion, an act of camaraderie among men who lived beyond the pale of bourgeois civility.”\textsuperscript{83} We must remember, again, that the cynicism and gloomy outlook of most shelter men was not merely a passive reflection of conditions; it was based on a realistic and rational analysis of objective possibilities. Collective resistance could lead to small victories, but it could not change the basic structure of shelter life, nor could it give men jobs, the one thing most of them desperately wanted. So there was little to be done, except…try to hold on to some remnant of hope, adapt to reality while yet struggling to maintain

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
one’s identity, and rebel against dehumanization in imagination and conversation. Alcohol, like gambling, facilitated these things.

Confidence, courage, and conviviality: three anti-institutional manifestations of one’s individuality, and three joys for which alcohol was a uniquely adept midwife. “When I drink I got guts,” said one inmate. “When I’m not tanked up I sit quiet and still, but when I’m drunk I can go up and bum anybody, panhandle, or bum from store to store. I can go to a woman, fight, or do anything.” The sense of freedom, friendliness, and uninhibitedness that comes with drinking would naturally be intoxicating, so to speak, to an inmate of a virtual prison. While entering the shelter as a stranger in a strange land, he soon learned that “a group of jolly companions could be found around a bottle.” Few men drank alone, preferring to share their bottle with friends or anyone nearby. Sometimes several would contribute to a communal fund with which to “enjoy a real spree” together. They could go to the cheap taverns that abounded in the neighborhoods, or to the “moonshine joints” located in the basements of dilapidated old buildings, or they could buy the even cheaper “derail” that was sold illegally—denatured alcohol diluted with water. Sitting together, they jocularly told tall tales about past conquests of women, or complained about the relief administration, or discussed possible solutions to the economic depression. And so they coped with the misfortunes that had befallen them.84

Few shelter men were chronic alcoholics: perhaps 10 percent, according to one estimate. The majority drank occasionally but rarely got drunk, while others went on periodic sprees. It seems to have been older men who were most likely to drink heavily, and who, staggering around the streets in the vicinity of the shelters, gave the public the impression that all these

84 Roseman, Shelter Care, 33; Sutherland and Locke, 113–122; David Scheyer, “Flop-House”; Dees, Jr., Flophouse, 117–120.
homeless men were bums. Here is one example, a man who resided in the worst and most hopeless of the shelters:

[He] had been a telegrapher. He lost his job in 1927 at the age of fifty-one. For a few years he worked at odd jobs—as bill peddler, receiving clerk, canvasser. For two years he has had no employment at all. He has spent eighteen months of those two years in [government] flop-houses… Now he is drinking “de-rail”—shots of denatured alcohol, bought for seven or eight cents a pint—and belongs to the lowest caste of flop-house bums, a grade below those who seek Lethe in moonshine at fifteen cents a pint. Undoubtedly he will die in a flop-house and quite soon.85

On the other side of the spectrum, however, were men, usually Hobohemians, who were not depressed or demoralized at all. They even enjoyed living in a shelter. “When you know you are going to get your meals and bed,” said one, “you feel like you are sitting on top of the world. I like it better every day.” “Things might be a lot worse than they are here. I have hoboed some and I have learned to get along with whatever I find.” Another man (a former stockyards worker), 65 years old, had lived in shelters for two-and-a-half years and had grown so used to them that he had stopped his former drinking, had made many friends, and frequently dropped in to see his caseworker not for any problem but just to chat. Such was the adaptability of some people accustomed to a spartan lifestyle.86

85 Scheyer, “Flop-House.”
86 Sutherland and Locke, 164; Beasley, “Care of Destitute Unattached Men,” 28.
As the popular perception was wrong that most homeless men were depressed, alcoholic bums, so it was wrong that most beggars, or most men who begged even occasionally, were self-contemptuous failures at life. On the contrary, many treated begging as a job, a craft that required skill and a nuanced understanding of humanity. Admittedly, this attitude was rare among former non-Hobohemians, who were relatively inclined to feel shame on the occasions when they tried panhandling. A good many could never bring themselves to do it. Most of them much preferred to find odd jobs, which apparently were not as difficult to find as one might think. Just by “keeping an open eye,” a couple of men said, each had made eight dollars in one month cleaning basements, washing cars, repairing a radio, unloading a truck, selling papers, and so on. Doubtless thousands of others found similar jobs as they spent most of each day away from the shelter, walking the streets or visiting friends, sitting in parks, and reading in the public library.87

But begging was, nevertheless, extremely common. Some who had practiced the art for a long time complained that it had become much more difficult since the Depression increased the number of beggars and reduced the amount that people gave. And yet it seems that people tended to be surprisingly generous, much more so than business and political elites were comfortable with. In an earlier chapter we quoted a businessman inveighing, in 1931, against the public’s “mistaken ideas of charity,” a sentiment certainly shared by a large proportion of the upper class. Under pressure from downtown business interests, police periodically made sweeps of the Loop to round up and arrest as many beggars as they could—83 on one occasion in 1933 (none of them a long-term Chicago resident, incidentally). On another occasion, in late 1934, 189 were arrested in the Loop, although many were only hoping to get a paper at one of the L stops. Still, despite the risks and the abundance of beggars, the money to be made generally ensured that

panhandling was worthwhile—at least if we’re to judge by the following experience of a man impersonating a beggar in Springfield, Illinois in 1933: 88

[In less than three hours, the man] made 27 contacts, was given aid totaling $1.27 by 10 [people], was taken into a restaurant 4 times and fed, was offered whiskey 6 times, was told by young women [beggars] not to solicit in their territory…., was invited to meet one of the men next day to be given a shirt, was given 4 lectures on the consequences of being a bum, and received 9 polite refusals. 89

In New York City, there were reports of professional beggars making $50 a day. Others might make $10 or $15, and still others settled for a dollar or less. In Chicago, most shelter men who tried their hand at begging were content to make 25 or 50 cents in a day, just enough to buy razor blades, soap, and tobacco, or to pay for alcohol, sex, or gambling. Few were daring and persistent enough to make much more than that. On the other hand, those too timid to beg on streets frequently had success going into restaurants and asking for food, or entering stores and holding out their hat for pennies from the customers. On the whole, the relative generosity beggars encountered suggests that the public was rather sympathetic to their plight, and was not as utterly contemptuous of the homeless as one might think from press coverage at the time. Certainly the middle class’s attitudes were more humane than those of the business community, which used newspapers like the conservative Chicago Tribune to try to indoctrinate the public with “correct” ideas about the poor. 90

88 Chicago Tribune, February 22, 1931, April 6, 1933; James Finan, “Don’t Give to Beggars,” Forum and Century, June 1938; Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 141, 142.
89 Quoted in Kusmer, Down and Out, On the Road, 200.
90 Finan, “Don’t Give to Beggars”; Sutherland and Locke, Twenty Thousand Homeless Men, 134, 135, 139.
To sum up this discussion of men living in shelters, I would simply suggest, again, that the most fruitful way to think about their situation—like the situation, indeed, of any subaltern group of people in the modern world—is to focus on the conflict between impersonal, fundamentally class-determined institutions (which impose bureaucratic, authoritarian roles on those who work in them) and the “messy humanity,” resistant and resilient, of the people subjected to them. This “dialectic” of the anti-human confronting the human called forth a variety of responses from the subjugated homeless, not all of them pretty or admirable, but none of them uninteresting. The whole project of herding together carpenters, mechanics, shopkeepers, butchers, railroaders, clerks, farm hands, family men and single men, young men and the elderly, and fifty different nationalities can even be called a fascinating social experiment. Unsurprisingly, in such conditions divisions between the men were the norm, not the exception. White Americans, for example, were sometimes so prejudiced against the non-English-speaking foreigners in their midst that their anti-black racism was all but forgotten in comparison. “I don’t talk to the Pollacks [i.e., foreigners],” said one American in 1934. “If there is nine hundred men in here, eight hundred men are Pollacks. I get along with them because I stay away from them.” “These damn foreigners,” complained another. “Why, they are so ignorant and crude. When you are sitting down, they will cough right in your face… Why can’t they teach these fellows a little manners and etiquette so that when they cough, they will turn their face away and avoid all that.” Such hostility, on the other hand, had a constructive effect: it tended to unify the groups who were its targets, encouraging friendship and intimacy among those with a similar cultural background.  

In general, it seems that most shelter men understood who their real “enemies” were: the politicians, the administrators and staffers who lorded it over them, the rich businessmen who

they knew ruled the country in their own interests. But, physically separated from these enemies, living in animal proximity to fellow unfortunates whom they neither knew nor liked, they did as workers so often have and directed some of their simmering resentment at “alien” groups in their midst. Thus did the squalor of their surroundings divert and pervert their populist indignation.

**Outside the Shelters**

In addition to shelter men was a second type of homeless: those who lived in parks or shantytowns or on streets secluded from the hustle of capitalist society. These people were truly, literally, outcast, unable or unwilling to conform to expected norms and so subject to the physically manifested judgments—punishments—of authorities and the police. Unfortunately, even fewer sources exist on these homeless than on Chicago’s shelter population. Occasional newspaper and magazine articles, brief mentions in studies, passing references in archives are the kinds of sources available. There is one notable exception, however, a source that is quite illuminating and appears not to have been used in scholarship: a study commissioned by the Service Bureau for Men in 1935 to find out how many men had slipped through administrative cracks when the shelters (with a few exceptions) had been closed that year and most clients had been transferred to home relief. There had been reports—which turned out to be exaggerated—that large numbers of men were sleeping out in parks, under Wacker Drive, in railroad yards and box cars, in alleys and police stations; as a result, a comprehensive investigation of these men
and their pasts was conducted. In the short discussion that follows, I will rely substantially on this report.\textsuperscript{92}

Throughout the 1930s, some men and even women (in much smaller numbers) inhabited the kinds of places just mentioned—Loop alleys, parks from South Chicago to the North Side, and police stations, where people were often permitted to sleep for a night or two. In times of crisis, as in 1938, the numbers increased; in more stable times, as in 1936, they declined. But the mid-decade decline was also due to a factor not always emphasized in historical scholarship: police repression. For example, it is widely known that Chicago had several shantytowns in the early Depression in its parks and railroad yards; less widely known is that the reason they passed out of existence is simply that authorities destroyed them. The largest of them, the Hooverville in Grant Park, was gone as early as 1932, burned to the ground by the police. “The inhabitants were summarily told to get out,” a reporter describes, “and thirty minutes later the ‘homes’ were in ashes.” By 1935 (or earlier), shantytowns were an extreme rarity. Investigators for the Men’s Service Bureau found only one near the Loop, consisting of six shacks facing the railroad yards next to the river, where seven people had lived for periods ranging from three months to two-and-a-half years.\textsuperscript{93}

Until about 1933, one or two hundred men could be found sleeping in the box cars on Navy Pier every night, but the railroad companies grew so tired of this that they wired and fastened the doors of each car shut. The sidewalks, hot air vents, and loading platforms underneath Wacker Drive, likewise, were cleared of homeless men—but not definitively until late 1935, when police were ordered to drive all would-be sleepers away. Around the same time,


\textsuperscript{93} Charles R. Walker, “Relief and Revolution,” \textit{Forum and Century}, August 1932; Stern, “A Study,” 9, 10. The information in the following paragraphs is from Stern’s report.
police undertook to keep alleys in the Loop clear of sleepers, who were arrested and booked on disorderly conduct charges. Grant Park still saw men sleeping in various locations, especially in the summer, but it was usually only from ten to seventy or so. Smaller parks, such as Washington Square, Union Park, and Jefferson Park, of course had fewer men, frequently no one except in the summer. Even the large Washington Park on the South Side usually had very few homeless at night—but this was mainly because the police kicked them out. Police stations tended to be open to a few nightly lodgers, both Illinois residents and interstate transients, a couple dozen or so around the city finding shelter in them every night.

Over a period of six days in October 1935, researchers interviewed 120 “sleepers-out,” who constituted the large majority of the homeless they found in parks and the other locations visited. Only one of those interviewed was a woman; the others consisted of 92 Illinois residents and 27 transients. In accord with national trends, nearly all the transients were in their thirties or younger, while half the residents were over 50. Thirteen percent of the residents were African-American, compared to 41 percent of the transients, a disproportion probably due to the fact that white missions—which many transient men used in lieu of sleeping outside—did not accept blacks. All the transients were native-born Americans, compared to 75 percent of the Illinois residents. Almost half of the men had been unskilled laborers, the others being skilled workers or clerks, and among the residents there was a high incidence of physical disability, in addition to some cases of mental disability.

Thirteen percent of the Illinois residents had been transferred from shelters to home relief, and so had active cases on file with the district offices of the Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare. Of this group, most had been evicted from their rooms for failure to pay rent—that is, for the relief administration’s failure to pay their rent. In fact, even in the latter half of the
thirties thousands of single unemployed men were evicted, more often to take up residence in basements, vacant buildings, and barns—or, of course, in public shelters—than outside in parks or alleys. A study in 1937, for example, describes some of the deplorable conditions of these semi-homeless people, of which the following is typical: “Mr. J. K., age 50, with faulty vision, was living with an 82-year-old woman in a condemned building. With no toilet available both used a large five-gallon pail over the top of which was a broken toilet seat. The man’s bed was in a room…where the wallpaper hung in jagged streamers from the walls and ceiling. The blankets and one ragged quilt were filthy. An oil lamp provided the evening light. The man and the old woman had lived there for two years.” If such conditions were the alternative, it is understandable why some people preferred to sleep in parks.94

Living in the open air, begging or scavenging or doing odd jobs for food, not having to worry about rent or the other quotidian responsibilities that grind one down year after year, was an existence relatively congenial to many men, even Chicago residents middle-aged or older. They preferred to live outside by their wits rather than be confined to a shelter with its regimentation and bad food and lack of privacy. One of their interviewers observed that they considered it more self-respecting to beg in the streets and scavenge food from garbage pails than to be subjected to shelter life. In some cases, even when caseworkers approached them and offered to refer them to a division of the relief administration, they refused. They were satisfied with the outdoor life they had created for themselves, even under the ever-present threat of the police baton and the glares of middle-class society.95

Admittedly, it is unlikely that they were as satisfied as they had been, or would have been, living in “jungles” earlier in the decade, before police had eliminated most of them. The

94 Johnson, Relief and Health Problems, 19.
hobo jungle should not be romanticized: it was no paradise. But the appreciative way it was described in an internal Communist Party report of 1933 was not unreasonable:

There is perhaps no place or institution in the entire world where so much real freedom exists as in the Hobo Jungles. Here there is complete freedom from all inhibitions. No language is considered vile or shocking. No dress is considered inappropriate. No one is condemned for his ideas or habits unless they interfere directly with others present. Laziness is not considered a vice and there is more freedom from labor than elsewhere since a little bumming will supply the necessary needs.96

Years earlier, an inhabitant of the jungles had written, “here you share and share alike in true fraternal style… Staple foods are always left behind for the common supply.” Absolute democracy reigned, and it functioned well: the camp and everything in it, especially kitchen supplies, were kept clean, and infractions of the rules of etiquette were strictly punished (by expulsion, forced labor, or physical punishment). The jungle, in fact, was a truly anarchist institution, which, as the Communist writer just quoted said, would have flourished and expanded had it not been regularly raided and ultimately destroyed by police.97

The homeless who lived outside any institutional context did not experience such a mature and organized anarchism, but at least they were free from the despotic regime of the public shelter. Unfortunately they remained subject to the capitalist regime of mainstream

---

society, which in effect, by harassing them and chasing them from the visible and comfortable spots in the city, sought to punish them for their poverty. In this respect, indeed, they could identify with their fellow outcasts the shelter men, and more broadly with the multitudes too poor to buy social influence, rich only in that mysterious human quality: resilience.
Chapter V

Relief, Part II: Governments, Unions, and Churches

Two central conflicts broadly determined the quality and quantity of relief for Chicago’s unemployed in the 1930s: the class conflict, and the political conflict between Cook County and all other Illinois counties (usually referred to as downstate counties). The class conflict, as usual, was by far the more significant one, being responsible—at least indirectly—even for the insufficiency of the federal government’s aid for relief, but the fierce rivalry between Cook County and downstate counties bore much responsibility for Chicago’s many relief crises. Rural counties did not want to pay to relieve Chicago’s unemployed, so they regularly lobbied and voted against the city’s interests in the state legislature. But the city did not want to pay for its poor either. So in the battle between Cook County and the rest of the state, it was the unemployed who suffered.

This chapter has two main purposes: first, to tell the sordid tale of local and state governments’ neglect of the poor, as manifested in their meager financing of relief; second, to contrast this miserable record with the more generous one of unions and churches, which because of their social missions could not act—and were not inclined to act—so callously towards the jobless. The section on government in particular supports the Marxian conception of the state as being, to a first approximation, an instrument primarily in the hands of the business class in its struggle to amass and maintain as much power and wealth as possible. Inasmuch as the disaffected poor tended to share this Marxian attitude, the analysis supports the argument that the supposed cynicism, “apathy,” resignation, and diffuse resentment of many of the long-term unemployed were based on rational understanding and not merely irrational alienation or an
“excess of spleen.” Of course, to some extent the state is capable of neutrality in adjudicating between the poor and the rich, and through popular movements it can be forced to heed certain demands of the lower orders. This, too, many of the poor understood, as by the millions they pressured government at the local, state, and federal levels to move significantly to the left. We’ll discuss this supreme manifestation of anti-passiveness (despite years of enforced idleness) in the next chapter.

The accounts in this and the following chapter support the analysis given by Piven and Cloward in *Regulating the Poor*. As they say,

The key to an understanding of relief-giving is in the functions it serves for the larger political and economic order, for relief is a secondary and supportive institution… We shall argue that expansive relief policies are designed to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to reinforce work norms. In other words, relief policies are cyclical—liberal or restrictive depending on the problems of regulation in the larger society with which government must contend.¹

We might, however, qualify their argument by noting that relief policies can be expansive and restrictive at the same time, in different respects. And they can never get *too* expansive, for the need to discipline the labor force always remains. Thus, as civil unrest exploded across Illinois from 1930 to 1932, the relief policies and financing of townships, counties, and eventually the state slowly grew more expansive, while yet remaining extremely restrictive relative to the need that existed. In the summer of 1932 the federal government, finally acknowledging the necessity

---

of providing funds to subsidize states’ relief efforts, broadened the mandate of the recently created Reconstruction Finance Corporation so it could give loans for this purpose. With the initiation of federal involvement, Illinois could continue its niggardly record as regards relief financing without inviting the charge that it was permitting thousands of families to literally starve to death (for the RFC’s funds prevented that from happening). Federal relief policies became more expansive with the onset of FERA and then the CWA in 1933, while the governments of Illinois and Chicago stayed committed to restrictive policies, preferring to let the national administration be responsible for “muting civil disorder” as the state and city did what they could, in effect, to “reinforce work norms.” In retrospect, one can see it was a delicate balancing act that all three levels of government were engaged in: public relief had to be tremendously expanded…but not too much, lest class structures be upset and the working class become undisciplined.

Once the emergency of civil unrest in the early Depression had subsided, the federal government could abandon its unwonted generosity in the sphere of direct relief and let responsibility for it devolve back to states and localities. Which meant that the enforcing of work norms—by keeping public assistance at low levels—would again be the main function of relief. On the federal level, a relatively expansive policy did continue in the form of the Social Security Act and the WPA; but the conservatism and restrictiveness of these measures—even the WPA at its peak aided (with low wages) only about a quarter of the jobless—indicated that their purpose was just as much to reinforce work norms as to prevent and mitigate civil disorder. And so the decade limped to its end in an ever more conservative political environment, the disciplining of

---

the labor force taking ever greater prominence as a purpose of both direct relief and federal work relief.

It is true that most politicians and officials did not interpret relief in such terms, as being determined by the exigencies of class struggle (the struggle of the rich to control the poor, in the context of the poor’s struggles for greater power and dignity). They did not see themselves as public servants of the business class. The large majority, surely, were convinced that they were motivated solely by considerations of the general welfare, and that regulation of the poor had nothing to do with it. This fact, however, is not an argument against Piven and Cloward’s (or my) Marxian interpretation of relief. As noted in the Introduction, the self-interpretations and self-reports of institutional actors are highly unreliable guides to the significance of particular political phenomena, for people are expert at deceiving themselves, at embracing high-minded but superficial rationalizations. This is one of the lessons of Marxism, namely, that one discovers the broad significance of a phenomenon through institutional analysis, not through analysis of rhetoric or politicians’ professed intentions. It is institutions that are the main actors here, not individuals somehow isolated from an institutional context—a context that, in fact, structures their actions and interactions and determines political possibilities. One might even say, therefore—what I am, in part, arguing in this dissertation—that members of a working class that is typically cynical and suspicious of the motives of the rich and powerful have (to that extent) more honest insight into the workings of society, and are less indoctrinated, than most people who belong to powerful and/or prestigious status groups that are convinced of their own benignity.³

³ Students of U.S. imperialism are especially familiar with the reality of self-deception and hypocrisy among policymakers. To take an example at random, Gillian McGillivray espouses a refreshing realism about U.S. motives in invading Latin American countries dozens of times in the twentieth century when she argues, “The most common characteristic of these interventions (beginning with Cuba [in 1898]) was the U.S. administrations’ need to portray
Thus, while it is not hard to find examples of public figures in the early Depression expressing dismay at the thought of widespread suffering and insisting that such suffering alone necessitated huge expansions of relief, this fact is of little interest or importance. In particular, we should not conclude from it—as, for instance, the historian Jeff Singleton does—that “the large emergency relief organizations created in the early winter of 1931–1932 [and later] do not seem to have been a response to demanding workers [as Piven and Cloward argue] but were produced by a genuine desire to ‘prevent starvation’…”⁴ Doubtless many officials did have such a genuine desire. The question, however, is whether political and business leaders around the country would have made such a clamor for expansion of relief had the suffering masses remained quietly in their homes, relatively out of sight and out of trouble, or been content to write polite letters-to-the-editor from time to time. If localities and states had not been threatened with multiple types of breakdown—social, financial, political—would hundreds of representatives of powerful institutions have pleaded with Congress and Herbert Hoover for federal aid to states (especially considering their earlier abhorrence of that idea)? That seems unlikely. The prospect of mass starvation was useful in lending moral weight to their entreaties, but fundamentally it was threats to institutional stability and the class structure on which it was

them as motivated by humanitarian generosity when what really drove them was U.S. capitalists’ desire for new markets. By the late nineteenth century, many U.S. industrialists were ready to export goods, to import and process primary resources, or to set up export industries abroad… Within this framework, one can understand the contradiction between what U.S. politicians said they were doing and what they actually did in Cuba and the rest of Latin America. The hypocrisy began with the myth that U.S. forces invaded Cuba to help the Cubans win freedom from Spain. The actual goal was to preclude a social and racial revolution (‘another Haiti’) and to create a new, dependent, and politically moderate Cuba safe for U.S. capital…” Gillian McGillivray, Blazing Cane: Sugar Communities, Class, and State Formation in Cuba, 1868–1959 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 67, 68. See also, among many others, Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), and Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993). It is economic interest and power that makes the world go round.

⁴ Jeff Singleton, The American Dole: Unemployment Relief and the Welfare State in the Great Depression (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 80. Anthony Badger appears to agree with this contention when he argues that the evidence does not “support the argument that the New Deal welfare measures were designed to ward off the threat of disorder by the unemployed and the poor.” Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933–40 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 302.
based that, by mid-1932, provoked a nationwide wave of elite support for federal aid. And it was the perceived disappearance of those threats a few years later that caused such support to recede.

With the exception of a dissertation written in 1973, there appears to be no work after 1941 that systematically recounts the history of relief policy and financing in Illinois during the Depression. The few relevant studies written during the Depression are informative but not interpretive, as the following is. The 1973 dissertation, Dwayne Charles Cole’s “The Relief Crisis in Illinois during the Depression, 1930–1940,” is a fairly comprehensive history of both state and federal policies in Illinois, including extensive discussion of the political quarrels and machinations that were responsible for the ten-year-long “relief crisis.” However, it does not use the history to illustrate the arguments—the materialistic arguments—that I am making. Inasmuch as our purposes are different, it seems appropriate for me to give another account of the story—which also happens to be a much more condensed and focused account than Cole’s.

The section on unions is much shorter than the one on government, in part because it is less central to the broader points I want to make in this dissertation. But I’ll return to the subject of unionists’ radicalism in the following chapter, particularly in the context of their support for the extraordinary Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill that Representative Ernest Lundeen, of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party, introduced in Congress in 1934 and 1935. In this chapter I simply sketch some of unions’ major responses to mass unemployment and briefly make the not very controversial argument that rank-and-file members of AFL unions tended to be more radical than the higher officials of Internationals, state and local federations, and the national office. I also touch upon the CIO’s response to unemployment, which, in short, was much more activist than the AFL’s. James Lorence has done excellent work on unions’ unemployed activism in Michigan, and in my brief analysis I draw on his scholarship. My main
contribution in this section is to outline some of the contours of union activism in Illinois, about which very little has been written.

The section on churches differs from the two previous ones in that it discusses the unemployed themselves in addition to institutions. What effect did joblessness have on religious attitudes? In what ways did the unemployed interact with churches? It might have been more appropriate to include this material in chapter three, but, as already stated, the length of that chapter was such that the discussion of religion had to be placed elsewhere. Its placement here is not arbitrary, however, for at the beginning of the section I do describe some of the responses that churches had to the poverty epidemic. Lizabeth Cohen and others have shown that the demand for relief quickly overwhelmed the resources of churches and charities, so I do not focus on that aspect here. Instead, I emphasize simply the generosity and left-wing nature of the attitudes that a large swath of the religious community displayed. This emphasis supports the general argument being made in this study that the hegemony of capitalist ideologies, including the belief in the legitimacy of the social order and its ruling authorities, is not as thoroughgoing as we are wont to think. Wherever there is altruism, compassion, commitment to the principle that every life has dignity, or awareness of the reality of severe conflict between social classes—combined with a valorization of the lower class’s interests—there is implicit or explicit resistance to the dynamics of the dominant institutions of a modern capitalist society, which are demonstrably grounded in the anti-Kantian principle of treating people as means to the end of one’s own profit-making and power-accumulating. Each instance of “left-wing” consciousness or activity (i.e., anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian consciousness or activity) signifies a tear in the mantle of “bourgeois hegemony.” In the case of churches in the 1930s, the tear was very large indeed.
In fact, the description I give of the lower-income African-American church culture permits me to argue that, perhaps paradoxically, one of the central “meanings” of lower-class religion is a type of diverted class struggle. As in the case of other examples of class struggle described in this dissertation, it is not typically understood in this way even by the participants. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to discern tendencies that lend themselves to such an interpretation. In certain social contexts, the tendencies blossom into fully fledged struggle between poor and rich, oppressed and oppressors: the case of liberation theology in Latin America is the most obvious example, but aspects of the 1960s’ Civil Rights Movement are another, as are features of the Protestant Reformation itself, and of the very birth of Christianity among the poor and outcast of the Roman Empire. When people of limited means come together to empower themselves, even if not in a directly or explicitly political way, there is reason for the dominant class to be wary. Fortunately religious institutions are usually well-integrated into mainstream society and do not pose much of a threat; and if they did, they would certainly not be tolerated for long. But the cooperative, compassionate ethic they preach, and the communitarian essence of their institutional practices, should not be seen only as some politically anodyne complement to the Hobbesian market. These tendencies are, instead, inherently dangerous and potentially subversive, and must not be permitted to become overtly political or to spread into the broader arena of social and economic relations. Social atomization must not be overcome, for this would be to overcome capitalism itself, premised logically and politically on atomization.

Thus, the first half of the chapter describes the political economy of atomization, while the second half describes two manifestations of the political economy of solidarity or community. In the following chapter, we’ll discuss the clash between the two, in which the poor rose up against the rich.

**Money and politics**

It is easy to think that the reason relief was so inadequate in these years is that it was, after all, the Depression. Money was not abundant. In reality, the country had plenty of wealth that it could have spent on the poor, including in the years of greatest crisis. For, of course, the federal government *could* have distributed, for the purpose of relief, billions of dollars to individuals, municipalities, and states even in 1932. And it could have afforded to spend many billions more than it did on the WPA from 1935 on. Some members of Congress supported such initiatives, as when Senator Robert Wagner submitted a bill in March 1932 calling for a $1.1 billion public works program to be financed through a bond issue, or when a couple months later Senator Edward Costigan submitted a bill permitting a grant of $500 million to states. Hoover and his supporters defeated these and similar measures, unwilling to countenance an unbalanced budget. It is not irrelevant to note that Hoover was utterly in thrall to big banks (which tended to oppose deficit financing), so in thrall that he deliberately faked entries in a “diary” he left historians so as to paint himself as more independent of bankers than he was.\(^6\) Consistent with this orientation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was originally created (in January 1932) to lend $2 billion to banks, railroads, insurance companies, building and loan associations, etc.,

thus initiating a long tradition of the federal government’s bailing out the financial sector when things went awry. The unemployed and the poor got nothing. It was hoped that the RFC’s loans would end bank failures, relieve liquidity fears, and allow banks to start lending to businesses again, which would permit them to resume investing on a large scale and so end the crisis. That is, wealth would “trickle down” from banks to industrial firms to employees (the currently unemployed). Needless to say, this did not happen. The bankers who received loans “betrayed” Hoover—as he saw it—by not expanding lending but building up their reserves in case of another liquidity crisis. And so, while the RFC did temporarily stabilize the financial system, industry did not recover.⁷

It was at this point, in the summer of 1932, that Hoover finally relented on the principle of giving loans to states for unemployment relief. The nationwide pressure had become unendurable: constant hunger marches, the beginning of the Bonus March on Washington (and the organizing of bonus protests in major cities), continual public revelations of mass suffering and social disorder, the impending collapse of relief in Chicago and other cities, intense lobbying by governors, mayors, and businessmen, and considerations of politics in an election year were, in the aggregate, apparently enough to convince Hoover that he should do something. So, after further haggling and compromising with liberal Congressmen, and despite his obsessive fear of anything resembling a national “dole,” he signed a bill among whose provisions was that the RFC could lend $300 million to states for direct relief.⁸

And yet even then, this absurdly insufficient amount trickled out to states very slowly, in part because of the stringent conditions a state had to meet (and the vast amount of paperwork it

---

had to submit—every month, for a new loan) before it could receive even a few million dollars. For example, in July 1932 Governor Pinchot of Pennsylvania—a state in desperate straits—applied for a loan of $45 million but was granted nothing, because supposedly the state had not tapped all its own resources yet. Pinchot tried again in August, arguing that Pennsylvania’s good faith had been demonstrated by the General Assembly’s recent passage of a $12 million relief bill. Again his request was denied: the state had to do still more before it could get some of the RFC’s money. Incensed, Pinchot—a Republican—went public with his disgust, adding his voice to the nationwide chorus of attacks on the RFC for being nothing but a dole to the wealthy. He made a personal appeal to Hoover, asking him to cut the red tape and approve the loan. At last, in late September, the RFC acted: it gave Pennsylvania $2.5 million, which was little better than an insult. Struck by the contrast between the ease and speed with which the RFC had given corporations almost $2 billion and the incredible stinginess with which it approached loans for the purpose of unemployment relief, Pinchot wrote a scathing and well-publicized letter to the head of the RFC, in which he charged that “in giving help to the great banks, great railroads, and great corporations you have shown no such niggardly spirit… [O]ur people have little patience with giving everything possible to the big fellow and as little as possible to the little fellow.” Coming from a Republican, this letter did Hoover no favors in the presidential election six weeks later.9

Pinchot, incidentally, had distinguished himself months earlier in his willingness to expose all the politicians’ cant about America’s glorious traditions of rugged individualism, self-reliance, local initiative, neighbor helping neighbor, and the irreparable damage to the national character that would result from federal relief. In an article in January 1932 for the important

---

liberal journal *Survey*, he concluded that the real reason for mainstream opposition to federal relief was “the safeguarding of money in the hands of an incredibly small number of incredibly rich men,” a conclusion he backed up with detailed analysis of the polarized economic structure that the 1920s had produced. “The force behind the stubborn opposition to federal relief,” he insisted, “is fear lest the taxation to provide that relief be levied on concentrated wealth—fear lest the policy of years, the policy of shielding big fortunes at the expense of the little ones, should at long last be tossed into the discard.” Local, and even state, relief meant making the relatively poor pay, as we’ll see momentarily, and so was the preferred policy until it was no longer sustainable. –These points would be too obvious to mention were it not that historians have tended to focus on the ideological motivations of localism, voluntarism, and individualism at the expense of the far more important class dynamics out of which such ideologies emerged.10

Let us turn now to the state and local levels, which are our main concern. As one historian pointedly states, “the depression years were by no means progressive in the history of state finance.” It was in these years that states discovered the sales tax, and came to rely on it (together with taxes on alcohol, tobacco, gasoline, and soft drinks) for the majority of their revenue. By 1937, 28 states had a sales tax (and it had been repealed or declared unconstitutional in five other states), up from zero states in 1931. The incredible lucrativeness of consumer taxes accounts for the striking fact that at the end of the Depression decade, states were in a much stronger financial position than at the end of the 1920s, some even showing budget surpluses.

“Despite poor economic conditions, states almost doubled their revenues, collecting $2.1 billion

---

from all sources in 1930 and $4.1 billion in 1940.” Most states, therefore, could not plead poverty as an excuse for underfunding unemployment relief.11

Illinois was an enthusiastic participant in the regressive fiscal trends of these years, by 1938 raising 80 percent of its revenue from four taxes that disproportionately affected the middle and lower classes: a gasoline tax, a motor vehicle registration fee, taxes on alcoholic beverages, and a sales tax. The latter alone, dating from July 1933, provided 42.8 percent of the state’s revenue, a higher proportion than in any other state except West Virginia. On the other hand, while Illinois had a higher percentage of people earning over $5,000 than the United States as a whole, it had no income tax at all, a distinction shared by only eleven other states. (The Illinois Supreme Court had ruled unconstitutional a proposed income tax in 1932.) Nor did it have a state property tax after 1932, since the new sales tax was thought to have made it unnecessary. Cook County and Chicago levied property taxes, but tax delinquency there was “so bad that it is almost impossible to comprehend,” an analyst wrote in 1938. “Cook County, Illinois,” he declared, “stands out as the only area in the United States where the payment of real estate taxes is more or less a voluntary matter.” Such facts as these indicate the degree to which the propertied, in particular those of considerable wealth, were able to mitigate their tax burden in these years.12

Credit for this achievement was due in no small part to organizations like the Civic Federation of Chicago, which was dedicated to safeguarding the taxpayer’s purse, especially the businessman’s purse. Throughout the decade it, together with the Better Government Association, the Chicago Association of Commerce, the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association, and other such groups, fought against and often defeated such measures as Old Age Assistance,

---

“prevailing rate of wage” laws for public works projects, increased taxes to support Chicago schools, increased assistance for the blind, bond issues for expansions of the overcrowded Cook County Hospital and Oak Forest Infirmary, and additional taxes for poor relief in Cook County and Chicago. Whenever a new tax on property was proposed on the city, county, or state level, the Civic Federation was there to evaluate it and, in all likelihood, lobby against it. Thus, when we read of the hardships of Chicago’s poor in the late 1930s, we should not think this state of affairs was something that just happened, an unfortunate product of the Depression and of the complex and inadequate machinery for poor relief that had evolved in Illinois. It was the product of particular policies advocated by particular interests (in addition, of course, to the very structure of Chicago’s political economy).  

To give another example, the powerful Chicago Real Estate Board was always on hand to press for “drastic economies” in relief administration. In early 1934, for instance, when it looked as though a bond issue would not be sufficient to finance relief for the whole year (as indeed it was not), the president of the Real Estate Board warned the governor that “any attempt to increase taxes on property for emergency relief purposes would certainly meet our most determined opposition. Prompt and determined action must be taken immediately,” he ordered, “or all savings to taxpayers, through reduction in public expenditures and through your action in using the proceeds of the sales tax to cover the state budget, will be offset and stultified by the emergency relief and its requirements.” He went on to decry the “stubborn opposition” among relief administrators to reducing the number of their employees—a reduction, incidentally, that would have meant disaster, since when the Civil Works Administration ended a month later the

13 Bulletins 123, 126, 127, 137, 147, 161-A, 169-A, Civic Federation of Chicago Papers, UIC Special Collections, box 1, folders 7–9.
relief rolls expanded enormously. But such were the forces that disproportionately determined policy.\footnote{Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1934.}

Early in the Depression, the relief policy that the dominant interests favored was, as ever, voluntarist and privatized. Fundraising drives were organized, and private family welfare agencies were supposed to take the initiative in caring for the unemployed. These sorts of anti-government dogmas, in fact, were already outdated by the 1920s, for in 1929 the Bureau of Social Statistics had unearthed the striking fact that in the previous year 71.6 percent of all relief (including mothers’ aid, assistance to the blind, etc.) in fifteen important cities was from public, not private, funds. Nevertheless, when the economic whirlwind struck it was largely up to Chicago’s five major private agencies—the United Charities, the Jewish Social Service Bureau, the Catholic Central Charity Bureau, the American Red Cross, and the Salvation Army—to aid the stricken, although hundreds of churches, fraternal organizations, settlements, clubs, unions, local relief committees, and schools played in the aggregate an important role as well. The Cook County Bureau of Public Welfare took on many cases, but by 1931 the shares of public and private agencies in total relief activities were the exact inverse of their relative positions in 1928: whereas in that year the public burden of relief was 63.9 percent and the private burden 36.1 percent, the opposite was the case in 1931 (36.1 percent public, 63.9 percent private).\footnote{Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief, 1929–1939 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971/1940), 55; Clorinne McCulloch Brandenburg, “Chicago Relief and Service Statistics, 1928–1931” (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1932), 39.}

The only way private agencies were able to so expand their caseload was through state-assisted fundraising. In October 1930 the governor appointed a Commission on Unemployment and Relief, which raised $5 million in Cook County, an amount that was thought to cover a year’s needs (i.e., until October 1931). After it ran out in July, the Commission was reorganized
in August and a subsidiary organization set up in Cook County, the Joint Emergency Relief Fund. In the following months this Fund was able to raise $10 million, a sum that did not approach adequacy. It was primarily the lower middle class that gave money, sometimes in the form of voluntary or involuntary “gifts” that corporations and the state government deducted from the pay of employees.\(^\text{16}\)

While the business class could have donated far more than it did (which, by some accounts, was next to nothing), more than enough to solve the relief crisis of the winter of 1931–32, it is true that the Chicago government was not in a position to be of much use. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, even before the Depression hit it was stuck in a fiscal morass due to the profligacy of Mayor “Big Bill” Thompson’s administration, excessive political corruption and waste, a long-drawn-out property reassessment that interfered with tax collection, a tax strike by real-estate owners, and in general the inadequate municipal fiscal powers that a hostile state legislature had imposed on Chicago (including debt and tax limits and hundreds of regulations regarding the minutiae of budget matters). Nor was the legislature cooperative in solving the mess it had helped create. As a result, the new mayor Anton Cermak was effectively a captive of bankers and industrialists, whose money he needed in order to keep the city running. “He conducted the business of the municipality,” a reporter acidly observed, “not in the council chamber of the City Hall, but in the comfortable quarters of the Chicago and Union League clubs,” where the bankers and their friends congregated. As a condition for their loans they demanded Cermak follow a program of ruthless austerity, precisely the opposite of what the relief crisis called for. Thus, during his brief tenure as mayor—he was assassinated in March 1933—Cermak spent most of his time shuttling back and forth between the real centers of power

\(^{16}\) Brandenburg, “Chicago Relief,” 14–16, 20, 21; Brown, Public Relief, 72; Mauritz Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933), 123, 133.
so as to plead for help: business communities in Chicago and New York, the state legislature in Springfield, and Congress, for federal aid.\textsuperscript{17}

It was in the winter of 1931–32 that Chicago’s relief crisis became a climactic emergency, forcing the state legislature to act. This body, dominated by downstate counties, had distinguished itself both for its callousness to the suffering of the unemployed—in 1931 it passed not a single major piece of legislation to alleviate misery in the state—and for its refusal even to reform Cook County’s anarchic and archaic tax machinery. The governor called a special legislative session in November 1931 to address these matters, during which bill after bill was introduced to provide state financing for relief. As earlier in the year, none passed, despite the tremendous pressure coming from public officials and the press in Chicago, where the issue was most urgent. Pleas for action from the Governor’s Commission and the Chicago Church Federation were read before the General Assembly, to no effect. By mid-December the $10 million raised by the Joint Emergency Relief Fund that fall was already approaching exhaustion, and it appeared that relief stations would soon have to close—even as the ranks of the jobless were continuously swelling. There was literally no other recourse but state funding. Nevertheless, having accomplished nothing, the General Assembly adjourned on December 17, until January 5. After it reconvened, another bill was introduced, this time a proposal “to permit diversion by counties, for relief purposes, of the one cent per gallon of motor fuel tax regularly rebated to them by the State for highway purposes.” It passed the Senate but died in the House. Incredibly, after this failure, “interest of the General Assembly in the relief problem subsided again,” to quote an informed observer. Instead, the legislature finally enacted the long-delayed public finance reform of Cook County and Chicago—after which, again, it adjourned, until

February 2. “Relief funds in Chicago were only ten days from exhaustion as the state’s lawmakers, on whom all hope was pinned, voted themselves a vacation and went home.”

For the politically active members of Chicago’s elite, who understood the enormity of the crisis, this adjournment on January 21 was the last straw. A few bankers, newspaper editors, relief officials, leaders of the General Assembly, and the governor met in a hotel and, over a few hours, worked out the legislative program that they planned to browbeat the lawmakers into approving. Members of the Assembly were telegraphed to return to Springfield a week earlier than they had intended. Meanwhile, prominent figures were publicly uttering apocalyptic pronouncements, as when Mayor Cermak spoke of the newly worked out legislation as follows:

This is civic fire insurance. These communist organizers are not new in our city. We had them in times of plenty. But now they find men more ready to listen to them. I say to the men who may object to this public relief because it will add to the tax burden on their property, that they should be glad to pay it, for it is the best way of insuring that they keep that property.

Still the downstate legislators were wary. As the legislation was designed, there was a chance—depending on the outcome of a bond referendum—that the state property tax would be raised in order to pay for the $20 million that was to be allocated to relief. That is, the downstaters were worried they and their constituents might end up footing a large part of Chicago’s relief bill. Moreover, some members continued to think Chicago had the wherewithal to take care of its

---

19 *Chicago Tribune*, January 25, 1932.
own. With some justice, one senator “said that Chicago was proceeding to raise $400,000 for the opera; Chicago had no difficulty in putting up the $300,000 for the national political convention; Chicago was spending millions on the Century of Progress; therefore, Chicago should stop these projects and devote the money to charity.” And so the debates continued for another week. Relief funds ran out, but the stations remained open in the hope that legislative action would be forthcoming.20

At long last, it was, on February 3rd in the House and 6th in the Senate. Illinois had entered the relief business, the fifth state to do so—under extreme duress, and after months of procrastination. The final act was rather dramatic and is worth summarizing, for it was also revealing:

The first effort to pass the [relief] bills was made in the House and many Chicagoans, including the mayor, were present. When the initial roll call was taken on the first of the bills fifty votes were lacking for the two-thirds majority necessary to pass an emergency (immediately effective) measure. At this point the veteran speaker of the House broke his own policy of not speaking to a measure, and said: “There is grave danger now. The federal government has already issued the orders necessary to curb disorder if it arises. The mayor of Chicago is on the rostrum here and he is undecided whether he should agree to calling out the troops tomorrow morning. The armories are under guard now.” On a later roll call the bills passed with many votes to spare… 21

---

21 Glick, 26; Brown, Public Relief, 89–96.
Humanitarianism was not absent, but more importantly, property was in danger.

The legislative program enacted was quite complicated, consisting of five bills that both established the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission and outlined a convoluted way of funding relief. The essential point, as usual, was to protect property, but also to protect downstate counties from paying for Chicago’s relief (which was just another way of protecting property, namely that of downstaters). The basic method was to make each county responsible for financing its own relief, by diverting its share of the state gasoline tax from highway expenditures to relief expenditures. (In effect, this also meant shifting the burden of relief from property owners to automobile owners, and so, in proportion to wealth, affecting those in the middle and lower classes more than those in the upper class.) It would have been simpler just to raise the gasoline tax and spend the difference on relief, and it might have come to this but for the opposition of gasoline producers. Instead, in order to get money immediately, the legislature approved a statewide property tax levy against which tax anticipation warrants could be sold. But so that the property tax levy would not actually have to be collected, a bond referendum was scheduled for November 1932. If the voters approved the $20 million bond issue—which they did—the proceeds from it would be used to pay off the outstanding tax anticipation warrants. (If they had not approved the bond issue, then the property tax would have had to be collected.) The bond issue, in turn, was to be paid off over twenty years by deducting from each county’s gasoline tax rebates an amount proportional to the share of the public relief money that the county had used.22

By means of this Rube Goldberg legislation, Chicago’s relief crisis abated. The new IERC insisted that public funds should go to public agencies, so the Cook County Bureau of

---

Public Welfare took over control of the Joint Emergency Relief Service—with its many “district relief stations” around the city—that had been organized by the private agencies to care for all the clients who would not ordinarily fall under their purview (in other words, most of the unemployed). Together these relief stations constituted the new Unemployment Relief Service, a division of the Bureau of Public Welfare. The private agencies could now gradually return to something like their pre-Depression caseload, while cooperating with public authorities and sometimes providing crucial aid, as when the relief stations temporarily shut down because of funding problems. The Council of Social Agencies assumed the enormous task of coordinating activities among all the private and public organizations, some of which were yet to be born.23

Difficulties arose in marketing all the tax anticipation warrants, so within a few months the relief stations were in danger of closing again. They did not have funds to continue beyond June 3. To induce bankers to buy a few more million dollars’ worth of warrants and so keep the stations open another month or two, the Unemployed Councils, the Workers Committee on Unemployment, and relief authorities mobilized in May. Public demonstrations, radio and newspaper publicity, telegrams to politicians, and meetings with the mayor and bankers had the desired effect, and on June 3 scores of Chicago bankers and industrialists held a meeting to buy the remaining tax warrants. “In other words,” recalls an activist, “the starvation date in Cook County was postponed until about July 25.” But on this date, the full $20 million that had been appropriated was already going to be exhausted, and there was little hope that the state legislature would appropriate more funds. So Cermak and others redoubled their efforts to get

23 Edward L. Ryerson, Jr., “Out of the Depression,” Survey, January 1934, 3–7; William Arthur Hillman, “Urbanization and the Organization of Welfare Activities in the Metropolitan Community of Chicago” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1940), 60–62; G. D. Jones, “The Local Political Significance of New Deal Relief Legislation in Chicago: 1933–1940” (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1970), 22. After 1933, the Unemployment Relief Service was administered directly by the IERC. Through all these years the Field Service Division of the County Bureau of Public Welfare was responsible for “unemployables,” i.e., cases of illness, old age, etc.
money from the federal government, and this time, as we have seen, met with success, when a bill authorizing the RFC to lend to states was passed on July 21. Illinois received $3 million on July 27, having asked for $10 million. On August 18 it asked for $23 million and got $6 million. Less than a month later it asked for $37 million to keep the relief stations open until January, and got $5 million. While paltry, these sums were far more than other states received, even though Philadelphia’s relief stations had actually been forced to close for the summer, a tragedy that elicited from the RFC only a self-righteous lecture to Governor Pinchot that he ought to have done more to help the victims. (Somehow they survived during these months of total abandonment by the state, which surely testifies to human resourcefulness and neighborly generosity.) Around the same time, incidentally, the Dawes bank in Chicago received a $90 million loan from the RFC, a fact that infuriated unpaid teachers and the unemployed.\(^24\)

In the fall of 1932 the General Assembly passed a few measures that authorized counties to raise more money, largely out of the gasoline tax, but they were of limited value. Through the terrible winter of 1932–33 it was primarily the RFC’s regular advances of money that allowed relief to continue, albeit on an inadequate basis. Indeed, in October the IERC announced a fifty percent cut in that month’s relief rations, which were already based on a subsistence level. Disturbances soon broke out all over Chicago in the vicinity of relief stations, as when a crowd of several hundred unemployed went on “strike” by refusing to accept any aid, instead sitting down in various places on the sidewalk (one of the early uses of a tactic that the CIO would make historic use of several years later). A delegation of hundreds went to the city hall to demand more funds, objecting to a sales tax and proposing instead that the police force be reduced and the money saved be used to feed the jobless. A massive hunger march was to

happen at the end of the month, even though a permit was denied. All this pressure evidently worked, for at the end of the month the RFC approved a new loan that would permit a resumption of normal relief rations in November. (The march took place anyway, between 30,000 and 60,000 people tramping in pouring rain through the Loop and into Grant Park, where they cheered speakers exhorting them to fight “the bosses of the capitalist class.”)\textsuperscript{25}

And so Illinois muddled through that winter and spring, living off the largesse of the RFC. So far the state government had, strictly speaking, provided no funds for relief, only diverting local shares of gasoline tax revenues and authorizing county bond issues. This parsimonious phase ended in March 1933 with the inauguration of a state sales tax—which, however, was promptly declared unconstitutional. (The legislature also passed a law requiring relief applicants to sign a “pauper’s oath,” a tool of humiliation.) RFC loans were set to last only until the middle of May, and none more would be forthcoming because the agency had reached the end of its financial resources. Once again, though, the federal government acted just in time to avert a major crisis, this time by creating FERA, which proceeded to give monthly grants to Illinois from May 1933 to December 1935. The total of these grants was over $200 million, which constituted about 75 percent of Illinois’s relief financing, more than the majority of states even though Illinois was one of the wealthiest.\textsuperscript{26}

A new, amended sales tax took effect in July 1933, which went some way towards meeting FERA’s demands that Illinois do more to finance its own relief. But Harry Hopkins, the head of FERA, was still not satisfied: the tax provided less than $20 million for the rest of the


\textsuperscript{26} Scheinman, “Financing Unemployment Relief,” 185, 186; James T. Nicholson, “Family Relief and Service,” in Social Service Year Book, 1933, 3; Glick, The IERC, 179–186.
year, and starting in 1934 its revenues would not be available for relief anyway. They would go into the state’s general revenue fund, making it possible to do away with the property tax. After Hopkins announced in September that federal funds to Illinois would cease unless the state acted more responsibly, Governor Henry Horner called a special legislative session to authorize a new bond issue. The plan proposed was similar to the one enacted in February 1932, except that this time it was to raise $30 million, not $20 million. As in 1932, though, legislators were reluctant to approve it. “The impression here,” an observer in Illinois told Hopkins, “is that the federal government is going to do it all—let it.” Moreover, downstate representatives resented the fact that Chicago was getting the large majority of funds, and that money from other counties was, to an extent, being diverted to Cook County. After a month of debate and several attempts at the bill’s passage, it was finally necessary to fly in Anna Ickes, wife of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, to cast a vote and so get the bill passed by a one-vote margin. The resultant bond issue was the main (albeit insufficient) source of state funding in 1934.27

From November 15, 1933 until March 31, 1934, the Civil Works Administration eased the burden on relief agencies and finances by employing about 230,000 workers in Illinois, half of them in Cook County. After it had ended, however, relief rolls rose again and required still more expenditures than before. Fortunately FERA was willing to assume the overwhelming responsibility, even when funds from the bond issue ran out and it had to meet more than 90 percent of Illinois’s relief needs (in November and December 1934). Hopkins informed Horner that this could not go on, that in 1935 the state would have to contribute $3 million per month to its relief administration. Otherwise federal aid would cease. But where to get the money? Horner knew that the General Assembly would never consent to another bond issue. For the moment,

therefore, he asked legislators to allocate for relief the $9 million surplus that had accumulated in the treasury from the sales tax, which they did. But this was going to run out by April 1935, after which it would be necessary to find a more permanent solution. This solution, Horner decided that spring, was to increase the sales tax from 2 percent to 3 percent. But there was a problem: while it would not be hard to get a simple majority of the legislature to pass such a measure, the money would not be available until August, whereas Hopkins had insisted that Illinois should provide its monthly quota of $3 million at once. This meant the bill would have to pass as an emergency measure, which required a two-thirds majority. And so the stage was set for an epic battle between Horner and downstate legislators, especially Republicans.28

The intricacies of the battle, which provoked one of Illinois’s greatest post-1932 relief crises, need not concern us, but they revolved around a couple of different issues. As usual, there was the bitter complaint that the Chicago-based IERC spent a disproportionate amount of money on Chicago rather than downstate. This complaint had by now fused with resentment of the whole “centralized” FERA system itself as personified in Hopkins, who was hated for his ostensibly autocratic tendencies and contempt for Illinois’s lawmakers. It was felt that the state—particularly its non-Cook County portion—was constantly being dictated to, that it was at the mercy of Hopkins’ whims and arbitrary demands, for the monthly $3 million was considered excessive. The legislature even sent a delegation to Washington, D.C. to ask Hopkins how he had arrived at that estimate of the state’s fair contribution, but he snubbed it by going on a vacation with FDR the night before it arrived. Such treatment only served to make more vituperative the denunciations that Republican politicians heaped on him, especially after he expressed disapproval of two bills to gut the IERC and return relief functions to the local level.

“In my present mood,” one representative shouted on the floor of the Illinois House of Representatives, “I am ready and willing to tell Washington to go to hell… Now is the time to determine whether Illinois is a sovereign state or a puppet creature of the Washington bureaucracy.”

Hopkins’ demand in 1935 for more state money—a perfectly reasonable demand—was really but the spark that ignited a powder keg, for the business class’s hostility toward public relief had never abated even in the moments of dire crisis. Relief had only been accepted as a necessary evil then, a very temporary necessary evil. Throughout the decade, a relief administrator noted in retrospect, most Illinois newspapers “both shared and reflected a lack of sympathy for the unemployed en masse… The basic assumption seemed to be that the unemployed by and large were ne’er-do-wells who needed discipline as much as public assistance.” Interestingly, when the press mentioned particular cases that had come to its attention it frequently criticized the inhumanity of the relief that had been granted (probably just as another way to argue that public relief was necessarily bad); but when it dealt in generalities it returned to the criticism that relief was too generous. The Tribune expressed a not uncommon attitude in its editorial on November 9, 1932, in which it declared that “The recipients of unemployment relief are objects of charity [and thus of little worth]… It was their duty to support themselves and their families and in addition to help support the common government. For one reason or another they have failed to make the grade.” The IERC, as the symbol and administrator of public relief, was the target of the most vicious criticism. Aside from the Tribune, the William Randolph Hearst-owned Chicago Evening American and Chicago Herald and Examiner were most critical, the Daily News less so; and “probably a majority” of local newspapers (and politicians) around the state were critical of relief in general, the IERC in

particular. This agency was continually subject to scurrilous and usually unsupported attacks charging “thievery, swindling, forgery, and plundering,” or “THE VILEST KIND OF RACKET,” to quote one headline, or political patronage to Democrats, or waste of funds on a colossal scale, etc. Grand jury investigations uncovered essentially no wrongdoing by the IERC.30

Legislative committees, too, conducted investigations of the Relief Commission, for instance in 1934 and 1937–38. The 1934 investigation culminated in a report that was “a vitriolic criticism and little more,” “highly biased and largely misinformed.” A few days after the report was submitted (in February 1935), a joint session of the House and Senate was convened to discuss the matter, to which members of the Relief Commission were invited. They proceeded to suffer through an “inquisition” led by a bitterly antagonistic House member, at which numerous witnesses with personal vendettas were called to legitimize the torrent of abuse. One senator interrupted the affair to protest against its indignity, but he was “squelched by shouts from the floor and galleries.” Fortunately, no consequences for the IERC ensued. The investigation three years later, which occurred at a time when the Commission had been stripped of nearly all its former powers, was more legitimate, being concerned with the inadequacies of what was by then a system of relief by local governmental units. Indeed, its final report argued that the IERC should regain supervisory authority over local administration of state funds, because the money was being spent wastefully. Nevertheless, it too was somewhat hostile toward unemployment relief, stating, for example, that “the effort to extend social service as a state-wide function of

30 Jones, “The Local Political Significance,” 79–82; Glick, The IERC, 137–144. Even the Daily News, not excessively hostile towards the IERC, was quite hostile towards relief in general. To quote one editorial, “[Relief] is a poison, both psychological and moral, that insidiously tempts its victims to succumb, and then destroys the desire and the spirit of enterprise that should grasp every opportunity for a return to independence.” Chicago Daily News, July 17, 1934. Such an attitude was very common all over the country, including among New Dealers and even some of the unemployed themselves, who wanted to work. Its seductive appeal was an indispensable ally in the campaigns of conservatives and the business class to roll back and finally destroy federal- and state-administered relief.
poor relief [an effort that had been integral to the FERA system of public relief] is an extravagant result of the successful propaganda of a profession [namely, social work] desiring to establish a permanent field of public employment for themselves.” All in all, a knowledgeable commentator concludes, “it is apparent that the first state relief administration in Illinois had little or no support from the legislature which had created it.” No surprise, then, that it effectively came to an end (albeit temporarily) in July 1936, as we’ll see.31

Meanwhile, in April 1935 neither the governor nor the downstate opposition forces would back down in their standoff over the sales tax increase. Horner, backed by Hopkins, demanded it immediately, but the Republicans would not grant it. The matter came to a head at the end of April, when funds ran out. The opposition had probably thought FERA would not dare withhold money for May and let the state’s relief stations shut down, but they were in for a rude surprise. On May 1 the nearly 10,000 employees of the IERC were cut off the payroll (although many continued working as volunteers) and relief stations in most counties closed, leaving the jobless to fend for themselves. Cook County was able to squeeze out another week of drastically reduced relief by selling poor relief bonds worth $1,200,000. Apparently unaware of the irony, politicians and newspaper editors shrieked that Hopkins was “provoking hunger and perhaps even violence” and showing “insolent indifference toward physical suffering,” but he did not budge. Some legislators, on the other hand, were not upset by the developments. “For the first time there has been a tightening of the Illinois Relief Commission’s purse strings,” said one. “They are being forced to purge their rolls of chislers [i.e., fraudulent relief cases]. The payroll

31 Glick, 144–151.
brigade has been laid off and when they get money to start operations again I don’t believe they will dare put all their thousands back to work.”

Those on relief were of a rather different state of mind. Hundreds of demonstrators marched on the State Capitol waving banners—“United We Eat, Divided We Starve,” “Tax Wealth, Not Misery,” a criticism of the sales tax (which taxed the unemployed themselves for their own relief). Chicago saw demonstrations as well, at which dozens were arrested. Thousands of eviction notices were posted as rent payments ceased. Later in the month hunger marchers returned to Springfield, this time in the thousands: “unemployed miners, farmers, and laborers in ragged old clothes and overalls, tired and hungry, marched about the capitol building with posters denouncing the sales tax,” as “hundreds of state troopers wearing Sam Brown belts studded with bullets guarded the entrance to the capitol.” They informed the crowd that machine guns would be turned on them if they tried to enter the building. While the politicians inside attacked one another for their cruelty and callousness, the marchers demanded that relief be restored with money raised by taxes on inheritances, incomes, and the Chicago Board of Trade.

Finally in late May the crisis came to an end. Governor Horner had been desperate to get some Republican votes because, with a gubernatorial election coming up in 1936, he did not want to give Republicans the chance to say that he had burdened the state with a Democratic tax. So he held out and bargained and tried to get it passed even after it had become abundantly clear that a two-thirds majority in the House was impossible to achieve. By the middle of May Hopkins had come to this conclusion and decided he would accept a simple non-emergency measure, according to which the sales tax would take effect in July and the state could resume

---

contributing to the financing of relief in August. Horner reluctantly agreed to this—i.e., to a “Democratic tax”—a few days later, having been assured that FERA would finance Illinois’s entire relief operation until the rise in the sales tax started to bring in more revenue. On May 27, then, relief stations reopened, and things started to return to normal. For the rest of the year FERA continued to finance well over three-fourths of the state’s unemployment relief.34

However, political currents in the second half of 1935 were anything but placid, for major changes in federal policy were in the works. The WPA was slowly being set up in the summer and fall of 1935, in preparation for a dismantling of FERA. In January 1935 Roosevelt had pledged to end federal participation in direct relief, and the gradual disassembling of FERA that fall fulfilled his pledge. Minor “crises” occurred as funding shrank, for instance when the IERC was $1 million short of its needs in September, and when the food budget was reduced by 10 percent in November, but the real difficulties for Illinois’s administrators were produced by the simultaneous directives to build up the infrastructure of the WPA—which entailed transferring tens of thousands of relief cases to federal work relief—and tear down the infrastructure of FERA. It is something of a miracle that this bureaucratic nightmare went as “smoothly” as it did, or rather did not collapse under the weight of administrative confusion. In fact, the major problems that emerged in the course of the transition, and were not solved in the following years, were financial rather than strictly “administrative”: the Roosevelt administration did not request, and Congress did not grant, sufficient funds for the WPA even to hire all the employable (“able-bodied”) people on the relief rolls, quite apart from the millions of able-bodied unemployed who were not on relief at all (and therefore could not be hired by the WPA). Governors had been led to expect that nearly all the employable relief cases in their state would be transferred to the WPA and thereby become a federal responsibility, so that the state would no longer have to pay

for their direct relief. This would free up more money to use on care for “unemployables,” such as the disabled and those who were too old to work but not old enough for Old Age Assistance. But because of the inadequate finances of the WPA—which grew even more inadequate after 1935—states ended up being saddled with far more relief cases than they had expected, which led to even lower standards of care than would have been the case anyway. In Illinois, for example, the “residual” relief caseload (i.e., the number of cases that were not transferred to the WPA) in January 1936 had been predicted to be around 65,000, but it turned out to be 130,000.35

And so Illinois entered a new, tragic phase, the post-FERA phase of its relief administration. Historians have written about the grim consequences nationwide of this backward step in unemployment relief, the devolution of relief back from the centralized FERA to the states and localities, so we need not dwell on its broad contours. Taking their cue from the federal government, many states quickly shed their relief burden and shunted the responsibility back onto local communities, which in most cases had neither the inclination nor the means to meet the resultant chaos. All too frequently, and as early as January or February 1936, relief sank to old, miserable poor-law standards. “In one eastern community,” a relief worker wrote in June 1936, “town officials authorized families to beg their food from merchants and householders when town funds for relief were exhausted. Recently newspapers have reported the encampment of delegations of unemployed in legislative chambers in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Missouri protesting the abandonment of state aid for relief, calling to mind the ‘hunger marches’ of the early period of the depression.” During the terrible recession of 1938, a journalist noted that “food, clothing, and shelter budgets for families receiving direct relief have been lopped so

drastically and so generally [in the Midwest] that it is impossible to measure the results in human suffering.” As may be imagined, conditions were even worse in the South. Dorothy Kahn, director of the Philadelphia relief program, asked in despair, “Have we lived through the agonizing years of depression relief to produce nothing better than this?”36

Commentators at the time and subsequently have puzzled over why the Roosevelt administration abruptly ended FERA after only two-and-a-half years. Jacob Fisher, chairman of the National Coordinating Committee of Social Service Employee Groups, was convinced it was the propaganda campaigns and lobbying of the business class that doomed FERA. “The engineers of defeat of the social work program have been the American Manufacturers Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Liberty League.” Doubtless there was some truth to this, for business at the national and state levels had indeed vigorously opposed high standards of public relief, and much of the media had waged an ideological war against relief. The mainstream culture of the well-propertied had never grown comfortable with the idea of federally administered unemployment relief—what was sometimes called the “national dole”—especially if it was to last longer than a year or two. But this means that the Roosevelt administration itself was never comfortable with a national dole, and from the very beginning looked forward to ending it. Indeed, this is why the word “emergency” was in the very name of the relief agency. Even Harry Hopkins, himself a social worker who was extremely sympathetic to the suffering of the poor, was convinced that relief was a “very demoralizing thing” that encouraged “an unwholesome attitude toward the Nation and the States.” (The liberal magazine *The Nation* answered this opinion with the reasonable argument that it was *unemployment*, not

relief, that harmed morale and “character.”) Progressives replied to Hopkins and Roosevelt that no one doubted it was better to have work than relief; what was at issue was the inability of the WPA to hire anything close to a majority of the eligible unemployed, who would therefore be thrust back onto the miserable resources and cruelty of states and localities. It was similarly cruel to abandon “unemployables” to their states, even if the provisions of the new Social Security Act were likely to make things marginally better for them.37

But such pleas were of no use: Roosevelt’s personal ideology had been formed in a political economy that overwhelmingly favored the interests of business, so it was basically conservative, committed to fiscal conservatism and a belief that relief was so degrading that the federal government should not be involved in it. Reinforcing these convictions was evidence of the “unwholesome attitude” among those on federal relief that disturbed Hopkins: all over the country they had come to think the federal government had an obligation to give relief to the needy, and that it was not fulfilling this obligation satisfactorily. “Clients are assuming that the government has a responsibility to provide,” a journalist reported, adding that “the stigma of relief has [by 1934] almost disappeared except among white-collar groups.” Relief workers noted that many clients even claimed a right to live comfortably at the government’s expense (if work in the private sector could not be found). We’ll return to this important point in the next chapter. Such a defiant attitude was very unsettling to authorities, for in its implications it seemed to demand a wholly new social order. How could capitalism continue—without radically changing—if all the unemployed received generous government support? Average wages would have to rise significantly in order to tempt people to seek employment, and wealth would have to

be taxed enormously in order to pay for such an expansive welfare state. Society as a whole would become much more statist, and individual states’ independence of the federal government would erode significantly. In short, FERA was encouraging attitudes—and social movements, as we’ll see—incompatible with America’s capitalist economy and federalist political structure. It had to be dismantled lest the pressures for its expansion engulf the nation.\(^{38}\)

So discipline of the working class became the order of the day, an order that Illinois carried out with relish (in effect, if not in intent). To retrace all the political machinations, sectional jealousies, personal rivalries, business lobbying, and popular protests that determined Illinois’s relief policies in the following years is a Herculean task that will not be attempted here. But we can draw two main conclusions from the less ambitious overview that follows. First, to quote a relief administrator, “there is no gainsaying the fact that the state and localities could have provided more relief money than they did during the period of FERA grants.” This is obvious from the fact that they did provide more money, because they were forced to, after the federal government had withdrawn. Second, the welfare of the unemployed was at all times a low priority compared to other issues such as the avoidance of tax increases, the sectional desire to saddle other regions of the state with as much of the relief bill as possible, the determination not to reintroduce a state property tax or pursue any kind of corporate income tax, and the agendas of partisan politics.\(^{39}\)

It was not a good omen when the underfunding of relief began immediately in January 1936, even though by some accounts the state had an $18 million surplus in its treasury. It is true that, as noted a moment ago, there was a larger residual relief caseload than expected, and also that the IERC had to supplement inadequate WPA wages for 30,000 families (out of 180,000


\(^{39}\) Glick, *The IERC*, 183.
enrolled with the WPA). Funds were therefore expected to run out by January 15. Governor Horner pleaded with Roosevelt for one last infusion of federal aid, but Roosevelt refused. So Horner called a special session of the legislature, which finally, on January 15, after overcoming the predictable disagreements between Cook County and the rest of the state, voted to keep the relief stations open until February by appropriating $2.5 million. Three weeks later, an appropriation of $7.5 million ensured that relief would continue until May 1. But meanwhile, measures had been passed that threatened to throw the entire administrative machinery into chaos: the General Assembly, led by downstate elements (which themselves were led by the Illinois Agricultural Association), had decided to abolish the hated IERC on May 1 and transfer financial and administrative responsibility to the state’s 1,454 townships. To make Chicago pay for its own poor, it and all other townships had to levy a property tax of 30 cents per $100 valuation in order to be eligible for state funds. But, with the IERC to be dismantled, no provision was made for the handling of these funds. Horner, who had often supported Chicago in its battles with downstate counties, signed off on this terrible, hastily conceived legislation because he was at that moment mired in a political battle with the Chicago Democratic machine and had decided to “play rough.” He knew, too, that in his fight for reelection downstaters would appreciate an anti-Chicago stance.  

Less dramatic than the state’s political skirmishes but equally or more real was the continued inadequacy of relief in these early months of 1936. In March, for example, clients’ budgets had to be slashed 9 percent, which meant that the IERC could in but few cases pay for clients’ rent and electricity bills. Clothing and medical service authorizations, likewise, were

---

restricted to emergency cases. Such curtailments were to recur regularly from 1936 on, even in months of relative financial stability.\textsuperscript{41}

The spring of 1936 saw a series of \textit{ad hoc} bills each passed at the last minute to address the consequences of the earlier anti-IERC, anti-Chicago bills. When the smoke cleared, the IERC had been granted two more months of robust life, after which (starting on July 1) it would linger as a mere allocating and certifying body, not an administrative one. The General Assembly appropriated $4.5 million and $4 million for relief in May and June respectively, but it decreed that starting in July only $2 million of state funds would be available each month—to meet a need of more than twice that amount. The townships were supposed to supply the remainder. So on July 1, Illinois’s relief financing and administration entered a period of “truly medieval” decentralization, in which 1,454 authorities existed where formerly there had been one (with many sub-units around the state). It was now—much as in the bad old days of “pauper relief”—up to townships to determine who would be eligible for relief and how much they would be granted, a system that, as was just mentioned, lent itself to abuses, inefficiencies, local incompetence, and wide variations in relief standards. It is true, though, that there was not a literal return to the Elizabethan poor-law administration of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since the state government did commit to contributing money towards relief and maintained some connection with local institutions (as well as with the WPA and other federal programs). Moreover, Chicago was fortunate in that the new Chicago Relief Administration could simply take over the existing networks and professional personnel of the IERC, which had been based there.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Chicago Tribune}, March 14, 1936.
\textsuperscript{42} Lubell and Everett, “The Breakdown of Relief,” 173, 174.
On the other hand, the city’s poor were unfortunate in the degree to which the City Council was subordinate to business interests. The transition to the post-IERC era was going to be difficult in the best of circumstances, but with such a City Council it was utterly chaotic. Even if the Council had prepared for the sudden reduction of state funds in July 1936 by passing the 30-cent-per-$100 tax levy, a 20 to 40 percent cut in relief budgets would have been necessary. (The governor was apprised of this, but because of political squabbles with Mayor Kelly, he still vetoed a bill that would have increased the state’s ridiculously low $2 million monthly contribution to relief.) But the aldermen refused to pass the tax, hoping to find a way to circumvent the state’s decree. As neither the city nor the state cared enough to keep relief functioning in Chicago, drastic cuts were necessary beginning in late June. Medical and hospital services were discontinued first, then rent, gas, electricity, and clothing services, and then food budgets had to be cut 20 percent. The crisis was compounded when, because of legal technicalities, none of Chicago’s share of state relief money for July could be used to pay administrative costs, which meant that CRA employees could not be paid—relief stations had to close—and there was not even any money to mail the thousands of grocery orders that families were counting on. Between July 1 and July 9, therefore, no food was given. “The total amount of suffering,” the Chicago Defender observed, “endured during the seven or eight days of absolute destitution by clients will never be known.” At last aldermen donated $2,900 to pay for postage to mail the food orders that CRA employees had volunteered (without pay) to fill out.43

On July 8 there occurred a dramatic illustration of the Piven-Cloward thesis that (in crude terms) the surest way, and often the only way, for the poor to get consideration is to cause turmoil. Hundreds of people on relief, representing the Illinois Workers Alliance, the Association

of Workers in Public Agencies, and the Revolutionary Workers’ League, stormed the City Council chambers and flooded the galleries, loudly denouncing the assembled aldermen as the mayor tried to call the meeting to order. Pandemonium ensued until police dragged the demonstrators into the hallway. With the hundreds of “troublemakers” finally outside, the aldermen were called to order to the tune of “Solidarity Forever” ringing in the halls. This whole affair apparently made an impression, for the City Council promptly voted to levy the property tax it had put off for months. Later that day, grocery orders were mailed to clients.\footnote{\textit{Chicago Tribune}, July 9, 1936.}

Unfortunately the tax could not be collected right away, and no banks would buy the tax anticipation warrants. So local money remained unavailable. A skeleton CRA staff continued to work without pay so that families could receive their grocery orders (the mayor lent $2,500 for the postage), but still no other aid was given. Protest demonstrations continued, for instance on July 18, when 10,000 people marched from Union Park to Michigan Avenue to protest the suspension of cash relief and the state’s policy of using only one-third of revenue from the sales tax for relief purposes. Conditions were equally bad in many other areas of the state—in some places even worse, for the entirety of relief administration had suddenly been thrust onto local staffs with little experience—but the governor was on vacation and the legislature was out of session, so nothing was done. Finally on August 4 the General Assembly reconvened—under heavy guard, for it was greeted by hundreds of “hunger marchers.” An anonymous bomb threat heightened the politicians’ sense that something must be done. “An infernal machine,” the threat said, “will be thrown into the Senate chamber and members of the Legislature will go home in boxes and on stretchers…if you don’t take up our program first.” Obediently they did.\footnote{\textit{Chicago Tribune}, July 14, 16, 18, August 5, 1936; Cole, “The Relief Crisis in Illinois,” 354–357; \textit{Washington Post}, August 5, 1936; \textit{New York Times}, August 9, 1936.}
By mid-August some ameliorations of the statewide disaster had been approved, in particular that from September to January 1937 $3 million of state money (from the sales tax) would be available for relief each month, and that some of the state and local money could be used for administrative purposes (rectifying an oversight in the earlier legislation that had necessitated the virtual shutting down of administration). But still only eight percent of funds could be used for this purpose in Chicago (only five percent downstate), an absurd and arbitrary constraint that forced a reduction in the CRA staff from 2,200 to 1,000 and—among many other inefficiencies—saddled the remaining caseworkers with 250 cases each. This was counterproductive even from the austerity-obsessed perspective of the legislature, for with such a high caseload, workers could not effectively investigate clients, which prevented them from cutting off many who no longer needed relief. (A couple years later, the legislature raised the funding limit for administration to 10 percent.) The increased state funds allowed food budgets to be restored to 100 percent and cash relief to be resumed, and two months later, after Chicago’s tax anticipation warrants had finally been sold, semi-regular payments for rent, fuel, shoes, and clothing resumed. In December the state appropriated another $12 million, which carried relief through May 1937—although not without yet more cuts in the spring that forced thousands of families off the relief rolls in Chicago and reduced money available for rent and clothing.46

Now that local governments could receive state funding only if they levied a poor-relief tax of 30 cents per $100, most of them for the first time started contributing substantially to the costs of relief. With exceptions, the counties’ record had been quite unimpressive until now.

Between January 1933 and December 1935, local funds had contributed an average of 4.5 percent to relief costs, compared to 11 percent in Michigan, 30 percent in New York, 16.5 percent in California, and 47 percent in Massachusetts. (The local contribution was much higher, though, if one includes in it counties’ repayments for Illinois’s bond issues.) Cook County had been especially miserly, contributing 0.5 percent of funding between February 1933 and June 1934. From July 1936 to June 1938, on the other hand, Chicago financed 25.6 percent of its own relief, the state the rest. But both entities could have afforded to provide more, thereby saving hundreds of thousands of people a great deal of suffering during the “Roosevelt recession” of 1937–38.47

A notable development just before the recession was that in June 1937 the legislature finally tried to end its years-long practice of temporizing and passing relief bills at the last minute: hoping to wash its hands of this irksome relief business for a while, it appropriated $70 million for the next two years, to be spent at a rate not higher than $2.9 million per month. It was soon evident that this would be far from sufficient. Relief rolls increased throughout the summer, in part because 35,000 WPA jobs in Illinois had been eliminated. (The backlash by conservatives and big business against the New Deal had begun, and even the Roosevelt administration was succumbing to the conservative ascendancy.)48 As a result, by late August the CRA had spent all

---

48 It is possible to see the end of FERA as the first moment of the national turn towards conservatism, the initial target of which was public unemployment relief and the second target, a few years later, the spirit of the CIO. From this perspective, ironically, the Social Security Act, approximately coincident with the end of FERA, can be seen as just as much a victory of conservatism as of liberalism, for it constituted but a feeble attempt at state welfarism in comparison to the far more popular Workers’ Unemployment and Social Insurance Bill. From these two initial victories, one may see the slowly building conservative “movement” as progressing to even greater triumphs in its vitiation of the potential of the WPA and its halting the social-movement momentum of the CIO from 1938 into the war years. Eventually, starting perhaps in 1947 and ’48, it established itself as the dominant political and cultural paradigm. According to this periodization the crucial year was 1935 (not 1938 or the later years that historians have proposed), for it was then that certain radical possibilities were foreclosed, the tide turned against unemployment relief and an expansive welfare state, and the Roosevelt administration definitively revealed its true conservative colors. The die was cast even before Roosevelt’s overwhelming electoral win in 1936.
the local money available for the rest of the year; it would now have to rely on its share of the state’s monthly $2.9 million allocation. This left the CRA with only 67 percent of the money it needed, which necessitated drastic cuts in (already inadequate) relief budgets. Once again, starting in September, payments for rent, light, and clothing ceased, and thousands of clients were dropped from the relief rolls. Eviction rates shot up. Private charities were flooded with applicants who could not get public relief. Soon desperate parents were pleading with courts to assume guardianship of their children, so that they could receive proper care in foster homes or institutions. Officials, local politicians, and social workers agreed that a special session of the legislature had to be called to divert more state money to the city and authorize Chicago to raise taxes, but for some reason Governor Horner refused to do this. Nor would the federal government assist with direct relief, though it did increase WPA quotas. So the situation deteriorated as the recession deepened, to the point that in late November the head of the CRA declared that the city was facing its worst crisis since the winter of 1930–31.  

The new year brought a temporary respite, for now Chicago could levy its annual 30-cent-per-$100 poor-relief tax. Relief returned to 80 or 85 percent adequacy (as measured by a subsistence budget). But because the recession continued, expenditures were very high, so high that the CRA was set to use up all the money from the levy by May 17. Predictably, nothing was done until the situation had become an emergency, at which point the governor acquiesced and finally called a special session of the legislature. Relief stations closed on May 18, shutting 93,000 families off from access to life’s necessities. Fortunately 59,000 of them had already received their May relief checks; but the other 34,000 would have to subsist on the monthly handouts from the Federal Commodity Surplus Corporation, which gave rations that had a retail

---

value of $1.15. “No one connected with the relief agencies,” a journalist remarked, “pretends that the food allowance can be called even a starvation ration.” The emergency was mercifully short-lived, however, for on May 25 the legislature approved a $500,000 increase in the state’s monthly contribution, so it was now $3.4 million. This new allotment allowed checks for food to be sent out, but it was still grossly insufficient for other purposes such as the payment of rent. Through June, therefore, negotiations and back-room deals continued between Chicago Democrats and the hostile Horner/downstate group, various bills being proposed and defeated. One plan, for example, was to empower towns and cities to license businesses as a means of raising funds, but it was defeated by the opposition of business and trade associations. Similarly, the Chicago City Council passed a resolution condemning any increase in property taxes. At last, in late June, a solution was found: Horner agreed to an additional relief appropriation of $400,000 per month for the rest of the year in return for the diversion of $2.5 million of Chicago’s share of the state gasoline tax into relief. This agreement stabilized finances (at a still-low level) for the remainder of the year.50

An even more significant change enacted in June 1938 was that the IERC was granted supervisory authority over localities’ administration of relief. Complete decentralization of relief, from July 1936 to June 1938, had proved a fiasco, as social workers and unemployed organizations had predicted. As mentioned in chapter two, average monthly grants to clients in Cook County had declined from $38.65 for the year ending June 30, 1935 to $28.62 between 1936 and 1938, though they were frequently much lower than that. Relief standards had varied wildly between townships, and administration in most of the state had been “grossly inefficient

and excessively wasteful,” according to a legislative committee. This committee, like others before it, recommended that relief be centralized in the State Department of Public Welfare, but the bills drafted for this purpose failed to pass in the legislature. So relief remained decentralized, but after June 1938 the IERC was empowered (1) to set policies for local units that restored some uniformity in standards, (2) to determine that funds were being spent for the purpose intended, and (3) to review the relief load in any locality to determine needs. These changes were to the benefit of clients, but they did not prevent a widespread increase of suffering in 1939 and 1940 (as described briefly in the second chapter).  

As Congress slashed appropriations for the WPA in 1939, relief rolls in Chicago and Illinois expanded. The CRA and the IERC resorted to the usual measures to reduce the rolls, in particular by discontinuing all relief cases (of which there were 190,000, representing 570,000 people) and forcing everyone to reapply and possibly undergo an investigation. In addition, employable relief recipients were forced to work on streets, playgrounds, or parks for thirty hours a month; it was hoped that many would refuse, so they could be cut loose. To cut the rolls further, the legislature passed the law mentioned in the last chapter stipulating that only people who had lived in Illinois for three consecutive years could be granted relief. But despite all these austerity measures, funds kept hemorrhaging, so once again Chicago ran out of its own money and needed increased help from the state. The usual temporizing and month-to-month aid by the legislature went on in the first half of 1939; Horner’s usual priority to keep the budget balanced continued; and the Chicago City Council kept up its usual close-fisted ways. At a time when New York City was contributing 60 percent of the cost of relief, Chicago was supplying about 17 percent. (It is true that the city had never totally recovered from its fiscal problems in the early

---


363
1930s. Still, its social workers were right to insist that it could afford to divert more resources to relief, for example by raising taxes, transferring money from other programs, and cutting down on some of the patronage, waste, and graft that was rampant in the administration.) In June 1939 the state agreed to provide $4 million every month for the next year and a half, although for Chicago’s relief clients, who had to survive at 65 percent of the CRA’s minimum budget, this was still inhumanly insufficient.52

Thus, in 1940 relief conditions were again abysmal. In May, trade unions and “a huge host of progressive organizations” such as the Illinois Workers Security Federation (successor to the Illinois Workers Alliance) sent a resolution to Governor Horner pleading for a special session of the legislature, a resolution that began, “The relief situation in Chicago today is a major emergency. Malnutrition, starvation and disease are appalling in extent. Present WPA cuts will make these conditions even worse.” No special session was called. Or, more accurately, no session was called for relief needs: another session was already in progress, but Horner did not want it to address “controversial issues” like relief. (As his administrative assistant said, “the Governor does not believe there is need for any action [to expand relief].”) A number of stalwart activists, veterans of unemployed advocacy, valiantly continued the fight in an ever more conservative political climate, but they had little success. Even the most powerful unions were unable to sway the governor or the legislature. For instance, in a letter to Frank W. McCulloch, Secretary-Treasurer of the IWSF, the district president of the United Mine Workers lamented that “our Union has done everything humanly possible to bring these matters [of relief] to the attention of the state administration, but, I am sorry to say, without any results.” Now that unemployed organizations, victims of conservative backlash, had “shrunk to the vanishing point”

(as McCulloch said), the state had no reason to remember the thousands of unfortunates suffering in their tenements and back alleys.\textsuperscript{53}

As we know, what finally saved the unemployed and ended the twelve-year-long relief crisis (continuing into 1941) not only in Illinois but all over the country was, perversely, the imperative to kill Nazis in Europe and Japanese in the Pacific. Such an imperative, far from being a threat to the class structures of American capitalism and their distribution of power, was a colossal boon to business, so it was able to become national policy, as adequate unemployment relief never was. Where the New Deal and (in some respects) its humanitarian impulse had failed, global war succeeded.

**Unions**

One might say that the problem of voluntary organizations such as trade unions, churches, charities, and benefit societies was the opposite of the Illinois government: while the latter had resources but lacked the will to support the unemployed, the former, comparatively speaking, had the will but lacked the resources. It is true that the national, and in most cases state, leadership of organized labor had little will to organize the jobless (though this was less true after the formation of the CIO), and could have lobbied more aggressively for more generous unemployment insurance than it did. Nevertheless, unions generally displayed far more concern for the jobless than governments did. Unfortunately, the weakness of organized labor at the end of the 1920s meant that only a tiny number of workers nationwide belonged to unions that had unemployment-benefit plans for their members: in 1931, for instance, about 65,000

\textsuperscript{53} Lea D. Taylor et al., “Resolution to Governor Horner on Relief,” Frank McCulloch Papers, box 9, folder 4; \textit{Work}, May 23, 1940, 1; letter from UMW District 12 president to McCulloch, May 21, 1940, and letter from McCulloch to Sophonisba Breckenridge, May 18, 1940, in ibid.; \textit{Chicago Tribune}, April 7, June 5, 1940.
workers were covered by plans jointly administered by companies and unions, while 45,000 were covered by separate union plans. Moreover, these numbers dropped off considerably as the Depression progressed and union treasuries depleted.  

In Chicago, the most highly developed unemployment benefits plan was that of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. This union had in 1923 set up joint plans with employers in the Chicago area who were engaged in the production of men’s clothing in union shops: contributions to the benefit fund were to amount to 1.5 percent of the earnings of union members and 3 percent of the employer’s payroll. Involuntarily unemployed workers not on strike or involved in a lockout were to receive 30 percent of their wages, but no more than $15, per week, for up to three weeks per season depending on the shop in which they worked. The fund managed to continue through the Depression, even as benefits were slightly increased in 1930 and 1931. But the number of workers the plan covered inevitably dropped: whereas in 1926, 206 firms and 19,000 workers were covered, by late 1933 the number of firms had been reduced to 90 and the number of workers to 12,500.  

A few local unions administered their own benefit plans. Bookbinders Local 8, with 800 members in 1939, paid $5.50 per week to its unemployed members for up to thirteen weeks, while Electrotypers Local 3 gave weekly benefits of $15 to journeymen—$7.50 to apprentices—for as long as they were out of work. (The benefits were reduced to this scale in October 1933, having been $20 and $12 respectively before then.) Photo-engravers Local 5, with 1,500 members, likewise gave benefits indefinitely, although as the Depression continued they had to

---

be reduced from $25 to $12. Typographical workers, milk drivers, and members of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union were also among the lucky few who received unemployment benefits.56

A number of other unions, including among railway carmen, street and electric railwaymen, and in some of the building trades, tried share-the-work schemes early in the Depression.57 In December 1930 the economist Sumner Slichter described how some of those worked:

In many railroad shops, on the Baltimore and Ohio, on the Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville, and on other roads, the men for months have voluntarily been working five days a week instead of six in order to provide jobs for more workers. Under the union regulations, the seniority rule would ordinarily be applied and the junior men laid off. The senior employees in these shops, therefore, are contributing one day’s pay a week, one-sixth of their income, to the relief of unemployment. This is being done by men who receive eighty cents an hour or less. How many millionaires, or men receiving $5,000 or $10,000 a year, are contributing one-sixth of their incomes to unemployment relief? Some locals of the Typographical Union have limited their members to working five days a week for a period of several months in order to provide employment for “substitutes.”… 58

Similarly, in May 1932, the director of the Block Community Organization in New York City stated that “unemployment relief is definitely receiving significant support from a large number of small givers. There is being shown among wage-earners a greater awareness of the desperate need for assistance…” And a year earlier Mayor Harry A. Mackey of Philadelphia had declared,

Up to the present a great proportion of the relief funds has been contributed by the working class. Not one-tenth of our citizens have responded, and it is a lamentable fact, but none the less true, that many of our wealthy men and women have failed to respond, while many others who are rich and well able to do so have sent contributions for insignificant sums… I say to you it is the poor man who has saved the situation up to this time. In other words, the poor man is protecting the interests of the rich man because the poor man is sympathetic.59

In fact, according to a study in 1939 by an economist at Columbia University, between 1930 and 1936 Americans with annual incomes of more than a million dollars gave only 3.9 percent of the total that went to private welfare institutions in the country. People earning over $50,000 per year contributed only 14.6 percent.60

In any event, to address the unemployment epidemic primarily through contributions from wage-earners, or through share-the-work plans or union- and company-administered benefits, was a hopelessly inadequate response. Sooner or later, unions were bound to turn to

---
60 *Work*, May 23, 1940, 3.
grander measures to solve the crisis. In particular, the American Federation of Labor’s traditional voluntarism could not survive: by 1932, the economic climate had made the Federation’s opposition to government-run unemployment insurance utterly anachronistic. Its old nostrums of “employment assurance” through a shorter work week, public works, and stable wage levels were little better than a bad joke when nationwide unemployment was approaching 25 percent. However, William Green, head of the AFL, and his fellow officers were not going to give up their voluntarism voluntarily (so to speak). It required a major movement of the rank and file to force the Federation’s executive council to change its stance in July 1932, when it finally assigned Green the task of preparing an unemployment insurance bill for introduction in Congress.61

The story can be summarized briefly—and is apropos in its anticipation of one of the themes of the next chapter, that people on the “rank-and-file” level tended to be quite radical (much more so than those in positions of authority). Already by late 1930, despite the opposition of the AFL, many constituent organizations and unions had gone on record in support of legislation for unemployment insurance, including eight state federations of labor (not Illinois’s), the central labor bodies of nine cities, and the American Federation of Teachers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the ILGWU, the United Textile Workers, the United Hebrew Trades, and a number of other Internationals. Public pressure continued to mount in 1931, as 52 bills for unemployment insurance were introduced (unsuccessfully) in state legislatures. But at the 1931 AFL convention the leadership was still able to smother the growing demand that the Federation change its voluntarist position. A rank-and-file movement therefore began in January

---

1932, when Carpenters Local 2717 in New York City called a conference of AFL unions. Representatives of 19 locals passed a resolution to appoint a committee—the AFL Trade Union Committee for Unemployment Insurance and Relief (AFLTU Committee)—that would gauge sentiment and build support among unions for federal insurance, in particular for the Communist-written Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill. In part because of its activities—and despite its being viciously persecuted by the national office as Communist—by the spring of 1934 over 2,000 locals and many central bodies had joined in its endorsement of the radical Workers’ Bill that Ernest Lundeen had just introduced in Congress.⁶²

The head of the committee was Louis Weinstock, a Communist and member of the Painters’ Union in New York City. To advocate for the Workers’ Bill he conducted a national tour in 1934, in each city contacting unionists who helped him organize meetings that were attended by hundreds of workers. Some cities had their own local AFL Committee for Unemployment Insurance, while in others Weinstock helped create one (or several). In reports to the Communist Party he made some telling observations about the left-wing militancy of the local unions he encountered, as contrasted with the conservatism of the Internationals to which they belonged. For example, while some locals insisted that unemployed members should be able to remain in good standing even if they could not pay dues, Internationals were more likely to want to purge their out-of-work members. In Chicago, building trades unions followed the practice of the Communist Unemployed Councils in electing small relief committees to take members to a charity office and demand more relief. They often even united with the

Unemployed Councils in these activities, a tendency that, from the perspective of higher union officials, was growing to “alarming proportions” all over the country. Internationals, on the other hand, usually followed the conservative AFL line in its absolute rejection of cooperation with Communists, to the point that members who participated in Unemployed Council demonstrations risked being expelled from the union. In a case in Minneapolis, for instance, a local refused to accept the decision of its International that one of its members be expelled for having taken part in a Communist demonstration. The International replied that unless the union expelled her, it would have its charter revoked.63

But already by 1932, sentiment in favor of unemployment insurance had swept the large majority of rank-and-file unionists, in addition, of course, to the long-term unemployed whether unionized or not. Members were radicalizing, growing friendlier with Communists in their disgust at the inaction of union leaders. To quote Mauritz Hallgren, a keen observer of the labor movement,

although in the early years of the crisis they had tended to drift away from the unions, [jobless members] were in 1932 taking an increasingly active part in union affairs. The fear was expressed that in some organizations the unemployed might even come into control of the bureaucratic machinery. That they exercised a tremendous influence over local unions and city and state central bodies was seen from the avalanche of radical demands that poured in upon the quarterly meeting of the Federation’s executive council at Atlantic City in July [1932]. The

rank-and-file workers, whether unemployed or not, were no longer to be put off with windy promises of action…

After the powerful United Mine Workers endorsed the principle of government action at its convention in early 1932—which followed endorsements in 1931 by the Teamsters, the International Association of Machinists, the Molders’ Union, and many others—the AFL’s executive council saw the writing on the wall. It could prevaricate and postpone no longer; it had to accept, and propose at the next national convention, a version of compulsory unemployment insurance, thereby accepting the idea of government “interference” in the affairs of organized labor. But it could still qualify its endorsement of the principle, by proposing only state unemployment insurance, not federal. This is what it did at the 1932 convention in November, which was an eventful one as regards the fight between the Federation’s left wing and its right wing. After holding a rump convention in Carpenters Hall, the AFLTU Committee sent a delegation of 24 to present to William Green the rank and file’s views on unemployment insurance. When they arrived at the convention site, Green refused to meet them. So they sat in the balcony observing the proceedings—until Weinstock climbed onto a chandelier and addressed the convention, which acutely embarrassed the presiding officials. Several were still resolutely opposed even to Green’s moderate proposal for legislation, but in the end he was able to overcome their opposition and put the issue to a vote, whereupon the delegates approved his proposal by an “overwhelming margin.”

---

64 Hallgren, Seeds of Revolt, 221.
It should be recalled that the years 1931 to 1936 were a time of exceptional “insubordination” in the ranks of labor, as the AFL elite had to fight ruthlessly to contain the “Communism” that was sweeping the masses. The strike wave of 1934 was one manifestation of rank-and-file rebelliousness; the deep conflicts demonstrated at national conventions, culminating in the historic 1935 convention that precipitated the founding of the CIO immediately afterwards, were another. At the 1934 convention, to quote a Communist publication, rank-and-file delegates submitted “62 different resolutions criticizing the policies of the A. F. of L. and proposing a militant program dealing with all phases and problems of the workers in this country” (italics in original), all of which were rejected by the resolutions committee.\footnote{The spread of a militantly progressive spirit in the ranks of the AFL is apparent by comparing the quantity and quality of resolutions introduced at various national conventions. At the 1932 convention no rank-and-file group was allowed to be represented, and only 90 resolutions were introduced, most of them dealing with conservative and routine issues. At the 1934 convention, by contrast, about 230 resolutions were submitted, over 100 dealing with “rank-and-file issues.” The number was still higher at the 1935 convention. “Rank and File Progress in A. F. of L.,” \textit{Labor Notes}, November 1935, 5.} The quotation is from the AFLTU Committee’s \textit{Rank and File Federationist}, a monthly magazine that proved an effective tool in the committee’s ideological guerrilla warfare against the union establishment. So threatened did the establishment apparently feel by this committee (and its affiliates) that it regularly refused its representatives entry to national conventions and in 1936 filed suit with the Federal Trade Commission to have the acronym AFL removed from its name. Similarly, at the 1935 convention a resolution was approved to “energetically use all means at our command to purge our membership of proven Red termites who are endeavoring to destroy our government and the American Federation of Labor.” The influence of the Red termites had, however, at least been indirectly responsible for the AFL’s endorsement of the Social Security Act, since the “Communist” Lundeen Bill was anathema.\footnote{Philip Foner, “Introduction to A. F. of L. \textit{Rank and File Federationist}”; Edwin Young, “The Split in the Labor Movement,” in \textit{Labor and the New Deal}, eds. Milton Derber and Edwin Young (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972).}
Meanwhile, the Chicago and the Illinois State Federations of Labor, like their counterparts in other states, were neither ignoring the unemployed nor organizing them. The Executive Board of the CFL debated the question and decided that organization of the unemployed would result in dual unions for existing crafts. (It did, however, pledge cooperation with affiliated unions that organized their own unemployed.) The legislative priorities of the CFL and ISFL tended to be such issues as updating workmen’s compensation, establishing state pensions for the elderly and mothers, and regulating the employment of women and children, but the federations did devote considerable attention to the plight of the jobless. With social workers and welfare agencies, they (especially the ISFL) were in the forefront of the push for state funding of public relief, and in their newspapers they regularly published information and stories on unemployment and poverty. For instance, in 1932 the Federation News, the CFL’s newspaper, published a series of articles on the dreadful conditions at Oak Forest Infirmary just south of Chicago, where over 4,000 “poor and needy” were cared for (in a sense). The Federation’s investigation uncovered conditions so shocking that the county conducted its own investigation—after which it did nothing to improve the situation, because of the political class’s “zeal for economy” (which the CFL and ISFL consistently decried). With regard to unemployment insurance, starting in 1933 the ISFL lobbied for a bill in the Illinois legislature, finally achieving victory in the summer of 1937. Illinois was the last state to establish a system of unemployment compensation, which provided for sixteen weeks of benefits paid out of a general fund to which only employers (not employees) contributed. (Unfortunately, during the Depression most of the unemployed remained ineligible for benefits.)

On at least one occasion the CFL did organize a huge unemployment demonstration, through its affiliated unions. But it was on Labor Day in 1932, incorporated into the festivities (a parade, music, dancing, etc.), so it did not have quite the gravity or rebellious undertone that Communist demonstrations did. In fact, Chicago Communists were convinced, probably with good reason, that it was little more than an attempt to steal the unemployment issue from them and rein in its disorderly tendencies. Or, just as likely, its purpose may have been to counteract the widespread impression that organized labor was fiddling while Rome burned, or merely pleading fecklessly with business and political leaders for unemployment relief instead of mobilizing millions to demand action. Of course, such inaction was perfectly consistent with the orientation of the AFL toward craft unionism, the representation and defense of a small labor aristocracy. For example, in a rather pitiful display of its passiveness, in early December 1932 the CFL reported in the *Federation News* that thirty organizations of the unemployed had recently met in Chicago for the Midwestern Conference of Unemployed Organizations, in order to lay the foundation for a Federation of Unemployed Workers’ Leagues. “The program of the Federation,” the article noted, “is of particular interest to organized labor for its deliberate efforts to forestall conflict with organized labor and instead to secure its co-operation.” The irony passed unnoticed that the very issue under discussion, namely rampant unemployment, should itself have been of “particular interest to organized labor.” And yet not only did the CFL and ISFL have no connection with any of the attending groups: the CFL had actually refused official
support to the Chicago Workers Committee on Unemployment when it was formed in the summer of 1931.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, within the limited sphere of its narrow tactics and excessive conservatism, and notwithstanding exceptions, organized labor did not necessarily acquit itself badly in the unemployment crisis. During Chicago’s many relief crises, the ISFL was on hand to aggressively push, through lobbying and press releases, for immediate action by the legislature. In doing so, it sometimes found itself awkwardly placed between the business community and the Illinois Workers Alliance (IWA), a federation of unemployed organizations that was founded in December 1933. During the emergency of May 1935, for instance, ISFL officials were outraged at the stances of both right-wing and left-wing groups, which had curiously merged: the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and its affiliates “deluge[d] the legislature with telegrams against the ‘occupational tax’” as the means to fund relief, while the IWA and its affiliates picketed the state capitol in opposition to the same tax, which they called the sales tax because businesses typically passed their so-called occupational tax on to customers. “In each instance,” the ISFL observed, “their fire is directed at precisely the same target—the pending bills intended to raise relief funds through what one calls an extension of the ‘occupational tax on merchants’ and the other calls a ‘sales tax on customers.’” After an intelligent critique of each party’s proposed solution to the crisis, the press release continued:

---

…Both are making a political foot-ball out of the miseries and suffering of more than a million of men, women and children. Are they rank hypocrites, brazen mountebanks, or just plain ignoramuses?

Certain of the leaders of one side of this remarkable combination apparently hope that, if the people can be made desperate through hunger, a “revolution” may take place to destroy the other group, some leaders of which seemingly believe that they can “save money” by letting the people starve. What a mess!

Out upon them both! “Go to!” as Shakespeare said. State relief funds must be provided without further delay. Feed the hungry! Have mercy upon the suffering men, women and children for whom the relief agencies are the only source of bread. Pass the pending bills and let them have food.70

Inasmuch as the charge leveled at the IWA was largely justified, the ISFL does seem in this case to have adopted the most honorable and humane position.

In 1934 and most of 1935 the relations between the IWA and the ISFL were frigid. The latter was hostile, and the former apparently did little to try to improve relations. In the summer of 1934, for example, after hearing reports that Unemployed Councils and IWA members downstate were interfering with work relief and union activities, the Secretary-Treasurer of the ISFL, Victor Olander, asked union assemblies and federations around the state to send him information on the doings of the “Communist” IWA in their vicinity. (Most of the respondents had few complaints to make of the “radicals” in their area.) A year later, at the annual ISFL

---

convention, the report prepared by the Executive Board included—not for the first time—a stern reprimand of the IWA. By the fall of 1935 one of the leaders of the IWA, Frank W. McCulloch, was so concerned about relations with the ISFL that he arranged to meet Olander and clear up any misunderstandings. Evidently he succeeded, for by 1936 the State Federation was no longer hurling insults at the IWA but rather cooperating with it on issues of mutual interest. Indeed, in November 1936 IWA representatives were even able to appeal to organized labor for financial assistance, noting in their open letter that “the IWA is the recognized organization of unemployed, WPA, and part-time workers whose status does not permit them to join trade unions… In countless instances,” they continued, “we have helped trade unions on the picket line, in organizational drives, and have done much to break down resentment to working-class organization in communities where prior to our appearance such a thing was unknown.” So, at length, organized labor in Illinois and the organized unemployed were able to overcome their mutual suspicions and join together for common causes.71

One such cause—though not one supported by the ISFL—was the establishment in 1935 and ’36 of the Illinois Labor Party. Radical left-wing sentiment was sweeping the country like a conflagration in these years—one need only think of EPIC, Huey Long, Charles Coughlin (not yet a fascist), the CIO, and the Workers’ Bill that I’ll discuss in the next chapter—and the movement to establish labor parties was one manifestation of it. In 1935 the state federations of labor in Oregon, Utah, and Connecticut endorsed the principle of a labor party, and resolutions for such a party were submitted at the conventions that year of the Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Arkansas, New York, New Jersey, and South Dakota federations of labor. Far more actions to establish labor parties followed in 1936, and they met with far more success, despite the hostility

---

71 Frank McCulloch to Victor Olander, September 11, 1935, and other letters from 1934 and 1936, in Victor Olander Papers, UIC Special Collections, box 12, folder 157. It must be said, again, that the “suspiciousness” was usually on the side of organized labor, especially of its state-level and county-level bodies.
of the AFL’s leadership. The CFL and ISFL were similarly hostile, preventing the principle of a state labor party from being endorsed at conventions. As a result, it was left to unions that were affiliated with these bodies to independently form, first, the Labor Party of Chicago and Cook County in the summer of 1935, and then, with the assistance of the IWA and dozens of other unions around the state, the Illinois Labor Party in April 1936.72

The platform of the ILP could hardly have been more progressive: a thirty-hour week with no reduction in pay; a national minimum wage; abolition of child labor and free primary, secondary, and college education for all; adequate cash relief for those out of work, and a federal program of public works at union wages for all employable people; generous unemployment, sickness, and accident insurance, and munificent old-age pensions; no eviction from homes for inability to pay rent, taxes, or mortgages; permanent legislation against the sales tax; nationalization of banks, transportation, communication, public utilities, and other vital industries; and many more such planks, nearly all of which would have done the Communist Party proud. (Actually, within a year or two—certainly by 1938—the Communists had moved so far to the right that they tended to work within and for the Democratic Party. The rather odd result was that certain representatives of organized labor had, in some respects, become more radical than the Communists, whom they denounced for undermining labor—because of their conservatism!) After its formation the party maintained close relations with the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the Wisconsin Farmer-Labor Progressive Federation, both of which saw

72 Rank and File Federationist, October 1935; New York Herald Tribune, August 16, 1936; Chicago Tribune, November 26, 1936; Daily Worker, July 18, 24, September 19, November 13, 1935, March 31, April 1, 3, 6, 7, 1936.
huge victories in the 1936 elections. Unfortunately the ILP did not have such success, even in 1938, after it had had a few years to build support.73

One problem was that initially the party allowed only trade unions to affiliate with it, not unemployed groups, fraternal organizations, or political groups. This tended to restrict its mass influence. On the other hand, its close relations with unemployed organizations are shown by the fact that heading its slate of candidates in 1938 was Frank McCulloch (running for U.S. Senator), then chairman of the Illinois Workers Alliance of Cook County (affiliate of the statewide IWA) and formerly of the Workers Committee on Unemployment. A far greater problem than the ILP’s restriction of affiliation to unions was the profound hostility it faced from the state’s political establishment. The most graphic illustration of this hostility occurred in 1938, when the party was denied a place on the ballot for contrived technical reasons despite having gathered many thousands of signatures on its petition. In a realistic analysis, the ILP told its supporters on November 1, 1938 that “the Democratic Party Machine in the state…decided after an investigation that the Labor Party ticket was going to receive a surprisingly large vote. They therefore threw out our nominating petition on technical grounds while leaving the Prohibition party, which they knew was quite insignificant, still on the ballot although it did not even pretend to file half the legally required number of signatures.” This electoral failure did not signify the

end of the party, but it boded ill for the future—accurately. The ILP never achieved political success.74

Of all unemployed organizations, the one that secured the most goodwill and cooperation from organized labor was the Workers Alliance of America (WA), founded in March 1935. Attendance at the national convention that created it was drawn from sixteen states, although organizations in many other states that were unable to attend sent letters of endorsement. Trade unions, too, were interested in this attempt to unify all major unemployed and relief-workers’ groups in the country, and the convention received greetings from (among others) the ILGWU, the New York Joint Board of Cloakmakers, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, and William Green. Green sent a telegram that was widely used for publicity purposes:

I am of the opinion that cooperation should prevail among the unemployed organizations and the city central bodies and state federations of labor for the purposes of protecting and preserving wage standards, hours of labor and conditions of employment upon public workers and relief projects. I will urge the closest cooperation among the organized units referred to in this telegram so that the interests of both employed and unemployed may be protected and advanced.75

True national unity was achieved at the 1936 convention, when the Communist National Unemployment Council and the Musteite National Unemployed League joined the Alliance. By the end of 1936 the WA reportedly had—through its affiliates—1,600 locals in 43 states, with an

74 Childs, “Forging Unity in Illinois,” 777; Chicago Tribune, September 20, 1938; in McCulloch Papers, box 5, folder 11: letters from ILP to all members and supporters, September 26, November 1, 1938, November 10, 1939; letter from Frank McCulloch to Herbert Bebb, October 5, 1938.
75 William Green, quoted in Seymour, “The Organized Unemployed,” 38.
estimated 300,000 members. (Other estimates put the number at 600,000.) The federal government had recognized it as a collective bargaining agent for WPA workers. It was a force to be reckoned with—as is indicated by the willingness of organized labor to cooperate with it despite the presence of Communists on its Executive Board.76

Admittedly, the AFL was never a very enthusiastic partner. While Frank Morrison, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL, addressed the 1936 convention and read a letter from Green to presidents of the state federations of labor urging cooperation with the WAA, a more considered statement of the AFL’s attitude is contained in a letter Green sent to an academic researcher:

As the American Federation of Labor has never accepted the idea that men and women were permanently unemployed, it has never attempted to organize them into independent organizations of the unemployed or taken any position on this proposal.

The Federation has cooperated with the Workers Alliance for the purpose of maintaining wage rates on work relief projects. It has never taken any position on the Workers Alliance itself…77

In general, the AFL and its local and state federations did not actively pursue collaboration with the WA. But on specific demands or campaigns, such as the WAA demand in 1936 for a 20 percent increase in WPA wages, Green was willing to publicly express support.78

---

76 Lorence, Organizing the Unemployed, 97; Seymour, “The Organized Unemployed,” 37–48; Chicago Defender, April 18, 1936; Proceedings, Resolutions, and Program of the National Convention of the Unemployed Organizing the Workers Alliance of America, McCulloch Papers, box 6, folder 4; Selden Rodman, “Lasser and the Workers’ Alliance,” Nation, September 10, 1938; Anthony Badger, The New Deal, 202; Washington Post, September 5, 1936.
77 Seymour, “The Organized Unemployed,” 49.
78 Letter from David Lasser (chairman of the WA) to Frank McCulloch, August 14, 1936, in McCulloch Papers, box 6, folder 5.
The CIO’s attitude was quite different, far less passive. In response to the “Roosevelt recession” of 1937–38, CIO leaders began in November 1937 to formulate plans to ensure that union members had access to adequate relief benefits. As historian James Lorence describes, directives were issued “urging all CIO affiliates to establish unemployment committees and uniform machinery to guarantee that union members would be placed on WPA projects and receive all unemployment compensation and other benefits to which they were entitled.” The CIO undertook to represent unemployed unionists before welfare authorities and lobby Congress for generous relief legislation, and it insisted that jobless members should be able to remain in their union. In Michigan, for example, the United Autoworkers was especially aggressive in assisting its unemployed members: dozens of locals established committees to halt evictions, “the employed rally[ing] to defend the unemployed”; the Detroit Welfare Department allowed UAW welfare committees to certify clients as eligible for relief and WPA work, which saved applicants time even as it enhanced union prestige; the new UAW Welfare Department and the UAW City Welfare Council helped relief clients cope with the contempt and obstructionism they encountered at welfare offices; and in 1938, union officials successfully pressured Roosevelt to increase the number of WPA jobs in Michigan. With the cooperation of the Workers Alliance, the AFL, and WPA workers, the UAW was even able to mobilize over 100,000 demonstrators in Detroit’s Cadillac Square for more WPA jobs, adequate relief, and a moratorium on debt payments—an event that may have been “the greatest demonstration that was ever staged by one union.” The CIO as a whole directed its affiliates to organize their own unemployed members who had taken WPA jobs, in order to keep them within the fold of the union and to fight—in many cases successfully—for such demands as improved working conditions, formal grievance procedures on WPA projects, and government recognition of a steward system. With the
assistance of the Workers Alliance, unions’ “WPA auxiliaries” saw notable victories on projects all over the country, including the reform of racist hiring practices and the ending of intimidation of union workers.\(^79\)

The life of the WPA was turbulent: organized and unorganized workers conducted countless demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, and slow-downs to protest everything from inadequate Congressional appropriations to supervisors’ misconduct. Chicago did not have such a dominant union as the UAW, but it was nonetheless a full participant in these national trends. As early as January 1936, the Deputy Works Progress Administrator for Illinois found it necessary to publicly dissuade WPA workers from joining unions, arguing that payment of dues would be a waste of money because organizers could not win changes in working conditions. As elsewhere, it was not mainly AFL affiliates that were organizing relief workers; it was Communists, members of the Workers Alliance, and, eventually, affiliates of the CIO. By 1938, sit-down strikes and picketing were becoming virtually epidemic.\(^80\)

For instance, in February 1938 organizers with the WA facilitated a strike of 6,700 WPA workers at the Chicago airport, which resulted in the granting of their demand for a change in hours. A few weeks earlier, groups of IWA members had staged simultaneous sit-ins at relief stations around the city, forming picket lines after they were ejected. “Banners stating demands of nearly every nature,’’ a reporter wrote, “seemed to have been prepared in advance.” Reminiscent of the early years of the Depression, “pressure groups” filed into relief stations one by one to make mass demands on behalf of an individual. Both CIO union representatives and IWA members were typically found in these groups. Members of the CIO’s Steel Workers Organizing Committee who had a few months earlier been active in the South Chicago steel

\(^79\) Lorence, \textit{Organizing the Unemployed}, 161–189.
\(^80\) \textit{Chicago Tribune}, January 19, 1936.
mills were now, in early 1938, organizing men on both work relief and direct relief. One tactic was to hold mass meetings at which they urged support of the IWA, the WA (of which the IWA was an affiliate), and the CIO, and exhorted their listeners to picket relief stations in order to secure increases in payments for rent, light, gas, and food. The dismay that authorities and the Chicago Tribune expressed at the influence of these “outside agitators” testifies to their effectiveness.\(^{81}\)

With regard to the WPA, the main concerns of the AFL and the ISFL were that wage rates not undermine union wages, and that non-union workers not take jobs for which union members were eligible. At state conventions, the ISFL regularly stated that neither of these conditions was being met. Delegates at the 1938 convention resolved, for example, that “the expansion of WPA into organized construction fields results in a demoralized industry, making it incapable of reemploying men at full-time jobs.” Another resolution stated that “many of the WPA projects now under construction are taking employment from the common laborer as well as the skilled laborer, thereby reducing wage scales and lowering standards of working conditions.” Despite these concerns, however, AFL leaders did not countenance strikes on federal relief projects for higher pay. “The remedy lies with Congress,” William Green said in July 1939, “rather than through strikes on WPA projects.” This statement amounted to a disavowal of the strikes then occurring all over the country, which had been called not only by affiliates of the Workers Alliance and CIO unions but also by councils and unions affiliated with the AFL. Involving well over 75,000 relief workers, they were a reaction to Congress’s ruling that all WPA employees had to work 130 hours a month with no increase in pay, a ruling that

---

\(^{81}\) Ibid., February 28, 1938.
meant that skilled workers, who had previously worked sixty hours or less, would be paid less than half per hour what they had been. The strikers’ cause ended in failure.\(^{82}\)

So, in a sense, the decade ended much as it had begun, with the more militant and rank-and-file-supported aspect of the labor movement vigorously adopting the cause of the unemployed (including relief workers), while the higher officialdom of the AFL and its affiliates took a more distanced and decorous approach to the problem of mass unemployment. This battle between the conservative and the radical strains of organized labor has, of course, been waged throughout the whole history of industrial capitalism. Nevertheless, even labor’s conservative wing was apt to display, as we have seen, a more creditable attitude towards the hungry masses than state and local governments were, and even the federal government. Which is unsurprising. For governments tend to ally with one side of the class struggle, organized labor with the other. It was the misfortune of the unemployed that unions had incomparably fewer resources than business and its political allies.

**Churches**

The relation of Depression-era churches to the unemployed—i.e., the policies and practices they favored—is a massive subject that I can only touch on here. Of course there was no uniformity between individual churches, denominations, or regions of the country. Nevertheless, without oversimplification it can be said that a large portion of the “religious community” showed a striking degree of compassion and humanity in these years, far more than government regularly did and arguably more than most AFL-affiliated Internationals did. The

---

founder of Christianity would surely have approved of the poor-loving and rich-censuring attitude that many prominent religious organizations displayed.\textsuperscript{83}

Father John A. Ryan, head of the Social Action Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, was speaking for more than a negligible proportion of religious authorities when he thundered, in November 1930, “When I think of what has been happening since unemployment began, and when I think of the futility of the leaders, I wish we might double the number of Communists in this country, to put the fear, if not of God then the fear of something else, into the hearts of our leaders—not only our industrialists but our politicians and statesmen.”

In cities all over the country, churches and church associations were acting on the basis of such humanitarianism as this. It is known, of course, that churches were actively in the breadline-and-soup-kitchen business, but other examples can be given. Between November 1930 and early February 1931, with the assistance of the Chicago Church Federation, the 1,200 Protestant churches in Chicago raised $500,000 for emergency relief—$200,000 directly from their congregations—and found jobs for more than 5,000 people. Truckloads of food and clothing were collected and distributed. Indeed, already in the spring of 1930 the 800 Protestant churches affiliated with the Church Federation were (in many cases) appealing to their congregations for help in finding jobs for those out of work. Meanwhile, the well-developed Catholic and Jewish charities, in particular the Central Charity Bureau and the Jewish Social Service Bureau, were aiding many thousands of their constituents. It was not until late 1934 that the Protestant

\textsuperscript{83} On Jesus’s hostile attitude towards the rich, see, for example, Luke 6:24-25: “But woe unto you that are rich! for ye have received your consolation. Woe unto you that are full! for ye shall hunger. Woe unto you that laugh now! for ye shall mourn and weep.”
churches formed their own semi-comparable entity, the Associated Church Charities, in part to help with financing the tremendous burden being carried by the Protestant charitable agencies.\footnote{Federation News, November 1, 1930, 12; Chicago Tribune, April 29 and December 30, 1930, February 14, 1931, December 11, 1934, July 11, 1935.}

The ideological orientation of the Chicago Church Federation was consistent with that of the national association with which it was affiliated, the Federal Council of Churches in Christ: both were sharply left-wing. And neither was afraid to flaunt its social radicalism. The executive council of the Church Federation published a report in October 1930 that was scathing in its denunciation of the “interfraternity between gangdom, politics and [Chicago’s] law-enforcing agencies.” A reporter summarized it as follows: “The committee charges that the police and public officials are dominated by politicians, gangsters and racketeers, that grafting on public funds and an orgy of crime result at times in an approach to the breakdown of local civic authority and that the greed for easy money has developed an interlocking system of control which tends to throttle Chicago’s civil, business and social life.” This was clearly an activist organization, as interested in the temporal world as in the spiritual. The Federal Council of Churches, for its part, which represented 135,000 Protestant churches (from 26 denominations) with a membership of 22 million, was considered by many to be notoriously left-wing. In 1938 it was condemned at a hearing of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) for “attempting to spread social radicalism in the various Christian denominations of America.” The Reverend John H. McComb spoke for conservative religious groups when he insisted, “The Federal Council is in no sense representative of American Protestantism. It only represents those who use the church as a means to meddle in politics and dabble in sociology.” Its meddling and dabbling are illustrated by its adoption of a revised Social Creed in 1932, which called for “a wider and fairer distribution of wealth; social insurance against unemployment, sickness,
accident and old-age want; social control of the economic process; revision of penal methods and of criminal court procedure,” and liberalism with regard to birth control and divorce. HUAC had good reason to be hostile towards the Federal Council.85

But even on a less political level, a sort of “communism”—in David Graeber’s sense—was at the heart of Christian practice. For of course this was the meaning of the sympathy and generosity, the powerful (and potentially very subversive) impulse to share, that inspired so many thousands of church members in Chicago to donate money and goods to the unemployed and to volunteer their labor for relief services. It is impossible to know the numbers of either donors or beneficiaries—or volunteers—at any time during the Depression, but we can get some indication of the scale of religious generosity from isolated and anecdotal evidence. Late in 1932 it was estimated—conservatively—that if Protestant organizations suddenly put an end to their permanent relief agencies, at least 7,000 people would have to sleep on the streets that night and 20,000 would have nothing to eat. But many thousands more were being helped week by week and month by month. The Christian Industrial League alone housed 3,400 people a night and served 12,000 meals every day. A single church on Halsted Street—the Halsted Street Institutional Church—that also functioned as a permanent relief agency gave, with the help of its membership, various forms of relief to more than 8,000 families in its neighborhood. Between 1930 and 1939, the Episcopal Cathedral Shelter provided housing, food, clothing, medical care, and help finding jobs to well over two million people. In addition to such organizations were the hundreds of individual churches that helped their members (and whose members helped each other) in whatever ways they could. The executive secretary of the Church Federation remarked

that “unquestionably” the number of people assisted in this way far exceeded that assisted by the relief agencies.\textsuperscript{86}

The Catholic Central Charity Bureau was particularly effective at mobilizing volunteers. Under its direction, 4,000 men, members of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, distributed relief to thousands of Catholic families, visiting each family once a week. Many of these men were unemployed themselves. A report by the Church Federation on how best to organize its own Associated Church Charities highlighted some of the strengths of this system: “The distributors speak the language of those they serve; they usually live in the same neighborhood and attend the same Church. Their visitations are frequent. They become friends. Their relief is not alone material; it is friendly, human and spiritual.” In 1933, the Society of St. Vincent de Paul directly aided 321,000 people in Chicago.\textsuperscript{87}

Chicago’s Jews, for their part, had, like other ethnicities and religious groups, built a world of relative cooperation, communalism, and mutual aid in the heart of a society ostensibly based on capitalist principles of competition, self-gain, and the impersonal market. In fact, given the relative solidarity and ethnic consciousness that they have traditionally displayed, the Jewish people are an especially powerful illustration of the truth that “communism,” far more than capitalism, pervades social relations and human interactions. By 1930, the Jewish Charities of Chicago encompassed 26 organizations and had 9,500 subscribers who donated $1.5 million a year. This money helped support the following institutions (among others): two homes for the elderly, two hospitals, two large orphanages, a home-finding society for children, two

\textsuperscript{86} Chicago Tribune, November 6, 13, 1932, October 16, 1939.
dispensaries that treated 20,000 annually, a tuberculosis sanitarium, a family welfare agency, and a number of Jewish schools. It also funded a social-service bureau that provided legal aid, help for “wayward” boys and girls, industrial workshops for the disabled, and assistance for the sick, the poor, the unemployed, and transients. In addition, there were “numberless” charitable institutions not associated with Jewish Charities. And there were the synagogues. What the Chicago Tribune had said in 1908 was still largely true a generation later: “with the Jew, his synagogue is the doorway to the satisfaction of his physical needs. Here he gives an account of himself, and establishing his need he is given money in hand to meet these necessities.” It was recognized at the time that the (relatively few) Jewish unemployed of Chicago tended to be better taken care of than those of most other ethnicities.88

And yet even the least wealthy churches, such as those in the Black Belt, still found ways to feed the jobless. The Immanuel Baptist Church, just north of Bronzeville, almost had to close in 1932 because of the debts it had incurred in its 38 years of feeding the unemployed. The Reverend Johnston Myers had established one of Chicago’s earliest breadlines in 1895; by 1932, the church had warmed and fed perhaps 15 million people. In the winter of 1932, 3,000 supplicants came every day. “If we go down,” Myers said, “it will be with colors flying. Our last penny will go to the needy.” The previous year, appalled at the thought that “[even a] single person [should] go hungry in this land of plenty, where fields are running over with things to eat,” he organized a program to transport food from farms in Michigan, where crops were rotting in the fields, to Chicago. Contractors donated fifteen trucks, farmers charged little or nothing for the food, volunteers picked and loaded the fruit and vegetables onto the trucks, and buildings were donated as food stations. Over several months, thousands of bushels of apples, wheat, and

rye, and scores of truckloads of peaches, vegetables, and potatoes, were distributed to the needy. Myers was struck by the abundant generosity that magically appeared, as it were, as news of the operation spread. A journalist who interviewed him one day noted that the telephone kept him busy. “A thousand bushels of apples are on their way from Benton Harbor and the city council there has voted to co-operate with us,” Myers said after one call. “An offer of 300 carloads of potatoes and vegetables,” he said a few minutes later, after another call. And again: “I’ve just had a contribution of $500 promised by one man.” Thus did the initiative of one person provide an outlet for the generosity of many.  

The institutional tangle of churches and charitable institutions, even in the Black Belt alone (not to mention the entire city), can scarcely be unraveled. With the Great Migration had come an overwhelming need to provide assistance to tens of thousands of black migrants; the charitable networks that emerged were of use, and were expanded, in the Depression. Huge churches like Olivet Baptist and the Institutional African Methodist Episcopal (AME) had established social service departments long before the 1930s to assist and enrich the lives of migrants, while smaller churches built alliances with secular organizations like the Travelers Aid Society, the Chicago Urban League, and the United Charities. Such alliances helped in the formation, for instance, of the Good Shepherd Community Center in 1936, which was established on the initiative of the Good Shepherd Congregational Church. By 1929, Olivet Baptist, St. Mark’s AME, Provident Baptist, Metropolitan Community Church, and others employed full-time social workers, and were providing such services as paying for school expenses, caring for widows, giving temporary emergency relief to families, distributing baskets of food to the poor, conducting nursery schools, and “constantly” giving handouts, carfare, 

89 *Washington Post*, May 1, 1932; *China Press*, November 25, 1931; *Chicago Tribune*, August 22, 30, 1931.
lunch, etc. to those who applied for it. Most of this work was financed by taking extra collections from the congregation after the regular church collection every Sunday.⁹⁰

Overall, Protestant institutions were responsible for the large majority of the social agency work done by religious groups in Chicago—four fifths of it, according to a survey conducted in 1936 by the Federal Council of Churches. The survey found that “of the fifty or more social settlements and neighborhood houses in Chicago, forty are connected with Protestant communions… There are thirteen [Protestant] children’s agencies, ten homes for the aged, eight hospitals, fourteen general institutions…twenty-two neighborhood houses, one day nursery, five relief and benevolent agencies, including the Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America, and a few miscellaneous agencies.”⁹¹

As already stated, comparable social consciousness was evidenced at higher levels of Protestant bodies. In fact, the 1930s saw a spectacular revival and radicalization of the Social Gospel, which had declined in the previous decade. In 1932, for example, delegates to the General Conference of the Methodist Church approved a resolution that a journalist described as a “wholesale condemnation of the present social order, and the acquisitive principle on which it is based.” That same year, delegates to the Northern Baptist Convention affirmed, among other radical declarations, “that all wealth and all labor power are intended by the Creator for the highest good of all people; that from the cradle to the grave all members of the community are bound to do their best for the common good, and reciprocally are entitled to the best that the


community is able to provide for its members in common;\footnote{92} that the normal standard of living for any is that which is practicable for all;… and that no person can establish a rightful claim upon or within the community for more than a normal living.” The Methodist Federation of Social Action was far to the left of the New Deal, as was the Federal Council of Churches as a whole, which was even allied with the Workers Alliance. On a local level, the Chicago Church Federation established in 1936 a Department of Social Service, with four divisions: Public Institutions, Race Relations, Civic Relations, and Church and Industry. Such examples of a rejuvenated Social Gospel could be multiplied many times over.\footnote{93}

An especially interesting event was the creation, in June 1934, of the Council for Social Action (CSA) by the General Council of Congregational and Christian Churches. The CSA was to be not merely a minor body in the church’s structure that would undertake some social advocacy; rather, it was to be a “major society in the denominational structure,” to which the entire church should in a sense be subordinated. According to church leaders, its establishment signified a virtual revolution—“the most radical in the history of Protestantism”—viz., the beginning of a turn in Protestantism from “pioneer work in geographical expansion to pioneer work in social reconstruction.” The Christian Century hailed the creation of the CSA as Christianity’s greatest step forward since the establishment of the missionary enterprise. The new social outlook was symbolized by the General Council’s passage of a remarkable resolution—which was subsequently very controversial—that demanded the overthrow of the present

\footnote{92} Cf. Marx’s “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.”
economic system with its principles of private ownership, which “[depend] upon exploitation of one group by another, create industrial and civic strife, precipitate periods of unemployment, and perpetuate insecurity and all its attendant miseries.” The resolution continued:

We set ourselves to work toward the abolition of the system responsible for all these destructive elements in our common life by eliminating the system’s habits, the legal forms which sustain it, the moral ideals which justify it. We set ourselves to work toward the inauguration of a genuinely cooperative social economy, democratically planned to adjust production to consumption requirements, to modify or eliminate private ownership of the means of production or distribution wherever such ownership interferes with the social good.94

Among other goals, the CSA (headquartered in Chicago and New York) intended to cooperate with the Federal Council of Churches to create a program that would be not only ambitious, staking out left-wing positions with regard to international relations, industrial relations, race relations, and rural conditions, but also “genuinely interdenominational.”95

The national infrastructure the CSA set up included regional committees, state committees, local church committees that would “take the lead in organizing the local church for social education and action,” and numerous commissions that were assigned specific tasks. It founded an important bi-monthly journal, Social Action. The outreach that the CSA undertook to the younger generation involved making contributions to curricula for various classes and clubs,

94 Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1934. See also “Chicago Conference on the International and Economic Crisis,” May 14, 1934, in McCulloch Papers, box 8, folder 3.
printing pamphlets and leaflets on particular issues such as “Why Men Strike” or “What Makes Communists?,” setting up and supporting institutes, conferences, and seminars, and developing a mailing list of young and adult leaders in local churches. Because church leaders encountered “abysmal apprehension and misunderstanding” regarding the CSA among rank-and-file Congregationalists, who tended to be more conservative than the Council, it was deemed necessary to “spend considerable time indoctrinating church members,” especially by means of seminars in local churches. How successful these indoctrination efforts were is unclear, although an “economic plebiscite” of the 1,200,000 church members conducted in 1938 showed that most had liberal views on work relief, labor unions, public ownership of electric utilities, organization of consumer cooperatives, and further social control of the economy. Unfortunately the significance of these findings is limited, since only a tiny fraction of members took part in the plebiscite.96

The Catholic Church, likewise, was not a mere pawn in the hands of the capitalist status quo. Nor had it ever been such. In Chicago, in the U.S., and internationally, the Church had long had an ambivalent relationship with industrial capitalism, as evidenced by Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum*, which both upheld the rights of private property and inveighed against the social evils of laissez-faire capitalism. Indeed, even if many church leaders had not been offended by the “injustice and oppression and inhuman greed” of big business—to quote Chicago’s Catholic newspaper the *New World* in 1904—they would likely have remained skeptical of economic liberalism just because it functioned, they thought, as a solvent of social bonds. Nothing could have been more contrary to the medievalism of the Church, with its

conception of society as an organic and harmonious unity, than liberal capitalism. “Justice is allied to cooperation, not competition,” declared William J. Dillon, editor of the *New World*, echoing Leo’s encyclical. Thus, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the American Church tended to take a progressive stand on industrial issues, supporting—as did *Rerum Novarum*—government protection of labor unions, the worker’s right to a living wage, and regulation of child labor. It is true that the Church’s vehement hostility to socialism significantly tempered its progressivism—most of its leaders, for instance, supported the relatively conservative AFL—and the majority of parish priests certainly could not be called left-wing, despite their working-class constituency. On the whole, the Church had a very conservative influence on its mass base. Nevertheless, the social turmoil of the Progressive Era impelled many priests, lay societies, and the Church hierarchy towards ever more leftist positions, culminating in the important Bishops’ Program of 1919. This program of social reconstruction, largely the work of the activist Father John A. Ryan but endorsed by the hierarchy through its arm the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), advocated measures that a horrified business community saw as nearly Bolshevik: public housing, control of monopolies, governmental guarantee of workers’ right to organize, national minimum-wage legislation and a minimum working age, progressive taxation, and insurance against old age, sickness, and unemployment. Had the 1920s not intervened, the stage would have been set for the social agenda of the 1930s.97

---

As it happened, an even more important document set the stage for American Catholicism’s definitive move leftward, namely Pope Pius XI’s *Quadragesimo Anno*, published in 1931. Received with enthusiasm by American Catholics, this encyclical was truly progressive: it called for redistribution of property, worker participation in management and ownership, a family wage for all workers, state planning of the economy for the sake of “social justice,” and, in general, a complete “reform of morals” through a return to the (very anti-capitalist) teachings of the Gospel. The appearance of this document greatly enhanced the prestige of John Ryan and his ideas, which were now seen even by many parish priests to have been endorsed by the Pope himself. Catholic spokesmen like Father Charles Coughlin and the more respectable Archbishop John T. McNicholas of Cincinnati were already denouncing “the monstrous abuses of capitalism” (to quote Father Paul Blakely in 1931), and soon they were joined by a nationwide chorus of lay and clerical voices. “The real authors of violent and bloody revolutions in our times,” declared the administrative committee of the NCWC, “are not the radicals and communists, but the callous and autocratic possessors of wealth and power who use their positions and their riches to oppress their fellows.” “The trouble with us [Catholics] in the past,” said Archbishop Mundelein of Chicago, “has been that we were too often drawn into an alliance with the wrong side… Our place is beside the poor, beside the working man.” Catholic journals like *Commonweal, Catholic Charities Review, Catholic Mind, America, Catholic World,* and *Catholic Action* published articles severely critical of capitalism and, after the election of FDR, supportive of the New Deal. Later in the decade some even expressed attitudes strikingly sympathetic to communism: e.g., a *Commonweal* writer observed that “the Christian doctrine of love is the essence of the perfect state of communism,” and a priest wrote that he was “quite as much opposed to the abuses of capitalism as any Communist.”

---

The Social Action Department of the NCWC greatly expanded its activities in the 1930s. Its many publications addressed the Pope’s labor encyclicals and the relation of Catholic social thought to the plight of the worker, in particular the scourge of unemployment. It published supportive statements on strikes, and it issued joint statements with Protestant and Jewish bodies supporting the NRA, organized labor, the Wagner Act, progressive taxation, a shorter work week, and cooperative economic planning. It also organized conferences on reconstructing capitalism (with titles such as “A Christian Social Order” and “A Christian Democracy”) that bishops and priests attended, and established schools to train labor priests to agitate among workers. Its guiding spirit John Ryan was nearly ubiquitous in liberal circles: he was vice-president of the National Unemployment League, vice-president of the American Association for Labor Legislation, vice-president of the American Association for Social Security, held several government labor advisory positions, and, like many Catholic leaders, actively supported the CIO. In Chicago, Monseigneur Hildebrand conducted labor seminars at St. Mary’s Seminary for priests from industrial districts, frequently inviting labor leaders to give lectures. “The ideology of the Hildebrand school,” historian Barbara Warne Newell notes, “placed upon the parish priest, as one of his responsibilities, the encouragement of trade-unionism on the ground that only in this way could the standard of living and the human dignity of man be raised.” Chicago’s Bishop Sheil provided crucial support to this ideology, notably by harnessing the energies of the Catholic Youth Organization to the crusade being waged by the CIO.99

Lay Catholics, too, leapt into labor activism, for instance by forming the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists in February 1937, which by 1940 had eight chapters around the country, including in Chicago. Among other activities, the ACTU helped organize scores of labor schools in ten cities (in alliance with archdioceses, the Catholic League for Social Justice, the National Conference of Catholic Charities, and the NCWC), conducted mass rallies in working-class parishes, and published a newspaper that vigorously defended the CIO even while consistently attacking communism. However, the Catholic Worker movement, founded in 1933 by Dorothy Day and the French intellectual Peter Maurin, was far more radical and influential, forming communities across the country that engaged in activism on all issues of the left. Indeed, this movement continues up to the present, so deeply has it resonated among liberal Catholics.100

But religion, of course, is a complex social phenomenon, and local clergy and laypeople were not always as radical as the more visible intellectuals or activists. George Patterson, a Chicago steelworker and organizer with the United Steelworkers in 1937, recalled that the clergy in South Chicago—unlike in the stockyards area—tended to be unsympathetic toward his activism. In part, their reaction was simply good sense: financially, many churches were reliant on the steel mills, so it was unlikely that clergymen would assist organizers or advocate for the union in their sermons. “See the coal down there in the basement?” a priest at St. Michael’s said to him once. “[T]he charcoal comes from this mill. See that lumber that’s lying outside the window? We’re going to build a playroom for the kids. We got that from the steel mills. You don’t expect us to bite the hand that feeds us, do you?” It is important to remember, therefore, that even when priests would not publicly embrace left-wing causes, this did not necessarily

---

indicate intellectual subservience to business rule. Priests’ working-class constituents, for their part, were usually even less subservient, sometimes going so far as to join organizations like the Young Communist League or the Communist Party itself. In fact, it seems that Protestants were more prone to fierce anti-communism than Catholics—which is perhaps unsurprising, given the typical class composition of the congregations. Patterson had for years been very active in the South Shore Presbyterian Church, but as he embraced the labor movement he noticed his former friends shunning him and felt pressure to resign his positions in church groups. When he brought up the union, the response was usually “Reds!”

In general, despite the examples we have given of an acute social conscience among the religious, it can hardly be said that most churches, even in Chicago, were as radical or as alive to the sufferings of the poor as the situation called for. Such was the conclusion of a thorough study in 1932, which quoted the opinion of a leader in emergency relief in “a large city” that “Not a clergymen in this city has spoken out loud enough to make himself heard against the malnutrition of children.” The author of this study observed that “the plain fact is that the well-to-do generally do not want to hear how the unemployed are faring; the subject is unpleasant, and the recital would disturb the peace of a church service.” Accordingly, most clergymen tended to avoid the subject in their sermons, and doubtless did not exert as much energy as they could have on fundraising for unemployment relief. Nevertheless, in part through the efforts of such Protestant organizations as the Federal Council of Churches and the Congregationalist Council for Social Action—or such Catholic organizations as the Social Action Department of

101 From anecdotal evidence, we may infer that it was not rare for working-class Catholics to join Communist clubs, at least when they knew of their existence or when friends had given them Communist publications like the Daily Worker. See Sigmund G. Eisenscher, “Some Experiences in Work Among Catholics,” Party Organizer, vol. 11, no. 5 (May 1938): 14–17.
the NCWC or the many lay and ecclesiastical journals to which hundreds of thousands subscribed—even well-to-do church members were not allowed to entirely forget the desolation of long-term unemployment. Every year before Labor Day the Federal Council distributed its Labor Sunday message to 110,000 pastors, with requests that they read it in church. The 1935 message ended with a prayer that concluded, “From ever forgetting the forlorn figure of the unemployed; from failure to see that our social fabric is as shabby as his coat, and that our heads must bow in equal shame with his, good Lord, deliver us. That our consciences may know no rest until unemployment is abolished, we beseech Thee to hear us, good Lord.”

It must be said, too, that insofar as churches did not always do as much for the unemployed as one might have wished, this was partly because the Depression had savaged their finances. The pastor of the Mount Meriah Baptist Church, on the South Side, reported in 1934 that the church’s current income was 30 percent of what it had been in 1929, and attendance had been cut in half. A nearby church had managed to maintain its attendance but had still lost 60 percent of its income since 1929. As historians have argued, such financial troubles meant that social outreach and relief programs suffered: Boy Scout and Campfire Girl programs were cut, social workers had to be laid off, churches could not stay open as many days of the week as previously, etc. To some extent volunteers were able to take over for paid workers and give assistance to the neediest members of the congregation, but overwhelmingly the indigent masses had to turn to government for help.

104 “Effect of the depression…as reported in interviews with the Rev. W. L. Petty, and the Rev. Mary Evans,” in Burgess Papers, box 134, folder 1; “Effect of the depression on religion…as reported in an interview with the Reverend J. B. Redmond,” ibid.
Thus, while in many respects churches were embracing the poor in these years, the poor were not universally embracing churches. This did not necessarily indicate a loss of religious faith, however; in fact, one study found that most families that no longer attended church professed not to have changed their attitude towards religion. Another study, of families on relief in New York, similarly concluded that the large majority of believers did not “revolt.” On the other hand, among all three major religious groups—Catholics, Protestants, and Jews—there was in general a “loosening of religious bonds.” “Prior to their unemployment,” the researchers found, “75 percent of the families had been orthodox; 15 percent, moderate; and the remainder had no religious bonds. Only one was antagonistic. At the time when these families were interviewed, only 40 percent were orthodox; 33 percent, moderate; and 17 percent were without ties. Ten percent were antagonistic.”105

One reason for the increase of antagonism may have been anger at church practices. Many Catholics in Chicago thought the relief they received from the Central Charity Bureau (of the Catholic Charities) was highly inadequate—when it was given at all. One young couple, for instance, was refused relief on the ridiculous grounds that they lived with the man’s mother. A person of some influence in the Polish community insisted, “the worst offenders in the line of skimmed budgets are Catholic Charities.” There was also widespread resentment that the Church still expected people to pay parochial school tuition, and that some churches still charged fees for performing ritual acts like baptisms, confirmations, and burials. Among Italians on the North Side there was a “definite feeling that the church is always after money, money and more money,” an observer stated. “Children, ordinarily too young to make such observations, say when passing the Cardinal’s house, ‘See what a swell place we pay to keep up.’” Poles on the

South Side had similar reactions. One teenage boy colorfully expressed a common attitude: “These fuckers over here at St. Michael’s, all they think about is money. You should see it when the money wagon comes around! They have to wheel it out in wheelbarrows! Anytime you want anything, all they think of is, ‘Do they get a fin for it?’ They’d never give a guy a break!”106

Such rebelliousness against authority and disgust with the ignominy of the profit motive characterized also the African-American community on the South Side. The charge of churchly “racketeering” was nearly ubiquitous in Bronzeville, especially among non-members. The proprietor of a gambling establishment, for example, remarked, “The church is getting to be too big a racket for me. I’d rather support my own racket.” A janitor confided to an interviewer, “You know churches are nothing but a racket.” An optometrist commented, “I was baptized in a Baptist church but I don’t go regularly… It’s just racketeering on people’s emotions anyway.” A WPA worker said he didn’t attend church because “they don’t help anybody, and all they want is money to keep the big shots going.” A skilled laborer lashed out at preachers: “Blood-suckers! They’ll take the food out of your mouth and make you think they are doing you a favor.” Church members grumbled as well. “The preachers want to line their pockets with gold,” one said. Another insisted, “Ministers are not as conscientious as they used to be. They are money-mad nowadays. All they want is the almighty dollar and that is all they talk about.” “I thinks there’s only one heaven where we all will go,” a woman said, “but the biggest thieves are running the churches, so what can they do about saving us? Nothing!” We’ll see in the next chapter just how pervasive was this denial of the legitimacy of dominant institutions.107

Incidentally, such hostility towards the church may not have been entirely justified. Black churches were often deeply in debt from obligations they had incurred before the Depression, and they had to emphasize fundraising just to keep their doors open. Ministerial salaries averaged less than $2,000 a year—although it is true they were higher than what most of the laity earned. One study concluded that on average, 43 percent of the money black churches raised went to salaries, 21 percent to “benevolence,” 23 percent to interest and reduction of debt, and the rest to church upkeep and overhead.\footnote{Drake and Cayton, \textit{Black Metropolis}, 420, 421.}

Even white workers in “conservative” Midwestern towns like Muncie, Indiana sometimes questioned church authority on left-wing grounds. “I don’t go to church,” a working man told Robert Lynd in 1935, “because the church ought to have something to meet the needs of laboring men, and the laborers feel that the administration of churches is in the hands of wealth.” Likely a fairly representative sentiment, this statement already shows a kind of class consciousness—in the heartland of America. On the other hand, an unemployed factory worker from the same town (Muncie) remarked that he and his friends had started going to church because they had no money to go anywhere else, “and we got interested in the teachings and activities and stuck.” It may be that they enjoyed the sermons even in mainstream churches that deprecated lust for dollars, criticized the “practical man” who lived only for the market, and praised kindness, love, and mutual aid.\footnote{Robert and Helen Lynd, \textit{Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts} (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1937), 302. For two representative sermons, see ibid., 299, 300.}

As was mentioned above, insofar as churches’ social service work declined during the Depression, membership tended to shrink. But even when the working-class unemployed continued to attend church, it was not rare for their faith to have been shaken by all the troubles they had seen. The secretary of a Yugoslav Women’s Club, for instance, told an interviewer in
1936 that Yugoslavs’ religious feeling had weakened. “Slovene people,” she said, “are observing religious customs and go to church, of course, but deep in their hearts they are losing faith. They usually say, ‘Prayer does not help us any more in this country.’” They attended church less frequently than before, and mainly only for its social aspect. Men in particular—not only Yugoslavian men but apparently from all nationalities—were most likely to have grown skeptical. “After five years of fruitless prayer,” commented a social worker who had had experience with many different nationalities, “[the men] remain to brood in the home, while the women still attend mass.” In general, according to an expert on unemployment (writing in 1940), religious activity among “the great masses of workers”—especially men—was “more a matter of retaining a nominal contact with a possible source of well-being than a matter of sharing intimately and constantly in the ministrations of the church or the comfort and convictions of religion.” To another, it was clear that organized religion was “much weaker” in 1940 than a generation earlier, particularly among Jews and Protestants.\footnote{“Mrs. Kushar—landlady—Jugoslavian,” Burgess Papers, box 131, folder 3; no title, no name, Burgess Papers, box 131, folder 4; E. Wight Bakke, 

\emph{Citizens Without Work} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 45; Ginzberg, \emph{The Unemployed}, 164.}

Nevertheless, as an outlet for sociality and a “haven in a heartless world,” the church remained an integral part of civic life. A person was not treated there as though he were a mere cog in a machine or an instrument for amassing profit, or an alien; and to the degree that he thought he \textit{was} treated that way, he rebelled against it and condemned church authorities as base and dishonorable. (This entails, incidentally, that he implicitly considered the motive of pecuniary gain to be a base thing—which is a revealing illustration of intellectual resistance to dominant social norms.) In church, he was supposed to be not a means to an end but an end in himself, someone with a personal relationship to God and therefore possessing dignity, as contrasted with his condition in society. In fact, one might interpret the entirety of religion itself
as manifesting a belief in the illegitimacy of the dominant social order, and as being the most potent, durable, and collective form of resistance to injustice ever created. This is approximately how the young Karl Marx saw it in his Introduction to the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*: “Religio[n] is, at one and the same time, the *expression* of real suffering and a *protest* against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions.” (Italics in the original.) Even in its purely social aspect, as providing a satisfying form of communal participation, one can detect in religion an element of resistance and even “communism.”

Consider the hold that religion continued to exert in these years on African-Americans on the South Side of Chicago. While some of the larger, old-line churches saw a drop in attendance, many of the smaller and more “lower-class” churches saw a dramatic increase. The big churches, a housewife said, “don’t want you if you haven’t any money… I mean that I am recognized in a little church, whereas I wouldn’t be in a big church. I’m able to take my place even when I don’t have any money, in a little church.” By the 1940s, almost 75 percent of the Black Belt’s churches were these storefront or house churches, which had an average membership of fewer than 35 people (as contrasted with the five largest churches that had a membership of more than 10,000 and sat 2,000 people). There was one on almost every block. They were often Baptist, but a large number were Holiness or Spiritualist churches, which, as Liz Cohen says, “offered worshippers an intense, emotional experience and took little responsibility for anything but their souls.” The revivalist Cosmopolitan Community Church, for example, saw a 40 percent increase in attendance between 1929 and 1934, apparently because with the arrival of the Reverend Mary Evans it came to be organized in a more intimate and “intense” way. The Holiness church was so

---

111 Herbert Gutman was among the first labor historians to analyze the role of religion as a framework to resist economic oppression. See his article “Protestantism and the American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the Gilded Age,” *American Historical Review*, vol. 72, no. 1 (Oct. 1966): 74–101.
named because of its perfectionist doctrine, the doctrine of sanctification. From a writer’s description one may well understand the appeal of this church to people whose lot in life was hard:

[Sanctification] is a concept that makes the guilty guiltless, shields them from that side of life…which has become distasteful and repellent. Converts become free from sin, holy, sanctified, and above the world of things. Nothing can touch or harm them. They find complete comfort and perfection of self in union with the person of the Holy Spirit. They find new expression of power. They have refuge from all that they think of as sinful, and from the overpowering forces of immediate social requirements.\textsuperscript{112}

At one of these churches in a federal slum clearance area, a domestic worker gave emotional testimony: “I thank God for being here this morning. I thank God I am saved and sanctified… You and I look up and see God working. You can see how He works and how He guides you. I was scrubbing the floor last night and I was so tired I couldn’t get through. God pulled me through…”\textsuperscript{113}

From waterless tenements and closet-sized kitchenettes, from relief-station lines and packed park benches, tens of thousands of people (two-thirds of them women) came to these churches every week, usually multiple times a week. Some churches had services every day.

\textsuperscript{112} Quoted in Vattel Elbert Daniel, “Ritual in Chicago’s South Side Churches for Negroes” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1940), 118.
These were not the restrained services that the upper-middle class attended, the Congregationalist, Presbyterian, Methodist, or Baptist services at the larger churches; they were the ecstatic, Dionysian services that the disinherited craved, simultaneously protest and joyous self-justification. In most churches of this type the sermons were strikingly democratic: they were simply expositions of scripture read by members of the congregation, a verse at a time, interspersed with elaborations by the minister. In other cases the ministers, or “elders”—who were not infrequently illiterate—expounded, through song, speech, and “speaking in tongues,” interpretations of Biblical passages and stories. But in these sermons, too, it was not merely an individual addressing an audience of passive listeners; rather, they were collective sermons, so to speak, the people participating by giving loud, spontaneous assent in antiphonal fashion. “Amen!” “Preach it!” “Hallelujah!” “Bless God forever!” “Yes, Jesus!” Or they would emphatically repeat the preacher’s dramatic cadences. The collective enthusiasm (pithily referred to as “getting happy”) built to the point that the congregation went well beyond the antiphonal tradition of the Greek chorus: in its frenzy it acted out, so to speak, the emotional content of the sermon. According to one researcher, the yelling could grow so vociferous that it sounded like a baseball game. People stood up and raised their hands while praying or speaking in tongues, jumped up and down like a jumping-jack, rhythmically clapped and stomped their feet, ran and danced and fainted. In the Holiness sect there were even healing rituals and saint-making rituals. (After being “converted” one could become a “saint,” i.e., be sanctified.) One may be inclined to smile at the “superstitious” and wildly popular practice of healing—which was integral to the Spiritualist sect as well—but from innumerable testimonies it is clear that astonishing results were often obtained.114

114 Daniel, “Ritual in Chicago’s South Side Churches,” 25, 40, 41, 80–83; Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 619; Dolinar, The Negro in Illinois, 211. For examples of the remarkable cures of physical ailments that healers were able
Music was at least as essential an element of these lower-class services as of those catering to the upper-middle class. But it was a different type of music: gospel, as opposed to the more sober hymns and processions of the Lutherans and other such sects. Even the smaller churches had a gospel chorus. The piano was substituted for the organ, and percussive instruments such as the tambourine, triangle, and drums were introduced. Gospel is a jubilant genre: the songs of these churches more frequently emphasized comfort, joy, and ecstasy than those of the more sedate mainline churches. The most popular gospel hymn of the 1930s, written by a local Baptist choir-leader, went as follows:

Precious Lord, take my hand,
Lead me on, let me stand;
I am tired, I am weak, I am worn;
Through the night, through the storm,
Take my hand, lead me on,
Precious Lord, take my hand, lead me on.115

Perhaps as significant as the music’s themes of comfort and joy was its swinging and staccato style, and even “the spontaneity with which the music [was] introduced into the service, seemingly anywhere and by anybody.” James Baldwin, who grew up under the profound influence of the Holiness church (for his father was a storefront preacher), recalled that it was to bring about, see, e.g., the reports in Burgess Papers, box 89, folder 10. “Quacks” (as false healers were called) of course abounded, but it does seem that some people had legitimate powers of healing. The many thousands of church members (some of them educated and middle-class) who were convinced were not merely credulous and irrational, as even contemporary liberal-minded scholars might think; there was real evidence to back up their faith. To what extent “healing” was due to powerful placebo effects cannot be known, but one hopes that science will someday investigate and clarify these phenomena.

115 Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 622.
“very exciting… There is no music like that music, no drama like that of the saints rejoicing, the sinners moaning, the tambourines racing, and all those voices coming together and crying holy unto the Lord.”

The writer Zora Neale Hurston captured the meaning of all these elements of a Sanctified Church service—the sermons, the prayers, the singing, the dancing—when she said simply, “The supplication is forgotten in the frenzy of creation.” It all amounted to collective creation, in fact to drama with music, as Hurston said. “And since music without motion is unnatural among Negroes,” she continued, “there is always something that approaches dancing—in fact IS dancing—in such a ceremony… It must be noted that the sermon in these churches is not the set thing that [it] is in the other protestant churches. It is loose and formless [though “a true work of art”] and is in reality merely a framework upon which to hang more songs. Every opportunity to introduce a new rhythm is eagerly seized upon. The whole movement of the Sanctified Church is a rebirth of song-making! It has brought in a new era of spiritual-making.”

The dominant society of Chicago’s black middle and upper classes tended to have either benign or malign contempt for the religious style of the lower class. Some of the reactions that interviewers recorded are amusing, but also indirectly revelatory of the (reciprocal) contempt that many of the underprivileged evidently had for mainstream mores. A young high-school graduate said, “I’ve stood outside these store-fronts a lot of times and listened to the people sing and dance… I say to myself, ‘Why should I pay to see a show when these people are putting one on for free?’” “I am certainly very much against store-fronts,” remarked a Presbyterian minister. “They are demoralizing to our race. The field is overwhelmed with them… They encourage ‘jumping-jack’ religion. I think those people are in the first stages of insanity.” Many of the

larger, middle-class churches, especially the Baptist or Methodist ones, had “mixed” congregations, with both lower- and middle-income members. The latter were likely to look askance at the behavior of the former, as illustrated by a young woman’s comments:

The only thing I dislike about the church is the shouting of its members… The men as well as the women have outbursts. They run up and down the aisles shaking and yelling, overcome as it were with emotion. I get happy to the point of wanting to cry and sometimes do, but I have known the sisters and brothers to become so happy that persons around them are in actual danger of getting knocked in the face. They might even get their glasses broken sometimes if the “nurses” didn’t watch out for them.118

Even more scorned were the rituals and beliefs of Spiritualist churches, which, as stated in chapter three, proliferated in certain sections of the Black Belt.119 (There were also a large number of “spiritual advisers” not affiliated with a church.) Patronized even more disproportionately by women than Holiness churches were, they combined religion with fortune-telling and such “heathenish” practices as distributing “lucky” flowers to any member who gave some small amount of money. Aside from the emotional satisfaction that the churches provided, their popularity was due largely to the practical value of being given good luck charms (to help in a job search, for example), lucky policy numbers, messages from fortune-tellers, and messages from departed loved ones. Equally importantly, the Spiritualist sect, unlike other denominations,

118 As the writers who quote this woman remark, “some of the churches have a white-uniformed nursing corps to take care of the shouters” (e.g., to assist them if they faint). Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 671, 672.
119 Some white immigrants and Americans were also attracted to Spiritualism and Pentecostalism: such churches were scattered all over Chicago in the 1930s. See reports in Burgess Papers, boxes 89 and 90.
had no unkind words for card-playing, policy, or dancing. In addition, like the Holiness sect, it was appreciated for its progressive gender norms: ambitious women could rise to the top, could become elders, ministers, healers, mediums, choir members, or heads of missionary societies. As historian Wallace Best states, the many women who had high positions in low-income churches “exerted great influence among the city’s poor, challenging the male-dominated moral authority and cultural dominance of mainline Protestant black churches.” In fact, it was largely women who built and maintained lower-class churches, which were therefore, in effect, a vital terrain of struggle against the dominant society’s patriarchal order.\(^\text{120}\)

In a social context as pathological as the one we have described in earlier chapters, it is hardly surprising that so many thousands of people would seek solace, or rather would express their will to resist, by turning to an institution whose very raison d’être appeared to be love and community: community with God, community with people, and harmony with oneself (by raising oneself up to commune with God and others). The note in a printed program of a Community church expressed the transcendent spirit: “Whosoever thou art that enters this church, enter it with the spirit of reverence and leave it not without prayer for thyself, for her who ministers, and for those who worship.” It scarcely needs belaboring that the lower-class black Chicago church, transplanted as it were from the fields of the South, aspired to be a church of love and unity, and racial unity. The following prayer spoken at a Baptist church exemplifies the racial consciousness that infused this religion:

God, help us all to see the mission field. Help us all to see what Thou hast shown us. Help us to put clothes on the people of Africa. They walk over silver and gold and do not know its worth. They have around them valuable giant trees and do not know how to cut them down. Help us to save our brothers in black. Amen.¹²¹

On a more intimate level, the congregation was its own community. By participating in a storefront church in particular, one was rebelling against the atomization of urban life, especially as the vast majority of storefront congregants had recently migrated from the South. Many longed for churches that were “more like the churches in the South,” where some congregations were so intimate that if, for example, a woman did not show up to Sunday School they would send someone to her home to see what was the matter. Storefront churches, however, were to some extent able to resurrect this “close and intimate folk culture of the South,” as Richard Wright said. Even some larger churches made moves in this direction, as in the case of Mary Evans’ Cosmopolitan church. Evans cultivated close ties with her flock, e.g., by sending each member a birthday card on his or her birthday; they, in turn, “minded her just like we were children,” one recalled. She even referred to them as her children, encouraging them to see her as a maternal figure.¹²²

In a sense, the “community” aspect of storefront churches was enhanced by their concern not only with the spiritual lives of members but also with the material lives of both members and non-members. The overall otherworldly emphasis did not preclude interest in this-worldly struggle. A number of churches raised money to assist needy families, and sermons not infrequently highlighted issues of clean housing, employment, and education. One pastor of a

¹²² Best, Passionately Human, No Less Divine, 65, 158; Richard Wright, 12 Million Black Voices (reprint, New York: Thunder’s Mouth, 1988), 134.
“mixed-type” church, for instance, ended a sermon on work with the prayer, “O Father, we are talking about work this morning. We are praying that the people will work [i.e., will find jobs] as they never have worked before. Give all the needed encouragement and help us to do well. This we ask in Thy Son’s name. Amen.” The sermon of a Baptist preacher included the message, “Enforced idleness is breaking men down on the inside. Sometimes it is better not to let people do things for you, because it breaks you down personally. You ought not to sit down and whine. Go to work!” The “mother” of a low-income church prayed, “Gracious Father…we come, nothing but filthy rags, this morning. But it is you, the Shepherd, who can help us… We want to pay our bills, my Father. It disturbs us, our Father, when we owe, because you said, ‘Owe no man.’” Symptomatic of trends in the 1930s was the sign in front of a black church in Chicago that a journalist observed: underneath the question “What Must We Do To Be Saved?” was given the answer, “Beset with Rent Hogs, Overcrowded in Hovels, Come to the Housing Meeting, Thursday Noon.”

The quintessential example of storefront generosity was that of Elder Lucy Smith, an “elderly, corpulent, dark-skinned and maternal” Georgian who had begun her ministry (without a formal education) in a Bronzeville storefront in 1930 but within a few years was so popular that she moved her All Nations Pentecostal Church into a much larger building on a fashionable boulevard. She was practically legendary among the lower class of Bronzeville (although generally despised by the middle and upper class, for her “ignorant” and “backward” ways). Indeed, so popular was she that in the 1940s she had to build an even larger church, telling an

---

123 Best, Passionately Human, 60, 61; Daniel, “Ritual in Chicago’s South Side Churches,” 39, 43, 80; James R. McGovern, And a Time for Hope: Americans in the Great Depression (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 240.
124 When she died in 1952, more than a hundred thousand people, including some of Chicago’s most prominent black citizens, attended her funeral. It was the largest funeral in black Chicago’s history. Just as the Black Belt’s religious practices were revolutionized by the Great Migration, so its middle and upper classes were eventually compelled to pay at least public homage to the figures who epitomized lower-class religion.
interviewer, “You wouldn’t believe that these folks with barely enough to live on are the very people who helped build my new large church.” The predominant passion that inspired her, it seems, was to provide aid and comfort to impoverished blacks and whites—“my people.” “The singing in my church has ‘swing’ to it,” she remarked, “because I want my people to swing out of themselves all the mis’ry and troubles that is heavy on their hearts.” To concretely ameliorate the misery and troubles of the poor, every Thursday her church distributed food and clothing that had been donated either by congregants or by members of her huge radio audience—for in 1933 she began to broadcast live worship that was carried around the country (the first black Chicago preacher to do so). Her program The Glorious Church of the Air had such influence that she was able to develop fruitful relationships with nearby black businesses, which heeded her calls for contributions of food and clothing. Poor whites, too, who appreciated her services far more than higher-status blacks did, came to her church and received help, not only material but emotional.125

Apart from all these manifestations of fellow-feeling (as one might call it) that tended to suffuse congregations and animate many churchly activities, the human instinct for sociability found further expression in church clubs, as well as opportunities to be elected to some office in the church and to compete for prestige. Such offices might include deacons, trustees, assistant ministers, missionaries, the Sunday School superintendent, announcement clerk, recording secretary, and music director. Church clubs were especially common in larger churches (which frequently had many low-income members): while men were rarely very involved in them, women embraced them as being the most satisfying aspect of their social lives. Craft groups, for instance, such as sewing circles, were popular, as were clubs organized along home state lines

that were meant to appeal to migrants. There were even “culture” clubs devoted to art, black history, and the discussion of social problems.\footnote{Drake and Cayton, \textit{Black Metropolis}, 424; Daniel, “Ritual in Chicago’s South Side Churches,” 108, 141; Sidney Harrison Moore, “Family and Social Networks in an Urban Black Storefront Church” (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1975), 236–252; Drake, \textit{Churches and Voluntary Associations}, 189.}

Altogether, as suggested earlier in the chapter, a fruitful way to interpret lower-class religion may be as, in part, a kind of sublimated class struggle, a spiritualized form of resistance to a political economy that is structured for the benefit of the rich. Whatever the functions or appeal of religious institutions may be for the materially prosperous, it is far from implausible to view the religiosity of the poor in class terms. When Chicago’s migrant African-Americans rejected large churches because of their formality and impersonality, cherishing instead the friendliness and intimacy of store fronts, they were struggling in the most realistic way they could against the isolating and alienating structures of a modern urban capitalist economy. When, having spent the previous day floor-scrubbing in some white domicile or tramping around the city in search of an odd job, they participated in the ecstatic faith and rituals of Pentecostalism with its swinging gospel music, they were repudiating and rebelling against a political economy that worshiped the rich and consigned the poor to the netherworld. The joy that a storefront congregation expressed upon the sanctification of one of its members was an un-self-conscious solidarity of the poor with the poor, against the backdrop of a society that was thought to be money-mad, cruel, and sinful. Nor ought we to forget that lower-class black churches were continually engaged, by one means or another, in the material struggles of their congregations.

The passionate concern that so many Christians evinced in being \textit{good people}, whether “saints” or merely good Christians who tried to minimize their sinning, can be interpreted in these terms of opposition to capitalist culture. Indeed, it is less fruitful to see it as only another manifestation of individualistic interest in one’s own well-being (“salvation”) or as
indoctrination by a relatively dominant institution (the Church) than as a collectively inspired and sustained rejection of what Marxists of the day called bourgeois culture. When an African-American woman, member of a storefront church, said, “I read the Bible a lot… You see, that’s what it’s all about. You see I can’t teach you not to drink if I sit up in those taverns myself,” we must remember that she was sustained by a vital community set against mainstream society’s vices of pride, greed, envy, intoxication, and lust. Hers was a resolutely, if not self-consciously, anti-capitalist communitarian ethos, a creed of neighbor helping neighbor and self forgetting self. While this fact may in some sense be a truism, we easily forget both its radical implications and the socially radical nature of impassioned adherence to such an ideology. To repeat, in some respects it amounts to a diverted and diluted class struggle, a struggle to raise the moral level of the self and the world such that Christian love becomes the rule, selfishness has no dominion, the poor are not forgotten or despised, the rich are not beloved for being rich, and people do not treat each other only as means to the ends of amusement or sexual pleasure or financial gain. This radical religious paradigm was the ideal that a large minority of Chicago’s black population—“contradictory” though its “consciousness” necessarily was—tried to uphold in practice.127

Needless to say, African-Americans were not the only disenfranchised residents of Chicago who embraced religion in their (class-conditioned) desire for comfort, community, and education. For example, a large proportion of Mexican migrants belonged to Catholic churches, although some—primarily middle-class—were receptive to Protestant proselytizing, including Pentecostalism. Most lower-class Mexicans thought of the Protestant church as “little more than a club at which interesting or uninteresting questions are discussed. The use of the beautiful in color, form, action, sound and odor as an aid to religious worship” remained, according to one researcher—whose impressions reflected stereotypical but not false ideas—integral to the

127 Daniel, “Ritual in Chicago’s South Side Churches,” 105.
religious practices of most Mexicans in Chicago. In general, another writer reported, “nearly every [Mexican] religious group [had] English classes, settlement activities, entertainments, kindergartens or some other class of work.” A single church in South Chicago, known as Tempo de Guadalupe, had 8,000 Mexican members (including children) in 1935 and conducted services four times a day every day of the week. Adults regularly attended the classes it offered in language, music, sewing, handicrafts, arithmetic, physics, and sociology, and every day well over a hundred children attended the school it ran. The nearby Bird Memorial Congregational Church ran the South Chicago Community Center (which led the Catholic Church to ban its members from using the institution’s gymnasium and activity rooms). In fact, the only part of Chicago’s Mexican colony that was not well-supplied with places of worship was the Stockyards district.128

For the long-term unemployed (or their wives) who continued to attend church, certain aspects of religious doctrine could be a source of comfort. Catholics in particular benefited from their view of God as being merciful and loving: as the sociologist E. Wight Bakke said, the Catholic ““suffering-here–reward-hereafter’ formula [was] very nicely suited to producing a more comfortable acceptance of one’s lot.” The more one suffered, the greater would one’s heavenly reward be. (Here we see evidence for the Marxian view of religion as, in part, consolation for the poor. If one cannot wage victorious class struggle in the present, one projects one’s victory into the afterlife.) Protestants, on the other hand, or at least the relatively few who were of a “religious turn of mind,” were more likely to think that present difficulties were

---

punishment for past sins. But this idea only ended up causing resentment in the many cases where they thought they did not deserve such punishment. On the whole, however, among all the religious, God was not usually blamed for the depression: it was thought that he had little to do with the large forces of social and economic affairs. Many people, especially women, prayed fervently for a change in circumstances, but a French Canadian expressed the most common view when he said, “The jobs are in the hands of men, and God doesn’t have anything to do with it.”

Bakke also reported that both Catholic priests and Protestant ministers found the secular side of their service increasing during these years. People came to them for advice that earlier they might have gotten from doctors or lawyers; and religious authorities were expected to know something about the great social and economic issues of the time. Priests especially had to know something about unemployment and the problems it caused, since unemployment affected their congregations more severely than it did Protestant congregations. In short, the social spaces of religion became in some respects more materialistic and this-worldly.

Despite the continued vitality of religion in the Depression, however, we must repeat that the urgency of class issues in this time did tend to undermine the authority and hegemony of a semi-“otherworldly” institution. The authors of Black Metropolis, written in the early 1940s, considered Chicago’s Black Belt to epitomize trends that were operative everywhere:

…But the acids of modernity are at work in Bronzeville as they are everywhere.

Skepticism about the truth of the saga of salvation is general. Mistrust of the motives of the professional religionists is widespread. Often hungry and beset by

---

130 Ibid., 27–29.
family troubles, discriminated against by white people and more affluent Negroes, Bronzeville’s lower class, during the Depression years, entertained serious doubts of either the necessity or the efficacy of religion. They demanded results in the “here and now” rather than in “the sweet by-and-by.”

In Bronzeville as in the U.S. generally, the majority of the long-term unemployed did not see much hope for “salvation” in religion. Only through individual initiative or secular collective action could they wrest from a society-for-the-rich what was rightly theirs.

---

Chapter VI

Collective Action

Historical scholarship since the 1960s has established that during the Great Depression the long-term unemployed were capable of remarkable militancy, on a broad and sustained scale. Roy Rosenzweig, an expert on the subject, says—in what is likely a considerable understatement—that “easily two million jobless workers engaged in some form of activism at some time in the thirties.”\(^1\) Mark Naison’s 1983 study *Communists in Harlem during the Depression* shows that the Communist Party was a major force in Harlem the entire decade, in fact in New York City as a whole. James Lorence’s *Organizing the Unemployed* (1996) makes it equally clear that across the state of Michigan, from Keewenaw County to Detroit, the jobless actively protested the indignities and hardships that were imposed on them. Late in the decade the Workers Alliance was still a “dynamic force” in many counties, and by the spring of 1938 over 80 percent of Michigan’s WPA workers were members of the UAW. The same was true in some other industrial states: majorities of relief workers organized into unions, in a trend that evidently reflected sentiment among a larger pool of the unemployed than merely WPA workers. If they thought they had a chance of success, people were eager to fight for their demands. Demonstration after demonstration in cities across the country—and Chicago in the first five years of the Depression had well over 2,000 such—saw upwards of ten or twenty thousand

\(^1\) Given the high turnover of participation in Communist and other radical unemployed organizations, and the many hundreds of thousands of people who attended large or small relief demonstrations at least once or twice, the overall number may well be triple or quadruple Rosenzweig’s estimated minimum.
people, or even fifty thousand, clamor for action by political authorities, risking police brutality in order to force leaders of business and politics to remember the forgotten man.²

At the same time, however, social historians since the 1960s (and even more so before) have often been at pains to deny that in these years the masses had much interest in radical ideologies. An image is painted of Americans that sometimes comes perilously close to the old Consensus school of thought, by seeming to attribute to them a sort of cultural inertia, political passivity, a stubborn clinging to individualism and the American political system, and a lack of “class consciousness.” Melvyn Dubofsky’s paper “Not So ‘Turbulent Years’: A New Look at the 1930s,” quoted in the Introduction, is a classic statement of this perspective. In explaining why (so he argues) “durable working-class radicalism” did not emerge in the Great Depression, Dubofsky invokes the supposed “inability of most workers and their leaders to conceive of an alternative to the values of marketplace capitalism, that is to create a working-class culture autonomous from that of the ruling class.” Workers did not become “a class fully aware of their role, power, and ability to replace the existing system with ‘a better, firmer, more just social order [than] the one to be torn down.’” Of the long-term unemployed, Anthony Badger’s perspective is not unusual: “the unemployed seem to have been neither rebellious nor the deferential victims of bourgeois hegemony… [E]mployment gave workers many of the values they cherished: status vis-à-vis their fellows, economic security, and a reputation as a good provider. The goal of the unemployed was [nothing more rebellious than] to restore those

values.” Badger even goes so far as to say, “there was no constituency waiting at the grass-roots for more radical action than Roosevelt offered.”

Such interpretations are dramatically oversimplified, if not wholly false. Their premise that “radicalism” or “rebelliousness” is measured by the character of one’s ideological consciousness, specifically by the degree to which one identifies with Socialism/Communism or has the sort of revolutionary class consciousness of which a Marxist would approve, is flawed. It is an expression of the intellectual’s characteristic focus on “consciousness” rather than “social being,” to use Marx’s terms, particularly of the left-wing intellectual’s valorization of his own theoretical understanding of systemic oppression and (perhaps utopian) belief in the possibility of a very different social order. If the masses do not subscribe to the intellectual’s or militant’s ideology, or to his valorization of rebellious collective action at all costs, they are thought to be rather conservative or confused or perhaps the victims of bourgeois hegemony, as Dubofsky implies in his article. More sensible, though, would be to follow the precept of Marx to concentrate on social being, the social context in which people live and which structures their resistance to authority. From this perspective, one can see that “ordinary people” are frequently rebellious in the ways that are most rational given their situations. As James C. Scott says,

To require of lower-class resistance that it somehow be “principled” or “selfless” [i.e., “idealistic,” ideologically driven] is not only utopian and a slander on the moral status of fundamental material needs; it is, more fundamentally, a misconstruction of the basis of class struggle, which is, first and foremost, a

---

struggle over the appropriation of work, production, property, and taxes. “Bread-and-butter” issues are the essence of lower-class politics and resistance.⁴

It is a confusion to contrast (as does Badger) rebelliousness or radicalism with the commitment of the unemployed—and everyone—to such “conventional,” “conservative” values as status and economic security. These are precisely the values that constitute the basis of class struggle, which, as we have seen throughout this study, is waged even by that “atomized” group of people the long-term unemployed.

It can certainly be useful for the sake of achieving greater economic and political power to have a lucid class consciousness, indeed to have a basic Marxian understanding of the world, so that one is not misled by elite propaganda. On the other hand, it is unclear what we ought to conclude from the fact that millions of workers in the U.S. during the Depression were not as class-conscious as a Marxist might have liked. Does this mean they were not opposed to rule by big business, to the fiscal austerity preached by conservatives, or to violent suppression of labor unions? Surely not. Does it mean they did not have social-democratic values or did not desire a society in which the rapacity of capitalism was tamed and ordinary workers had determining input into the political and economic process? No (as we’ll see). The alleged half-heartedness of workers’ commitment to left-wing politics—insofar as this allegation has any truth—can be seen as implying, instead, nothing more significant than the obvious truth that organizations of the Left had been, and continued to be, effectively trampled down by the forces of capital, such that many Americans were subjected to barrages of business and nationalist propaganda virtually

unopposed by countervailing institutions. Similarly, when in large swathes of the country the Left’s organizational resources were very limited, it is no surprise that workers and the unemployed did not always consider it worthwhile to join a union or to get actively involved in politics (possibly with negative consequences for their job and their family). It made more sense to struggle on one’s own, with the help of one’s relatives, friends, and neighbors.

So, while the question of which ideology masses of people are swayed by can be of great moment, it is quite possible for scholars to focus too much on this issue and not enough on the concrete structural, economic conditions that set the context for workers’ political behavior. From the former perspective many people might seem deceived and somewhat passive, mere victims of mainstream indoctrination (since they are thought not to be radical enough), while from the latter their behavior and beliefs—in context—might seem reasonable or even rebellious. And their lack of interest in “ideology” might be the most sensible response possible—because what does ideology matter when one is fighting for survival, or when the Left has been so beaten down that one sees only futility in Socialist or Communist politics? We will see shortly that for many workers it was the perceived futility of left-wing politics, not its fundamental wrongness, that prevented them from embracing it.

In his Utopia of Rules (2015), David Graeber goes so far as to suggest (implicitly, at least) that the common historiographic question of whether the unemployed in the Depression tended to blame themselves for their hardships—a tendency that is supposed to equate to a lack of class consciousness or radicalism—is largely misguided. He constructs a scenario to illustrate this:

---

5 The Lynds’ classic study of Middletown in the mid-1930s describes such a context. And yet even in this Midwestern town, as they show, leftist dissent was not absent, despite the near-total absence of institutions to encourage or sustain it. Thus, Dubofsky’s reading of their work (see the Introduction) can be turned on its head: it can seem impressive how much political and economic dissent there was, given the social context.
Imagine, if you will, some warlike tribe (let’s call them the Alphas) that sweeps out of the desert and seizes a swath of land inhabited by peaceful farmers (let’s call them the Omegas). But instead of exacting tribute, they appropriate all the fertile land, and arrange for their children to have privileged access to most forms of practical education, at the same time initiating a religious ideology that holds that they are intrinsically superior beings, finer and more beautiful and more intelligent, and that the Omegas, now largely reduced to working on their estates, have been cursed by the divine powers for some terrible sin, and have become stupid, ugly, and base. And perhaps the Omegas internalize their disgrace and come to act as if they believe they really are guilty of something. In a sense perhaps they do believe it. But on a deeper level it doesn’t make a lot of sense to ask whether they do or not. The whole arrangement is the fruit of violence and can only be maintained by the continual threat of violence: the fact that the Omegas are quite aware that if anyone directly challenged property arrangements, or access to education, swords would be drawn and people’s heads would almost certainly end up being lopped off. In a case like this, what we talk about in terms of “belief” are simply the psychological techniques people develop to accommodate themselves to this reality. We have no idea how they would act, or what they would think, if the Alphas’ command of the means of violence were to somehow disappear.6

This scenario recalls one of the points made in the Introduction: far more significant than culture or “discourses” in explaining “conformist” mass behavior—acquiescence, apparent submission to power—is violence and the threat of violence, and more generally various physical sanctions on “improper” behavior (such as starvation or homelessness if one refuses to submit to the hierarchies of the workplace). We may investigate whether the long-term unemployed ashamedly blamed themselves, but we should remember that this question and others like it, such as whether people identified with a particular class and were aware of common interests with others, are not as meaningful or momentous as they might appear. For in the absence of an institutional context that allows workers to effectively act on the basis of class solidarity—a context that, after the “fall of the house of labor” in the 1920s, was lacking in most, or all, of the country\footnote{Organized labor was stronger in some parts of the country than others, but the absence of a major labor or leftist party foreclosed certain possibilities of militant class action. It can hardly be doubted that a large proportion, probably a significant majority, of workers would have liked there to be such a party, or would have supported it had it existed. We’ll see evidence for this (albeit indirect evidence) later.}—it is not of much practical interest whether people have a sophisticated understanding of class oppression. It becomes mainly a private affair. If some do, fine; if others don’t, that is in no small part precisely because of the repression of an organized Left that could propagate such ideas.

The main purpose of this chapter, in short, as of the whole dissertation, is to challenge the still-culturally-dominant myth of “ordinary people’s” ideological conservatism/centrism/apathy—or, insofar as historical scholarship no longer subscribes to this myth as much as it once did, to argue that people were (and are) in fact quite radical, though sometimes only in implicit (ideologically un-self-conscious) ways. I will start out by considering general questions that have received much treatment in the literature, such as the question of whether large proportions of the unemployed blamed themselves rather than “the system” for their joblessness. (I will continue to argue against the significance of this question, but it has received so much
attention from historians that I cannot ignore it.) More interesting is the subject of people’s political and social views, which I briefly investigate—as a prelude to the more in-depth chapter-long discussion—through polls and Depression-era sociological studies. While, for reasons mentioned in the Introduction and below, polls are a flawed source of knowledge, they can at least be suggestive.

I also consider the question of why working-class Americans tended to identify themselves as hostile to Communism, and argue that ideological disagreement was secondary to other causes. This is certainly not the received wisdom or the most obvious interpretation: it would seem, and has generally been assumed by historians, that if people rejected Communism (and even Socialism, in the form, e.g., of the Socialist Party) it was mainly because they rejected the views of Communists and Socialists. This interpretation, however, is challenged by statements like the following, from a writer who interviewed members of the famous Bonus Army in 1932:

A paradox of the Bonus Army is the virulence of their curses at both the bankers and the Communists. They treat the latter roughly whenever they can lay their hands on them. They have to be content with using words to lambast the former. These veterans denounce Hoover, insist it is the right of every citizen to have a job and that the government should take over the industries of the country to make that possible and then, in the next breath, they swear vengeance on “the reds who come in here trying to stir up trouble with their Marxism, Leninism and Bolshevism.”

---

8 Gardner Jackson, “Unknown Soldiers,” Survey Graphic, August 1, 1932, 343.
From this observation one should already suspect that popular opposition to Communism and Socialism (to the extent that there was such opposition) was a rather superficial thing. Apparently even these hard-bitten, patriotic veterans embraced some of the most radical ideas of the far-left, including, at least implicitly, absolute denial of the sanctity of private property. It was essentially the foreign-sounding names ‘Marxism,’ ‘Leninism,’ and ‘Bolshevism’ to which working-class white Americans objected, and the taint of foreignness that clung to certain leftist political parties. When ideas similar to some of the prescriptions, and even the analyses, of Communists and Socialists were put forward by Huey Long, Charles Coughlin (at least early on, when his anti-semitism was subdued), Upton Sinclair’s EPIC movement, the La Follette brothers, and Farmer-Labor parties in the Midwest, millions of Americans became enthusiastic adherents. In fact, from 1930 to 1936 a mass movement even coalesced around a Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill that Communists had written, and that was much more radical than comparable provisions in the Soviet Union. Later I’ll discuss this movement in some depth, because historians have largely ignored it. ⁹

An implicit theme of the chapter, then—which I’ll make more explicit in the dissertation’s Conclusion—is that historians have tended to draw unwarranted conclusions about Americans’ political values and beliefs from the fact that most have in name rejected Marxism and derivative “foreign” concepts. Names, and even the analytical niceties of an intellectual system like Marxism, are relatively superficial. On a deeper level, the majority of Americans shared the values of Communists, notably collective resistance to the power of the rich for the sake of making society more democratic, egalitarian, and indeed “socialistic” in the sense of radical government interference with the market economy to protect human rights and well-

⁹ For instance, in a book called Voices of Protest (published in 1983), Alan Brinkley does not devote a single sentence to it. Nor does Robert McElvaine in his standard history of the Depression. David Kennedy devotes half a sentence to it in volume one of his 2004 history of the Depression and World War II.
being. Already in 1930 and ’31, millions of people were demanding massive social-democratic statism.

Most of the chapter consists of an analysis of the two major unemployed organizations in Chicago, the Unemployed Councils and the Chicago Workers Committee on Unemployment. The former has received more attention from scholars, but the latter—including its offshoot the Illinois Workers Alliance—was arguably just as successful and important. My focus is not on the structure or the leadership of the two groups, since other historians have treated of these subjects. Randi Storch, Harvey Klehr, Roy Rosenzweig, Daniel Leab, and others have described the elaborate organizational structure of the Councils, and Rosenzweig has discussed the same topic in relation to the Workers Committee. Instead, I am interested in the participation of “ordinary people” in these groups, the attitudes and actions of the rank and file. While not everyone endorsed the ideology of Communism, even self-declared anti-Communists were the exact opposite of individualistic and anti-statist.

In the long concluding section on “popular radicalism,” I consider several phenomena that more generally illustrate just how “radical” people were in their attitudes towards relief, politics, and the economy. The Workers’ Bill is the primary case-study I use, but I also touch on the Long and Coughlin movements, arguing against Alan Brinkley that they were in fact profoundly opposed to dominant institutions and ideologies. Even aside from such articulate dissidence, however, millions of relief clients had by 1933 and ’34 (if not earlier) embraced the Communist teaching that anyone who could not find a stable and well-paying job was entitled to a comfortable existence at the government’s expense. This is to say that people desired a fundamentally different social order, a hybrid socialistic capitalism such as would be achieved on a less ambitious scale in certain Western European countries in the postwar era. The Social
Security Act, largely a response to the revolutionary mood of the masses, was but a shadow of this ideal social vision, although in combination with the Works Progress Administration it did somewhat restore the disaffected multitudes’ wavering faith in Roosevelt.

In the second chapter we briefly discussed the shame that many people felt after being without a job for long stretches of time. It would seem that implicit in shame is self-blame, even if consciously the ashamed person recognizes that his misfortune is due at least in part to other factors besides his own ability or worth. The fact that shame was rather common is no surprise, not only because of the natural psychological impact of being without a job but also because of the atomized social fabric of the U.S., including the weakness of organized labor and the absence of a political party comparable to the Labor party in Britain. On the other hand, even in Britain and Europe, the jobless were very susceptible to the same shame, “passivity,” and “apathy” that were thought to characterize Americans. In Britain, Poland, Austria, and elsewhere, writers concluded that the unemployed were “scattered, loose, perplexed and hopeless...a mass only numerically, not socially,” to quote two Polish sociologists. We should be wary, therefore, of drawing the usual contrasts between “individualistic” attitudes/behavior in the U.S. and “collectivist” or “radical” attitudes/behavior in Europe.10

But how common were shame and self-blame in the U.S.? Until at least the 1980s, it was widely assumed among historians that—to quote a textbook published in 1973—“the average worker in the 1930s blamed his economic hardships on himself and not on the capitalist system.” (The next sentence makes the implication explicit: “Socialism and Communism failed, therefore,

---

to develop a mass base during the Great Depression.”) More recent scholars have avoided such categorical statements, but general histories still emphasize (understandably) the shame of unemployment. What are interesting, however, are the many cases of non-self-blame. One study published in 1936 had surprising findings: its survey of 2,882 residents of Minneapolis found less feeling of inferiority among the unemployed than among employed workers. Those in the former group blamed the economic system, not themselves, for their plight. A study in 1932 of lodgers at the Shelter for Transient Men in Palo Alto, California found that almost exactly the same proportion (38 percent) blamed the economy for their condition as admitted that they personally bore some responsibility (42 percent). In 1934, interviews with 100 relief families in St. Louis revealed the following attitudes: 44 men said unequivocally that they deserved help; 14 asked for more work to cover the deficits in their budgets; ten took relief as a matter of course, saying that since others received help they too expected it; seven were very demanding; and the remainder were either timid or unclear in their attitudes. Still another researcher found in interviews with more than 500 relief cases in Seattle (in 1935) that 49 percent voiced disapproval of or resistance towards “the system,” 12 percent accepted what they could get without thanks or protest, and 39 percent appeared to accept or in some cases approve of the system. Other studies similarly indicated that large proportions of Depression victims did not blame themselves.

Some did, of course. Yet, again, few historians appear to have asked what exactly this means. For one thing, people do not have static or one-dimensional self-conceptions: it is perfectly possible, and doubtless very common, to blame both oneself and broader social forces, and to change one’s opinions on this matter over time. Even day to day, one might have a

---

different opinion about who or what is to blame, or one might feel less and more shame depending on circumstances and mood. (For such reasons, every poll or survey on any topic ought to be viewed with some skepticism.) Richard Wright wrote of the burning shame he felt when he thought of going into one of Chicago’s relief stations, as if he were making a public confession of his hunger, yet he was certainly aware that his unemployment was not straightforwardly his own fault. In fact, the sociologist E. Wight Bakke observed that even when men found some reason to blame themselves, their perceived personal shortcomings were “robbed of their sting” by the knowledge that others who had presumably not made mistakes had lost their jobs as well. Impersonal forces were therefore blamed as much as or more than personal faults.  

Secondly, self-blame did not necessarily indicate deep adherence to “individualism,” as is often assumed, or thoroughgoing indoctrination with the values of bourgeois culture, for the simple reason that in many cases there was rational justification for the belief. To my knowledge, no scholar has made this point; all have interpreted “self-blame” not as a rational reaction but as a culturally manufactured one. And yet there is no doubt that in many cases the man was partly right: he had acted irresponsibly in his youth, he had failed to get a good education, he had squandered his earnings on drink and women, he had had too many children or had inadvisably married before settling into a lucrative career. After all, while it is true that he was far from alone in being out of work, a lot of people still had jobs. Evidently, or so it seemed, many of them had made smarter choices, had taken more secure jobs. It was perfectly natural and rational to have regrets, in itself not at all a reflection of ideology.

---

In extreme manifestations, to be sure, shame and self-blame could, like the emotional depression or lassitude that was often a result of long-term unemployment, interfere with the aggressive defense of one’s interests, whether in joint action with others or on one’s own. This is clear from the descriptions of emotional fatigue in the second chapter, and it was an important factor militating against participation by the unemployed in large-scale popular movements. The historian John Garraty has argued for this point:

The effects of prolonged joblessness, and particularly its psychological effects, go far toward explaining why unemployment did not generate more political protest, let alone revolutionary activity, among its victims. [He means victims in both the U.S. and Europe.] Many practical considerations combined to keep the unemployed from revolting, some of these being the international character of the Depression, which made it difficult to believe that any one government was responsible for it; the lack of intellectually convincing suggestions as to how unemployment could be significantly reduced; the fact that the unemployed were everywhere a minority; fear of repression (which the majority seldom hesitated to apply when the jobless did make trouble); even gratitude for the aid which every society [i.e., every country] did provide for those without work. But the numbing effect of prolonged idleness, partly no doubt a result of diets low in proteins and also partly psychological, was also involved.14

On the other hand, even this debilitating malaise could not prevent, for example, the famous Bonus March in 1932, in which 20,000 or more veterans descended upon Washington, D.C. to

14 Garraty, “Unemployment during the Great Depression,” 151, 152.
demand early payment of the World War I “bonus” they were due in 1945. These men were certainly no revolutionaries: as Mauritz Hallgren observed, they were all in or beyond middle age and had been “thoroughly whipped” by their economic circumstances. “There is about the lot of them an atmosphere of hopelessness, of utter despair,” he said, “though not of desperation.” Hoover considered it necessary to send in the military to destroy their camp at Anacostia Flats, but to Hallgren these men were “weary, footsore, and bedraggled”: “there is in these bonus-seekers no revolt, no fire, not even smoldering resentment; at most they are but an inchoate aggregation of frustrated men nursing a common grievance.” Nevertheless, even without direction by any central organizing body, these harassed and discouraged people had been able to come together from all over the country in pursuit of a common goal. On smaller scales, this phenomenon was constantly occurring in the Depression decade, in cities and towns from California to Maine.15

With respect to ideological beliefs and values, the data from polls and studies conducted at the time are mixed. They do not indicate extreme “class consciousness” among workers and the jobless, but they do not indicate much “individualism” or conservatism either. In their article “Unemployment, Class Consciousness, and Radical Politics: What Didn’t Happen in the Thirties” (1977), Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman present the results of two national polls that were conducted in 1939 for Fortune Magazine. Each survey had 5,214 respondents, over two hundred of whom listed their occupation as “unemployed”—not nearly the same proportion as the unemployed in the general population, but sufficient to allow us to

meaningfully distinguish between their attitudes and those of the employed. The following table includes some of the more interesting findings.\(^\text{16}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent saying:</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Upper white-collar</th>
<th>Lower white-collar</th>
<th>Wage workers (not salaried)</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government should see that everyone is above subsistence</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government should guarantee job opportunities</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The gov. should redistribute wealth through high taxes on the rich</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The gov. should confiscate wealth beyond what people need</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be gov. relief even if it means the end of capitalism</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be relief even if it means government assignment of jobs</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data are even more interesting in light of the fact that, for methodological reasons, Verba and Schlozman chose to exclude African-American respondents. Had they been included, the percentages in the last two columns surely would have increased. Thus—according to these surveys—near the end of the 1930s probably a third or more of the jobless thought the government should confiscate wealth, perhaps almost two fifths were willing to countenance the end of capitalism, and nearly all thought the government should, in effect, guarantee people a living wage. These are strikingly “socialistic” attitudes.

They accord with the findings of a poll of New Haven workers in 1932, before the dramatic entrance of the federal government into the field of relief and social service. Sixty-eight percent of American and Italian workers polled favored “government regulation of wages and hours,” and 88 percent favored “other government protection.” This is in contrast to the 29 percent who thought that “more individual initiative and thrift” could be a solution to workers’ difficulties. In fact, only 13 percent of Americans (as opposed to 45 percent of Italians) agreed with the individualistic solution. Government action was favored by approximately equal percentages of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers: 89, 87, and 91 percent respectively. (It should be noted, however, that only 19 percent of workers wanted “socialism,” a word that business and conservatives had demonized for decades, to some effect.) In another national survey, a quarter of unemployed workers thought that “a revolution might be a very good thing for this country.”17

A study published in 1936 found similar attitudes among people on relief in Los Angeles. To the question, “Do you believe in (1) co-operation of members of society for the common good, or (2) do you feel that each individual’s financial and social problems are his own?,” 89 favored the first option, 34 the second. Likewise, 86 supported production for use (the plan associated with Upton Sinclair’s EPIC campaign), compared to 36 who did not.18

National polls found evidence of support for truly radical government action. A poll in 1935 found that 41 percent of the upper-middle class, 49 percent of the lower-middle class, and 60 percent of the poor thought the government should not allow a man to keep investments worth


over $1 million. In fact, as late as 1942, 64 percent of people (the poll did not break down respondents in terms of class) thought it was a good idea to limit annual incomes to $25,000. A 1936 survey of 600 Chicago residents found a marked “tendency for the middle-income group to agree with the lower group on questions pertaining to the present distribution of wealth and influence.” Thirty-three percent of skilled manual workers and 56 percent of the unskilled and semi-skilled favored government ownership of large industries. In 1942, almost 30 percent of the nation’s factory workers thought “some form of socialism would be a good thing…for the country as a whole,” while 34 percent had open minds about it—which means that only 36 percent thought socialism would be “a bad thing.” Given the resources and energy the ruling class had dedicated to vilifying socialism, these findings are striking.\footnote{Robert S. McElvaine, “Thunder Without Lightning: Working-Class Discontent in the United States, 1929–1937” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 1974), 73, 92–96.}

In the same year as the Fortune surveys, 1939, Harry Hopkins’ staff compiled the results of various polls since 1932 on the WPA and unemployment. While their report does not disaggregate the polls and says almost nothing about sample sizes, some of the information it presents is at least suggestive. Among the respondents to a national Gallup poll in January 1938, 69 percent said the government had a “responsibility to pay the living expenses of needy people who are out of work.” Another poll that month found that 85 percent of people would favor a plan for the unemployed in their geographical region to “make some goods for their own use”—i.e., an anti-market production-for-use plan. In a 1937 survey of 13,500 youth in Maryland, nine out of ten respondents said that relief should be on a “health and decency” level rather than a “bare subsistence” level (as it most often was—when it was not \textit{below} subsistence). A Gallup poll in May 1937 showed that people on relief were surprisingly optimistic about the long term: 72 percent thought that the problem of unemployment could be solved, compared to 65 percent
of all respondents. Regarding the WPA, which was constantly under attack by conservatives and some sectors of big business for being inefficient, costly, ineffective, laziness-enabling (among relief workers), and socialistic, support—at least in May 1937—was strikingly broad: 79 percent of Americans did not think that the government should do away with the WPA and give only cash or direct relief. On the whole, it seems that most Americans had left-wing attitudes on a number of issues, even after conservatives had launched their powerful counteroffensive in the last years of the thirties.20

Of course, such leftist inclinations among the public are precisely one reason why “big business” has, since the era of World War I, had to devote colossal resources to indoctrinating people with the proper nationalistic, jingoistic, and capitalistic values. If people already agreed with such values, there would be no need to try to instill them. Much of the public relations industry would be redundant and senseless: its project would be comparable to obsessively trying to convert to Christianity someone who is already Christian. It is people’s basic anti-capitalism and anti-nationalism—their commitment to values such as compassion, generosity, democracy, local community, social welfare, peace and not war—that has made necessary ubiquitous political and economic propaganda.21

Returning to the Fortune polls, questions were also asked about people’s class consciousness: specifically, what class they thought they belonged to, and whether they thought

20 “Results of Various Polls Concerning WPA and Unemployment,” February 21, 1939, Harry Hopkins Papers, box 55, FDR Presidential Library.
21 Scholarship cited in previous chapters provides support for these ideas. Again, see Alex Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and Liberty (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997); Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Patricia Cayo Sexton, The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America’s Unique Conservatism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1991); Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and Liberalism, 1945–60 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994). One might argue that values such as compassion and generosity have no ideological or political content, but that is not entirely true. Popular support for social welfare programs, like popular opposition to imperialistic war, is an outgrowth of basic human values that are in conflict with structures of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism.
the interests of employers and employees were essentially in opposition or essentially the same. The first question was open-ended: respondents were asked to use one word to describe their class. An abundance of answers was provided, such as middle, upper, lower, poor, laboring, average, American, and liberal. To correlate the results with respondents’ objective economic status, Verba and Schlozman constructed the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class self-identification</th>
<th>Upper white-collar</th>
<th>Lower white-collar</th>
<th>Wage workers</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper or middle</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (e.g., “average”)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, approximately equal percentages of the unemployed identified as middle-class and working-class. But a fuller class consciousness in the Marxian sense requires that one be aware of the antagonism of interests between employer and employee. To measure this more robust class consciousness, Verba and Schlozman presented the data on how many respondents believed in class conflict while controlling for subjective class identification. In the following table, then, the percentages are of people who saw management and workers as being in opposition.

---

22 It is likely that more respondents would have described themselves as working-class had the question not been open-ended but instead asked them to choose between upper-class, middle-class, and working-class. Indeed, Richard Centers’ classic *The Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) reported that, when presented with the option, 51 percent of white men in the U.S. whom the author surveyed regarded themselves as working-class.
Combining these two tables, one can see how many people in the white workforce were “fully” class-conscious (in Verba and Schlozman’s definition of the term): only 12 percent of wage workers and 10 percent of the unemployed. These are the proportions of people who both saw themselves as working-class and believed in class conflict. As for whether this sort of class consciousness correlated with left-wing views, the authors have this to say: “The data indicate that full class consciousness did result in more radical economic views; and it did so to a greater degree when it was coupled with unemployment. Furthermore, the data make clear that working class self-identification was associated with a more radical set of political attitudes only when it was coupled with a perception of conflict among the social classes.”

Class consciousness did matter, then, and it was not as widespread as a Marxist would have liked. While many people who did not identify as working-class or believe in class conflict had radical economic views, it is not surprising that the first two traits were associated with the third. Again, though, we should be careful what conclusions we draw from polling, especially from polling as far back as the 1930s (when modern methods were still being hammered out). The temptation to fetishize an inherently atomized and superficial method of understanding popular dispositions just because it deals in easily classifiable quantities ought to be resisted. The

---

historian Martin Glaberman criticizes an article by Tom Langford on “strikes and class consciousness” on these grounds:

In the first place, [in Langford’s article] consciousness is defined by verbal statements of belief. This may be appropriate to debates among intellectuals but it is totally irrelevant in ascertaining the dialectical and contradictory nature of working-class consciousness. The nature of working-class consciousness is not easy to document in ways that would be acceptable to academic social science. But occasionally there is a clear-cut example. One such example was a referendum vote in the auto workers union in the waning months of World War II in Canada and the United States. The subject was whether or not the union should retain or abandon its pledge not to strike during the war. The members voted approximately two to one to retain the no-strike pledge. One could easily conclude that workers put patriotism above their own class interest. The problem, however, was that an absolute majority of auto workers went out on wildcat strikes during the very time that the referendum was taking place. Was working-class consciousness reflected in individual thought as each worker filled out a ballot in the privacy of his or her home? Or was working-class consciousness reflected in collective action on the shop floor? There is no way that Langford’s methodology [which is that of academic social science] can even begin to deal with that question.24

Glaberman also criticizes the very project of “divid[ing] workers up according to the way they think,” and notes that the workers who have made or attempted revolutions from Russia’s in 1917 to Hungary in 1956 and France in 1968 have, as isolated individuals, had very conservative attitudes (of sexism, chauvinism, anti-semitism, etc.). Evidently people who are in many respects “conservative” are capable of acting in radical ways, and of having their consciousness transformed thereby. It is no surprise that a majority of people in a country (the U.S.) whose small Communist party, under constant attack by authorities, had far too few resources to effectively indoctrinate the public with Marxism would prefer to believe in the possibility of harmony between employers and employees—at least while filling out a survey in the privacy of their home. To what extent this belief influenced their values and actions, however, or discouraged them from acting collectively in defense of their economic interests, is unclear.

The very concept of class consciousness is so problematic that an enormous body of sociological literature exists to try to explicate it. Verba and Schlozman’s survey-based conception is quite thin and impoverished, given its unavoidable individualist bias, its “exclusive focus on ideation” rather than practice (to quote Rick Fantasia), its oversimplified character, and its hypostatizing assumption that class consciousness is a static thing, something that either exists or doesn’t exist, instead of being a dynamic and interactive process of shared understanding that is manifested in the various realms of culture, politics, trade unionism, and the workplace. The richness and ambiguity of the notion of class consciousness is shown by the fact that E. P.

---

Thompson’s gigantic *Making of the English Working Class* can be called simply an exploration of the class consciousness of England’s working class in its formative decades. The multiple valences of the concept include both expressivist and cognitivist dimensions, individual-focused and group-focused dimensions, elements of subjectivity and of objectivity, of ideas and of practices. It may, in fact, be such a nebulous and multiply interpretable idea, so prone to dissolving away upon analysis and therefore so difficult to “operationalize” in a strict and precise way, that it is up to each author to give it whatever meaning he wants—provided the meaning has some relation to the intuitive core of awareness of class conflict and willingness (given the right circumstances) to fight collectively against economic oppressors.

In any event, more productive than to dwell on the meaning of a concept that Marx, who is supposed to have been its progenitor, did not even use is to consider the in-depth observations of investigators.26 With regard to the unemployed, E. Wight Bakke was one of the best. In his 1940 study *Citizens Without Work* he observed that most of the unemployed in New Haven, as in other cities, did not get actively involved in radical politics, whether Communist, Socialist, or any other variety. In a sense, he found this puzzling. As all across the country, agitators in parks and on street corners received sympathetic hearings and garnered large crowds. In Cleveland, for example, the journalist Len De Caux wrote in retrospect, “In hundreds of jobless meetings, I heard no objections to the points the communists made, and much applause for them. Sometimes I’d hear a communist speaker say something so bitter and extreme I’d feel embarrassed. Then I’d look around at the unemployed audience—shabby clothes, expressions worried and sour. Faces would start to glow, heads to nod, hands to clap. They liked that stuff best of all.” Urban workers and the jobless tended to be quite aware of class: their lives were one long demonstration that the

---

26 On Marx’s non-use of the concept of class consciousness, see Rick Fantasia, “From Class Consciousness to Culture,” 272.
working class was separated by a vast gulf from the upper class, and that the two groups had very different outlooks and interests. As the New Haven machinist quoted in the Introduction said to Bakke, “Hell, brother, you don’t have to look to know there’s a workin’ class!” The class divide was, if not the air they breathed, at least an element of it. So why, after a speech by a Communist whose “every word rang true to the experiences men had had,” did only a few listeners join him in a march on New Haven’s City Hall?27

From Bakke’s account it seems that, contrary to the general thrust of postmodern scholarship (which foregrounds the discursive realm of the “imaginary”), ideology was not of primary significance. Several factors were more important. First was the very smallness and perceived ineffectiveness of radical political circles. It was thought futile to dedicate oneself to far-left activism, whether Communist or Socialist, when it was bound to have little or no political success. Bakke suspects that a rubber worker was speaking for most men when he said, “I tell you my reason for steering clear of any radical party… I fought enough losin’ battles in my life, and, by God, in politics I’m goin’ to play a winner if I can. A man can be a Democrat or a Republican and be able to get drunk once in a while on election night because he won. But the Socialists—when do you think they’re going to have the chance to get drunk?” There were, after all, very real benefits to being either a Democrat or a Republican: one could receive political patronage through personal connections or from voting the right way; one could socialize and make friends relatively easily on the basis of shared institutions and common interests; one was thought to “fit in” and not be an outsider, which reinforced one’s self-esteem. It is odd that few historians have made these points when discussing Americans’ supposed lack of radicalism in the 1930s, since they are of enormous importance. Whatever one believed politically, in a time

27 Len De Caux, Labor Radical: From the Wobblies to CIO, A Personal History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 163; E. Wight Bakke, Citizens Without Work (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 57. This latter book, pp. 55–70, is the main source for the next six paragraphs.
when radical activists constituted a demonized and violently repressed minority the pressures of sociality were, for most Americans, very much on the side of not participating in their movements.

Many thousands of people in Chicago and other cities did join the Communists’ Unemployed Councils or even the Party itself, for at least a short time. But the historian Daniel Leab is surely right that large numbers “abandoned them when they found out that instead of a larger relief ticket or settlement of their grievances, all their ‘radical militancy’ got them was a crack on the skull from a police club.” As soon as they saw no hope of changing their circumstances through association with Communists, they very sensibly ended such association. Ideology was of no relevance here.28

Reinforcing and to some extent coinciding with the pressures of sociality and the belief that radicals were fighting a losing battle was fear of the consequences of joining their ranks. When Bakke asked some men where the Communist office in New Haven was, a Greek immediately warned him to stay aware from there. “This is what happens,” he said. “If you are working in a restaurant, dishwashing, and somebody sees you, they will go and say to your boss, ‘He’s a Communist.’” And the boss will fire you. Whether at work or outside of work, “the realistic judgment of the worker is that radicalism is a ‘sure fire demoter,’” Bakke reported. “He has observed this fact in his working days… The warnings of administration officials about what will happen to ‘dissatisfied radicals’ do not fall on deaf ears… He may know some of the men who ‘lost what little they did have’ because they ‘wouldn’t listen to reason.’” Likewise, people were unwilling to riot, even when they felt angry enough to do so, because of the probable consequences. For one thing, “You don’t have any confidence that if you did riot it would do any

---

28 Daniel J. Leab, “‘United We Eat’: The Creation and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930,” *Labor History*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 1967): 314.
good,” a textile worker said. “How would you get anything better than what you have?” According to a laborer, “There will be no riots as long as there is charity enough to support the men. If that were not there, there might be trouble, but the men are afraid, in the first place, to riot because they might lose what little they have left of security.” Even passing out Communist leaflets could get one arrested, as happened often in Chicago.²⁹

Perhaps more important than anything else was the fact that “the poor [were] used to being poor,” were used to the old ways of dealing with adversity: “put up with it, grin and bear it, and use the common sense and experience you have to pull out.” The ruling class’s old and ongoing war against the Left had prevented radical collective action from becoming one of the standard tools that people used in their efforts to survive and improve their circumstances. Instead, they naturally continued to draw on the repertoire of more realistic strategies that had always served them well, which we discussed in the third chapter. Their lives had consisted of “adjustments to the inevitable,” which were even more necessary during unemployment. Indeed, people who were suspicious of the possibility or even desirability of radical change arguably showed more intelligence and realism than the Communists who made a leap of faith into the unknown, being willing to risk personal security for the sake of ideological dogmas and dreams that surely never had much chance of coming to fruition. The sort of idealism and even recklessness—not to mention passionate interest in politics—that it takes to try to build a major political movement out of nothing in a society more than willing to violently repress it is a trait that most people lack, having families to worry about and little experience in ideological training. Nor are they inclined to take seriously utopian dreams of a workers’ state or a classless society if everything in their experience tells them these dreams are impossible or meaningless.

²⁹ Interview of Emil Luchterhand by Kubet Luchterhand, 3, 13, Roosevelt University Oral History Project in Labor History.
mere figments of feverish imaginations. Richard Wright’s judgment would have commanded widespread assent: “I liked [Communists’] readiness to act, but they seemed lost in folly, wandering in a fantasy.”

In addition to these fundamental “material” and “self-interested” reasons for not joining the Communist party or participating in collective protests were the secondary ideological reasons. To a large degree these were probably mere rationalizations for one’s disinclination to join a marginalized and maligned minority that demanded extreme ideological and existential commitment in the service of an unrealistic cause, but ultimately we cannot tell how much weight they carried. In any case, historians have amply related these reasons, which included, first and foremost, the hostility to Communists’ Russophilia. A boilermaker spoke for probably the majority of white American workers when he said of Communists, “Now suppose they could set us up in that kind of a heaven they tell about. Suppose they could I say, because one look, and you know they couldn’t. But if they could, would it be America—or would it be Russia? And who the hell wants to live in Russia?” An eminently rational argument, especially considering the conditions in Russia at the time.

Historians’ argument that the working class in the U.S. was ideologically opposed to Communism is tendentious insofar as it implies that workers were not left-wing enough to be Communists. There is more truth to the opposite way in which Mauritz Hallgren framed the matter in 1933:

In traveling around the country I talked with thousands of jobless workers. I found them increasingly sympathetic with the activities of the Communist Party, at least to the extent that those activities dealt with their own immediate problems. In

---

large cities like Chicago and New York the Communists experienced no difficulty at all in persuading entire neighborhoods to take part in demonstrations against evictions and relief cuts. Yet a vast majority of the unemployed with whom I talked were utterly cold to communism as a way of life… [When the Communists] sought recruits for the party, they promptly dropped into a jargon unintelligible to the average American worker. He could have no idea of the meaning of “rightist deviation,” “agitprop,” and “theoretical levels.” The use of such language invariably frightened him off. *The Communists were revolutionists who lacked the courage to discuss revolution in straightforward, realistic terms.*

The italicized sentence turns the common historical argument on its head: the point is not that people were opposed to radicalism but that Communists were opposed to comprehensible and indigenous American radicalism. Historians have, of course, demonstrated that in fact the Party was aware of many of its inadequacies, and that it tried to address them. For instance, the district organizer Clarence Hathaway wrote in September 1930 that one of the reasons why organized Unemployed Councils were “almost non-existent” (probably an exaggeration) was that Party members were in the habit of abstractly sloganeering about revolution, dialectical contradictions, defense of the Soviet Union, and a workers’ government, rather than dedicating themselves to the concrete actions and demands that alone would make sense to people. But in fact no amount of self-criticism without *structural* changes in the Party could have been sufficient, because, as Hallgren goes on to say, the source of the problems was in the Party’s subordination to the Comintern and its absolute adherence to Leninism and Stalinism, which were far from appropriate to American conditions (as well as British, French, and German conditions).

---

Communists’ obsessive sectarianism, especially during their Third Period in the early 1930s, likewise seemed absurd to most Americans, who were clear-headed enough to see that the defenders of the poor should unite and not squabble among themselves.32

A study published in 1941 that analyzed the attitudes of citizens of Akron, Ohio concluded that, despite the presence of significant “rebellious discontent,” radical activists were likely to fail for one main reason: “they show that they have interests and aims beyond that [sic] of the mass organization in which they are working. They do this by pushing issues that have nothing to do with the immediate purposes of the workers [and by other actions] which mark them off as a tightly organized, determined, unscrupulous, alien body within the larger mass.” Again, Richard Wright’s opinion of African-American Communists in Washington Park was in all likelihood shared, albeit perhaps in a more moderate and less lucid way, by observers of white Communists: “An hour’s listening disclosed the fanatical intolerance of minds sealed against new ideas, new facts, new feelings, new attitudes, new hints at ways to live.” The ideological disagreements that people could claim to have with radicals—involving issues such as patriotism, religion, attitudes toward Russia, and the (un)desirability of revolution—were secondary to, or seen as merely another manifestation of, the viscerally off-putting behavior of the fanatic.33

Nevertheless, despite all the considerations of rationality and humanity—as opposed to historians’ usual invocations of mere ideology and cultural indoctrination—that militated against

popular acceptance of Communism, in staggering numbers people came to manifest a radicalism of both thought and deed. Let us turn now to an examination of this popular radicalism.

**Activism in Chicago**

**Unemployed Councils**

Had there been a political party in the U.S. with the resources and competence to *sustainably* organize the rebellious masses, March 6, 1930 would have been a very good omen. The Comintern had designated this date as International Unemployment Day, which would be marked by demonstrations across the Western world organized by the various Communist parties. The American CP made elaborate preparations for the actions: in Chicago, for example, 200,000 leaflets, 50,000 stickers, and 50,000 shop papers were printed and distributed in the last few days before March 6, and open-air meetings, lectures, and small demonstrations raised awareness of what was to come. The results exceeded even the Party’s expectations: while its claim of well over a million demonstrators around the country was an exaggeration, its boast that in the aggregate the protests constituted the single largest workers’ demonstration in U.S. history may well be accurate. Even the *New York Times* reported that 75,000 people participated in Detroit and 35,000 in Union Square in New York—though the latter figure is likely an underestimate. The numbers in Chicago were more modest, between 5,000 and 10,000, with thousands more onlookers. In many cities the day’s events ended in sanguinary mayhem, as police forces charged, trampled, and beat up the crowds.34

---

34 Lasswell and Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda*, 191–194; Roy Rosenzweig, “Organizing the Unemployed: The Early Years of the Great Depression, 1929–1933,” *Radical America*, vol. 10, no. 4 (July–August
For such a small political party, the events of March 6 were quite an achievement. Party membership in the 1930s is listed in the table below, which includes only those members who had paid their dues in full. (Numbers are unavailable for certain years.)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>National Party</th>
<th>Chicago Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>8-9,000</td>
<td>1,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>12-14,000</td>
<td>2,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>16-20,000</td>
<td>2,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>24,5000</td>
<td>3,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>5,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is true that, nationally, hundreds of thousands more people, most of whom were not Communists, participated in dozens of such “auxiliary” organizations as the International Labor Defense, the Unemployed Councils, the Young Communist League, the John Reed Clubs, the Young Pioneers of America, and the League of Struggle for Negro Rights. The Party itself, though, remained small—in part because of its insufficient finances. A Congressional investigation in the late 1930s determined that the total deposits in 43 bank accounts held by the CP and all its subsidiaries, auxiliaries, and publishing houses were a little over $10 million, in

---

itself an impressive sum (far more than the Party possessed before its Popular Front phase) but quite inadequate considering how thinly it was spread. The Illinois budget, for instance, was only $35,000 in 1938, and in huge stretches of the country—including most of its Western half—there was virtually no Communist presence at all. Dues were often not collected, and when they were they sometimes were not turned over to the district office because the lower-level body wanted to keep them for its own needs. Especially in the early 1930s the CP had an acute shortage of organizers and frequently could not afford to pay its functionaries. In the Chicago district, even such basic necessities as mimeograph machines were sometimes luxuries.36

Nevertheless, during the thirties the party did manage to recruit almost 250,000 people, according to historian Harvey Klehr.37 The problem was that most of them eventually dropped out. Between 1930 and 1934, 60,000 joined the party, but the total increase in membership was only about 16,000. The reasons for this disappointing record, which historians have written about, had nothing to do with ideology: they had to do with organizational problems and the inner life of the party. For one thing, thousands of people who signed application cards or even paid initiation fees were simply lost, were never followed up with, never assigned to a Party unit. Bureaucratic mismanagement was rife within the CP. Those who were assigned to a local unit, whether a street unit (based on geography) or a shop unit (based on industrial concentration), faced the next hurdle: tolerating the mechanical drudgery and dreariness of unit meetings, and the superhuman workload that was imposed on them. The weekly meetings, full of carping criticism and sterile discussion, could last for three or four hours; new members were rarely made to feel welcome. “I can’t be everywhere all at once,” one member complained. “I must

---

37 Actually, the number may be higher than this, since the inefficient party bureaucracy bungled untold thousands of applications. Communist organizer Katherine Hyndman estimated that “millions” of people went through the Party and its auxiliary organizations. Interview of Katherine Hyndman by Staughton Lynd, 1970, 49, Roosevelt University Oral History Project in Labor History.
sleep sometimes. I have spent enough energy at inner meetings to overthrow the whole capitalist system. My wife won’t stand for it either.” Another member pithily summed up the problems: “until our movement…realizes that its members are human being [sic] and want to be treated as such and not just a cog in the wheel, our movement will remain small, no matter how many members we attract and recruit.”

All these handicaps did not, however, prevent the CP from facilitating the emergence of Unemployed Councils in dozens of cities already in January and February 1930. While one would not have known this from reading the mainstream press—or even subsequent historical accounts—urban areas of the country were in ferment a mere three or four months after the stock market crash. Almost every day the Daily Worker reported mass meetings and marches on city halls in cities from Buffalo to Chicago to Chattanooga and beyond, by the spring spreading even to the Deep South. Large-scale actions continued after March 6, for instance on May Day, which the Federated Press reported saw its largest nationwide turnout in forty years. By the summer, Chicago had twelve Unemployed Councils with a thousand active members and many more peripheral followers, who were regularly carrying out the actions for which councils soon became famous: resisting evictions and protesting at relief stations. While CP leaders were frustrated with the halting progress of the party’s unemployed organizing—“[there is] an agitational meeting in a neighborhood or before a factory today and then nothing for a month,” Clarence Hathaway reprimanded his comrades—the momentum of the work picked up again in

late 1930 and early 1931. The jobless thousands were hungry for leadership, and they were perfectly happy to have Communists provide it.\textsuperscript{39}

For the next couple of years, the continual protests and disruptions that the \textit{Daily Worker} reported—which were inevitably only a fraction of the total—belied intellectuals’ impression at the time, transmitted to posterity by historians, that the unemployed (and partly employed) masses were acquiescent and apathetic. In fact, contrary to Irving Bernstein’s periodization, the Hoover years were arguably the most “turbulent” of the decade, in some respects more so than the New Deal years. “Hardly a day passed,” the historian Albert Prago says, “without some major demonstration [in fact, many] taking place in some town, city, or state capital.” It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the society was in upheaval, indeed so riven by rebellion that soon the business class was able to clamor for the hitherto unfathomable: federal unemployment relief and a major public works program. Such a departure from what had been considered the bedrock of capitalists’ class interest, namely privatization and social atomization, could only have come about from a general perception that the working class was on the verge of mounting the ramparts and had to be appeased. Moreover, elite panic did not recur on such a broad scale in the later years of the thirties, despite the birth of the CIO: after 1932, the mayor of Chicago never again came close to pleading for federal armed intervention in his city, as Cermak had. It was the radicalized discontent of those without work that most threatened the foundations of the social order, not the (retrospectively more celebrated) unionizing ambitions of industrial workers.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{40} Prago, “The Organization of the Unemployed,” 116.
Recall, for example, that the occupying and theft of property were epidemic in the early Depression. Historian Gary Roth describes some of the direct action that was going on in Chicago by 1931 and ’32:

…The unemployed began to use abandoned storefronts for their own purposes. Locks were broken, and the stores became meeting places, with chairs taken from deserted movie houses. [Paul] Mattick\(^1\) estimated that there were fifty or sixty such locales in Chicago, serving as the [unemployed] movement’s equivalent of neighbourhood settlement houses. In some areas, there were one or two such places on every street. Mimeograph machines were installed for the production of leaflets and movement literature. Paper was contributed by those still employed, who stole office supplies from their workplaces.

Among the unemployed were many skilled workers, and they procured electricity for the storefronts by running wire from the street lamps. Gas lines were tapped without setting off the meters—something that the plumbers knew how to do, and the gas was used for heating and cooking. Others solicited food in bulk quantities from nearby fruit and vegetable markets, food shops, bakeries, and meat stores, sometimes by threatening the proprietors. Makeshift kitchens were set up in the storefronts and meals cooked around the clock. The homeless also used the storefronts as rudimentary sleeping quarters.\(^2\)

---

\(^{1}\) Mattick was an influential Marxist writer and activist, an anti-Leninist who identified with the ideological tradition of council communism.

Whether associated with the Unemployed Councils, Mattick’s Workers League, the Workers Committee on Unemployment, or no official organization at all, collective seizure of property was a defiant affront to dominant institutions, arguably revolutionary in its implications.

Eviction protests, for instance, have not always been considered in this light, but of course what they amounted to was the community’s seizing of private property to ensure the welfare and dignity of its members. (This is a basically socialist principle.) In Marxian language, they expressed class solidarity, even a type of “class consciousness,” if by that term we mean not some abstract intellectual awareness of the essence of production relations but rather something more significant, viz., the sort of consciousness that infuses the practice of aggressively defending workers and the poor against the predations and depredations of the rich (or of authorities in league with the rich). The “ideology” of those who reinstalled furniture in an apartment after a bailiff had dragged it outside—as well as of those (millions) who sympathized with such an action—was indeed “radical,” inasmuch as that act not only exalted human rights over property rights but flagrantly flouted the law. It was an ideology—because a practice—of collective class struggle.

African-Americans, not surprisingly, “constitute[d] the most active section of [Chicago’s] Unemployed Council” already in mid-1930, according to the Daily Worker. From before the beginning of the year Communists had been conducting house-to-house canvasses, literature distribution campaigns, street-corner conversations, and mass meetings in the industrial and lower-class sections of the city, not least on the South Side. Interracial marches on the city hall, met by police violence, featured demands for “Work or Wages” (“wages” meant unemployment

---

43 In fact, the sympathizers probably numbered in the tens of millions, at least if we are to assume that most of the “one third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished” supported resisting landlords who wanted to evict impoverished tenants. It is likely that many in the middle class sympathized with eviction protests as well, though I am unaware of any surveys on the matter.
insurance at full wage-rates), “Immediate Relief,” and the seven-hour day and five-day week. The unemployed of multiple nationalities attended huge meetings in Musicians’ Hall, Ukrainian Hall (in the Back of the Yards neighborhood), and Ashland Auditorium; when the police arrived and arrested scores of participants—mostly foreigners—Mexicans and African-Americans were reported to be the most aggressive in resisting the attacks. (Some of the meetings in fact were organized to protest police brutality—only to elicit more brutality.) Blacks on the South Side were also the most aggressive in fighting evictions, probably for three main reasons: their deprivation was worse than that of other ethnic groups; their racial consciousness sharpened their anger and awareness of grievances; and in general they were not well-integrated into mainstream white society, which made them more willing to collectively violate norms of property and propriety.\(^{44}\)

As Randi Storch and other historians have related, eviction demonstrations sometimes began at Washington Park, where crowds of fifty to five thousand listened every day to speakers denounce the injustices of capitalism. Whether here or at the neighborhood Unemployed Council headquarters—a meeting hall where men were always gathered whiling away the hours in conversation—someone would show up and inform the others that a person was being evicted blocks away. They would rush over, or rather march, for hundreds of people would regularly join them. “Whole neighborhoods were frequently mobilized to take part in this mutual assistance,” a participant recalled years later. The sociologist Horace Cayton observed one such action in 1931: while eating in a restaurant in the Black Belt he “chanced to look out the window and saw a number of Negroes walking by, three abreast, forming a long uninterrupted line,” solemnly marching to a house where a family was being evicted. In this case the eviction had already

happened, so the furniture was simply brought back into the house. Other times confrontations with the police ensued, which were apt to be violent and bloody. The most important of these was on August 3, 1931, when a crowd of several thousand blacks and whites marched to protect the home of a woman who lived near Washington Park. Police hurried to intercept them and arrested several of the leaders, as two patrol wagons blocked the crowd in its path. The course of events is uncertain, but the police ended up drawing their revolvers and started shooting, resulting in general tumult. “Thousands of terrified people scattered,” a contemporary wrote, “rushing for their lives, tripping, stumbling, stepping on one another. Others fought, slugging with fists, hurling sticks and stones at the police.” By the end of the melee three black men lay dead and scores of demonstrators were injured.\footnote{Lasswell and Blumenstock, \textit{World Revolutionary Propaganda}, 170, 171, 196–204; Horace Cayton, “The Black Bugs,” \textit{Nation}, September 9, 1931; Carl Winter, “Unemployment Struggles of the Thirties,” \textit{Political Affairs}, vol. 48, nos. 9-10 (September-October 1969): 53–63; Randi Storch, \textit{Red Chicago}, 99–101; \textit{Daily Worker}, August 5–8, 10, 1931.}

Within a day of the riot Chicago was thrown into panic and headlines around the country shrieked of the nefarious influence of Reds. Fears of Communist insurrection in Chicago and race riots ran rampant. Scores of squad cars were sent to patrol the district; the National Guard was put on alert; Mayor Cermak returned early from his yachting vacation; and in the following days enormous meetings of white and black workers were held in Washington Park to protest the killings. As far as the city’s elite was concerned, if the event “had been an out-and-out race riot it would have been understandable,” according to the authors of \textit{Black Metropolis}. “But here was something new: Negroes and whites together rioting against the forces of law and order.” The Renters’ Court immediately suspended all eviction proceedings for an indefinite period, which turned out to be several months long. In fact, that summer tenants across the South Side had already been flatly refusing to pay rent, declaring that the Communists would protect them.
Landlords had accepted this situation in part because, according to bailiffs, 60 percent of African-Americans who were evicted simply looked around the block for the nearest vacant room, broke the locks, and moved in. “Although they are without lights, gas, or water,” a bailiff reported, “the squatters remain in their new quarters until evicted again, when they find another vacant flat or are reinstated by the communists. Under these conditions landlords are willing to waive the rent to keep their properties occupied.” The hundreds of eviction demonstrations constantly occurring on the South Side that summer had, despite the police’s best efforts at vigilance, effectively given tenants power to partially dictate the terms of their occupancy to landlords.46

Meanwhile, the Unemployed Councils and the Communist Party organized a mass funeral and an open-casket viewing of the three fallen men. An estimated 25,000 people filed past the bodies during the two days they were on display—on a stage under a huge photograph of Lenin, the walls adorned with large paintings of a black and white worker clasping hands—and afterwards, perhaps twice as many marchers (almost half of them white) followed the coffins in a slow procession down State Street. As in the many other marches that Chicago saw in these years, placards with such slogans as “Fight Against Lynching—Equal Rights for Negroes!” and “They Died for Us! We Must Keep Fighting!” were generously scattered throughout the parade. In the three weeks that followed the August 3 riot, the Unemployed Councils on the South Side received 5,500 new applications for membership.47

While eviction demonstrations were particularly common in the Black Belt, few areas of Chicago were entirely free of them in the early Depression years. We can only guess at how

---

46 Chicago Defender, August 8, 1931; Chicago Tribune, August 6, 1931; Pittsburgh Courier, August 8, 1931; Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, 87; Horace Cayton, Long Old Road (New York: Trident Press, 1965), 182, 183.
47 Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, 201–204; Daily Worker, August 10, 1931; Prago, “Organizing the Unemployed,” 108.
many occurred, but if their frequency in New York City is any indication, there were many
thousands: according to one study, of the 185,794 families that received eviction notices in New
York in the eight months before June 30, 1932, 77,000 were saved from temporary homelessness
by the efforts of the organized unemployed. Chicago’s West Side, for example, had numerous
Unemployed Councils by 1931, such as the one on 14th Street near a Greek Workers Club on
South Halsted Street. Its proximity to Greektown guaranteed its vitality, for Greek workers were
exceptionally militant, as the activist Steve Nelson recalled. “Some were furriers and garment
workers, and a few worked in the stockyards, but most were waiters, cooks, and busboys in the
city’s restaurants. Almost all were single and very militant. Actually, they knew what to do better
than I.” If they heard of an eviction, they raced over to stop it. The Communist organizer
Katherine Hyndman remembered a revealing incident worth describing at length, the sort of
event that happened continually in these years when “all you had to do was distribute a leaflet
and you’d have thousands of people show up…not frightened by the police or anything”:

I was on my way to meet the people at the Greek Workers Club when I happened
to see a woman and her children. They’d been evicted. They’re out there, their
furniture, all out in the street. So I hurried over to the Greek Workers Club and
got a whole number of people to help break down the door, put in the furniture,
and so on… Some of the people who had been in our little [Unemployed Council]
headquarters had gone there during the day and had tried to put the furniture back.
But each time they had been arrested. In the meantime they sent some people over
into the South Side, into the Negro area on the South Side and got a whole bunch
of people to come from there…and each time they came, all of them were
arrested… As soon as we got there the police had been in hiding around different buildings, [so they] come there and surround us. And I tried to go up into this small house… So one of the policemen jumps up on the steps of the house with a sawed-off machine gun…and he says, “The first son of a bitch that sets foot on these stairs is going to have his head chopped off.” Well, you can’t let that go unchallenged, you know. So I stepped forward, a young white man steps forward, and a Negro couple… When we four went on the stairs the people came out of their houses. They came swarming out and they surrounded the police. And this policeman…just held his gun uselessly in his hand. And the four of us stood triumphantly up at the top of the stairs and were kicking at the door. The policeman who was in charge said [to his fellow officers], “Now, look. We’ve had hundreds of people arrested. It’s enough. I’ve had enough.”…

The landlord, who had been hiding with the police, decided the family could move back in if a collection were taken up to provide at least a fraction of their rent. So one of the officers passed around his hat, and the family was allowed to return to its home.48

In neighborhoods on the North Side where people were paying mortgages on homes, or on the Near North Side where it was most common to live in rooming houses, it was much less easy to organize eviction demonstrations. Instead, as elsewhere in the city, people rallied around demands for less dehumanizing relief. The most dramatic form of activity was the group march

on relief stations in response to the ill treatment of, or denial of relief to, a family, or to protest a particular policy. Sometimes the group would occupy the station and refuse to leave until its demands were met; other times it would be less belligerent, or would leave in response to threats to call the police. Relief caseworkers’ practice of asking invasive and humiliating questions about the private lives of their clients was especially resented, and many demonstrations protested this policy. The actions on behalf of some individual case regularly succeeded in their goals, as even relief authorities admitted.49

Examples illustrate protesters’ tactics and police responses. On August 31, 1931, 400 people marched on the United Charities office at 4500 South Prairie Avenue. By the time they reached the office the crowd was 1,500 strong, and it proceeded to storm the station. After a police squad arrived, a “general riot” ensued. On March 13, 1932 several thousand people converged on the Humboldt Park relief station to demand that the “box relief” system be changed to cash relief. Hundreds of police opened fire, though no fatalities ensued. (Soon afterwards, the state relief administration announced that it would henceforth give relief in cash.) In early July 1932 hundreds of steel workers and their families stormed a relief station in Kensington, near Pullman, because the supply of food had been completely cut off. Police arrived, but the workers broke through their lines and hurled bricks at the windows. “Five more squads of police and a large group of motorcycle reinforcements came up,” the Daily Worker reported, and “after a vicious battle the men with their women and children were forced to retreat.” In September 1932 a huge demonstration of several thousand occurred at a relief station in Pullman, at which the following demands were made: any three members of the Unemployed Council were always to be recognized as legitimate representatives of relief clients; the police

were to be removed from the relief agency’s premises; the agency was to receive the complaints of women as well as men; and rent was to be paid for clients. As was often the case, hundreds of women and children were present; police arrested many of them (calling them prostitutes, rats, etc.), and clubbed women and girls of all ages. (“A 14-year-old girl was beaten over the hips until blood ran streaming down her legs, and a woman carrying a baby was clubbed along with the baby. An aged woman standing in front of her home was knocked to the ground with a blow of a nightstick.”) Such spectacular clashes happened most frequently between the summer of 1931 and the early spring of 1933.50

Apart from the practical activities of day-to-day struggle against miserable relief, evictions, and the shutting off of gas and electricity in people’s homes, the Councils put forward a series of far-reaching political demands. The millions of people who embraced or shared these demands had an “ideology” that was radical indeed, necessitating a total transformation of American capitalism. The centerpiece of the Councils’ program was the demand for unemployment insurance, which was raised as early as January 1930. We’ll discuss this in more detail later, but judging just by the turnout on March 6, 1930, a large proportion of the unemployed very quickly and easily adopted the Communists’ extreme conception of unemployment insurance: full union wages paid by the state with no discrimination against any group, financed by taxes on inheritances, gifts, and individual and corporate incomes of $5,000 a year and over, administered by representatives elected by workers and farmers. Other Council demands, advertised in millions of leaflets, pamphlets, and newspapers, included the seven-hour day and five-day week, abolition of the speed-up system, free speech and assembly, prohibition of child labor, abolition of vagrancy laws, free employment agencies under workers’ control,

50 Paul Clinton Young, “Race, Class, and Radicalism in Chicago, 1914–1936” (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 2001), 207; Lasswell and Blumenstock, World Revolutionary Propaganda, 171; Daily Worker, March 14, July 6, September 15, 1932.
demolition of slums and construction of workers’ dwellings to be owned by the city, and the ending of evictions of jobless workers for non-payment of rent. That these demands were attractive to millions of Americans is no surprise, but that so many people mobilized in support of them shows how revolutionary are the values of “ordinary people,” especially in the context of an economic and social crisis such as the Depression.\textsuperscript{51}

If Communist Party membership is any indication, the unemployed tended to be more militant and radical than the employed, despite the very real hardships of the latter. In 1931, about 50 percent of members in Chicago were unemployed; and in a not atypical two-month period in that year, 80 percent of new recruits were without work. This trend was particularly pronounced on the South Side, where in 1933 79 percent of party members were unemployed. Nationally, in 1934 Earl Browder estimated that between 60 and 70 percent of the membership was jobless. On the other hand, the numbers were not so disproportionate in later years of the decade, when the Popular Front and the CIO attracted increasing numbers of employed workers to the CP.\textsuperscript{52}

The foreign-born, too, were disproportionately drawn to the CP, to the dismay of party leaders. In 1931, two-thirds of the national party and half of Chicago’s had been born abroad. In Chicago, Russians, South Slavs, Hungarians, Finns, and Lithuanians were overrepresented in the party, while Poles, Germans, and Italians were underrepresented. Jews were especially prominent: they constituted 22 percent of Chicago’s CP in 1931, and 19 percent of the party nationally. Between 1930 and 1935 the CP published daily newspapers in eight foreign languages, in addition to weeklies and of course the many pamphlets, leaflets, flyers, and shop papers that were constantly being distributed. Some indication of the influence of Communist


\textsuperscript{52} Storch, “Shades of Red,” 41; Ottanelli, \textit{The Communist Party}, 44.
publications in immigrant communities is given by the percentage of total daily newspaper circulation that was Communist. According to Nathan Glazer, in 1930 half of the circulation of dailies among Croats, Finns, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians was Communist, and about a third among Hungarians, Russians, and Slovaks. This suggests substantial influence, substantial sympathy among these groups for Communist views (particularly since newspapers were likely to be passed around after one person had read them). In Chicago, the CP’s many foreign-language federations—principally Workers’ Clubs (Jewish, Irish, Italian, Polish, Scandinavian, etc.)—amplified its impact in immigrant communities.53

Again, the most striking support for Communism was found in the Black Belt. While it is noteworthy that in 1931 24 percent of Chicago’s CP members were African-American, more telling are contemporaries’ descriptions of the enthusiasm non-members displayed toward the radical left. Much as in Harlem, as Mark Naison has described, Communism became a dominant force among blacks in Chicago under the impact of both the Depression and the Scottsboro campaign to save nine boys in Alabama falsely accused of raping two white women. A series of Daily Worker articles by the writer Michael Gold in September 1932 testified to the hegemony the CP had by that time achieved over much of the Black Belt’s lower class. With some, though likely not much, exaggeration, Gold wrote, “Everyone on the south side knows and sympathizes with the work of the [unemployed] councils. It has penetrated everywhere.” He gave a couple of illustrations: “In a little barbecue restaurant, five truck drivers were at lunch… I heard their talk: they were discussing that morning’s editorial in the Daily Worker on Germany. On a wooden stoop at sunset sat a group of tall jobless men and their wives. One giant in overalls fingered at a guitar; another was reading aloud to the serious little group out of a pamphlet by Lenin.”

Observing the crowds at Washington Park and Ellis Park, he wrote, “fathers, mothers, grandmothers from the deep south—all the generations were at the forum, this Communism has become a folk thing. They have taken Communism and translated it into their own idiom.” “We Negroes love our party, because it means freedom,” one person told him. Two months earlier he had witnessed the CP’s nominating convention at Chicago’s Coliseum, 14,000 whites and blacks from around the country attending, and heard dozens of speakers sound the same theme. “‘I love the Communist party,’ said Mrs. Laura Osbee, a gaunt stockyards worker in a green shirtwaist, ‘because under its banner we are not fighting for a lousy fifteen dollars a week, but for equal rights. This is the comrade party, the others are the boss parties. We Negroes love the Communist party.’”

Such statements invoking freedom and equal rights, which could be multiplied many times over, serve as a salutary reminder that despite the truth of James C. Scott’s assertion that “‘bread-and-butter’ issues are the essence of lower-class politics and resistance,” the role of idealism in animating members of the lower classes should not be discounted. “If we must die,” an old man said in Washington Park, “we will die for Communism and a great cause, not like stuck hogs.” E. Wight Bakke remarked on the incongruous juxtaposition of inspired idealism and prosaic demands in Communist meetings of unemployed workers in England. Bread-and-butter slogans were never far from the lips of speakers, but, as in the U.S., it was the stirring invocations of solidarity in the struggle against oppression that elicited the loudest cheers. “The worker, for a moment,” Bakke said, “was lifted out of his individual problems and given a sense of worth that comes from a consciousness of being engaged in business which has a focal point outside of one’s self.” This formulation is perceptive, but it leaves out a vital element: the

---

element of struggle, of a collective will to triumph over injustice. The moral dimension is essential to understanding the sway that idealism could have over millions. What is significant about this fact is what it suggests about people’s ordinary mentality and behavior. In brief, if people can so fervently embrace a cause because it is just and gives them dignity, justice and dignity must be deep-seated values, values at a person’s core even underneath the layers of mainstream indoctrination and enforced obedience. And the consciousness of injustice must be not merely superficial; rather, it exists in potentia even amidst the quotidian hassles and harassments of daily life, blossoming into full flower when the opportunity for effectual struggle arises.\textsuperscript{55}

Ordinarily idealism and moral consciousness, even revolt against social and economic degradation, found expression in religion. One might think that religion and Communism would be in contradiction, but this was not always the case. It is true that speakers in Washington Park, according to one observer, were “constantly” decrying religious fantasies as being the opiate of the masses, and that under the influence of Communism large numbers of African-Americans embraced atheism. Some ministers were so disturbed by the growing materialism of their former flock that they ventured into enemy territory, giving lectures in Washington Park to hostile audiences on such subjects as “Christianism and Communism.” The minister of the largest church in the Black Belt did so on one occasion in 1931: when asked by the unfriendly crowd to “explain his presence and to state why he didn’t stay in his church, he made the damaging admission that his congregation wasn’t coming to his church.” His attempts to reconstitute the congregation were fruitless.\textsuperscript{56}

The extremely common attitude on the South Side, as well as in other working-class districts and among men in flophouses and shelters, that everything was a “racket,” that ministers and politicians and other public authorities cared only about the almighty dollar and not at all about the woes of the working man, was itself due in no small part to the agitation of Communists, who were preaching exactly that viewpoint. In some ways the popular attitude may even have been more radical than the Communist, for it approached anarchism in its indiscriminate skepticism of all authority (including, sometimes, left-wing authorities like the CP). Religious authority, however, was the easiest target, and old IWW songs like the following, called “Pie in the Sky”—which mocks a preacher’s reply to a request for bread—were popular:

By and by, by and by,
Sweat all day, live on hay,
’Cause you’ll get pie
In the sky
By and by.\(^{57}\)

On the other hand, it was the usual policy of CP members not to direct their ire at religion but at economic, social, and political injustices. Many blacks in fact transferred their religious enthusiasm to Communism, and doubtless did not necessarily sense an incompatibility between the sacred and the secular. As Michael Gold said, “At mass meetings [African-Americans’] religious past becomes transmitted into a Communist present. They follow every word of the speaker with real emotion; they encourage him, as at a prayer meeting, with cries of ‘Yes, yes, comrade,’ and often there is an involuntary and heartfelt ‘Amen!’” One woman recalled that at

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 20.
least a third of her church at this time was Communist. As in Harlem, the CP’s intense involvement in the Scottsboro fight “gave it entry to churches, fraternal clubs, and political organizations that were previously closed to it”; even the Chicago Defender published an editorial in January 1933 entitled “Why We Can’t Hate Reds.” Prominent ministers began to declare themselves sympathetic to Communism, no doubt primarily for public relations purposes (because of Communists’ popularity in the community). In mid-1934, for example, Reverend J. C. Austin of Pilgrim Baptist Church, in alliance with the International Labor Defense, invited Angelo Herndon to speak at his church. Herndon was a young Party organizer who had become nationally known during his imprisonment in Georgia under the state’s old insurrection law, and his visit attracted an interracial crowd of 3,000 people “from every section of the city.” Herndon’s speech drew wild cheers, but the audience saved its loudest applause for the reverend’s remarks. “From all I have learned of Communism,” Austin said, “it means simply the brotherhood of man, and as far as I can see Jesus Christ was the greatest Communist of them all… Just a week ago I stood in this church and talked to my congregation from the subject ‘Russia, the hope of the Negro.’” A reporter wrote that “fully five minutes” of a “deafening” ovation followed his words (addressed to Communists), “Come here anytime you want to hold a meeting. Not only that, but you will find me always ready and willing to stand shoulder to shoulder with you, preach with you, pray with you, march with you, and, if necessary, die with you for the common good of us all.”

Another illustration of how deeply certain habits and ideas of Communism had penetrated the community is a Party leader’s remark, in an internal discussion in 1932, that “the

word ‘comrade’ is as popular on the South Side as it is in this Plenum. A Republican and Democratic politician going from house to house collecting signatures on petitions asked Negro workers, ‘Will you please sign the petition for comrade so and so?’” Admittedly a trivial detail, the use of this term even by mainstream politicians reveals the temper of the time.\(^5^9\)

Popular adoption of the Communist creed extended to the point of continual participation in interracial meetings and actions, despite Chicago’s long and violent history of racial and ethnic conflict. It is almost superfluous to give examples, since inter-ethnic and -racial solidarity were soon the norm rather than the exception. As early as January 1930, blacks and whites of various ethnicities were marching en masse on City Hall. May Day that year saw a colossal march in the vicinity of Haymarket Square, in which thousands of blacks and hundreds of children participated. On August 1 a large crowd attended an anti-war demonstration at Washington Square, at which the black and white speakers urging interracial cooperation received enthusiastic cheers. “White workers in particular,” reported the Daily Worker, “cheered the slogan of the speakers that it is up to the white workers to demonstrate to their Negro fellow workers that they will really take up the fight for the Negro workers and fight against lynchings and segregation.” In September, hundreds of whites and blacks attended the funeral procession for Lee Mason, a black candidate for Congress whom police had beaten to death at a lynching protest. In February 1931 a “mammoth” hunger march (as described by the Chicago Defender) that proceeded down State Street from 31st to 50th Streets began with a ratio of twenty whites to one black but ended in a rally that was split evenly between the races, at which speakers cried, “Down with the bosses” and for an end to discrimination against black workers. And so it

\(^5^9\) Bill Gebert, “The Struggle for the Negro Masses and the Fight Against the Social Demagogos [sic],” Party Organizer, May-June 1932, 12.
continued month after month for years, hunger marches, rallies, eviction protests, and relief demonstrations regularly being multi-racial and multi-ethnic.⁶⁰

Many Unemployed Council locals united ethnicities that had traditionally been mutually hostile. The Back-of-the-Yards council had several thousand members, who gathered bread from bakeries and other food from stores, even meat stolen from packinghouses, to feed more than 500 people a day. The most spectacular hunger march in this district occurred in April 1932, when thousands of employed and unemployed workers marched to the stockyards (singing a song with the refrain “When the Revolution Comes”) to present a list of demands to representatives of the Armour, Swift, and Wilson companies. A quarter of the demonstrators were black, and hundreds of Mexican and Polish workers marched side-by-side with the American-born. One participant recalled the significance of such experiences. “Polish, Lithuanian, Catholic, Protestant, or whatever,” Joe Zabritski said, “it didn’t matter who you were, just that you needed help. Sure some of the old suspicions were there, but they fell away once people saw what they could do together.” Mexicans were especially active in Packingtown’s unemployed movement, in part because the Catholic Church there did virtually nothing to reach out to them, thus making it easier for them to join left-wing, non-Mexican organizations. Still, even they sometimes let caution dictate their moves. In October 1932, members of the University of Chicago Settlement’s Mexican Club of Unemployed Men voted against joining over 25,000 other workers in a hunger march protesting cuts in relief, out of fear that police would label them as Communists and hand them over to immigration officials. Many immigrants must have let this fear get the best of them during the Depression.⁶¹

⁶¹ Rick Halpern, Down on the Killing Floor: Black and White Workers in Chicago’s Packinghouses, 1904–1954 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 101–104; Daily Worker, April 21, 1932; Chicago Defender, April 23,
In South Chicago, too—no haven of ethnic harmony—people of various backgrounds and different employment statuses united, at least periodically, under the banner of Communism. In September 1932 a reported 1,200 steelworkers, most of them working part-time or unemployed, jammed a hall in the neighborhood to listen to the Communist leader William Dunne speak, standing in for an ill William Z. Foster. The crowd, which included blacks, whites, youth, and many women, unanimously approved the following resolution: “We South Chicago workers assembled by the call to action of the Communist Party of the United States of America for the unity of all working class forces in a joint struggle against starvation, against the war program of the capitalists, pledge our support to the program of united struggle and to the Communist candidates, Foster for president and James W. Ford for vice-president.” The CP had less support in South Chicago than in Bronzeville and Back of the Yards, but even here, evidently, it was able to organize interracial cooperation.62

Needless to say, it was not only men doing the organizing and protesting. In Chicago, 15 percent of CP members were women, half of them working and half unemployed. Chicago’s party never put its resources into organizing women, but it seems that many did not require much of an external stimulus to activism in any case. To some degree they were held back by the sexism that even egalitarian-minded CP members could not always rid themselves of. An internal party discussion in early 1932 testifies to this fact: “In some of our unemployed branches in Chicago,” a member writes, “the women constitute the most active elements in the unemployed branch, yet we find that at a meeting of the City Committee of the Unemployed

---

Councils only one woman delegate is present. The tendency in the unemployed councils is that women can do the technical work, distribute leaflets, fight evictions and appear before charities for relief, but women are not eligible as delegates to the City Committee from their respective unemployed branches.” Often women were organized in women’s councils and mothers’ leagues, instead of being drawn into unemployed branches or the block committees that attracted the most militant people in the neighborhood. These female-centered groups engaged in such struggles as demanding pots and pans, bed linen, and clothing from relief agencies and organizing neighborhoods to picket shops that charged high prices.63

The various social pressures that militated against women’s active involvement in the Communist party did not prevent them from participating en masse in marches and rallies (which participation, we should remember, was always a significant act because of the threat of police brutality). On the one hand, women with children did not have much time to devote to organizing or Party activities, and the exigencies of trying to keep a family alive and healthy tended to fix their gaze almost exclusively on issues of relief that many Communists considered relatively trivial. Margaret Keller, the CP’s director of women’s work in 1933, complained, “it is terrible difficult work among the women, they are very narrow, due to the majority being housewives and can’t see anything else but the relief, we hope through education to convince them this is a political struggle.”64

On the other hand, evidence of women’s determination in both employed and unemployed struggles is abundant. Historians have amply shown that women workers and wives

63 K. E., “Organize the Work Among Women!” Party Organizer, January 1932, 26; Storch, Red Chicago, 45; Chicago Hunger Fighter, February 27, 1932; Daily Worker, February 10, 1931. A dramatic example of the demonstrations against rising prices occurred in Harlem in 1935, when “a flying squadron of black housewives marched through the streets demanding that butchers lower their prices by 25 percent.” They warned that if they didn’t, they could expect a riot. The butchers complied. See Lashawn Harris, “Running with the Reds: African American Women and the Communist Party during the Great Depression,” Journal of African American History, vol. 94, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 27.
64 Storch, Red Chicago, 126.
played active, even essential, roles in strikes throughout the 1930s, but they have devoted less attention to such collective action in the context of unemployment. One has but to peruse newspapers of the time, however, to learn that women were not infrequently more militant than men, sometimes even more aggressive in resisting police. In late July 1932 a meeting of employed and unemployed workers was called to protest the expulsion from Douglas Park of people who had no other place to sleep. Led by Chicago’s infamous Red Squad, police tried to break up the meeting, driving motorcycles across the sidewalk and into the crowd of men, women, and children. When they seized the speaker, “women led the struggle to get their leader back from the police,” which they did successfully. At eviction protests they acted similarly, exhorting crowds to “act like men”—“Hold your places, comrades!”—when attacked by police. Black women were especially prominent in these protests, as in parades and rallies, where they lustily led the singing and chanting.

In December 1934 a correspondent reported in an issue of the CP’s Working Woman that women from coal mining families in Hillsboro, Illinois had organized to demand adequate relief. They “held meetings, traveled through the countryside, raised money, and, in defiance of the male leadership of the Progressive Miners’ Association, led demonstrations. As one march began on City Hall, the male demonstrators ‘made vain efforts to keep their wives from the front ranks.’” Just as collective action birthed class consciousness among unemployed men, so it

---


birthed an incipient feminist consciousness among their wives, a sense of female power and a 

willingness to defy gendered expectations.67

By mid-1932 Chicago had about eighty Unemployed Council locals with ten or fifteen thousand members at a given time, in addition to the many block committees and neighborhood committees that sent delegates to these locals. An article in the Daily Worker about a “typical” unemployed branch in Chicago (in Lawndale, on the West Side) illuminated the inner life of the councils, in particular the challenges they faced in building a truly sustainable mass movement. In the two-year history of this council, many hundreds of names had been on its membership books, but at no time more than 200. Usually less than 50 attended the branch meetings. “These meetings,” the author wrote, “consist mostly of dull routine. Most of the time the agenda has too many points, sometimes as high as 21… The deadly monotony is often broken by squabbles and disorder.” The best people were driven away by the long meetings and unnecessary arguments. Moreover, American-born workers were viewed with suspicion—90 percent of the members were Jewish, mostly of foreign birth—and “the talk of stool-pigeons, especially by a Party member, [had] create[d] an atmosphere of distrust.” Nearly all the families helped by the council drifted away because there was “no organizational machinery to keep in touch with them and to overcome the influence of the charities which bribe and frighten them away from us.” Altogether, the branch was “headless and demoralized.”68

Party members complained alternately about the absence and the too-strong presence of Party control over councils. It was difficult to find the happy medium in which CP members provided sufficient guidance to keep council work productive and growing but not so much

guidance that councils became adjuncts of the Party that stifled neighborhood democracy. In late 1933, CP leader Israel Amter stated in the *Party Organizer* that there was too much “mechanical” Communist control of the councils. “We think we can remove and appoint and do exactly as we please. The organizers that we put in are responsible to the Party but have no responsibility to the masses.” Herbert Benjamin had registered a similar complaint a year earlier: “Party organizations instead of mobilizing the membership for participation in Unemployed Councils and committees, themselves take over the functions of these united from organizations. Where non-Party workers are attracted to our movement in such cases, they find themselves excluded from all participation in the actual work of planning and leading actions.” On the other hand, the March 1932 *Daily Worker* article that was mentioned above (among others) noted that the council had until recently had no functioning Party fraction at all (and that now that it did, not much had changed because Party members were themselves fractious and undisciplined). Internal documents from the CP’s Chicago district, likewise, periodically lamented the absence of functioning Party fractions in councils.69

In this context of obstacles to the unemployed movement’s growth, one must also mention, again, the essential role of police terror. Had there been no police at all, of course, it is likely that a great many people, not fearing legal repercussions, would have revolted against their rulers, invading stores and warehouses and taking what they wanted. As stated in the Introduction, this fact already suggests that a Gramscian or culture-focused interpretation of society must be subordinated to an economistic Marxian interpretation that emphasizes the role of sheer violence in upholding business rule. And violence, as we have seen, was something the

Chicago police excelled at. Party member Harry Haywood’s retrospective remarks were accurate:

The city administration’s answer to this growing [unemployed] movement was unbridled police terror. A tool of the corrupt city government and allied with gangsters, Chicago’s police force undoubtedly held the record for terror and lawlessness against workers. They were unsurpassed for sadism and brutality, regularly raiding the halls and offices of the Unemployed Councils, revolutionary organizations and the Party—smashing furniture, beating workers in the halls, on the streets and in the precinct stations. Hundreds were [sometimes] arrested [on a single occasion].

The Red Squad (the special police force devoted to terrorizing radicals and rebellious workers) constantly surveilled Communists, sending undercover agents to Party meetings and periodically stealing or destroying Party records. By 1940 the squad’s leader, Lieutenant Make Mills, had amassed a file of index cards that included 5,000 local Communists and 75,000 names around the country; the cards specified each person’s occupation, nationality, age, and leadership role. –

---

70 Harry Haywood, *Black Bolshevik: Autobiography of an Afro-American Communist* (Chicago: Liberator Press, 1978), 444. Consider one example of the continual horrors that went on behind closed doors at the police stations. In August 1937, a 20-year-old African-American boy named William Harris was arrested (mistakenly, it turned out) for supposedly stealing a woman’s purse a few weeks earlier. As the *Daily Worker* later reported, “Harris states that [at the police station, two officers] handcuffed his hands behind him to a ladder with his feet on a box. Then [one of them] kicked the box out from under his feet leaving him hanging in the air with the handcuffs cutting his wrists. Harris still refused to confess. He was punched in the stomach, back and sides. At last they used a board a foot wide and beat him across the feet, stomach, back and chest about 60 times. Five minutes later they took him back and hung him up again for 15 minutes, beating him again. Then they unlocked the handcuffs and Harris fell face forward to the floor.” Because of this beating, his right arm, wrist, and hand were paralyzed. *Daily Worker*, August 21, 1937.
In short, fear of police harassment and violence must have dissuaded countless thousands from participating in collective action.\footnote{Storch, “Shades of Red,” 33; Frank Donner, \textit{Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 50.}

Police tactics changed over several years, but at all times the use of violence as a deterrent, a punishment, and an effective interrupter of protests was crucial. In 1930, with one exception every outdoor demonstration (and many indoor meetings) that Communists organized was cut short by the police. This tendency continued for much of 1931, but eventually it was judged to be simpler and less politically costly (given the continual displays of frenzied brutality against even women and children) for the police to allow demonstrations, requiring only that a permit be obtained first. When it was denied but the event proceeded anyway, the ensuing police violence could be justified on the basis of the demonstration’s “illegality.” Participants in such illegal actions sometimes armed themselves with sticks and clubs and filled their pockets with stones; those who did not might follow the CP’s instruction to at least use their fists or to try to snatch clubs from police officers and use them on the police (in order to protect whoever was speaking). Usually, however, as in the innumerable relief-station demonstrations and most eviction protests, the demonstrators were unarmed. This did not stop the police from behaving as they did, for instance, at a March 1932 rally in front of the Japanese Consulate on Michigan Avenue, in protest against Japan’s invasion of China and Manchuria: “From Ohio Street,” reported the \textit{New York Herald Tribune}, “came the mounted police and machine gun squads. They galloped up the sidewalk, hurtling their mounts into the thick of the crowd. They clubbed left and right with all their strength”—incidentally hitting fellow officers on foot—“while the

Spectacular police violence, while less frequent than between 1930 and 1933, continued into the later years of the decade, as the 1937 Memorial Day Massacre attests. In 1935, a South Side demonstration of 10,000 people against Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia required between 750 and 2,000 police (accounts vary) in order to be broken up. The Red Squad especially discouraged interracial interaction, even in harmless contexts, as was clear from an interview Make Mills gave to (white) University of Chicago students in 1934. After being briefly taken into custody for talking to blacks on the South Side (the police lectured them about being in a “nigger” neighborhood, telling them to stay out of the Black Belt), they visited Mills to ask if he approved of arrests for such a reason. Evidently he did. “Anytime you go into a nigger district you’ll get hit with a club… You’ve no right to go into any nigger neighborhood.” With only slight exaggeration, the *Chicago Defender* commented that “it is the duty of [Mills’] squad to cruise around the city in search of ‘Reds,’ as evidenced by a group in which black and white people are found together as friends and not fighting each other. Whenever these squads find such gatherings, they immediately pounce upon the offenders, beat men and women over their heads with clubs, haul them off to stations and put them through ‘the works,’ which usually consists of photographing and fingerprinting them.” Unauthorized demonstrations at relief stations, too, continued to attract the police’s brutal notice the whole decade.\footnote{*New York Amsterdam News*, September 7, 1935; Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, 447–457; *Chicago Defender*, May 26, 1934, March 5, 1938. A *Chicago Defender* reporter witnessed the aftermath of the 1935 demonstration: “If the people who saw the police break up the parade were surprised at the brutality that went on all afternoon on 47th Street they would have been astonished at the downright savageness with which the police amused themselves at the}
Investigations by the ACLU illuminated the various other means that authorities had to discourage and suppress unemployed radicalism. As a report stated,

[The unemployed] run up against refusals of permits for meetings and parades, bans by mayors on meetings and parades, refusals of the use of tax-supported meeting places such as school-halls, police orders to landlords to refuse to rent halls, misapplication of ordinances against the distribution of advertising matter by hand bills, refusal of permits to post notices, and rarely, injunctions. Sometimes the welfare authorities themselves are responsible for attempts to hinder or disrupt the organization of the unemployed. Cases are not infrequent where persons active in organization work have been cut off the relief rolls…

In short, throughout the decade the civil liberties of the unemployed were systematically, though not universally, denied. In the words of one article, “Clients protesting inadequate relief [and] workers on relief projects organizing against wage reductions find themselves arrested and in the courts charged with, ‘Disorderly Conduct,’ ‘Malicious Mischief,’ ‘Assault,’ ‘Riot,’ ‘Anarchy,’ ‘Treason,’ ‘Criminal Syndicalism,’ or even ‘Conspiracy to Overthrow the Government.’” The last two charges carried prison sentences of up to twenty years. Most states, including Illinois, had sedition and criminal syndicalism laws, though they were infrequently applied. Vastly more common was the charge of disorderly conduct, which could cover everything from leafletting to

---

Wabash Avenue Station. The patrol wagons gathered in such numbers in front of the station as to hold up traffic on 48th Street. Prisoners were unloaded in the middle of the thoroughfare. On each side of the wagon formed a long double line of 15-30 police. The unfortunate prisoners were pulled out of the vehicle and forced to run the gauntlet. Their heads, shins and bodies were clubbed by policemen who yelped in glee at the bloody sight.” Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 455.

demonstrating to being in Chicago’s Black Belt while white. Even after Harry Hopkins gave an order in the spring of 1936 affirming the right of the unemployed to organize and to present their grievances—which did help improve relations with relief authorities—the right of assembly in Chicago continued to be denied on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{75}

But the fact that enormous numbers of the jobless were eager to organize and demonstrate even in the face of legalized repression and police brutality left it to more “benign” authorities to bring about the decline of the Unemployed Councils. Not, however, before the climax of activity occurred in late 1932 and early 1933. In October 1932 a 50 percent cut in relief was necessary because of inadequate funds, but it was not accepted passively by those it affected. Among the many demonstrations was one at a relief station on October 6, at which police drove into the crowd and opened fire, killing one man and wounding others. Scores more actions followed: for example, on October 11 at least 25 demonstrations happened in front of aldermen’s homes, the mayor’s home, and relief stations. As stated in the last chapter, all these actions, plus an enormous hunger march on October 31, got the cut rescinded. Resistance continued on a typically broad scale in the following months—in part related to and supportive of the second National Hunger March the Communists organized to Washington, D.C.—and into the spring, large demonstrations on a variety of issues occurring continually.\textsuperscript{76}

In January, many of them were directed at the relief authorities’ change in policy that was a “great blow” to the Unemployed Councils, to quote an analyst from the time. As Randi Storch has related, on January 1, 1933 the relief administration declared that it would no longer accept complaints from organized groups at relief stations, instead setting up a Public Relations Bureau

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Daily Worker}, October 7, 12, 15, 25, 1932.
downtown where unemployed organizations could register their grievances. Demonstrations were held at the stations in defiance of the new ruling, but the police strictly and violently enforced it. This simple shift in policy did far more than police violence in itself ever could to undercut the Councils, because now that adjudication occurred in a relatively routinized manner downtown it was harder for the CP to illustrate to the community the efficacy of mass pressure. Illegal demonstrations grew less frequent, and over the course of 1933 councils in some parts of the city were “almost completely wiped out of existence,” according to an internal Party letter. “The workers were looking for ACTION,” it stated, “[and] when they did not see the actions, they quit the councils.”

The other main blow to the Councils, of course, was the election of Franklin Roosevelt. Historians have exhaustively analyzed the ways in which Roosevelt’s populism co-opted and undermined radicalism, so we need not dwell on that point here. Dubofsky’s formulation is pithy: “By frightening the ruling class into conceding reforms and appealing to workers to vote as a solid block, Roosevelt simultaneously intensified class consciousness and stripped it of its radical potential.” Internal CP discussions in 1936 acknowledged that the Party and its mass organizations had had difficulty adapting to Roosevelt, for instance making the mistake of attacking the Civilian Conservation Corps as fascist and militaristic despite its (quite justified) popularity with the public. But even had radicals shown more savvy in their protests against Roosevelt, the fact is that FERA and the various federal work-relief programs did improve conditions for millions of people. To the degree that grievances over relief and lack of jobs were addressed, it is natural that fewer people would clamor for or participate in disruptive protest.

While their (revolutionary) maximal demands were not met—of munificent social insurance, the wholesale ending of evictions, government guarantee of employment, no discrimination against blacks, etc.—enough demands were answered in the middle years of the decade for the turbulence of earlier unemployed activism to subside somewhat.\(^78\)

One might just as easily argue, therefore, that the decline of the Councils and their turbulent modes of protest signified their \textit{success} as that it signified their \textit{failure}. Despite the evolution of historiography since the 1970s from its earlier stress on the long-term “failure” of the Councils, this point bears greater emphasis than it usually receives. Even critics of Piven and Cloward’s celebrated \textit{Poor People’s Movements} concede the intuitively obvious core of their argument, that the state’s move to the left in the 1930s was a response to the tumult of protest movements among both employed and unemployed workers.\(^79\) The implication is that the Unemployed Councils, the (Musteite) Unemployed Leagues, the (Socialist) Workers Committees, the Workers Leagues, the Unemployed Unions, and all the thousands of similar organizations across the country met with remarkable success, for, in effect, they laid the foundations of the welfare state in the U.S. They forced government to intervene in society and the economy on a hitherto unimaginable scale, and by so doing to undermine the very conditions of these groups’ rapid growth. For them to succeed, then—i.e., to make the mainstream go left (to some degree)—was, ironically, to plant the seeds of their own undoing. And yet despite the immense political importance and success of these organizations, it is still possible for the volume on the Great Depression in Oxford’s History of the United States to include but a single

\(^78\) Dubofsky, “Not So ‘Turbulent Years.’” 221.
sentence on the Unemployed Councils. Such is posterity’s continuing condescension towards radical groups of this era.

One more cause of the nationwide decline of Unemployed Councils after 1933 ought to be mentioned: to quote CP members themselves, as struggles among employed workers crescendoed in 1933 and 1934, much of the attention of radical organizers shifted away from the jobless. This continued to be the case in 1936 and ’37, when the CIO set about organizing the mass-production industries. The millions of workers on relief projects, too, became an object of greater interest to organizers than those on direct relief were. From a Marxist, or indeed a generically left-wing, perspective, it made perfect sense to shift one’s focus away from the unemployed and towards classic union-building when the opportunity arose.

Nevertheless, it is easy to underestimate the continued militancy of a minority of Chicago’s jobless in 1933 and afterwards. The parks remained full of speakers and crowds, and of thousands of fists held in the air when, e.g., a speaker shouted, “A revolution is what we need. A revolution against white bosses and black bosses!” The League of Struggle for Negro Rights remained instrumental in stopping evictions on the South Side—although both evictions and eviction protests became less frequent. Despite the forbidding of demonstrations at local relief stations, many continued to occur the whole decade, although, as usual, the paucity of sources clouds our historical vision. Harry Haywood casually mentions speaking at a relief-station demonstration in late 1934, as if such demonstrations were still happening rather frequently (especially on the South Side). Earlier that year the Hunger Fighter reported that Unemployed Council Local 25—and there were still dozens of councils in the city—had organized a small

---

number of people to demand (successfully) their delayed CWA checks, clothing, and shoes at the local relief station. A year later, it was reported that locals had recently been winning many grievance cases for relief and were doing such things as organizing neighborhood libraries, performing theater pieces their members had written, and organizing study clubs. It was mentioned in the last chapter that the pace of relief-station demonstrations and sit-ins picked up again starting in 1937, with the aid of the Workers Alliance and the CIO. Meanwhile, organizing campaigns among relief workers, from the CWA to the later years of the WPA, had considerable success nationwide, as indicated in the previous chapter. This subject, however, is outside the scope of the present study.82

The immense number of large demonstrations and parades that continued to take place in Chicago after Roosevelt’s election—and in Springfield too, particularly the state hunger marches in response to relief cuts—is enough to cast doubt on the notion that workers and the unemployed were oddly passive or “individualistic” in their responses to the Depression. Of course, as is usually the case even in moments of crisis, the majority of people did not participate in these actions. But in the aggregate throughout the decade, even if one assumes that Communist estimates of crowd sizes were highly exaggerated, probably between 300,000 and 600,000 Chicagoans took part at some point in the huge parades and demonstrations that happened many times each year. Whether the particular issue was related to unemployment, racism, Scottsboro, anti-fascism, anti-war, or May Day, organizers could regularly count on far more people than only Party members from showing up. In fact, during relief crises, the Unemployed Councils themselves revived, for a brief time approaching their earlier vitality. In the June 1935 issue of the Party Organizer, for example, a correspondent reported that councils

82 Edith Margo, “Chicago’s South Side Sees ‘Red,’” Daily Worker, June 3, 1933; Gosnell, Negro Politicians, 331; Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 445; Hunger Fighter, May 19, 1934, August 1935; New York Times, April 11, 1937; Chicago Defender, March 5, 1938.
in several parts of the city were growing, and overflow meetings were being held on a united front basis (with Socialists and other groups). “Many Sections [of Chicago],” he said, “have correctly linked up the struggle for the opening of the [relief] stations and against the sales tax with the struggle against the high cost of living. In Sections 4 and 11 neighborhood committees are conducting struggle against the high cost of living, participating in all actions for relief and against the sales tax.” Demonstrations were also organized quickly and successfully in front of the homes of state representatives.  

In Cook County, the Unemployment Councils (as they had been renamed) had about 4,500 members in early 1935, who could rally around them thousands more when necessary. In late 1934, when relief was at a low ebb, one of Harry Hopkins’ reporters wrote to him that people on the southwest side of Chicago (among other areas) were growing more belligerent. “The [relief] clients are well organized,” he said. “There are active units of the Workers’ Unemployment Committee and the Unemployed Council as well as another radical group called the Mt. Greenwood Benefit Association. The radical groups stage demonstrations with increasing frequency… The relief staff has to be on its guard at all moments lest a grievance committee appear in large numbers to disrupt the office routine.” The Italians, Poles, Greeks, and other immigrant groups in these neighborhoods were “prone to join whatever organizations invite them,” and were in the midst of picketing relief stations when the reporter visited the area.  

Months earlier, in May 1934, the Hunger Fighter had reported on the state committee meeting of the Illinois Unemployment Council. There had been an increase in organizational

---

activities throughout the state, and demonstrations had, as usual, been forcing relief expansions. “Downstate Illinois has ordered more than 22,000 membership cards in the last two months,” the paper reported. “Many new locals have been established, some in unorganized counties. Peoria County leads, having forced two relief increases and established nine locals with 1,700 members in two months. Sangamon County (Springfield) increased its membership tremendously and has practically doubled their relief.” That summer, the Daily Worker continued to report eviction demonstrations in Illinois. In one case, in Decatur, Unemployed Council members set the furniture back in the family’s apartment; after they left, the constable came back, loaded the furniture onto a truck, and hauled it off to a warehouse; the next day the Council returned to see how the family was doing and found them “scattered about among the neighbors,” so the men went to the warehouse, demanded the furniture, and put it back inside the house once again. That same day a couple of other such actions went on in the same neighborhood—which suggests that eviction resistance was still very common in towns and cities around the state.85

In short, Unemployed Councils existed in Chicago the whole decade, their fortunes waxing and waning in the context of broader political and economic currents. Through the whole decade they competed and cooperated with other organizations, most notably the Chicago Workers Committee on Unemployment, to which we now turn. Later I’ll sum up the two discussions and relate them to more general matters of popular attitudes towards both the relief system and the American political economy.

Workers Committee on Unemployment

85 Hunger Fighter, May 19, 1934; Daily Worker, June 7, 1934.
The story of the Workers Committee on Unemployment (WCU) lends support to Hallgren’s belief, stated earlier, that if Communists had had the “courage” to discuss revolution in straightforward American terms, millions of people might have wholeheartedly rallied to their banner. Founded in the summer of 1931, within a year the WCU had grown to encompass almost 15,000 people divided into 49 local units “meeting in all sections of the city,” according to Robert Asher, a young historian who participated in it. Soon it was to have at least 60 locals. Asher emphasized the political radicalism of its members: “The organized unemployed say they are fed up with the Republicans, the Democrats and the system they represent. They are ready [in September 1932] for a complete new deal and will back to the limit any political party with a radical economic program. With this in mind they have made the establishment of a planned economy, in which social security and the right to work shall be placed above the interests of private profit, one of the principal planks in their platform.” The rest of their demands, likewise, were similar to Communists’: adequate medical, dental, and hospital care, public housing, free public employment exchanges, the five-day week and six-hour day, unemployment insurance, etc. Had the WCU had more resources, its membership likely could have expanded to far more than the 25,000 people it included by early 1933. But even this number was a substantial achievement for an organization only eighteen months old.86

The Workers Committee was founded in July 1931 by a group of fifteen or twenty members of the Socialist Party and the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) who were fed up with the SP’s inaction on the issue of unemployment. Under the leadership of Karl Borders, executive secretary of the Chicago LID, this group of social workers, preachers, professors, and

union leaders first agreed on a political program (stated above) and then set about establishing locals. The Reverend W. B. Waltmire, pastor of the Humboldt Park Methodist Church, organized the first local with fifty unemployed men from his neighborhood, a number that quickly increased to almost three hundred. This group consisted mostly of Scandinavian immigrants; a second local, consisting of Poles, was established at Association House, a settlement house nearby. Three branches were formed at Northwestern University Settlement, and more spread to Chicago Commons, Onward Neighborhood House, and churches on the northwest side of the city. Before long there were ten branches (containing Greeks, Italians, English-speakers, and others), and it was decided that delegates from each should meet every two weeks at Association House to discuss their specific problems and work out joint solutions. The original group of Karl Borders and his fellow founders, which had continued to meet downtown, became the Central Committee for the whole organization, and worked together with delegates from the locals to plan activities.87

Overwhelmingly, the men (and it was mostly men) who joined the Workers Committee were manual laborers. In many cases a few men in a different part of the city heard about the original locals, decided to organize their neighborhood on a similar basis, and then affiliated with the Committee. “Sometimes the initiative came from a Socialist, a LID member, or a minister,” Roy Rosenzweig writes, “but most often the unemployed themselves provided the organizing talent. A member of an existing local might, for example, be evicted, move to a new neighborhood, and form a local there.” Without the support of settlement houses, however, the movement could scarcely have gotten started. They provided facilities, intellectual leadership,

connections with political and relief authorities, speakers to periodically address the locals, and morale-boosting encouragement to the discouraged jobless. Frank W. McCulloch, who became one of the leaders of the Workers Committee, remarked later that “the cooperation of the Commons was so constant, its leadership so central a factor in the establishment and maintenance of the CWCOU…that I suspect many of us took the Commons—and other settlements—too much for granted.”

Indeed, an important reason why Workers Committees were most successful in Chicago and (to a lesser degree) New York City is that settlements there had the political independence necessary to support such a “radical” movement. Unlike in other cities, they were not funded by a central Community Chest, an institution that was dominated by conservative elements from the city’s professional and business (particularly banking) elite. The Chest board, in effect, controlled every agency it funded, and could prevent settlements from supporting groups of the unemployed and other such class enemies of businessmen. In Chicago, on the other hand, any particular agency might have either a conservative or a liberal board; and if the board was liberal, a settlement could sometimes get away with providing facilities even for Unemployed Council meetings. Chicago Commons and others had such liberal boards—often because one influential liberal who sat on them, such as the Democratic lawyer Frank H. McCulloch (Frank W.’s father) in the case of the Commons, could outweigh the voices of conservatives. Thus, it was only a slight difference in the policies of repression between Chicago and other cities that opened up the institutional space for a significant unemployed movement to flower there.89

---

Throughout its existence the “higher echelons” of the Workers Committee, with the participation of the rank and file, concentrated on publicizing the plight of the jobless and pressing for legislative action. They worked with the Governor’s Commission in 1931 to raise funds for relief, lobbied for a special session of the legislature to deal with unemployment, organized a series of public hearings in 1932 and 1933, represented the unemployed in continual intercessions with relief authorities at local and state levels, and cooperated with other groups to push for state and federal unemployment insurance. On occasion the Workers Committee formed a united front with the Unemployed Councils, but Communists’ behavior in the October 1932 hunger march was so sectarian that it poisoned relations for years. The Speakers’ Bureau of the WCU arranged debates and open forums, and sent ten or twelve speakers a week to locals in order to stimulate discussion on contemporary issues. For six months in 1933 a newspaper was also published, the *New Frontier*, which had a style and content almost as radical as the Unemployed Council’s newspaper the *Hunger Fighter*.90

As the unemployed themselves took over increasing control of the Workers Committee in early 1932, the actions that locals engaged in became more militant, focused on immediate problems and not only legislative solutions. (The militancy of the rank and file calls to mind Communists’ need sometimes to *dampen* the energy of UC members, by discouraging group looting of supermarkets and violence against property.) Locals established grievance committees that, much as in Unemployed Councils—though usually less belligerently—presented cases to relief offices, demanding better treatment of clients. Whatever emergency arose in the neighborhood, Workers Committee members would rush over to remedy it. Gertrude Springer, a settlement worker, gave examples in January 1933:

The settlements claim no credit except as they afford a taking-off place and provide opportunities for the particular kind of neighborly help which the people give each other… For instance at Association House and a number of other settlements the Workers’ Committee local keeps a squad of ten men on duty all day, shock troops, to pop into any emergency that may arise. If Mrs. Olinsky’s relief coal has by someone’s error been dumped in the street and she has no way to get it up four flights to her kitchen, the shock troops are there in two shakes to do the job. If the baker in the next block telephones that he has a hundred left-over loaves and does Mr. Eells knows anybody…presto, a couple of men get it and deliver it to the homes where the relief ration is stretched thin.

The shock troops were especially useful in the case of evictions or the “petty persecutions” that landlords resorted to in order to get nonpaying tenants to leave of their own accord. In many settlements, locals had a list of all the vacant apartments in the neighborhood; upon hearing of an eviction, men would arrive to move the furniture into the nearest apartment. At other times they would, by one means or another, prevail upon landlords not to evict someone. Or they would foil the landlord’s sabotage of his tenants’ well-being:

Mrs. Russo’s landlord takes down the door to her flat and carries it off. Come a couple of carpenters from the local with a knocked-up packing case and presently Mrs. Russo has a door that answers every practical purpose. Mrs. Kelly’s little boy reports breathlessly that his mother’s kitchen is flooded—a mysterious hole
in a water-pipe and the landlord won’t do anything. A plumber, doing his tour of duty on the emergency squad, solders up the hole, obviously punched with a chisel. Mrs. Cohen is being smoked out, “Come a’runnin’.” Shock-troopers climb up to the roof, remove a rough and ready layer of bricks from Mrs. Cohen’s chimney top, and life goes on.\footnote{Gertrude Springer, “Shock Troops to the Rescue,” \textit{Survey}, January 1933, 9–11.}

Such were the tactics of class struggle at a relatively “primitive” level, which were supplemented by the grander tactics of mass meetings and large demonstrations. Interspersed with these forms of protest were other types of working-class self-activity, including (as with Unemployed Councils) the sponsoring of Christmas parties, dances, picnics, sewing clubs, bands, numerous educational programs, slide shows, a library, and a “Workers’ Training School,” all of which led Workers Committee locals to become “part of the fabric of community life, much like the local saloon, church, or fraternal lodge,” to quote a historian.\footnote{Rosenzweig, “Organizing the Unemployed,” 45; Rosenzweig, “‘Socialism In Our Time,’” 493; \textit{New Frontier}, December 12, 1932, January 8, 1933.}

In early 1933 a student at the University of Chicago wrote a case-study of a Workers Committee local in South Chicago that describes the trajectory of a typical unit. In March 1932 seven unemployed men drew up plans for a local: they announced in the \textit{Daily Calumet} that the first few meetings would be held in the Bessemer Park clubhouse and invited anyone to attend. A month later the group still had only 45 members, so they mimeographed and distributed over a thousand handbills and printed more advertisements in the \textit{Daily Calumet} (which ran two or three front-page headliners on the group). So many people began to show up that they had to start using a large auditorium for their weekly meetings, at which speakers from the WCU’s Central Committee made presentations on unemployment and the necessity of building a
nationwide movement. (At the first meeting over sixty police stood guard, in case it was a Communist gathering.) More than three hundred people of various nationalities regularly attended the lectures, though not everyone was accepted as a member because “no one present could vouch for them.” After a few months there was a crisis: Communists started showing up to disrupt the proceedings, on one occasion taking possession of the platform to denounce leaders of the WCU as traitors to the working class, misleaders, etc. As so often in those years, the Communists could not have been more successful at undermining the Left had they been FBI provocateurs: they antagonized everyone present, and the local actually ceased meeting for a while.

When meetings resumed they were in a smaller location, and membership had to be built up again from a small base. Once a grievance committee was formed in June 1932, however, new members started flooding in, as many as forty a week. At first the method of resolving grievances consisted of a personal interview between the committee and the supervisor or assistant supervisor at the local relief station, but later the relief office added the initial step of having to file a formal written complaint, which could be followed by a personal interview only if the grievance was not satisfactorily resolved. Another important project of the local, which was the first of its kind undertaken by the WCU, was to collect fruits and vegetables from farms for distribution among hundreds of members. This was no simple task: trucks and drivers had to be found; an alderman had to issue letters of introduction to officials of oil and gas companies so they would donate gasoline; letters of introduction to the farmers had to be obtained; and the produce had to be distributed in such a way that everyone received an equal amount.

---

93 Police usually treated members of the WCU better than Communists (when they made the distinction), but similar violations of civil liberties did take place: arrest for possession of a copy of the WCU’s platform, refusal of permits to parade, being cut off relief or fired from works projects for distributing the New Frontier, etc.
Nevertheless, it seems the project was a great success. Other locals organized similar undertakings, in addition to running cooperative barbershops and doing shoe and furniture repairing for each other.95

Since the basis for the Workers Committee’s success, however, was its constant interventions at relief stations, the establishment of the Public Relations Bureau in January 1933 was a major blow, as it was to the Unemployed Councils. The WCU’s numbers and its spirit began to decline—slowly. “The Workers’ Committee continued to use all forms of protest,” Robert Asher writes. “It achieved a noteworthy success [in 1933] in mitigating the plight of the single men. Its members marched under their own banners in the ‘Save Our Schools’ parades. They showed their solidarity with other workers by setting up a labor committee and getting on to strikers’ picket lines with signs of ‘The Unemployed Won’t Scab.’” They continued to call for vastly increased relief and workers’ representation on relief agencies, in addition to holding a third series of public hearings in June 1934 and conducting campaigns for cash relief instead of relief in kind. Indeed, the Committee’s 1934 annual report stated that in campaigns for decent relief and economic security it had “played an increasingly active and fruitful part” that year, among other things helping to organize the Chicago Labor College, agitating (by means of resolutions, letters, meetings, and visits to legislators) for unemployment insurance and a public works program, gathering thousands of signatures on petitions for cash relief, and joining the Unemployed Councils in a gigantic hunger march through the Loop on November 24 to protest relief cuts and other abuses. After the end of the CWA, a program that had destroyed many unemployed groups, the WCU grew from 25 to 30 locals with (according to Frank McCulloch) 7,500 members by early 1935. Still, as the administration of relief became more centralized in

1933 and ’34, and also in some respects more responsive to the popular will, both the Workers Committee and the Unemployed Councils ceased to be as “menacing [a] threat to the established political and economic order” as they had been.  

Accordingly, to magnify its impact the unemployed movement entered its “unity” phase. An attempt to form a Federation of Unemployed Workers Leagues in late 1932 and early 1933, which in its first meeting already had representatives from 35 Midwestern organizations, founderd on sectarian disputes when the Communists and Musteites (in the form of the Congress for Progressive Labor Action) got involved. Much more successful, though more limited in its ambitions and of a different structure, was the Illinois Workers Alliance, founded by WCU members and allies in December 1933. This organization quickly became one of the most powerful unemployed associations in the country, with locals in over 200 Illinois towns and cities; miners, a characteristically militant group, were especially attracted to it. As the (unaffiliated) Unemployed Councils lost visibility, the IWA gained it. It played a key role in the establishment of the nationwide Workers Alliance in March 1935, and managed to survive, albeit ultimately in a weakened state, until the U.S. entered World War II.  

In Chicago, the Workers Committee and the IWA were more or less identical: the locals of the former were those of the latter. As before, their main function was the handling of relief grievances. But with the formation of the Public Relations Bureau, the procedure had become

---

harassingly bureaucratic and inefficient. First, the person with a complaint had to try to resolve it himself at his district relief station; if he failed, the local’s grievance committee (composed of others on relief) would take it up—if it was judged to have merit. The aggrieved had to sign a statement describing the complaint, after which (in Cook County, at least) it was forwarded to the chairman of the central grievance committee at the IWA’s office in Chicago, who, like the chairman of the local grievance committee, had to decide whether it was valid. If he thought it was, he placed the seal of the organization on it and forwarded it to the Public Relations Bureau for adjudication as an official complaint. But the Bureau usually did little more than send the complaint back to the original district station for reconsideration, after which the client again had to wait an undetermined amount of time to receive an answer! And in most cases the answer was not favorable, or no answer was given at all. Likewise, when the Bureau answered the complaint directly instead of just forwarding it again, 75 percent of the time it was merely to reject the complaint on a technicality or for some other reason, and perhaps to advise the client to try his luck with the relief station again. This was apt to happen even in cases of emergency, such as when a married couple who for several months had been unable to get on relief had a baby for which they could not provide.98

Given the almost Kafkaesque quality of this system, it is no surprise that disturbances by individuals and protests by large groups at relief stations continued the whole decade. Regarding a protest in 1938, when over a hundred people were jammed inside a station in a “sit-in strike,” a reporter wrote, “Bitter resentment was evidenced by all against the public relations bureau, and

---

when asked what changes they desired made in that branch, one man shouted, ‘None at all. It’s prejudiced and incompetent. We want the damn thing abolished!’”

Tens of thousands of members coursed in and out of the IWA. Locals tended to be ethnically rather homogeneous: in Chicago there were locals mainly composed in each case of Italians, Poles, African-Americans, native whites, Jews, Austrians, Czechs, etc. But this was mostly just a consequence of neighborhood demographics, and a number of locals were ethnically mixed. As with other unemployed groups, members were supposed to pay a monthly fee, in this case of one or two cents. The majority joined just so they could file a grievance and stayed only as long as they found the organization useful, but undoubtedly a sizable minority appreciated the camaraderie, the opportunities for socializing, and the ability to get involved in politics and resistance. Some of the most active members even joined executive officers when they were granted hearings before the IERC to plead, e.g., for more humane handling of clients, better handling of grievances, elimination of the continual cuts to relief, and union wages on WPA jobs. Like many another union, the IWA had state conventions to which locals sent delegates, where plans were made on such matters as organizing new areas of the state, launching a “youth movement” (outreach toward the young), affiliating with the national Workers Alliance, forming a labor party, boycotting newspapers owned by rabid anti-Communist William Randolph Hearst, and “demanding the freedom of all class war prisoners.” As we saw in the last chapter, the IWA also became the main organizer of state hunger marches at moments of greater-than-average crisis.

---

99 Chicago Defender, March 5, 1938.
By 1936, locals of the Unemployment Councils were allowed to amalgamate with the IWA: they had to pay twelve cents for each of their members and one dollar for the state charter, fill out an application, and be recommended for admission. Representatives of the Councils were also allowed on the Executive Board. This does not seem, however, to have had much of an impact on the politics or militancy of the IWA, for its members, including in downstate counties, were already quite radical (and the Communists had abandoned their earlier ultra-radicalism). For example, in Franklin County a protest was organized in July 1934 to demand the resignation of Rosco Webb, chairman of the county relief programs. The letter sent to him read in part as follows:

We demand a sufficient participation in the wealth which we and our people have created so as to insure to us a decent standard of living. To this as willing workers we are entitled whether we are employed or unemployed. Our patience and humility are exhausted and we approach the time when we will find it literally necessary to remind you that we are human beings and our anger is fast rising.¹⁰¹

Evidently even in relatively rural regions, “class consciousness” was far from unknown.¹⁰²

As mass popular movements of the middle years of the thirties (see the next section) were quashed and the CIO’s momentum collided with the obstinacy of reaction, unemployed groups suffered as well. But many of them managed to cling to relative vitality for a long time, up to 1939. Even after renewed hostility between Communists and other political groups caused the Workers Alliance to split apart in 1939, the unemployed movement did not collapse. We can see

¹⁰¹ Chicago Tribune, July 17, 1934.
¹⁰² Illinois Workers Alliance of Cook County, Bulletin No. 43, mid-May 1936, Chicago Commons Papers, box 25, folder “I. C. Association.”
evidence of this in the minutes of Cook County-wide meetings of delegates from IWA locals, for instance in early July 1939, when massive WPA cuts were starting to take effect and local relief was, as usual, miserly. IWA local 1 was active at relief stations, leafletting, recruiting, and planning a mass meeting the following week; local 16 had fifty members active who were circulating petitions and leaflets; local 35 was bringing in new members—twenty the previous month—undertaking joint actions with other groups on the South Side, planning a sit-in at a station in a few days, and selling tickets for a huge picnic that the Cook County IWA was organizing. Local 44 was brand-new, with an average attendance of 36 but getting new members; it had distributed 2,000 leaflets and was working on the picnic. Other locals were meeting regularly and focusing on grievance work; still others were having a harder time because “summer weather makes attendance generally go down.” Finances were pretty good, but it was necessary to have more regular dues payments. The West Side, North Side, and South Side district committees were going to work together to plan regional and city-wide protests. The recent conference in Washington, D.C. to form a new national organization, the Workers Security Federation, had gone well; the organizations present—which had split from the Workers Alliance—represented a total of 100,000 people.\footnote{\textit{County Delegate Meeting – July 5, 1939,” McCulloch Papers, box 4, folder 8.}}

A year later, however, the situation was dire. The IWA, which had been renamed the Illinois Workers Security Federation, had fewer members than ever and terrible finances. Only eight or ten locals remained in Chicago, with an attendance that varied from ten to fifty. Frank McCulloch, the IWSF’s Secretary-Treasurer, had to resort to begging for money from allies, such as the Juvenile Protective Association and the Federation of Jewish Trade Unions. “We in the Security Federation,” he wrote in a letter, “are not strong, for there is great hopelessness and despair—not to say downright physical weakness—in the unemployed group.” They had, it is
true, “kept together a core of experienced and responsible persons and locals who are working against great odds to protect the interests of WPA, low-wage and relief families. But we cannot, alone, meet even office rent and other minimum expenses, not to mention the costs of an effective job and relief campaign.” With war looming and conservatives in the ascendancy, the political environment was simply no longer hospitable to the Left—even less than it had been in recent years.  

Perhaps an equally important cause of the withering away of the unemployed movement was the fact that the unemployed in 1940 and ’41 were proportionately fewer than they had been earlier in the Depression. Many of the most capable and energetic people had found jobs, so the mass base of the movement was both smaller and less determined than in, say, 1934.

The Workers Alliance (WA) itself had never become the awe-inspiring force of politics that its organizers had hoped it would be, though for several years it and its affiliates had a vitality that politicians could not afford to ignore. Its Socialist affiliates alone, based in Illinois, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New York, and several other states, claimed to have a membership of 450,000 in early 1935 (though their active membership was considerably smaller). When the Unemployment Councils and National Unemployed League joined in April 1936, one estimate put the Alliance’s combined dues-paying and non-dues-paying membership at 800,000, though this was likely too high. Whatever the real numbers were, the organization did a competent job of defending the interests of unemployed and relief workers. One journalist wrote in 1938 that the usual practice of WA groups in New York City, as elsewhere, with regard to relief grievances was, first, to present a formal protest; if satisfactory results were not achieved, the WA would organize a mass demonstration. If that didn’t work, then “the organization settles down for a long

---

104 Letter from Frank McCulloch to Jessie Binford, June 11, 1940, McCulloch Papers, box 5, folder 8; McCulloch to Morris Seskind, July 13, 1940, ibid.; McCulloch to Sophonisba Breckenridge, May 18, 1940, ibid.
pull with picket lines around the offices of the offending officials and, when necessary, a walk-out or a sit-down strike.” He concluded that “the record is impressive”: for instance, in March 1937 3,000 relief clients had sat down in 29 Emergency Relief Bureau offices in New York City.105

In front of every office in which a sit-in was in progress, hundreds of pickets massed. Supplies of food, blankets, radios, games, were smuggled in. Although it was a bitterly cold night and the police as well as the weather tried to freeze out the strikers, no one left. Torchlight processions outside, gay singing, and hourly broadcasts from the Workers Alliance headquarters to those inside the relief offices, made almost festive a demonstration which had been forced upon the unemployed after a long series of efforts to win decent relief standards for their families.106

As a result, the mayor granted an open hearing on relief, which led to a much larger relief appropriation by the city council and the speeding up of sluggish bureaucratic procedures.

Whether the Workers Alliance could have forced more expansive relief policies at the national level “by pushing turbulence to its outer limits,” as Piven and Cloward suggest, rather than by trying to cooperate with authorities and cultivate friendly relations with members of Congress and the Roosevelt administration, is impossible to know. What is certain is that the setbacks the movement suffered in the second half of the decade, as federal and state governments retrenched, happened in spite of the aggressive mood and actions of tens of


thousands of the unemployed, who besieged state legislatures, marched on city halls, picketed relief stations, deluged public officials with postcards and letters, and held public hearings. The diminishing returns of such tactics eventually caused the movement to shrink, to the point that by late 1940 it scarcely existed at all. All that remained were the memories of how continent-wide class struggles had wrested an incipient welfare state from the ruling class.\footnote{Piven and Cloward, \textit{Poor People’s Movements}, 91; \textit{Workers Alliance}, August 1936; \textit{Work}, May 20, 1939, May 23, August 29, 1940.}

**Popular radicalism**

The kinds of mass behavior that have been described here should put to rest the old notion that victims of the Depression tended to be timid, subservient, and primarily self-blaming. Rather, it seems that at least as often they were resentful, rebellious, and conscious of injustice. They lashed out against their subjection to cruel and amoral institutions, braving police brutality in order to force their demands on government and the relief administration. The ease with which Communists were able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people across the country already in early 1930—by insisting that relief was a “right rooted in justice rather than a privilege based on charity,” to quote James Lorence—testifies to a decidedly non-submissive attitude among “the masses,” as does the willingness of millions in the next few years to publicly acknowledge their unemployment by participating in highly visible demonstrations. However discouraged the Depression’s victims may have been, and however ashamedly they may have initially approached the relief station, it did not take long for possibly a majority of them to come to the
semi-revolutionary conclusion that relief, in fact generous relief, was something to which they were entitled.\textsuperscript{108}

On a relatively individualized level this attitude, or something like it, was manifested in the “fraud” that relief clients frequently engaged in. The relative absence of discussions of relief fraud in historical scholarship is unfortunate, for it was anything but a marginal phenomenon. Major frauds, involving the concealment of large sources of income or thousands of dollars’ worth of property, were rare, but minor frauds were not. From the standpoint of the relief administration, this was inevitable: since caseworkers were often responsible for more than two hundred cases each, they could hardly investigate every one with the thoroughness that the \textit{Chicago Tribune}, for example, would have liked. (The \textit{Tribune} constantly ran articles alleging fraud of massive proportions among relief recipients.) This means that reliable statistics on fraud do not exist. Occasional special investigations, however, had suggestive findings. An investigation by the IERC in 1938 found that a third of relief cases in Springfield were receiving relief through “fraud or inefficiency.” Another investigation that year found that nearly half the cases in Granite City, Illinois evidenced fraud. Indeed, an informant from the IERC told the \textit{Tribune} that “the Illinois Workers’ Alliance has been, to all practical purposes, running the administration of relief [in Granite City].” Two studies of fraud in Chicago found that 51 percent of “chiselers” were foreign-born whites and 17.6 percent were African-Americans.\textsuperscript{109}

The resourcefulness with which people cheated the relief administration is revealed by E. Wight Bakke’s anecdotal accounts. One caseworker in New Haven who understood Italian was able to eavesdrop on Italian clients’ conversations: she would hear the mother call to her son to come see the investigator but to put his old shoes on first, or parents tell someone in the back of

\textsuperscript{108} Lorence, \textit{Organizing the Unemployed}, 32.

the house to put away the wine or food before the investigator came inside. In another case, a
woman who needed cash got help from her neighbors: every month she got her whole grocery
order in macaroni and tomato sauce, and then the neighbors bought it from her. (Technically this
did not violate any rules, but when authorities found out they made her stop anyway.) Other
times people sold items—blankets, clothes—they did not want that the relief authorities had
given them. One man who was living with relatives complained to a steam fitter that he could not
get on relief. “Did you tell them you’re living with relatives?” his interlocutor asked. “Yes.”
“You are a damn fool. You never should have told them that. Tell them you are light
housekeeping in a couple of rooms.” The conversation was filled with useful advice, at the end
of which the man seeking advice said, “It doesn’t pay to give them a straight story, does it?”
“Oh, Christ!” the steam fitter scoffed. “You’ll never get anything if you tell the truth. You gotta
be wise, give them a good story.” The fact that this was considered utterly obvious, as if one had
to be extremely stupid not to know it, suggests how widespread such wisdom must have been.110

Bakke described other methods of deceit:

Most social workers could tell stories about clients who were able to withhold
information about their resources. Consider the matter of property transference. It
is almost impossible to trace the ownership of a store, house, or automobile in
some areas. The family, particularly in foreign districts, is so closely knit and yet
so widely spread that an item of property may be shifted several times within the
same family yet be used by the original owner. Such was the case with a store on
Hamilton Street. The family who owned it transferred the ownership to another
member of the family who again transferred it. The new owners moved into the

---

110 Bakke, The Unemployed Worker, 371–385.
dwelling adjoining the store, but the original owner and the family tended the store as before. Another method of “covering up” is to hold jobs in the name of a relative. If a social worker traces a person down as working in a certain plant, he responds, “Oh, that’s my cousin.” 111

It was also common simply not to report odd jobs that one got, hoping the social worker would not find out about them (because then one might be dropped from the rolls). Bakke sums up his discussion with the apt comment, “Control of his own affairs was a myth once the investigator had entered [a man’s] home, yet he and his family adopted every available means to ‘control’ her and thus regain some power of determination of their own livelihood.” 112

However mundane and commonsensical such behavior may seem, in its essence it was not far removed from the eviction protests, relief demonstrations, hunger marches, group thefts, and bootlegging that have received more attention from historians. All such activities constituted class resistance (resistance against laws/rules/institutions that uphold the power of a dominant class), rational resistance to institutions that were seen as alien and oppressive. And all such activities, spurred in part by radical political organizations, both presupposed and encouraged the (anti-capitalist) attitude that groups and individuals suffering from material deprivation were entitled to resist power for the sake of their dignity and well-being.

A particularly radical form of this belief, or an extension of it, was the belief that structures of power had to be drastically altered so that society would provide for those who could not provide for themselves. Whether elderly or infirm or involuntarily out of work, people were owed economic security; and it was to be provided at the expense of the wealthy. In

111 Ibid., 373, 374.
112 Ibid., 384.
immense numbers, Americans in effect believed and fought for the communist principle, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” It is worth noting, in fact, that it was not only in the 1930s that this was the case. A poll in 1987 found that 45 percent of Americans considered the quoted principle to be so morally obvious that they thought it was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution!\textsuperscript{113} As we saw in earlier chapters, a communist morality is constitutive of the very fabric of society, and tends to be at least implicitly endorsed, in particular, by members of the lower classes (but also, less obviously, by members of the middle and upper classes).

An example of this fact is the support that Americans gave between 1930 and 1936 to a radical proposal for unemployment and social insurance that was originally authored by the Communist Party. While the proposal took slightly different forms over the years, its essence is captured in the description given at the end of chapter one of this dissertation. When it was introduced (as the Workers’ Social Insurance Bill) in Congress for the last time, in 1936, by Representative Ernest Lundeen of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and Republican Senator Lynn Frazier of North Dakota, it took an even more generous form than before: it included insurance for widows, mothers, and the self-employed, appropriated $5 billion for the year 1936, established a Workers’ Social Insurance Commission to administer the system, and elaborated in much more detail than its forerunners had in 1934 and 1935 on how the system would be financed and managed. As before, Congress did not come close to approving the measure. Its provisions were so radical, in fact, that it never had a chance. But what is interesting is the momentum that developed behind it, despite what amounted to a virtual conspiracy of silence.

from the press and extreme hostility from business constituencies, conservative Congressmen, and the Roosevelt administration.\textsuperscript{114}

The history of the Workers’ Social Insurance Bill (in its various forms), which was to become one of the most popular pieces of legislation of the Depression decade, began in 1930, when the Communist Party proposed its first iteration—an incredible $25 per week to the unemployed and $5 for each dependent—and immediately proceeded to agitate on its behalf. The reception that the unemployed gave this campaign suggests, contrary to what historians have sometimes argued, that it did not take long at all for a large proportion of the Depression’s victims to reject the voluntarist ideology of the 1920s and the Hoover administration—not to mention “self-blame” for their troubles—in favor of massive government intervention in society for the purpose of income redistribution. By late summer of 1930, the \textit{Daily Worker} was already reporting mass petition signings and continual demonstrations for the bill in scores of cities, including small ones like Indianapolis, Springfield, Belleville, Rockford, Milwaukee, South Chicago, and Gary, Indiana (to speak only of cities near Chicago).\textsuperscript{115}

The pace of actions died down a bit in the fall but picked up again in December and January, in preparation for February 10, 1931, when 150 delegates elected from around the country were going to present the bill and its hundreds of thousands of signatures to Congress. Requests for signature lists flooded into the New York office of the National Campaign Committee for Unemployment Insurance from not only the large industrial centers but even towns and farms in the South and West, and Alaska. Metal workers in Chicago Heights got involved in the campaign; railroad workers and section hands in Reno, Nevada signed petitions; letters like the following were sent to the \textit{Daily Worker}:


\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Daily Worker}, July 31, August 2, 13, 18, 20, 1930.
Let me know what I can do to help carry forward the fight for unemployment insurance? This is the greatest need at this hour. I am the only reader of the Daily Worker here in Ashby, Minn., and am one of four Communist votes cast here in the elections. I am a woman of 60 years, living on land; I pass out all my Daily Workers to neighbors and am getting new subscribers. Will help all I can to get signatures for the bill.\textsuperscript{116}

Countless united front conferences of workers’ organizations took place in cities around the country, for instance Gary, Indiana, where the keynote of one conference was sounded by an African-American steelworker and veteran of World War I who said, in part, “It’s no use going way over to France to fight. We can demand things here just as good as we can there, fight here just as good as there, and if need be, die here just as good as there… Let’s fight for ourselves, right here, now.” They fought in Charlotte, North Carolina; Ambridge, Pennsylvania; Wheeling, West Virginia; Minneapolis, Grand Rapids, and San Antonio; Hartford, Buffalo, and San Francisco. City hunger marches were so numerous that the \textit{Daily Worker} could not keep track of them. The Workers’ Bill, of course, was not the only or even the most pressing issue addressed by all these actions, but it did figure prominently among their demands. On the big day, February 10, demonstrations and state hunger marches occurred in at least 63 cities (including a huge march in Chicago’s Black Belt) as the delegation in Washington, D.C. interrupted a session in the House and was forcibly ejected by police. In St. Paul, Minnesota, the type of action occurred that was already becoming rather common: demonstrators broke through police lines around the

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., December 18, 1930.
state capitol and occupied the legislative chambers, announcing that they would not leave until the legislature had acted on their demands.\textsuperscript{117}

In short, even before churches, charities, and benefit societies had conclusively demonstrated their inability to meet the crisis, well over a million people nationwide (and more every week) were demanding that the federal government become in effect a radically social democratic welfare state. In general, the statist orientation that Lizabeth Cohen writes about in \textit{Making a New Deal}, which often was an extremely \textit{collectivist} orientation (as embodied, e.g., in the Workers’ Bill), did not have to wait for Roosevelt and the New Deal to act as midwives, as Cohen and other historians seem to suggest. It emerged organically on the grassroots level, stimulated both by radical groups and by suffering people’s sense that \textit{society}, “\textit{America},” with all its abundant resources possessed ultimately by the federal government, had to do something to end the epidemic of unjust suffering. (Herein we see the subversive threat inherent in nationalism: if I am supposed to be “proud to be an American,” as so many of the Depression’s victims were—hence (in part) their hostility to “Communism”—I may expect that America ought to act according to justice. And if it does not, I may organize with others to force it to do so.) Roosevelt and the New Deal were products of the country’s growing collectivism more than they were causes of it. And for many millions of Americans, they never went far enough.

Support for the Workers’ Bill grew during the next few years, with the help of continued demonstrations, petitions, and the efforts of radical unionists to enlist union members’ support (as noted in the previous chapter). In June 1931, a hunger march of several hundred delegates to Springfield culminated in one of its leaders’ delivering a speech before the Illinois state legislature demanding enactment of the bill. Other such marches occurred, for example, in April,

August, and October of 1933. The two national hunger marches that Communists organized in December 1931 and 1932 gave publicity to the bill; and on February 4, 1932, which the Communist Party had dubbed National Unemployment Insurance Day, hundreds of thousands of people around the country demonstrated for it. Petitions garnered thousands of signatures: according to the Hunger Fighter, in just three weeks in March 1932, over 30,000 people in Chicago—in factories, AFL locals, public shelters, and neighborhoods—signed the bill, in preparation for May 2, when 200 workers “from all important industries from every section of America” were again going to present the petitions to Congress. Across the country, including in Chicago, 1933 saw the organizing of numerous conferences of unemployed groups to coordinate the campaign for unemployment insurance and to prepare for the CP’s National Convention Against Unemployment in February 1934.¹¹⁸

That February was also the month that Representative Lundeen introduced the bill in the House (as H.R. 7598). While it fared even worse in this session of Congress than it was to fare in 1935, Lundeen’s sponsorship increased the momentum of its popularity among the working class. Within just a couple months of its introduction, 800 more AFL locals had defied the Federation’s leadership and endorsed it, joining 1,200 locals who had done so earlier. In Chicago, John Fitzpatrick and other leaders of the Chicago Federation of Labor began to have less success than in previous years preventing unions from endorsing it, as locals of the Railway Conductors, Railway Clerks, Machinists, Painters, Metal Polishers, School Custodians, Women’s Upholsterers, Granite Cutters, Millinery Workers, and many other unions sent delegates to a Communist-sponsored unemployment insurance conference in the summer of

1934. In July, representatives of 43,000 workers who were organized in fraternal and benevolent societies (specifically, in the Federation of Fraternal Organizations in Struggle for Unemployment Insurance) attended a hearing before the Chicago City Council to demand that that body support the bill; committees also visited aldermen in their wards to demand the same. In September, at another conference in Chicago, delegates from the National Unemployed Leagues, the Illinois Workers Alliance, the Eastern Federation of Unemployed and Emergency Workers Union, the Wisconsin Federation of Unemployed Leagues, and the Fort Wayne Unemployed League—in the aggregate claiming a membership of 750,000—endorsed the measure.  

Meanwhile, in January 1934 an organization had been founded that was to play an important role in lending academic respectability to the bill: the Inter-Professional Association for Social Insurance (IPA). While not officially affiliated with the Communist Party, it had close ties to leading Party members and coordinated its campaign for passage of the Lundeen Bill with organizations of the Left. Within a year it had dozens of chapters and organizing committees around the country, made up of both individual professionals and representatives of groups—nurses, physicians, actors, teachers, engineers, architects, authors, etc. The distinguished social worker Mary Van Kleeck of the Russell Sage Foundation led an army of her colleagues in supporting the bill and, in some cases, proselytizing for it in the press and before Congress. Economists and lawyers associated with the IPA testified to the economic soundness and constitutionality of the measure, especially in 1935, when Lundeen reintroduced it as H.R. 2827. Left-wing professionals considered it vastly superior to the Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934 and 1935—what became the Social Security Act—a professor at Smith College, for example,

---

damning the latter as “a proposal to set up little privileged groups in the sea of misery who would be content to sit on their small islands and watch the others drown.” The Lundeen Bill was certainly not without flaws, including its vagueness and, arguably, the financial burden it would impose on the country, but evidently its Communist-style radicalism was so appreciated that even experts in their field were willing to overlook its defects.\textsuperscript{120}

Significantly, it was in fact far more radical than the Soviet Union’s measures for unemployment and social insurance. While the Lundeen Bill provided (among other things) for unemployment benefits for an unlimited period of time equal to 100 percent of wages—or much more, since an unskilled laborer with a wife and four children who might be lucky to get $16 a week would get $25 if unemployed\textsuperscript{121}—in Soviet Russia only about 35 percent of the customary wage was paid, and that for a limited time. Moreover, the various forms of insurance that H.R. 2827 would establish (unemployment, old age, maternity, disability, and industrial injury) were to be administered by councils of workers and their representatives, thus embodying “workers’ democracy,” which the Soviet system certainly did not. In effect, then, the millions of Americans who advocated the measure desired a system that was more authentically communist/socialist (anti-capitalist) than the Soviet one. This is another indication that it was primarily the \textit{designation} “Communist” to which people objected, not the substance of radical doctrines.


\textsuperscript{121} $10 weekly plus $3 for each dependent. To the criticism that under this system malingering would flourish, defenders of the bill answered that this was actually a strength. By withdrawing workers from the labor market, it would force wage rates to rise until they at least equaled unemployment benefits. “The benefits to the unemployed,” Paul Douglas noted, “could thus be used as a lever to compel industry to pay a living wage to those who were employed.” Douglas, \textit{Social Security in the United States}, 80.
Agencies of propaganda, and to some degree the American Communist Party itself, had largely succeeded in sullying the word Communism in the popular mind, but much less so in sullying the values and ideas of Marxism and socialism.  

A few days after Lundeen reintroduced his bill on January 3, 1935, the National Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance was held in Washington, D.C., at the Washington Auditorium. Organized by the CP and its many allies, the congress comprised almost 3,000 delegates who had come by truck, jalopy, rail, box car, and on foot from every region of the country and forty states. To quote one historian, “cowboys from Colorado and Wyoming, black sharecroppers from Alabama, Texas oil hands, Florida housewives, skilled and unskilled workers, employed and unemployed” in the dead of winter made the pilgrimage to the nation’s seat of power, guided by visions of an egalitarian society, conscious that in their aggregate they directly represented millions and indirectly represented well over half the country. Unions of all types—professional, AFL-affiliated, independent; fraternal organizations and political groups; farm organizations and shop delegates; women’s groups, church groups, veterans’ groups, and unemployed groups—hundreds of such organizations, in an anticipation of the Popular Front, managed to overcome the congenital sectarianism of the Left and call as one for unprecedented social democracy. A few of the scores of lesser-known unemployed groups that were represented included the Chinese Unemployed Alliance, the Farmer Labor Union, the Italian Unemployed Groups, the Relief Workers League, the United Mine Workers Unemployment Council, the Workers Union of the World, the Right-To-Live Club, and the Dancers Emergency Association. The National Urban League, which endorsed the bill, also sent delegates.

\[122\] Ibid., 79.

The legendary socialist and feminist Mother Bloor, who addressed the congress, pithily summed up its significance to a reporter from the *Washington Post*: “‘The congress is a success. It’s proved a big crowd of people can break down barriers of race, social position, political opinions, and convictions for a common cause. Why, there are white people and yellow people and black people out there.’ She nodded toward the mass meeting going on in the auditorium. ‘There are Communists and Socialists and Republicans. There’s even some Democrats.’” At the Congressional hearings on H.R. 2827, the chairman of the congress stated, not implausibly, that it had “formed the broadest and most representative congress of the American people ever held in the United States.”

The Congressional hearings themselves were noteworthy. While the executive secretary of the IPA may have exaggerated when he wrote, “The record of the hearings on H.R. 2827 is one of the most challenging ever placed before the Congress of the United States and probably the most unique document ever to appear in the Congressional Record,” that judgment is understandable. Eighty witnesses testified: industrial workers, farmers, veterans, professional workers, African-Americans, women, the foreign-born, and youth. “Probably never in American history,” an editor of the *Nation* wrote, “have the underprivileged had a better opportunity to present their case before Congress.” The aggregate of the testimonies amounted to a systematic indictment of American capitalism and the New Deal, and an impassioned defense of the radical alternative under consideration. Witness after witness described the harrowing suffering that they and the thousands they represented (in each case) were enduring, and condemned the Wagner-Lewis bill as a sham. From the representative of the American Youth Congress, which encompassed over two million people, to the representative of the United Council of Working-

---

Class Women, which had 10,000 members, each testimony fleshed out the eminently “class-conscious” point of view of the people back home who had “gather[ed] up nickels and pennies which they [could] poorly spare” in order to send someone to plead their case before Congress. Most of the Congressmen on the Labor subcommittee they were addressing were strikingly sympathetic.  

For example, when Herbert Benjamin, one of the leaders of the CP, had this to say on press coverage (or the lack thereof) of the Lundeen Bill—

So much has been said in the last few weeks about the Townsend plan [for old-age pensions]. I have discussed this question with a number of Members [of Congress], and they tell me that, outside of California, they received not a single postal card on the Townsend plan, but they received thousands of cards from all over the United States on the Lundeen Bill, asking for the enactment of this bill. Yet the newspapers, by reason of the fact that they really fear this measure and do not fear the Townsend plan, knowing that the Townsend plan can be a very good red herring to draw attention away from social insurance, have given publicity to the Townsend plan, and have yet avoided very studiously any attention to the workers’ unemployment and social-insurance measure—

the chairman of the subcommittee, Matthew Dunn, interrupted to say,

---

125 Albion A. Hartwell, “America Speaks: The Hearings on the Workers Bill,” Social Work Today, April 1935, 19, 20; Maxwell Stewart, Hearings on H.R. 2827, 681; Herbert Benjamin, ibid., 694. Many opponents of the bill had been invited to testify, but not a single one did. Apparently they had all decided that the best strategy to defeat it was to ignore it.
I want to substantiate the statement you just made about the Townsend bill and about this bill. Now, I represent the Thirty-fourth District in Pennsylvania, which is a very large district. May I say that I do not believe I have received over a half dozen letters to support the Townsend bill; however, I have received quite a number of letters and cards from the State of California. In addition to that, I have received many letters and cards from all over the country asking me to give my utmost support in behalf of the Lundeen bill, H.R. 2827.126

Incidentally, Benjamin’s complaint about press coverage was justified. Overwhelmingly more press attention was devoted to the ridiculous Townsend Plan that made no economic sense at all;127 virtually no coverage was granted the Lundeen Bill except during and after the subcommittee’s hearings, and even then it was mostly local papers that covered it. According to the executive secretary of the IPA, “forty-three news releases to all the news agencies and newspapers of the major cities during the course of two weeks [i.e., during the hearings] were, with few exceptions, suppressed, although in those outlying districts where organization has made the demands of the workers more articulate,128 some papers carried workers’ testimony as front page news.” Historians have followed newspapers’ lead by tending to ignore the Lundeen Bill and focus on the Townsend Plan, in many cases condescendingly interpreting the popularity of the latter’s provisions as evidence of the credulousness and simple-mindedness of the American public. This emphasis is unfortunate in that (1) it was the press that was significantly

126 Ibid., 173.
 responsible for propagating the Townsend Plan (presumably to divert attention from the Lundeen Bill), and (2) the supposedly simple-minded public had the organizational sophistication and political savvy to build a mass movement around a more reasonable bill premised on both the reality and the valorization of class conflict, not only without help from the press but despite active hostility from nearly all sectors of power—the press, the AFL, the Roosevelt administration, reactionary Southern landowners and politicians, and big business in general. Under such conditions, for example, organizers’ ability to get over five million signatures on their petitions was no mean achievement.\textsuperscript{129}

Admittedly, compared to the number of signatures they likely could have collected had they possessed more resources, five million is not terribly impressive. In the spring of 1935 the \textit{New York Post} conducted a poll of its readers after printing the contents of the Lundeen, the Townsend, and the Wagner-Lewis bills. Out of 1,391 votes cast, 1,209 readers supported the first, 157 the second, 14 the third, and 7 none of them. Of the 1,073 respondents who were employed, 957 supported the Lundeen Bill, 100 the Townsend Bill, 7 the Wagner-Lewis Bill, and 5 none. It would not be outlandish to infer from these findings that, had they known of the contents of the bills, the large majority of Americans would have much preferred Lundeen’s Communist-written one. This is also suggested by the enormous number of letters congressmen received on the measure, such as this one sent to Lundeen:

\begin{quote}
The reason I am writing you is, that we Farmers [and] Industrial workers feel that you are the only Congressman and Representative that is working for our interest.

We have analyzed the Wagner-Lewis Bill [and] also [the] Townsend Bill. But the
\end{quote}

Lundeen H.R. (2827) is the only bill that means anything for our class… The people all over the country are [waking] up to the facts that the two old Political Parties are owned soul, mind [and] body by the Capitalist Class.  

Feeling the pressure of this mass movement, both the subcommittee and the House Labor Committee voted in favor of H.R. 2827 that spring, making it the first unemployment insurance plan in U.S. history to be recommended by a committee. It had no chance in the House, though. The Rules Committee refused to send it to the floor, although it allowed Lundeen to propose it as an amendment to the Social Security Bill (as a substitute for the unemployment insurance provisions in that bill). It was defeated in April by a vote of 204 to 52.

As far as its advocates were concerned, the fight was not over. Throughout the spring and summer the flood of endorsements did not stop. The first national convention of rank-and-file social workers endorsed it in February; the Progressive Miners of America followed, along with scores of local unions and such ethnic societies as the Italian-American Democratic Organization of New York (with 235,000 members) and the Slovak-American Political Federation of Youngstown, Ohio. Virtually identical state versions of H.R. 2827 were (or already had been) introduced in the legislatures of California, Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and other states. Conferences of unions and fraternal organizations were called in a number of states, including the Deep South, to plan further campaigns for the Workers’ Bill. That year’s May Day was one of the largest in American history, “monster demonstrations” (to quote the New York Times) of tens of thousands taking place in New York City, for example; and

---

in many cities, included among the marchers were united fronts of church groups, workers clubs, fraternal lodges, and Communist and Socialist groups parading under banners demanding the passage of H.R. 2827. While the majority of AFL unions never endorsed the bill, perhaps because William Green and the Executive Council were exerting intense pressure on them not to do so, it is probable that most of the rank and file supported it.132

As stated above, in January 1936 Lynn Frazier and Ernest Lundeen introduced in their respective houses of Congress a more sophisticated version of the bill, which the Inter-Professional Association had written. Again it was endorsed by unions, labor councils, and other institutions, including the 1936 convention of the EPIC movement in California. The National Joint Action Committee for Genuine Social Insurance, which had grown out of the 1935 Congress for Unemployment and Social Insurance, coordinated a nationwide campaign. In New York, “flying squads” from the Fraternal Federation for Social Insurance visited lodges and fraternal organizations throughout the city (e.g., Knights of Pythias, Woodmen of the World, Workmen’s Circle, etc.) to secure their support. In Philadelphia, Baltimore, and several other cities, united-front conferences and committees were organized to campaign for the bill. The hearings before the Senate Labor Committee in April resembled the hearings on H.R. 2827, with academics, social workers, unionists, and farmers testifying as to the inadequacy of the Social Security Act and the necessity of the Frazier-Lundeen Bill. A representative of the National Committee on Rural Social Planning spoke for the millions of agricultural workers, sharecroppers, tenants, and small owners when he opined that this bill was “the only one which

is likely to check the fascist terror now riding the fields” in the South (directed against the Southern Tenant Farmers Union).\(^{133}\)

The fascist terror continued unchecked, however, for the bill did not even make it out of committee. After its dismal fate in 1936, it was never introduced again.

From a certain perspective, one might say that the Workers’ Bill, in its radicalism and collectivism, departed from traditions of “Americanism,” whatever that word is taken to mean. A more defensible perspective, however, would see the bill as something like the apotheosis of radical collectivist strains that for many decades had been, and would continue to be, embedded deeply in American popular culture (the idea of which, to quote T. J. Jackson Lears, must of course always be distinguished from the “corporate-sponsored mass culture that is so often mistaken for it”). The class solidarity it embodied in its frontal attack on fundamental institutions of capitalism—private appropriation of wealth, determination of wages by the market, maintenance of an insecure army of the unemployed—has in fact just as much claim to the title of “Americanism” as anything else: for U.S history abounds with the solidarity of the wealthy and the solidarity of the poor. It just so happens that with regard to the Workers’ Bill, as on so many other occasions, the solidarity of the wealthy triumphed—because, as always, of the far greater resources at the disposal of the wealthy.\(^{134}\)

What one Communist organizer wrote of some workers in a small mining town in Southern Illinois can, perhaps, be generalized: “They were filled with capitalist ideology—at the same time being strongly anti-capitalist.” Even as many Americans believed, with these workers, that “capitalism had always existed, that it had come into existence peacefully, that capital and


labor are equally necessary,” their actions revealed a starkly opposed ideology and value-system. Farmers and industrial workers, for example, in many cases identified with each other’s causes and embraced them. In November 1933, the Farmers’ National Relief Conference was held at the Coliseum in Chicago: 700 “frost-bitten” delegates from around the country—“Negro sharecroppers from North Carolina, Arkansas and Alabama; Yankee stone farmers from New England; wheat farmers from Nebraska, Montana, and the Dakotas; dairy and corn farmers from Iowa; fruit farmers from California; potato growers from Idaho; and poultry farmers from Connecticut”—met to coordinate their campaign for a cancellation of all farm debts, including mortgages, crop loans, taxes, and rents. They were greeted and joined by workers from basic industries in Chicago, and fed in part by donations of bread from the West Side Jewish Bakers Union (affiliated with the AFL). Around the same time, the Daily Worker reported that striking farmers in Kankakee, Illinois and employed and unemployed workers were helping each other: the farmers were distributing hundreds of quarts of free milk to workers who were on strike and to the unemployed, and at the same time workers had joined the farmers on their picket line. A few hundred miles away, in Detroit, a statewide conference was being held on the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill to which both farmers’ and workers’ organizations had sent delegates.135

Historians have recognized that it was essential to the success of the Toledo Auto-Lite strike in 1934 that thousands of the “class-conscious” unemployed, instead of scabbing, joined strikers on the picket lines. But this was only the most dramatic example of a phenomenon that was much more widespread than scholars seem to have appreciated. A miners’ strike in McKeeseport, Pennsylvania in the fall of 1933 was successful largely because thousands of

---

135 S. K., “Experiences of a Full-time Training School in a Mining Center,” Party Organizer, May 1936, 34–36; Daily Worker, November 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 1933.
unemployed men joined in it. That October, the municipal unemployment relief committee in Edgewater, New Jersey tried to use people on relief as scabs in the strike that was going on at the Ford plant nearby, but the unemployed refused to accept the jobs. Instead they joined the picket line and marched in solidarity with the workers on strike. It was noted above that members of the Chicago Workers Committee on Unemployment, not to mention the Unemployed Councils, walked in picket lines with signs proclaiming “The Unemployed Won’t Scab.” This was the case in Milwaukee too (among other cities), e.g. in the summer of 1934, when the Milwaukee Workers Committee saved the Electric Railway and Light Company strike by organizing mass picketing of the unemployed. That same year, Minneapolis General Drivers’ Local 544 recruited unemployed workers for its picket lines during a general strike, and even formed a lasting auxiliary called the Federal Workers Section. Robert Asher observed in 1934 that in both Wisconsin and Illinois (and evidently elsewhere), “the cooperation furnished by the unemployed to workers and farmers in industrial and agricultural disputes has been significant.”

It is true that in the absence of unemployed organizations, there was a much more pronounced tendency for the jobless to act as strikebreakers. The CPLA’s Executive Committee, allied with the Unemployed Councils, acknowledged this fact in December 1933, when it lamented that recent diversions of cadre from the UCs to other activities had resulted in a decline in participation by the unemployed on picket lines. This is hardly surprising, however, for organization has always facilitated radicalization. The noteworthy thing is that under certain

---

conditions, even people desperate for work were, on a large scale across the country, willing and eager to aid their class brothers at the expense of getting a job.\footnote{\textit{Minutes of the National Executive Committee, Conference for Progressive Labor Action, held at national office, December 13, 1933,” microfilm reel 258, CP files, Tamiment.}}

While there is not space to embellish much on this point, we may note that it is not necessary to turn to the Workers’ Bill or manifestations of class solidarity between employed and unemployed workers in order to find examples of a kind of class consciousness and anti-capitalism that was supposedly surprisingly absent among Americans in the Great Depression. This trend can be found in two phenomena that have received a great deal of attention from historians: the mass following behind Huey Long, and the mass following behind the “radio priest” Charles Coughlin—at least before his anti-semitism overwhelmed the genuinely left-wing content of his message (in the late thirties, by which time his popularity was a shadow of its former self). These things have been analyzed so often that it is superfluous to dwell on them here.\footnote{See, e.g., T. Harry Williams, \textit{Huey Long} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); Alan Brinkley, \textit{Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression} (New York: Vintage Books, 1983); Anthony J. Badger, “Huey Long and the New Deal,” in \textit{Nothing Else to Fear: New Perspectives on America in the Thirties}, eds. Stephen W. Baskerville and Ralph Willett (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 64–100; David J. O’Brien, \textit{American Catholics and Social Reform: The New Deal Years} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), chapter 7; Robert McElvaine, \textit{The Great Depression} (New York: Times Books, 1984); Edward F. Haas, “Huey Long and the Communists,” \textit{Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association}, vol. 32, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 29–46; Charles J. Tull, \textit{Father Coughlin and the New Deal} (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1965); Sheldon Marcus, \textit{Father Coughlin: The Tumultuous Life of the Priest of the Little Flower} (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).} However, a few observations may be worth making, to correct the “anti-left” biases of mainstream historians like Alan Brinkley and Anthony Badger.\footnote{Badger, for instance, argues that the solutions that Long and Coughlin offered “scarcely constituted a radical challenge to the New Deal from the left. They offered instead glib panaceas designed to reassure the discontented that the dramatic benefits that they were promising could be achieved without radical or painful change.” Badger, \textit{The New Deal}, 294.}

Brinkley, Robert McElvaine, and others have made the point, but it bears repeating: neither Long nor Coughlin (before 1938) was a fascist. A journalist wrote in early 1935—that decisive year when the two “demagogues” were at the height of their success, when the
Townsend Plan and the Workers’ Bill were sweeping the nation, when FERA was dismantled and the WPA inaugurated, when the Social Security Act and the Wagner Act were passed—that Coughlin “talk[s] about a living wage, about profits for the farmer, about government-protected labor unions. He insists that human rights be placed above property rights. He emphasizes the ‘wickedness’ of ‘private financialism and production for profit.’” Consistent with these values were the principles of Coughlin’s National Union for Social Justice, founded in 1934, including (among others) the following: a “just and living [i.e., not market-determined] annual wage which will enable [every citizen willing and able to work] to maintain and educate his family according to the standards of American decency”; nationalization of such “public necessities” as banking, credit and currency, power, light, oil and natural gas, and natural resources; private ownership of all other property, but control of it for the public good; abolition of the privately owned Federal Reserve and establishment of a government-owned central bank; “the lifting of crushing taxation from the slender revenues of the laboring class” and substituting for it taxation of the rich; in the event of war, “a conscription of wealth as well as a conscription of men”; and the guiding value that “the chief concern of government shall be for the poor.” Insofar as Coughlin’s tens of millions of fans agreed with this political program, they certainly can be said (pace Brinkley and Badger) to have desired fundamental reforms, radical reforms, in American capitalism, which in effect would have ushered in a much more collectivistic and socialistic society.\footnote{New York Times, March 17, 1935; Marquis W. Childs, “Father Coughlin: A Success Story of the Depression,” New Republic, May 2, 1934; “Father Coughlin’s Preamble and Principles of the National Union for Social Justice,” in Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 287, 288; Verba and Schlozmann, “Unemployment, Class Consciousness, and Radical Politics,” 295. Like Badger’s above-quoted statement, Brinkley’s claim that “the Long and Coughlin messages [were appealing because they] avoid[ed] the troubling implications of radical reform” is puzzling, in light of the astonishingly radical reforms Long and Coughlin proposed. Voices of Protest, 160.}

Indeed, were it not that Coughlin always remembered to denounce Communism almost as vociferously (though not as verbally) as he denounced capitalism and Wall Street titans, one
suspects that he might have encountered more censorship than he did. This is suggested by an unusual incident in March 1936, when, in order to advertise its liberal position on freedom of speech, CBS invited Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, to speak for fifteen minutes (at 10:45 p.m.) on a national radio broadcast, with the understanding that he would be answered the following night by zealous anti-Communist Congressman Hamilton Fish. This “generosity” towards a Communist created quite a furor among right-wing organizations such as the National Americanization League, which subsequently picketed the CBS building, and a number of stations around the country refused to air Browder’s talk. But it was in fact considerably more tame than any of Coughlin’s diatribes. Browder simply appealed to “the majority of the toiling people” to establish a national Farmer-Labor Party that would be affiliated with the Communist Party but “would not yet take up the full program of socialism, for which many are not yet prepared.” He did admit that Communists’ ultimate aim was to remake the U.S. “along the lines of the highly successful Soviet Union”: once they had the support of a majority of Americans, he said, “we will put that program into effect with the same firmness, the same determination, with which Washington and the founding fathers carried through the revolution that established our country, with the same thoroughness with which Lincoln abolished chattel slavery.”

Reactions to Browder’s talk were revealing: according to both CBS and the Daily Worker, they were almost uniformly positive. CBS immediately received several hundred responses praising Browder’s talk, and the Daily Worker, whose New York address Browder had mentioned on the air, received thousands of letters. The following are representative:

141 New York Times, March 6, 1936; Washington Post, March 6, 1936; Broadcasting, March 5, 1936; Variety, March 11, 1936; Billboard, March 14, 1936.
Chattanooga, Tennessee: “If you could have listened to the people I know who listened to you, you would have learned that your speech did much to make them realize the importance of forming a Farmer-Labor Party. I am sure that the 15 minutes into which you put so much that is vitally important to the American people was time used to great advantage. Many people are thanking you, I know.”

Evanston, Illinois: “Just listened to your speech tonight and I think it was the truest talk I ever heard on the radio. Mr. Browder, would it not be a good thing if you would have an opportunity to talk to the people of the U.S.A. at least once a week, for 30 to 60 minutes? Let’s hear from you some more, Mr. Browder.”

Springfield, Pennsylvania: “I listened to your most interesting speech recently on the radio. I would be much pleased to receive your articles on Communism. Although I am an American Legion member I believe you are at least sincere in your teachings.”

Bricelyn, Minnesota: “Your speech came in fine and it was music to the ears of another unemployed for four years. Please send me full and complete data on your movement and send a few extra copies if you will, as I have some very interested friends—plenty of them eager to join up, as is yours truly.”

Harrold, South Dakota: “Thank you for the fine talk over the air tonight. It was good common sense and we were glad you had a chance to talk over the air and glad to hear someone who had nerve enough to speak against capitalism.”

Sparkes, Nebraska: “Would you send me 50 copies of your speech over the radio last night? I would like to give them to some of my neighbors who are all farmers.”
Arena, New York: “Although I am a young Republican (but good American citizen) I enjoyed listening to your radio speech last evening. I believe you told the truth in a convincing manner and I failed to see where you said anything dangerous to the welfare of the American people.”

Julesburg, Colorado: “Heard your talk… It was great. Would like a copy of same, also other dope on your party. It is due time we take a hand in things or there will be no United States left in a few more years. Will be looking forward for this dope and also your address.”

In general, the main themes of the letters were questions like, “Where can I learn more about the Communist Party?”, “How can I join your Party?”, and “Where is your nearest headquarters?” Some people sent money in the hope that it would facilitate more broadcasts. The editors of the Daily Worker plaintively asked their readers, “Isn’t it time we overhauled our old horse-and-buggy methods of recruiting? While we are recruiting by ones and twos, aren’t we overlooking hundreds?” One can only imagine how many millions of people in far-flung regions would have flocked to the Communist banner had Browder and William Z. Foster been permitted the national radio audience that Coughlin was.

The interpretation that Alan Brinkley espouses as regards radicalism in the 1930s reflects dominant, long-term tendencies in American historiography:

The failure of more radical political movements to take root in the 1930s reflected, in part, the absence of a serious radical tradition in American political culture. The rhetoric of class conflict echoed only weakly among men and women

---

142 Daily Worker, March 11, 13, 1936.
steeped in the dominant themes of their nation’s history; and leaders relying upon that rhetoric faced grave, perhaps insuperable difficulties in attempting to create political coalitions…

But this semi-“Consensus”-based interpretation—semi-Gramscian—is backward. The reason that Marxist-type leaders have had trouble achieving mainstream success is simply that forces of repression and censorship, emanating from institutions with overwhelming control over resources, have suppressed them and the ideas—or, even more importantly, the information—they have tried to propagate. There is no great mystery about it, no need to invoke deep-seated cultural tendencies of individualism or lack of comprehension of “class” (which is a pretty simple notion, after all). When Browder’s radio audience heard him discuss class conflict and Marxism, a large proportion of them, possibly a majority, considered it “good common sense.” They did not have to struggle painfully to break free of the shackles of American ideologies, as if liberating their minds from enslavement to a long tradition of bourgeois cultural hegemony. They simply thought, “this is true, and kind of obvious.” But the “grave, perhaps insuperable difficulties” that Communists and others faced in getting information out to tens of millions of Americans had prevented, and probably continued to prevent, these listeners from learning much about the political ideology they found so commonsensical, and even more from getting involved in a radical movement.

143 Brinkley, Voices of Protest, 160, 161.
144 One of the essential functions of the mass media is to suppress information. Again, see Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent, an impeccable scholarly source, as well as Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: Sound End Press, 1982). If great masses of people learn of the horrors that the powerful are constantly inflicting on the subjugated (whether in factories, on farms, in colonial or neocolonial domains, etc.) they will, naturally, try to stop the horrors and make society more democratic and transparent. So it is necessary to prevent them from knowing, for example by excluding Marxist speakers from the airwaves.
145 It isn’t hard to comprehend—or to agree with—the idea of a conflict between those who own and those who don’t.
Similarly, Brinkley is wrong to argue, in the sentence that follows the above quotation, “The Long and Coughlin movements, by contrast, flourished precisely because they evoked so clearly one of the oldest and most powerful of American political traditions [namely, opposition to centralized authority and demands for the wide dispersion of power].” Rather, they flourished for two main reasons: first, in rejecting Communism and Socialism—at least rhetorically—Long and Coughlin were not quite as anathema to various political and economic authorities as Communists and Socialists, and so were, to some extent, tolerated and even supported by authorities (such as the Catholic Church in the case of Coughlin and many Louisiana corporations and businessmen in the case of Long). Since they were not constantly censored and suppressed, they were able to get their message out. Second, the two men appealed to the masses by, on the one hand, denouncing the nation’s “pigs swilling in the trough of luxury,” to quote Long, and on the other hand proposing radical schemes to redistribute wealth. At its core, the matter is as simple as that. Brinkley, characteristically, tries to deflect attention from class and material interests, but sometimes the simplest and most obvious explanation is the right one.

It requires impressive intellectual acrobatics to strongly differentiate the populism of Long and Coughlin from a semi-Marxian populism of class, when, for instance, Long’s whimsical retrospective account of his First Days in the White House, a book completed a few days before he was shot, describes accomplishments that are so class-oriented. As a reviewer summarized Long’s post-presidential self-description, “he was the man of action who in rapid succession launched a stupendous program of reclamation and conservation, who planned for scientific treatment of criminals, cheaper transportation and popular control of banking. Higher education for all became fact. Tell every parent, he said to his advisers, ‘I will send your boy and girl to college.’ There was much more, but all was overshadowed by legislation for the

redistribution of wealth [by means of confiscatory taxation].” Such a plan was certainly utopian and therefore, one might say, little more than fantasy, but the communist vision that inspired ideological Marxists—often considered more sophisticated than (the disproportionately unemployed) followers of Long and Coughlin—was arguably far more utopian and fantastical. In any case, while most of Long and Coughlin’s supporters were not expert in the dialectics of Das Kapital, it is clear that they dreamed of expropriating the expropriators, the great class of propertied magnates, and democratically distributing the proceeds among the relatively poor.¹⁴⁷

Given all the protest movements that have been surveyed in this chapter, movements that had been swelling and surging from coast to coast since 1930, officials in the Roosevelt administration should not have been surprised to learn from their roving reporters in 1933 and 1934 that great masses of people had adopted a thoroughly “un-American” attitude towards relief. In August 1933, Lorena Hickock wrote to Harry Hopkins from Pennsylvania, “I still feel, as I felt a week ago, that vast numbers of the unemployed are ‘right on the edge,’ so to speak—that it wouldn’t take much to make Communists out of them.” Another reporter wrote that men on relief had become truculent, “more critical, more complaining, more ready to react,” and increasingly resentful of investigation and surveillance by social workers. In Ohio, unemployed families were “less and less embarrassed to ask for relief and…more and more dependent on it as security against times of unemployment as well as in some cases a bulwark forever.” Some cried the first time they sought relief, “but by the third order they become demanding.” In Flint, Michigan, “all the [relief] workers were unanimous in saying that a large proportion of the relief lists took the ‘entitled to it’ attitude.” The same was true in the Stockyards district of Chicago: according to the supervisor of a relief station there, “the clients are less patient than they used to

be. They demand relief with more assurance. They criticize more freely.” It seems that this relatively apolitical assertiveness and defiance easily became more political, in the form of joining Unemployed Councils, demonstrating, and supporting the movement for generous social insurance.148

If it were necessary, more evidence could be adduced. “I do get a kick out of the attitude of the American people toward their government,” Hickok wrote. “Just a big sucker—that’s all Uncle Sam is to them.” Relief was “a regular and accepted way of life.” A local relief administrator remarked, “We have made the rank and file of our investigators scared to death of the client… It would take machine guns to cut off relief.” “It is a sad sight,” a state administrator lamented, “to see the attitude…changing from one that used to be a modest request for help temporarily to…demanding their share of what the Government has to give.” The manager of the Fisher body plant in Flint, Michigan complained that workers “consider themselves shareholders in relief,” and that relief “is making them not want to work” except for high wages. The “entitled” attitude was also evident in the frequently militant behavior of men on work relief, including their protests and strikes against low wages, the end of the CWA, and racial discrimination.149

A leading welfare administrator in New York declared in late 1934 that they could not go on for another year “without being forced to bring in a new social order.” The populist pressures were threatening to burst the integument of the old capitalist order. Far from, say, Long and Coughlin’s adoring fans not truly desiring radical change, even the average relief recipient

149 Lowitt and Beasley, One Third of a Nation, 122; Wilson, “Report, Flint, Michigan.”
apparently wanted the sphere of the market to be severely circumscribed and the federal government to assume the quintessentially socialistic burden of guaranteeing economic security for all. It was Roosevelt’s failure to pursue this goal, to vigorously stand up to big business, that caused millions of Americans to turn away from him between late 1934 and early 1935. Historian Charles Beard observed a “staggering rapidity” in the “disintegration of President Roosevelt’s prestige” in February and March 1935, while Martha Gellhorn wrote, “it surprises me how radically attitudes can change within four or five months.” Correspondents wrote to Roosevelt that he had “faded out on the masses of hungry, idle people,” had served only the “very rich” and proven to be “no deferent [sic] from any other President.” “Huey Long is the man we thought you were when we voted for you,” a man wrote from Montana. The so-called Second New Deal shored up Roosevelt’s popular support, but it was not nearly as left-wing as many millions would have liked.\footnote{Brock, \textit{Welfare, Democracy, and the New Deal}, 264; McElvaine, \textit{The Great Depression}, 249, 253, 254. For more examples of popular disillusionment with Roosevelt, see McElvaine, “Thunder without Lightning,” 73, 74, 82–88.}

In short, it was certainly nothing like Gramscian processes of hegemony that kept the U.S. within the fold of a relatively traditional capitalism during the 1930s. To the extent that bourgeois “hegemony” had ever existed at all, it broke down in the Depression decade. Millions of Americans clamored for a much more democratic and much less capitalistic social order; tens of millions supported organizations, politicians, and demagogues who promised the same. Contrary to the thrust of much historiography, it was primarily the lack of elite support, not a lack of popular support, that doomed the hopes of leftists. That is one of the dreary lessons of American history: if the ruling class is united in opposition to something, such as the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill, it will not come to pass. Even the Wagner Act and Social
Security Act became the law of the land only because substantial sectors of the ruling class favored them, as the research of Thomas Ferguson has shown.\textsuperscript{151}

As for whether broad swaths of the American populace could have been called “revolution-minded” in this most radical of decades, the answer has to be yes, unless one arbitrarily confines the term “revolution” to a collective seizure of the national state and establishment of a so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. Sensibly, the masses neither hoped for nor attempted such an uprising, which certainly would have been an abortive undertaking in a country so totally different from Russia in 1917. Instead, they hoped for and attempted to carry out the more realistic and democratic revolution of compelling government to provide economic security to everyone, regardless of race, sex, ethnicity, occupation, or age. The radicalism of this hope is astounding: to realize it on a scale as immense as the United States, and in a country as capitalistic as the United States, would have been one of the great achievements of human history. It is no surprise, then, that the project failed. It is up to the present generation and its descendants to take up the battle again, illuminated by the study of past defeats and victories, and to carry it forward to fruition.

Conclusion

This dissertation has had two major purposes: first, to tell the social history of the unemployed in Chicago at a time when they constituted almost the majority of the population; second, to argue that people on the rank-and-file level—“ordinary people”—were (and are), in fundamental ways, opposed to the dominant order, including the political economy, the policy priorities of the two major parties, and dominant ideologies that serve to uphold the power of the ruling class. I have argued that both implicitly, as in the frequently communistic practices of the working class, and explicitly, as in the widespread popular support for the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill, people have evidenced a “radical” consciousness and behavior. “Implicitly” they have even had semi-socialist views, as in the case of the supposedly anti-Communist and conservative veterans in the Bonus Army who wanted the government to take over major industries and guarantee people jobs. Historians should be careful not to draw far-reaching conclusions from the fact that people scorn the labels socialist, communist, Marxist, and left-wing. As stated in the Introduction, self-deception and ignorance are not exactly uncommon, and people’s characterization of their values and beliefs should never be taken at face-value. Marx was aware of this elementary point when he enjoined us (in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*) not to trust the self-interpretations of historical actors; in fact, his whole system is based on the belief that the true significance of people’s thoughts and actions is to be found not in their self-consciousness but in deep analysis of their social circumstances and institutional roles. Thus, while historians must heed how actors, including policymakers, describe their intentions and goals, they should not make the mistake that Odd Arne Westad (see
footnote 20 in the Introduction) and other non-Marxists sometimes do in putting too much stock in people’s reports of their goals and values.¹

In a sense, the question of how left-wing or right-wing the masses are is not even very interesting. What people want is straightforward: they want material comfort, freedom to choose their work and recreational activities, a job that is safe and secure, a good education for their children, a social and natural environment that is healthy, safe, and aesthetically pleasing; they want not to be shut out of the political sphere, not to be dominated and exploited by entities with interests opposed to theirs, not to have a much lower social status than an esteemed minority, not to be discriminated against or denied their dignity. If “right-wing,” as Corey Robin argues, means the impulse to defend power and privilege against movements demanding freedom, equality, and democracy, then it follows from the basic values just enumerated that the vast majority of people are far-leftists, in particular to the degree that they lack power and privilege.² They may not know it or call themselves that, but, nevertheless, their values align with those that have inspired the radical-left tradition (including the militant wing of organized labor). Likewise, to the extent that left-wing analyses, strategies, and tactics provide rationally defensible means of realizing these values, in principle one can convince people to accept them.

Even fascist or semi-fascist movements and parties get their strength, ironically, from the democratic and liberatory desires of large numbers of their followers. The groundswell of popular support for Donald Trump that led to his election provides a clear example.

¹This is one respect in which historians would do well to follow the practice of Noam Chomsky, who, as a Marxist (though he dislikes that term and disagrees, rightly, with the orthodox Marxist conception of revolution), ignores politicians’ rhetoric as being vacuous and predictable. It gives little insight into the true significance and purposes of policy, which must be sought instead in the social and institutional, especially class, dynamics out of which policy emerges. For instance, anyone who believes—as Westad and innumerable commentators at the time did—that George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq was motivated by either a search for WMDs, a desire to liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein, or a desire to spread democracy has been misled by vacuous rhetoric. See Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2003).
Commentators may quibble whether Trump is truly fascist or not; but it is not hard to discern parallels with classical fascism, given Trump’s treatment of Muslims and undocumented immigrants, his ridiculing of “elite liberals,” his appeal not only to the white working class but even to neo-Nazis, his nationalistic rhetoric about “making America great again,” his friendly relations with big business, etc. And yet it seems that the major reason millions voted for him was their perfectly justifiable perception that in the last generation they have been economically, politically, and socially dispossessed: they are the “forgotten men,” ignored by the Wall Street–Washington–billionaire-class establishment, left to rot in communities denuded of jobs and starved of self-respect. “There’s no American dream for anyone who isn’t a lawyer or a banker,” a Trump supporter told a reporter. “Everyone else, we are getting a raw deal.” “Clarington [Ohio] is a shithole,” another said. “Jobs all left. There is nothing here anymore… I have five kids and two have addictions. There is nothing else for kids to do here but drugs. No jobs. No place to play.” According to polls, a large proportion of Trump’s supporters would have preferred Bernie Sanders.3

But in a system with a capitalist class as powerful as that of the U.S., a left-wing candidate like Bernie Sanders is not going to be allowed to become one of the two main nominees for president. Political insiders will scheme against him to ensure that a more corporation-friendly politician will be selected, as indeed happened.4 So millions of discontented, rebellious, anti-establishment voters will be forced to turn to the semi-fascist candidate in their (essentially class-conscious) hope for liberation from relative poverty and despair. It is evident from Trump’s boisterous rallies that were there still a vital tradition of the Left and a functioning

---

labor movement, as there was in the 1930s, many of his supporters would be avid participants, for they do not lack in energy or populist rage. But the absence of an organized Left leaves the basically left-wing masses, desirous of political and economic empowerment, the ready prey of the demagogue. They can then be misled into racist and xenophobic scapegoating, when their fundamental political impulses are simply egalitarian and democratic.

The whole mainstream discourse around the supposed death of class consciousness among the working class—especially the “white working class”—the decline of a collective working-class identity since the 1970s, the rise of a more ethnic, culturalist, even racist consciousness, the paradoxical and self-defeating conservatism of the white working class, etc., is somewhat misconceived. Economic issues remain as important as ever: people are hardly indifferent on the question of their wages, their health care, the security of their jobs, education for their children, or the economic status of their community. But when for decades the Democratic Party has been unwilling to take a clear, courageous, radical stand on these issues—in fact has usually sided with the class enemies of workers, as the latter rightly perceive—it should not be surprising if the Republican public-relations juggernaut has success painting Democrats as having sold out to Wall Street and other groups, whether culturally, racially, or economically defined. The ambiguity of Democratic politics, firmly within the anti-worker paradigm of neoliberalism but showing qualified commitment to disadvantaged groups, opens the party to being portrayed as the party of high taxes that will only benefit “other” groups. Millions of people are thus induced to support a different party that, while in fact even worse for

---


6 This fact explains Trump’s success at attacking Hillary Clinton on the grounds of her association with NAFTA and the TPP, both of which his supporters saw as against their class interests.
their material interests than the Democratic, has crafted a public-relations campaign invoking a hodgepodge of class, ethnic, and cultural identities to give the impression that its policies will concretely benefit low-income whites. It offers a compelling story to explain why things have gotten so bad for Middletown, USA in the last generation, and it gives policy proposals that superficially seem likely to improve the situation.\footnote{Kirk Noden, “Why Do White Working-Class People Vote Against Their Interests? They Don’t,” \textit{Nation}, November 17, 2016.}

But we should not conclude from the electoral success of right-wing populism that the substantial segment of low-income whites who have found it attractive have thereby, obviously, completely shed the \textit{class} component of their identity in favor of racism. It is at least as reasonable to argue that the very reason for the success of this kind of populism is the potency of class grievances, the sense that one belongs to a large group of people in approximately the same economic position who have been left behind by a corporate-capitalist economy that (so the story goes) imports cheap immigrant labor \textit{en masse} and thereby deprives “people like us” of jobs. But it is true, indeed truistic, that in the absence of an organized Left that could sharpen and direct the deep-seated awareness of class among low-income whites, the field is open to right-wing populism.

Similarly—but more pertinently to this dissertation—even the long-term unemployed are, fundamentally, rarely apolitical or apathetic, contrary to the thrust of scholarship. If they, like many others, sometimes seem so, that is only because they have been shut out of the political process and have no clear means of influencing it. Evidently they see no reason to become deeply invested in politics when they lack the resources to have even a microscopic modicum of sway. It is rational in this case to focus on other things such as survival and family life. But to deny that people nevertheless care profoundly, if somewhat implicitly, about the outcomes of
politics, and even *would like* to have a significant say over the system’s priorities and functioning, is quite unjustified. It is only the pathologies of the political economy that produce the appearance of mass apathy.

In fact, all the manifestations of the “tenacity of self-preservation” that we have encountered in this study, and the diverse forms of recreation in the face of deprivation—life-celebration despite immiseration—have themselves been implicitly political, democratic, anti-authoritarian. While the historian James Patterson may be right that none of this is especially “noble,” it is nonetheless striking, and revelatory of people’s political values, to observe the instinct for freedom and self-assertion, and for resistance to inhumanity, in the spontaneous and organized activities of the poor during the Great Depression.⁸ Even collective thefts by the unemployed and Communist-facilitated protests against an oligarchic political economy were expressions of the same political impulses that caused relief clients to dissemble in order to get what they wanted, and unemployed men to join together in social clubs at settlement houses. What people want is liberation.

Whether this study can contribute anything to the struggle for popular liberation is an open question. Like most relevant historical work, its lessons are very general, having to do with the inexorable conflict between classes, the necessity of mass “direct action”—disruptive demonstrations, riots, defiance of the law—in order to achieve substantive social change, the counterproductiveness of left-wing sectarianism, the latent and potential militancy of huge numbers of people in the service of radical political programs, the correlative falsity of the mainstream idea that most Americans are and always have been largely centrist and must be appealed to on the basis of centrist ideologies, the importance of uniting along *class* lines (as

---

Americans in the 1930s did), not gender or race or occupation, if the goal is to transform institutional structures, etc. It does not even seem necessary anymore, in the early twenty-first century, for radicals to play down their identification as socialists in the hope of securing more followers, for the Cold War is over and the younger generation is not afflicted by the prejudices of its elders. Gallup reported in May 2016 that 55 percent of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 have a positive view of socialism (although, interestingly, approximately the same proportion, 57 percent, have a positive view of capitalism). In fact, a full 35 percent of all Americans favor socialism, whatever it is they understand by that term—which is striking, inasmuch as the business, political, and media elites have for generations painted socialism as all but the hideous incarnation of political evil.9

On a narrower level, one possible contribution of this study is to provide activists with information they can draw on in talks and speeches they give, and in discussion groups. It can be useful to remind the public that Communist-sponsored measures such as the Workers’ Unemployment Insurance Bill have in the past attracted mass, mainstream support, that grassroots movements organized by small groups like the AFL Rank and File Committee for Unemployment Insurance have succeeded in forcing Congress to consider measures anathema to the ruling class, in addition to compelling the AFL to change its stance on unemployment insurance and the federal government to approve bills like the Social Security Act that were unthinkable a few short years before. People must be reminded that they themselves, “the masses,” are a slumbering giant that could effect revolutions if only it adopted as its slogan “Solidarity!”

As unemployment in the United States increases in the coming years and decades, activists should draw inspiration from the Unemployed Councils, Workers Committees, and Unemployed Leagues, which proved that it is possible to organize the unemployed. The tactics of such organizations can be profitably studied: for instance, sweeping ideological appeals tend to be less effective and sustainable than appeals to concrete problems and material needs, on the basis of which positive proposals must be made. This is not because people are “un-ideological” per se, or conservative, but simply because they do not live in the clouds: their actual lives are what matter to them, more than utopias and fanciful revolutionary programs. Admittedly, the “ideology” that animates them does not have the grandiose pretensions of Marxism-Leninism or some such; it is more humble, consisting in essence of the desires listed in the second paragraph above. But those desires, in the context of an oppressive social system, can be revolutionary, and may well eventuate in dramatic social transformations.

Another possible “contribution” of this study, as stated in the Introduction, is that hopefully it serves as a reminder of the explanatory value of historical materialism. As such a reminder it cannot compare to countless scholarly works that have preceded it, some of which have been mentioned in the dissertation: for example, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix’s 1981 masterpiece *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*, which explains 1,400 years of history on the basis of a few simple Marxian concepts.10 Nevertheless, since the long reign of academic idealism continues—although it may succumb in the next couple of decades to the urgency of class issues—there is still some pedagogical,

---

10 It is a massive and dense work, but for people who lack the time to read it I have provided a summary at https://uic.academia.edu/ChrisWright. The webpage contains many other summaries of necessary materialist scholarship, such as Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers’ brilliant study *Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986).
polemical, and scholarly value to works that unequivocally prioritize class. A few reflections on the matter, supplementing those in the Introduction, are apposite.

John Maynard Keynes gave a classic exposition of the idealist philosophy in the last paragraph of his *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*:

…[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.

Surprisingly, I have never seen a critique of this celebrated paragraph. It is a competent expression of the liberal faith, and more generally of the idealism that throughout history has taken many intellectual forms, but it is wrong. Permit me to quote from a paper of mine, which criticizes the paragraph in polemical language:
…These are backward fantasies, which grow out of a poor sociological imagination. The point is that the ideas that come to be accepted as gospel are those useful to vested interests, which are the entities that have the resources to propagate them. (In the typically bourgeois language of impersonal ‘automaticity,’ Keynes refers to “the gradual encroachment of ideas.” But ideas do not spread of themselves; they are propagated and subsidized by people and institutions whose interests they express. This is why “the ruling ideas of a society are the ideas of its ruling class,” which has the resources to disseminate them.)

Keynes’ famous book itself contributed not at all to the so-called Keynesian policies of FDR and Hitler and others; in fact, such policies were already being pursued by Baron Haussmann in France in the 1850s, because they were useful in giving employment to thousands of workers and raising aggregate demand and thereby economic growth.\(^{11}\) Is it likely that had Keynes not published his book in 1936, the U.S. government during and after World War II would have pursued radically different, un-Keynesian economic policies? Hardly. Because they were useful to vested interests, those policies were bound to be adopted—and economists, tools of the ruling class, were bound to systematize their theoretical rationalizations sooner or later.\(^{12}\) Incidentally, in some form they had been around


\(^{12}\) Through the last two centuries, the history of struggles between economic schools of thought has been little more than an ideological reflection of the power struggles between different classes, in particular the landed aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the working class (but even different subgroups of the bourgeoisie have at times favored different systems of economics, such as Keynesian versus neoclassical). For an interpretation of classical political economy as just an ideological expression and tool of the rising bourgeoisie’s dual class war against the aristocracy and the poor, see Rajani Kothari, *Political Economy and Laissez-Faire: Economics and Ideology in the Ricardian Era* (Totowa, NJ: Roman & Littlefield, 1986). This book, being Marxist, has been largely ignored, but one can scarcely understand the significance of the classical economists without reading it.
already in the late nineteenth century, long before Keynes, among liberals and socialists, “underconsumptionists” like John Hobson and many others. But they did not become conventional wisdom until major sectors of the ruling class had taken them up between the late 1930s and early 1970s. After their usefulness had ended, in the 1970s, they were abandoned, and a new, neoliberal, ideological crusade began, which was predictably successful because it was waged by the most powerful actors in society. The falseness and superficiality of the “supply-side” ideas of Reaganomics were no great hindrance to their political success, because theory does not matter in the real world—despite what self-apologists like Keynes and other liberals (Paul Krugman, etc.) might think. 13

The question of the production and distribution of resources is so fundamental that history cannot be understood except on the basis of materialism.

The simplifications that enable us to understand history must all be erected on a materialist foundation. I have tried to illustrate and give evidence for some of these necessary simplifications in this study, in particular one that Chomsky states as follows: “The history of the United States is a constant struggle between these two tendencies: pressure for more freedom and democracy coming from below, and efforts at elite control and domination coming from above.” 14 The simplicity of this formulation is its virtue, for one must abstract from the messiness of reality in order to understand it, i.e., in order to find the general principles that allow us to give order to the chaos. One understands society by locating dominant tendencies, as

---

13 Chris Wright, “The Rise of the Right in the U.S.,” at academia.edu. On the neoliberal “ideological crusade” and the reasons why Keynesianism was no longer useful to the ruling class, see, for example, David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
14 Requiem for the American Dream, directed by Kelly Nyks, Peter D. Hutchison, and Jared P. Scott (2015; FilmRise).
Marx did, to which there are always exceptions but which are incomparably more important than the exceptions. From the founding of the U.S., when James Madison declared that government ought to “protect the minority of the opulent from the majority” and John Jay believed “the people who own the country ought to govern it” (a principle effectively enshrined in the Constitution), to the present, when President Donald Trump’s cabinet is the wealthiest ever, the country’s history is indeed, from a broad perspective, the history of class struggle.\textsuperscript{15} All history, since the emergence of civilization, is the history of class struggle, which takes many different forms and is implicitly present in a vast array of social phenomena—as I have suggested throughout this dissertation.\textsuperscript{16}

Materialist principles like these are useful not only because they are true and give us the keys to understanding history, but also because their dissemination through scholarship and teaching facilitates popular struggles for freedom and power. They are \textit{morally} important

\textsuperscript{15} Julianna Goldman, “Donald Trump’s cabinet richest in U.S. history, historians say,” \textit{CBS News}, December 20, 2016. On the Constitution, see Charles Beard’s still-compelling classic, \textit{An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States} (New York: Macmillan Co., 1921); also Woody Holton, \textit{Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution} (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008) and Terry Bouton, \textit{Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). It is possible that Beard placed too much emphasis on the crass economic self-interest of the Constitution’s framers and not enough on their sincere belief that what they were doing was for the common good. As I’ve written elsewhere, though, “historians who reject Beardian and Marxian arguments as being reductive are wont to forget the elementary psychological truth that people find it very easy to rationalize doing what is in their interest. Nothing is easier than to convince oneself of a noble justification for doing what one \textit{wants} to do. The question of personal motive, therefore, or self-interpretation, isn’t very important or interesting; the main point is that people tend to see the world, and the good, implicitly in class terms, specifically in terms of what benefits \textit{them} (or the institutions they identify with). Their experience is structured in manifold ways by class; their very ideals are often little more than sublimations of class interest—as in the case of the 18\textsuperscript{th}-century farmers and debtors who wanted radical democracy because it would be good for them, and the bondholders and merchants who wanted an ‘aristocratic’ and strong federal government—which they got—because it would be good for them. Anyway, the liberal article of faith that policymakers somehow levitate above vulgar economic interests and nobly acknowledge only ideas and ideals is transparently inadequate.” Chris Wright, \textit{Finding Our Compass: Reflections on a World in Crisis} (Bradenton, FL: Booklocker, 2014), 60. Sure, the Founders had a genuine desire to serve the common good. So did George W. Bush when he invaded Iraq. So did the generals who waged World War I. Even Hitler did. Virtually everyone is concerned on some level with the “common good” and thinks he is serving it. It should be the task of the historian to penetrate these superficial and predictable psychological facts and discover the real social and institutional dynamics that explain, e.g., policy formation.

\textsuperscript{16} For a defense of Marx’s frequently ridiculed dictum that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” see pages 3 and 4 of my summary of Ste. Croix’s work, “The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World,” at \texttt{academia.edu}. To excerpt one sentence: “[E]ven the very tasks of \textit{survival} in complex societies are structured by class antagonisms, which determine who gets what resources when and in what ways.”
principles. This is probably the main reason why radical intellectuals like Chomsky and Howard Zinn have had such success in the public arena: the populace appreciates not only the truths that are imparted but especially the ammunition given to resist mainstream propaganda and build popular movements. It is simple, clear principles like the basic ones of Marxism\textsuperscript{17} that must serve as the intellectual bedrock of social movements; the ambiguity in which historical scholarship frequently revels—which often, unfortunately, only \textit{distracts} from important insights—is not well-suited to serve moral battles in the political sphere. The most effective and most valuable way, then, for scholars to reach outside the academy and contribute to political conversations is to elaborate on and give evidence for the old left-wing “clichés,” in addition, of course, to weighing in on specific policy debates and political issues.

In this fateful moment of global crisis—economic, social, political, and environmental crisis—the world needs an \textit{engaged} class of leftist intellectuals more than ever. While ideas and ideologies are not of the total importance that intellectuals like to think, they are not of zero importance either. It is incumbent on people with privileged access to intellectual resources to fight back in their writings and teaching against the reactionary debasement of public discourse that has become ever more pronounced in the neoliberal era, and that serves no one’s interest but the ultra-rich. History is made in the streets, not the study, but the study can help arm the struggle in the streets.

\textsuperscript{17} Not including Marx’s outdated conception of socialist/communist revolution. Again, see my \textit{Worker Cooperatives and Revolution: History and Possibilities in the United States}. 

549
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscript and Archival Collections


Chicago Commons. Papers. Chicago History Museum.


Communist Party of the USA in the Comintern Archives. Files. Tamiment Library, New York University.


McCulloch, Frank W. Papers. Chicago History Museum.

McDowell, Mary. Papers. Chicago History Museum.


Oral History Project in Labor History. Roosevelt University, Chicago.

Special Collections and Preservation Division, Chicago Public Library.


Newspapers and Periodicals

Atlanta Daily World
Barron’s
Billboard
Blue Shirt News
Chicago Daily News
Chicago Defender
Chicago Hunger Fighter
Chicago Tribune
China Press
Communist
Compass
Daily Worker
Federated Press
Federation News
Forbes
Forum and Century
Industrial Worker
Labor Notes
Los Angeles Sentinel
Los Angeles Times
Monthly Labor Review
Nation
National Geographic
New Frontier
New Republic
New York Amsterdam News
New York Times
New York Herald Tribune
Party Organizer
Pittsburgh Courier
Rank and File Federationist
Social Service Year Book
Social Work Today
Survey
Survey Graphic
Unemployed Union
Unemployment Insurance Review
Variety
Washington Post
Wall Street Journal
Work
Workers Alliance
Government Documents


——. *Biennial Report of the IERC, Covering the Period July 1, 1934 through June 30, 1936.* Chicago, 1936.


U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Labor. *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor.* 74th Congress, 1st session, 1935.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Manufactures. *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 174 and S. 262.* 72nd Congress, 1st session, 1931.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Manufactures. *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 4592.* 72nd Congress, 1st session, 1932.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Manufactures. *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 4076.* 72nd Congress, 1st session, 1932.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Manufactures. *Relief for Unemployed Transients: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Manufactures on S. 5121.* 72nd Congress, 2nd session, 1933.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Manufactures. *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures on S. 5125.* 72nd Congress, 2nd session, 1933.
Books and Pamphlets


Drake, St. Clair. *Churches and Voluntary Associations in the Chicago Negro Community*. Chicago: Works Progress Administration, 1940.


Reed, Ellery F. *Federal Transient Program: An Evaluative Survey.* New York: Committee on Care of Transient and Homeless, 1935.


**Articles and Chapters**


Beliajus, Vytautas F. “Folk Dancing in Chicago.” *Recreation* 30, no. 6 (September 1936): 309, 310.


Leab, Daniel J. “‘United We Eat’: The Creation and Organization of the Unemployed Councils in 1930.” *Labor History* 8, no. 3 (Fall 1967): 300–315.


Theses and Dissertations


Diran, Mary. “Medical Care Given to a Group of Clients of the Unemployment Relief Service.” M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1935.


VITA
Christopher Wright
602 West 180th Street, Apt. 32
New York City, New York 10033
(617) 875-1148
ccwwgd@gmail.com

EDUCATION

University of Illinois at Chicago
Ph.D., U.S. History, May 2017
Advisor: Leon Fink
Dissertation Title: “Down But Not Out: The Unemployed in Chicago during the Great Depression”

University of Massachusetts Boston
M.A., U.S. History, December 2010
Advisor: James Green
Thesis Title: “Worker Cooperatives and Revolution: History and Possibilities in the United States”

University of Missouri-St. Louis
M.A., Philosophy, May 2007

Wesleyan University
Bachelor of Arts, College of Social Studies, May 2003

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS


Co-Organizer, Midwest Labor and Working-Class History Conference. University of Illinois at Chicago, April 4-5, 2014

Wrote a timeline of U.S. labor history for a Hull House exhibit, summer 2014


TEACHING

University of Illinois at Chicago: 2010 – May 2016
Teaching assistant – taught multiple discussion sections in U.S. History, U.S. Labor History, Russian History, and various iterations of Western History; graded papers, wrote and presented lectures

University of Massachusetts Boston: 2008 – 2010
Teaching assistant – advised students and evaluated their work in courses on ancient Greek and Roman history

GEOS, Boston, MA: 2009
ESL (English as a Second Language) Teacher

ESL teacher

University of Missouri-St. Louis: 2005 – 2007
Teaching assistant; Instructor – taught a course in Business Ethics

LIKE Language Institute, Daegu, South Korea: 2003 – 2004
ESL teacher

SERVICE
Judge, Chicago Metropolitan History Fair: 2015, 2016

Served on the Bargaining Committee and Stewards Committee, as a steward of the History department

Undergraduate mentor, University of Missouri-St. Louis: 2006 – 2007

HONORS/AWARDS
Marion S. Miller Dissertation Fellowship, University of Illinois at Chicago: 2016 – 2017

History Doctoral Award, University of Illinois at Chicago: 2010 – 2014

University Scholarship, Wesleyan University: 1999 – 2003

Valedictorian, Mount Hope High School: 1999

PUBLICATIONS
Books:
Worker Cooperatives and Revolution: History and Possibilities in the United States (Booklocker, 2014)
Finding Our Compass: Reflections on a World in Crisis (Booklocker, 2014)
Notes of an Underground Humanist (Booklocker, 2013)

Articles, essays, and poems published in Philosophy Now, CounterPunch, Dissident Voice, Peace Magazine, Open Democracy, ROAR Magazine, Left Curve, Chaffey Review, Main Street Rag, and The Great American Poetry Show