Bargaining space: deal-making strategies for large-scale renewal projects in Colombian cities

BY

CATALINA ORTIZ
B.Architect, National University of Colombia, 1999
M.S., National University of Colombia, 2001

THESIS

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Defense Committee:

Rachel N. Weber, Chair and Advisor
Brenda Parker
John J. Betancur
Nik Theodore
Sanjeev Vidyarthi
Clara Irazábal, GSAPP, University of Columbia
To my parents
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAR: Regional Environmental Corporation
COOTACOJ: Cooperative of Associated Informal Workers of Corazon de Jesus
CP: Communicative Planning
CSP: Critical Spatial Planning
DANE: National Administrative Department of Statistics
DNP: National Department of Planning
LR: Land Readjustment
MADVT: Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development
PA: Power Analytics
PP: Partial plans
POT: Territorial Municipal Plan
UAU: Unit of Urban Actuation
SUMMARY

Large-scale urban projects have become the political currency for unlocking land values in prime real estate locations. For over a decade, and unlike most of the Latin American countries, Colombia has been implementing a new progressive spatial planning system. This system introduced the model of large-scale projects through public / private partnerships. Much of the research has been concerned with why the new planning system should be in place. However the question of the negotiation dynamics as necessary condition to address actors’ access to power in large-scale projects has been overlooked. This dissertation examines the negotiation of partial plans, the land management tool enabling large-scale projects, in the context of downtown renewal comparing two cases (i.e. community led and publicly led initiatives) in Colombian cities (i.e. Medellin and Pereira).

I termed ‘critical spatial planning’ the lens for analyzing emerging spatial planning practices in Colombia and the frame to overcome gaps in negotiation theory. This literature largely fails to account for the impacts of (post) colonialism in the circuits of capital and planning ideas, the role of the materiality of space, and informality as pivotal features of spatial planning in the so-called Global South. The dissertation suggests shifting the focus of negotiation studies to off-the-table agent’ strategies and tactics for mobilizing interests, the historical trajectories of materiality of space, and the dialogic connections of transnational flows of planning ideas and capital.

Based on in-depth interviews with key informants from local and national governments, the private sector, and community organizations. I argue that partial plans crystallize long-term planning initiatives in downtown fringe areas to unlock land values through the formalization of “informal” practices on public spaces. The findings suggest the main negotiation strategies and
tactics were focused on positioning politically the project, setting the boundaries of formality/informality, the land speculation controls, and the urban design. The cases reveal how community coalitions and mayoral involvement (or their lack thereof) can inhibit (or facilitate) the protection of inhabitants and the provision of public amenities. Despite the socially progressive goals of this planning framework, the legal emphasis on landownership curtails the leverage of non-landowners. As a result, the implementation of partial plans of renewal was more efficient in allocating costs of the projects than in assuring citizens’ rights and government responsibilities.
1. **Introduction: Setting the negotiation stage**

"Informalized spaces are reclaimed through urban renewal, while formalized spaces accrue value through state-authorized legitimacy" (Roy, 2011: 233)

1.1. **Background and purpose**

Large-scale urban projects have become the political currency for unlocking land values in prime real estate locations. The model of large-scale projects through public/private partnerships was launched in Colombia in late 1990s. Consistent with the democratic turn of Latin America, the 1990s in Colombia were a time of institutional advances in the areas of land management and urban rights following the signing of the new constitution in 1991. The political constitution incorporated the principles of the social and ecological functions of property, the equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of urbanization, and the direct participation of citizens in urban policy decision-making. These propositions operate as the pillars of the ‘urban land reform’ agenda that, since the passage of the Territorial Development Law in 1997, gave birth to a new spatial planning system. As a result, Colombia is considered a pioneer in implementing a progressive system of urban land reform in Latin America. Thus, the new planning system changes the terms of agents’ access to land promising a socially progressive framework.

All municipalities in Colombia attempted to implement these propositions through new participatory master plans (i.e., Planes de Ordenamiento Territorial-POTs) including strategic large-scale urban projects to be developed through Partial Plans –PP-. The partial plan is a land management tool that enables the assembly of parcels/lots, and requires coordinated urban design and self-funding mechanisms. PP constitutes a typology of physical planning at intermediate scale. In 2000, over 4,000 hectares of downtown fringe areas in the main Colombian cities were

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¹ I understand agents as political subjects or collectivities of subjects who share similar interests and values around space transformations.
designated as urban renewal areas to be redeveloped using this novel land management tool (DNP, 2010). By 2010, more than 95 partial plans of renewal began the formulation process and more than 32 were approved (DNP, 2010). At the same time, designation of these areas set off processes of contestation that sparked my interest in explaining the ways in which agents mobilized their interests to intervene downtown locations. Therefore, this dissertation examines the dynamics of implementation of this agenda on the basis of large-scale renewal projects, focusing on the process of negotiation before plan execution in downtown fringe areas of Colombian cities.

According to the new legal framework, local governments need to negotiate with a diverse set of agents the land management of large-scale urban renewal projects for community revitalization. Renewal remains the preferred tool to overcome the contradictions within city areas in decline. Particularly, central areas of most Latin American cities are the settings of intricate ownership fragmentation, low-income renters, and intertwined informal/formal activities in public spaces. In this context, partial plans attempt to guide the intervention of central urban areas by changing lot configurations, increasing population densities, and creating new public spaces. The new legislation privileges landownership and assigns rights and responsibilities based on investment and profit of interventions. Therefore, the social costs and the involvement of non-landowners have been particularly contentious in the negotiation process. Partial plan negotiations emerge as a pivotal site to explore urban land reform challenges since they embody a new politics of space.

Even though partial plans are gaining momentum in Colombia, researchers have overlooked their pervasiveness, impacts on the urban form, and negotiation dynamics. No assessment of this emergent land management practice exists, and theory about large-scale urban projects in Latin America is still scarce. Consequently, policymakers, community leaders, and public officials are working with minimal information. Although researchers have developed a few
ideas about why partial plans should work and are necessary (Garcia-Bellido, 1998; Vazquez, 2000; Garcia, 2002; Maldonado, 2006; Pinto, 2008; Arzayuz et al., 2010), they have not offered evidence regarding whether they do work on the ground, or about particular circumstances in which it is possible for all concerned parties to reach agreements.

The broader goal of this dissertation is to examine the ways in which large-scale projects represent the changing dynamics of real estate capital, state practices, and civil society responses. In particular I seek to understand how the negotiation of large-scale projects serves as a catalyst for the interests of agents in the re-shaping of space. The central purpose of this multiple case study is to explore the partial plans’ negotiation processes surrounding large-scale urban renewal projects in Colombia’s downtown areas. In particular, I seek to determine how the interests of public and private agents are crystallized in physical design schemes to which stakeholders agree. Furthermore, I want to understand the factors that have jeopardized the implementation of the urban land reform agenda.

Based on case studies, this research attempts to address the following central question:

- How do agents involved in large-scale projects of downtown renewal mobilize their interests to shape space?

This line of inquiry focuses on the ways in which involved parties engage in discursive and spatial practices to pursue their interests within the new spatial planning system. In order to grasp the complexity of its implementation, I explore two key sub-questions that examine the context of the emergent land management practices:

- How does the negotiated urban design scheme articulate public and private agents’ interests in large-scale redevelopment projects?
- To what extent have non-landowners been able to influence the process and outcomes of partial plan negotiation?

**1.2. Theoretical framework and significance**

This dissertation explores the configuration of large-scale projects of renewal in Colombia resulting from the mediation of agents’ interests and institutional frameworks. The theoretical framework presents the debates and critiques of deal making in planning theory. I address the gaps in the literature by proposing the analytical framework I term “critical spatial planning”. Critical spatial planning (CSP) encompasses three layers of interpretation. First, it is critical because –as critical urban theory does- CSP problematizes the impacts of the territorial circuits of capital and the pervading impacts of neo-liberal oriented governance. Second, it is spatial because CSP focuses on space as product, site, and mediator of social relations and a departure point to understand the built environment. Third, CSP refers to planning as an open arena of place making that involves mechanisms for (de) regulating space from grass roots initiatives, state institutions, private firms, their networks and its contestations.

I focus on theories of negotiation in urban planning. These theories expose plan and plan-making processes as vehicles of the complex linkages between space, knowledge, and subjectivities operating in urban transformations. I trace two theoretical approaches to critically assess negotiation in urban transformations: communicative planning and the analytics of power. In particular, the power analytics (PA) perspective offers a planning practice understanding based on the power/knowledge discourse elicited through space. Also PA exposes how the driving force of planning practice and its rationalities are subjected to the asymmetrical forces power, defining what counts as knowledge. This literature has helped me to disentangle the rationales of agents engaging in bargaining strategies and tactics within the context of partial plans. Furthermore, insights from
this literature help to explore how discursive and spatial practices underpin each other in the interpretation of the current bargaining framework to promote urban renewal projects. Hence, this perspective reveals spatial practices as sources of actors’ meanings and interests in partial plans.

The main limitations of this body of literature is its silence regarding the impacts of (post) colonialism on current space configuration and power circuits, hence an absence of information on the planning practices of the ‘Global South’. Thus, extant planning practice literature reproduces the assumptions of hierarchical accounts emphasizing the condition of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ cities assuming these labels entail a priory differences among cities. Moreover, current negotiation theory neglects the transnational flows of planning and policies as pivotal sources of institutional changes and diffusion of hegemonic discourses. In addition, theory on planning practice ignores informality as a prevalent governance feature and mode of space production in the majority of cities in the Global South. Thus, my contribution is located at the intersection of three interdisciplinary bodies of work to overcome the above-mentioned limitations in the negotiation literature. As a result, I call for a critical spatial planning frame to examine how partial plans of renewal embody the implementation of a new spatial planning system in Colombia.

First, I borrow from post-colonial urban studies the notion of “ordinary cities” to counter the taken-for-granted hierarchies currently in place in the examination of cities (i.e., developed – developing cities) (Robinson, 2006). With this lens, I examine the lack of attention to the impacts of post-colonialism in deal-making theories. The post-colonial turn in urban studies advocates for positioning the study of urbanisms in the Global South as sites of innovation. Furthermore, this perspective urges for a shifting of sites of knowledge production as a way of enabling a more cosmopolitan urban theory. This literature helps to challenge the assumptions of hegemonic views of development and modernity and contributes to an understanding of the impacts of historic
trajectories in the travels of planning models across contexts. Therefore, the “ordinary city” approach depicts, not only the uneven geographies of knowledge production, but also the potential for a cross learning experience based on Colombian urbanism experiences.

Second, I draw from critical policy studies to locate the emergence of the spatial planning system as a product of transnational flows of urban planning models and policy. I use this literature to overcome the limitations of negotiation theories around ideology and macro patterns of institutional political economy. This policy literature frames policy mobility and mutation as a power field and ideological tool of recent neoliberal patterning. Furthermore, it suggests that the process of policy "importing" takes place in a non-linear reproduction fashion. In other words, the diffusion of policies is not a single fixed compound of ideas that disseminate but rather an “already-in-transformation” model as they travel (Peck & Theodore, 2010). This literature contributes to an understanding of how the Colombian case installs a variegated set of international references as a result of international cooperation agreements around technical support that inform urban land reform in Latin America. Moreover, the resulting legal and institutional framework becomes the source of agents’ leverage and the discourse used to articulate public and private interests. Thus, this perspective exposes the transnational nature of contemporary urbanism, positioning the circulation of models as the embodiment of authoritarian knowledge and expertise.

Third, I use theories of informality to explain a central governance feature in global southern cities that has been overlooked in the negotiation literature. This approach is crucial to understand the rationalities that guide renewal projects in their attempt to formalize informality or relocate spatial practices considered “informal”. Theories about informality frame renewal as a state mechanism to privilege elites and to pursue market driven agendas of capital accumulation (Roy, 2005; 2009; 2011). This literature helps to disentangle how informality becomes a feature of
power structures and a purposive mode to regulate space. Insights from this literature also allow
the framing of informality as a discursive / spatial practice of the state. Moreover, I contend that
informality is a contributing factor to the mutation of tools and models in circulation. Thus, this
perspective sheds light on the intertwined nature of informality and formality on processes of
negotiation in renewal projects.

In sum, I define ‘critical spatial planning’ as the analytical framework that sees planning
practice through the lens of critical theory to interrogate changes in the materiality of space. I posit
that, by addressing spatial and discursive practices, a spatial turn in negotiation studies can be
made. In this regard, negotiation is conceived as the mobilization of agents’ interests influenced by
transnational circuits of planning ideas and capital to shape space. In addition, I highlight the
notion of strategy as an analytical tool, and add a line of inquiry to unpack how actors’ interests are
mobilized. ‘Strategy’ becomes a way to understand how politics of space operate in the negotiation
of large-scale projects, exposing the shifting boundaries of formality/informality. Thus, examining
large-scale projects through the lens of power dynamics allows for a better understanding of the
built environment as a byproduct of deal-making processes.

Some of the significant contributions of this research focus are:

• The improvement of practice and policy debate: This study broadens the planning practice
and the policy debate by addressing the land management practices for large-scale projects in cities
of the Global South. Likewise, the investigation exposes the linkages among land readjustment,
urban design, and distribution of rights and responsibilities of owners and non-landowners in large-
scale urban projects. In addition, it explores spatially and historically contingent conditions for
initiative formation and strategies for reaching agreements over redevelopment projects. This study
of the urban design schemes and their associated bargaining strategies examine the nature of the
agents’ political leverage in shaping the built environment in the Latin American context.

- The addition to scholarly research: This project also contributes to the three major theoretical literatures described above. The literature on negotiation largely fails to account for the role of the materiality of space and of informality in spatial planning. I contribute to the literature on negotiation in urban planning by suggesting a shift that gives more saliency to off-the-table agents’ moves, the materiality of space, and the dialogic connections of various discourses. Moreover, I engage the literature on critical policy studies by depicting the assemblage of a multiplicity of transnational influences that shape the spatial planning system in Colombia. Similarly, I add to informality theories by revealing the discursive practices and the government cartographies to target and reframe spatial practices categorized as “informal”. In sum, retooling our understanding of large-scale project negotiation will improve policies and research aimed at enhancing spatial equity within changing political economic contexts.

1.3. Argument

Under the new spatial planning system in Colombia, negotiation has become a necessary condition to address actors’ access to power in large-scale projects; thus, the deal-making strategies and tactics reveal the ways in which agents’ interests are mobilized to reconfigure the materiality of space. I argue that partial plans, the land management tool that has enabled large-scale projects in Colombia, crystallize long-term planning initiatives in downtown fringe areas to unlock land values through the formalization of “informal” practices on public spaces. State planning employed the concept of ‘formalization’ as a way to dismantle existing economic circuits; clear public space use of unwanted users and criminalize some spatial practices. Despite the socially progressive goals of this planning framework, the legal emphasis on landownership curtails the leverage of non-
landowner inhabitants/users. Furthermore, social costs and urban design become subordinated to private investment and mayoral approval.

Partial plans entail using land value appreciation to obtain public amenities through the real estate market. In spite of that, whether to build public amenities — directly in the case in Pereira — or require their provision by developers — like in the Medellin case — remains a matter of the local POT and the political mayoral agenda. At the same time, the preservation and enhancement of existing economic circuits of formality / informality depends on the strength of the community and the planning expertise of its leaders. Mayoral involvement determines if state-owned land becomes the mechanism to foster (i.e. Pereira) or block (i.e. Medellin) the project. Furthermore, the lack of speculation controls in place jeopardizes the self-funding mandate of partial plans because the increase in land values diminishes the agents’ ability to fund public amenities. That is why the lead agent’s attitude towards informality, mayoral involvement, land speculation controls, and the presence of community groups mainly determine the type of negotiation strategies pursued by agents. As a result, deal-making strategies take place at different levels, impacting directly the ability of agents to engage and influence negotiation.

This research identifies three scales and stages of negotiation in the structuring of large-scale projects. First, the stage of assemblage constitutes the point of point of departure where the parameters of the bargaining framework are established at the new spatial planning system. This assemblage moment presents the process of transnational transfer of urban models to the legal and institutional national level. Second, the stage of redeployment depicts the trajectory of the planning framework from the national to the city level to target renewal areas using the new legislation. The redeployment episode inscribes public interest as a public amenities agenda within the two-tier system of comprehensive planning and strategic intervention through partial plans. Moreover, the
type of initiative and the initial stakes of the players are defined at this stage. Third, the stage of deal making shows the transaction from the city level to the actual project. At this stage, actors display bargaining strategies and tactics to mobilize and claim their interests, to transform spaces at the downtown fringe, and compromise to reach an agreement. By exposing the layers of deal making strategies in large-scale projects, I demonstrate that negotiation becomes the locus of power relations and rationalities that interact to shape strategic urban space.

1.4. Method and case selection

I employed a qualitative research methodology, in particular a multiple case study approach, to examine the structure and dynamics of emergent land management practices for large-scale redevelopment projects in Colombian cities. The main data gathering technique used was the semi-structured interview of key informants. I conducted 35 in-depth interviews with selected informants from local and national governments, the private sector, and community organizations in 2010. To a lesser extent, I relied on archival research and content analysis techniques for gathering secondary data. The study also includes spatial analysis to expose land management strategies based on current vs. intended patterns of urban form, public space use, parcel structure, land tenure, and price.

I am concentrating on the Colombian case since it is considered a paradigmatic example of planning practices that seek to balance city interests with private interests, emphasize collective rights, and involve land value capture (Fernandes & Maldonado, 2009; Vejarano, 2007; Morales, 2003; Furtado, 2000; Smolka & Furtado, 2001; Garcia-Bellido, 1998; Doebele, 1997). Pioneering examples of the two models for steering partial plans are: 1) The publicly-led Ciudad Victoria Renewal Partial Plan, an exceptional case taking place in Pereira that not only received a national award for its achievements but also set precedents in the implementation of renewal projects in the
entire country. 2) The community-led Corazon de Jesus Renewal Partial Plan in the City of Medellin, the first partial plan approved that involved agents of formal and informal economic networks.

I concentrated on three intertwined aspects of the negotiation of partial plans: the urban design of public and private areas, owners and non-landowners rights and responsibilities, and funding strategies. In addition, I focused on the discursive and spatial strategies and tactics regarding attitudes towards informality, community organization capabilities, land assemblage dynamics, and mayoral involvement as contributing factors to the negotiation process. The cases reveal how community coalitions (or their lack thereof) at the district level can inhibit (or facilitate) renewal projects.

1.5. Outline of the dissertation

The second chapter discusses the theories that guide my line of inquiry. In this chapter I present the main epistemological perspectives that inform studies on negotiation in planning. I use the insights of post-colonial urban studies, critical policy studies, and informality theories to overcome the main limitations of existing negotiation literature. I explain my analytical framework as a critical spatial planning approach to capture the spatial dimension of power and rationalities through strategies and tactics of negotiation.

The third chapter presents the methodological considerations used to examine the processes of negotiation of large-scale projects as a part of the emerging land management practices pursuing urban land reform. This chapter depicts the point of point of departure premises undergird an in depth case analysis from a qualitative standpoint. In this section I discuss the justification for the case selection, the research design, and the strategies of validating my findings. In addition, I describe the data collection techniques employed and the challenges faced on the ground. To
conclude this section, I address the limitations of the study in terms of the shortcomings of the method itself and issues of data availability.

The fourth chapter traces the lineage of partial plans as the bargaining framework for developing large-scale projects in Colombia. This section depicts the historical conditions that favored the creation of a new spatial planning system following an urban land reform agenda and the transnational models that serve to build it. In addition, this chapter explains the redeployment of partial plans in the context of downtown renewal in Medellin and Pereira. It also reveals the appropriation and reinterpretation of the national legal and institutional framework to tailor it to local spatial trajectories. I present partial plans as a product of an assemblage of international references that put urban models in motion and constant mutation. This chapter explains the rationale that guides targeting areas for large-scale projects of renewal to position public and private interests in the deal-making framework.

The fifth and sixth chapters present the public-private deal making in two pioneer partial plans of renewal in the cities of Pereira and Medellin. These chapters deal with the implementation of partial plans before the execution of the large-scale projects, as their designation sparked contestation and initiatives to lead the negotiation. In doing so, I describe the actors’ profiles, the negotiation process, and the agreement achieved. In sum, both chapters detail the bargaining strategies and tactics employed by agents to mobilize their interests in four aspects: the political positioning of the initiative, the framing of informality as a way to tackle non-landowner leverage, the real estate market impacts on land pooling, and the resulting urban design.

The fifth chapter shows the negotiation of the partial plan of Ciudad Victoria as a model of a state-led renewal project in Pereira. This case unravels the spatial and discursive practices that local planning authorities and the mayor used in the absence of community organization. Moreover, this
chapter portrays the ways in which non-landowners’ practices are depicted as social deviance, while foreign investors are privileged through a fast track regulatory benefits package. In turn, the project becomes the mayor’s political platform by assuming public facilities construction and upfront financial risks at the expense of the displacement of vulnerable populations.

The sixth chapter focuses on the actors’ deal-making strategies and tactics used in the district of Corazon de Jesus, the community-led partial plan of renewal in Medellin. This case reveals how a community coalition, rooted in civil strikes against eviction and zoning changes, mobilized to counteract local planning ideas of renewal. In addition, this chapter exposes the leverage of non-landowners to influence the compromises on social programs and the limitations of landowners for participating in the land assembling system. As a result, the project can be seen as a bastion of community resistance; yet the exclusion of street workers and the pressures of local planning authorities jeopardized its initial social goals.

Finally, the seventh chapter discusses the main theoretical and empirical insights gained in examining the case results. This chapter compares both initiatives and addresses the challenges of implementing the urban land reform agenda. Here, I revisit the theoretical framework used for answering the research questions and expose further aspects of inquiry. In addition, I present possibilities for enhancing current planning practices and the creation of a more responsive urban policy. The closing remarks indicate the research agenda that will guide my intellectual endeavors toward positioning new sites of knowledge production in this front.
2. **Politics of space: Situating deal-making in urban planning theory**

“[Power] is embodied in every aspect of discourses, in formal routines, informal practices, and physical structures”
(Foucault quoted in Gunder, 2010: 303).

**Introduction**

This chapter explores the theoretical debate about deal making in planning practice and presents the analytical framework to address my research questions. Large-scale projects constitute emblematic tools of space intervention in contemporary urbanism. Studies on large-scale urban projects in Latin America have focused primarily on: the risks coming from the privatization of urban management (e.g., Lungo, 2005; Carmona, 2005), the role of legal frameworks in the implementation of urban land reform (e.g., Fernandes, 2005; Maldonado, 2009), the financial strategies of land value capture (e.g., Smolka & Furtado, 2001), and the power relations involved in implementing them (e.g., Zumino, 2006; Cuenya, 2009). Although, these studies are relevant in the examination of large-scale projects, they overlook the negotiation processes, the role of non-landowners, and the impacts of public and private interests on the materiality of space. This gap in the literature is the seed of my intellectual inquiry about large-scale projects land management practices in Colombia. I believe if we trace the negotiation processes in these projects we can retool our understanding of the politics of space; because, they reveal the material circulation of knowledge, policies, and capital shaping strategic urban spaces.

The first section depicts the theoretical premises of the main perspectives about planning. Processes of negotiation remain at the core of planning practice. Changes in governance systems install the logic of securing partnerships between the public sector and the private sector, and eventually, civil society, to intervene in space. This transformation changes the terms to access urban land and impacts the role of planners. Moreover, this process has led to an increase in joint
negotiations to make the zoning flexible and devise a collective bargaining practice for splitting responsibilities between actors (tax-payers, developers, landowners). Thus, the transactional nature of planning is pivotal to its examination. In this context, negotiation studies draw from two main epistemological perspectives: Communicative planning theory based on Habermas’ ideas and the power analytics based on Foucault’s ideas. These theories are based on the idea of the mutually embedded nature of rationalities, inter-subjectivities, and power in planning practice. I argue that negotiation processes are within spatial planning practices and become the locus of power and rationalities for shaping space.

The second section presents the critique to the approaches and their limitations for explaining the negotiation of large-scale projects. Large-scale projects become the political currency in decentralized governance schemes. In that regard, agents’ leverage and the mechanisms to mobilize space-based interests determine the nature of the deal-making process. The debate between both schools revolves around three aspects: the ways to deal with power asymmetries, the role of rationality and knowledge, and the normative and critical approach to negotiation. Despite the insights derived from these two schools, both perspectives underplay the impacts of (post) coloniality in planning practice, the transnational trajectories of city-making models, the active role of informality as a space production mode, and the institutional political economy. I argue that the literature on negotiation offers necessary analytical categories but not sufficient to account for the role of the materiality of space and informality as pivotal features of spatial planning in the so-called Global South.

The third section calls for a critical spatial planning as an analytical framework. Negotiation is a necessary condition to address the differential access to power in planning decision-making processes. In order to address negotiation, power analytics brings the concept of ‘negotiation
strategy and tactic’ as analytical tools and entry points to disentangle the circulation of knowledge, policies, and capital. Although I contend that the insights of power analytics offer a more suitable analytical framework to address agents’ interest mobilization, I acknowledge its limitations in underestimating the role of space in the productive economy, the impacts of post-colonialism in knowledge production, and the transnational flows of planning ideas. Based on a critique of the negotiation literature, I use the contribution from the three bodies of literature to propose a framework that helps overcome most of their shortcomings. As a result, my analytical framework locates at the intersection of the growing literature on post-colonial urban studies, critical policy studies, and political geography. I borrow particularly three concepts that help to characterize more precisely contemporary planning practice: ‘ordinary city’, transnational planning / policy mobility, and ‘informality from above’. I argue the need to make a turn in studies about negotiation that would include off-the-table agents’ moves, the materiality of space, and the dialogic connections of discourses throughout the various scales.

2.1. Deal-making in contemporary planning theory

The focus on the ‘how’ rather than on the ‘why’ dominates theoretical debates on US urban planning. This is true, even though the process paradigm for planning does give insights about how power factors into decision-making. The philosophers Jurgen Habermas and Michael Foucault are political thinkers who have greatly influenced contemporary planning theory. While the former gives a basis for communicative rationality that looks for ‘what would like to see happening’, the latter provides the foundations for a power dynamic that seeks to understand ‘what is actually happening’. Their contributions to the planning field have introduced new meanings and reassessed the planner’s role in contemporary society. Nonetheless, an intense debate revolves around the divergences of both approaches and their impact on how planning is conceived. I argue
that negotiation processes within spatial planning practices become the locus of power and rationalities for shaping space.

2.1.1. Communicative planning theory

Habermas is the most prominent exponent of a procedural macro politics tradition derived from Kant, Socrates, and Plato (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). In particular, communicative planning draws its theoretical foundations from Habermas’ communicative rationality theory. This theory gives the ground to normative models of participation and has framed planning practice proposals over the last two decades. The main assumption of this perspective is the intrinsic connection between the social world and communication. Its conceptions of rationality, power, and inter-subjectivity provide the basis for communicative planning. This perspective favors normatively what would like to see happening in the planning practice.

The communicative conception of rationality defines “reasoning as a legitimate guiding principle for collective affairs” (Healey, 1992: 243). In this regard participatory processes are the privileged means to achieve collective action through consensus building. According to Habermas, the ideal condition needed for reaching consensus is an “unconstrained and undistorted dialogue” (Harper & Stein, 1995: 239). The dialogue can be achieved by having an ‘ideal speech situation’ constituted by a “free speech situation, consistency between discourse and beliefs, transparency of values, and a focus on common interest” (Van der Hove, 2006: 12). Concerning the saliency of the process, Habermas has been described as ‘top down moralist’ since the ideas of speech situation are defined in advance; whereas in terms of content he has been defined as a ‘bottom-up situationalist’ because participants determine the substance of deliberation (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Therefore, Habermassians believe that the futures can be shaped through “fair

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1 Communicative planning perspective has been championed mainly in the US, Canada, and Britain. This approach has been led by Patsy Healey, John Forester, Judith Innes, and Jean Hillier; and by pragmatists such as Charles Hoch, Tom Stein, Tom Harper, and Seymour Mandelbaum.
and democratic communicative practices” (Yitachfel, 2000: 908). Thus, communicative rationality is considered the vehicle for achieving consensus; in other words, the assumption is that the force of the better argument shapes the consensus.

For communicative theorists power is conceived as “political communication” (Forester, 1982: 76). The exercise of power is manifested in the decisions, agenda setting, and the need for shaping procedures (Forester, 1982). Accordingly, participatory processes become one strategy for transforming power relations (Forester, 1989). The assumption is that dialogue, through deliberative rituals among actors, generates and redistributes power in as much as the autonomy degree of actors in the dominant structure is assured (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997). In this context, planning emerges in “adversarial situations in settings of inequality, difference, conflict, and power” (Forester, 2006: 455). According to Forester (1982), information is a source of power and in the planning process “misinformation and distortions of communication are systemic, structural, and institutional problems to be addressed and counteracted” (1982: 70). The premise is that information acts as means to engage in distributive power. As a consequence, citizens can be empowered by anticipating systematic sources of misinformation.

Communicative theory conceives of civil society as autonomous subjects engaging in collaboration through the decision-making process. Communication is the basis for collaboration (Baxamusa, 2008a). The grounds for collaboration come from stakeholder interaction and the learning processes taking place among them. As the product of “strategic conviction” (Healey, 1992: 278) collaborative undertakings “seek to maintain and transform mindsets about the meaning of places and the priorities for action” (Mandanipur et. al., 2001: 278). Furthermore, participatory processes revolve around inter-subjective relations that are the base of participatory learning processes, allowing for the restructuring of preferences and the emergence of original
solutions (Van der Hove, 2004). The privileged actors in the deliberative process are landowners, developers, and planning agencies. Thus, the actors’ interactions unfold using learning about identities and value inquiry, involving rationality, ethical judgment, and emotional sensitivity in the decision-making process.

Planning is conceived as a “communicative enterprise” (Healey, 1992: 245) grounded on a collective effort of mutual understanding. This school frames planning as a set of procedures “of decision making, information exchange, and power relations” (Yiftachel, 1999: 268). In addition, planning is understood as a normative social practice that brings a “solid rationale for fostering institutions according to ‘our’ liberal democratic ideals” (Harper & Stein, 1995: 239). The shift in the state functioning has placed planning itself as a “mechanism for mediating among conflicting interests at various scales” (Healey, 2003:103). As a result, spatial strategies were put in place for stabilizing market conditions and for reducing investor risk.

According to this framework, Collaborative planning can potentially counteract neoliberal practices accusing them of being purely market oriented and a-spatial (Healey, 2001; 2003). Collaborative planning is intended to reduce levels of conflict through the coordination of stakeholders’ activities for shaping places’ meanings. Hence, its regulatory object is “the way of thinking policy discourses frames of reference” (Healey, 2003: 27.5), and the process is focused on “collective social construction of strategic organizing ideas” (27.5). The most salient aims of planning systems focus on conflicts over land development and the promotion of places of quality (Healey, 2003). As a consequence, collaborative planning rests on the basis of political legitimacy and creative synergy of collaborative multi-stakeholder.

The planner is considered a mediator of conflict resolution within deliberative settings. This role requires emotional and communicative skills to mediate in land use conflicts, taking into
consideration the existence of inequalities of information, expertise, and financing (Forester, 1987). Even though mediated negotiation strategies are not necessarily intended to perpetuate power imbalances, they can be adopted within the extant local regulations. The planner’s role is envisioned as skillful mediators redirecting conflict through “mediated participation” for achieving practical agreements that will serve the diverse interests of multiple stakeholders (Forester, 2006). The mediation focus is justified because it “turns parties toward their multiple interests and it encourages practical proposals... to negotiate a workable agreement for mutual gain and ...transformative learning” (Forester, 2006: 452). In sum, the planner’s role consists in channeling stakeholders’ power relations through deliberation in order to influence citizen empowerment.

Negotiation processes become the settings where actors interpret the regulatory framework in order to pursue their interests. Actors’ interests derive from attitudes towards, among other things, landownership and legal property rights. For Healey (1997), “the aim of the negotiation is to generate consensus between the parties to resolve a dispute” (1945). However, consensus seeking needs to be understood as an outcome that is fragile, temporary, and disputable. Negotiation is involved in financing public infrastructure in decentralized governments. In such cases negotiation is a “dynamic process in which preferences are endogenously constructed during the process itself, and where power relations are susceptible to change” (Van den Hove, 2004: 14). The key analytical tools for understanding negotiation become: interests, mutual gains, and information (Shmueli et. al., 2008). In the same line, CP advocates for a ‘principled negotiation’ (Healey, 1997) that must fulfill three requirements: participants must see themselves as problem-solvers, the focus of the negotiation must be taken as a basis for consensus and it must try to devise options of mutual gain. As a result, communicative planning describes an ideal that planners should be working toward in order to move forward ideal speech situations.
2.1.2. Power analytics planning theory

Foucault is the most important thinker of the contextualist tradition rooted in the ideas of Thucydides, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche and focusing on micro politics (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Foucault’s theory about power and rationality serves as a basis for a power analytics planning theory that critically assesses the planning practice and its drivers. The main focus is the inextricable linkages among power, discourses, and space. The conceptions of power/knowledge, governmental technologies, and spatial/discursive practice are the bases for power analytics planning. This perspective favors what is actually happening in the planning practice.

The idea of ‘power/knowledge’ entails the inseparability of the dynamics of power and knowledge production. For Foucault, power is not a thing that someone possesses; rather, it is a relational and ubiquitous force that can be productive or oppressive. Moreover, power is produced in practice and is rooted in historical accounts of knowledge. In this line of thought “knowledge (savoir) is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice ... is found in reflection, narrative accounts, institutional regulations, and political decisions” (Foucault, 1972: 182-3). Then, discourses are the vehicle to transmit and produce knowledge. In contrast to communicative theorists, power analytics understands rationality, not in an objective and context-free fashion; but rather, with rationality as contingent and shaped by power relations (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Based on this assertion, Foucault is characterized as a bottom-up political thinker regarding process and contents. Furthermore, Foucaultians argue that ‘power defines reality’ since power relations are “what decides whether it is true that knowledge is always important, or what decides whether knowledge gets to count as knowledge or not” (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 3). Foucault suggests that

\[1\] The power analytics perspective has been championed by Bent Flyvbjerg, Tom Richardson, Oren Yiftachel, and Margo Huxley. Their works have been developed mainly in Denmark, Israel, and US.
most politics and power disputes take place outside communicative processes. Therefore, discourse and practice constitute an arena for continual power struggles.

Even though Foucault emphasizes that power cannot be localized in a state apparatus, the conception of the state is crucial in addressing how power operates. The state is conceptualized as a "transactional reality" and part of "practices of government" (Foucault, 2004: 79-301). In other words, the state is the result of an ensemble of power relations that produces the political knowledge to conduct and control populations. That is why the state is not considered as a pre-given institution but as a ‘style of thought’. This ‘style’ operates through discourses and tools that “enable political actors to perform strategies and realize their goals” (Lemke, 2007: 48). Actors use their ‘political knowledge’ (Foucault, 1997: 67) embodied in “statistical accounts, architectural plans, bureaucratic rules, and graphs to represent data for political action” (Lemke, 2007: 48). In this context, law acts simultaneously as an instrument of power and a mask of it (Foucault, 1980: 141). As a result, the state is not an object, function, or single institution; rather, the state is a set of practices, strategies, and technologies (Lemke, 2007).

For power analytics, space becomes a receptacle of historic traces and a tool to exert power. A multiplicity of social practices shapes space and, at the same time, “many spaces may co-exist within the same physical space” (Flybjerg and Richardson 2001:15). This condition enables one to think of space as an economic and political form that crystallizes dynamics “from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat...” (Foucault, 1980: 149). In this line, the inextricable link between power and discourses makes it inevitable that space is involved in this relationship. In that regard, Foucault argues that “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power” (1984:252).

In addition, Richardson and Jensen (2003) emphasize that space is produced through spatial
practices that involve the performance of discourses. This non-textual approach to discourse is necessary to understand the social construction of spaces. Since each discourse attempts to introduce a hegemonic knowledge, planning discourses are the privileged strategy of the state to build and intervene into space. The construction of discourses carries an intrinsic system of symbolic meanings that shape the rationalities of agents. In this dynamic, institutions engender representations of space in maps and textually oriented discourses.

For power analytics, planning entails a spatial strategic discourse. This theory focuses on how power and space are closely bound up in planning (Flybjerg & Richardson, 2001). On the one hand, planning derives from a changing balance of discourses of global and local powers. On the other hand, planning is conceived of as “a state-sanctioned strategy for the creation and regulation of space, populations, and development” (Yiftachel, 2000: 912), that also includes “the practices and the power/knowledge discourses” (Yiftachel, 2000: 912). Hence, discursive representations of space set the lenses of regulatory power mechanisms.

Like communicative planning, the power analytics perspective also seeks to make a critique of neoliberal governance. However, its understanding of neo-liberalism debunks the idea of single whole coherent phenomena; rather, they refer to neoliberalism as a heterogeneous style of reasoning. Neoliberal ‘reasoning style’ seeks to promote a retreat of the state by “promoting individual responsibility, privatized risk management, and entrepreneurial models in social domains” (Lemke, 2007: 45). Nevertheless, according to Foucault, state and capital should not be ignored; but, they are not decisive for an analysis of power. Following this premise, power analytics moves from the details of institutional practices such as ethnographic accounts of what planners do to “forms of global domination” (Foucault, 1980: 99). These processes occur through a combination of ‘advanced liberal’ institutional arrangements and discourses not necessarily within a
single internal logic (Collier, 2009). Thus, political knowledge involves a way to define problem-making techniques and rationalities to shape practices.

The planner’s role departs from locating him/herself in a power network where he or she exerts power and becomes involved in partisan relations. The ‘empowering planner sees the profession as a means for social transformation, questioning the intrinsically ‘progressive ideals’ of the practice. In this sense, power analytics attempts to overcome the normative attitude of communicative planning by exposing stories of dubious social and political practices. Furthermore, this perspective conceives of the subject of political communication more by “non-rational rhetoric and maintenance of interests than by freedom from domination and consensus seeking” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 227). Thus, planners should engage in “public dialogue to claim transparency, public attention, and as a result, accountability” (Flyvbjerg: 2001:123). The planning practice shifts the strategic ways in which professionals construct their argumentation for either depoliticizing a contesting issue or engaging in the rationalization of a political decision. Baxamusa (2008a) argues that grassroots organizing, coalition building, and democratic deliberation could allow community empowerment for achieving power redistribution. Therefore, the planner becomes “partisan, faces conflict, and exercises power” (Flyvbjerg, 2002, 15) to support the empowerment of civil society.

Processes of negotiation occur in a conflict driven fashion and often focus on compromises rather than consensus. However, negotiations in planning have been dismissed by power analytics, considering them purely procedural, narrowly focused on process, and disconnected from broader power dynamics. Despite that, this perspective finds it impossible to achieve the ideal dialogue conditions as a power free setting, because it is “meaningless to operate with a concept of communication in which power is absent” (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002: 49). Therefore, the scope of negotiation should be “practical, committed, and ready for conflict participation process
rather than a discursive, detached, and consensus-dependent process” (Flyvbjerg, 1998: 236). In sum, the dynamics of power in negotiation are not focused on producing better arguments; rather they are deployed in strategies and tactics to achieve agents’ ends.

2.2. Critique of planning practice theory

This section presents the most relevant arguments and counter-arguments and unsettled tensions between the two approaches described above. It is important to remember that these approaches cannot be considered as homogeneous scholarly clusters; rather, they constitute a set of diverse intellectual journeys drawn from similar sources. In addition, this section presents crucial features of contemporary planning that the literature on planning practice and negotiation neglects. These gaps give rise to an analytical framework that is one of my contributions to the field.

- Normative/analytical split

The first tension between communicative and power analytics theory revolves around the nature of the field and the notion of rationality. The role of rationality confronts the idea of deliberative reasoning as a source for achieving consensus (Healey, 1992), and that the notion of power/knowledge defines what counts as reality through practices and discourses (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Power analytics scholars have disputed the paradigmatic status of the “communicative turn” and its normative agenda (Yifachel, 1999, Yiftachel & Huxley 2000a, 2000b; Purcell, 2009). They advocate for pluralism in planning theory production and the need for recognizing multiple ways of thinking about urbanism. They argue that the communicative scholar “analyzes planning with a clear normative task of reforming and improving it from within” (Yiftachel, 1999: 268). As a result, Habermasians take for granted planning practice as “an intrinsically progressive public endeavor” (Yiftachel, 2002a: 910). This assumption underscores the
vast evidence of several regressive planning practices resulting in an array of inequalities. Yiftachel and Huxley (2000) highlight the need to interrogate planning practice beyond the institutional practice of the state taking a critical distance to place the profession itself under scrutiny. Conversely, most critical scholars also examine the causes and consequences of planning policies because they conceive planning as a “societal phenomenon, that is, from outside” (Yiftachel, 2002a: 910). Even more, this perspective questions the treatment of the ‘planner’ as if he were beyond power, a neutral mediator. Thus, analytics of power seeks to explain the roots of the problems that planning is attempting to ‘solve’. In chapters 5 and 6 the case studies show that planning tools also could serve regressive interests and that planners operate as political actors.

**From stakeholder to citizen empowerment**

The second tension between communicative and power analytics theory arises when recognizing the conflict in planning practices and the contestability of power relations. According to Baxamusa (2008), communicative planning theorists conceive civil society as stakeholders that “act autonomously in the process” (262). This assumption underscores the differential leverage that actors and power networks have in planning. In order to reach consensus, stakeholders’ deliberation needs to occur ‘as if’ the differences in power were neutralized. Moreover, the assumption is that all stakeholders have an equal chance to participate and have in mind the common interest (Purcell, 2009). However, Shmueli et al. (2008) recognizes that “information can be selectively perceived and strategically manipulated” (361), and “impacts of negotiated agreements on unrepresented or unrepresentable groups in a community may be overlooked or purposefully ignored” (362). Therefore, the centrality of stakeholder interaction seems to privilege the command and control of two privileged agents: the planner and the developer.

Another assumption is that planning is confined to only formal structures and institutions.
For instance, Ennis (1997) and Healey (1992) reduce the planning system to the “administrative procedures for regulating the use of land” (Ennis, 1997: 1950). As a result, practices ‘outside’ the institution and citizenship-led initiatives that transform the space are underestimated. Even though conflict is recognized as inherent in power relations, the asymmetrical distribution of power does not get challenged. Hence, stakeholder collaboration and deliberative practices can result in legitimizing hegemonic agendas. In contrast, the analytics of power are criticized because considering knowledge as derived from power may suggest the impossibility for having rational deliberation (Baxamusa, 2008b). Moreover, analytics of power claim that power corrupts any process and defines civil society as objects acting in a predetermined power structure. Therefore, the role of participation in planning “becomes an ambiguous process and target” (Baxamusa, 2008a: 262).

The case studies reveal that information about land prices, land tenure, and economic productivity becomes a tool to exert power either to favor mayoral political interest or for legitimating community coalitions interests. Furthermore, conflict, resistance and betrayal drove the negotiation of partial plans since disenfranchised citizens (i.e. homeless, low cost accommodation renters, street workers) struggled to have voice in the participatory processes. The dissertation counterpoints the state and grassroots planning practices.

-Power naïveté vs. power absolutism

The third contestation between communicative and power analytics theory emerges when conceiving power as political communication (Forester, 1982), or considering power as ubiquitous presence entrenched within knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2002). The main critique of communicative theory is that it overlooks the political processes that give shape to cities and regions. For example, Flyvbjerg (2002) argues that Habermasians remain normative and procedural rather than grounded
in a substantive understanding of the *realpolitik* through the study of power, conflict, and partisanship. Akin to this view, Yiftachel (2000) suggests that communicative scholars place excessive emphasis on agency over structure, overlooking the context of the contexts that generates the urban problems that they try to solve. In the same line of thought, Purcell (2009) claims that work rooted in a consensus-seeking endeavor needs stable power relations to work; therefore, this perspective reinforces rather than challenges extant power relations, since its point of departure does not address the required social critique necessary for effective communicative action.

Communicative theorists counter-argue that it is an “unfair accusation that Habermasian are naïve in considering power” (Harper et al., 2003: 134). Healey rejects the idea that “all significant social relations are driven by a single structuring force” such as power (2003: 112). Basically, they claim that these critiques reduce Habermasian theory to an idealistic model grounded in a rational search for universal norms that fails to acknowledge power relations and conflict (Van der Hove, 2004). For example, Forester (1892, 1897) has conflict at the heart of his work and Van der Hove (2004) acknowledges conflict as a driving force that can result in no conciliation of participants’ viewpoints. Nevertheless, Forester (2006) admits that, even after successful participatory processes, structural issues may remain. Along the same lines, Shmueli and colleagues (2008) argue “collaborative processes may not be desirable avenues for those whose goal is fundamental societal or institutional change” (360).

On the other hand, Harper & Stein (1995) and Forester (1990) point out that Foucouldians fail to distinguish between “what power is oppressing and which empowering” (241). Even more so, Healey finds “simple dualistic oppositions of ‘Rationality’ versus ‘Power’ unhelpful in exploring these [power] relations” (2003: 113). Likewise, Harper (2003) counters Flyvbjerg, contending that eliminating the distinction between rational persuasion and coercion equivocates the argument
“between two different meanings of power” (125). Foucaultdians counter that their analysis elevates to a privileged status “the vocabulary of power...and its meaning is extended to cover all human social behavior” (Harper et. al., 2003: 25-125). Accordingly, Harper (2003) asserts that relying solely on the interpretation of power can lead to “a distortion of planning theory, anarchy, victimhood, paralyzed practice, unachievable consensus, and despair in resistance (125). As a result, in the critique to PA, the hegemony of power obfuscates the understanding of more complex and nuanced reality in which all interactions are reduced to power relations.

The cases reveal how in the process of negotiating partial plans structural conditions such as the legal privileges of landowners remain uncontested by the agents involved. Despite the stable power relations in the public and the community initiatives they exposed the simultaneity of domination, resistance and productive power involved in each large-scale project. In both dynamics instead to achieve a broad consensus, they fought over some compromises around costs and benefits of the projects.

- Neglecting space

The fourth tension between communicative and power analytics theory derives from the relevance given to space in the planning practice, either as a backdrop or a pivotal source of urban transformations. The absence of space in the theoretical premises of communicative theory, with few exceptions, is notorious; indeed, the relevance of spatiality is completely neglected. The underlying assumption is that space is a mere receptacle or a background for the interactive micro politics of planning practice. The implications of this assumption are problematic, mainly because they underscore the “territorial circuits of late capitalism” (Roy, 2011: 8). Moreover, by overlooking space, communicative theorists do not acknowledge that the struggles over space are a crucial site of social relations and productive economy. This absence denies the very object of
planning as politics of space influencing regional and urban transformation. Hence, overlooking missing the spatial configuration obscure its impacts on power, social learning, and collaborative strategies.

A few communicative theorists consider space in their work. For instance, Healey, et al. (2001) developed the idea of ‘governance of place’, considering that new ways of doing governance are interwoven with new ways of thinking space and place. However, the materiality of space is reduced to the analysis of property rights and the ideology of property when examining negotiations (Healey, 1997; Ennis, 1997; Renard, 2003). This emphasis underscores the spatial practices of inhabitants and their symbolic attachment to place and the privileges landowners’ interests have in deal making. In addition, Irazábal (2009) acknowledges the a-spatial nature of communicative planning theory and calls for giving centrality to space in its constitutive role in the construction of subjectivities. Irazábal (2009) highlights the effects that spatiality has on power, knowledge, and subjectivities to introduce the notions of space for solidarity and to promote spatial justice.

Even so, Flyvbjerg (1998, 2000, 2001), the most prominent scholar of the analytics of power, hardly suggests the role of spatiality in relation to power and rationality. Nonetheless, Yiftachel and Huxley (2000, 2001) are strong advocates for placing space at the crux of planning as inherently crucial in urban transformation and enmeshed in multiple power networks. The point of departure of this approach considers planning as the "public production of space" (Yiftachel & Huxley, 2000: 924). Their perspectives corroborate that “focusing on ‘the production of space’ does not obscure the importance of decision-making and communications for the analysis of planning, rather it firmly incorporates the spatial and political-economic embeddedness often overlooked in past theories” (Yiftachel, 2000b, 911). They emphasize that a complex array of institutions (i.e., public,
private, quasi-public, non governmental institutions) are actively involved in space production and regulation. Furthermore, they claim that space determines the material and symbolic resources of agents. Therefore, a crucial aspect of planning involves the discourses that seek to mobilize space transformations.

The large-scale projects discussed in this dissertation corroborate the explanatory relevance that materiality of space and spatial practices have on the negotiation process. On one hand, the location and morphology of the targeted sites determined its value in terms of the real estate markets. On the other hand, the intensive use and appropriation of public spaces also influenced the planning decision to dismantle the entrenched circuits of formal-informal economies. Finally, the negotiation of both partial plan initiatives involved multiple institutions with different leverage degrees and spatial relations with the targeted sites (i.e. civic organizations, NGO’s, universities, private firms, and public institutions at national and local level).

- Post-Colonialism and transnationalism denial

The fifth element of critique between communicative and power analytics theory refers to two intertwined elements that both approaches ignore: post-coloniality and transnational mobility of city-making models. The limitation of current theories of negotiation lies in ignoring the interdependent and diverse nature of discursive and spatial practices in post-colonial democracy. Nowadays, a renewed interest arises in post-colonializing urban studies contesting authoritative sites of knowledge. Post-colonialism should be relevant to planning theory as a way of acknowledging differential sites of planning practice and the diversity of challenges in urban transformations. For instance, planning theory requires addressing the intertwined nature of formality-informality in the production of space inasmuch as the cities of the ‘colonized’ are in their majority depicted as informal urbanization.

Current planning theories over-emphasize the Euro - American experiences as ‘universal’
standards of what planning entails. This feature carries assumptions rooted in ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’ that remain at the core of planning as a profession and field of knowledge. In spite of calls to decolonize the mind (Miraftab, 2009), the politics of space in the ‘Global South’ is constituted through the impacts of coloniality in the geographies of capital and knowledge circulation. As a result, this landscape determines the ways in which agents regulate, use, and transform the materiality of space. Thus, planning theory requires recognizing the transnational interconnections of institutional changes and discourses that shape space regulations.

Communicative planning theory remains silent about the role of coloniality in planning practice; hence, they neither consider its impacts on the micro politics of planning, nor the macro patterns of changing governance. In the same vein, power analytics, and especially Foucault’s writings, neglects the process of coloniality, ignoring its impacts on present conditions of discursive practices and the genealogy of knowledge and space (Roy, 2011b). Moreover, the framework of analytics of power fails to consider supranational and transnational scales, despite Foucault's insights about the local-global linkages of power (Lemke, 2007). This framework offers limited analytical tools to address the differential power mechanisms operating in planning practice and the colonial trajectories of production sites.

On the other hand, both frameworks have shortcomings in terms of recognizing ‘macro institutional patters’ and the mobility of urban policies as sources for planning performance. Contemporary planning is rooted in interREFERENTIAL city models that shape planning discourses and legal orders. Communicative planning places in the background structural factors that shape agents’ leverage and influence of deliberative rationality in formal negotiation settings. Nevertheless, the framework of policy transfer resonates with communicative planning since it also operates under the rational-choice model (Peck & Theodore, 2010). For policy transfer studies,
policy makers act rationally to maximize policy reform goals where “producer-innovators and consumer-emulators engage in freely chosen transactions... to superior performance in exporting jurisdictions.” (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 169). This approach considers policy “emulators” as passive learners in the power network, underscoring their innovation resources and resistance. Additionally, power analytics overlooks the context of context (Peck & Theodore, 2010) and ignores the transnational circulation of capital, policies, and institutional changes patterns. Therefore, contemporary planning theories and, particularly, negotiation studies, fall short in examining the challenges of ‘Global South’ planning practice and space-based interests mobilization.

Colombia’s spatial planning system epitomizes the long-term trajectories of neo colonial influences. However, this system is far from being a mere resemblance of their referents, it also emerges as a complex and innovative assemblage of planning and land management tools. Simultaneously, the rapid changes in Bogota and Medellin urban landscapes have placed those cities in the map of ‘best practices’ in Latin America. First, Bogota became known in the 90’s for its ‘citizen culture model’, the new system of public spaces, and the rapid transit system (i.e. Transmilenio). Second, Medellin in late 2000 positioned the ‘social urbanism model’ as a way to intervene highly underserved areas through new public libraries, parks and a cable propelled transit system (i.e. Metrocable). These city-making models arise in conjunction with transnational flow of planning ideas and local spatial trajectories. The above experiences have traveled sideways and upwards, in other words, to countries from the so-called Glob South and the Global North. In sum, the Colombia’s experience reveals the not only the entrenched transnational dimension of city making practices but also the inter-scalar power networks operate for intervening space.
2.3. Analytical framework: Towards a critical spatial planning

I use critical spatial planning as a lens to explore the implementation of the new spatial planning system in Colombia, and as a bridge to fill the gaps in the negotiation literature. The analytical framework is located at the confluence of power analytics, critical policy studies, post-colonial urban studies, and informality theory. This framework helps me explore the mobilization of agents’ interests within the negotiation processes of large-scale projects. Moreover, it acknowledges that land management practices arise in accordance with a transnational flow of planning ideas and local spatial trajectories. As a consequence, this framework highlights the materiality of space as a by-product of decision-making processes.

Current perspectives on deal making in planning bring insights about how power permeates decision-making processes and different ways to pursue social change. However, they also have inherent shortcomings to explain and address the changes in materiality of space and informality as pivotal features for understanding large-scale project negotiation. On the one hand, communicative planning theory underplays the role of space, the asymmetrical power relations embedded in deliberations, and citizens’ contestation to the decision-making process. On the other hand, power analytics theory overlooks the political economy of institutions, the transnational flows of planning ideas as crucial sources of discursive practices, and the role of space in productive economy as an essential feature for government practices. Hence, in order to tackle the gaps identified in the literature, I draw from an interdisciplinary body of work the analytical tools for guiding my empirical analysis (explained below):

- From power analytics, the concept of spatial strategy and tactics helps to operationalize the linkages between space, power, and knowledge.

- From post-colonial urban studies, the concept of ordinary cities serves as a way to legitimize new
geographies of knowledge production.

- From critical policy studies, the concept of “models-in-circulation” brings the dynamics of the long-standing tradition of circulation of ideas about city-making practices.

- From informality theory, the concept of informality from above is offered as an understanding of ‘informality’ as a purposive governance strategy and discursive practice.

As a result, my analytical framework -critical spatial planning- calls for a shift in negotiation studies, foregrounding the materiality of space, agents’ negotiation strategies, and the dialogic connections of discourses throughout various scales. Then, this perspective involves central features of contemporary urbanism and reveals how planning practices in the so-called Global South operate also as sites of innovation. The framework opens a venue to analyze changing processes in Latin American cities through the lens of power dynamics. I argue that negotiation strategies act as pivotal factors enabling the material circulation of knowledge, policies, and capital to shape spaces through large-scale projects.

- **Ordinary cities**

Post-colonial urban studies challenge the ways in which contemporary urban theory operates within embedded neo imperial and colonial assumptions (Robinson, 2006; Connell, 2007; Escobar, 2002; Roy, 2009; Miraftab, 2009; Watson, 2003). Under this perspective, planning itself is considered a new chapter of an “extractive neo-colonialism” (Escobar, 1997: 136). Moreover, post-colonial lenses highlight the limitations of framing ‘third world cities’ in terms of inferiority, deprivation, and emulation of the ‘North’. As Adichie (2009) suggests, this interpretation “emphasizes how we are different rather than how we are similar.”

Similarly, Robinson (2006) argues that theories of modernity and development have deepened a divisive view of urban systems, labeling cities as developed / developing; this
dichotomy assumes that cities are at a “different stage of advancement and has embedded hierarchical assumptions about the relations among cities into the analysis of cities at an international scale” (Robinson, 2006: 5). This portrayal truncates the understanding of diversity of urbanization processes and underplays perceptions of innovation. However, the unevenness of knowledge production results from a long-term geopolitical order that polices the corpus of ideas, policies, and practices mobility.

In turn, post-colonial urban studies advocate for a more cosmopolitan framework that overcomes the western parochialism of theory. Accordingly, some planning scholars advocate for a (de) colonization of planning theory by ‘decolonizing the mind’, overcoming a mindset of “inferiority of the colonized and superiority of the colonizer” (Miraftab, 2009: 44). In that sense, this approach repositions the lessons drawn from the so-called ‘Global South’s’ experiences surmounting colonial prejudices that produce cultural differences. ‘Global South’ is defined as the "unmapped space that is integrated into dominant forms of knowledge as ‘the other’, that which does not fully conform to known templates of urbanism” (Roy, 2011:9).

Post-colonial urban studies reframe urban development as a series of challenges that face the wealthiest and the poorer cities (Robinson, 2006). This perspective forefronts urbanization processes as a matter of “gathering difference as diversity rather than hierarchical division” (Robison, 2006: 6). This shift in the perspective enables to legitimization of the ‘Global South’ as sites of innovation and sources of learning across experiences in the transnational flows of capital and policies. Thus, examining Colombian planning practice requires acknowledging that space transformation and discourses are rooted in the process of historic trajectories of (post) colonization.

The politics of space is inherently intertwined with knowledge production. A cross-
fertilization of theories/experiences would allow fostering new geographies of theory and widening the scope of contemporary urbanism. In this endeavor, planning processes in the ‘Global South’ become sites of innovation to draw insights to all cities. As a result, the concept of ‘ordinary cities’ entails a provocation and an invitation to recalibrate the lenses to tackle local production of transnational contemporary urbanism. The concept of ordinary cities seeks “linking local and transnational economies; tying together informal and formal sectors; realizing and building on the creativity and dynamism of the diversity of city economies...” (Robinson, 2006: 11). Moreover, “ordinary cities emerge here as diverse, differentiated, and contested, shaped by processes stretching far beyond their physical extent, but also by the complex dynamics of the city itself” (Robinson, 2006: 10). In sum, this view contributes to reenacting alternative sites of knowledge production and opening venues to forge new spatial imaginations.

**- Transnational circulation of urban planning and policy**

The emerging field of critical policy studies frames policy mobility and mutation as a power and ideological field. The movement of ideas shapes the planning system itself and determines patterns of resemblance in city-making practices across contexts. The dominant definition of the policy mobility considers that policy learning and transfer is the “process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz & Marsh quoted in Gonzalez, 2011: 1399). Contrary to this perspective, Peck and Theodore (2010) criticize the orthodox methods of emulation of successful transfers because they are based on rational choice presumptions and consider “superior performance in exporting jurisdictions” (169). They understand policy mobility as border-crossing practices whereby policy agents operate within many intermediaries that form epistemic and praxis communities. The
process of ‘importing’ takes place in a non-linear fashion; rather than a reproduction of a formulaic process, what is diffused brings partial accounts of the ‘alleged sources’. That is why Peck and Theodore (2010) argue that policy mobility becomes already-in-transformation models as they travel.

From this perspective, the policy model seeks “to stabilize and validate an explicit set of rules, techniques, and behaviors that, when applied in ‘foreign’ settings, might be expected to yield comparative results. This rationale gaze is persistently disrupted by messy realities of policy making at the 'ground' level.” (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 170). However, the networks of policy making, rather than emulate a singular model, adapt symbolic aspirations to local institutions and practices using several mediators. In this process, circuits of power are forged through the circulation of knowledge in “academic and policy-making nodes in a messy geography of practices” (Peck & Theodore, 2010: 171). As a result, the mobility of policies not only steers hegemonic policy discourses aligned with neoliberalization processes, but they also produce opportunities of contestation by using transnational circuits for mobilizing progressive ends such as the right to the city campaign. As Irazábal (2008) explains, transnational planning encompasses the “multicultural dimensionality of the political practices of place-making” (1). Moreover, the transnational dimension of contemporary city planning entails the cross border networks of planning practices transcending nation-states and attending all scales of space transformation. This Diaspora of knowhow and intervention repertoires are also aimed at better carry out the exigencies of territorial circuits of capital but open also venues for alternative sources of solidarity and resistance.

The transnational motion of urban policy directly impacts planning thinking and its practice. Planning results in a cross-border borrowing of ‘models in circulation’ that involves the ensemble of foreign/indigenous ideas. Since urban space becomes the “site, medium, and
outcome of historically specific relations of social power” (Brenner, 2009: 198), the transnational flows of planning ideas influence its transformation. In this line of thought, Roy (2011) argues that the “production of urban space takes place through reference of models of urbanism as examples of post-colonial sovereignty or home grown neoliberalization” (10). Thus, the post-colonial circuit of power crystallizes in the flows of planning ideas that perpetuate the ‘hierarchies’ of the sites of authoritative knowledge production. As a result, Latin American cities derive from ongoing intercontinental trajectories of ideas, policies, and practices.

- Negotiation strategy and tactics

The power analytics (PA) framework partially suits to answer my questions. Nevertheless, the concept of strategy and tactic is not fully developed in his work. I highlight the notion of strategy and tactic as an analytical tool and a line of inquiry to unravel how agents’ interests are mobilized. The main insights derived from this framework explore the linkages between rationality and power through political rationalization involving realpolitiks and a partisan approach to planning. In doing so, PA examines power dynamics beyond the communicative acts focusing on discursive as well as spatial practices. Moreover, PA depicts space as technology of power enmeshed in discourses. From this perspective, power is not only a dominant force but also a productive relation prone to resistance and acknowledges the conflict-driven nature of planning practice. Flyvbjerg (1998) emphasizes that planning practice is a matter of strategies and tactics rather than the force of the better argument as Habermas suggests.

The issue of ‘Negotiation strategies’ proves to be a way to understand how the politics of space operates in deliberations over large-scale projects. For Foucault, “[power] is embodied in every aspect of discourses, in formal routines, informal practices, and physical structures” (Foucault quoted in Gunder, 2010: 303). Accordingly, the notion of ‘strategy’ is conceived as the knowledge-
practice of space that has the goal of guaranteeing provisional domination (Crampton & Elden, 2007). Furthermore, ‘negotiation strategy’ becomes the agents’ practices to mobilize resources, turning interests into operational objectives and means for driving action (McKinlay et al., 2010). Along the same lines, ‘strategy’ is conceived as a context-dependent rationality that guides the trajectory of forces pursuing its own end; whereas, ‘tactic’ refers to the concreteness of support to the strategy in a double conditioning fashion, whereby strategy-making becomes conditioned to tactics (Thompson, 2003). Then, the focus on strategy and tactics becomes the tool to understand how and why actors pursue their interests to shape space.

In order to understand space, it is necessary to “examine the logics contained in strategies of power/government that seek to use space for particular ends” (Huxley, in Crampton & Elden, 2007: 194). In this regard, the logic of strategy is “the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory” (Foucault, 2008: 102). Thus, actors do not operate in a monolithic frame of action; rather, their rationalities are bound to spatial practices and available discourses to mobilize their interests. In sum, negotiation strategies influence the ability of city-making models, capital, and legal frameworks to shape space.

- Informality from above

Informality is back on the international development and urban planning agenda (Roy, 2005; Varley, 2010). Informality has been depicted as ‘inverse colonialism’ inasmuch as it subverts the colonial order. Moreover, contemporary accounts of urbanism question a priori assumption of considering informality to be endemic to the ‘Global South’. In this regard, Devlin (2011) and Hossain (2010) argue that informality is a feature of space production not only linked to ‘developing’ nations but also to ‘developed’ countries. That is why informality is conceived as a “heuristic device that undercover the ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal and illegal,
legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized” (Roy, 2011b: 233). I argue that informality can be understood as a facet of power through discourses and spatial strategies.

Informality also operates as a source of innovation and mutation of northern models of planning. Law is a social process subject to multiple agents’ interests and a point of point of departure for negotiating space change (Hossain, 2010; Devlin, 2011). Under this lens, informality is a relational strategy of political bargaining involved in the contested boundaries between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ spheres (Hossain, 2010). Roy (2005) advocates for understanding informality as a generalized mode of metropolitan urbanization of low, middle, and high-income households. However, she warns that some expressions of space production are criminalized (i.e., subaltern informalities) while others are legitimized (i.e., elite informalities) (Roy, 2011).

State intervention defines the boundaries of formality. Thus, informality is not defined by the intrinsic attribute of spatial practices but rather through the relational strategies deployed by the state to pursue its interests. Despite the erosion of the state’s role in social reproduction in neoliberal governance schemes, “informality operates as a deregulated system instead of a regulatory void” (Hossain, 2010: 276). Therefore, informality is a “state of deregulation, one where the ownership, use and purpose of land cannot be fixed and mapped according to any prescribed set of regulations or the law” (Roy, 2009: 80). The concept of ‘informality from above’ explains how the state functions as an entity that utilize ‘informality’ as a means of accumulation and authority (Roy, 2009). Thus, recent informality explanations debunk versions of informality as heroic conquests of the subaltern or the apocalyptic view of marginalization and despair (Varley, 2010). Instead, informality becomes a feature of power structures and a purposive mode of regulation (Roy, 2009; Hossain, 2010)

In the same vein, the materiality and discursive spheres of informality cannot be decoupled.
As Parker (2011) argues, following Haraway’s ideas, the “the formula ‘material-discursive’ [is useful] to recognize the importance of discourse while reasserting the materiality of bodies, of nature, and of non-human and human interfaces” (438). Even though, the current debate on informality problematizes equating poverty with informality several discursive practices in planning designate material conditions of vulnerable population either living in ‘slums’ or working in the streets not conforming the law. That is why informality operates as a ‘discursive-material’ strategy entrenched in the planning practices themselves. In consequence, state regulation of territorial practices becomes inherently political and strongly related to the interests of the actors following a rationality of power (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Hossain, 2010). In sum, according with Roy, (2009) ‘third world cities’ planning practice needs to “integrate the informal into the legal, formal, and planned sectors of political economy” (82).

**Conclusion**

The literature on negotiation largely fails to account for the role of the materiality of space, the impacts of transnational flows on planning practices, and of informality as the pivotal feature of spatial planning. As a result, critical spatial planning offers a window to place politics of space at the core of planning practice. This framework can help us examine agents’ spatial strategies for mobilizing their interests in large-scale projects. Context and local political economy shape actions and actors’ leverage in the bargaining process (Sagalyn, 1997; 2007). That is why the critique of negotiation literature suggests the need to give more saliency to off-the-table agents’ moves, the materiality of space, and the dialogic connections of discourses throughout scales. Negotiation becomes a necessary condition to address the differential actors' access to power in the decision-making process in planning. I argue that negotiation becomes a site where agents articulate rationalities and where power shapes the materiality of space.
Under this perspective, negotiation processes are conceived as the set of planning episodes where agents engage in bargaining strategies to reach provisional agreements. Deal-making processes are not confined to the agents’ interaction in the formal institutional settings; rather, they refer to the spatial strategies and tactics used through formal and informal channels to pursue agents’ interests. Moreover, negotiations catalyze space-based interests in continual transactional moves across scales. Therefore, the deal-making process in large-scale projects encompasses how the agents’ leverage is used in urban design, land appraisal, funding strategies, social costs, and citizen involvement. In consequence, the focus on negotiation brings a more nuanced understanding of the planning practice, in particular in the Latin American context.

The negotiation of large-scale projects is a by-product of multi-scalar processes of spatial planning. Thus, critical spatial planning exposes systematic processes of uneven development through the mobility and mutation of ideas, practices, and policies. Moreover, this framework challenges authoritative knowledge reclaiming that cases from the ‘Global South’ have the potential to elucidate an “analysis of the heterogeneity and multiplicity of metropolitan modernities” (Roy, 2009: 821). In this context, Latin America could be a heuristic device for studying global processes in the production and politics of space. In doing so, I explore how discursive practices and spatial practices underpin each other in negotiation strategies.

In concordance with Roy (2009), the exploration of planning practice needs to “integrate the informal into the legal, formal, and planned sectors of political economy” (82). When agents deploy their strategies and tactics, they grapple with the intertwined nature of formality and informality as source of innovation and mutation of planning models. If we acknowledge this feature in conjunction with the assemblage in space of circuits of policies, capital, and practices, a cross-fertilization of theories could rise. This, then, “would enable the circuits of theory-generation
to become multi-directional and outward-facing” (Robinson, 2010: 16). In sum, a critical spatial planning framework attempts to build new landscapes of theory from alternative sites by borrowing and appropriating diverse lenses.
3. **Method: negotiating of large-scale projects**

“The case may be unique but not singular” (Castree, 2005: 541)

**Introduction**

My dissertation focuses on the interplay between changes in the built environment and in urban governance. Of particular interest for my research is the way in which government, the private sector, and civil society negotiate large-scale urban projects through partial plans. My case studies add to the understanding of emergent planning practices in Latin America and the critical spatial planning approach (CSP) I adopt, as discussed in chapter 2, moves to the forefront the materiality of space on decision-making, the circulation of multiple scale agents’ power, and the role of non-landowners in large-scale projects of renewal. As a result, the concepts of *enabling conditions* and *negotiation strategies/tactics* become the analytical tools for understanding the power mobilized in the negotiation of large-scale renewal projects in downtown.

This chapter describes the epistemological approaches underlying my methods, the research design rationale, and the case selection criteria. I use qualitative methodology of an in-depth comparative case study focusing on the negotiation of two renewal partial plans in Colombian cities: Ciudad Victoria in Pereira and Corazon de Jesus in Medellin. This chapter details the types of questions, the assumptions, and the challenges of qualitative research. Also, it describes the process of data collection and the ways in which the trustworthiness of the study is assured. In addition, the chapter justifies the case selection in light of the research questions, the purpose of the study, and the analytical apparatus derived from the theoretical framework. I argue that studying the enabling conditions and the negotiation strategies/tactics in contrasting cases across cities can explain large-scale projects as the outcomes of different deal-making processes.
3.1. Methodological approach

As a researcher, I locate myself at the intersection of the constructivist and critical realism traditions. While the former acknowledges the existence of a multiplicity of historically constructed realities, the latter emphasizes the spatiotemporal situational influence on structures and events. In constructivism, knowledge is framed as a social construct and the researcher is a participant who co-constructs understandings of the world. Critical realism posits that knowledge is political and that researchers’ values frame inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Furthermore, constructivists believe that social phenomena are based on participants’ views of situations as they give meaning through a context-dependent interaction shaping interpretations of reality (Creswell, 2009). Hence, both traditions fall under a reflexive model of science and a qualitative research paradigm.

This model “embraces not detachment but engagement as the road to knowledge” (Burawoy, 1997: 5). As a result, reflexive science uses theory interrogation as the basis for explaining empirical phenomena. The point of departure is context, understood as multi-scalar and contingent on phenomena that come together empirically and can be conceived conceptually (Castree, 2005: 542). Working within this model requires the researcher to envision themselves as a ‘positioned subject’ who establishes ongoing self-examination by adopting a critical reflexivity position (Baxter & Eyles, 1997: 506; Hay, 2005: 22). Thus, the purpose of a reflexive model is to reconstruct extant theories based upon the researcher’s embeddedness in place.

For critical realism (CR), knowledge production becomes historically and spatially situated. Under this perspective, the ‘strata’ of reality operate through mechanisms, events, and experiences. Hence, open social structures (i.e. mechanisms) manifest in the activities (i.e. events) of agents govern in as much as agents’ discourses and practices (i.e. experiences) are embedded in the actions they engage in. Then, ‘reality’ emerges in the main domains of critical realism: the real,
actual and the empirical as Table 3 shows. First, mechanisms are identified in the real domain; second, events or effects of mechanisms are expressed in the real and the actual; third, the empirical domain is constituted by the experience of events that simultaneously give an understanding of mechanisms. In this way, the explanatory power of theory aims to “connect abstract (structures) to empirical (events) and to (agents’) experience of them” (Banai, 1995: 565). Therefore, this model is question-driven and builds on extant theory to unveil connections between extra-local forces and local processes.

Table I. Critical realism ontology

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<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Real</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Empirical</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mechanisms</td>
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<td>Events</td>
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<td>Experiences</td>
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Source: Banai, 1995 based on Bhaskar, 1975

Instead of looking for universality and predictability of mechanisms and events, this methodological approach seeks to explain the multiple causalities of social processes. Since these processes are contingent upon spatial-temporal processes, I attempt to unravel large-scale projects’ enabling conditions and agents’ negotiation strategies/tactics. Following CR rationale (Banai, 1995) the enabling conditions refer to the long-term geopolitics of space or the contextual mechanisms of structures. These conditions are revealed in the events derived from the entanglements of uneven geographies of knowledge production with transnational circulation of capital, policies and planning practices. Negotiation strategies and tactics refer to the agent’s experiences in space production. In the deal-making processes, agents mobilize their interests employing spatial as well as discursive practices where context dependent rationalities influence the trajectories of power.

In order to answer my research questions, I employ comparative case study to examine variations of the structure and dynamics of emergent land management practices for large-scale
renewal projects. The starting point of this examination is the presentation of explanatory factors that reveal “common influences of the larger context of which all are a part and how the cases interact” (Bergene, 2007: 16). In fact, the context sensitivity of the interpretation allows the re-contextualization of theory by applying it to a new context, or reinterprets a phenomenon in light of a new theoretical framework (Bergene, 2007: 15). At the crux of my research design is the comparison of two emerging models for steering large-scale urban projects in Colombia: community-led and government-led partial plans of renewal. According to the reflexive model of science, I follow a relational comparative approach (Ward, 2010), inasmuch as it acknowledges that the production of space results from the conjunction of multiple scales at work.

In a time of growing concern for framing comparative urbanisms, this research explores venues to place comparison as a productive strategy for theory production. In concordance with the Critical Spatial Planning perspective, more than tracing causality as a quasi-scientific, law-like explanation, this study focuses on the understanding of multiple ongoing mechanisms that shape the space of the city itself. Then, the cases and the context are mutually constituted, becoming the grounds for comparison across contexts. The spatiality of cities plays a crucial role in the understanding of historic processes and actions that shape “the geographies behind the production of cities” (Ward, 2010: 471). For this approach, cities are understood as “dense bundles of social relations and power-infused interactions that are always formed out of entanglements and connections with dynamics at work in other places, and in wider regional, national and transnational arenas” (Hart, 2002: 297 quoted in Ward, 2010: 481). As a result, this conception also urges ‘theorizing back,’ based on a multiplicity of evidence from different contexts to the post-colonial critique of urban theories (Ward, 2010).

The comparative strategy of ‘individualizing’ (Robinson 2010) resonates entirely with the
relational comparative approach. This strategy attempts to explain the distinctive outcomes in one city (or more cities) through an explicit qualitative comparison with other cases that may confirm hypotheses concerning causal processes (Robinson, 2010). This strategy has an embedded theory-building goal by conceiving theory as “the way we speak beyond the single case” (Connell, 2007: 225 quoted on Robinson, 2010:16). In order to engage with theory building, it is necessary to examine the gaps of generalized statements in a wider literature through the lens of detailed analysis of a particular historic context of cases. This analysis requires relational or spatial thinking for unraveling the contingent connections informing the emergence of systems (Robinson, 2010). Most importantly, the emphasis on circulation of planning discourses and practices through strategies and tactics unravels social structures themselves as causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, this approach highlights that contextual explanations do not rely on a single but rather in overlapping and multi-determined causalities of political and economic outcomes. Therefore, this type of comparison does not seek generalization; rather, it looks for exposing the connections and circulations among cases inasmuch as they shed light on theoretical gaps.

3.2. Research design

The main focus of this research is agents’ strategies and tactics to mobilize their interests in the large-scale projects negotiation process. In this process the differential access to power configures the agents’ spatial and discursive practices in their interaction with institutional frameworks. Since I am interested in understanding the materiality of space as a by-product of decision-making processes, I used a comparative, in-depth case study (Creswell, 2009; Bergene, 2007; Flyvbejerg, 2006; Yin, 1994). That is why I explore the structure and dynamics of emergent land management practices from an actor-centered approach. The actor-centered approach focuses on highlighting the experiences of actors in the different stages and scale where the process of negotiation takes
place. In this endeavor, the examination of historical contexts and socio-spatial trajectories of targeted areas for large-scale projects becomes crucial. This context provides the grounds from which to understand the enabling conditions for the changes in the institutional and legal frameworks, which in turn configures agents’ leverage and discursive formations.

The purpose of this multiple case study is to explore the partial plans’ negotiation processes surrounding large-scale renewal projects in Colombian cities’ downtown areas. In particular, I am interested in local governments, community organizations, and private sector developers’ bargaining strategies. I concentrate on three intertwined aspects of the negotiation process: urban design guidelines, landowners’ / non-landowners’ rights and responsibilities, and self-funding through land assembly. Thus, in order to grasp the complexity of these negotiation processes, I examine large urban projects in Colombia’s cities by answering two key questions:

**QUESTION 1. How does the urban design scheme articulate public and private agents’ interests?**

I explore the mechanisms employed by local officials, developers, and community organizations to connect urban design and land negotiations. The new spatial planning system has at its core a change in the role of property ownership: from an ‘absolute right’ to a ‘source of rights and responsibilities’. The government’s assumption is that the legal principle of equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities guides this process. Moreover, the new spatial planning system brings space to the centre of urban land policy by opening up plans to participatory processes and stimulating a socially oriented land value capture. The introduction of partial plans opens venues for a negotiated agreement over voluntary land pooling for parcel assembly, the urban design scheme, and self-financing strategies. Partial plans allow for self-financing of the intervention, using land and future use/development rights to pay for public infrastructure.
QUESTION 2. To what extent were non-landowners able to influence the process and outcomes of the partial plan negotiation?

This question focuses on the claims (or lack thereof) over space of the main downtown fringe area users, mostly vulnerable population, renters, and informal workers. The concentration of these groups becomes both the motivation for targeting the intervention sites as ‘renewal areas,’ and the legal ‘void’ for protecting inhabitants and including social costs in the partial plan. The central areas targeted for large-scale projects of renewal host a high concentration of non-landowners. Renters of low cost accommodations, street workers, and vulnerable populations constitute the core inhabitants of these areas. In contrast, landowners remain absent receiving high rents from mostly disinvested sites. Originally, partial plans were used to develop non-urbanized areas (i.e. new growth or urban expansion) in the Iberian model. Notwithstanding these origins, partial plans have been used in the Colombian context to intervene in built up areas in prime real estate locations that have undergone disinvestment. Public officials and community organizations have devised strategies to introduce non-landowner interests.

Data collection and analysis

The Research Protocol # 2010-0679, approved in September 2010 by Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS), guided the data gathering process for this research. In order to answer the above questions, the main data gathering technique was in-depth interviewing of key informants from local and national governments, the private sector, and community organizations. To a lesser extent, I relied on archival research and content analysis techniques for gathering secondary data. The study also includes spatial analysis to expose land management strategies based on current vs. intended patterns of urban form, public space use, parcel/lot structure, land tenure, and land price.
My prior experience working for over seven years in the revision of master plans and formulation of partial plans facilitated the understanding of the context as well as the identification of key informants. Based on that experience, I constructed a list of prospective informants, places, and organizations to contact. This preliminary research helped me to frame the fieldwork. I conducted the interviews and data gathering between September 2010 and January 2011. I visited Bogota to acquire information at the national level and contacted some of the key interviewees for the cases. In addition, I spent almost two months in Medellin and Pereira interviewing informants and gathering the information not available online. Finally the transcription process took place between February and April 2011.

Since one of my purposes was to gain an understanding of the space-based interests of agents leading the negotiation, I selected the key informants relying on a purposive sample. Unlike a quantitative study with a large N and random sampling, this study employs semi-structured interviews to uncover the perceptions, intentions, and motivations of the multiple agents and their institutional arrangements. This type of data gathering better suits the purpose of tracing the nuances of agents’ strategies and tactics to mobilize their interests to shape space. I contacted interviewees directly (i.e., email and/or telephone calls) using an introductory letter following all the IRB ethical standards for international sites. I also defined a set of common questions for all subjects and a set of specific questions for each group, public officials, non-profit agency leaders, master planners, and developers. Hence, I used an embedded triangulation strategy for acquiring the perspectives of multiple agents in the implementation of an emergent spatial planning system through partial plans. Table 3 presents the methods of data collection in relation to the analytical framework and the main actors in each case and the most salient data sources in the constitution of an emergent land management practice.
The process of interviewing concentrated on two institutional levels: the national and the local scale (See table II). Following Hay (2005), I structured the type of questions in a sequence of

Table II. Research design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling conditions</th>
<th>Negotiation strategies and tactics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio Spatial Trajectories</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bargaining Framework</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mechanisms of macro institutional political economy</td>
<td>- Legal and institutional conditions for regulatory mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Historic events of socio-space transformation</td>
<td>- Political rationalities in the planning agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Colonial legacy and uneven geographies of knowledge production</td>
<td>- Transnational flows of planning ideas and practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Main Actors</strong></th>
<th><strong>Data collection</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National</strong></td>
<td>Literature review: pivotal historical events that shape the introduction of a new spatial planning system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National Department of Planning</td>
<td>Archival research: trajectory of legal framework of spatial planning, policy documents, and government publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ministry of Economic Development / MADVT</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews: national and local planners, academic experts, consultants, and non-profit actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National consultants</td>
<td>Archival research: Municipal plan, partial plan decree, and newspapers articles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- International advisers</td>
<td>Cartographic analysis: historic maps of intervention area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ciudad Victoria</strong></td>
<td>Observation: photographic account of the intervention areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mayor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NGO Futuro y vida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EXITO (big box retailer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- URBAN (shopping mall developers)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technical coordinator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CORAJE (Community development association)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Street workers association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technical coordinator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CORAJE information center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consultants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civic advisory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- City Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>City</strong></th>
<th><strong>Data sources</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corazon de Jesus</strong></td>
<td>Interviews transcriptions coded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mayor</td>
<td>Newspapers: Diario el Otun and La Tarde (Pereira Public Library), El Mundo and El Colombiano (websites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civic advisory</td>
<td>Policy and planning documents:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- City Council</td>
<td>City hall- Partial plans division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- TECHNICAL COORDINATOR</td>
<td>CORAJE information center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Street workers association</td>
<td>Planning department website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technical coordinator</td>
<td>Maps:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data visualization section (MapGIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land and real estate market observatory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legislation and policy documents: |
- Senate (www.senado.gov.co) |
- National Department of Urban Development (www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES) |

Statistical info: |
- National Department of Statistics (www.dane.gov.co)
descriptive, storytelling, contrast, and devil’s advocate approaches. On the one hand, I asked to national level participants questions related to the policy transfer of the partial plans from Spain, Japan, and France, the role of the nation in large-scale projects of renewal, the trajectory and drivers of the normative frameworks related to PP, and their opinions about the implementation of the policy and partial plans in localities. On the other hand, I asked participants of the local level questions about partial plan initiative formation, negotiation strategies, conflictive issues with the other parties, social cost assessment, the role of landowners and non-landowners, the criteria for defining the program and urban form, information management, and their perceptions about the final agreement. I taped record all the interviews for transcription purposes with the participants’ consent; in the parts that they preferred not to be taped I took notes.

I conducted thirty-two semi-structured interviews in total; as Table 4 shows, twelve of them were performed with agents at the national level, eleven in the Medellin case, and nine in the Pereira case. Once I listened again to the material collected, I selected the interviews that were more valuable to transcribe. Although I had predefined the coding procedures in the proposal, after the fieldwork was conducted, I changed the codes and regrouped the categories for classifying the data. The data analysis revealed four types of strategies used by the leading agent in each partial plan: political positioning of the initiative, framing the treatment of non-landowners, measuring the impacts of land values, and the resulting spatial arrangement scheme. The interpretation of the contextual meaning of the data was aided by the familiarization with each case prior to the interviews. In addition, I took field notes after each interview and I processed the transcriptions and notes using the software TAMS for coding.
Table III. Profile of interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Bogota)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medellin case</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO – inhabitants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector **</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pereira case</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO – inhabitants</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviewees</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes former public officials involved in the introduction of the new spatial planning system as well as consultants in local processes.

** Includes business owners.

Among the three main actors in the negotiation of partial plans (i.e., national/local governments, community organizations, and private sector developers), I found that private sector developers were reluctant to be interviewed. My practical choice was to focus on the testimony of the directors of the local associations of realtors, developers, and builders in Medellin and Pereira to understand their rationale. Moreover, the access to representatives of landowners was not possible inasmuch as most of these subjects operate as absentee landlords. However, the leading actors in each partial plan portrayed the experience of landowners’ practices and their interests in the projects. Not only did I experience drawbacks on gaining access to developers, but also I faced limitations on acquiring some crucial data. For instance, the information about land tenure concentration is kept confidential, the socioeconomic census of the intervention area in Pereira disappeared, the land appraisal before the plans were approved is not accessible to the public, and the meeting minutes are not kept. Therefore, the limited info works to the favor of the developer and the city. This absence of information becomes an indicator of how power operates more relevant than the documentation produced itself (i.e., the eviction of inhabitants in Pereira, or the
land speculation in Medellin) (Flyvbjerg, 1998).

Other aspects that prove to be problematic consist in the fidelity of the transcription process and the translation of the excerpts used in the quotes. Ideally for solving the former the use of ‘member checking’ would have come in handy; however, access to participants after the interviews was difficult. That is why I used an outsider planner for checking the fidelity of all the transcriptions, taking advantage of her familiarity with the planning vocabulary. On the other hand, for addressing the aspects of complicated translations such as slang, idioms, and legal terms, I asked bilingual colleagues to double check if my translation to English approximated the meaning in Spanish. Even though, I used these strategies for assuring precision in the discursive practices, I acknowledge some of the quotes utilized may still have some imprecision.

**Trustworthiness of the study**

I followed Shenton’s (2004) strategies in order to ensure trustworthiness in conducting qualitative research. First, the **credibility** of the study is supported by the researcher’s background, assuring familiarity with the institutional contexts, the culture of the participants, and the socio-spatial trajectories in Colombian cities. I engaged in an iterative questioning during the dialogues with informants followed by a ‘reflective commentary’ in my notes after each interview. Moreover, the fourth chapter offers a thick description of the planning contexts and previous studies’ findings regarding large-scale projects and partial plans. Second, the **transferability** of the study is possible thanks to the transparency of the design method, case background, and data sources. I offer a detailed description of findings in terms of the agents’ bargaining strategies and tactics in the fifth and sixth chapters as a basis for comparison. Third, the **dependability** of the research is enabled by an in-depth methodological description in the third chapter, allowing for the replication of the study and readers’ scrutiny of results. Moreover, the seventh chapter presents the conclusions as a
reflective appraisal of the entire research project. Finally, the *confirmability* of the research is assured by the triangulation of different types of informants (i.e., public officials, non-profit leaders, private sector developers), sites (i.e., Pereira and Medellin), types of cases (i.e., government led and community led), and types of data (public documents, interviews, newspaper articles). I also recognize the limitations of the methodological approach and theoretical assumptions. In addition, in the second and third chapters I acknowledge my theoretical and methodological assumptions and their limitations.

**3.3. Case study selection**

I am concentrating on Colombia since it is considered a paradigmatic example of how recent Latin American administrations have implemented urban land reform. Their agenda looks for planning practices that seek to balance city interests with private interests, emphasize collective rights, and involve socially oriented land value capture (Fernandes & Maldonado, 2009; Vejarano, 2007; Morales, 2003; Furtado, 2000; Smolka & Furtado, 2001; Garcia-Bellido, 1998; Doebele, 1997). I have chosen Corazon de Jesus in the Medellin and Ciudad Victoria in the Pereira partial plans of renewal (See Table 5) to conduct an in-depth comparative case study based on the following criteria:

- First, I selected the cities where most partial plans were identified according to the National Department of Planning. As of 2010, in 17 Colombian cities are identified over 95 partial plans of renewal and only 32 have been approved. However, 71 partial plans are concentrated in the main metropolitan areas such as Bogota D.C., Cali, Medellin, and Pereira. I had to discard the Bogota and Cali cases since, in the former, none of the plans were approved by the time I was drafting the dissertation proposal; while in the latter I lacked professional networks for finding key informants.

- Second, I based the project selection on the location of renewal areas. In this regard, I
found that most of downtown fringe areas of former bus terminals and central city market locations were intended for long-term intervention, as they had become areas in ‘decay’. As a result, I locate the sites designated for partial plans where the social composition and morphology illustrate the dynamics of downtown fringe area contexts.

- Third, I focused on the models for steering large-scale projects enabled by the new planning system. Even though this legislation entails the logic of public–private partnerships, it also allows for the first time community initiative to lead these projects through partial plans. Then, the legislation contemplates three types of initiatives: public, private, and community or the combination of them. As a result, I focus on pioneering examples of two of those models: government led and community-driven partial plans of renewal.

The selected cases that suit my research purpose are:

1) The government-led partial plan Ciudad Victoria: This is an exceptional case located in Pereira that not only received a national award for its achievements but also set precedents in the implementation of renewal projects in the entire country. Pereira’s female mayor led the project during her mayoral term (2001 to 2003). In Ciudad Victoria PP, the renewal area was the location of the old city market where crime, prostitution, and homelessness were concentrated. In 2001, a French-Colombian big box retailer chain wanted to locate in Pereira; at the same time a new female mayor was elected having the Ciudad Victoria PP as part of her main projects. After three months of negotiations the project began its implementation. Of the 700 street workers and 1,500 low-income renters, less than 35% were relocated. Private investors eventually paid two thirds of the costs, but the public infrastructure was an up-front cost for the municipality. This project received the best practice in spatial planning award from the Colombian Society of Architects.
2) Community-led partial plan Corazon de Jesus: This is the first partial plan approved that involved agents of formal and informal economic networks located in Medellin. CORAJE was the community organization that led the project from 2000 to 2007. In this project more than 80% of its current workers/residents were intended to remain in the area through the use of boulevards and open internal corridors to include and assure working places for street workers. Before the Corazon de Jesus PP was approved in 2007, the area specialized in vehicle repair services and had been designated as a residential site by a zoning ordinance of 1991. The municipality’s eviction threat sparked a strong civil opposition that ended up in riots and civil strikes opposing relocation in 1995. Despite political compromises of keeping the area as a mixed-use zone, the new comprehensive plan declared the site for renewal, implying a substantive transformation of the spatial configuration and economic activities in the area. Local workers and renters proposed several initiatives for formulating the PP. Despite these attempts, the planning department denied the possibilities for actual users of space to remain in the area alleging ‘illegal’ use of public space and environmental degradation. The community initiative became viable only after an independent candidate became mayor. As a result, public officials and planners had to reconcile with the leaders of the community-led PP. The negotiation lasted seven years.

In this dissertation the unit of analysis that allows for comparison is the large-scale project negotiation process. It includes not only the territorial delimitation of the renewal projects in downtown fringe areas in Pereira and Medellin, but also, the agents’ interaction in the deal-making process until they reached agreement. Even though the contrasting cases bear similarities regarding institutional frameworks, the planning culture, and the historical trajectory of downtown spatiality, I avoid attributing a priori causality in the divergence of outcomes to a single explanatory factor. Rather, I examine the contingent factors that the distinctive politics of space enabled. That is why
the point of departure for analysis is the assemblage of a new planning system and its redeployment in downtowns spatial patterns across Colombian cities. The deal making of partial plans epitomizes the implementation of the planning system as it shapes agents’ leverage and their challenges for mobilizing rights and responsibilities in transforming the materiality of space.

Table IV. General characteristics of the cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General information</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Pereira (576,329 hab.)</td>
<td>Medellin (2,223,078 hab.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative type</td>
<td>Public (Mayor’s office)</td>
<td>Community (CORAJE foundation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>10 Ha (13 Blocks)</td>
<td>26.4 Ha (33 Blocks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcels</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>1,536 (workers and residents)</td>
<td>560 residents + 6,200 workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renters</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street workers</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predominant use</td>
<td>Commercial and Residential</td>
<td>Services and Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deal- making</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation time</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management units</td>
<td>6 units</td>
<td>22 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public interest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New public space</td>
<td>16,950 m² (park+ civic plaza)</td>
<td>18,000 m² (3 plazas + boulevards) + 8,000 m² off-site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New amenities</td>
<td>4,227 m² (Cultural center)</td>
<td>(Public School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private interest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential areas</td>
<td>60,000 m²</td>
<td>117,000 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial area</td>
<td>60,500 m²</td>
<td>360,000 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office areas</td>
<td>15,000 m²</td>
<td>166,000 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-landowners interest</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social programs</td>
<td>7,068 points (US$ 0.47) - partial relocation of residents and workers</td>
<td>1% of the sales (US$ 7.5) - maintain 90% of workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


“...Policies are not simply transiting intact between jurisdictions, but evolve through mobility, while at the same time (re)making relational connections between policymaking sites...”
(Theodore & Peck, 2010: 170)

Introduction

The new spatial planning system was introduced in Colombia after the approval of the Territorial Development Law 388 in 1997. This new legal framework set a breaking point with previous planning practices because this law incorporated actively land management tools for public infrastructure funding and spatial equity purposes. The Colombian case reveals the influence of the transnational policy mobilities to the national level policy implementation, reshaping the local institutional and legal landscapes. In particular, the new spatial planning system epitomizes the contested nature of opposing yet intertwined forces: hegemonic, neoliberal urban policies and socially progressive urban land reform. This chapter presents the transnational assemblage of planning tools that shape the bargaining framework for partial plans. I argue that partial plans represent the transnational flows of planning models targeting prime real estate locations via land management tools.

Planning practices in the Global South are not isolated technocratic endeavors; rather they constitute an active site of innovation. Local planning systems are an assemblage of international references as sources of authoritative knowledge. This chapter explores the formation of partial plans as land management tools by presenting the new spatial planning system in Colombia. I describe the rationales used by the Ministry of Economic Development and the National Planning Department for referencing multiple international planning models. I employ data from historic research, interviews with public officials from national planning agencies, academic experts, and consultants who acted as agents of transfer in the formation of a new planning system. The
resulting legislation served as the bargaining framework to determine agents’ leverage in the negotiation of large-scale projects.

In this chapter I depict the enabling conditions in Colombia for the transformation in the legal and institutional framework as well as their impacts on urban socio-spatial trajectories. The first section portrays the trajectories of international reference for shaping the contents of the bargaining framework of large-scale projects in particular and spatial planning in general. The second section explains the main mechanisms and events that trigger spatial planning: decentralization, democratization, and globalization. The third section describes the contents of the national assemblage of the new spatial planning. The final section shows the rationales of the partial plan as a means of land management for large-scale projects, and the partial plan becoming the basis for shaping public and private interests.

4.1. Genealogy of international influences

Latin American urbanization results from a vast *bricolage* of ideas, practices, and sources of capital. As such, Latin American societies have performed the role of *bricoleurs*, assembling various available resources to continually invent their own strategies for comprehending and shaping reality. Throughout more than five centuries of history, urban landscapes have been shaped as palimpsests of intercontinental trajectories of ideas materialized in urban forms and geographical patterns. As a result, diverse social groups are producing space amid the embedded politics of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dialectics in distinctive ways. The impacts of post colonialism and the forces of modernization define the fate of space production. Then, this history presents an account of mingling transient and enduring Eurocentric and North American influences, as well as the concomitant dynamics of the vernacular. Nevertheless, I argue the Latin
American urbanisms are not merely copycat societies of a hegemonic North, but rather are active and innovative agents in the production of their own space.

-Spanish Colonial Foundations

The city itself was the main instrument of domination in colonial times. Since the Spanish conquest in sixteenth century, existing settlements were targeted as military objectives to impose by force a new order. One of the main tools of domination was the imposition of a spatial pattern directly defined by King Ferdinand II of Aragon. The “Laws of the Indies” (1519) were a set of regulations for aiding colonizers to locate, build, and populate the new possessions of the kingdom. The “template” was applied systematically in terms of generating a central plaza, a symbol of the church and crown powers, and an orthogonal continuous grid, that prompted mechanisms to allocate land among the “newcomers.” As a result, most of the Spanish colonies in America followed these guidelines in determining the urban form of downtown areas. Until the early twentieth century, central plazas were the site of city markets and transit terminals that later were relocated to the outskirts of towns. These areas would be the ones that a century later would tend to be targeted for renewal. Nowadays, foundational cores still remain the settings of governmental power and the commercial engines of cities.

-North American and European Influences in Emerging Urbanism

The beginnings of formal administrative planning practice in Colombia and Latin America involved local and foreign experts being called in to respond to rural-to-urban migration and the increasing mismatch between industrialization and urbanization. Local professionals developed the first plans in Medellin (1913), and in Bogota (1917) they used some hygienic and beautification

1“Latin professionals were ‘European-trained, or prepared for the technical field in their own country by European-trained professors’. In addition to their thorough technicality, Latin professionals frequently had ‘a broader understanding of their own and related fields than would be provided in similar training in the United States’. More than their North American colleagues, Latin urbanistas also tended “to philosophize about the significance of the city’s pattern, about the broad human objective of planning” (Almandoz, 2006: 92).
ideas in circulation since 1870 in Europe. Three main international influences shaped planning from the late 1920's to the early 1960's: the Viennese school of combined scientific and humanist approach to planning, the French/US implementation of the functionalism principles contained in the CIAM's “Athens Charter” and the World Bank economic planning strategies. These influences epitomize the “developmentalism” and “modernization” agendas of the time.

The Viennese influence crystallized the institutional and professional platforms of modern planning in Colombia following Karl Brunner's ideas. In 1938, Brunner settled in Bogota and became a pioneer in simultaneously developing legal proposals for urban design and planning, neighborhood plans, and academic work. For Brunner “epistemology and history were still vital nourishments for the urban design” (Almandoz, 2006: 118). His main contributions were small-scale interventions in existing urban tissue; emphasizing the generation of public green space and the introduction of social housing neighborhoods built through cooperatives (Bohl & Lejeune, 2009). Additionally, his influential books Manual de Urbanismo published in 1939 and 1940 had an expanding impact on the professional education of young planners in Latin America at the time.

Le Corbusier became a key figure in the dissemination of the principles of the Athens Charter, published in 1943, throughout the world. His first trip to South America occurred in 1929 while his five visits to Colombia started in 1947. He was in charge of formulating the basis for a Bogota Master Plan that later, in 1949, required the collaboration of the Town Planning Associates.

5 *As a belated expression of the inter-war colonialism in Latin America, which was still seduced by the old world’s cultural and academic prestige, the new offices of urbanism, though boasting teams that already were professionally mature, hired famous experts from Europe, either as advisors or coordinators of the plans to be produced. The new instruments seemed to reach the value of manifestoes or birth certificates of the emerging discipline, unlike European countries where the first planning laws had more epistemological significance* (Almandoz, 2006: 97). For instance, the Swiss-French Le Courbusier visited Bogota, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Sao Paulo, and Rec; the Austrian Karl Brunner lived and taught in Santiago and Bogota; the French Jacques Lambert drafted the master plan for Caracas; and the American Paul Wiener and the Spanish Louis Sert also produced plans for four Colombian cities (Almandoz, 2006).

6 Karl Brunner worked in Santiago, Chile between 1929 and 1934 (Bohl & Lejeune, 2009); although, other source argues that Brunner lived in Colombia from 1933 to 1948 (Maya, 2004). He served as professor in the nascent Architecture school of the National University of Colombia for over a decade and designed the master plan of its main campus.

7 Brunner designed several neighborhoods and public spaces in Bogota and Medellin and was top adviser in urban problems in several cities such as Popayan, Pasto, Manizales, Santa Marta, Girardot, Medellin, and Buenaventura (Maya, 2004).
based in New York. Josep Luis Sert (from Spain) and Paul Lester Wiener (from Germany – US Nationalized) worked in Colombia between 1948 and 1953 formulating plans for several cities: Tumaco (1947), Medellin (1948), Cali (1949), and Bogota (1949) (Schnitter, 2002, 2003). In particular, the Master Plan for Bogota involved four scales – regional plan, metropolitan plan, urban plan, and civic center plan - employing the CIAM analytical guidelines for living, working, recreation, and circulation (Del Castillo et al., 2008; O’Byrne et al., 2010). Even though not fully implemented, those plans were decisive in the consolidation of physical planning as a discipline and served as a blueprint for the main infrastructural investments.

Lauchlin Currie⁸ led the World Bank’s first mission to Colombia through the IBRD – the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The mission produced the first comprehensive country survey in 1950 that served as the basis for new guidelines in "development and growth" of the nation. Based on the survey, Currie recommended fostering the construction industry in urban areas as a way to create jobs and increase urbanization rates (UN HABITAT, 2005). As a product of his advice, in 1950, the “National Plan of Public Works” (del Castillo, et al., 2008) was approved. On the other hand, Currie’s extensive theoretical work on banking and credit theory deeply influenced national housing policy, the creation of the national housing credit system, and the National Department of Planning in 1959. Moreover, Currie served as a top presidential adviser⁹ for several years, becoming a salient member of the National Planning Council created in 1960. Currie and the Council delivered crucial plans for the economic fate of the country: Operation Colombia in 1961 and the Four Strategies Plan in 1971.¹⁰ Currie’s work in

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⁸ Currie was a Canadian born economist who served as economic adviser under President Roosevelt during the Great Depression in the US.
⁹ Currie remained in Colombia until his death in 1993. He kept working on housing credit issues and served as an urban economy professor at Los Andes University.
¹⁰ The plan introduced the idea of supporting four leading sectors in the economy: housing construction, exports stimulus, increase in rural productivity, and wealth redistribution.
Colombia set the foundations of economic planning impacting the fiscal and administrative reform of the state during the 60’s and 70’s.

- The impact of multilateral agencies on Latin American planning and the critique of developmentalism

The USA and the United Nations implemented the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) program in Latin America from 1930’s to 1980’s as a way to extract the potential of industrial exploitation. As part of that strategy, they backed the creation of international agencies such as the OAS (Organization of American States) and the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), fostering economic policies that would generate “corporate states” (Almandoz, 2006). The notion of the “Latin American city” itself was part of the ECLA and UNESCO agendas for the region. This agenda was underpinned by the constitution of the Inter-American Society of Planning (SIAP) and the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO). Also, in 1974, the Development Program of the United Nations and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) started technical support programs in local planning in Colombia. Therefore, planning discourses on development and economic growth became instrumental for operating the USA capital reproduction agenda.

The failure of ISI was linked to the lack of consolidation and diversification in local economies and resulted in the rise of urban unemployment and the largest waves of rural-to-urban migration in recent history. This socio-economic unrest propelled Latin American countries to raise their foreign debt exponentially. By the first half of the XX century, Latin America became dependent on the IMF and on WB economic and social remedies. In this context, the Dependency School of thought emerged as a Marxist response to capital developmentalism,

11 JICA offered a set of transportation infrastructure project financing tools.
12 It is also well known that the IMF supported dictatorships in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, and Paraguay.
operating under a liberal doctrine. This theory seeks to “reinterpret the center /periphery antinomy as a structural hindrance that could only be overcome on the basis of the state’s public intervention” (Almandoz, 2006: 105). The Dependency School pervades Latin America’s social sciences, and urban studies in particular. Nevertheless, the main critiques of this theory claim that it obliterates the spatial dimension in its analysis of urbanization in an era of increasing segregation and social polarization (Almandoz, 2006). In this stage, the Development Plan and the Urban Code became the main planning instruments coupled with the primacy of this socioeconomic bias in planning.

-**Urban planning as a national function and as product of international cooperative agreements**

The new spatial planning system in Colombia emerged at the junction of several transnational circuits of power/knowledge. The international cooperative agreements are bi-national diplomatic contracts for exchange and aid in several issues. These agreements became pivotal tools for enabling the circulation of planning ideas and, as a result, sources of capital. These ideas were validated by the democratic turn and their support from global capital markets. In the trajectories traveled by planning models and practices, the role of international consultants and top public officials became crucial for shaping the bargaining framework of large-scale projects. The alleged expertise of technocrats brings inspiration into other contexts as a way to position their power for setting agendas at the local level. Along these lines, the concept of partial plan comes from a tool conceived in Spain (i.e., the Land Readjustment law of 1954 and Land of Law of 1956) and Japan (i.e., land readjustment based on the 1889 Law of Rural Land Consolidation), and the “land plus values” or land value-capture devised in France. The process to install and adapt these land management tools is illustrated as follows:
Since 1992, Spain sought a new phase of trade with Latin America subscribing to a Technical Cooperation Treaty (Rodriguez, 2006). In particular, the Municipality of Madrid worked with the Colombian Ministry of Development between 1994 and 1995 in coordination with a UN-Development Program initiative\(^{13}\) for drafting a new law of territorial planning (Pinto, 2005). This international cooperative agreement involved a series of exchanges between experts in Spain and Colombia. The rationale for using the Spanish planning model in Colombia was based on their parallel judicial systems and the fact that the inspiration for Colombia’s Political Constitution is the Spanish one (Ezquiaga, 2010).

The visits of the Madrid Planning Department Director, Dr. Jose Maria Ezquiaga, furthered the discussion of the land management tools used for enabling large-scale projects. As he recalled:

“At that time we were solving symbolic large-scale projects in diverse areas of the municipality [Madrid], particularly in downtown areas... we called them “Urban Projects,” and they had the capability to impact the infrastructure of mobility defined in the general plan through strategic urban uses such as public amenities of a metropolitan scale. Additionally, the topics of public space and iconic regenerations were used as seeds of urban transformation on a broader scale...” (Interviewed on 10.14.2010)

The concept of Urban Project would dominate the vision of one fraction of the technical group working on the draft of the new law, while the other part of the group would be more focused on the economic impacts on land market regulation. However, Ezquiaga considered his main contribution to the conceptual and legal framework as an emphasis on:

“The subordination of individual property rights to the general interest... this is the social dimension of property, property does not work as a right per se, but as a right relative to the social use of the parcels... the idea is based on that the real value of urban land is produced by collective action throughout history... that is why the socially oriented land value capture is paramount in the planning system...the other point is the idea of having the plan as the expression of a city project... based on environmental and heritage elements, the memory preservation is also as

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\(^{13}\) The UNPD through contract #93001 had a set of local and foreign professionals who were hired to participate in drafting the new Law of Territorial Development.
In fact, central aspects of the Spanish legislation were incorporated in the Colombian legal framework. Nevertheless, in Spain partial plans develop aspects of the general plan in terms of areas targeted for urban expansion. In the Colombian legislation, partial plans are used not only for urban expansion but also for intervening into built up areas that are in “decay.”

The visit of another well-known Spanish expert, Javier Garcia-Bellido, in 1998, helped further the developments of legal guidelines for partial plans. The Director of Urban Development of the Ministry of Development at the time claimed that:

“...in the law it was already said that partial plans should be used in urban expansion and could be used in urban areas...the discussions with Garcia-Bellido helped to clarify...if the urban renewal needed to overcome the piecemeal fashion of a lot-by-lot intervention, it needed ‘integracion inmobiliaria’ [a type of Land Readjustment in urbanized areas with buildings] through units of action in a more complex process.” (Interview, 10.21.2010)

Land Readjustment (LR) was a tool in place since 1989 detailed in the Urban Land Reform Law that was not used in the local planning practice at that time. However, in the new legal system, following also the Spanish model, the principle of the equitable distribution of costs and benefits became a paramount guide for devising land management tools such as LR. This concept is also drawn from the technique of so-called “reparcelaciones” -loosely translated as “re-plotting,” implying physical, judicial, and economic changes in the parcel structure (See figure 1). The tool was introduced in Spain with the Law of Land of 1956 inspired by the technique implemented in 1861 by Ildelfonso Cerda in Barcelona’s expansion (Pinto, 2005).

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14 Even though the designation of the scope of the tool was a team decision, Ezquiaga argues: “I recommended not to use the same terminology for urban growth and urban renewal, as those are very different things, contrary methods, different developers... they are different worlds...In Spain we called them ‘Special plans of inner reform’ and the others are called simply ‘partial plans.” (Interviewed on 10.14.2010).

15 The incorporation of LR was influenced by the Japanese technical cooperation I describe below.
The model of associative management of land seeks to preserve landowners’ property rights in proportion to the original extension of owned land; the resulting lots, after the re-plotting and generating of public areas, are valued as a function of the median of the construction rights distributed proportionately among the participants (Pinto, 2010). LR, as the basis for negotiating partial plans, was devised for the incorporation of rural land for urban growth. The conception of the tool has entrenched the idea of privileged individual property rights as far as the generation of land for public infrastructure is assured. Therefore, notwithstanding the original purpose of the tool, its use becomes problematic in settings with intricate tenure issues, the presence of renters, and the intertwined formal-informal dynamics.

As local and foreign experts argue, to conceive a planning framework entails the examination of selective references and strong relation with historic trajectories of each country. As Garcia-Bellido asserts in his extensive analysis of the Colombian model:
“The structures and processes of social production of space ... are virtually inimitable, untransferable. They belong to the cultural and social heritage built throughout history in a cumulative process... some superficial structures could be slowly incorporated by diffusion... however, the deep structures underlying sociopolitical and judicial forms in each culture... it is necessary to select critically... and reinvent the contents in order to make them penetrate the receptacle culture... what entails the change in the sociopolitical structure to adapt/adopt the innovation and legitimize it...but being a foreigner what legitimacy do I have for doing this analysis? None. However my interest is that of a Spanish academic with long-term experience in the structure that inspires the new law of territorial planning analogous to the Spanish legislation (1956-92). However, the Colombian government brought many positive corrections and additions... so, my analysis is far from being a neocolonial paternalism or an arrogant European sufficiency”. (1998:119-20)

Therefore, we see that the paradigm change in urban planning in Colombia operates within a long-standing tradition of conceiving universal problems in terms of singular responses using several international references. In this case, the participation of Spanish technocrats in the making of a planning framework16 resulted in the reemergence of postcolonial ties.17

Similar to the Spanish case, Japan has had an even more active relationship with the Colombian government in land management issues.18 The Japanese International Cooperation Agency19 –JICA- began activities in Colombia in 1980 with the Master Plans of Transportation of some cities: Barranquilla and Cartagena in 1980-82 and Bogota in 1995-96. However, the focus of the technical support shifted to how to place Land Readjustment – Kukaku-Seiri – as a mechanism of land contribution against land acquisition for the provision of public facilities. The new area of technical exchange was called “Land Readjustment and Urban Planning” and underwent implementation between 1998 and 2007 in five Andean countries20 led by Dr. Kobayashi. This project involved visits of Japanese experts, intensive courses in Japan of local top public officials

16Despite Ezquiaga’s assessment that “in Spain we don’t have enough developments to put in practice such complex and sophisticated system as you have...” (Intertwined, 10.14. 2010).
17In addition, an increasing number of Colombian professionals in architectArchitecture sought graduate schools mainly in Madrid and Barcelona. The academic influence of the Spanish school had been prevalent in the last two decades.
18Moreover, JICA has had influence in topics related to sanitation and risk and hazard management.
19This agency was established on 1974.
20Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. Moreover, this project has been expanded to some countries in Africa and Asia.
and consultants, and seminars for implementation issues in each country. In Colombia the project had 69 trainees coming from 18 different cities (DNP, 2009). As a result, further developments for regulating large-scale projects through Partial plans and its implementation were directly influenced by the technical assistance of LR.

LR has been operating for over a century in Japan trying to solve a threefold problem: a) to assemble fragmented rural landholdings in an unified development, b) to provide a plan for consolidated areas, and c) to devise mechanisms for capturing increased capital values created by the improvements with minimal budgetary constraints (Hong & Needham, 2007: ix). LR is defined as a “technique of betterment of urban areas through which the form of individual plots is regularized to increase their efficiency for building public infrastructures” (Pinto, 2005: 92). (See Figure 2.) Thus, LR suits the purposes of minimizing public investment and promoting a “voluntary” negotiated exchange of property rights. In that regard, land readjustment mechanisms are comprised of “institutional arrangements for persuading owners to negotiate collectively property transfers with land developers” (Hong & Needham, 2007: 4). Furthermore, the World Bank promoted LR some decades ago as a tool for urban poverty alleviation, as far as it could be linked to improvement of housing and basic urban services (Doebele, 2007). However, the differential agent’s bargaining powers and the protection of non-landowners go unquestioned within this framework.\footnote{The assumption is that "relations can facilitate cooperation between involved parties in LR; yet, if these relations are broken or do not persist, LR agencies will have to depend on law and coercion to force property transfers" (Hong & Needham, 2007: 21).}
The rationale for introducing this tool is that LR has been defined as the most practical scheme for the capture of socially created value for public purposes (Doebele, 2007). The common method used to obtain land for public purposes has been compulsory purchase (i.e., land selling based on property appraisal) or expropriation (i.e., legal involvement in eminent domain). While the former becomes fiscally unviable under local government austerity, the latter remains politically costly; both mechanisms have proved to be neither efficient nor fair (Hong & Needham, 2007). This said, LR suits the purposes of land pooling to self-fund infrastructure based on land value increase resulting from a project.

The sub director of Urban Development and Housing in the National Planning Department acknowledged the influence of JICA in the Colombian legal system:
“Land readjustment is applied with great success in Japan. The LR that is contained in the law [Colombian development law]... was inspired by this Japanese technique as well as by the Spanish “re-plotting”... no matter the name... LR has become a universal technique to improve land management scenarios and improve overall the participation of landowners in urban management taking different adaptations... the Colombian law is a hybrid of those experiences”. (Interviewed on 11.5.2010)

Moreover, top technocratic advisers, in concordance with the principle of equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities, have used the linkages with foreign models:

“Colombia has taken advantage of the opportunity to know the LR practice and to exchange opinions about the applied procedures in their own context. This fact has enabled us to complement our vision about the international experience with regard to the distribution of costs and benefits and to evaluate this model. This is a process of “trial and exploration” that becomes part of an “interesting mestizaje” that has characterized Colombian urbanism.” (Pinto, 2005:104)

Therefore, LR is presented as a method of reconfiguring property relations when obtaining land for public use. Nevertheless, there remains the question of how a tool whose purpose is protecting property rights can promote spatial equity.

Finally, the tool used for land value capture and the observatories of land and real estate are drawn from the French practice used in their process of designing new planning systems. Land value capture is “the appropriation for public purposes of some of the increase in the value of privately-held urban property that results from public decisions and public investments” (Furtado & Smolka, 2002: 76). As the sub director of Urban Development and Housing in the National Planning Department stated:

“We had two great influences from the French cooperative agreement: the first aid was keeping the instrument of land value capture and believe more in its strengths by developing the tool methodologically; even though the instrument was already part of the Urban Land Reform Law (1989). Second, the idea of implementing Land and Real Estate Observatories came from Vincent Renard from the Sorbonne University and Crisol Serra from some municipality in France.... Through the French embassy we could develop these observatories as a further

22 The Observatory is a team working with a technologic platform that collects and analyzes data from multiple sources about trends in territorial development and real estate behavior in order to inform the decision making process in municipalities.
Additionally, other of the top advisers of the territorial development law claimed, “a relevant source of the law was the French Interventionist State School” (Interviewed 10.09.2010). Also the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy had been actively involved since 2003 partnering with local universities for evaluating the implementation of the new planning system, as well as fostering the dissemination of the system and the use of land value capture. Furthermore, the Inter American Bank led in promoting state intervention in downtown revitalization, justifying this intervention on the basis of the intervention’s efficiency in the provision of compact growth patterns and as a site for fostering tripartite partnerships (Rojas, 2004; Fox, 2008). As a result, a growing interest in downtown fringes emerges as sites of potential for unlocking land values in prime real estate locations.

4.2. Enabling conditions for a new spatial planning system

- Decentralization and popular mayor elections (1986)

Colombia experienced a restructuring of national and local government institutions in alignment with the Latin American democratic shift of the 1980’s. These processes emerged as a product of a long-standing centralized state apparatus, changes in the borrowing practices of multilateral agencies, growing urbanization rates, and especially the concomitant social discontent. Unlike the majority of Latin American countries, Colombia suffered a military dictatorship between 1954 and 1957. However, political power was monopolized by a coalition of the Conservative and Liberal parties²³ that alternated the presidency between 1958 and 1974. Simultaneously, the increasing social inequity boosted insurgent social movements, some of which

²³ The National Front, as this period was known, was established by a 1957 amendment of the Colombian 1886 Constitution.
transformed into guerrilla groups, such as FARC, M-19, PRT, EPL, and ELN\textsuperscript{a}. Moreover, the increasing social unrest over the deficiency of public services and infrastructure manifested in more than 252 civil strikes between 1978 and 1988 (UN HABITAT, 2005). As a result, in 1982, the candidates running for president echoed social concerns and offered to compromise so as to foster decentralization in order to legitimate local political forces and to achieve state efficiency.

The peace agreements,\textsuperscript{b} proliferation of traditional parties’ dissidents and the rise of new political movements are evidence of the political system’s transformation (Restrepo, 2002). In turn, these factors showed the erosion of centralism and bipartisanship influencing a deep democratic transformation that crystallized in 1986 with the approval of the popular election\textsuperscript{c} of mayors and governors.\textsuperscript{d} These political changes followed the transformation of legal and institutional frameworks in the fiscal, administrative, and political domains. For instance, 50% of the national income began to be transferred to Departments and Municipalities\textsuperscript{e} (Restrepo, 2002). Likewise, the nation transferred to municipalities the responsibilities of providing infrastructure, economic development, and spatial planning.

In terms of spatial planning, municipalities operated based on outdated zoning practices that were completely disconnected from social and economic planning. Additionally, the planning system was not equipped to deal with the increasing housing deficit and the rise of “informal settlements.” Of relevance is that more than 50 percent of current neighborhoods in Colombian cities have an “illegal” origin and that displacement from rural areas to urban centers keeps rising (UN HABITAT, 2005). In this context, zoning enforcement was impossible.

\textsuperscript{a} FARC: Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces / ELN: Army of National liberation / 
\textsuperscript{b} During the presidency of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). 
\textsuperscript{c} Until 1986, the president appointed governors and they appointed the mayors of each municipality. 
\textsuperscript{d} Law of popular election of mayors and governors (Law 11) and the Code of Municipal Regimes (Decree 1333). 
\textsuperscript{e} In Colombia there are 32 departments (local version of US States) and 1,098 municipalities.
In 1989, the first urban land reform law of was passed after thirteen attempts between 1960 and 1986. The leader of the legal initiative in Congress was the senator Ernesto Samper, who would become the president under which the new spatial planning system was introduced in 1997. The three principles that guided urban land reform law (Law 9°) were: 1) the preservation of public space, 2) the protection of dwellers in areas of renewal, and 3) the protection of citizens from natural hazards. The law introduced the concept of Land Readjustment based on Japanese and Spanish models and defined the nature of urban renewal plans:

“Article 39: Urban renewal plans are the ones aimed to introduce substantial modifications to the land use and the buildings in order to stop physical and environmental decay processes in downtown areas. They seek the betterment of inhabitants’ life quality in renewal areas, the efficient use of installed infrastructure, the rational densification for residential and service areas, the decongestion of urban traffic or the rehabilitation of historic landmarks. All of these actions aim at a more efficient use of urban sites and more benefit for the community”

This legislation was the point of departure for positioning spatial planning as a means of managing the complexity of the fast growing systems in cities. Therefore, the ongoing transformations of the 80’s served as fertile grounds for a broader social movement that urged a new social contract in the midst of the urban crisis.

-Opening of the national economy to global markets (1990)

In concordance with Colombia’s involvement in the structural adjustment policies, a neoliberal doctrine was firmly entrenched by the late 1980’s. The President and the technocratic elite ruling at the time were closely associated with multilateral financial institutions. For instance, President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) acted as an executive director of the World Bank until 1974. These linkages facilitated the introduction of privatization and openings for foreign investments in the name of anti-poverty measures. Nonetheless, President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) “officially”
incorporated Colombia to global markets imports and exports championing his Economic Openness Program in 1990.

This reform entailed economic measures aimed at raising import/export levels, changing regulations on tariffs, maritime ports, currency exchange, taxation, and foreign investment promotion (Castaño, 2002). Perhaps the most relevant domains of the reform were a fiscal austerity package coupled with the introduction of flexibility in labor conditions. As a consequence, the neoliberal restructuring was implemented, notwithstanding precarious social conditions, an incipient industrial sector, and uneven development in the region. The catastrophic results are well known.

As in other Latin American countries, the territorial impacts of this reform also affected land markets, the building industry, and the housing sector. Since the 60’s, the national government had positioned the building industry as the main promoter of economic growth and job generation. Moreover, from the 60’s to the 90’s the absence of mechanisms for land market regulation were notable, promoting land speculation at the local level. However, the reform of the state in early 90’s dismantled the institutions devoted to fostering social housing, strengthening the role of the private sector in the housing credit system and construction (Arango, in Brand, 2001). The new focus of housing policy became housing subsidies based on the individual demands of families with savings capacities. As a result, in the years following the integration of global markets, real estate capital became the new venue of capital accumulation of the new financial order.

At this stage, international agencies further defined a set of global rules that extended “domination without colonies” to assure that financial powers could act in securing a global network (Jessop, 2002). However, this period also represents a time of re-democratization supported by vast social movements that elected several left-wing/social democratic national
governments. Nations have struggled to have national urban policies that go beyond fragmented versions of the urbanization processes (i.e., housing, infrastructure, environment, etc.), opening up new venues for urban space in the political agenda. In addition, local governments embraced decentralization processes in the midst of retrenched clientelism. This process revealed the contradiction of increasingly deregulated markets and the need to regulate urban land markets to increase local revenues.

Latin America presents three overarching trends in land management: prevalence of private property rights (Argentina and El Salvador), prevalence of informality despite reforms (Perú and México), and reforms that seek a balance between private and collective interests (Colombia, Brazil, and Cuba) (Morales, 2003). Nowadays, Latin American cities face the aforementioned cumulative issues, but also the challenges of geographical dispersion of gated communities, retrenched informal settlements, and large-scale redevelopment projects.


The insurmountable problems of inequality, corruption, and drug-traffic prompted a vigorous social movement advocating for the creation of a new Political Constitution. The social turmoil fueled student mobilizations in 1988, calling for a participatory National Constitutional Assembly. As a consequence, in the elections of 1990, a citizens’ initiative included an extra ballot – called the seventh ballot – for achieving legal recognition of the popular will behind changing the Constitution of 1886. In 1991, representatives of several parties and social groups systematically excluded from the political system – such as the indigenous population, Afro-Colombians, and newly reinserted guerrilla members were elected for drafting the new Political Constitution (CP). The main changes proposed involved the introduction of a Social State of Rights and the

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29 During the presidency of Virgilio Barco (1986-1990).
acknowledgement of the multiethnic and cultural plurality of people from the different regions.
Furthermore, the CP gave priority to the municipality as the pivotal administrative unit. Thus, the CP changed the relationship of society and state, impacting the legal and institutional basis for planning and regulation of land property. On the one hand, the CP changed the conception of land property by redefining its function, principles, and regulation. In the Constitution of 1886, land property was considered an absolute right following the civil tradition of law, even though the social function of property was also proclaimed. From this perspective, land property is considered a privilege; thus, it leads to an absence of duty on the part of landowners for the provision of public infrastructure in the urbanization process. In contrast, the new CP considers land property as a right bound to responsibilities following the principle of solidarity (Maldonado, 2002). Following that principle, the 2nd Title proclaims the role of the state in protecting social and collective rights before individual rights. Hence, the chapter of rights, duties, and guarantees (social, economic, and cultural rights) in Article 58 portrays this shift:

“The state guarantees the right of private property and other rights previously acquired according to civil laws, that cannot be at risk by succeeding laws... if a new law results in conflict with individual property rights the public interest shall prevail...Property is a social function that involves obligations and it has an inherent ecologic function... The State shall protect and promote associative and solidarity forms of property... Public need or social interest can motivate eminent domain through legal verdict and just compensation... Legislative power based on equity could determine cases when compensation is not necessary if there is unanimity among members of the legislative body”. (Colombian Congress, National Political Constitution, 1991).

In this way, the CP installs the social and ecological function of property inasmuch as it is linked to the protection of collective rights and promotion of access to social housing. Public space, healthy environment, and historic heritage became then recognized as constitutional collective rights. Moreover, the CP gives the basis for the separation of property rights from development rights (i.e., building and urbanization) as means of favoring the collectivity. In this
partition, the landowner acquires development rights only if he or she assumes responsibilities as defined in the municipal plan (i.e., public amenities and infrastructure provision). Hence, this substantial change opened myriad challenges for local authorities to overcome the limitations of preexisting zoning.

On the other hand, the CP also brought new competencies to local governments for regulating territorial development and positioning participatory processes in planning. In this framework, state entities have a public function to carry out through public services provision. Thus, municipalities not only have the competence to classify land and assign land uses based on land users and owners rights, but also to define the strategic large-scale projects required to meet resident’s needs. Furthermore, the CP defines the guiding principles of the new spatial planning system as: a) democratic participation of individuals in planning decisions, b) the public function of urbanism, c) the social and ecological functions of property, d) the common good prevails over individual interests, and e) the equitable distribution of costs and benefits of development. In sum, the new CP sets the foundations of a new planning system with the promise of a socially progressive reform sparking optimism regarding the transformation of local state practices.

4.3. The Birth of the Territorial Development Law

Spatial strategies at the state level unfolded within an evolving legal, political, and fiscal framework. Colombia adopted a new spatial planning system after 30 years of attempts to pass legal initiatives for a comprehensive urban land reform. Samuel Jaramillo, one of the top advisors in urban economy in the process asserts: “We had 10 or 12 law projects and all of them failed, among other things, because they had a big enemy...the capitalist promoters, the investors that in the beginning were developers. They reacted by aligning with builders to blockade any initiative...” (Interviewed on 11.16.2010). This reform consisted of a transformative project that sought “the
autonomy of municipal governments, the democratic management of cities, the social right to housing, the right to the regularization of consolidated informal settlements...and the need to combat land and property speculation in urban areas” (Fernandes, 2007: 180). As a result, decentralized governments acquired new tools to regulate spatial transformation while urban design quality became more dependent on the real estate investment market.

The opening act for introducing the new planning system was the first urban policy since 1972, when the “Cities within Cities” policy started to respond to the fast growing pace of city growth (Buraglia, 2000). Under President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), the policy ‘Cities and Citizenship’ (1995) became part of the National Development Plan, “The Social Leap.” The urban economist Fabio Giraldo, the Vice Minister of Economic Development at the time, became the key figure in structuring the policy and in passing the legislative initiative. He explained the perspective used for promoting both urban policy and law as follows:

“We were a government that promoted an alternative model in Latin America...We proposed strong regulation and intervention in the market...an alternative to central planning and the simplistic view of neoliberalism... the social function of property means the primacy of the collective use of the land as an asset... It is a constitutional framework for a market economy guided by mixed economy principles... the political economic argument is the most relevant for seeking to break socio-spatial asymmetries...” (Interviewed on 11.14.2010)

This perspective reflects inspiration from the new constitutional principles and a concern to address inequality and segregation by regulating land use. The optimism of a new socio-democratic government dismissed the impacts of neoliberal agendas in extremely unequal societies such as Colombia.

The conceptual framework of “Cities and Citizenship” provided a guide for the state in meeting the challenges of spatial regulations for a global market economy. This framework emerged as a response to several decades of inadequate urban planning practices and uncoordinated sector-related policies that led to a general weakening of the planning system.
The city was conceptualized as an “organized totality” (MDE, 1995: 47) and a “meritorious good of public consumption par excellence, being both the setting for an active exercise of fundamental public rights and the management for handling possible conflicts” (MDE, 1995: 27). As a consequence, the city was defined in terms of a set of attributes such as land, transportation, housing, public space, services, and infrastructure; and dimensions, such as the economic, social, environmental, political, and cultural (MDE, 1995). Furthermore, this policy emphasized the role of the city as an arena for exercising constitutional rights, giving it an active role in the production of citizenship and legitimating planning through public participation. Thus, the overall approach is summed up in the phrase: “The market where possible and the state where necessary” (MDE, 1995: 81). Therefore, “Cities and Citizenship” offered a technocratic framework to address the complexity of the city, bringing back the relevance of the spatial dimension of “development” long neglected by an economic planning bias.

The urban land reform law (1989), the new constitution (1991), and the Cities and Citizenship urban policy (1995) were the foundations for a new legal framework for spatial planning. The Law of Territorial Development (LTD), passed in 1997, crystallized a set of principles for guiding an emergent planning practice in tune with the process of decentralization. Five of the most salient principles that guided the territorial planning system were:

- **The social and ecological function of property**: This principle indicates the intrinsic contents of property whose use and transformation are contingent to social needs and environmental asset protection. Private property obligations and limitations are legitimized in terms of collective rights such as a healthy environment and housing with dignity.

- **The common good prevails over the individual interest**: Individual interests become
subordinated in cases where the provision of public amenities, infrastructure, or open spaces is necessary. However, local states could compensate private owners, depending on the case. By the same token, it becomes mandatory to transfer private land for public purposes in urbanization processes according to the Plan’ standards.

- *Equitable distribution of costs and benefits of development:* This principle relies on the implicit value of solidarity in the production of urban spaces and the equal treatment of citizens. It seeks to make participation in the gains derived from urban growth more balanced. For instance, if the plan defines areas for urban growth, the collectivity needs to participate in the surplus land value generated by the planning designation. In this case, landowners need to give back to the collectivity part of that exceptional gain through the provision of public amenities and reserved areas for affordable housing.

- *The public function of urbanism:* This principle supports efforts to offer access to land, housing, and public facilities. The state should grant the rights to promote a rational use of the territory, to maintain the preservation of cultural and natural heritage, and to offer security of settlement in hazardous site areas.

- *Democratic participation of individuals in planning decisions:* Citizen involvement in the planning process is meant to be permanent, from the plan formulation stage to implementation, and even in the permit request process. It is a duty of local governments to guide planning decisions based on open and transparent processes with communities and all stakeholders.

The LTD creates a two-tier spatial planning system. Thus, two levels of planning tools frame the decision-making process in spatial decisions: the territorial development plan (POT) for the whole municipality and the partial plans (PP) for strategic large-scale projects. The purpose of the POT is
to coordinate under a “shared territorial vision” three domains of regulation: private (i.e., parcel-by-parcel), public-private (i.e., strategic large-scale urban projects), and public (i.e., public infrastructure). The POT defines the municipal land classification and indicates the purpose and location of strategic urban projects to be implemented through partial plans. Partial plans implement and complement the general plan’s goals and define operational steps to achieve the long-term vision of the spatial transformation expected (see Section 4.4).

Table V. Colombian Institutional framework for planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Planning instruments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>National Planning Department</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Council on Economic and Social Policy</td>
<td>National Social Policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development</td>
<td>National Decrees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Autonomous Environmental Corporation</td>
<td>Regional Environmental Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Secretary of Planning</td>
<td>Departmental Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>Metropolitan Area</td>
<td>Integral Plan of Metropolitan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Administrative Department of Planning</td>
<td>Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plan of Territorial Development (12 years)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipal Development Plan (4 years)</td>
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</table>

For the first time every municipality had to formulate a POT. Unlike previous national initiatives, this time enforcement was linked to the fiscal transfers of central government. The transfers were put on hold until the regional environmental authority and the local city council or the mayor approved the POT. Hence, between 1998 and 2004, almost 90% of all municipalities had a POT approved (DNP, 2005). In addition to a new challenge for ill-equipped municipalities, the coordination with a relatively nascent cross-scale institutional structure and planning competencies had become contested (See figure 3). Despite the limitations in POT formulation and the severe obstacles to its implementation, this process constituted an advance in establishing a

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8 Using the land classification categories inspired in the Spanish model.
11 The scope and complexity of the plan varies depending upon the population size: the ranges were less than 30,000, between 30,000 and 100,000, and more than 100,000.
spatial planning culture. The emergence of this practice opened new participatory channels to shape planning outcomes. However, on the one hand, social involvement in the decision making process legitimized local plans; but, on the other hand, elite interests also had greater visibility when formulating comprehensive plans, and landowners more “voice” when negotiating partial plans.

A POT contains a set of objectives, policies, strategies, goals, programs, and norms that drive the physical development and land use of the municipality’s management. In other words, the plan determines where, when, and how the spatial transformation takes place. Land classification hierarchy is related to the components of territorial development plans as follows (See figure 4):

- **Structural norms**: These are norms of the first hierarchical level that are defined over the terms of three mayoral periods. The vision of the desired future defines the key spaces that need to be preserved, transformed, and consolidated. In addition, the vision guides the type and location of public structural systems at municipal and regional levels such as public utilities, mobility infrastructure, public facilities, and public space. Land classification defines the growth patterns and boundaries of service areas shaping land values and the mechanisms to manage differently each area. The categories of land classification are: urban land, urban expansion areas, rural land, suburban areas, and protected areas (ecological and historic reserves for infrastructures). Finally, the definition of strategic large-scale projects belongs also to this normative level.

- **General norms**: These norms belong to the second hierarchical level and could be modified after two mayoral periods. These norms also define the public structural systems at the urban level. Moreover, territorial planning units are designated based on morphological, socioeconomic, and

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32 Urban expansion areas require partial plans for their development.
environmental features in order to achieve the image of the future. Depending upon the type of transformation trends, these units are given a particular urban treatment and are determined for each sector. The types of “treatments” include renewal (used in high rent areas but environmentally/functionally/socially deteriorated sites with vulnerable populations); preservation (used mainly in historic areas), redevelopment (used in obsolete industrial areas generally without residents); integral betterment (used in settlements of an informal nature); consolidation (areas whose transformation is acceptable and in line with the model of city); and development (for areas not provided with infrastructure and suitable for new growth districts). Treatments determine Floor Area Radio (FAR), density, and intensity. The aspects related to use (zoning) are subsumed within the units of urban treatment.

- Complementary norms: These norms belong to the third hierarchical level and could be changed in one mayoral period. This level included the delimitation of priority development land, designation of affordable housing districts, and the guidelines for formulating partial plans. Urban expansion areas and renewal areas require development through partial plans using judicial and financial land management tools such as LR and land value capture.

This legal framework brought new competencies to local governments despite the lack of technical expertise for conducting this new task. Nonetheless, the foundations for entitling collective rights turned into a contested arena as the constitutional concept of property blurs the rights and responsibilities of non-landowners in the process of urbanization and renewal. Despite the shortcomings of the legal framework, the LTD constituted a deep shift in the planning practice from a centralized lot-by-lot regulation to a comprehensive participatory regulation. However, the

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33 Renewal areas also require partial plans for their development through associative management of land; otherwise those areas designated as renewal areas cannot be transformed through individual interventions.

34 The types of uses designated in urban areas are residential, institutional, retail and business, industrial, services, and mixed.
LTD was a product of a vast negotiation among political sectors. The main negotiation strategy was to align powerful figures in Congress and use the credibility of the leader of the initiative with the main opponents of the law project.

Figure 3. Territorial Development Plan Structure

![Territorial Development Plan Structure](image)

Source: Based on Garcia, 2006

The Vice Minister of Economic Development explained the conjunction of tactics for achieving the LTD approval:

“The law was passed because I was the Vice President of CAMACOL [The National Association of Developers and Builders] and I was appointed as Vice Minister of Economic Development. I think five situations contributed to the passage of the law: 1) the minister was Rodrigo Marin Bernal from the conservative party; he exerted a big influence in Congress. 2) The 8000 process” took away attention to other issues. 3) The “presenter” of the law – the president of the 3rd commission – is Juan Martin Caicedo Ferrer who had empathy with the topic. 4) Holguin

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8 The “8000 process” is the name of a judiciary investigation for drug-traffic funding in the presidential campaign.
Sardi, the director of CAMACOL, agreed. 5) Private appraisers could present the land appraisal for expropriation purposes.” (Interviewed on 10.14.2010)

In the same vein, a top adviser of the process explains the tactics for passing the law:

“We selected a spokesperson in the senate that was not representing the big landlords and could not be influenced by developers for passing the law...we also kept a low profile; we did not allow too much scrutiny about the content of the law... I already knew the dynamic in Congress... I knew that if we could bring to our side Victor Renan Barco, the Congress oracle, we could pass the law…” (Interviewed on 10.20.2010)

In sum, more than the technical justifications for approving the LTD were the connections of the technocratic team with influential politicians who determined the changes in the national legal planning framework. Simultaneously, the key nodes of knowledge belong to praxis communities that reenact and adapt the symbolic aspirations of international experiences within the messy realities on the ground as Peck & Theodore (2010) describe. LTD contents were derived from assembling local and international references in an innovative fashion. Hence, the LTD sets the bargaining framework for negotiating large-scale projects through partial plans.

4.4. **Partial Plans: the tool to implement large-scale projects**

The partial plan (PP) became a land management tool that enabled urban design, land readjustment, and self-funding mechanisms for large-scale urban projects. Land management instruments were introduced to pursue spatial justice through mechanisms and tools that, when systematically applied, allowed for the financing of public works, the acquisition of private land for projects of municipal benefit, municipal intervention in land parcel structures, and the distribution of benefits (rights) and costs (responsibilities) derived from urban development (Maldonado, 2003). In renewal areas, PPs enabled parcel assembly in sites of highly fragmented land ownership, attempted to reduce financial pressures to local governments by funding public infrastructures, and facilitated equal sharing of the benefits and costs of the project among the agents involved. The aspects of PPs that are open to negotiation include: a) Urban design strategies – the divisions of
public and private spaces, urban programs, density, building types, etc; b) Land pooling/assemblage – land readjustment (LR) based on a new definition of property rights and boundaries for parcel assembly; and c) financing strategies – distribution of costs and benefits of the project based on the land value increment resulting from the project. Therefore, PPs offered a negotiated approach for coordinating planning, land management, financing, and urban design at the urban district level.

According to the Law of Territorial Development (Law 388/1997), partial plans are defined as follows:

“Article 19. PARTIAL PLANS. Partial plans are the instruments through which POT dispositions are developed and complemented. Partial plans will be used in new growth areas and in all the areas that need to be developed through urban units of intervention, macro projects, or other special urban interventions... A partial plan would include at least:

1) The delimitation and characteristics of the urban intervention or the minimum unit of intervention.
2) The precise definition of the objectives and the urban guidelines of the urban intervention in terms of construction rights, generation and betterment of public space, the quality of the environment, the alternatives for expansion, integral betterment or renewal; the stimulus to owners and investors to facilitate the negotiation process of land readjustment or building assembly or other mechanisms for the equitable distribution of costs and benefits; the programs and projects for assuring the objects...
3) The urban norms for the intervention, considering: land use, densities, heights, floor area ratios, so on.
4) The definition of the public space layout and the local mobility networks, the layout of public utilities networks, the location of collective facilities of public interest such as churches, schools, health centers, and green areas designed for parks. All the ones defined in the general plan.
5) All the complementary dispositions for achieving the objectives of the urban intervention.
6) The adoption of the land management tools for land value capture (plusvalia), distribution of costs and benefits, funding procedures for urbanization works and execution program...” Law 388/1997

This instrument allows for the participation of investors, landowners, real estate agents, and developers in large-scale projects where public resources are going to be involved (Maldonado et al., 2006). The initiative to lead these projects is no longer exclusive of local governments and

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This type of urban intervention is used for rehabilitating “informal settlements.”
opens a venue for private as well community agents to lead them. Thus, PPs attempt to constitute public-private partnerships for steering strategic large-scale urban projects.

Figure 4. Structure of partial planning instruments

Partial plans in Colombia embodied the new spatial planning system principles for the formulation of large-scale urban projects. In particular, the principle of equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities guides PP according to the LDT:

“Article 38: In development of the principle of citizens’ equality for the norms, partial plans as instruments that complement and develop the Territorial Development Plans, they should define the mechanisms that guarantee the equitable distribution of costs and benefits derived from urban planning among the affected agents”

On the one hand, “responsibilities” included the provision of land and the construction of public infrastructure if required. On the other hand, “rights” are conceived as the economic benefits derived from land use, densities, and floor area ratios defined in the project. At a detailed level,
urbanization obligations would consist of: a) land contribution for local systems of public streets, utilities, public spaces, and amenities; b) construction of secondary level systems of utilities, streets, parks, and amenities; and c) costs pertaining to primary level public utilities and street systems.

The objectives of an equitable distribution involved two aspects: first, to guarantee funding urbanization costs based on the increments of land prices produced by the project, and second, the financial strategy should be developed giving equitable treatment to the landowners involved, each receiving equivalent profit proportional to land area owned regardless of its final use (i.e., public systems or private spaces) (Maldonado et al., 2006; Todtmann, 2009).

Partial plans provide a tool for obtaining redistributive gains from private revenues generated by large-scale renewal projects in central areas. This rationale delegates the responsibility of the urbanization process to landowners rather than developers. Moreover, land value increments derived from the project are expected to cover the total costs of the intervention. As a consequence, the state acknowledged that public decisions, such as the ones contained in plans, produce land value increments enabling funding of large-scale projects. Thus, partial plans attempted to facilitate the cost sharing of project benefits and costs among local governments, developers, and landowners. In other words, partial plans attempted to link public good and private gain within urban districts through “compulsory negotiation” or collective bargaining.

The partial plan makes feasible a large-scale urban project through a set of real estate projects that determine the phasing of the intervention. Operatively, partial plans function as a “project of projects” (Bocanegra, 2006) because it is only through smaller ”spatial units” called units of urban intervention (UAU) that rights and responsibilities can be distributed (See Figure 5). These UAU are developed through different ways to transform parcel structure, either by land readjustment, building integration or participant cooperation. Once the partial plan is approved,
each UAU to be executed requires the approval of those owning more than 51 percent of the area. Reluctant owners are subject to eminent domain if necessary. UAU represents a real estate project that includes a set of parcels where the building density and lucrative uses are assigned in proportion to the public infrastructure required. In any case, the changes in parcel structure through LR\textsuperscript{7} is inherently necessary in renewal projects to generate more public space, increase urban quality but at the same time increase densities and land values and property taxes.

Figure 5. Partial Plan Approval Process

The physical configuration of space depends crucially on the negotiation between agents. Furthermore, areas designated for partial plans cannot be transformed (i.e., issue building permits) unless the plan is approved. It is only through this approval that space can be transformed. That is why agents involved in the process need to expedite the negotiation process to make the space more profitable and to change uses and densities. PPs have been used mainly for large-scale projects for urban expansion in peripheral areas and for renewal in downtown fringes. The

\textsuperscript{7} Land management instruments for PP execution also include variations of Spanish-Japanese land readjustment: integration of built areas and participant cooperation.
National Department of Planning identified more than 253 partial plans active covering more than 7.174 Ha (DNP, 2010). In 2000, over 4,000 hectares of downtown fringes in major Colombian cities have been designated as urban renewal areas to be redeveloped using PPs. As of 2010, 32 partial plans of renewal, of the 95 in the negotiation process, have been approved in 13 cities (DNP, 2010).

The rising numbers in initiatives for formulating PP of renewal (PPR) is linked to their emphasis in urban policy. Urban renewal is the linchpin strategy for the National Urban Policy 2002 -2010 called “Compact and Sustainable Cities.” The policy attempts to promote mixed-use developments, higher densities, increased public spaces, strength if transit systems, and promotion of efficient uses of infrastructure (DNP, 2003). In order to implement this policy, the national government has created an urban renewal program that “... seeks the recuperation of areas located in downtown areas of the main cities of the country that have undergone a deterioration process...the use of partial plans as land management tools are required...” (www.minambiente.gov.co retrieved in 2008). The compact cities policy is expected to reverse the trend of peripheral growth, boost local construction, and generate additional tax revenue. I argue that three objectives guide partial plans in downtown renewal: ensuring revenue flows from investment to fund public infrastructure, attracting investors to bring streams of economic development, and reducing “illegal” and informal economic activities that can undermine the exchange value of properties.

Central areas in most Latin American cities are the settings of intricate customary ownership fragmentation, low-income renters, and intertwined informal/formal activities taking place in public spaces. However, the partial plan privileges landowners’ interests, and its implementation need to be made in areas of highly informal appropriation, multiple use
saturation, and concentration of vulnerable populations. Thus, informality is a critical feature of downtown interventions. As a result, social costs and non-landowners involvement become contentious issues since the legal framework does not address explicitly the mechanisms for dealing with them. Hence, the negotiations of partial plans emerge as the embodiment of urban land reform challenges.

Renewal areas become spaces of exception. In these areas, not only is control over space taken by alternative sources of power, but also the legal system treats them through a special spatial regulation using partial plans. Partial plans enable venues of flexible regulation where the agreements over space intervention are negotiated among public, private, and community agents. Thus, “the characteristic of flexibility is the key to understanding the dynamics of urban politics in the global era...in contrast with the rigidity of modernist planning” (Shatkin, 2011: 83). In this context, local governments are increasingly relying on public-private deal making for large-scale redevelopment projects as a means for delivering what they want from the market. Thus, Partial Plans attempt to change the lot configuration, produce higher densities, and create new public spaces.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I described the mechanisms and events that gave rise to a new bargaining framework for large-scale projects in Colombia. The LTD emerged as an assemblage of local and foreign references shaping new spatial planning practices in Colombia. The chapter emphasizes the transnational nature of planning practice and its links to the role of Latin America in macro institutional political economy. Furthermore, it shows a long-term tradition of postcolonial circulation of knowledge as a basis for institutional and legal framework transformations.

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38 Groups linked to common delinquency, the paramilitary, and guerrillas.
Nonetheless, the LTD merges both the implementation of the logic of private-public partnership in strategic locations and a promise of progressive planning in the terms of the new constitution. As a result, the new state spatial strategy for fostering territorial circuits of capital uses the discourse of spatial equity and the protection of collective rights and participation.

In sum, table VI (See table attached) presents a timeline portraying the most salient planning international references, institutional changes, and the evolution of the legal framework. Based on those events, I have defined five phases in the trajectories of urban planning in Colombia: 1) the period of modernization and developmentalism (1940 – 1970) which begins a tradition of exchange of foreign visitors and local technocracies, ranging from physical to economic planning; 2) the democratic transition and crisis of zoning codes (1980 – 1991) which entails a strengthening of local government competencies in planning, and brings in the new challenges of an open economy; 3) the assemblage of a territorial planning system (1992- 1997), resulting in a response at the national level to the process of decentralization, democratization, and globalization; 4) redeployment of territorial planning (1998- 2003), which becomes the process of adaptation of local governments to an emergent planning practice; and 5) the implementation and revision of the territorial planning system (2004- 2011), which introduced the balance of a decade of system change and the increasing relevance of partial plans.

PPs become the pivotal policy mechanism to trace the contemporary history of Colombian urbanism. This model of planning reenacts post-colonial relations to frame space-based interests and reasserts the relevance of those linkages in space production. I have portrayed the enabling conditions and socio-spatial trajectories of the new planning system that serves as agents’ leverage to mobilize their interests inasmuch as space regulation through transnational flows of policy foster territorial circuits of capital. Therefore, I have argued partial plans embody the transnational flows
of planning models to target prime real estate locations.

The following chapters explain the local redeployment of the bargaining framework in two cases of partial plans of renewal: Ciudad Victoria in Pereira and Corazon de Jesus in Medellin. Chapter fifth and sixth focus on the local spatial trajectories of downtown fringes targeted for the large-scale projects of renewal. In particular, the upcoming chapters explore agents’ negotiation strategies and tactics to mobilize their interest to shape space. These strategies emphasize the political positioning of the project, the treatment of vulnerable populations, the land market conditions and the resulting spatial arrangement. In sum, I compare the new discursive and spatial practices configuring an emergent planning practice in the Colombian cities of Medellin and Pereira.
Figure VI. Colombia’s Planning Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>International Influences</th>
<th>Institutional Changes</th>
<th>Legal Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Le Corbusier visit - Werner &amp; Sal - NY Town Planning Associates Plans - 1st World Bank Mission - L. Curre</td>
<td>Creation National Department of Planning</td>
<td>Regulator Plans for main cities (Law 88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>World Bank - Economic survey</td>
<td>National Council of Planning</td>
<td>‘Operacion Colombia Plan’ - Luchin Curre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>World Bank - Transportation survey</td>
<td>Colombian Society of Planners</td>
<td>Urban Development law - Integral Development Plans (Law 641)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
<td>Peace agreement - New political parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>JICA - Transportation infrastructure projects</td>
<td>Political Decentralization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Virgilio Barco</td>
<td>Mayoral Popular election</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Democratic transition and Modernization and developmentaldemysticization</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Open country to international markets</td>
<td>New National Constitution</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>Compulsory Development Plans for municipalities (Law 152)</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>Creation of Environmental Regional Authorities - Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>National Environmental Protection System</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Cesar Gaviria</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Technical cooperation with Spain</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>Creation of Regional Councils of Social and Economic Development (CORPES)</td>
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<td>1995</td>
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<td>Urban Policy: Cities and Citizenship</td>
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5. Ciudad Victoria: Mayoral Political Platform

Introduction

This chapter discusses the negotiation of the publicly led partial plan of Ciudad Victoria in Pereira. The first section explains the trajectories of planning rationalities for targeting urban renewal in downtown fringes. The second section presents the actors, their interests, and leverage for influencing the negotiation. The third section depicts the negotiation strategies and tactics used to shape space. Finally, the fourth section examines the negotiated final agreement and its implications for the implementation of the urban land reform. I argue Ciudad Victoria PP served as a mayoral political platform favoring foreign capital at the expense of dispersing vulnerable populations.

I employ data from interviews of actors involved in the negotiation process and archival data from public documents and media reports.

“Strategy has the goal of enduring a provisional domination”
(Riou in Crampton & Elder, 2007:36)
I provide evidence of how space-based interests’ mobilization defines urban form and land management practices in Pereira today. Furthermore, I focus on revealing the rationalities of power embedded in the space-based discursive practices from the agents’ perspective. This chapter explores how planners’ attitudes towards informalities, mayoral involvement, land speculation controls and representations of community interests determine the type of actors’ negotiation strategies and tactics. As a result, I present how the logic of public-private schemes for unlocking land values in prime real estate locations operates in Ciudad Victoria.

Ciudad Victoria has become the most visited urban site in the Coffee Zone region of Colombia. In Pereira, a mid-sized city in the center of the region, a vibrant new center is rising with generous open and green spaces that promote recreational and cultural activities and is surrounded by institutional and commercial facilities. The traditional city market area was the most prosperous and dynamic in the city (See Figure 7). However, the activities associated to the market operations were a source of social controversy, as the previous director of the Urban Renewal Corporation, Architect Bedoya, explained:

“Ciudad Victoria has a history of more than forty years trying relocate the city market building... because it became a bad influence in the sense that the city market more than being an element in the food distribution it became the encounter point between the countryside and the city... and those rural services of cantinas, sex workers and so on created a bad environment but until the last day the city market was functioning well...but it was a black hole in the core of the city” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010)

Four decades ago, the area of the old city market entered a process of urban decline, as have many other city public market areas in Colombia. Pereira’s market area became known for the illegal activities that took place there. Over time, vulnerable groups, such as sex workers, homeless individuals, street vendors, and orphans, came to occupy this space.
Several issues converged to intensify this area’s deterioration. In 1999, an earthquake hit the region and destroyed the building that served as the focal point of the old city market, and the international price of coffee decreased affecting agricultural production. Since 1965, multiple renewal projects were proposed; however, the lack of political leadership and land management tools rendered public involvement ineffective. In 2001, a French-Colombian big box retailer chain wanted to open shop in Pereira; at the same time, a new female mayor was elected who had run on the political platform of renewing the area. Once in office, she moved expediently to produce a proposal that received the award for best practice in spatial planning in the country, issued by the Colombian Society of Architects in 2004 (see Figure 8).

5.1. Mapping Pereira's government rationalities

The Master Plans from 1958, 1966 and 1979 identified the need for urban renewal in the city market surroundings (See Figure 9). In 1966, the local government allowed the use of public streets for parking and street vending. Meanwhile the construction of the Ferrocarril Avenue started to segregate downtown from San Jose neighborhood next to the city market (Giraldo,
The first regulations about nightclubs and motels were defined in the 1970’s. During the 1980’s and 1990’s several planning sought alternatives for large-scale projects to be developed in the city market area. The earthquakes of 1995 and 1999 forced the municipality to prompt actions to intervene the area. The city then turned to urban renewal that at that point had become the tool systematically used to enforce government rationalities in downtown fringes.

Figure 9. City market surroundings during the 50’s and 60’s

The most relevant plans proposed for the area were:

- **First renewal project in the city market area, 1980-1982**

  The Planning Department hired Architect Orajanegra to lead the plan of urban renewal.

  The area was characterized as suffering from obsolescence that prevented the opportunities for expanding downtown. The indicators justifying the designation of this area for urban renewal were environmental deterioration, low building density, the unacceptable quality of infrastructure, strategic location, and inappropriate land uses (Giraldo, 2003). This plan followed the Urban Renewal definition devised in the 1979 plan: “Urban renewal entails the change of obsolete and inadequate areas of the city seeking to enable the required conditions for the betterment of urban
activities” (Mendoza & Olarte, 1979). This plan validated the idea that insecurity and obsolescence were barriers to economic activities.

Figure 10. Urban Renewal Plan – Pereira 1980-2

The plan defined a priority intervention area of 19.4 hectares. As Figure 11 shows the main interventions proposed included turning the city market building into a cultural civic center, generating a network of commercial passages, creating a pedestrian corridor at 15th street, and a vehicular connection N-S at 14th street. Funding for the project was to be provided by a national credit from the Central Bank of Mortgages and the local Urban Renewal Corporation. Nevertheless, the project was not executed. However, the plan raised private sector expectations about a state-led project relocating the city market.

-Downtown Development Plan – 1984

In 1984, The Urban Development Corporation of Pereira drafted a plan for the entire downtown. The plan explained downtown deterioration as a product of the fast pace of demographic growth,
deficient infrastructure, the high concentration of economic activities, inappropriate use of public space (i.e. street vendors, traffic, transit terminals), and the deterioration of the building stock (Giraldo, 2003). This plan sought to boost traditional activities through a new marketing model for the area and to improve the services offered to the peasants visiting the area. The plan targeted 27 blocks for intervention, keeping the same delimitation of the 1980-2 urban renewal plan and including another area Olaya Herrera (See figure 11).

Figure 11. Downtown Development Plan 1984

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002

In particular, this plan emphasized rings for vehicular circulation, an axis of pedestrian connections, social services, and bus transportation terminals. Implementation involved National
funding sources for renewal and also the use of the tool of valorization” [valorizacion] for development of the transportation infrastructure. The plan coordinator looking for public opinion and political support framed the plan benefits as:

“This urban renewal plan is very ambitious, it will bring innumerable economics and social benefits for the city...it makes us foresee great chances for building companies and the city along the way with the generation of jobs. Thus, in order not to waste time City Council approval is required”. (Newspaper La Tarde, January 27th, 1984)

In this plan, the urban renewal process is linked to the promotion of the building sector as source of jobs generation. However, only one commercial center was built following the plan, and the rest was not executed. Altogether, this plan pointed out the need to preserve and plan for rural-urban relations; yet, it left out the mechanisms to achieve this.

- Plan Procentro 1992-1993

Figure 12. Plan Procentro 1992-3

Source: Giraldo, 2003

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This tool was introduced in 1921 in Colombia; it consists in funding public infrastructure charging a special contribution to the landowners that benefit the most from it.
In 1992, The Urban Development Corporation of Pereira associated with PROCENTRO—a new public institution—formulated a new urban renewal plan for the area. This plan focused on social and economic alternatives for tackling the city market area problems. The plan defined renewal as:

“The process through which the municipality and the private sector change land uses completely or partially in deteriorated or inadequately used areas. The changes must lead to an appropriate destination for public and public uses according to the needs of modernization, reconstruction, beautification or sanitation of the city” (Procentro, 1993).

The plan emphasized: a) changes in the institutional structure including a cooperative for addressing the needs of low wage workers; b) creation of a boulevard in the Egoya channel to provide public space and mitigate environmental impacts; c) development of a Commercial Center to attract housing and services to the area, and d) the widening of 14th and 13th streets (Giraldo, 2003). In contrast with the previous plans, this one limits radical transformation to the Egoya Boulevard and attempts smaller interventions near Ferrocarril Avenue (See Figure 12). The vehicular infrastructure was the only part that was executed using the tool of valorization and national funds. In sum, this plan expanded the purposes of urban renewal and included public and private uses as well as social programs as constitutive of this type of interventions.

- **Urban Renewal Pereira Plan 1995**

In 1995, the Urban Renewal Corporation formulated a new plan in the nine blocks considered most physically and socially critical for intervention after the earthquake. This plan articulated social, economic and urban design aspects using tools from the Urban Land reform law (Law 9th/1989). It differed from the previous in its focus on urban design and urban Architecture as shown in Figure 14. Moreover, following this plan, a decree designated 34 blocks for urban renewal and declared the 13 blocks surrounding the city market were as public interest (Alcaldía de Pereira,

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Egoya channel is a body of water that was filled in and built above.
This plan introduced urban design in the public discussion; still, despite the declared urgency, the plan was not executed due to limited funding sources.

Figure 13. Renovacion Pereira Plan 1995

As a response to the 1999 earthquake, a coalition of entities formed the Urban Management Workshop. Using resources from the Foundation for the Reconstruction of the Coffee Axis - FOREC to give advise to a coalition of local public, academic and private entities. This initiative was aimed at guiding the territorial planning of the municipalities affected by the earthquake. Even though Pereira formulated its Municipal Territorial Plan (POT) in early 2000, massive destruction occurred after the plan's approval. In the POT the city market area was also declared as renewal area – this time using partial plans (see next section).
This new attempt defined a large-scale urban project called "Galeria-Egoya". The main problems that the project sought to solve were: a) high levels of physical deterioration derived from the state of ruin of several buildings; b) the extreme conditions of social marginality of its residents involved in illegal and informal business; c) the stagnation of real estate values and developer

\[\text{It was approved through the Decree 3991/2000}\]
interest; d) the reduction of residential uses downtown. The plan focused on situating the area within the regional economy, addressing the environmental imperatives of the site, and identifying financial strategies to fund the projects included.

The main interventions proposed were the cultural center at the site of the city market, a public park in front of it and a shopping center linked to a new transit system line defined in the POT (See Figure 14). Moreover, the plan defined an intervention area of 34 blocks for development through a set of five partial plans. The plan introduced the notion of urban project associated to partial plans derived from the Spanish and French academic and legal influences of the coordinator team. It plan justified the intervention by the severity of the earthquake impacts but also on the basis of the informal and illegal activities taking place in the area that had been reported for over two decades.

The new plan reflected the long-term attempts of the municipality to transform the old city market area. The municipality continued using the notion of urban renewal as the pivotal tool for dismantling unwanted uses and users posing a threat to security and real estate development or values. However, this notion varied over time, shifting the focus of the discourses and the type of spatial interventions required. These changes range from framing the area in terms of obsolescence to defining it as a threat due to the ruin brought up by the earthquake. Likewise renewal was articulated as a jobs generation opportunity associated with the building industry, and as environmental remediation and public space generation. Moreover, land uses had been described as inadequate in the 80’s and as informal and illegal in the latest stage.

The plans continued to press the need to relocate the city market, improve pedestrian and vehicular accessibility, and make a radical transformation in at least nine blocks. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the intervention area, the funding mechanisms, and the strategy for addressing social
concerns were contested each time. The plans also reflect permanent institutional changes for intervention of downtown. The planning system operating prior to the Territorial Development Law had as major limitations the proposed funding strategies and land property interventions.

- The Territorial Municipal Plan –POT- 2000

Figure 15. Territorial Urban Strategies POT 2000

Through a participatory process, the Municipal Territorial Plan was formulated in 2000 in concordance with the new planning system. The plan vision for the future depicts downtown as the center of commercial, services and touristic activities in the Mid West Metropolitan Area. For achieving this purpose, the main territorial strategy sought to extend the traditional downtown incentivizing: a) Decentralization of uses from the traditional downtown; b) redevelopment of areas for new public amenities; c) limitation of recreational uses in the old city market surroundings; and d) promotion of residential and commercial uses around the Egoya channel (Giraldo, 2003). The

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira, 2000

\[\text{The Pereira's City Council approved it through the Ordinance 18 in 2000.}\]
area of the old city market - already relocated - was inscribed within a broader urban scheme of intervention as a crucial site for expanding the traditional downtown (See Figure 16).

The location of the main large-scale projects and the rationale justifying it sought the expansion and consolidation of the downtown area as well as the incorporation of land for new urban growth in environmentally appropriate areas. The POT in its article 508 designated the old city market area as a partial plan of renewal:

“The old city market is a Zone linked with the traditional downtown with high physical, environmental, and social deterioration and environmental restrictions imposed by the Egoya channel. This area must include one or several partial plans of renewal for the purpose of generation of public space... and serves as a connection with the traditional downtown... involving residential, cultural and administrative activities.” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2000)

In 2010, although 18 partial plans of urban expansion have been approved, only 9 partial plans within the urban area are in the process of implementation (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2010). Partial plans became a tool for activating land markets and real estate activity habilitating more than 800 h for new urbanization processes and 45 ha for redevelopment. Once again Urban Renewal is the discourse used to intervene downtown areas in order to maximize the efficiency of land occupation patterns. The history of planning initiatives in downtown Pereira had operated as a ‘style of thought’ (Foucault, 1997) that privilege the discourse of urban renewal for its ability to articulate agents’ interests over real estate development. The public interests agenda in downtown fringes is linked to the whole structural system of public amenities and the State ownership of land in areas of ‘decay’. In particular, the old city market area played a relevant role in the provision of metropolitan level amenities in the five public systems defined in the POT:

a) Transit system: the partial plan area includes one station of the new integrated transit system - MEGABUS-, the connections of the vehicular central ring, and the pedestrian network N-S.
b) Environmental system: the Egoya channel requires a box culvert and a protective green strip for preventing seismic impacts in the surrounding areas.

c) Public utilities system: the Egoya channel is a significant element in the ‘Centro - Otun - Consota’ circuit of sewage waters for the metropolitan area.

d) Public space system: the renewal area is expected to contribute to the city as a whole with more public space either as a civic plaza or a green park.

e) Collective amenities system: Since the 80’s the site where the old city was located was targeted for a metropolitan cultural center using public land.

Despite the plan, the mayor influenced this public agenda and the allocation of development rights as an anchor for foreign investment. In the next sections I explain the agents’ interests and their profile.

5.2 Agents’ profile and interests

- Local government

Pereira’s mayor, Martha Bedoya (2001-2003), from the traditional Liberal party, was the first female leader to win the city’s municipal elections. The mayor herself led the public initiative of renewal, and hired a new staff to expedite the crafting of the partial plan. She advanced a new institutional configuration including an office dealing directly with partial plans; at the same time she appointed two other women to direct the planning department and as technical coordinator of partial plans. The new staff, as well as the mayor, had a business-oriented profile. After an extended period of failed attempts to intervene in the old city market area, the project became a personal challenge to shift the decline dynamic towards one of prosperity. The “Ciudad Victoria” project was used to demonstrate good governance by attracting private capital to renew the city market area and by promoting female leadership at the regional and national levels.
- **Investors / developers**

EXITO was the main anchor commercial facility the mayor recruited to embark on the partial plan formulation and execution. This old Colombian department store chain expanded significantly during the ‘90s attracting French investors who bought 60% of its shares in 2000. EXITO was interested in opening new stores throughout the country and had as an objective the monopoly of retail commerce, since the French firm Carrefour was also looking to locate in the region. The other active agent was the “URBE Group” a private firm of developers from the southwest region of the country. This firm wanted to locate a shopping center that catered to all social classes. It hoped to locate a facility in an iconic area that would bring users on a regional scale, offering an alternative entertainment area in downtown Pereira. The mixture of activities would guarantee permanent users and the mobility infrastructure would guarantee accessibility. They also pushed for a convention center in close proximity to the target area.

In sum, the main motivation for private developers was to maximize profit based on a strategic location and to capture a new market of clients from throughout the region by participating in the making of an iconic place in the city. EXITO's spatial strategy was to capitalize from central locations. However, these investors faced the uncertainty of a highly fragmented parcel/lot structure, high land values, and the instability of public regulations.

- **Property owners**

The owners of the 239 parcels in the 13-block area were classified as absent landlords since 90% of the parcels were rented (Municipality of Pereira, 2002). More than 38% of the parcels included residential activities, 16% were vacant lots, 15% included a mix of commercial and storage uses, 14% include small hotels and hostels, and the remaining lots were used for storing recycled materials. Renters and landowners extracted high rents from this dilapidated area due to the
presence of illegal activities, such as: prostitution, drug dealing, and trade of stolen items and weapons. In this regard, the stigmatization of the area motivated landowners in two ways. On the one hand, they were interested in maintaining the high rents of these properties. On the other hand, they expected to sell their properties to the highest bidders since land prices had suffered depreciation after the earthquake and legal actions were likely to occur around the liability coming from the use of their buildings.

Despite the legal protection of property rights, these landowners faced the property confiscation for allowing illegal activities to take place in their properties. Also, landowners dealt with the uncertainty of law enforcement in cases of eminent domain and the “right” land price definition in the land assessment produced by the corresponding national authority. In addition, they had to resolve contract lease stipulations with renters and sub-lesasers regarding their compensation based on the length of occupation and effective selling of the properties.

- Users / non-landowners

In 2001, a census of the area’s population found that 1,536 inhabitants lived there and 90% (i.e. 1,382) of them were tenants who paid daily for modest accommodations. Around 200 people were engaged in recycling activities; 317 adults were homeless, most of them drug addicts; 108 were identified as sex workers; and 120 as abandoned orphans; In addition, the census identified 700 street vendors (Vallejo in Arzayuz & Garcia, 2010: 242). The interests of the population ranged from staying in the area to engage in recycling activities to finding new housing and places of employment, to getting access to job training and security (Gonzales, 2001). Informal workers expected to retain the advantages of the area’s central location and to find low cost accommodations, while residents linked to the illegal activities of drug and weapons trade were interested in avoiding legal sanctions and in preserving the control of their businesses.
Only 20% of residents had a degree of institutionalized organization and were involved in the participatory process (Gonzales, 2001). However, the lack of involvement in the final phase of the negotiations increased the fear of displacement and loss of economic activities and social networks. In addition, residents were skeptical about the state’s capabilities to create and maintain social programs as they had experienced an absence of social support for decades.

5.3. Negotiation strategies and tactics

1. Positioning the initiative: Using urban renewal as a mayoral political platform

Figure 16. Mayor presenting the urban renewal project in the city council

Source: Diario del Otun newspaper, 2002

The mayor used the project as a political platform and as a means of demonstrating good governance (See Figure 16). Although, the intervention of the old city market was already a strategic project in the municipal plan, the mayor was the first leader investing municipal resources
in the project. The public initiative became undoubtedly public as the former Director of the Urban Renewal Corporation, Architect Bedoya, expressed: “everybody said that in a renewal process with a critical social problematic if the state does not lead the process there is no option to change…” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010). The mayor justified the public investment as a matter of the need to address a historical problem in the city and the exacerbation of decay arising from the aftermath of the 1999 earthquake. Thus, a moment of crisis was taken as an opportunity to apply the logic of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit of citizens.’

The project highlighted the need to attract investment as a mechanism for achieving urban efficiency and competitiveness. In 2000, the municipality sold half of the public telephone enterprise and retained the proceeds for discretionary spending. The partial plan attempted to: “Boost an economic reactivation process habilitating the commercial potential of the area…and promote a real estate management that supports public-private partnership” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002: 36). After her mandate period, the mayor was appointed to top-level positions at the regional and national levels. Nevertheless, she was defeated in the 2008-2010 mayoral election. Explaining the political use of the project architect Bedoya claimed: “the project was used as a personal display... they passed to history with the project” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010). The tactics used in the deal making processes were:

a. Trust seeking of investors and voters

The mayor’s campaign was based on the idea of developing a collaborative scheme of governance. She used the project to enlarge and maintain the support of her constituency, as the plan states:

“[It] is vital to strengthen governance, creating an atmosphere of confidence among the project stakeholders through planning and urban management. This will allow the continued building and
consolidating of other parts of the city through large-scale urban projects. Hence, public credibility is strengthened by a shared vision of the city.” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002: 33)

Besides, agents’ trust was a common factor all interviewees involved in the case mentioned, pointing out that trust was the enabling factor behind the project’s success. As the technical coordinator of the Partial Plan architect Gallegos states:

“The politician’s role is to transmit trust, and I believe that the mayor and the secretary of planning knew how to do it. They promoted trust among investors, landowners, and the technical group that were working with them”. (Interviewed on 09.12.2010).

The concrete actions taken to gain trust were oriented to moving quickly from the plan to the intervention to assure a faster rate of return for investors and gain credibility with citizens. This tactic was deployed through internal institutional coordination for assuring funding sources, political support, and the beautification of the area. The mayor set this project into the axis of city governance, motivated by a personal obsession to become known as a heroic character who would save the town from decadence.

b. Private investors hunting

The pivotal role of the private sector in the mayor’s plan was to come up with investors who could sponsor the anchor facility. Investors from EXITO and Grupo Urbe were already interested in the area. As a consequence, the plan focused on a public-private partnership:

“The partial plan should facilitate the processes of public and private investment. The investment must seek equity in the negotiations that occur in the area, subject always to market conditions in a deteriorated area, fragmentation of ownership, and the need for investment incentives”. (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002: 33).

The mayor had Fabio Giraldo, the former vice minister of economic development, as advisor and was joined by a local senator for negotiating with EXITO. Nevertheless, according to off-the-record testimonies the mayor offered mayor benefits even before asking for something in return.
The departing point was assuring the big box retailer location at any cost – as the technical coordinator, architect Gallegos, asserted:

“The risk of investors in entering this type of project is very high; therefore, the rate of return that they must receive in a project of this magnitude has to be very good ranging from 22% to 24% ... when they saw that the project was a reality, investors came by themselves”. (Interviewed on 09.12.2010)

The considerations of profitability for private investors were separated from the public amenities self-funding principle. This fact highlights the disconnection with the principle of equitable distribution of costs and benefits. Moreover, private investors were neither involved in the negotiation with the community nor were they interested in discussing the spatial or social components of the project. That is why the EXITO’s planning director claimed:

“I think the municipality has the legal instruments for designing the norm and one [the private actor] is basically an interested party, an investor, then we try to fit; but we do not participate as an active agent rather as a passive agent...the municipality gave me the calculations and we responded due to the interest in the project and we were able to make those investments... we are not clear in how they defined the budget and distributed benefits and costs...” (Quoted in Guinger, 2005: 40 -173).

Consequently, public leadership translated into an expedited plan formulation, legal assistance for massive land buying, and political support for exceptional budget investments with the city council.

c. State catalytic actions

The municipality took the lead in transforming the area even before the plan was approved. The technical group leading the plan wanted to show results as evidence of transparency and efficiency. In this regard, the pioneering interventions refer to the spatial actions taken to start changing the imagery of the citizens of the area. These actions concentrated on the beautification of facades, the cleaning of dilapidated properties, greening vacant lots, and garbage collection. The former director of partial plans, architect Valencia, explained:
“The mayor had a compromise in her government plan of pushing the renewal of the city market, she said: What I want is that the people see actions in public works to show that this is a real fact...” (Interviewed on 12.16.2010).

Additionally, the demolition of the city market building and the biggest hotel became a symbolic act signaling a point of no return in the project, as the technical coordinator, architect Gallegos, described:

“To demolish this building with dynamite in front of the TV cameras was very strategic. That day people believed in the plan... that was like taking out an icon in the area and say there is nothing else to do...this generated an impact on the whole society in Pereira...” (Interviewed on 12.09. 2010).

The use of media to convey the beginning of the renewal project changed the skepticism of the public about long-term failed attempts of transformation.

2. Addressing informality: Framing informality as social deviance

Figure 17. Inhabitants’ conditions in the old city market area

Planners characterized public space occupation as space deprivation on an urban scale in terms of limiting pedestrian traffic and concentrating social vulnerability. The mayor herself described the situation of residents as: “people living like animals” (Interviewed on
12.02.2010). Furthermore, the government plan describes the conjunction of street vendors and homeless in downtown fringes:

“It is necessary to highlight the problem of the vulnerability of the occupation of public space by street vendors. We estimate over 3,000 informal traders located mainly in the traditional downtown... Additionally, we found an increasing number of homeless reaching 2,200, with 1,200 of them living in the area of renewal... concentrating the higher social vulnerability of the city.” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2001: 83)

On other hand, the targeted area was depicted as a place where control of space was taken by ‘alternative’ sources of power, as several experts who worked in previous plans for the area mentioned:

“There was a large margin of illegality, the police did not enter the area... from the 17 social groups identified, 50% were illegal... such as the trafficking of women, currency falsification, weapons fabrication, drug selling and so on... they by themselves were in charge of the control inside the area... ” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010).

Moreover, another public official in the Planning department at the time claimed, “there was an underground economy moving millions for powerful people” (Interviewed on 05.12.2010). For another expert, Mrs. Gonzales, who guided the social component at the beginning of the process, the situation was only possible because of the existence of “mafias who buy the state” (Interviewed on 12.02.2010). In this case, becomes explicit what Hossain (2010) and Roy (2011b) argue about understanding informality as a relational strategy to set the ever-shifting boundaries between legal and illegal. Thus, the condition of informality is presented as the intersection of city regulations, complicit authorities, and the operation of black markets. The discursive and spatial tactics used in the deal making process with private agents and public authorities were:
a. Advocating Human dignity in poverty

Human dignity and right to the city discourses were used as rhetorical bastions to delegitimize informal practices. On the one hand, the mayor’s rationale introduced in the government plan the axis of human dignity defined as:

“To dignify the inhabitants’ life... involves committing to the ones living in poverty. Poverty is understood as an efficiency problem and finding possibilities to progress ... and participate in the decisions that affect their lives...” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2001 p.12)

The administration committed to focus on populations in poverty", addressing the problem as a matter of efficiency and participation. On the other hand, the partial plan opening text quoted an excerpt of Lefebvre’s right to the city to frame the project as a progressive democratic process:

“The city and the urban are not constituted by city’s signs, or the urban semantemes; even though, the city is a meaningful amalgam...the city is not only a language but a practice...” (Lefebvre quoted in Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002:1).

Despite the fact this is the only time the Lefebvre’s ideas are mentioned, it becomes highly significant to include them in a public legal document. Moreover, foregrounding the RTTC excerpt confers a discursive bastion to legitimize the public initiative. However, the final deal making process evolved as an expedited technocratic process formulated in spite of the use of this rhetorical device. The technical group avoided the use of informality as a concept to veil the erasure of unwanted space users. Accordingly, inhabitants, instead of becoming subjects of the planning process, were objects of intervention and were voiceless in the negotiation. The planning group held the assumption that the limitations of vulnerable populations prevented them from participating or deciding what is best for them. Nonetheless, the proposal included the notion of social costs to incorporate the social programs funding for the vulnerable population.

\footnote{53.9 \% of the population according to the government plan}
b. Using police force and selective relocation

In Pereira the tactic to restore the control of public space occurred through the use of police force imitating the spatial practices of street vendors and fragmenting them. As the mayor explained:

“We had to act as the informals. We invaded before they arrived, with the police we confiscated what they had... so I was relocating and cleaning those streets...I was very Hitlerian...” (Interviewed on 12.02.2010)

The mayor relocated some street vendors to underutilized public buildings called ‘popular bazaars’ based on the type of products sold. Furthermore, the remaining inhabitants were evicted from the area after the demolition process using police force. As Mrs. Gonzales, asserted “the Police were there at 3 am...they used the SWAT for evicting people with tear gases and tanks...it was awful... some of them are still in prison” (Interviewed on 12.02.2010). In conjunction with police force also ‘social cleanliness’ was used according to a study on the topic:

“Public agents, within institutional spaces, instigated the violence, particularly illegal violence against unwanted actors such the homeless in Pereira downtown... this makes invisible the growing power of illegal networks of drug trafficking and paramilitaries...” (Martinez, et al., 2010: 52)

This tactic reveals how the negotiation of the project occurs off the table, in this case supporting spatial practice of violence used as a means for regaining police control of the area. On the other hand, the problems of renters were assumed to be the private problems of each landlord while at the same time they were given a three-month subsidized lease. Drug addicts, victims of sexual work, and orphans were assisted in social centers for a few months. In sum, the local state government attempted to dissolve informality using the police resorted to de facto over de jure strategies, giving temporary social assistance, and pushing the limits of legality to eradicate illegal activities.

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45 This term is commonly used to refer to illegal killing of vulnerable population.
c. Shifts in NGO participation and institutional changes

Since the mayor eliminated the Urban Renewal Corporation, the responsibility of the project negotiation and execution was transferred to the Planning Department. The corporation was leading the participatory process with inhabitants through NGO’s. In that regard the previous director of the corporation, architect Bedoya, contended:

“This administration was characterized for concentrating power... we had a matriarchal system: the mayor, governor, secretary of planning, water sanitation director... all were women... that concentration of power allowed to generate the partial plan of renewal but within that circle of power... the sub direction of partial plans was created for doing that...” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010)

Figure 18. Cultural map of the old city market – participatory process

The negotiation’s direction was marked by the participation of NGOs – Vida y Futuro and Germinando-, who acted as liaison between the community and the municipality at the beginning of the project. In this process, NGOs moved from working in health and housing in the community to providing census information to the municipality for designing social programs in
the first phase. They built a comprehensive diagnosis of the social conditions of the inhabitants through cultural maps and informative workshops (See Figure 19). After the mayor took the leadership of the process, the technical team shifted to more real estate and urban design oriented professionals, interrupting the social work done and suppressing the social component of the technical team. This group translated social programs into social costs to be distributed among private agents and the municipality. EXITO assumed some tax-deductible costs by providing job training to some inhabitants.

After the new mayor took office, the non-governmental organizations were considered contractors for providing social assistance to the vulnerable population. NGOs such as Germinando and Vida y Futuro formed a coalition to guide the social programs. However, the contract was given to a non-local organization devoted to assisting homeless and drug addicts rather than offering job training and rehabilitation services to the larger population. One of the NGO leaders that worked with inhabitants before the project synthesized the intervention: “I call the project: Ciudad vencimos [the city we defeat], the elite defeated us showing no interest in the people but in the infrastructure” (interviewed on 12.06. 2010). The shift of NGO involvement reveals the challenges of inhabitant protection and the issues of representation of the vulnerable population. Hence, the lack of internal organization and repression jeopardized inhabitants’ claims for their rights.

3. Measuring land market: Surrendering to state-led land speculation
This strategy entails to neglect of legal mechanisms on the part of the state to assure the regulation of land values in favor of big landowners. Planners and landowners acknowledged state responsibilities in the long-term cycles of property values. For instance, a resident and landowner, Mrs. Nelly Ruiz, asserted:
“...They [State] let land prices go down, they let all the decay occur at the expense of the inhabitants quality of life... since 1995 they wanted to renew the area 'cause it is located downtown... they wanted to give other use to it ' because they said the parcels were too big and the density too low, so they wanted to take of advantage of that and expand commercial activities in the area...” (Quoted in Guinger, 2005: 52)

On the other hand, the former director of partial plans, architect Valencia, said:

“...During the last 20 years...the municipal government decided to abandon the security of the area. It started to generate a lack of governability which in turn generated acceptance of those illegal activities...and depreciated land values.” (Quoted in Guinger, 2005: 25)

The opportunity to unlock land values emerged in conjunction with the deterioration of the area and the proximity to the highest land values of the city (See Figure 19). This strategic location has constituted the motivation of several planning initiatives. Even though, the logic of partial plans entails the involvement of landowners as partners and the self-funding of the project based on land value appreciation; both principles were disregarded in this partial plan. On the contrary, the negotiation strategy involved massive land sales and state sponsored land speculation.

Figure 19. Downtown Pereira Land prices Model 2002

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira - Observatorio Inmobiliario, 2010

The tactics used in the deal making process with private agents and public authorities were:
a. Paying more for land, getting less for public amenities

Since land assessment was the basis for the funding strategy, the request to the national authority - IGAC- to carry out land assessments produced unexpected obstacles. According to the technical coordinator architect Gallegos:

“When we requested the land assessment to the national authority (IGAC) we found that cadastral values were higher than commercial land assessments...the land assessment ... included future expectations in the price, that inflated land prices from the moment zero of the intervention...what did the administration do? They started to diminish ‘costs’ for the private sector trying to compensate for the overvalued parcels...but this produced a chain of speculation” (interviewed on 10.21.2010)

In the same line, the plan’s advisor and former director of urban development at the national level, architect Garcia, explained the impacts on the distribution of rights and responsibilities:

“What was complicated was to deal with the increase of land values... when we did the [financial] simulations of how much each development must contribute in terms of costs, we had to value the land that implies the responsibilities but the price had an exaggerated increase... in other words, we had to pay a more expensive land and as a result the responsibilities [social and physical] ended up being more expensive...we could’ve assigned more responsibilities to the developments and avoid to invest that much in land...” (Quoted in Guinger, 2005: 52)

The public land appraisers increased the values, taking into consideration the potential development of the parcels instead of reflecting the deterioration of the area in land prices. While the IGAC contended that it was a result of applying the standard method of valuation, some others, as architect Garcia, claimed: “I think that it was corruption, there is no other explanation, nobody explains why if all the norms about appraisals define that you cannot evaluate future factors, IGAC did that...” (Interviewed on 11.23.2010). As a result, land values were high even before the intervention favoring mostly to big landowners as architect Bedoya contends:

“In the land buying negotiation they [local State] had to separate owner form user... the Mereck’s [senator’s family]... they were not fool they started to buy land long ago, they do that in all Colombian cities... the negotiation with small landowners was the minority...” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010)
The long-term expectations of the urban renewal project also caused land speculation and monopoly ownership. As a consequence, the mayor decided to assume the upfront costs of the project and to guarantee to private investors the execution of public infrastructure despite the unforeseen costs of land. In this move, the local state acted as a landowner by pioneering the intervention on public land whereas the national state through the IGAC acted as a sponsor of land speculation. In sum, this tactic reflects what Flyvberg (2002) contends about how power defining reality and what knowledge get into account.

b. Single land buyer for private and public purposes

The municipality contracted a lawyer from a private firm to buy land for public and private purposes. The intermediary lawyer helped EXITO and city hall in the land acquisition using the same protocol with all the landowners, as the lawyer Gutierrez, declared:

“I was contracted to make the judicial study of land tenure of every parcel and to buy all the lots involved in the partial plan... We started the juridical study of property titles going back 20 years... with visits to each building, lot by lot determining who was occupying the building: owner, renter, occupier... so we could know the requirements for the buy offer... we used the value according to the commercial land appraisal at the moment of the negotiation... The land transaction was made between private and private [parties] in favor of the state...” (Interviewed on 11.29.2010)

During the purchase, the appraisal issued by IGAC was the basis for negotiating with landowners; however, the land buying negotiation excluded landowners from the option of becoming partners in the project. Furthermore, the intricate land tenure and leaseholders conditions were declared as a private issue to reduce the complexity of the process as the director of partial plans, architect Valencia, explained:

“We [state] negotiated with the owner and the owner had to deal with their renters... otherwise there is an expectation chain that cannot be solved and makes the project not feasible... For clearing the properties, the secretary of government went to every single place that was not conforming to the law in terms of uses... such as prostitution, drug selling... They were notified of the deadlines for leaving the
area and also opening confiscation processes of those properties where the owners allowed those uses or abandoned the buildings... that was part of a rigorous process of administrative governance... to retake that area for the city... I think that was very brave...” (Interviewed on 12.16.2010)

In the process of law enforcement the problems with inhabitants non-landowners became a private affair inasmuch as absent landlords had to solve the relationship with them. Nevertheless, the use of this tactic assured the purchase of the totality of properties for public purposes and the big box retailer location in less than three months. Landowners were urged to sell their properties because the critical conditions of the area, as the former director of the Urban Renewal Corporation, architect Bedoya, asserted:

“...Owners were thinking to sell the land considering that from cheap to nothing it better cheap... the people were desperate and the private sector was seeing such a great opportunity that they even paid for a very expensive land...” (Interviewed on 12.06.2010)

In the same line, EXITO’s planning director, architect Montoya, referring to the option of using expropriation in the negotiation process explained:

“...We did not have expropriations, all the business we made as a common agreement... out of 77 parcels 75 were without complications...I think they [landowners] sold well...However, I think they sold with pressure because the law enables the expropriation... that is like negotiating with the sword in your back ... that facilitated the negotiation... without the option of expropriation I never would have been involved in this business... that many parcels were impossible to buy otherwise...” (Quoted in Guinger, 2005: 87).

Therefore, to control the land acquisition, the state helped EXITO also in decreasing the transaction costs of the purchase while renters and occupiers were considered a threat for the state.

b. Giving up on land market regulation and cost recovery

Partial plans were intended to fund large-scale projects using the legal principle of equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities. However, this tactic reveals the asymmetries between inhabitants-landowners vs. investors on the distribution of costs and benefits. The legal emphasis on landowners’ responsibilities in funding public amenities becomes questioned as a long-term
resident and landowner, Mrs. Ruiz, contended:

“We said that the distribution [of rights and responsibilities] is impossible because the inhabitants of the area cannot participate as investors... when we talk of an urban renewal plan it is because the area is deteriorated socially and economically... therefore, the point of departure is having imposed obligations [costs] that we are not able to fulfill... we have to take care of the property and the other owners around are not wealthy, so, we are not at the same level of the big investors who are the ones that are going to capture all the land value increase... if we give up the money of the land, with what money are we going to survive? ...” (Quoted in Guinger, 2005: 21)

The testimony of the owner also raises the question over who captures the land value increase, if the state for funding the public amenities agenda or the private investors who get benefits for locating there. Despite this contested issue, the legal tool of land value capture was not implemented in the project as architect Valencia, former Director of Partial plans, explained:

“We did not charge land value capture because the tool was not regulated in the municipality and 'cause not long ago we charged contributions for betterment for several public works of the municipality... in that case we would've done double dipping ...” (Interviewed on 12.16.2010)

Figure 20. Ciudad Victoria partial plan delimitation and parcel structure

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002
As a result, three factors jeopardized the use of land value capture: the lack of political will, prior use of other mechanisms for cost recovery [valorization] for vehicular infrastructure in surrounding areas, and the already high costs of land according to the land appraisal. Even though, the cultural center and the line of the transit system were funded using different sources, the rest of the public benefit package was mostly covered by the state, as the former director of the urban renewal corporation explained:

“If you see what the decree about partial plans says clearly the self funding mechanisms... the project has costs of over 42 thousand millions and a return of less than 2 thousand millions...that is why I say that [the project] as a partial plan is a disaster...but as an urban project in the city has meant a recovery of ten times what it cost...”(Interviewed on 12.06.2010)

In sum, in the negotiation of the financing, the state ignored the land management principles of the new planning system and exposed its limitations for regulating the land market..

**4. Shaping space: Creating a civic plaza as an iconic landscape of resurgence**

Figure 21. The new civic plaza in downtown public space’s network

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002
The stigmatization of the area and the earthquake aftermath urged a radical spatial intervention. As architect Garcia, one of the advisors of the plan and an ex-public national official suggested: “the need for the re-foundation of the city, a city that is born again from the ashes of an earthquake...” (Interviewed on 11. 23. 2011). In this process, urban design turned into a tool to generate new open public space for civic encounter (See figure 19). Along those lines, the idea of creating a new civic plaza fit the need of creating a sign of a rebirth of the city and the clearance of unwanted users. The plaza is the nodal public space typology in Latin American cities for collective scenarios. The technical document of the plan defines the objective of this new space:

“The expansion of the traditional downtown of Pereira must continue with the function of a regional headquarters of public institutions, a place of cultural representations, a symbolic public space on a municipal scale...” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002: 13)

However, a single architect had oversight of the design failing to disclose any spatial information for discussion. Only the cultural center design was defined by a public contest. The placement of the cultural center where the city market was located made it the icon of progress and change in the city’s priorities. As a result, the project was launched as an epicenter for marketing the city and extending the activities of centrality. The tactics used in the deal making process were:

a. Re-founding the city

The Mayor’s rhetoric consisted of framing the renewal project as an opportunity born out at a time of crisis in order to regain control of public space. Even the name of the project varied from the original name of the place, using an allegory to a former public space of the city. The partial plan presents the project as follows:

“Ciudad Victoria is part of the process of re foundation of the city... it means to dignify people’s lives. This opens space for citizen encounter and coexistence. [This project] is a way to consolidate governance...Thus, Ciudad Victoria more than a government project is a city project.” (Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002: 1)
The idea of expanding the central area included access to a prime real estate location that had been inaccessible for decades. In order to do so, the plan attempted to simplify the existing parcel structure and to create super blocks to coincide with a street layout making the new program functional. Furthermore, the designer introduced the civic plaza and the iconic public building of the cultural center to create a new landscape and to deactivate current spatial practices in the area. Hence, the rationale used to justify the project introduced the founding of symbolic space to reclaim the city as a new metropolis after the earthquake.

b. Inverting the accessibility/land value nexus

The land market value of a strategic location relies on real estate investment interests, proximity to potential users, and accessibility to several transportation modes. The location of the city market was contiguous to the traditional downtown but the area had become a barrier to connecting the city with the north despite its proximity to the traditional downtown. Because of the levels of decay and social deprivation, the old city market surroundings acted as a black hole in the city. With the project, the spatial arrangement was used as a way to change the patterns of land values according to levels of accessibility. Furthermore, the overall criteria for the urban design was based on block sizes and mobility, as the director of partial plans, architect Valencia, explained:

“The guiding concept of the urban design was the types of blocks and the mobility: “ we used macro blocks for big box retailers, the middle size blocks for a shopping center, and small blocks for housing... mobility was a pivotal theme...we had the new public transit system... but also the need to attract pedestrians, not only vehicles...we need to consolidate the POT policy regarding decreasing car use in downtown ... but also allow for an efficient circulation of private vehicles... so, we distributed the uses according to the access points and parking....” (Interviewed on 12.16.2010)

Following those guides, the big box facility was expected to be located on the parcels most deteriorated and occupied by the most vulnerable populations, while the residential and institutional components were located in a zone less deteriorated and easier to access. As architect
Gallegos, the technical coordinator, explains: “...through an economic scheme we had to shift the land price pattern, to turn the cheapest it into the most expensive and the most expensive turn it into the cheapest land” (Interviewed on 09.12.2010). Thus, while the areas where more profitable activities were going to be located were the areas of less value according to the land assessment; the challenge was to subvert the land price pattern to shape the financial strategy of the project and make feasible the urban design program and configuration.

c. Establishing an entrepreneurial surrounding

The spatial frame of the new civic plaza depicts the new powers of a contemporary city. While the traditional foundational areas integrated the civic plaza with buildings representing religious and administrative powers; the new civic plaza introduced a cultural center, big box retailers, a shopping center, and privatized public services facilities. The rationality of the city’s rebirth brings to the surrounding public space activities of entertainment, consumption, and culture in new building typologies. In order to obtain block sizes for the intended commercial purposes, the design strategy was to generate a new street layout breaking the compact grid morphology. This process required converting previously public streets into sellable land to form new super blocks. The planning department had to request the city council to publish an authorization to restore the public space in a different area, in this case in the Egoya Park in the border of the intervention area. In addition, land assemblage was used to simplify the parcel structure and produce autonomous real estate projects in each block. Hence, this tactic frames urban resurgence as a new competitive city.

5.4. Deal and Compromises

In October 2002, the mayor approved the partial plan through Decree 1301 after 6 months of negotiations with city council, investors, and landowners. The official document begins quoting
Lefebvre in his concept of Right to the city; nonetheless, the use of “right to the city” to frame the intervention in Pereira suggests the erosion of RTTC as radical practice, becoming a trope to legitimize informal workers and homeless dispersion. The plan sought to catalyze public political engagement in shaping public infrastructural systems. Hence, the agreements achieved were:

- **Urban design**

  Figure 22. Ciudad Victoria partial plan urban design

![Image](image.png)

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002

The urban design strategy defined the generation of a city scale open space through a new civic plaza (12,727 square meters) and a public park (10,668 square meters) that recuperate a deteriorated ecological corridor of the Egoya channel. Ciudad Victoria concluded as a moderate density mixed-use project of residential, institutional, and commercial activities. The civic plaza and the Egoya Park were the main public open spaces and the cultural center, located in the city’s former market site, the main public amenity. The new street layout proposes super blocks for
commercial purposes (i.e. EXITO and URBE group shopping center) and keeps traditional blocks for housing and institutions. The typology of the surrounding buildings was flexible so long as the maximum density and use were respected. Only the block dedicated to housing was the unit where high rises were expected.

The urban design guidelines remained vague in order to indicate the mechanisms to connect new buildings in the new street layout with the new public space. Moreover, neither the civic plaza nor the park design offered spatial alternatives for relocating the street vendors. Therefore, this conception of public space does not permit maintaining the type of informal activities encountered; it rather proposes a public space for new users by dispersing the traditional inhabitants and public uses.

- **Financial strategy**

Each one of the blocks dedicated to private uses was defined as an autonomous real estate project (i.e. UAU) with each of them transferring its responsibilities to funding public infrastructure and social programs according to the use and land value incidence on the project (See figure 24). The agreement also defined a set of tax exemption benefits for private investors. For commercial enterprises the commerce and industry tax has an exemption of 100% of the cost for 3 to 5 years depending upon the number of direct jobs generated. Moreover, new real estate projects have a property tax exemption for 10 years.

At the beginning of the project, the civic plaza and the park were the main amenities to be funded with private contributions. However, the high land prices and the benefit package for EXITO and the URBE group investors only allowed them to fund the Egoya Park. The total direct costs of the project were calculated in Points$^{46}$ or economic constant units adjustable

\[^{46}\text{This is a Japanese technique of constant units to set prices in process of land readjustment.}\]
annually to the price index. The calculation was based on the costs of social programs and public infrastructure agreed to in the negotiation process. The costs were proportionally distributed according to the benefit acquired by each of the six autonomous projects (i.e. Unit of Urban Actuation). A public fiduciary was the entity in charge of collecting the payment of each unit.

Figure 23. Costs assignation according to land use and land value

![Costs assignation diagram]

Source: Alcaldía de Pereira, 2002

On the one hand, public infrastructure costs were quantified as 10,668 points for funding utilities infrastructure up-grades, pedestrian paths, a sidewalk system and the Egoya Park. However, the civic plaza and the pedestrian bridge were assumed as the only public expenditure. The commercial use of the underground parking in the plaza was expected to help the cost recovery of the project. On the other hand, social costs were calculated at 7,068 points representing the actions needed to assist the most vulnerable populations of the area including welfare protection
and labor training (i.e. 700 street vendors, 180 orphans, 90 waste recycler workers, 112 homeless, 200 sexual workers, and 270 tenants).

Nevertheless, the social programs did not reach the entire population; only 60% of orphans, 40% of sexual workers, 7% of street vendors, 30% of adults dedicated to recycling activities, and 90% of tenants got either economic support or job training (Vallejo, 2008). The plan lacks mechanisms to enforce the social programs and the institutional support to sustain the programs. As a result, not only the totality of the project was not self-funded but also delivery of the most critical part of the social programs was not ensured.

- **Property rights and land readjustment**

In partial plans the time framework for the intervention is linked to the land readjustment feasibility of parcel assembly. In this case the block and addition of blocks become the spatial unit where the land assembly takes place. The process of land readjustment defined six units of land management into a single area corresponding to costs in the Egoya Park, and two special management areas (See Figure 22). First, the units of land management (i.e. autonomous real estate projects) were: Unit A: 34 parcels, Unit B: 21 parcels, Unit C: 37 parcels, Unit D: 28 parcel, Unit E: 77 parcel, and Unit F: 20 parcels. Each unit consists in assembling the parcels for forming a single lot base of a real estate project.

Furthermore, the new layout of superblocks turned public streets into private spaces; these areas were replaced in the area of the Egoya Park as costs to the public approved by city council. Second, the agreement assigned the strip of the Egoya channel as the area for locating the responsibilities of private investors in funding the public amenities package. Initially the civic plaza –Unit F- was supposed to be privately funded but, as any other unit in the final agreement ran counter to the initial expectations. Third, the special management units participate in the benefits
of the project but not in the investment scheme. Two areas were designated as such: the single historic preservation project and some good quality hotels.

Figure 24. Parcel reconfiguration through units of urban actuation

Landowners were excluded from participating as partners in the autonomous real estate projects – even though they took advantage of the speculative process derived from the land
appraisal and were part of the massive land selling process in the commercial areas. As a result, units A, B, and C devoted to housing projects became commercially unviable because of the extremely high land prices.

**Conclusion**

“The sledgehammer of progress wiped out 9 destitute blocks overrun by misery and crime, uncovering the tragedy that lie beneath. The army gave a hand in eradicating delinquency fed by narcotrafic (and also “paramilitaries’ and guerrillas people say)...Beggars and drug addicts were expatriated by the urban renewal. They ended up in La Churria, a site in Pereira suburbs, where people say they do not hurt anyone...”

Luiyith Melo García - El País newspaper Reporter (2008, January 2)

Figure 25. Panoramic Ciudad Victoria partial plan

Source: Valencia, 2007

In this chapter, I discussed the negotiation of the government led partial plan of renewal: Ciudad Victoria. The chapter showed the systemic use of urban renewal in Pereira’s planning practice as a tool for dismantling entrenched formal-informal dynamics and unlocking land values in strategic locations. Despite the long trajectory of urban renewal as a category of space intervention, only the arrival of the partial plan as a land management tool made the implantation of the large-scale project feasible. The mayor played a pivotal role in leading the project at the conjunction of several events: a) the 1999 earthquake impacted the building stock and specially the city market building, b) the privatization of the telephone enterprise brought ‘profits’ for discretionary expending, c) the interest of foreign and national investors in locating downtown, and d) the beginnings of the implementation of the new planning system in the municipality. As a
consequence, the partial plan became the mayor’s political platform for gaining electoral support and visibility in the region.

The chapter details the negotiation strategies and tactics for mobilizing agents’ interests. I portrayed the spatial and discursive practices used for politically positioning the project, the treatment of social vulnerability, the land market regulation, and the spatial configuration resulting from the negotiation. Public space–based interests were contained in the public amenities agenda defined in the POT. However, the actualization of those interests was contingent upon the political use of state-owned land to build public amenities directly assuming up-front costs.

Private interests gained access to a prime real estate location and to preferential treatment. The fast tracking agreement, land acquisition support and tax exemptions assured the location of the commercial anchor facilities. Even though, social costs were introduced in the negotiation process, despite the legal void in this regard, the participation of inhabitants was minimized. Hence, non-landowners inhabitants as the most vulnerable population were prevented from voicing their rights due to their status as engaged in informal and illegal practices. As a result, the lack of protection of the inhabitants/users reveals both a built in limitation of the legal framework and a strategy to unlock land values.

The chapter also examines the ways in which the logic of public-private partnerships operates under partial plans of renewal. The creation of new opportunities for speculative investment in the central city took place at the expense of low rent accommodations and vulnerable population protection. In addition, the state’s reluctance to use land market regulation tools also expresses the limitations and complicities of the emergent planning practice with territorial capital circuits. Therefore, I have argued that Ciudad Victoria’s PP served as a mayoral political platform.
6. Corazon de Jesus: Community coalition resistance

“Political resistance is intrinsic to power” (Thompson, 2003)

Introduction

Negotiation strategies and tactics enable actors to turn their interests into operational means for driving action. Nonetheless, the bargaining framework in which actors operate determines their leverage in the deal-making process. This chapter presents the negotiation process of the pioneering, community-led partial plan of renewal in Medellin: Corazon de Jesus. The first section presents the local state’s rationale for targeting the neighborhood as a site for radical land use changes and the community’s response to those initiatives.

The second section depicts the redeployment of the new planning system for framing public and private interests in the Territorial Municipal Plan.

The third section describes the main actors’ profiles and interests. The fourth section explains how actors mobilize their interests employing spatial and discursive practices. Finally, the fifth section summarizes the agreement achieved in the negotiation process. I argue that the Corazon de
Jesus PP exposes the systematic use of ‘informality’ to curtail non-landowners’ leverage in the negotiation. In this struggle, despite the community coalition, the state withdraws its social responsibilities shifting them onto the real estate market.

I used data from interviews with community leaders, planning advisors, private builders, state planners and archival data from public documents and media reports. I explain how the new planning system enables community-planning initiatives to contest large-scale renewal projects as the main tool for unlocking land values in downtown fringes. However, the emergent planning practices in Medellin also show the drawbacks of privileging landownership and the limitations for protecting street workers and renters in the projects. This chapter explores the strategies and tactics used for positioning politically the project, dealing with informal/informal dynamics, land market regulation, and the urban design proposal. I present how community resistance operated in Corazon de Jesus to confront public-private schemes for urban renewal.

Sagrado Corazon de Jesus is the official name of the neighborhood, thanks to the magnificent church of the same name located in the area ‘Barrio Triste [Sad neighborhood]’, as it has been known for decades, is the largest area in Medellin specialized in auto parts trade and vehicle repair services. To residents of the city, the name evokes dirtiness, disorder, homelessness, and crime because of its connection to the former city marketplace. However, its proximity to the main public administrative buildings of the city, its adjacency to the metro line, arterial metropolitan corridor, and the riverfront make the area an irresistible target for transformation (See figure 24). In 1989, the business owners of the area created a civic committee called Fundacion Coraje [Courage Foundation] to advocate for their interests and to improve the conditions of the area.
The approval of a zoning ordinance in 1990 designated the neighborhood as a residential zone neglecting the intense commercial activity that over three decades had been established there. The municipality decided to enforce the ordinance impeding the functioning of businesses by removing their licenses. After the workers reluctance to leave the area, the mayor ordered to use the police to force them to leave. The municipality’s eviction threat sparked a strong civil opposition in 1995 that ended in riots and civil strikes opposing displacement.

After three years of negotiations, the zoning ordinance changed recognizing the area as a mixed-use zone. Workers needed to mitigate the negative impacts of car repair services in order to remain in the area. In the meantime, the Foundation developed a strategy to counter the pressure of the increasing number of new development projects in the surrounding area. They decided to involve themselves in the participatory planning process of the Municipal Territorial Plan (POT). Figure 27. Corazon de Jesus partial plan location in downtown Medellin

The planning department opposed several local workers’ and renters’ initiatives of a partial plan alleging the interest of the city as a whole in removing the current uses of the area. Only when an independent candidate became mayor had planners to open the door for a community-led partial plan formulation. Fundacion Coraje supported the mayor’s campaign when he agreed to
support the partial plan they were envisioning. Negotiations lasted seven years. This resulting partial plan became a pioneer community-led initiative in the country.

### 6.1 Mapping Medellín’s government rationalities

Figure 28. Chronology of Corazon de Jesus spatial transformation

![Map of Corazon de Jesus spatial transformation over time](image)

Source: Based on Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007

Corazon de Jesus began as a port of the Aburra River for basic goods and wood shipped to the founding settlement of the City. Since 1875, Colombia, Ayacucho and Maturin became the main streets for connecting it with the traditional downtown area (See Figure 28). In 1923, the Sagrado Corazon de Jesus church was built contiguous to the city’s marketplace in turn connected to the initial street layout, as can be seen in the 1938 map. Later in 1950, the Master plan of Wiener & Sert defined the area as part of the train terminal support activities and across the street.
they proposed the location of the city’s administrative center built in the 1980’s. This center was the basis for targeting Corazon de Jesus in later decades for renovation.

In agreement with the master plan, in 1959 municipal ordinance N.52 defined this growing area as a commercial anchor. During the 1970s the municipality focused on vehicular infrastructure as the main spatial intervention using the cost recovery technique of ‘valorization’. In this period the main streets delimited the neighborhood and turned the area into a single planning unit. The resulting morphological configuration produced three sectors that would influence the functional division of the neighborhood. As Figure 26 shows, Corazon de Jesus has three distinguishable areas: zone 1 where the auto parts commerce and car repair services are located, zone 2 devoted to wood trade and storage, and zone 3 occupied by the garment industry mixed with housing. The spatial interests of the actors are defined according to location and activities.

Figure 29. Functional areas in Corazon de Jesus

Source: Based on Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007

*Valorization is a cost recovery tool created in 1921 to fund public works using a special tax payment charged to the direct beneficiaries of the work. In Medellin, 60% of the mobilization infrastructure was funded through this technique.
-Zoning change and eviction threat (1990)

In 1990, Ordinance 38 of the Municipal Planning Statute was approved following a highly technocratic and non-participatory approach focusing on zoning to regulate only private land uses. Article 244 declares Corazon de Jesus as a ‘sector in transformation’ where: “land uses classified as prohibited by zoning will be tolerated only for five years “... parking at the street level or car services will be prohibited ... [and allowed] only in conforming gas stations...” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 1990). The cartographic material of this statute was located in a single office of the Department of Planning impeding public disclosure of the information. Through this planning initiative the municipality approved the eviction of economic activities taking place in conjunction with public space occupation in the main transportation corridors. Land use became the excuse for dismantling the intertwined formal and informal economic activities, such as car repair clusters.

The leader of the Foundation of workers and inhabitants of the area, Mrs. Zea, explained:

“In 1990 without any discussion with the community, ordinance 038 said that [the neighborhood] is not commercial anymore but residential... we had no announcement of when the environmental license would expire... once the license expired, the business became illegal because they would not renew the license and gave us six months for leaving...at that point spatial planning became an issue for the foundation...” (Interviewed on 11.27.2010)

The municipality pushed the boundaries of formality using the environmental license to make existing activities illegal and prompting their eviction. Furthermore, the enforcement of the law started few years later in 1993 when the police evicted businesses and residents from the area, as Mrs. Zea described:

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* Conforming Uses: Residential: R-T, R-M, from the third floor and up
  Commercial: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-7, C-9, C-11, C-12, C-13
“We were treated as criminals, they brought the army with tanks, and public space and transit authorities; they were expecting to remove everybody... It was a violent action...they surrounded all the neighborhood... that generated an immediate reaction of the people... we united around the Foundation for defining a strategic plan of defense... because we were cataloged as the worst part of the city...”

(Interviewed on 11.27.2010)

The threat turned into a motivation for forming a community coalition and started a struggle for changing the stigmatization of the neighborhood through planning.


Figure 30. Medellin city vision and strategic large-scale projects

Source: Alcaldía de Medellín, 1999,

Changes in the spatial planning system prompted a reframing of national legal principles within local dynamics. The municipality opened a participatory process for introducing the principles of
the Territorial Development Law to prioritize interventions. The product of the participatory process defined the vision of the city highlighting the purposes of the plan:

a) “Contribute from Medellin to the consolidation of a metropolitan and regional competitive platform”, b) “Turn public spaces into the structural elements of environmental balance, social integration and construction of citizenship”, c) “Contribute from the spatial planning practice to the construction of an equitable city where a participatory and democratic planning culture is installed” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 1999).

The point of departure of the plan brings at the core of the planning practice was the discourse of competitiveness, equity and environmental protection. Figure 27 shows the city’s vision translating those precepts into spatial representations guiding intervention.

The map of the city vision set the geographical limits of strategic areas and the extended downtown region where Corazon de Jesus is located. The main objectives of the city vision include: a) An Aburra river corridor spatially and environmentally integrated, b) Urban growth towards the flat areas of the valley in the riverfront (See figure 28), c) Traditional downtown revitalization, d) A Healthy mixture of uses, and e) Consolidation and connection of urban centralities. (Alcaldía de Medellín, 1999)

The vision of the future city creates a rationale for justifying the location and goals of large-scale projects. Under this model, planning practice expanded the tool for the regulation of public, private, and public-private space interventions. In this context partial plans are framed as tools for enhancing urban productivity and as a mechanism for promoting the equitable distribution of costs and benefits in large-scale urban projects. As a consequence, over 38 partial plans were designated for the land management of strategic projects; nine of them were partial plans of renewal in the downtown fringe (See Figure 29). Corazon de Jesus is defined as one of the pilot projects for developing the new set of land management tools in the POT (Article 105).

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*I mentioned here only the aspects related to the area of study.*
Figure 31. Partial Plans location and downtown renewal areas

Source: Alcaldía de Medellín, 1999, 2007

The POT follows the same idea of ‘Urban Renewal’ as the discourse for targeting downtown in the last four decades. Even though, urban renewal has been considered a tool for radical spatial transformations over time, the emerging planning practice incorporate new meanings and broaden their impacts. For instance, the definition of renewal in Article 158 of the POT emphasizes the role of downtown fringes in achieving the city's vision and, as a result, the consolidation of a competitive platform:

“Article 158: Renewal treatment. With this treatment the attempt is to promote important transformations in areas relevant for achieving the city vision... areas of environmental, social or physical deterioration or functional inner conflicts or with the surroundings... that require transformation to take advantage of their potential as strategic locations, excellent conditions of infrastructure and accessibility... these areas should promote diversification and intensification of land use and developments that improve the life of residents with rational densification, the mixture of uses...the
Areas targeted as renewal are framed as opportunities for improving life quality masking the threat of displacement for neighborhood residents/users. Furthermore, there were functional conflicts associated with the construction of new public facilities in the surroundings of the city administrative headquarters (Blue buildings in the bottom right map - Figure 29). Hence, renewal turns into a trump card for disrupting enclaves of public space occupation with informal activities or low cost accommodation in the name of “rational” densification.

The POT frames public interests in Corazon de Jesus as a matter of the public amenities agenda for downtown fringes: a) Natural structural public systems: The riverfront articulation project; and b) Artificial structural public systems: The project of METROPLUS - public transit system line - connecting with the Cisneros metro station, the pedestrian network in the arterial streets, and the preservation of Sagrado Corazon de Jesus church as a national landmark. The POT also states that the real estate projects in the area should contribute at least 4 m$^2$ of green areas for each 100m$^2$ built and 1m$^2$ of public facilities per each housing unit built or the 1% of the built area in other uses (Alcaldía de Medellín, 1999).

The POT defined private interests in terms of development rights potential and differential profitability of the type of uses allowed in the area. While only two floors of construction (i.e. 1.5 FAR) are allowed in the area without the partial plan, with the partial plan a construction index of 8.0 can be achieved. The potential development rights increased by more than five times with the partial plan boosting investment opportunities. Since Corazon de Jesus is part of the metropolitan center, the land uses regime is flexible regarding car repair services, wood industries, and textile
industries and commerce. Therefore, under the partial plan, the real estate market interests in the area become the main drivers for unlocking land values.

### 6.2 Agents’ profiles and interests

#### - Community coalition

More than 7,250 workers, 1,050 street workers, 550 residents, and 350 homeless persons inhabited the neighborhood before the plan was to be implemented. 82.5% of businesses rent space and 61% of all businesses have been active for more than five years (CEO, 2006). In 1989, business owners in the area created the Fundacion Coraje, a civic committee with over 200 members involved in the auto parts trade. The organization had now turned into a non-profit organization representing workers, businesses, and residents of the neighborhood. The organization seeks “the well being of members by providing recreation, education, security, and environmental programs” ([www.fundacioncoraje.org](http://www.fundacioncoraje.org)). In 2000, Fundacion Coraje was leading in the development of the partial plan and incorporating their expectations into the renewal project. In order to tackle this endeavor, they decided to ask advice from public universities and young professional planners. This internal participatory process was based on open debate while providing information and scenarios to engage the inhabitants/users of the neighborhood. This process led to the creation of the cooperative of street workers -COOTACOJ-, the Garment Workers Association, and the Wood Warehouses Owners Association. The coalition of these organizations happened informally, without contracts, as they united around a central interest: to remain in the area and improve their labor and living conditions.

The initial process of social mobilization revealed leadership skills in some community members. One female leader, daughter of a long-term worker of the area, surprised the largely

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* 64.6% of workers linked to formal economic activities worked in the auto parts business.
* Workers linked to informal activities are distributed as follows, 53.3% in services and 45.4% commerce/retail.
male community. The female leadership of the organization kept the long-term process of formulation and negotiation going for over seven years. For several years they maintained the self-funded initiative despite its limitations and kept the enthusiasm and unity of this largely diverse set of inhabitants/users intact. However, the lack of resources and technical expertise became a major uncertainty in the process, and there was a lack of trust in the enforcement of social program compromises between the public sector and private investors.

- Local government

In Medellin, the new mayor, Sergio Fajardo (2003-2007), had an unusual profile for a politician. He held a doctorate degree in Mathematics and became the representative of a coalition of citizens’ organizations with non-partisan affiliation. He was the first independent mayor elected in Medellin, and most recently was a vice presidential candidate for the country. His campaign capitalized on the vote of civic associations such as CORAJE, and emphasized downtown revitalization through partial plans of renewal as a priority of his government (Guinger, 2006: 8).

After the election, the mayor used his leverage to support the remaining costs of technical studies and expert support for the final phase of the partial plan’s formulation. The new planning department director promoted the creation of an office solely in charge of the monitoring and formulation of partial plans that had increasingly become the most demanding activity in the department. While new professionals became involved in the process to direct the negotiation process, long-term public officers, averse to the community-led proposal, were also involved in the negotiation. Finally, however, the planning department and the mayor’s office became responsible for the criteria for plan approval.
- Landowners

The owners of the 789 parcels in the 33 blocks of the area were mainly absent landlords, since 79% of the parcels were rented. More than 49% of the parcels included commercial activities, 22% were parking lots, 13% garment and wood products industrial shops, and the remaining 12% were residential (Guinguer, 2006: 43). Only 20% of the business owners were also landowners; in other words, from 746 formal economic units in the neighborhood, only 101 were used and managed by the owner. Landowners had long-term leases with steady rents for commercial activities and a minimum investment in maintaining the properties. Nevertheless, they acknowledged the high pace of transformation in surrounding areas and the lucrative aspects of the project. Therefore, landowners pursued two types of interests: either to sell land to the highest bidder or to become partners in the real estate projects that resulted from the partial plan.

Landowners faced the uncertainty of the legal process of land readjustment. They had to contribute property in order to obtain a profit via sales of the project and development rights. Moreover, landowners faced a silent land speculation process in the zone where wood industries were located; newcomers were attempting to buy at least 51% of the area, and had a commanding voice in the land readjustment process. These circumstances caused owners to fear price distortions and the viability of the project.

6.3. Negotiation strategies and tactics

1. Positioning the initiative: Forming a community coalition of political resistance

The ‘Barrio Triste community united only under the stated threat of eviction from the zoning change from commercial to residential in the 90’s. They acknowledged that this threat was the single factor motivating them to bring together the wide variety of actors in the neighborhood. The police eviction sparked an unprecedented social mobilization and civic strike that began a history
of unity and solidarity among the area’s inhabitants. Even when a former mayor - Luis A. Ramos- prohibited parking in the area, as one of the business owners remembered:

“In the mobilization against city hall the majority of people were informal [street workers]... they were protesting and also as a solidarity gesture with business people of the area... we all were depending upon parking... the decree was finally not adopted” (Interviewed on 11.22.2010).

Figure 32. Meeting of the street workers association and CORAJE

The civic committee turned into a coalition of leaders with representatives from auto parts businesses, street workers, garment industry workers, and woodworkers all with seats on the CORAJE Foundation board. As Mrs. Zea, the CORAJE leader, framed it:

“It was a fight of two against one, the municipality and possible investors against the community... the prime interest was to remain and our enemy were the investors and government. (Interviewed on 11. 27.2010)
The Foundation took the lead in the partial plan’s formulation to assure the protection of the inhabitants in the renewal project. CORAJE was not directly invited to formulate the partial plan; rather, they invented the initiative supported in the constitutional right to participate in the planning decisions. The municipal plan advocated for enhancing the current economic circuits using the inner block areas. The tactics used in the deal making process were:

a. Changing meanings

The foundation’s female leaders learned that the new 1991 constitution granted them the right to participate in planning decisions. That became the starting point of the process of negotiation. CORAJE director, Luz Stella Zea, challenged the planning authority by explaining to them:

“The constitution gave us a right that you are not respecting or you do not know what does it mean because you only know how to draw lines in a map from your desk…we had the task of understanding how to exercise this right and claim it.” (Interviewed on 11.27.2010)

In addition, they had to define the meaning of participation: “We understand that participation consists in being able to modify what affects you; if you do not modify it, then you do not participate” (Interviewed on 11.27.2010). The foundation made use of the media attention to press for political openings of channels of communication with the planning authorities and city council. They were able to modify the zoning change. However, the formulation of the new municipal territorial plan still targeted the neighborhood as a renewal area. CORAJE leaders disagreed with this proposal, the community leader Sonia Vasquez explains:

“...We did not want to be a renewal area because it meant tearing down the zone and rebuilding it. We were able to have the concept of renewal in the general plan modified by adding a line that says ‘involves the improvement of what is already there’.” We fought two years for this”. (El Colombiano Newspaper, August 11th, 2007).
The foundation representatives advocated in the negotiation the idea of “prudential renewal.” According to the technical coordinator, this notion “cannot be misunderstood as a type of paternalistic social program; on the contrary, it constitutes the opportunity to guide community development based on...the social capital, tradition and knowledge... a socially oriented procedure through which the urban intervention is produced with local social organizations and users of the affected areas” (DTS, 2006: 114).

The guiding principles of the project were: “permanence, negotiation, flexibility, and profitability” (DTS, 2006: 115). Even though, the municipality agreed to the project’s new approach, CORAJE also had to admit the wider city interests. Mrs. Zea explained the tradeoff:

“We were an Area of Renewal with multiple uses. This means that we give up something, because we had to accept the word “multiple use” that gives room for residential activities. Even though we were in opposition to housing projects, we had to concede that point since the Planning Department also conceded on the definition of renewal”. (Interviewed on 27.11.2010)

The tactics used in this strategy points to the relevance of language as a site of power struggle. This strategy clearly reveals what Foucault (1997, 2004) defines as the productive power of subverting discourses of hegemonic knowledge in planning practice.

b. Praising Self-Management

The planning department’s intent to target the area responded to the presence of delinquency, occupation of public space, and underutilization of building stock. Even community leaders acknowledged the negative impacts derived from the economic activities of the inhabitants and the need to overcome the area’s stigmatization. CORAJE leader, Mrs. Zea, explained how:

“Associates of the foundation contribute economically every month for running the programs and to cover staff expenses...by ourselves we fixed the pedestrian lanes, we included lighting in the area, we assisted orphans that live in the street... we gave support to the police to improve security by giving them
motorcycles, cameras, and so on... we developed an environmental program to treat liquid waste and to recycle the oil used in the mechanic services...” (Interviewed on 11. 27. 2010).

Figure 3. CORAJE Street cleaning team in 2004

Source: CORAJE, 2010

CORAJE decided to tackle the accrued needs of the neighborhood, despite the lack of contributions from the municipality to improve the quality of social services and infrastructure. They framed their initiatives as a matter of self-management by the neighborhood based on solidarity among its inhabitants:

“The workers and businesses in Corazon de Jesus have generated legitimate antecedents of self-protection.... They have protected themselves from the expulsion acknowledging that their survival is affected negatively by the rupture of affective, social and economic networks developed in the traditional downtown and their solidarity values in the everyday work...” (Guinger, 2006:193)

Along the same lines, CORAJE director explained: “...nowadays we are familiar with the term co-responsibility, by which we say ‘all give’, you give, we give...” (Interviewed on 11. 27.2010). Over time, the results of the initiatives changed the imagery associated with the area, and this move
influenced the strength of the organization to promote social programs and tested the cohesion of the area to move forward the renewal project.

c. Becoming a Vote Bank

The mobilization process made evident the political power of the neighborhood population. In the process, CORAJE and its leader gained visibility and decided to engage in electoral politics. The leader gained a seat in the local action board (JAC) with more votes than any member of the city council. The election of the leader, therefore, became a turning point in the area, positioning the neighborhood as a vote bastion. As the CORAJE leader, Mrs. Zea, explained: “Since then, the people said: there are a lot of votes in the zone” (Interviewed on 11. 27.2010). In the 90’s, they persuaded three city council meetings to veto the zoning change until the aldermen supported the decision.

In 2000, the foundation started to promote the partial plan initiative and make progress in preliminary technical studies. However, the lack of funds and technical expertise showed the need for higher-level political support and communication channels with the planning department. CORAJE saw the opportunity to present the plan to an independent mayoral candidate that was looking for non-partisan civic support. Then, CORAJE decided to campaign in favor of Sergio Fajardo as a board member, Elena Jaramillo, explains: “we politicized ourselves” (Interviewed on 11.17. 2010). In the same line, a business owner referring to CORAJE leaders said: “ I would say that they changed the L of leadership for the L of lobbying... the neighborhood leaders became like any traditional politics...” (Interviewed on 11.22.2010). The purpose was to boost the project and assure mayoral support to finish the plan and get public approval. The representatives of the community coalition using their context dependent rationality engaged in partisan politics to operate as planners as Flyvberg (2002) would suggest. However, CORAJE leaders involved in the
political campaign lost some credibility with the inhabitants. In sum, the rationale of participating in the campaign was to push forward an agreement to introduce their terms in prior negotiations in which they were neglected by planning authorities.

2. **Addressing social vulnerability: Framing informality as productive symbiosis**

According to the leader Mrs. Zea, the central planning decisions were a product of ignorance: "*Planners didn’t even bother getting to know the neighborhood, they hadn’t done a single study, they didn’t know anything*" (Interviewed on 11.27.2010). In the same line, the former director of partial plans, Mrs. Acero, claimed:

"*Form the desks we can never find true solutions, people have the solutions for the problems they are suffering, they know how to solve them...we are only facilitators for devising the strategies...*" (Interviewed on 12.11.2010).

CORAJE attempted to reveal the capriciousness and lack of technical rationality behind the intentions of the planners. For them, knowledge of the area was their weapon of choice to fight the planning department in terms of informal activities and public space occupation. The community leaders worked to end myths about the competitive nature of formal and informal activities. Instead, the coalition framed the formality-informality nexus as productive chains and clusters of solidarity. The tactics used by these leaders in the deal making process were:
a. Advocating inhabitants’ protection

Figure 35. Neighborhood characters in the local memory workshop

Source: Guinger, 2007

This move to protect the inhabitants appealed to previously granted legal rights. The former legal framework of urban land reform (Law 9/1989) introduced the right to protect inhabitants in renewal processes. The technical coordinator brought back this concept and used it as a legal basis for their claim of the right to remain in the intervention area. The partial plan technical support document frames this right as follows:

“The protection of inhabitants, more than a concept, is a social construct that originates in a specific territory and particular circumstances. However, the political acceptance of local government provides the basis to grant these rights. Thus, the protection of inhabitants allows for the collective construction of habitat that represents the materialization of an economic and symbolic heritage”. (Guinger, 2006: 116)

The terms of protection also accepted bringing new users and activities and protecting existing economic circuits, modernizing productive activities, and qualifying public space conditions. In this proposal, CORAJE expected to maintain at least 80% of its current inhabitants adjusting to the new
requirements of the project. CORAJE defined a set of social programs as constitutive part of the social costs of the project.

The most salient programs proposed were the attention of homeless, the mitigation of impacts for uses and population expulsion, the organizational support for informal workers, and the like. As a result, in order to justify the need for protecting inhabitants/non-landowners CORAJE used available legislation. It emphasized the state’s responsibility in granting citizens rights and the obligations of private investors in terms of the social responsibility of the enterprise:

“The essential feature of urban renewal areas, in contraposition to the territorial law, is that land tenure is not in the hands of inhabitants; here the participation of the State is mandatory as the only regulatory entity and guarantor of citizen rights... Moreover, private enterprises policies become an input for the public policy... productivity, efficiency, profitability cannot be taken as a disadvantage, rather they can help as redistributive mechanisms in the context of partial plans of renewal according to the law” (Guinger, 2006:103)

Furthermore, CORAJE advocated for linking inhabitants protection not only in terms of housing but intertwined with the constitutional right of work (i.e. article 25 of the political constitution). In this way, the preliminary technical document of the partial plan unveils the disjuncture between the legal privilege of landowners and the reality of having a majority of street workers and renters.

c. Partnering with street workers

Street workers realized that they would be highly impacted if the renewal plans were implemented. One of their leaders proposed to organize a cooperative to articulate and voice their needs in the negotiation process. The street workers leader, Mr. Javier Esparragos, explained:

“Unfortunately we, as street workers, do not have support from the municipality. They tolerate that we work in the street but they do not support us for a project” (Interviewed on 11. 26.2010). In addition, he contended: “The interests of CORAJE were not the same as our interests...” (Interviewed on 11. 26.2010) while the CORAJE leader, acknowledges: “The informal workers
were at a weak position within the process. For some, they are convenient and for others they are disturbing” (Interviewed on 11. 27. 2010). Then, street workers found in a cooperative an institutional organization for partnering among themselves to be heard in the process of negotiation. The organization was formed in 2001 under the name of COOTACOJ (Cooperative of Associated Informal Workers of Corazon de Jesus).

Street workers hold the belief of becoming landowners as a requisite for getting benefits in the process. Thus, land tenure started to be an imperative to informal workers, who started saving money to buy land and have a stake in the process. According to the street workers’ leader: “We have to fight for our wellness, for a parking lot, a parcel where we can have access to build the head office of the cooperative and a space for a store to sell new and second hand auto parts…” (Interviewed on 11. 26. 2010). Even though, street workers sought to become landowners, they were thinking that collective land tenure would preserve solidarity networks.

In the vision of a plan advisor who also worked in the assemblage of the national legal framework “the cooperative of informal workers had the possibility of access to formal facilities in the new commercial spaces” (Interviewed on 11.23.2010). Moreover, the technical coordinator of the plan, architect Sandra Guinger, explained:

“To deal with informal work in terms of land management is very complicated ... this is the Achilles heel of the law about partial plans...we are dealing with activities that are linked to illegality such the informal occupation of public space... it is inevitable that those productive chains become broken…” (Interviewed on 12.17.2010)

Planners acknowledge the limitation of the legal framework and links to illegal and informal spatial practices. This conviction and attempts to acquire the status of owners were congruent with ideas of property protection and formalization. In that regard, the plan advisors proposed having a percentage of profit derived from the project to fund social programs for street workers.
Figure 36. Spatial practices of street workers and inhabitants

Source: Guinger, 2007
4. Measuring land markets: State restrains land market regulation and land buying encroachment

This strategy unveils how the landowners’ legal privileges curtail the leverage of non-landowner inhabitants indirectly affecting the decision making process. CORAJE persuaded landowners to become partners of the project despite the limitations and complexity of having a vast number of owners in the area.

Figure 37. Variation in land prices in downtown Medellin

Source: Alcaldía de Medellin, 2006
Landowners of big lots were also business owners who could facilitate their involvement as partners; private sector investors favored the exclusion of inhabitants in the decision making process. As the director of the local real estate and builders association, Mr. Loaiza, argued:

“It is necessary to organize the community of non-landowners for voicing their interests ... but they cannot be in the decision making table...they have to be heard but they cannot make decisions...” Interviewed on 11.24.2010

Figure 38. Corazon de Jesus parcel structure

Source: Guinger, 2007
This rationale limited the inclusion of private investors in the partial plan negotiation for contravening the principles of the community initiative. Moreover, the local state used its role as landowner in crucial locations and opposed the use of land speculation controls, such as, land value capture. The passive action of the local state exposes their collaboration in land speculation. At the same time the expectations generated by the plan and the growing textile maquiladoras in the sector also created a big pressure of transformation. Therefore, CORAJE’s strategy is a constant struggle with local state acting as reluctant owner, the encroachment of land buyers for textile maquilas, and the landowners’ fragmented interests. The tactics used under this strategy were:

**a. Defy the 51% land ownership rule**

The new legal framework attempts to change the relation with land property. However, entrenched spatial practices of ownership confront legal notions on the ground as the CORAJE director, Mrs. Zea, expressed:

“Here the sense of ownership of land is very entrenched because we have to struggle so hard for buying land... then we fight against a model that is copied from Spain models and Japan... law 388 [Law of territorial development] brings a mixture of thousand things... therefore, how can you compare a renewal process in Japan where everybody knows that land is at the end owned by the state... leased for a century or so... there is a different consciousness of land ownership.... instead, here [in Colombia] If I buy land I die with MY land, it remains in my family and so on...that is why it is so hard to make people interested in getting together in the transformation of a block and a whole neighborhood, people only understand ‘who is going to buy, how much I am going to get, and when do I have to leave... that’s all because that has been the language of state planning... ” (Interviewed on 11. 27.2010).

This excerpt not only shows the tensions aroused in the implementation process of the new spatial planning system; but also questioned the deep differences with the models of reference used for the new system of land assemblage. Furthermore, the TDL determines that it is necessary that the
owners’ of the 51% of the land agree for executing the project through each land management unit. In downtown projects the block becomes the unit for land readjustment. As a result, the big landowners are most likely to dominate the negotiation as Mrs. Zea claimed:

“Who makes the decisions about what are we going to do? Is it the owner of the place or the owner of the business? ... The laws defines that the ones that decide are the owners and if the owners of more than 51% agree, no matter the amount of neighbors, the one that decides is the one with more land, and the rest? I’m sorry, they are screwed up...” (Interviewed on 11. 27.2010).

The plan promoters acknowledge the limitation of their leverage for claiming inhabitants’ rights in the midst of such legal restrictions. Hence, the tactic remained to struggle for persuading the owners involved in the same business of auto repair services to partner in the project.

b. Land buying encroachment

The planning department did not control land speculation and limited the access to existing cadastral information. The monopoly of public information was used as a political tool to inhibit the circulation of ownership data among the plan formulators. However, some critics of the process argued, “The State is doing traffic of privileged information long ago” (Interviewed on 11.02.2010). Even though, CORAJE director explained:

“The people from the textile industry formed an association and came to ask me how was the partial plan and what was the construction right index – 4.2 – when I gave that information to their representatives... they started to buy parcels immediately...” (Interviewed on 11.27.2010).

The information disclosure to possible partners jeopardized the scheme of land tenure and produced drastic changes in the price patterns, as the technical coordinator, Architect Guinger, stated:

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This total area is referred to the operational units or autonomous real estate projects that conform the large-scale project. In urban renewal areas the land management unit becomes the block.
“The official realtors office did some referential land appraisals at the beginning of the process... but in the final phase some of the land appraisal all the land prices had risen because the textile sector started to buy a lot of land... so the owners remaining there said ‘if that law tells me that I have to transform my lot...it means to invest and if I have the chance to sell these people are offering me a high price, then, I rather sell’... as a result the market was completely distorted...” (Interviewed on 12.17.2010)

Land speculation increased the landowners’ expectations of selling property instead of becoming partners in the project. The rise of demand for textile maquilas influenced the unprecedented land selling in the area. In addition, the long duration of the negotiation process also brought problems in projecting the financial scheme in the midst of changing land market conditions. In consequence, CORAJE faced the trickle down effect of land selling and the impotence of combating the increases on land prices.

**c. Struggle against the State as reluctant owner**

Figure 39. Urban design proposal and state-owned project

Source: Guinger, 2007
The role of state-owned land in the intervention area triggered a conflict between CORAJE and the Planning Department. While state planners advocated for maintaining the public facilities location (i.e. Police station, fire station and some storage of the public utilities enterprise), CORAJE pitched for turning these low-density buildings into the pioneer public spaces for the project as a whole. The contentious issue becomes the internal contradiction of local state promoting a densification process and the generation of public space but not leading the process with the use of its own land.

CORAJE defended the location of housing uses nearby the existent residential areas and as conditioned use in the rest of current commercial areas. CORAJE proposed the generation of the Agora plaza in the state-owned land as an opportunity to create a metropolitan center of institutional uses. However, the planning department excluded these two topics from the negotiation table and decided unilaterally before the mayor’s approval. Therefore, the inclusion of residential uses was used as alibi for dismantling the enduring struggles for traditional workers to remain in the site.

4. Shaping space: Generating an open blocks network as a bastion for integration

The participatory approach to urban design was a product of the partnership between CORAJE and the Architecture School of the National University in 1997. Professor Wolf, who led this project with students and local inhabitants, explained the process:

“We had a social program of academic work with students who wanted to link their graduation project with real problems...we were standing against the speculative real estate that goes against traditional uses and the appropriation of some citizens that are a little bit defenseless in front of legal instruments... these students were passionate with the process of being in a territory that was under threat... for us that threat was the condition to make the people get together ... where there is not a threat is very difficult to build community ... we had a mutual learning experience...We did fieldwork in the streets drawing in plans ... and we did a collaborative tridimensional model using the materials available in the area... we had workshops for understanding and proposing a spatial arrangement that suits their needs and desires...the
biggest achievement was to change the way of thinking in that territory, instead of thinking this territory is just for my own, we push for thinking in terms of a collective project...start to talk about that was also a way to expand arenas to work with informals, including them in the project... ” (Interviewed on 11.22.2010)

These encounters grouped the inhabitants by economic activity, zone, block, and land tenure on a weekly basis. One of the challenges in the participatory process entailed understanding the implications of generating more public space at the expense of current private land. However, the CORAJE leader insisted: “when you dream you compromise” (Interviewed on 11.17.2010). The scope of the urban design in words of one of the plan advisors, Architect Garcia, was: “the role of urban design on a partial plan is very detailed in the public aspect and very sketchy in the private space.” (Interviewed on 11.23.2010). The Mrs. Zea explained the pivotal role of public space configuration: “The conflict was and it will be to define where public space is going to be located that needs to be generated with the partial plan. That has been always the fight” ( Interviewed on 11.17.2010). As a result, the main proposal to tackle the urban design of the area promoted a layout to would keep the open space activities inside the blocks as hubs of public/private areas forming a system of an open blocks network. The tactics used in the deal making process were:

a. Participatory design manifesto

Actors channeled their interests in the urban design in the process of negotiation of large-scale projects. CORAJE and the School of Architecture of the National University developed a set of participatory design workshops that went on over the course of three years. This process focused on providing tri-dimensional models for guiding the spatial intervention correlated to the inhabitants’ desires and needs. The main proposal was to maintain the existing economic activities distribution (i.e., housing - textiles - wood - vehicles) and the protection of formal-informal dynamics to fortify existing economic circuits. Therefore, the spatial pattern promoted several
strips of flexible building typologies with open cores in each block and urban connections to transit and public space corridors.

Figure 40. Initial participatory urban design proposal for Corazon de Jesus

Source: Ortiz, 2010

The process resulted also in an intervention decalogue to guide the plan negotiation:

“a) The area has several comparative advantages in the city; b) The people that work here want to stay; c) In the area exists solidarity networks that keep jobs; d) The area needs to be changed in concordance with the surrounding interventions, planning requirements and the inhabitants’ economic benefit; e) Jobs need to be protected and productivity increased; f) In order to be more productive and profitable, the area must attract more clients and offer more services; g) In search of higher profitability, the area needs to transform in function to that of the market; h) The benefit from the built environment qualification must be oriented to the same workers of the area; i) Every body fits: formal and informal; and j) There are no messiahs; the process belongs to the community.” (Guinger, 2006: 102)
This example suggests reclaiming urban design as political encounter of place based interests to shape city landscape.

**b. Past argument for future**

Memory became a key tool to justify keeping the inhabitants and activities in the area. The leader Ms. Zea asserts:

“We did a research on cultural memory with support from the Secretary of Education and Culture...that study revealed the church as the main architectonic landmark ...also the house where CORAJE operates has a lot of value...but the main heritage that the area has is the knowledge of all the crafts operating in the area...we discovered that the neighborhood was inherited from the great grandfathers, and the crafts and business owners were the grandsons and sons of the same family...” (Interviewed on 11.27.2010)

Thus, a collective study on the heritage of the practices and landmarks in place helped to build identity and a sense of community and solidarity. The technical coordinator of the plan traced the historic pattern of occupation and legal dispositions in the area:

“The spatial configuration of Corazon de Jesus originated in the fist decades of the XX century, as an expansion of the old city market area in Guayaquil. The area where the neighborhood is located was occupied by commercial and services activities...Ordinance 92 from 1959 defined the land use and authorized the settlement of commercial activities in the area of Corazon de Jesus...” (Guinguer, 2006: 43).

In this way, the community showed the historic trajectory of the area as a long-standing tradition of commercial activities and services. The study of heritage portrayed the roots of the spatial practices and attachments to define motivations and interests in the process of renewal.

**c. Reversing public space occupation**

The public space “invasion” by street workers and renters was one of the most controversial issues when discussing the problems of the zone. Despite the generous dimensions of the street layout and block sizes, the cores were under utilized and streets and pedestrian lines saturated.
Thus, the proposal focused on functionality and formalization; the plan advisor, Architect Garcia, explained:

“\textit{The partial plan in essence sought to give space to the formalization of informal activities and give spaces to relocate activities in the same areas for renters...sharing economic clusters to enhance productivity by concentrating activities and bringing more users}. ” (Interviewed on 11. 23.2010)

The rationale behind meeting the challenges inherent in renewal projects is balancing the introduction of higher densities with public space generation.

In order to apply that rationale, the community discussed building typologies, types of public space, and the threshold of semiprivate open spaces. According to Architect Garcia the purpose was that:

“\textit{The original owner has availability of space to keep the original renters, but having more commercial spots to rent. That is why the option of having open blocks in four buildings will give more corners to rent...}” (Interviewed on 11.23.2010)

Furthermore, the preservation of most of existing parcel structure would facilitate the process of land readjustment, as the coordinator of the plan, Architect Guinger, explained:

“\textit{...If we see the layout of existent conditions and see the one of the proposal the modifications are minimal in terms of urban structure and lots configuration ... based on the parcel structure we tried to impact the minimum possible to generate the new public space required according to POT... we created pedestrian passages, boulevards in existing streets for connecting four new plazas, three at the neighborhood level and one at urban lever for connecting the neighborhood with the rest of development around the area...}” (Interviewed on 12.17.2010)

Consequently, the preferred spatial arrangement had central backyards in each block; open-commercial ground floors in mix use towers, a set of inner passages, a network of boulevards, and a circuit of three plazas. This tactic resonates with Foucault’s (1984) idea of portraying space as central to communal life and as means to exercise power. As a result, the notion of public space was not only seen in terms of a scene for inhabitants’ appropriation, but also as a tool to make them conform to normalized practices of ‘formality’.
6.4 Deal and compromises

In August of 2007, the mayor approved the partial plan though Decree N.1316 after seven years of negotiation. The renewal of the area, according to the agreement, included a socio-economic component to fortify the competitive platform by taking advantage of existing productive economic networks. Nonetheless, the planning department changed the initiative from community-led to private, shifting responsibility for the project onto private investors. The strategies to cope with uncertainty and complexity associated with informality were:

- Urban design

Figure 41. Corazon de Jesus partial plan urban design proposal

The design seeks to generate a public space system based on a pedestrian circuit that connects a sequence of three plazas. The project generated 26.242 square meters of new public spaces (18.002 sq. mt. within the planning area), and 42.230 square meters of upgraded sidewalks.
This proposal considered creating a network of boulevards and three plazas (Plaza del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús, Plazarella, and Plaza de los oficios), and improvement of pedestrian accessibility and connectivity to public transit and to the metro station. The Partial Plan Renewal proposed to enlarge sidewalks to generate a central boulevard in the main streets—cars had occupied three quarters of this space. A new park adjacent to the church and the historic preservation of the building were also included. The main public facility was an educational institution to support and train the workers of the area. In addition, a pedestrian bridge was proposed that would connect the area to the other side or the river.

Figure 42. Design of Private Areas in the Partial plan of Corazon de Jesus

Sellable Private spaces included 656.054m² in total. The project seeks to cluster auto mechanic services within six blocks, two for trucks services and four for smaller vehicles. The typology of these buildings was geared to support the maintenance formal/informal arrangements.
By having blocks with internal corridors connecting to the open core of the block and a double façade, the design seeks to avoid occupation of public space while still permitting accessibility and retaining areas for these services. Moreover, the buildings design proposed a mixed-use typology introducing a street pedestrian platform open to commercial activities. These towers are designed involving the first four stores for offices and commerce and higher floors for residential uses. Twenty percent of the area was to be dedicated to housing projects with ten percent of the total intended for affordable housing in high rises (See Figure 43). However, last minute changes made by the planning department allowed residential uses in all the areas of the neighborhood contrary to what CORAJE principles had considered.

Figure 43. Public areas design in the Partial plan of Corazon de Jesus

![Public areas design in the Partial plan of Corazon de Jesus](image)

Source: Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007

- Financial strategy

The social impacts of the project were mitigated with the funds generated by one percent of the sales of each of the 22 land management units or autonomous real estate project. This
represents close to US$ 7.5 million from the total private investment of almost US$32 million toward the entire project for public space and amenities. Subsidies would be managed by an independent institution in charge of the execution of this aspect of the plan and responsible for support of small enterprises, development of a center for informal workers, and for addressing impacts on activities and populations that would need to be displaced. Even though the agreement expected to maintain 80 percent of the current population, the remaining inhabitants would need the support of several public entities to determine their future. The implementation of the plan relies on the private sector since it is the private sector, and, in this case, the landowners who would need to develop each phase of the project.

Figure 44. Financial scheme Partial plan of Corazon de Jesus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICADORES</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ÁREA DE PLANIFICACIÓN</td>
<td>264,000 m²</td>
<td>HA: 28.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÁREAS DE CESIÓN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aporte EP m²</td>
<td>26,242</td>
<td>EP/HAB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aporte EQ m²</td>
<td>6,771</td>
<td>Aporte Vías m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIVIENDA PROYECTADA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidades</td>
<td>1,544</td>
<td>m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Área VIV</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Un. Ví</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTROS USOS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comercio m²</td>
<td>359,363</td>
<td>Unid. Comercio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servicios m²</td>
<td>163,347</td>
<td>Unid. Servicio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÁREA NETA</td>
<td>99,803 m²</td>
<td>HA: 9.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÁREA TOTAL CONSTRUIDA</td>
<td>653,387 m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICADORES ECONÓMICOS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventas totales previstas</td>
<td>1,524,561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egresos totales previstos</td>
<td>1,230,515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilidad estimada</td>
<td>294,046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilidad sobre ventas</td>
<td>19.29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDICADORES DE IMPACTO SOCIAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empleos generados en ejecución</td>
<td>31,185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aportes a la Inversión física y social del municipio (Millones de pesos)</td>
<td>$94,593</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007

- Property rights and land readjustment

Landowners were conceived as partners in the real estate projects with the opportunity to sell or purchase development rights. However, the intervention area suffered from a silent massive
land buying by textile traders in the last years of the negotiation. As a result, new absentee landlords owned the areas where the wood industry was entrenched generating distrust in the future negotiation process. The land readjustment allowed for a more effective land use through 22 different phases of the units of management development. These spatial units aim to distribute the costs and benefits of the project. In this project, each block became a unit, only divisible if conforming to the designed inner open cores and passages. In addition, the areas of new public space took 20 percent of existing built areas for generating the three plazas and boulevards.

Figure 45. Land readjustment scheme Partial plan of Corazon de Jesu

Source: Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007

Two areas of special management were declared; one was expected, the other surprised CORAJE. The former consisted of the surroundings of the religious landmark, while the latter
included state-owned land expected to pioneer the intervention and assume part of the social housing required in the area. In this case, the state acted as a reluctant landowner in the last round. As result, CORAJE felt betrayed and alleged corruption associated with the personal interests of planning department members.

**Conclusion**

“Today, after 18 years of that ill-fated norm we are still in our neighborhood ‘Barrio Triste’. With perseverance and panic, we need both to keep moving and to transform ourselves yet remain.”


Figure 46. Panoramic view of Corazon de Jesus neighborhood

source: Liliana Arboleda, 2011

In this chapter I presented the negotiation of the community-led partial plan of renewal Corazon de Jesus. This chapter showed how partial plans of renewal in Medellin served as the
linchpin tool for the remaking of downtown. Moreover, it presented the systemic restraint of community initiatives despite the progressive promise of the new planning system. Even so-called progressive regimes fail to ameliorate basic starting conditions determining who will benefit in the end. The results of the planning department changes following agreements reached with CORAJE are: a) change in the type of initiative from community led to private and a reassignment of public responsibilities in the social component of the project, b) elimination of restrictions in residential uses location may trigger the expulsion of the main economic activities tied to car repair services, c) state-owned land was turned into a special treatment area exonerating local government of participating as partner in the project and contributing to the social housing share. As a consequence, the participatory process became jeopardized by state planners’ long-term refusal to allow community involvement in the transformation of space.

The chapter detailed the deal-making strategies and tactics that community coalition, local planners and private investors used for mobilizing their interests. I showed that the community initiative emerged as political resistance to planning proposals advanced by the municipality. Yet, when CORAJE engaged in electoral politics as a means to advance the interests of the residents, the organization’s inner legitimacy was questioned when one of the leaders assumed a public elected position. Despite their support of the elected mayor, the budget assigned to the partial plan focused only on funding technical studies. This fact signaled a limited compromise of the mayor with the community of Corazon de Jesus –even though he approved the partial plan during his mandate.

The case exposed the use of informality as a discursive practice that diminishes non-landowners inhabitants’ leverage in their attempt to protect their rights to stay. Even though the emphasis on the symbiotic relationship between formal and informal economic circuits makes
visible the role of informal economic activities in local productivity, it places a barrier to integrate non-landowners in the land readjustment scheme inasmuch as it closes possibilities for collective tenure. In particular, the social costs devoted for street workers and renters programs depend solely on real estate investment. As a consequence, achieving the 1% of the project sales for funding social programs becomes only an apparent success for it relies on the actual execution of the project in its entirety.

The POT frames public interests in terms of public amenities and the provision of social housing. Additionally, it requires that private developers assume responsibility for public facilities in large-scale projects as part of their responsibilities in the urbanization process. Although this measure materializes the changes in the conception of property, it also justifies the state’s withdrawal from participating in large-scale projects. In this case, the state-owned land involved in the project was excluded from the responsibility to contribute in the social and infrastructural aspects of the project. The municipality transferred the fulfillment of the public interest to the private investors and real estate developers. Furthermore, as I have argued, the Corazon de Jesus PP exposes the systematic use of ‘informality’ to curtail non-landowners’ leverage while shifting social responsibilities onto the real estate market despite the community coalition.
7. Conclusions: Spatial Politics of Large Scale Projects

“The centre of theory-making must move to the global south; there has to be a recalibration of the geographies of authoritative knowledge” (Roy, 2009: 820).

This dissertation examined the implementation of partial plans in the context of downtown renewal projects comparing two cases (i.e. community led and publicly led initiatives) in Colombian cities (i.e. Medellin and Pereira). This chapter summarizes how I employed ‘critical spatial planning’ as a lens for analyzing emerging spatial planning practices in Colombia and as a frame to overcome gaps in negotiation theory. The first section answers the main research questions regarding negotiation of partial plans of urban renewal. This line of inquiry unveiled the barriers to implement the urban land reform. The second section discussed the theoretical insights gained from studying the implementation of the new spatial planning system in Colombia. Finally, the third section addressed the limitations of the study and questions for future research. I have argued that the spatial politics of urban renewal operate as a state strategy to unlock land values through the formalization of informal practices in public spaces. In doing so, municipalities subordinate the urban renewal agenda to mayoral political agendas aiming to fund public infrastructure and amenities through the generation and capture of land appreciation. Therefore, I argued that the spatial dynamics of power in large-scale projects of this type can be understood using as an entry point the bargaining framework and the negotiation strategies and tactics of participating agents.

7.1 Research Findings

This section explores what the cases suggest about planning practices in the so-called Global South in general and the negotiation of large-scale projects in particular. It also summarizes
the implementation process of the new spatial planning system as I answer the questions guiding this research by comparing two cases in Colombian cities (See Table VI).

Table VI. Synthesis of negotiation process in the cases of study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader/key actor</strong></td>
<td>Public initiative: Mayor – EXITO foreign private investors</td>
<td>Community initiative turned into private initiative: CORAJE foundation – street workers association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation time</strong></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positioning Politically the project</strong></td>
<td>• Using renewal as Mayoral political Platform - Trust seeking of investors and voters - Private investors hunting - State catalytic actions</td>
<td>• Forming community coalition as political resistance - Changing meanings of renewal and participation - Praising self-management - Becoming a vote banking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Addressing informality</strong></td>
<td>• Framing informality as social deviance - Advocating human dignity in poverty - Using police force and selective relocation - Shifting NGO participation and institutional changes</td>
<td>• Framing informality as productive symbiosis - Legitimizing spatial knowledge - Advocating inhabitants protection - Partnering street workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measuring land market</strong></td>
<td>• Surrendering to state-led land speculation - Pay more for land get less for public amenities - Appoint a land buyer for private and public purposes - Giving up on land market regulation and cost recovery</td>
<td>• Enabling blockade of land market regulation - Defying 51% land ownership rule - Land buying encroachment - Struggle against state as reluctant owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shaping Space</strong></td>
<td>• Creating a civic plaza as iconic landscape of resurgence - Re-founding the city - Inverting the accessibility/land value nexus - Establishing an entrepreneurial surrounding</td>
<td>• Generating an open blocks network as bastion for integration - Creating a participatory design manifesto - Claiming the past as argument for the future - Reversing public space occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban design</strong></td>
<td>Public space: Cultural center (4,227 m²) + Emblematic civic plaza and Egoya park (16,950 m²) Private space: Residential areas (60,000 m²) + Commercial areas (60,500 m²) + Office areas (15,000 m²)</td>
<td>Public space: Education and labor training facility + three plazas and a network of boulevards (18,000 m²) + public space generation off site (8,000 m²) Private space: Residential areas -10% social housing (117,000 m²) + Commercial areas (360,000 m²) + Office areas (166,000 m²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding scheme</strong></td>
<td>Benefits: 50,460 points Infrastructural costs: 10,668 points Social costs: 7,068 points Self funding: No Up-front costs: Municipality</td>
<td>Benefits: 840,160 points Infrastructural costs: 159,371 points Social costs: 1% of total sales Self funding: Yes Up-front costs: Private investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land readjustment</strong></td>
<td>Land management units: 6 blocks assembling 214 parcels Landowners partners of the project: No Massive land buying: Yes</td>
<td>Land management units: 22 blocks assembling 974 parcels Landowners partners of the project: Yes Massive land buying: Partial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question One

- **How do agents involved in large-scale projects of downtown renewal mobilize their interests to shape space?**

The agent’s leverage derives from the bargaining framework and their ability to engage in the local power matrix. I showed how the mobilization of space-based interests occurred in three stages. **First, the assemblage stage:** The Law of Territorial Development (Law 388/1997) became the foundation of the new spatial planning system in Colombia. The case study illustrated how the negotiation framework resulted from transnational flows of planning models and local institutional trajectories and why partial plans embody the assemblage of transnational planning references for promoting large-scale projects. In this context, the Colombian technocracy shaped the new spatial planning system using a recombination of local and international references in the principles and land management tools. Likewise, the circulatory capacity of planning ideas was illustrated by the adoption of planning tool kits from Spain, Japan and France. These flows depict the linkages of circuits of power/knowledge first developed in the colonial past and continuously recycled in new ways and the nodes of authoritative knowledge involved. The planning system in Colombia emerged in the tension between hegemonic planning models and the promise of a progressive agenda of urban land reform in Latin America. The bargaining framework for large-scale projects exemplifies this tension. Meanwhile, the municipalities’ redeployment of the national legal framework opened participatory venues and reenacted the role of space in collective decision-making.

**Second, the re-deployment stage:** Strategic large-scale projects were defined in the formulation of municipal territorial plans -POT- and the associated partial plans used for their land management. Moreover, partial plans served for targeting strategic locations in downtown fringes as sites of renewal. These areas had a long-term trajectory as contested places in each of the two cities.
The reasoning of the municipalities of Pereira and Medellin suggested three focal points in the use of partial plans of renewal: first, the framing of downtown fringes as deteriorated and underutilized land; second, the use of large-scale projects as instruments for urban competitiveness; third, the installation of the logic of public-private schemes to execute the projects. However, the evidence identified in this research showed that the political rationalization of both projects catalyzed long-term attempts at dismantling circuits of formal/informal economic activities and concentrations of vulnerable populations. Hence, the use of partial plans of renewal sought to eliminate barriers in the profitability of the real estate projects, to unlock land values, and to regain state/private sector control of the areas.

Third, the deal making stage: Private and public actors mobilized their interests using discursive and spatial practices. This dissertation argued that using negotiation strategies and tactics as entry points allows for the disentangling of power dynamics in the circulation of knowledge and capital. The case analysis showed how, regardless of the type of initiative (i.e. public or community-based), negotiation strategies and tactics entailed: a) the political positioning of the project, b) the setting of the boundaries formality-informality, c) identifying ways to overcome lot fragmentation and land speculation, and d) the physical design of the resulting spatial arrangement. However, the leader of the plan negotiation determined the role of state, community, landowners and private investors.

While in Ciudad Victoria the alignment of the mayor and foreign investors triggered public coverage of up-front costs and a fast track agreement, the community coalition in Corazon de Jesus struggled over seven years to reach an agreement confirming the state’s withdrawal from social responsibilities. Moreover, the cases showed the role of state-owned land as a crucial factor for inhibiting or enabling the execution of large-scale projects. In Pereira the state operated as a
pioneer in the intervention, whereas in Medellin the state acted as a reluctant owner and blocked the transformation of public land. In both cases planners assumed that the real estate market could act as a distributive agent and that the state could use its ownership of land as leverage for public goods. As a result, the implementation of the legal principle of equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities was jeopardized.

Question Two

- How does the negotiated urban design scheme articulate public and private agents’ interests in large-scale renewal projects?

Agents’ interests are rooted in space. That is why spatial and discursive practices define the repertoires of space intervention. On the one hand, municipalities embody a three-fold interest: a public amenities agenda, state-owned land as an asset, and electoral platforms. On the other hand, private interests seek cost effective locations via public incentives to invest, development rights, flexible requirements in buildings typologies and uses, quick land acquisition, and stable rules for investment. As a consequence, the challenge of urban design becomes how to increase construction density, change the parcel/lot structure, define the compatibility of new uses, and develop strategies for public amenities generation. The central issues at stake is who decides the design and the features of public and private areas. I examined the ways in which urban designs inhibit or facilitate the protection of inhabitants/users and the circuits of the formal and informal economies.

Urban design in Corazon de Jesus was rooted in the participatory process channeled through the School of Architecture of the National University. Whereas the Ciudad Victoria case employed a single architect to design public space avoiding public disclosure or the bidding process (there was a public contest only for the Cultural Center), the Corazon de Jesus scheme sought enhancing the existing economic activities inverting the pattern of public space occupation -
from the street to the core block. In contrast, Ciudad Victoria’s design focused on replacing entirely the exiting morphology and uses building a cultural center in the previous city market site, carving out a new superblock for a big box retailer, and including symbolic open public space.

The Ciudad Victoria layout generated a central plaza and a linear park surrounded by low-rise commercial blocks and two blocks for mid-rise housing. This scheme avoided the possibility of retaining street vendors or relocating low cost uses. In contrast, Corazon de Jesus’ design strategy focused on a network of commercial passages and the generation of open block cores as semi private nodes for exiting activities. I concede that the departing social conditions of the sites explain the decision to protect or dismantle socio-economic activities. However, the differential degrees of social vulnerability do not justify the destruction of low cost accommodation or alternatives for street work. Thus, the formalization of informal activities in public spaces implied the relocation of street workers out of the intervention site in Pereira and turning street workers into owners in Medellin.

In sum, the cases exposed the shortcomings of obtaining public amenities through the real estate market by assembling land and sharing costs with the private sector. Corazon de Jesus’ design strategy served not only to involve landowners as partners of the project, but also to give the opportunity to renters and street workers of remaining in the location. Here, private interests crystallized in higher densities and flexibility of typologies to adapt to real estate demand and to make up for increases in land values. In addition, the mid-rise towers allowed for the mixture of uses and the development of the maximum construction index possible (i.e. 8,0). Public interest translated into devoting 15% of the private area for public space, introducing a circuit of three plazas and a set of boulevards in the main connecting streets. On the contrary, Ciudad Victoria’s design strategy focused on generating an emblematic public space to replace the old city market.
This strategy coupled with massive land acquisition prevented the participation of landowners and non-landowners as partners. In spite of that, while landowners received high land prices, foreign and national investors obtained the best location in the site, tax abatements, and expedited approval of their projects. Investors in return contributed only partially to fund land in the Egoya Park and social programs alleging the high costs of land. While Pereira’s mayor and investors favored the emblematic civic plaza, the community coalition in Medellin propelled not only economic clusters but also a network of semi public block cores and passages as spaces of integration for formal / informal economic circuits.

**Question Three**

- To what an extent have non-landowners been able to influence the process and outcomes of partial plan negotiation?

Downtown fringes are portrayed in state discourses as part of the geographies of decay, obsolescence, and illegality. Planning practices employed systematically the concept of ‘informality’ as a discursive tool to justify non-landowners/users rights to participate and impact the negotiation process. Nonetheless, the concentration of vulnerable populations in the intervention sites required in both cases the introduction of the variable social costs despite strategic voids in the legislation. Whereas in Corazon de Jesus the community coalition achieved a spatial configuration fostering existing economic circuits and the 1% of real estate sales for social programs, in Ciudad Victoria municipality and investors claimed to fund social costs at almost 30% of the total project costs. In this endeavor the NGO’s rooted in the neighborhood were more effective in voicing inhabitants’ interests than the ones operating at the city level. Although, CORAJE self-management proved to be an important component to community resistance, it also facilitated the state withdrawal in public services provision. Therefore, municipal governments diminished risks for
private investors while using new ways for financing public amenities at the expense of social responsibilities vis-à-vis vulnerable populations.

I addressed the limitations of land readjustment in a context of absentee landlords where the majority of space users are renters, street workers and vulnerable populations. In this regard state planning employed the concept of ‘formalization’ as a way to justify the dismantling of economic circuits, clearance of unwanted users from public spaces and criminalization of selected spatial practices. By doing this, municipalities dismissed the constitutive features of production of space in Latin American cities and the ever-shifting boundaries of formal-informal dynamics. Even though, the social costs of the projects were included as responsibilities in the execution of the project, protection funds relied on the real estate market –rather than on the state or on society at large. Thus, the curtailed leverage of local inhabitants/users reveals how the implementation of the new planning framework voids the principle of the primacy of collective rights determined by the 1991 Constitution.

These findings call into question the taken-for-granted assumption that informality is confined to the peripheries; rather, it is entrenched in the entire city and economy as a mechanism of space production aligned with differential spatial values. The cases showed that despite the fact that about 80% of inhabitants were non-landowners, the legal framework falls short in assuring their rights to protection. As a result, the implementation of partial plans of renewal was more efficient in allocating costs of public infrastructures and amenities to the projects than in assuring citizens’ rights and government social responsibilities.

In sum, Pereira and Medellin showed different processes and outcomes. In the former, a highly beneficial frame given to investors and local inhabitants were partially assisted by state or private programs; then, the governmental initiative seems less innovative to find strategies to
protect dwellers and also maintain them in the area. While in the latter, the grassroots initiative not only found a strategy to protect most of the vulnerable population but also presented a paradigmatic case of resistance and self-management. However, the spatial planning system as a whole system has been less effective in equalizing citizens’ rights access to opportunities pertaining downtown renewal. The outcomes of both negotiation processes cannot be fully attributed to the type of initiative. A variety of factors, such as the level of community vulnerability, inner power struggles, the real estate cycles also affected the renewal projects. Nonetheless, the attitude towards non-landowners residents and workers, community organization capabilities, and mayoral involvement on the project largely influenced the outcome.

The socio-legal movement of urban reform in Colombia in general and PP in particular are far from guarantee the initial progressive agenda. Nonetheless, the last two decades of urban land reform implementation have produced relevant advances in overcoming planning practices that conceives land ownership as a privilege and lacking of citizens involvement. Colombian spatial planning system is moving forward in defining responsibilities attached to land ownership and framing territorial development strategies. Yet the legal focus of partial plans on land ownership curtails the bargaining leverage of non-landowners to influence surplus distribution, social costs and space design. Likewise, it reveals a state retrenchment in supporting public services. Consequently, the entrenched asymmetry of non-landowners in the distribution of rights and responsibilities epitomizes the limitations of the implementation of land reform. Thus, even so-called progressive regimes fail to ameliorate basic starting conditions that determine who will benefit in the end.
### 7.2 Theoretical contributions

Table VII. Synthesis of the theoretical frameworks analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Communicative planning</th>
<th>Analytics of power planning</th>
<th>Critical spatial planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationality</strong></td>
<td>Communicative reasoning of argumentative agents’ constructs</td>
<td>Political rationalization as multiple rationalities entangled with power</td>
<td>Rationality of power entrenched in space-based discursive practices of agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Power</strong></td>
<td>Deliberative networked force of political communication</td>
<td>Ubiquitous relational dynamic that can be oppressive or productive - Power/knowledge operates to define what counts as reality</td>
<td>Social relations influenced by macro institutional political economy – acknowledges colonial trajectories of uneven geographies of knowledge production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-subjectivities</strong></td>
<td>Entitled stakeholders’ coordination for achieving consensus</td>
<td>Actors operating in a conflict driven dynamic of asymmetrical power</td>
<td>Agents using negotiation strategies and tactics to mobilize space-based interests searching for compromises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Space</strong></td>
<td>A-spatial framework – space as backdrop of communicative interactions</td>
<td>Space as a tool of power, inextricably linked to discourses and material practices</td>
<td>Space as centerpiece of productive economy, socially produced through formal/informal practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning context</strong></td>
<td>Conflict resolution under collaborative governance</td>
<td>Neoliberal governamentality as style of thought</td>
<td>Regulation of space through transnational flows of policy to foster territorial circuits of capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planner’s role</strong></td>
<td>Planner as mediator</td>
<td>Planner as imbued in power relations - empowering aspirations</td>
<td>Planner as agent of politics of space and rationality of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiation</strong></td>
<td>Problem solving process that emphasizes mutual gain; power relations are changed by correcting distortion in information</td>
<td>Constant struggle of political rationalization within partisan local political economy</td>
<td>Mobilization of agents’ interests influenced by transnational flows of planning ideas - space as by-product of decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section explores why the ‘critical spatial planning’ framework is best suited for understanding planning practice in the Latin American context. In addition, I point to the limitations of current negotiation theories, specifically communicative planning theory based on Habermas’ ideas and power analytics based on Foucault’s work. These theories illuminate the ways in which planning practice is embedded in multiple rationalities, inter-subjectivities, and power (See Table VII). Nevertheless, they largely fail to account for the impacts of post-
colonialism in the circuits of capital and planning ideas and the role of the materiality of space and
informality as pivotal features of spatial planning in the so-called Global South. As a result, I
suggest a turn in negotiation theory that forefronts off-the-table agents’ strategies for mobilizing
interests, the historical trajectories of the materiality of space, and the dialogic connections of
discourses at various scales.

- **Communicative planning theory**

The examination of the partial plans’ negotiation through the lenses of communicative action
theory fails to explain the politics of space operating in the cases examined here. I argue that this
theory underplays the role of space, the asymmetrical power relations embedded in deliberations,
and citizens’ contestation of the decision-making process. For instance, consider three pivotal
premises of communicative planning:

a) The focus on deliberative reasoning and planner mediation (Forester, 1982, 2006; Healey,
1997) ignores the critical role of police force and mayoral domination. The aspiration of an ideal
speech situation was not even intended for solving long-term conflicting relations between the city
and community organization in Medellin. The assumption of the planner as savvy mediator
jeopardizes a critical assessment of the technocratic biases of the planner as shown in Pereira and
even in the tactics of the Department of Planning of Medellin. Clearly, the planner in these cases
was not the source of advice but a conflict-producer.

b) The ideas of considering planning as collaborative power and stakeholders as autonomous
and the systemic exclusion of selected stakeholders. In the Ciudad Victoria case, instead of a
collaborative power in action, there was a partisan alliance with foreign investors that led to an off-
the-table agreement. Even though, institutional synergy was produced and NGO’s voiced the rights
of vulnerable populations, the non-organized community did not have voice in the process (80% of the population affected). Actually, the negotiation was used to legitimize public infrastructure investments and to direct benefits to private investors at the expenses of social inclusion.

c) The aims of having undistorted information and wide social learning (Forester, 2006) are jeopardized when information is used as a tool to constrain grassroots initiatives. Communicative planning suggests that in order to achieve agreements ‘unnecessary distortions of information’ have to be removed. Whereas in Corazon de Jesus land tenure information was restricted for CORAJE, in Ciudad Victoria the social census was not disclosed to the public. Besides, planners and developers were privileged in stakeholder interactions. This fact seems to underplay the role of citizens and especially of the disempowered agents that do not even get recognized as having a ‘stake’ in the process of city making.

In sum, Communicative Planning theory remains normative and procedural, rather than grounded in a substantive understanding of the ‘realpolitik’ through the study of conflict and partisanship. But, perhaps the most crucial limitation is ignoring space as a pivotal site for exerting power and as the source of agents’ interests.

- **Power Analytics theory**

The power analytics theory proved to be partially suited to explain the negotiation of partial plans. Although, this theory helps unravel how power operates in the practices of the state, it underestimates the role of space in the productive economy, the impacts of post-colonialism in knowledge production, and the transnational flows of planning ideas. For instance, consider three central premises of power analytics:

a) The exercise of power/knowledge defines what counts as reality (Flyvbjerg, 2002, 2004; Richardson & Flyvbjerg, 2001). In both cases key technologies of power, such as censuses and land
appraisals were crucial for shaping the negotiation terms. In Corazon de Jesus, it becomes most evident when CORAJE conducted its own economic census to demonstrate the role of the area and of formal-informal dynamics in urban productivity and space production. This is an expression of what Foucault calls productive power. Differently, in Ciudad Victoria the land appraisal conducted by the National Authority resulted in land speculation preventing the dedication of more private funds to public amenities. This is an expression of oppressive power. The cases showed how power/knowledge creates regimes of truth for mobilizing actors’ interests. However, using Flyvbjerg’s work (1998, 2002, 2004) I couldn’t explain the broader issue of how and why partial plans as a land management tool were introduced in the Colombian planning system. In Colombia the nexus with Spain recreates the prestige conferred to this country’s experts and the seduction/obsession with foreign sources of knowledge. When applied to the Global South, Flyvbjerg’s work on context dependent rationality and power overlooks the post-colonial legacy in the uneven geographies of authoritative knowledge production.

b) The state is depicted as a site of practices, strategies, and technologies (Lemke, 2007; Foucault, 2004). The cases reveal how large-scale projects result from the intertwining of practices and strategies and ‘realpolitiks’ as the driving force of planning practice. The Corazon de Jesus case showed how only when the area was considered a voting block in the mayor’s campaign, their planning initiative was considered by the Planning Department. Similarly, in Ciudad Victoria, the project became the political platform of the mayor to move to national level elected positions. Furthermore, the legal framework was the quintessential technology of manipulation to exercise power in the planning practice. In both cases the use of the territorial development law helped to install the public-private logic and to privilege landowners in the negotiation. Although, this approach to frame state action resulted very relevant in my analysis, power analytics fell short in
explaining the sources and motivations of the changes in the legal and institutional frameworks. In consequence, the missing link becomes the transnational flows of policies and planning models that shape local planning practice and the urban realities of informality.

c) Urban planning operates as a strategic and regulatory discourse of space (Richardson & Flyvbjerg, 2001; Richardson & Jensen, 2003; Foucault, 1980). This premise helped me to explain the multiplicity of discursive and spatial practices embedded in power dynamics in large-scale projects. Moreover, it aided to map the spatial rationalities that over time represented state interests in downtown intervention -- particularly, the systematic use of ‘urban renewal’ as a tool to target downtown fringes in long term efforts to dismantle the spatial practices of their residents/users. Nowadays, the municipal territorial plans promote large-scale projects as a leitmotiv for boosting the real estate market. By doing this, municipalities justify interventions in the name of ‘urban competitiveness’ and even ‘equity’. Even though, power analytics as Richardson & Jensen (2003) explain forefront the linkages between power struggles, space, and discourses, they ignore that one fundamental discursive practice in planning involves setting the boundaries between what is considered formal and informal.

- **Critical Spatial Planning**

The cases operated as platforms for addressing a broader issue – the power dynamics in large-scale urban projects in contemporary urbanism. Critical spatial planning challenges standard notions of negotiation inasmuch as it restores the importance of territorializing power. I contend that two levels of analysis are necessary to grasp the spatial politics of large-scale projects (See chapter 3). Meanwhile, the enabling conditions of space intervention involve the mechanisms of socio spatial trajectories of places and bargaining framework sources (See chapter 4). This level seeks to explain the macro institutional political economy that guides the planning agenda while
employing circulating urban policies and models. Furthermore, the bargaining framework needs to be located within the colonial legacy of uneven geography of knowledge production since it shapes the legal and institutional conditions for negotiation.

I highlight a notion not fully developed in the power analytics literature: ‘negotiation strategy and tactic’ as an analytical tool and a line of inquiry to unravel how actors’ space-based interests are mobilized (See chapters 5 and 6). This level includes the agents’ spatial and discursive practices employ for framing their interests and engaging in action. Consequently, my contribution consists of shifting the focus of negotiation planning to the mobilization of agents’ interests influenced by transnational circuits of planning ideas and capital to shape space, pre-emptying along the way the possibility of indigenous strategies corresponding to North-South dynamics.

The central premises to support the above framework are borrowed from several bodies of literature. I selected the premises that I corroborate with the empirical work:

a) Planning processes in the ‘Global South’ become sites of innovation to draw insights for all cities (Robinson, 2006; Miraftab, 2009; Roy, 2011). The ‘ordinary cities’ (Robinson, 2006) approach helped me to locate emergent Colombian planning practices in the process of historic trajectories of (post) colonization. I pointed out the long-term influence of foreign experts as a feature of Colombian urbanism. Moreover, my critiques to current negotiation theories pose an epistemological obstacle to tackle North - South comparisons. Moreover, assuming a formal framework/assumption, rationalities and practices imported from the North fail to incorporate the much higher levels of informality present in cities of the South and the formal/informal economy interactions involved. At the end, such framework becomes an impractical imposition while portraying non-formal activities as the problem rather than an actual solution (in Colombian cities providing nearly three-fifths of urban employment) preventing the possibility of creative solutions
that can actually apply to similar realities in cities of the North. Meanwhile, the analytical framework I present here can be useful across contexts.

b) Planning results in a cross-border borrowing of ‘models in circulation’ involving the ensemble of foreign/indigenous ideas to (de) regulate space (Peck & Theodore, 2010; Gonzalez, 2011; Roy 2011). Using this idea I described how the new spatial planning system in Colombia came about as an assemblage of pieces from the Spanish, French and Japanese planning models. Even more, I showed how the redeployment of the bargaining framework at the city level also introduced mutations in order to tailor the legal frame to local conditions. In both cases, the leading planning groups introduce a way to include social costs in the funding scheme and subordinate the idea of large-scale projects to long-term urban renewal initiatives. The transnational set of references allowed me to trace not only the sources of planning discourses but also the contents of land management tools, such as, partial plans and land redevelopment. I explained how the partial plans negotiation arose at the conjunction of transnational flows of planning ideas and local spatial trajectories. Thus, this premise also served to expose the spatial logics of the reassemble of agents’ power in the dispute for political control over real-estate capital.

c) Strategies and tactics become the actors’ practices to mobilize resources, turning interests into operational objectives and means for driving action (Thompson, 2003; Crampton & Elden, 2007; McKinlay et al., 2010). I focused my analysis on the context dependent rationality that guided CORAJE and the Pereira’s mayor to pursue their own ends. I portrayed the discursive and spatial practices employed for: positioning politically the project, setting the boundaries of formality/informality, addressing land markets, and designing physical arrangements. Furthermore, I explained how the spatial patterns for targeting urban renewal areas were linked to the role of
downtown in municipal plans. Hence, this premise helped me to unravel spatial practices as source of actors’ meanings and interests.

d) Urban informality operates in the political bargaining of the contested boundaries between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ spheres (Roy, 2005, 2009; Hossain, 2010; Devlin, 2011). This interpretation of informality served me to frame it as a state discursive strategy that attempts to legitimize or criminalize selected spatial practices. I used this notion for understanding how non-landowners were framed in both cases. Besides, I explored how citizens’ rights were acknowledged despite the landowners’ legal privilege in the decision-making process. Consequently, in both cases it became apparent that partial plan implementation is eroding the rights of residents/users using informality as a discursive practice for systematic exclusion/displacement.

Critical spatial planning emerges in a cross fertilization of theories by borrowing and appropriating diverse lenses. In doing that, I attempted to overcome the focus in the ‘how’ rather than in the ‘why’ that dominates US planning theoretical debates. Although, the analytical framework cannot fully contain the complexity of actors’ dynamics in place, it captures the most relevant features of contemporary urbanism.

7.3 Limitations and future research

There are several limitations in this study. The major ones stem from the method and the extent of data collection. First, data collection relied on available key informants. Second, there were limited secondary data about off-the table episodes due to their absence from meeting minutes and base line information of the intervention areas. The data analysis is substantially based on experts and state planners’ and NGO’ narratives of the process of negotiation.
Consequently, the difficulty of accessing private investors and landowners results in an incomplete picture of the negotiation process and a partial account of the variety of interests at stake.

There might be alternative explanations for the negotiation of partial plans of renewal. However, this study is exploratory in nature and examines an emergent planning practice that is unfolding. The analysis of more cases and contrasting analytical frameworks may provide a more robust explanatory framework. That is why, in my possible future venues for conducting research I am interested in the follow up of the agreements implementation and the use of partial plans in the urban expansion in the outskirts of the cities. In addition, I became interested in refining the analytical framework by under taking a cross context comparative study of large-scale projects of land management.

Partial plans are a key instrument that reveals the battle (present in the legislation itself as it tries to reflect constitutional mandates that can be ignored in practice as showed here) for two models of city-making, one rooted on social-spatial equity and the other based on land value extraction.

I close by suggesting that implementing land urban reform is a matter not only of national/local government compromises in partnering in the projects but also a matter of supporting non-landowners rights. In order to engender the socially progressive potential of Colombia’s spatial planning system the question becomes how targeted inhabitants can strengthen the power of community coalitions for driving partial plans regardless of mayoral support. Therefore, a shift in framing renewal and partial plans is needed in order to ground an effective and equitable distribution of rights and responsibilities as a way to protect inhabitants through the redistribution of power.
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EDUCATION
08 / 07 - 04 / 12  PhD in Urban Planning and Policy, CUPPA, University of Illinois, Chicago
08 / 99 - 06 / 01  M. Sc in Urban and Regional Studies, PLANUR, National University of Colombia, Medellin
09 / 94 - 06 / 99  BA in Architecture, National University of Colombia, Manizales
07 / 11          Summer Course on Comparative Urban Studies, University of Amsterdam
06 / 09          PhD Jamboree, SCARP, University of British Columbia, Vancouver
08 / 09          Dissertation workshop, ACSP, University of Washington, Seattle
07 / 06          Refresher Course on Environmental Management, Institute of Housing Studies, Lima

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
- TEACHING
01 / 09 - 05 / 10  Teaching Assistant, College Urban Planning and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Chicago
04 / 03 - present  Assistant Professor, School of Urban Planning, National University of Colombia, Medellin
02 / 02 - 12 / 02  Adjunct Professor, School of Architecture, La Salle University, Pasto (Colombia)
05 / 02 - 02 / 03  Academic Adviser, School of Arts, University of Nariño, Pasto (Colombia)
08 / 01 - 12 / 01  Adjunct Professor, School of Architecture, Bolivariana University, Medellin (Colombia)
- RESEARCH
08 / 09 - 12 / 09  Research Assistant, ‘Architecture for Change’, City Design Center, University of Illinois, Chicago
05 / 09 - 07 / 09  Research Assistant, ‘Global Economic Recovery: Cities Lead the Way’, Great Cities Institute, University of Illinois, Chicago
05 / 06 - 05 / 07  Research collaborator (team leader), ‘Colombia: Land and housing for the urban poor’, University College of London - World Bank - National Department of Planning, Medellin
03 / 06 - 03 / 07  Lead Researcher, ‘Reconversion of industrial areas in Aburrá river corridor’, National University of Colombia, Medellin
01 / 05 - 12 / 05  Lead Researcher, ‘Contemporary city’s emergent morphologic transformations’, National University of Colombia, Medellin
01 / 01 - 12 / 01  Research Assistant, ‘Reflections on the city - Medellín 1975 – 2002’, National University of Colombia, Medellin
- CONSULTING
05 / 06 - 05 / 07  Technical coordinator, ‘Revision of Master Plan of Itagüí’, Municipality of Itagüí
06 / 05 - 02 / 06  Technical coordinator, ‘Evaluation of Master Plan of Medellín’, Municipality of Medellin
02 / 05 - 05 / 05  Urban adviser, ‘Urban Design Guidelines for Southern Metropolitan Centrality’, PROSOCIAL
03 / 06 - 08 / 06  Urban designer, ‘Renewal Plan for Cienaga de la Virgen R4 – Cartagena’ - University of Valencia (Spain)
08 / 06 - 11 / 06  Urban designer, ‘Plan for Urban Growth A1 – Cartagena’, Foundation Compartir
10 / 06 - 04 / 07  Urban planner, ‘Plan for Urban Growth - Girardota’, Sierra Family
01 / 01 - 06 / 01 Urban planner, ‘Regional Plan of Public Space System’, CORANTIOQUIA

- PUBLIC SERVICE

05 / 02 - 03 / 03 Sub director of urban planning, Planning Department, Municipality of Pasto (Colombia)

CONFERENCES PRESENTATIONS

02/12 AAG Conference, Paper: Exploring politics of space in large-scale projects in Colombia: a comparative approach, New York

07 / 11 Research committee 21 ISA Conference - Paper: Negotiating downtown redevelopment projects in Colombia: is the right to the city a public discourse or a grounded citizenship practice? Amsterdam

03 / 11 UAA Meeting, Paper: Crafting agreements: shaping spaces for coping with uncertainty? The case of partial plans of downtown renewal in Colombia. New Orleans

10 / 10 ACIUR Seminar, Paper: ¿Reconfigurando Espacios Centrales Con Equidad Territorial? Bogota

09 / 10 Habitat Theory Congress, Paper: Grandes Proyectos Urbanos e Informalidad Urbana, UN, Bogota

11 / 09 Territorial Planning Congress, Paper: The collision of differential citizenship and spatial equity: Partial plans for urban renewal in Colombia, UNAM, Morelia

10 / 09 ACSP Conference, Paper: Partial plans for urban renewal in Colombia, new strategies for spatial equity?, Crystal city

03 / 09 MPSA Conference, Paper: The contemporary urban renewal through partial plans in Colombia: new frontiers for gentrification? Chicago

03 / 09 A AG Meeting, Paper: Suburban Archipelagos in Colombia: a new scale of segregation? Las Vegas

03 / 09 UAA Meeting, Paper: The influence of land use mix on social capital in Chicago communities, Chicago

03 / 06 IHS Congress, Paper: Articulating spatial planning and local economic growth in Colombia, Lima

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HONORS

07 / 11 FURS-IJJUR-RC21 Scholarship, Summer Course on Comparative Urban Studies

05 / 10 Fulbright Summer Research Grant, Dissertation fieldtrip

10 / 07 - 10 / 08 Chicago Consular Corps Scholarship, Best international students at University of Illinois

07 / 07 - 05 / 10 Fulbright Scholarship, PhD studies sponsorship in association with COLCIENCIAS - DNP