Building the Modern Turkish Household:
Koç Industries

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THESIS

Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Art History
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2012

Chicago, Illinois

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This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Danielle,
whose support enriched this intellectual journey.

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SUMMARY

This dissertation is a study of the changing visual and spatial culture of Turkey during and after the so-called "Marshall Plan Years," from 1947 to 1980. Looking at a series of cultural reconstructions, the dissertation traces the transformations that remade the visual, symbolic, and utilitarian spheres of the nation. Focusing on four seminal products, and the design and production sectors that produced them, notably Koç Industries, the dissertation examines tensions within the process of modernization: tensions between tradition and innovation, between local and national, between national and neo-colonial, and between private and state-controlled production and dissemination.

By foregrounding the main strand of Koç businesses that introduced four seminal products—instantaneous water heater, refrigerator, private automobile and television—this study exposes the development of a feedback loop that brought forth Turkey's consumer economy. A hybrid process occurred in which products came into existence both as a result of Vehbi Koç's responses to his larger context — notably, the changing national political economy and bursts of consumer demand — and by his forcing of responses from this context in order to realize his own vision of material well-being for the Turkish nation.

Koç Corporation transformed in the post-1980 period, during Turkey's transition from economic protectionism to global market integration, in order to ensure continuity by seeking global competitiveness. The study concludes with projections about Koç Corporation, as it gradually withdraws from manufacturing and seeks corporate power through more abstract means — such as concentrating its activities in the fields of energy, finance, and high-tech research.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. 1 Introduction

This dissertation is a study of the changing visual and spatial culture of Turkey during and after the so-called "Marshall Plan Years" from 1947 to 1980. Looking at a series of cultural reconstructions, the dissertation traces the transformations that remade the visual, symbolic, and utilitarian spheres of the nation. Focusing on four seminal products, and the design and production sectors that introduced them, notably Koç Industries, the dissertation examines tensions within the process of modernization: tensions between tradition and innovation, between local and national, between national and neo-colonial, and between private and state-controlled production and dissemination.

This dissertation simultaneously examines how Koç industries, a single industrial and design empire was able, through an increasingly sophisticated use of design principles and an equivalently savvy employment of the instruments of consumer desire, to implement the economic and material mirror of Atatürk's secularly modern Turkey, participating in the global market of modern ideas, yet proudly independent, economically, socially, and culturally self-sufficient. At the center of the discussion is Vehbi Koç, the founder of the industries, Turkey's first national capitalist and a leading member of its cultural elite who came into existence, both as a product of Turkey's larger modernity project and a prime mover that defined its course. By foregrounding the main strand of Koç businesses that introduced four seminal products, this study exposes the development of a feedback loop that

brought forth Turkey's consumer economy. A hybrid process occurred in which products came into existence both as a result of Vehbi Koç's responses to his larger context — notably, the changing national political economy and bursts of consumer demand — and by his forcing of responses from this context in order to realize his own vision of material well-being for the Turkish nation.

Over the course of the period covered by this dissertation, Turkey moved from a relatively stable, traditional, culturally independent, and predominantly pre-modern economic and social system, to a far more hybridized one that was technologically, industrially and economically modern, and one that was more deeply linked to globalized systems of production—of goods, of wealth, and of meaning. This dissertation proposes an overarching explanation for this shift, while at the same time looking at both the agents and the results of that shift, in the material products manufactured, used, and yearned for by a broadening and deepening plurality of Turkish citizens.

This study begins with the smallest but most significant spaces in the home—the kitchen and bath—and the products most important to their modernization, the hot water heater and the refrigerator. Tracing the development and dissemination of private hot water to a burgeoning middle-class Turkish population, introduces one of the central capitalist institutions of modernization within Turkey, Koç Industries and its founder Vehbi Koç.

Products directed toward the most stable and local of private spaces, the home, the Koç heaters and the Arçelik refrigerators were also agents for an increasingly interdependent and

increasingly mobile Turkish society—mobile in class and economic structure during the 1960s. The society became mobile also in movement through the public spheres, both spatial and informational during the 1970s. This evolving, expansive process is outlined in the development and implementation of the car and the television in which Koç industries took the leading role during the 1970s. These two objects—and the industrial, economic, and social systems that grew up around them and hastened their adoption—became the focus of larger national debates about the production of a modern Turkish identity. In the case of the automobile, these debates concerned the origins of design and production—to import, to create, or to hybridize—as well as the definition of a Turkish "folk car" that could simultaneously stand for and to enable, a new, mobile, Turkish national polity.

The television provided a more complex opportunity for cultural mobilization, this time focused not on geographical and social mobility but rather on the mobilization and motility of information. As an analysis of the physical design of the television and the graphic and symbolic design of the ads for televisions reveals, the ideological components of modernization were embedded in many different facets of the production system for television. At the same time, the television, and its capacity for widespread distribution of advertisements, resulted in a further amplification in the production of consumer desire for other machines of modernization, including the refrigerator, but most forcefully the automobile.

1.2 Koç Industries as a Social History of Design and Technology

Vehbi Koç's story offers a different kind of design history to be written than the ones devised for developed nations where designers operate in an advanced industrial and consumer culture. When authors talk about design in the United States, readers find themselves in a highly developed economy where easy reception of new ideas are possible.[1] Koç's story emerges in the lack of such a developed consumer culture. In fact, the story is about how a consumer culture can be created in the lack of supporting production, distribution, and marketing systems.

Throughout the period covered in this dissertation, Vehbi Koç operated in a primitive material cultural environment. Turkey was a newly industrializing country with relatively no culture of design. It was a traditional cultural environment that valued constancy and one that suspected transformation. There was no easy reception of new products. Thus, Vehbi Koç was adopting a certain kind of developed world mentality in a developing world situation. In this kind of lacking material context Koç takes on multiple roles. He embodies both the producer and the consumer as the nation's first capitalist who is also a leading member of its cultural elite. As a member of the cultural elite, his own example defined new living patterns that were aspired by and disseminated to the lower levels of the socio-economic ladder. As a businessman, he fashioned practical ways in which he met those aspirations. But, he also had to function within a strong central statist political economy that defined limitations for private enterprise. Thus, Koç's story is a certain way of thinking about design as part of national development where the entrepreneur is seeking opportunities within political, social, and economic constraints. By looking at Koç's design strategies that target the core values of the individual

and the family, and his entrepreneurship that builds industries within the means of a developing nation state, we can account for the larger social transformations that took place in Turkey from 1947 to 1980.

For the reasons stated above, this is primarily the story of an entrepreneur, and not of a designer. Vehbi Koç built businesses around design. Thus, the story has to account for the multi-dimensional context around the designed and engineered products, and requires to draw from multiple disciplinary frameworks, including political economy, business history, and history of technology. Studies about policies of industrial development and urbanization offer insights into how Turkish government's decisions set the playing field for Koç. Business histories illuminate Koç's challenging of national and global business hierarchies, as well as his leadership and institution of a new business ethos in Turkey. The core discussion of this dissertation — the transformation of the visual and material culture of Turkey after WW II — is, on the other hand, a hybrid history of design and technology. It involves Koç's 'translation' of design and technology for the developing country context in utilitarian and symbolic ways. Vehbi Koç built industries around multiple modes of design: architecture, branding and lastly product styling. The products themselves originated in the post WW II idea of using technical efficiency to democratize consumer goods for developing nations. They were conceived at the centers of industrial production and disseminated to less developed economies. Since the products and their technologies were borrowed, Koç's strategy was to claim their ownership by making the institutions that produced the objects to stand for them. Thus, the combination of architecture, branding, and product styling served to forge the institutional identities of Koç industries — specifically, Demirdöküm, Aygaz,

Arçelik, and TOFAŞ. They served as visual idioms for the Turkish modernity that were simultaneously national and global. These identities, that embedded elements of design and technology within them, meant to satisfy the social desire to share the contemporary moment with the world while they could be embraced as symbols of national expression. In order to tell this hybrid story of design and technology that involves the entire ecosystem of 'engineered' products, I also draw on sources uncommon to design history, that is, various histories of technology.

While this study's multi-dimensional approach offers a new way of talking about design history, its results offer to contribute to a more complete picture of how consumer culture took shape in the post WW II period beyond the United States and Western Europe. The discussion of Turkey as a nation that struggled to find its place in a world torn between Western and Eastern ideologies, partly illuminates the processes that gave way to specific designed expressions of developing nations.

In looking at Koç's story, I don't want to be trapped in a perspective that treats products as things that bear purely symbolic and aesthetic significance. Early and late historians of modern art, such as Nicholaus Pevsner (*Pioneers of Modern Design)* and Frederic Schwarz (*The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) think of products primarily as extensions of intellectual ideas of designers as cultural elites. Adrian Forty, Michael Adas (*Dominance by Design*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), Penny Sparke (*As Long as It's Pink*. London: Pandora, 1995), and Wiebe Bijker (*Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of*

Sociotechnical Change. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) are united in their belief that products are symbolic embodiments of hegemonic power. These authors consider designers to be subservient to the larger capitalist system of production where products are both consequences of and tools for top-down conditioning of consumers. The product's shell serves as phenomenological object for historians of modern art to make Marxist/neo-Marxist generalizations about industrial capitalism. In *Objects of Desire* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) Adrian Forty insists that the engineered product's significance derives primarily from its outer form which serves as a purely symbolic vehicle on which didactic messages are encoded to persuade consumers to adopt certain behavioral patterns. Others, such as Reyner Banham, while agreeing on their symbolic significance, see redeeming qualities in products and celebrate them as cultural artifacts freely adopted by popular taste cultures, their meanings freely made by consumers. ("Industrial Design and Popular Art," *Industrial Magazine*, March 1960; *Los Angeles: The Architecture Of Four Ecologies*. New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

All of these studies frame their discussion, more or less, by what they see in the products as aesthetic and symbolic qualities. They postulate the 'cultural' significance of products without truly venturing beyond the objects of discussion, and looking into the workings of the complex systems that give life to them. This approach that presumes products to be purely ideological things, as objects of discourse, prevents their multiple-dimensions to emerge, if they were, otherwise, treated as 'engineered' things having a place in a system of production, marketing, and distribution; if situated within the larger global industrial hierarchy, and the larger political economy that influences the course of the entire material system of allocations;

and if they were considered as units that worked within a system of products, with the potential to transform living patterns through their production, exchange/distribution, and use. Drawing a synthesis from such a wide array of factors could even be considered a kind of knowledge irrelevant or marginal for the purpose of design history that seems to isolate non-aesthetic factors in the discussion of products. Yet, such a multi-dimensional approach bears potential rewards for design history: it promises to make it a more complete, enriching and relevant history within the humanities whose appeal reaches beyond faculties of art and design.

I draw from those studies/histories of design that make an effort to situate 'engineered' products within their economical and technological contexts. This approach is best exemplified by Siegfried Gideion's classic *Mechanization Takes Command* (Oxford University Press, 1948), and by more recent works such as Jeffrey M. Meikle's *American Plastic: A Cultural History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995) and *Design in the U.S.A.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Books such as Peter Dormer's *Design Since 1945* (New York, NY: Thames and Hudson, 1993), John Heskett's *Industrial* Design (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1980), and Lucius Burckhardt's *The Werkbund: studies in the history and ideology of the Deutscher Werkbund*, 1907-1933 (The Design Council, 1980) also tell their stories as amalgams of utilitarian, symbolic, and aesthetic aspects of products. Burckhardt stresses the limitations of critiquing Werkbund as an industrial capitalist phenomenon, by pointing out that neither the actual condition of industrial production nor the realities of consumer demand were understood by its founding ideologues. Heskett's curiosity for/and keen telling of how the engineered product is built to perform its

function; and how the processes are devised to mass produce it provides insights into the relationship between exterior form, machine function, and personal use. Burckhardt's analyses weigh history of ideas about Werkbund against the facts of German history, and expose their relative significance/insignificance in relation to the actual design, manufacture, and utilization of products.

I also find benefit in seeking the 'business' dimension of products, drawing from books that explore design and consumer culture during the post WW II period within less-developed economic contexts. Business histories offer a more complex and ambiguous picture of how products relate to culture than traditional 'design history' books that usually portray this relationship as purely 'elitist' and 'hegemonic.' Paul Betts' *The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) is a book that is part of the design history canon. It discusses the design ethos and consumer culture in Eastern and Western Germany during the Cold War by limiting the discussion to everyday household objects and furniture, that is, 'non-engineered' products. In *The Authority of Everyday Objects,* Betts sets a dichotomy between the popular/populist and the elitist strands of furniture design in Germany. He concludes that the high-minded products of German design were defeated by consumer desire that rejected the ethos promoted by cultural elites. Yet, two business histories provide a more complex picture of German consumer culture of the same period, one that is closely related to the political economies that governed East and West Germany that determined what kind of 'engineered' products were to be introduced, in what order, and in what quantities to both societies. *Consuming Germany and the Cold War* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2003) edited by David

F. Crew, portrays mass produced goods from cheap to expensive to be core to the creation of consumer culture, whose availability in the East depended on resource allocations to the consumer goods industry and in the West closely regimented for a decade through economic planning until it was financially safe to disseminate products to the masses. Similarly, *Ford, 1903-2003: the European* history (Paris, P.L.A.G.E., 2003), edited by Hubert Bonin and others, by looking at the automotive industry of the same period, reveal how an economically responsible, visually subdued design ethos was common to all Western European producers of the post-World War II period. Several essays featured in the book show that the particular West German ethos of car design, by imbuing the Ford Sedan with a 'line of rationality,' was able to transform it successfully for the German national context. Essays featured in *Ford 1903-2003: the European history* also point to a sobering fact about what can be learned from advertising of products. Essays reveal that in quite a number of cases automobile advertising simply was expressive of the company's image and did not offer insights into the product's cultural reception.

Jordan Sand, in the *House and Home in Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005), like Betts, bases his conclusions about the transformation of the Japanese household with a discussion limited to non-engineered products. By looking at the ideas that the state bureaucrats promoted in the Japanese media about what constituted good life — that is, by looking at the 'discourse' of modernity — Sands concludes that modernization of the Japanese home was a top-down conditioning of the country's Westernizing elite that corroded the authenticity of Japanese household culture from 1880s until the 1930s. Business historian Simon Partner, however, exposes a multitude of historical data to reveal a different order in

which Japanese people admitted modernity in their lives in *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). As Partner suggests, the traditional Japanese life did not truly transform until the 1950s, the period of Japanese postwar reconstruction. It was the charm of technological products, and the public's belief in their economic benefit to Japan's national growth that drew people to modern products. Japanese people admitted modernity into their lives beginning with durable goods. It continued with home improvement, and finally culminated in home ownership. Sibel Bozdoğan is another historian of design/culture who sees the relationship between modern design and culture to be hegemonic. In *Modernism and Nation Building* (University of Washington Press, 2001), Bozdoğan considers Turkish public works of the 1920s and the 30s to be purely 'objects of discourse,' built as visual symbols to promote modernity. Bozdoğan neither asks whether these public works had any economic or larger social significance, nor does she see value in them beyond their 'aesthetic expression.' By limiting her analysis to 'visual discourse,' the author fails to relate the built environment to the massive economic and industrial development that the Turkish Republic went through during its formative period. The significance of these public works is illuminated by a multi-disciplinary historic study by İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin. *Cumhuriyetin Harcı: Köktenci Modernitenin Doğuşu* (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları, 2003) draws from Turkish economic history and urban development, and accounts for the built environment of Turkish Republic during its formative decades much more convincingly.

Authors who concern themselves with 'cultural' histories of design either explore a certain category of products that is the traditional subject matter of art and design history (like

everyday objects and furniture); or concentrate their studies on the 'aesthetic expression' of engineered products. Moreover, they draw their conclusions mostly after examining 'ideas' about the products as propounded by designers, intellectuals, public or private authorities — and find this method to be sufficient to account for social transformation. These authors primarily study 'discourse' about products, which is more readily available to a historian, as it is found in criticism or marketing and advertising messages.

In touching Koç, I am trying to write a design history that weighs the discussion more on the complex social, political, and economic eco-system of products. The larger ideological implications of the products are not determined solely on the basis of 'discourse analysis,' but by checking discourse against a complex web of factual relationships between the units and agents of the story — which means asking when advertising for Koç products was an expression of the self-image of the company, and when they reflected public ideas or economic realities. In order to construct a web of knowledge about Koç industries, I draw from a variety of sources outside the immediate field of art and design history. Studies of political economy such as James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine's *Theories of Political Economy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Turkish resources such as Günal Kansu's *Planlı Yıllar: anılarla DPT'nin öyküsü* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası kültür yayınları, 2005); Feyyaz Berker and Güngör Uras' *Fikir üreten fabrika : TÜSİAD'ın ilk on yılı 1970-1980* [the factory that produces ideas: the first decade of TUSİAD 1970-1980] (Şişli, İstanbul : Doğan Kitap, 2009); and various studies on the political economy of Turkish urbanization by İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin and Ruşen Keleş are helpful to assess the role of larger decision makers. Social histories of technology, such as, Ruth Schwarz Cowan's *A Social History of*

American Technology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Susan Strasser's *Never Done: A History of American Housework* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) as well as studies of material culture, such as *History from Things* edited by Steven Lubar and David Kingery; and Richard Bushman's *Refinement of America* — provide frameworks for looking at the intimate ways in which technological products transform living patterns.

Economic histories, such as, Susan Strasser's *Satisfaction Guaranteed: the making of the American mass market* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989) provide a broader perspective by telling the story of products within a larger system of exchanges. Economic histories that are influenced by Immanuel Wallerstein's *World Systems Analysis* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004) situate technological actors in a larger historical continuity[2]. Fikret Başkaya's *Azgelişmişliğin sürekliliği* [the perpetuity of under-development] (İstanbul : İmge Kitabevi, 2001) points at the existence of a hierarchical structure in industrial capitalism, that is not simply the product of a free market, but one largely predicated on the geo-political strength of nations in the global system. Christopher Chase-Dunne examines the positive and negative effects of the technological dependence of less-developed nations within the world system.[3] Joseph Stiglitz's analyses of the world economy point to the special financial conditions under which technological/economic systems began operating after World War II.[4] All of these works portray the world economy as a manifestation of a complex web of factors, rather than the product of a transcendental ideology — as economy is often understood by histories of art and design. Fernand Braudel's economic histories, *Structures of Everyday Life*, *The Wheels of Commerce*, and *The Perspective of the World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), similarly situate local actors in a broad geographical perspective and

a historical continuity. Yet, these histories also tell their stories by looking at the ways in which humans relate to products and to the human-made world. By this account these books also serve as histories of technology.

Thomas Hughes's *Human Built World* and Hounshell's *From American system to mass production 1800-1932* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984) are two histories of technology that look at products as part of a larger national political economy that allocates resources for them to survive and proliferate. In *History From Things* (R. Lubar, S. and W.D. Kingery (eds), Washington, 1993) Robert Friedel stresses the significance of physical constraints on technology in shaping products and the artificial world while countering arguments that the material world is simply shaped by human will, ideology, and hegemonic power. Also in *History From Things* Langdon Winner portrays a large array of human decisions that influence the shape of technological systems and products ranging from purely utilitarian to market- and employment-driven. While business histories, such as, *Ford 1903-2003: the European history* (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003) edited by Bonin and others; and *Automobile revolution: the impact of an industry* (University of North Carolina Press, 1982) by Jean-Pierre Bardou, Chanaron, Fridenson, and M. Laux illuminate how manufacturing companies operate and survive within their national and global technological, economic, and political realm. All of these disciplinary perspectives add another dimension to understanding the product as a transformative object.

The empirical data used in this study comes from a variety of historical sources, and a wide array of disciplinary fields that provides urban, macro-economic, socio-economic, and

material cultural/anthropological information. *Statistical Indicators 1923-2008* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2009) served as a general guide for quantitative data, while, in many cases I compiled and extrapolated the information from several other sources. Information about housing types and technical conditions in Turkish metropolitan centers were complied from reports published in *Yapı Dergisi* circa 1940s, and *Mimarlık* journal, circa 1960s. Historical values of energy use in Turkish homes were complied from Hasan Sinan Ertay and Arif İleri's essay titled "Energy and exergy utilization in Turkey during 1995," *Energy* 23.12 (1998) : 1099–1106. The socio-economic breakdown and purchasing power of Turkish families were found in Kemal Derviş and Sherman Robinson's essay "The structure of income inequality in Turkey: 1950-1973" [5]. Two empirical studies from the 1970s about the social value of products served to bring clarity to the analyses of durables and the automobile. Information about ownership, use, and perception of durables across Turkish income groups were compiled from a survey conducted by Nuri Bilgin in 1979 published in *Eşya ve İnsan [belongings and humans*] (Ankara: Gündogan yayınları, 1991). Meanwhile, information about Turkish automobile ownership and preference criteria was found in Izzet Pekarun's *Research on Automotive Industry: Supply and Demand in Automotive Products* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sanayi Kalkınma Bankası A. Ş., 1977). Detailed information about TV ownership was compiled from numerous newspaper reports that appeared in *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet* dailies throughout the 1970s. A public opinion poll jointly conducted by the Gallup Institute and the Turkish market research firm PEVA (Piyasa Etüd Müşavirlik Araştırma Tic. Ltd. Şti.) in 1976 about the Turkish perception of living standards served as an additional reference for evaluating the social critic's view of Turkish consumer.[6]

The choice of Koç was, also, a fortuitous one in that the Koç empire afforded a wide range of research materials enabling the study of the larger trends that underlie the dissertation. Several recent corporate histories served as departing points for research. *Koç topluluğunun 75 yili [75 years of Koç Holding]* (İstanbul: Koç Holding, 2001) provided a detailed chronology of Koç Industries. *Mamulattan Markaya: Arçelik Kurum Tarihi 1955-2000 [The corporate history of Arçelik 1955-2000]* (Istanbul: Mepa Medya, 2001) provided dozens of interviews with Arçelik personnel and featured reproductions of archival documents. *DemirDöküm'de 50 yıl [50 Years at Demirdöküm]* (İstanbul : DemirDöküm, 2004) similarly served as a source for interviews with company personnel. Istanbul Public Library (Atatürk Kitaplığı) provided access to trade journals from the period of this study, including *Endüstri Dergisi*, *Türkiye Mühendislik Haberleri*, *İktisadi Yürüyüş*, *Sevk ve İdare Dergisi, Türkiye İktisat Postası,* and *Türkiye İktisat Gazetesi*. The National Library in Ankara was a substantial resource for annual reports, promotional booklets, and advertising posters for Demirdöküm, Arçelik, and TOFAŞ companies and products. The Vehbi Koç and Ankara Research Center (VEKAM) provided invoices, letters, advertisements, and invitations, as well as newspaper and magazine clippings. Another crucial source were personal interviews made with personnel who worked for Koç industries during the period covered by this study. These individuals included former Arçelik manager Ege Cansen, engineers Nejat Olgaç and Ahmet Saraçoğlu, architect Aydın Boysan and designer Umur Çamas; TOFAŞ managers Savaş Arıkan and Inan Kiraç; and OYAK manager Bülend Özaydınlı. Interviews with more recent Koç personnel, such as Arçelik production manager Salih Karabacak, and designer Ümit Altun, brought contemporary perspectives that bridged the corporation’s past with its future.

1.3 Mechanization of the home and the making of modern comfort

The phenomenon that transformed the Turkish home is part of a common social history of technology. Bringing machines into the sphere of the home and the family, as part of the mechanization of everyday life — that Koç industries served for in Turkey during the second half of the 20th century — has been studied with regard to its social consequences. In the nineteenth century, as the Industrial Revolution reached maturity, "mechanization" as a concept began penetrating everyday life, as it was applied to urban systems, and as it entered the home. Mechanization redefined the idea of comfort for the households. As told by Sigfried Gideion, comfort as a concept was instilled into the culture of sixteenth century Europe with the advent of capitalism and a secure middle class.[7] The idea of comfort transformed furniture throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. It was adopted as a term in Britain to designate "everything to do with material and physical well being".[8] Mechanization sought to transform the home into an environment free of thermal contrasts, inadequate lighting, and the toils of household tasks. The sum total of various industrial rectifications of the home generated the idea of "modern comfort."

"Mechanical production" transformed the nature of labor as well as the structure of the household.[9] By the turn of the twentieth century, "modern household" was a term frequently pronounced to define the new family emerging out of the process of industrialization in Western Europe and the United States.[10] "The factory system" was recognized to have transformed the home from its previous position as the center of production into the center of consumption. Writing in 1912, Marion Talbot stated that the factory system had brought a division between work and home, and its mass production principle was applied to traditional

household chores, such as preparing foods and producing clothing.[11] Things that were previously produced at home were now available for purchase in the market. As a result, housewives were relegated to the status of consumers.[12] Talbot and others formulated the mother's role as the manager of the services of the new home, which was now designated as a realm of leisure and comfort.[13]

Scholars from a variety of disciplines have entered the discussion of this social history of technology, devising theoretical frameworks to understand the processes that brought about the mechanization of the home as it became a systemic effort, and the modern household, as it emerged as a pervasive phenomenon in the twentieth century.

Economic theorists of the eighteenth century saw that industrial capitalism was transforming the pre-industrial notion of "economy," which had been understood as "economizing" or "household management," relevant to a society in which "wants emerged and the things that satisfied them were produced in the household." [14] The industrial notion of economy was changed to "political economy," suggesting a complex system where the needs of an intertwined civil society were met by a central state that arbitrated public funds.[15] Political economy did not recognize a collective or public reality inseparable from the system of private interests.[16] Many approaches to political economy defend market-capitalism and posit that an "authentic" relationship between the subject and object of consumption is possible and indeed desirable.[17] For defenders of market capitalism, "power" does not exist but is totally surrendered to the impersonal play of the market.[18] This assertion implies that the modern middle-class and the modern household emerged "naturally," with public consent, out of the

industrial-capitalist system. Marxist, as well as Neo-marxist social theorists, challenged this notion.

Social theorists have tended to view the mechanization of the home and the emergence of the modern household as consequences of a top-down capitalist conditioning of society for the benefit of industrial-capitalism as mediated by public institutions and mass-media.[19] The ideal of a modern household was attributed to the Victorian "cult of domesticity," whose moral and material goals were disseminated across Europe and the US. Neo-Marxists, most importantly sociologists and psychologists associated with the Frankfurt school, attempted to grasp the emergence of a consumer society as a metaphysical challenge, to be understood in the framework of concepts descended from German idealism and French Socialism.[20] Most of these theorists were united in the belief that an "authentic" relationship between the public and the products of industrial capitalism was not possible due to the hegemonic power exerted by the center of capitalism to mold the value systems and the sense of taste of the society.[21] These general conjectures imply that the core values of the ideal household were imposed on the Third World by the hand of imperialism, especially during its 19th century expansion. Thus, many social theorists discredit modernization movements in the Third World that were based on the Western model, calling for the preservation of traditional authenticity.[22] Many approaches in the social sciences understand human mediation with mass produced objects or cultural products as acts of "consumption." Freudian psychoanalysts have frequently understood subject-object relationships to be pathological, asserting that possessions are symbolic substitutes for repressed desires.

Contemporary social psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's view of this relationship points to more complex psychological processes. Csikszentmihalyi views household objects as means towards psychic completion, self-stabilization, and as symbols of social integration.[23] However, ironically, excessive accumulation has reversed the relationship, as objects have seemingly come to exercise an evolutionary goal of replication through the continual consumption of society. Csikszentmihalyi attributes the emergence of twentieth century consumer culture to a process that began in the Enlightenment, where the notion of the good life was redefined as seeking ever-increasing levels of material comfort beyond what was necessary.[24]

Studies looking at the notion of mechanization from certain Western historical and geographic frameworks have tended to understand it as a "social history" of technology, a phenomenon with profound insights into the material culture of industrial capitalism. Architectural historian Siegfried Gideion, studying mechanization in England, France, and the US contends that new technologies were invited into the household domain rather than being forced into it by the system of manufacturing due to the general public preference for ease and convenience.[25] Gideion also acknowledges that industrial capitalism uses its central influence to mass-produce a common experience for households, modeled after the "ruling taste," which designates a soothing, but intellectually dulling experience in the home.[26]

Other studies contend that specific cultural values have influenced the invitation of mechanization into the home in different geographic contexts. Maureen Ogle points out that modern conveniences, such as plumbing entered the American home well before the country's

encounter with the second Industrial Revolution, a period more visibly governed by the policies of sanitarians, engineers, or planners.[27] Thus, acquiring comfort was beyond any central conditioning, coming from mid-nineteenth century Americans' desire for convenience, representative of the "democratic, technologically disposed strands of the American culture."

Social historians of American technology like Ruth Schwartz Cowan and Susan Strasser have told the story of the gradual improvement of everyday chores through the adoption of labor-saving devices.[28] They were introduced into the home during the second industrial revolution but there were unexpected consequences. Studies by both historians concluded that the burden of housework in the industrialized West had not decreased as much as would be expected since 1880.[29]

David A. Hounshell helps explain the mechanization of the American home from a business perspective with his study of key manufacturers of the late nineteenth century.[30] Certain American manufacturers, in order to utilize full capacity production, were forced to invent strategies to get the products of industrial machinery (such as sewing machines) into homes. Among them were strategies such as styling the machines like furniture and allowing them to be paid for in installments.[31]

1.4 Political Economy of Mechanization in the Developing World: technology for national and individual well-being

Nations like Turkey that lay outside the locus of power that gave birth to the industrial system experienced the mechanization of everyday life in a distant manner, from the underprivileged

position of outsiders since the 15th century. These countries have a long history of striving to achieve standards of material well-being set by new technologies perpetually devised by the loci of global economic power — which is a phenomenon that also came to define these nations as perpetually "developing." Throughout the historical continuity that gave birth to the industrial system the peripheral countries strived to improve their status within the larger system — as 'colonial', 'post-colonial', 'revolutionary', 'modernizing', 'developing', 'underdeveloped' and 'recently industrialized.'

Writing in the late 1970s, social historian Immanuel Wallerstein saw the roots of this historical continuity in the emergence of the European world-economy which had its roots in the "long sixteenth century" (1450-1640).[32] As the system reached its second stage (1650-1730), European countries had become persistently mercantilist, thus increasing their relations with provisionist agrarian empires.[33] In its third stage, industrial capitalism and geographical expansion helped the European system absorb the remaining world systems. At the end of World War I, according to Wallerstein, the industrial-capitalist world economy was consolidated into a "world-system."

The countries lying outside the locus of this historic continuity experienced this development as receivers of technology, and end-users of the practical applications of an ever-increasing know how. Their own systems were punctuated by military defeats and the collapse of their craft-based industries due to the entry of mercantilist, and then industrial goods into their markets. During this historic period, the motivation of Eastern sovereign countries was to "catch up" with the West by employing central/statist policies. As medieval empires that

existed in the post-medieval world—most notably the Russian, Ottoman, and Japanese Empires during the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries — they attempted to either reform or protect their medieval systems from an influx of ideas that challenged their stability. In the nineteenth century, as global capitalism extended and dominated their markets with industrially produced goods, the Eastern states sought to synchronize their key institutions with the West. Meanwhile, the first generation of Eastern intellectuals and elites directly appropriated Western consumption patterns. During the first several decades of the twentieth century, the second generation of elites worked towards nation-building by establishing modern institutions supported by rapid industrialization in order to foster a new society united under a national identity. For the "developing" countries, mechanization meant more than a gradual advance towards the future. It was a cultural transformation that was at times pronounced to be "revolution."[34] Governments actually suppressed mobility of their rural hinterlands to finance mechanization. By keeping farmers in their place, they guaranteed a continuous supply of agricultural revenues that could be used to finance their rapid industrialization until after World War II. In the post World War II period, the third generation of elites were bureaucrats of the "developing nations" who were faced with the fact that the state was incapable of deciding on a definite cultural program. Instead, they made investments to create the economic basis for a consumer culture. In this period, the awakened "masses" pressured governments, which resulted in the political fractures seen in developing countries of the post World War II period.

During this time, the political motive in developing countries became changing the notion of industrially designed products. Since the mid-nineteenth century, products were perceived as

things that were dumped into their markets to enchant their consumers and upset their trade balance. After World War II, the introduction of industrial systems as part of daily life began as building systems like rural electrification for public use. Next came the entry of mass-imported or import-substituted consumer goods into the home, led by household durables. The ideological choices of the states, from domestic comfort as an end-goal to it being a vehicle leading to full-blown socialism, determined the mode of entry for consumer goods into the home. In some countries household durables remained on a provision basis, that is, a limited number of consumer goods were produced by state enterprises and provided on the basis of need; in others they were supplied into the market. The levels of social, economic, and geographic mobility among developing countries depended on their strategic and economic alliances, and the ideologies they adopted.

1.5 The Modern home as a site for social mobility during the Cold War

Physical and economic mobility of developing nations such as Turkey, became most apparent after World War II, when mass migration into their cities shook up traditional consumption patterns. Urbanization of these countries instigated the beginnings of a mass market and consumer culture. In this period, nations were torn between competing ideologies of development. The European Recovery Program, as known as the Marshall Plan (1947), proposed the systemic economic cooperation of nations within a world market regulated by the US treasury, while the Soviet Block put in place a similar plan of cooperation that aimed to achieve development through economic planning governed by central state control.[35] On both sides of the Cold War divide, market and resource allocations were made to the core nations, which determined the hierarchy of the new capitalist world order. Simultaneously,

another competition was in place to win the strategic alliances of developing countries across the globe. It is helpful to take a look at the geographical picture of how both camps wanted to win the alliances of developing nations of the Southern hemisphere through direct aid and other development programs (see figure 1.1 below):



figure 1.1 "Competition of Foreign Aid: American and Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries between 1955-57." This map published in a Turkish political weekly demonstrates the race between the two powers to gain the allegiances of the developing countries through foreign aid. Black bars indicate the amount of American aid, and the white bars indicate Soviet aid.

On both sides, systemic approaches aimed to facilitate or at least accommodate socio-economic mobility.[36] In the Eastern block this was done through central provisioning. In the West, it was accomplished through the supply of the markets. Both sides sought to avoid social and political instability. Cold War development policies offered developing nations an opportunity to acquire the practical means and economic tools to move their modernity

projects forward. Governments across the Cold War divide whose legitimacy depended on providing material prosperity to their populace, placed the home at the center of social policy despite differing ideologies regarding the concept of the modern household and means to make housing a reality.[37]

These policies brought about the emergence of specific modern idioms across the nations on either side of the divide, facilitated by various modes of design.[38] Victor Buchli points to the Soviet government's desire to avoid the populist idiom expressed by Stalinist classicism of the pre-War era that was put in place as a populist concession to the ruling domestic taste. The post-war provisionist Soviet system could not afford to meet such opulent material aspirations, nor did it desire their symbolic implications of immoral excess. Instead, following the death of Stalin, the government promoted a design idiom inspired by Modernist principles of the Soviet Cultural Revolution and the contemporary West to help restore the socialist morality in Soviet home design of the 1950s and the 60s.[39]

Yugoslavia stood as an exception during the Cold War period, steering its own development by bypassing the central communist authority and cooperating with the United States and Western Europe. Barbara Predan and Cvetka Pozar point to Iskra, the former-Yugoslavia's leading home electronics manufacturer, as an institution whose design offered an independent modern idiom for the domestic realm of Yugoslavia, which was both international and independent, however, not aligned with either political block.[40]

Design was used as a foreign policy tool, as an extension of the economic cooperation inscribed in the Marshall Plan. American designers took on the role of envoys introducing

design as a social construction tool among countries allied with the United States by presenting modern American design "at its imaginative best."[41] Reception of the American design idiom was enthusiastic in Japan but mixed across Europe. There was a general negative reception among European intellectuals of its mainstream manifestations.

This was especially true for a Germany torn between two competing governments. West Germany had set out to reclaim its industrial leadership as well as its supremacy as a center that disseminated ideas about design. Under the banner of "good design" German designers sought an honest, non-exploitative aesthetic for socially responsible products. Design was to contribute to Germany's humanistic, socially progressive implementation of capitalism, pronounced as a "social market economy."[42] Throughout the 1950s and the 60s, German design was influenced by intellectuals who wanted to protect the public from exuberant forms of post-war American design which they considered to be psychologically exploitative and morally corrosive since they were devised to induce consumer excess.[43] As Betts notes, "West German design and its explicitly anti-American ethos was applauded by East German design journals."[44]

The situation in East Germany was more complex. The East German government inherited a certain industrial infrastructure and a design tradition from which it sought to recreate a new design idiom for a socialist society. However, East Germany did not commit the resources to its consumer-goods industry that could foster a "socialist consumer society." The state allocated resources concentrated its factories on heavy industry. Yet the same factories also produced a wide range of consumer goods on the side, in volumes much lower than public

demand.[45] Products of VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb: people owned enterprise) were emblematic of East German design where sparse looks gave the false impression that that they were widely available and rationed to every East German household.[46] In the 1950s, a group of Dutch designers similarly distanced themselves from American design ethics. In 1953, a Dutch study group concluded that "American industry often compel[ed] the designer to concessions" to produce "bad taste."[47]

However, European business professionals across the Cold War economic hierarchy generally celebrated American marketing methods.[48] One example mentioned by Pulos was when European executives from twenty-six countries visited the US in 1953. Moreover, Pulos notes that the same executives falsely concluded, from the best examples that they were exposed to during their visits, that idealism and business lived side-by-side in America.[49]

Among the Southern European countries, Italy was on the cusp between industrialization and developing nation status.[50] This hindered the dissipation of modern design into the depths of Italian society but did not inhibit the creation of an Italian modern idiom.[51] Writing in the 1970s, Gregotti noted that contact between Italian industry and design was infrequent in the 1950s.[52] In the early 1960s, a pervasive consumer culture had not yet emerged in Italy. Production and consumption were elitist, for a limited consumer group.[53] Critics like Tafuri lamented Italy's industrial limitations and accused its design establishment of producing "escapist" design strictly for "exportation,"[54] design that was irrelevant to Italian society.[55]

Japan was an exception within the Cold War map as the only country in Asia whose industrial tradition could be traced to its mid-nineteenth century reform movement. In the post World

War II period, Japanese industry was rebuilt with massive US technical and economic aid. Design reemerged under strong American influence. In the same period, as Jordan Sands points out, the Japanese home was transformed from a communal artifact into the center of consumption.[56] At the center of this transformation was the consumption of electrical durables that promised a "bright life" for Japanese families. The term implied a "modern home with a middle class standard of living" through the possession of a set of durables. The Japanese acquired a new set of durables in each consecutive decade with an increasing degree of luxury.[57]

Within the two decades that followed the war, post-war American design styles dominated Japanese products. Thus, the exuberant and propulsive forms of American post-war design prevailed in Japanese products. In the 1950s, the Japanese were skeptical about their quality. They consumed Japanese products to help the nation's development, and slowly warmed up to them.[58] Yet, at the intellectual level Japanese designers wanted to reconcile the deeper cultural traditions of the country with the universal cognitive tenets of modern design.[59] The first fruits of these post war experiments were demonstrated in the *Japan: Design Today* exhibition at the Smithsonian in 1960 at the time when a cornucopia of Japanese products was being introduced into the world markets under close guardianship of the United States.[60]

1.6 Home as the site of a modern design idiom for developing nations

For many underdeveloped countries, the 1950s was a time when they sought political and economic independence. Between 1946 and 1960 thirty-seven nations freed themselves from

colonial status in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[61] As Rajesh Chandra notes, for the recently independent countries, "who were acutely conscious of depending too much on their previous masters," import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy was indispensable. These nations also sought an independent modern idiom expressive of an independent national identity, one that could also help them compete with the allure of modern imports. Creation of a modern idiom was challenging for countries torn between their urban and rural cultures.[62] This was especially true for India, where deeply rooted traditional cultures were in place. Intellectuals sought to mediate modernity by understanding local values, seeking local answers, and preserving plural identities as was pronounced in the Ahmedabad declaration of 1979.[63] Underdeveloped countries could not avoid a drift towards the products of the centers of industrial capitalism. As Rajeshwari Ghose admits, most contemporary Asians continued to see first world technology and consumerism as the locus of design and modernity.[64]

Turkey's specific position on the Cold War map was unique. The Turkish modernity project exemplified a cultural transformation that many underdeveloped nations in North Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, who had recently gained their independence, looked to. At the same time, Turkey was one of the few less developed European countries, along with Greece and Portugal, to be made part of the Marshall Plan. However, as opposed to the developed members of the Plan, Turkey was designated as a "consumer" of post World War II industrial production.[65] Like other developing countries, Turkey encountered the uprooting and mobilization of its rural population in the 1950s, which only added to its economic burdens.[66] To make the post-war promise of the "good life" possible, Turkey was told to obey the rules of the free market and allow cheaply produced Western goods to enter its market. This

infertile policy was quickly abandoned and replaced by an import substitution policy, which was bolstered by a systemic industrial development plan in the early 1960s. It culminated in a unique model of collaboration between the state and private business, led by Vehbi Koç's joint enterprises.

1.7 Vehbi Koç and the Making of the modern Turkish Household

In Turkey, the mechanization of the home and the simultaneous emergence of a particular brand of modern household can be traced through the enterprises of one businessman, Vehbi Koç. He was a small merchant during the 1910s who, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, rose to become Turkey's first national capitalist, and then its first industrialist. Koç's contribution to the modernization of the home did not take place within the bounds of a free market, nor was it a direct consequence of a statist economic policy typical of a developing country. Instead, it was a by-product of national development policies during three economic periods that can be characterized as the "protectionism" of the formative period of the nation state from 1923 to 1947; the "liberalism" of the Marshall Plan years from 1947 to 1959, and the "planned economic development" period from 1960 to 1980.

Vehbi Koç is significant in instigating the Turkish modern household for the multiple roles he played during the during the three political/economic periods from 1923 to 1980. He is a national capitalist who took active part in establishing a material basis for Turkey's cultural modernity project. He was simultaneously a member of Turkey's modernist elite who defined 'material well-being' as a value to live by. Koç's business agency stirred the economic space. His investment strategy was not simply to sell products but to create supporting networks for

them in a way to sow the seeds for a mass-market. Koç brands, shaped by various modes of design, greased the wheels of public consumption. Later, technology acquisition contributed to narrowing technological deficits of manufacturing in Turkey. The order in which Koç introduced products reflected the stages in which his company acquired the respective manufacturing technologies: iron casting, metal forming, plastic molding, electrics and electronics. Hot water radiators and water heaters, refrigerators, televisions, and the private automobile, were key consumer products that several Koç enterprises produced, that gradually introduced comfort and convenience into homes and mobilized Turkish households.

Vehbi Koç was simultaneously an agent of consensus. Koç's enterprises sought to maintain a national consensus during the planned economic development years between 1960 and 1980, a period of rapid social mobility. Rapid industrial development policies were unable to fully transform agricultural workers into industrial laborers. These policies eventually created a population that drifted towards the cities. They entered as temporary residents who soon became permanent, and lived on the cusp between modern and pre-modern material life. As a result, the structure of the modern household was torn between three cultural divides: long-time city dwellers in the metropolitan centers, marginal workers on the edges, and semi-subsistence farmers in the countryside. Nevertheless, political economy of urban development brought home to the center of consumption across Turkey's socio-economic domains.[67] In this period of rapid development, Koç industries projected a vision of 'common good' achieved through production and consumption of industrial products.

Vehbi Koç was also a technologist, seeking to improve the rank of his enterprises within the larger system of industrial capitalism throughout the three economic periods from 1923 to 1980. At each period, Vehbi Koç's entrepreneurial relations with the industrial world depended on Turkey's status within the larger system, where international policies played their part. In the beginning, Turkey's economic weaknesses hindered Koç from acquiring the specific design and technologies he wanted to adopt. Yet, changes in national political economy, that lead to the state's financial and technical support of the creation of a national industry in the 1960s and the 70s allowed Koç to realize his technological enterprises. Each one of Vehbi Koç's industries were a joint-venture involving different levels of cooperation with and contribution by the Turkish state. At another level, state policies and Koç's business strategies complemented each other. While the Turkish state built larger industrial systems to support manufacturing, Vehbi Koç gradually built social-networking systems to nurture the products, which provided the basis of a mass-market in Turkey.[68]

Meanwhile, the creation of a national industry paralleled the creation of a modern idiom mediated by Koç's quintessential brands that satisfied the need to feel modern by participating the contemporary moment. The shapes that the brands took involved the use of architectural, advertising, branding, and product design — each mode of design contributing its own historic insight into the story. The stories of these brands also parallel Vehbi Koç's business adventure involving his strategies in transforming his trading companies into industrial enterprises and the methods with which he acquired respective technologies, as well as witnessing the emergence of the modern Turkish household.[69]

The second chapter ("Bringing Comfort into Turkish Domestic Space: Vehbi Koç's Heat and Water Technologies") sets the stage for Vehbi Koç's rise as a businessman in Ankara from the 1910s until the end of World War II. The chapter explores the roots of Koç's entrepreneurial impulse; portrays his transformation of the Turkish business culture; and the making of a national capitalist. The founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 instigated a chain of social/cultural aspirations that set into motion social transformations in which Vehbi Koç took part both as a standard-setting cultural elite and a material-providing entrepreneur. Koç's businesses took shape in the midst of shifts in the larger national political, economic, social context. First, during the formative period of the nation state from the 1920s to 1947, and then during the Marshall Plan years from 1947 until 1960. This chapter portrays the simultaneous transformation of the Turkish home from the 1920s to the 1940s, and its mass-production as 'apartment units' in the 1950s; discusses the changes it brought about in family life within metropolitan areas, including Vehbi Koç's own. It also traces the development of Vehbi Koç's personal agency in home improvement; his transition from a supplier of commodities for the home into a mass-distributor of home supplies; and then into a mass-producer of cast-iron plumbing systems and gas-fired hot water heaters. The technologies introduced into the home, most prominently by Vehbi Koç's enterprises, began to transform its very nature. The Turkish home gradually turned from a center of production and shelter into a realm of consumption and leisure.

Chapter three ("The Arçelik Refrigerator: Design in a Planned Economy") tells the story of building the electric durables company Arçelik, during the 1950s, 'the Marshall Plan years,'

and its establishment as a national brand and a paragon of Turkish modernity during the 1960s, and the early 1970s, 'the planned economic development' decades. Various modes of design were used to ensure Arçelik's acceptance by Turkish consumers. The chapter goes on to describe how the company continued to invest in design and technology to increase the production and distribution of refrigerators, its primary products. It makes reference to business and design strategies that combined to realize the full-blown mechanization of Turkish homes throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, which extended across all homes in Turkey, with a special mention of the emergence of an alternative metropolitan culture on the fringes of the Turkish cities by the mid-1960s.

Chapter four ("The Car and the TV: two objects of social mobility in Turkey in the 1970s") addresses the final stage of these changes in Turkish consumer culture in which Koç's Fiat/Murat 124 brand private automobiles competed with Renault 12s to bring geographical mobility and ideas of propulsive and expansive freedom to Turkish families, while the introduction of Arçelik TVs that competed with various German branded TVs provided tele-visual mobility to households. Koç industries are established as the leading producer of consumer durables in Turkey, while, despite their disparate design and technical origins, most of their manufactures are imbued with a common design aura and widely received as 'everyman's products'.

The fifth chapter ("Indicators of mobility: media and information") portrays the rich consumer landscape that Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) created in Turkey at the end of the 1970s, dominated by images of Koç's brands that were complemented by a wide

range of simpler manufactured goods. A mass-market distributed the goods, and mass media disseminated and re-circulated sales messages. Planned economic development that was bolstered by the ISI policy transformed both the physical and virtual space. Informational mobility connected citizens, yet it also exposed inequalities. Vehbi Koç's brands served to maintain national consensus by promising to include citizens as equal participants of Turkey's economic development. The industrial system mobilized Turkish society as never before, yet also brought political conflict. While the urban society was intertwined within the mass-market economy, it was also divided along political lines, where many interest groups made conflicting demands on the system. This led the country into a period of economic exhaustion at the end of the 1970s.

The dissertation concludes with remarks about the positions of Vehbi Koç and Turkey in the industrial capitalist hierarchy at the end of the planned economy/ISI period, the dawn of the 1980s market liberalization ("Vehbi Koç: a private agent of social and economic mobility"). Vehbi Koç's multiple roles, the significance of his agency in the making of the modern Turkish household are reviewed in this chapter. Koç is recalled as an active participant of Turkish national development policies and plans from 1923 until 1980. His multiple roles within the 'planned economic development' of the 1960s and the 70s—as the Turkish industrial system came into existence—as an instigator of social, cultural, and economic mobility are evaluated. Koç's strategies in finding resources for industrial production in an economy of scarcities, as well as in creating desirable domestic brands that sold and instigated a national market, are recalled. Technologies introduced by Koç industries transformed the home, mobilized households, and relocated national resources. Design and technology

development played a key role in making Koç brands survive the economic crisis of the late 1970s.

Simultaneously, there were side effects of rapid industrialization and the creation of consumer culture, Vehbi Koç was partly responsible for. The national, private, and corporate benefit of the works of Koç enterprises are evaluated in the concluding chapter. Beginning in the 1980s, at the dawn of the global free market period, corporate goals shifted from seeking 'national development,' to seeking 'global power acquisition.' Vehbi Koç handed down the management of the Koç Corporation (Koç Holding), to the second generation of Koç family members, Rahmi Koç and Suna Kıraç in 1984. His heirs worked to integrate the corporation with the global corporate economy. The dissertation concludes with the discussion of the legacy and the future of Koç Corporation, as it moves away from manufacturing towards more abstract means of acquiring business power.

CHAPTER 2

BRINGING COMFORT INTO TURKISH DOMESTIC SPACE: VEHBI KOÇ'S HEAT AND WATER TECHNOLOGIES

2.1 Introduction of Comfort into Turkish Homes and the emergence of Vehbi Koç as a provider for the home

Vehbi Koç's own vision and his entrepreneurship played a significant role towards changing the perception of what constituted comfort, the basis of household happiness, during the formative period of the Turkish Republic from 1923 to 1946. Koç operated in a political context that sought rapid industrial development as a means of catching up with the material standards set by the Western European nations and the United States. Turkish political power emphasized the collective nature of development; prioritized the production of investment goods; and thought of private/personal improvement as a by-product of this process. Koç, simultaneously, promoted the supremacy of the private sphere, and the satisfaction of the individual through the acquisition of material means of comfort. Koç's own family served to disseminate new material aspirations for life as members of Turkey's new cultural elite; while his ingenuity managed to bring into existence systems that could take consumer culture beyond Istanbul and sow its seeds across Turkey.

Introduction of Comfort into Turkish Homes in the 19th century

Turkey's material shortcomings had become obvious since the 19th century, after the technological-economic incursions of Western European countries into the country. The Ottoman Empire was integrated into the world economic system during the first half of the 19th century, while its administration reformed its entire institutional system to be compatible with its Western trade partners.[70] Industrial Revolution-driven extensions of material life hit Turkey's port cities, then its local markets, in the late 19th century and began to pose alternatives to traditional Turkish daily life. Where it came in contact with local life — it induced aspiration in the people to seek technological/mass-produced means of comfort. The public considered industrial products as more than tools that helped overcome the drudgery of everyday life, but as things that also enriched life through their use. It was a new vision of 'what constituted happiness' that challenged the cyclical rhythm of daily life and cultural values like fatalism that governed Turkish life. This movement would travel even into Vehbi Koç's own hometown, a mid-sized Ottoman city called Ankara, as he was born into it in the 1900s. This new vision of life driven by commerce and industry challenged the satisfaction driven from 'peace' in a single family home; and instigated a desire to be connected in the marketplace of goods and ideas of the present day.

Istanbul's minority families (Armenians, Greeks, Jews, etc.) were the first to adopt the Western lifestyles introduced by the emerging managerial class of Western expatriates. Domestic comfort first entered into the homes of this group who had prospered due to the exclusive trade rights they won under the new economy that had freed importation of Western manufactures. Minorities, now a business elite who lived in port cities such as Izmir and

Istanbul, provided the link between a largely medieval Ottoman society and the modern lifestyles that were emerging in the European capitals. However, their privileged lifestyle was not designated or accessible to the entire country. It was decidedly confined to the Empire's port cities and their business centers. Still, the economic changes and the lifestyle that was brought with them were a force that could not be confined only to one neighborhood. Very quickly, members of the Muslim majority found ways to become part of the new economic and cultural forces that sparked a liberal sense of life in Istanbul.[71] These families began moving into multi-story apartment buildings in Istanbul's traditionally non-Muslim neighborhoods of Galata and Pera — the former being a business district and the latter a residential neighborhood. City gas and electric services were introduced for the use of these privileged families. These utilities allowed homeowners to use modern appliances for the first time, and brought ease and comfort to their lives. Soon, some members of the Muslim majority could also afford the new lifestyle provided by modern amenities. While a relatively small group enjoyed modern life inside new dwellings supplied with utilities, most Turks continued to live traditional lives inside their wooden one or two-story homes. Therefore, a dual urban profile and a dual standard of living emerged in the imperial capital of Istanbul in the early twentieth century.[72]

The declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923 brought dramatic changes. Modernization was no longer limited to the business and government elites of Istanbul. Government sought to systematically disseminate modern living by laying the economic foundations to support it. The young Turkish government sought to establish industry and began constructing an entirely new capital in Ankara, a mildly-significant former Ottoman town that happened to be

the hometown of Vehbi Koç. The choice of Ankara as the new capital was fateful in enabling the entrepreneurial potential of this highly-motivated young businessman. It gave Koç the opportunity to change the social and economic status assigned to him in the old Ottoman hierarchy. Ankara's promotion to Turkey's capital city was also a strong sign of the young Turkish Republic's desire to disseminate opportunities, modern living patterns, and cultural values across the nation. Ankara, as a central hub, served to break the disparity between a cosmopolitan old imperial center and the sleepy medieval heartland — a rigid spatial/political structure that was fit for the Ottoman Empire, a largely medieval, agrarian, military slave-state. Vehbi Koç took part in the phenomenal business boom in Ankara, and it was in this city that he laid the foundations of his future business empire — that would set the pace for modernizing the home in Turkey.

The state of domestic comfort in Vehbi Koç's hometown Ankara, in the 1910s

Ankara, where Vehbi Koç grew up in the early 1900s, was a typical mid-sized Ottoman town. Its historic development and physical layout mirrored many similar mid-sized towns across Turkey. It was a city built on the slope of a hill graced by a 7th century Byzantine fortress that the Ottomans had inherited in the 13th century. The city was surrounded by a belt of cemeteries beyond which were farms.[73] Ankara had been a minor trade hub on the central Anatolian steppe for several centuries.[74] Its economy was based on small-scale production and trade in agricultural commodities, primarily Angora wool, up until the 19th century. Yet, the consequences of Industrial Revolution were felt on its downtown by the 1910s. A modern government center and a central business district had pushed traditional structures away. Since the 1830s, when the Ottoman Empire had opened Ankara's markets to the world,

Ankara's hand-made textile businesses had shut down, unable to compete with inexpensive manufactured imports.[75] Beginning in the 1860s, Ankara's old trade district began to turn into a central business district with stores selling goods imported from England and France.[76]

As the basis of a modern economy was being built in the country, wealthy merchants and government officials were the first to take advantage of these changes. However, life in a typical Ankara home between 1910-1920 was simple, unadorned, and devoid of modern comforts that were exclusively practiced in the Western minority dominated sections of Istanbul.[77] Vehbi Koç's own surroundings were primitive, rhythm of daily life was slow and cyclical, and the prospects of economic and social mobility looked low. As Vehbi Koç remembers, there was no running water in the city, no electricity for lighting, and no coal-fired stoves to heat the homes.[78] Most people carried drinking and bathing water home, inside urns or pitchers (*küp, ibrik*) from the district fountain. In order to wash clothes, one went to a creek (*çay*) to fetch water, which was used to boil clothes in a washtub (*kazan*). People might fully wash in a public bath house, typically just once a month. Some homes featured rooms with closets (*gusülhane* or *dolap*) that served as primitive bathrooms. Lighting was provided by portable kerosene-fueled lamps (*gazlambası*). Wealthy households lit their homes with superior kerosene fired lamps (*lüks)* that were considered luxurious. Koç remembers that his family used regular lamps: a lower grade lamp when studying, reading, and doing accounting and a higher grade one to entertain guests.[79] Meals were cooked in copper pots and baked goods were taken to the neighborhood bakeries that cooked them for a fee, because there were no ovens in most Turkish homes.[80] There was usually no heat in individual bedrooms, but the home's common living space (*sofa)* was heated by a portable brazier (*mangal* or *kürsü*).[81] The

sofa was the gathering place for the extended family composed of the married couple, children, and the husband's family.[82] A typical *sofa* would literally be furnished with a low sofa bed (called *sedir*, or *sandık*) that stood against the walls of the room. This was not the movable furniture typical of Western homes with built-in upholstery raised off the ground on free-standing legs. The Turkish sofa was a fixed piece of furniture, essentially a wooden platform that was covered with cushions to allow seating.[83]

The layout of a typical Turkish home in the early 20th century

Vehbi Koç's home represented the typical urban home in Ankara in the early 1900s. Like the majority of urban homes in Turkey it was a house built on an individual lot (figure 2.1). It was a vineyard-type house with an interior courtyard, typical of the traditional, inward oriented Anatolian layout.[84] Traditional homes usually were comprised of two stories: the first floor for storage and the second floor for living. Homes were mainly spaces for living, housing guests, and cooking. However, much space was devoted to storage in the form of closets (*yüklük*), chests (*sandık*), pantries (*kiler*) for house belongings, cooking and washing vessels, and firewood.[85] Before modern utilities and appliances arrived, homes had to be self-sufficient realms capable of storing and utilizing basic supplies. Water and fuel were carried in from the outside rather than being supplied to homes from a central distribution service. Some homes featured a primitive kitchen on the first floor. However, in most simple homes there was no space for cooking, washing, or going to the toilet.[86]

In the typical urban home around 1910 there was no separate dining room furnished with tables and chairs. Most families ate at a low table (*yer sofrası*) while sitting on the floor.

Small town families, however, weren't entirely isolated from lifestyle changes that were taking place in Istanbul. Though service areas like the kitchen and the bathroom were primitive like before, families like Koç's have begun to transform their living rooms. In fact, tables and chairs had begun to enter homes like the Koç household starting in the late nineteenth century. Slowly, these new furniture changed the way people dined and lived.[87] Sometimes, a transitory solution to Western living room arrangements could be seen, as it took place in the Koç home circa 1926. At the time, both a floor table (*yer sofrası*) and a modern dining table (*alafranga sofra*) co-existed to serve different groups of guests in Koç's living room.[88]

The primary goal behind the arrangement of the traditional home was to ensure the privacy of couples and segregation of the sexes.[89] Rooms were placed around the central living space *(sofa)* (figure 2.2). Male and female guests were entertained in separate rooms. Couples who came to stay were given a room of their own. The boundary between living room and private rooms was never crossed. The homes were also secluded from their surroundings by their inward looking arrangement: windows of the first floors faced an interior courtyard (*avlu*). Upper floors had some rooms that faced the street, yet these rooms were concealed from outside viewers by devices like window bars (*kafes*) and shutters (*kepenk)*.[90]

Vehbi Koç grew dissatisfied with life in Ankara as it did not offer opportunities for mobility, social, economical, cultural, or geo-physical. As Vehbi Koç remembers, life in Ankara in the 1910s was slow, largely traditional and it moved along according to prayer times.[91] What made Vehbi Koç to question and then to seek ways to transform his situation was his

witnessing of an alternative lifestyle that co-existed. Growing up in the 1910s, he was becoming aware of alternative living conditions that coexisted with the lives of Ankara's Muslim majority, lives that were much more dynamic and desirable to him. In Ankara, too, minorities were much more connected to the spirit of the 20th century, through their trade connections with Turkish port cities/trade centers. Koç saw that Ankara's minorities of Greeks, Armenians and Jews, which made up its merchant middle-class, lived in much more pleasing homes and under much more comfortable conditions.[92] In contrast to this group, the farm and working-class Muslim families lived in extremely simple conditions. Koç was not content with the lifestyle of most Muslims in Ankara and looked for a means to live a life adorned with the comforts of the contemporary day.

Vehbi Koç enters the business world in Ankara: *Koç Zade Hacı Mustafa Rahmi company*, 1917-1926

Vehbi Koç dropped out of school at the age of sixteen to pursue a full-time career in business. His success depended on, and would bring about, a transformation in the way business was done in Turkey. He was a member of the Muslim majority to enter the trade of manufactured goods that was dominated by minorities for centuries. He was not interested in agriculture and related businesses, the occupation of most Muslim Turks in Ankara. Success in those relatively simple occupations depended more on weather conditions. They were also inherently unstable.[93] On the contrary, as young Vehbi Koç came to realize, success in the trade of manufactured goods was only limited by one's ingenuity. In order to wield real power and control over his business, Koç forced his way into a business establishment that was dominated by non-Muslim tradesmen.

Initially, Koç began to follow one of the two career paths available to Muslim Turks at the time. With its opening in 1917, he assisted his father in a grocery store (*Koç Zade Hacı Mustafa Rahmi*).[94] Typically, all new Turkish shop owners began with a general store. Crates of food, drinks, and fuel were sold, to Koç's dismay, almost entirely to farmers who lacked stable incomes.[95] Koç had observed that manufactured goods enjoyed a more stable clientele, such as wage earning government clerks, leading to a more stable business model.[96] Koç found this to be an exciting prospect. Turkish merchants, however, had no experience selling manufactured goods. This field was concentrated in the hands of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish merchants of Ankara.[97] In order to enter this type of business, Koç hired a Greek salesman to sell shoes and an Armenian to sell hardware (*hırdavat)* at the family store.[98] Both of these salesmen used their Istanbul connections to purchase different goods for the shop, which contributed to its success.[99]

During World War I, while Turkey was under foreign occupation Vehbi Koç ran the family company. Then in 1920, Ankara was declared the capital of the Turkish Republic, which boosted the political and economic significance of the city. The new capital was to serve as an administrative center. It was also a building ground to foster a new cultural value system within Turkey's larger secularization/modernization project. Government officials who were drafted from imperial centers to Ankara served to represent the cultural ideals of the secular republic and grafted Western living patterns into the central Anatolian heartland. The new capital was located in the heartland, in a way to ease the dissemination of the modernity project across Turkey.

The foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the construction of a new capital in Ankara soon after affected Koç and his family in several ways: new construction reinforced the sales at Koç trading companies and the new town that emerged (*Yenişehir)* changed their lifestyle. In the meantime, the Koç family experienced modern lifestyles that Istanbulites were bringing into their city.[100] Throughout the early days of the Turkish Republic, Koç transformed his business from a small grocery store into a trading company (*Koç Zade Ahmed Vehbi*, 1926) that supplied the growing needs of Ankara's households (figure 2.3). Through networks he established, Koç supplied lighting and cooking oil to homes. He also imported household goods and construction materials to be sold in specialized stores.[101] However, Vehbi Koç's dream was to become a big merchant in Istanbul. He knew that he had to first pay his dues in Ankara. The choice of Ankara as the new capital and the subsequent concentration of national business activity in the city transformed Vehbi Koç's business destiny, as well as the course of country's material cultural development.

2.2 Modern homes and the modernizing life in the 1920s, 30s, and the 40s: Koç Family formulate, exemplify the Turkish ideal of a middle-class modern family.

Modern homes and the modernizing life in Ankara's new districts in the 1920s and the 30s: products of national development

Ankara was the new government center, also the site of an economic and cultural transformation. A modern city was being built to accommodate incoming government officials and the resulting economic activity that grew around this city literally changed Turkey's geo-economic map.[102] Vehbi Koç found himself at the right place and at the right time. Conversely, one can argue that the Turkish Republic had located the right entrepreneurial spirit that could catalyze economic development. Koç shared the 'modernization of the private sphere' goal with the Turkey's new builders who were also its new cultural elite. But perhaps Koç wanted to get there faster than the way state envisioned it. Thus, his accelerating effect on the development of consumer culture.

Surprisingly, the driving force behind Ankara's and Turkey's consumer economy proved to be the bureaucrats, whose modern consumer patterns created an ecosystem of goods and services around them. To accommodate them, the builders of Ankara devised a new district south of the existing town according to latest civic planning patterns.[103] The new district was literally called "the new town," (*Yenişehir*). New residential areas were developed for employees of the new administration who arrived from Istanbul, the former Ottoman capital.[104] In the 1920s, a concerted government effort detached reluctant officials from their comfortable urban surroundings in Istanbul and other formal imperial centers, and relocated

them on the still miserable semi-swamp of the Ankara plain. Ankara's prospects for becoming a modern city looked so bleak that foreign governments were reluctant to send their representatives to the city until around 1928 when the city was electrified.[105]

The Turkish bureaucrats who moved to Ankara came from a younger generation of Ottoman families who had acquired Western cultural values in imperial urban centers.[106] These bureaucrats arrived reluctantly, yet lived through the troubles of Ankara's daunting construction. As salaried state employees, these administrators also constituted the city's modern economic base. They fueled the demand for a better material life that began at the top, and was gradually disseminated to lower economic groups. The newcomers demanded the continuation of the urban lifestyles which they had become accustomed to in Istanbul. Thus, the government established modern housing in Yenisehir for its mid- and high-ranking officials. In the early days of construction, as the first modern homes of these families emerged on the boulevard, they served as a curious and delightful spectacle for longtime residents of Ankara who made regular trips to Yenişehir to observe the marvels of modern life that would occur inside them.[107] It didn't take long for this group to demand to live like the newcomers. They began moving into the new town that was built on the vacant southern plain. In the late 1930s, the Koçs and other established Ankara families prepared to move into new homes in Yenişehir. [108]

Construction activity that had begun around the time of Vehbi Koç's marriage (1926) had transformed the city within a matter of years. As Mrs. Koç remembers, the city's roads that were once covered with a powdery dust were now replaced by large asphalt-paved boulevards

(figure 2.4).[109] New government buildings rose along the boulevards; cars and buses appeared on the roads. New neighborhoods were taking shape according to the plan designed by the German planner Hermann Jansen (1869-1947) in 1932.[110] The newly built dam *Çubuk* began providing running water in 1936. The city, like others in the 1930s, was gradually being electrified.

All of this development helped Vehbi Koç expand his business. He now owned two stores: one for construction and electrical supplies and another for car sales. As Vehbi Koç became a more prominent businessman, he also joined the ranks of Ankara's administrative/cultural elite. The Koç home hosted important guests like government bureaucrats, merchants, and journalists. The family's traditional two-story wooden house in the old downtown had become insufficient. Beyond that, the Koç family also wanted to change their lives. Vehbi Koç had a modern apartment building constructed on the new capital's main boulevard.[111] By moving into the new part of the city, the Koçs also made a big leap in comfort: from the inconvenience of wood-fired heating and fetched water to the comfort of modern plumbing and central heating.[112] Beyond the family's own leap of comfort, however, *Koç Apartmanı*, also served as a luxurious prototype to reflect Vehbi Koç's vision of a technologically-supported living standard and domestic happiness. It was known to be the most modern building in the entire city, being the only Ankara residence to boast an elevator besides central plumbing and heating.[113] *Koç Apartmanı* became a top rental option for high-ranking bureaucrats. But comfort did not arrive immediately as instant gratification for the Koç family. It was because Vehbi Koç had set limits for it: hot water from the faucets were

allowed to come just once a week, forcing the entire family to bathe on a designated day of the week like traditional households.[114]

Origins of home modernization in nineteenth-century Istanbul: style and luxury in a port-city of global capitalism

The modernization of the home that was taking place in Ankara and other towns across Turkey was due to policies designed to create a national economy and a nation state. It was structurally different than the modernization that had taken place in Istanbul's minority neighborhoods from the 1880s to the 1920s. In Istanbul, modernization disseminated from the minority by way of class relationships, adopted by upper-middle class members of the Muslim majority. It stopped at the mid- and low-income groups who continued to live traditionally. Modernization of the late-19th to early-20th century period was a by-product of global capitalism that was instigated by Western European officials stationed in port cities. These officials transformed sections of those cities into living spaces for their families, who were, then, joined by the local cultural elites. However, the living patterns of this group did not constitute a model for the rest of the country. In this period, the sites of modernization, that is, apartment buildings, signified social privilege. Their designs reflected upper-middle class tastes. Apartment buildings were mostly inspired by Parisian models that blended elements of neo-classical and art-nouveau.[115] Early examples were designed by European architects and latter ones by local master-builders (*kalfa*) who copied designs from magazines.[116] The comfort inside the apartments, however, largely contrasted with the luxurious exteriors. The apartment's comforts were limited to the small number of subscribers of city water and gas who lived in the minority neighborhoods. Only a few thousand families

subscribed to gas in the 1910s, primarily for indoor lighting purposes, at a time when Istanbul's population was over a million.[117] It would take a nation state to provide the proliferation of utilities needed to reach the majority of citizens.

Whatever their shortcomings might be, the early apartment buildings of Istanbul instigated a change at the top tiers of the Turkish middle class.[118] They defined a higher standard of living by their sturdier construction in planned neighborhoods. They provided for a more liberal life by their physical divide from traditional neighborhoods and the social control mechanisms that governed them.[119] Nuclear families, broken away from their extended families, came to live in these apartments.[120] Former Ottoman bureaucrats, now the new governing elite of Turkey, served to graft modern living patterns in Ankara in the course of building a nation state.

Ankaralites move into "apartments," both cheap and luxurious, in the 1930s

In contrast with the modernity in Istanbul, a by-product of global capitalism that came from seeking luxury material comfort, the modernity in Ankara was the product of a national development program that sought to disseminate modern urban living patterns across the nation. Economic policies made apartments proliferate in two separate ways in Ankara. Government housing, posed as the ideal, implemented in a limited way, that aimed humane, controlled, low-density residential patterns. New residential quarters such as *Yenişehir* presented urban living patterns that all income-groups aspired to.[121] The majority of the apartments, however, resulted from active social and economic forces that were set in motion by the construction of a new government center Ankara. This project involved creation of an

urban center to stand as an urban model for Turkey, fully equipped with modern infrastructure and supported by public works that were both practically and stylistically modern. Thus, Ankara had become the nation's economic center that drew people from all across the country, for whose housing needs small-scale private contractors catered to.

Despite accounts of Ankara as a product of top-down government engineering, in the 1920s and 30s, it was being built and re-built both by private and public contractors who wanted to accommodate families of three income levels.[122] Wealthy families and high-ranking government officials, mid-level government clerks, Ankara locals and small merchants, were all Vehbi Koç's potential clientele. Vehbi Koç's own family was simultaneously a high-ranking member of the new socio-economic class that was being shaped in Ankara, whose own consumption patterns served as a point of reference. The homes of Ankara's elites served as primary entry points of cultural aspiration. While small-scale government housing served as practically and stylistically modern examples in a minimal way, the multi-story, luxurious apartment buildings that were built by Ankara's wealthy families served as sites of a more arresting modernity. They were both residences and investments designed to bring rental income.

In the early days, Ankara's wealthy families were somehow unclear about their social role and aesthetic choices, whose lack of direction was manifested in excessive architectural expressions that appeared on Ankara's modern boulevard. They ordered hastily built structures conceived in the Ottoman eclectic style adorned with spires (*kule),* ogival windows, and eaves (*saçak)*, whose rich facades reflected the wealth of their owners.[123] By the late

1920s, owners began eliminating these elements to give their buildings simple, modern facades. One author likened this process to oriental men shaving off their beards and moustaches.[124] Subsequently, families created buildings whose facades were defined by modernist elements like horizontal window strips and round corners, also pulled from magazines and perhaps inspired by those of Ankara's European-designed public buildings (figure 2.5). "Cubic architecture," ("*kübik*") as the public referred to the international style, was the popular style of the 1930s.[125] They were built in the styles that their owners thought were the most modern that money could buy — directly copied from architectural magazines.[126] Wealthy families, such as the Koçs, did not stop at the exteriors. They also furnished their apartments in the modern style. Vehbi Koç's wife hired an Istanbul decorator who furnished their apartment in art deco style with seating arrangements, coffee tables (*sehpa)*, cabinets (*büfe)*, and art nouveau accessories. This made an instant impression on Mrs. Koç's friends.[127] Luxurious as they might appear, not all of the newer apartments featured modern amenities like central heating. However, those built on the new main boulevard set a high standard for luxury by even having elevators.

The majority of Ankara apartments were built in response to increased population pressure. They were batch-produced in massive numbers by small contractors who rebuilt the old town in higher densities to accommodate Ankara's emerging middle- and lower-middle income groups. Multi-story, middle-income rental homes (*kira evleri*) were built hastily and cheaply, but even so they took their appearance from modern examples (figure 2.6). Small contractors adapted the stylistic principles of modern architecture that actually allowed them to strip away

previously costly details.[128] This banal reduction of the international style was the type of building that silently began to dominate new construction in Ankara as early as the 1930s.

At the time, middle-income apartments were largely unadorned with amenities that made them even more difficult to live in than a traditional home, that, at least, offered water from a backyard well. But they worked to concentrate mid-level clerks in high-densities cheaply, while serving as a faint image of modernity as a distant promise. This group consisted of young intellectuals, many of whom had moved from Istanbul. They attempted to project a healthy, comfortable existence as best as they could despite the poor conditions of their cheap rental apartments in the old town.[129] Ankara locals, on the other hand, were a smaller group of small merchants and craftsmen. In the 1930s, they still preserved homes in the old town and local vineyards. In the following years, some became wealthier by dividing up and selling their properties. The middle-income merchants and craftsmen continued to live in rental buildings in the old town, while those with more wealth moved to the new town where they could share the lifestyles of the bourgeoisie.

By the mid 1930s, a third Ankara had emerged next to the old and new towns as another mass reality. A third social force was being mobilized in this city that had become the economic center of the country.[130] Poor farmers from surrounding areas began migrating to Ankara to seek work. Now, either unemployed citizens or as unskilled workers they squatted in the surrounding hills without even the comforts of their previously rural homes.[131] This group, then considered an undesired, temporary by-product of rapid development, would come to play a vital role in Turkey's transformation in the following decades.

Parallel to these private initiatives were state housing developments that introduced modern housing in a limited way which reflected the government's desire to avoid urban disorder during a time of rapid economic development. Ankara's German planner Hermann Jansen had envisioned Ankara developing in a rational and controlled manner, hoping that anarchic development typical of industrial cities of Europe could be avoided in this newly constructed town.[132] Thus, Jansen's 1932 plan envisioned Ankara as a garden city, where dynamic/functional aspects, such as business, industry, and public services could be contained by zoning and residential areas could be secluded from them.[133] While economic forces were already distorting the traditional pattern of the old town with densely erected apartment buildings, the government continued to control the development of the new districts. In 1934, they asked Herman Jansen to design a rational housing development for middle to upper-income government employees. Jansen argued against multi-story apartment buildings that he considered to be inhumane boxes, and instead proposed a low density, suburban-style neighborhood.[134] His designs preserved the character and appearance of the traditional home with living spaces that reflected his desire to sustain peace and quiet in bustling Ankara.[135] Yet, modern aspirations that were shared both by the cultural mass and the elite did not agree with Austrian architect's preservationist attitudes. Jansen's Turkish clients who were sold to the idea of a low-density development, however, did not like the idea of living in traditional homes.[136] To Jansen's dismay, the officials made modifications to his designs, enlarging the windows and adding balconies typical of international style in order to satisfy the modern aspirations of the families.[137]

Ankara's lively urban development, even under statist policies, was a foretelling of the development of a consumer culture in the following decades. Tensions between the supremacy of the public and the private sphere emerged much earlier than historians suggest. With the advent of new apartment construction in Ankara, acquisition of ground rent through real estate speculation became the basis for production of wealth. It was followed by the introduction of goods and services by Ankara's businessmen lead by Vehbi Koç.

In short, two distinct groups fueled the construction of apartments; the Republican middle class that was emerging among the business elite and bureaucrats, and the migrating workforce of mid-level government employees.[138] The new town was being built with luxurious buildings. The old town, on the other hand, was going through a transformation at the hands of small investors who were transforming single homes into cheap apartment buildings.[139] More than anyone else, they were small contractors who made apartments a mass-produced reality. This was happening to the dismay of Turkish social purists as well as foreign planning experts who sought to preserve the traditional social/spatial patterns of the home.[140] The adoption of the "apartment unit" as shelter forced non-traditional living patterns on the families that inhabited them, however, slowly. This was largely because modern comfort within the units was still lacking. Urban transformation was defining the beginning of a change in Turkish values. The definition of comfort was slowly changing from the maintenance of peace and quiet in a private family home to the acquisition of amenities for an urban apartment.

Vehbi Koç caters to the needs of modernizing homes: Koç Trading Company, 1938

The desire for upward mobility and for sharing the contemporary moment with the world spread from the very top (high ranking bureaucrats) to the very bottom (the urban poor). This active social force that was unleashed due to Ankara's development during the 1920s and the 30s, provided the basis for Vehbi Koç's consecutive enterprises. Indeed, Vehbi Koç witnessed and greatly benefited from the physical and cultural transformation of his hometown. Now that he had a clientele that demanded to live in new apartment units, he quickly transformed his father's traditional business from a supplier of basic commodities into a dealer of modern amenities for the home. He did this under the rubric of a new company named after himself (*Koç Zade Ahmed Vehbi*, 1926). Koç abandoned grocery and small goods sales (*bakkaliye, köselecilik, hırdavat*) and shifted to sale of traditional construction materials.[141] While he still sold hardware, he also slowly began to sell cement and faucets to be installed in private homes.[142] Soon, his company *Koç Zade Ahmed Vehbi* began supplying modern amenities to the government buildings that received utilities first. Koç contracted to build central heating, plumbing, electrical, and elevator systems in government buildings.[143]

Koç was beginning to see that the needs of the growing population offered an even larger business potential. A European trip in 1931 reinforced this view by offering him a glimpse into the future. Koç was deeply impressed by the higher standards of living he saw in cities like Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, and became anxious to bring the good life to Turkey. The standard conveniences that Vehbi Koç witnessed in Europe's great cities were luxuries for Turks at that time. He shared his impressions of Europe with his family in these words:

> "Everything is different there…people are different, buildings are large, cities have a kind of liveliness unknown to us. They are ahead of us in many ways. Of course, it makes one think: these people are human just like us. They are making such beautiful things, but then we will make smaller versions of these."[144]

Koç clearly had been seeking a kind of happiness in an accelerated sense of life provided by manufactured goods, not only through their use, but also by their way of connecting individuals in the marketplace of ideas. At the same time, he was getting excited by the possibility of making them real in his own right, thanks to the Turkish Republic's development policies that had empowered his business. In the late 1930s, Koç was heartened by the fact that his city was being visibly transformed into a modern environment as the construction of Ankara as the new capital had advanced. He provided his own family with modern conveniences in the new apartment building that he built in 1936. He also planned to make his family's rather privileged level of comfort a reality for the masses, which he believed was something to be established as a universal standard for Turkish families. While Koç had ideas for manufacturing European goods, he was still far from actually realizing them. In the meantime, he decided to import those goods and distribute them in larger quantities than before through a trading company.[145] Founded in 1938, Koç Trading Company (*Koç Ticaret A.Ş.*) provided imported modern amenities for homes — such as electrical, plumbing, and sanitary installations — and modern durable goods and private automobiles that promised to transform the lives of the Turkish households.

Koç Trading Company catered to the needs of Ankara's newcomers who were the driving force behind improving the standards of living in the city. A new city was being built but utilities were lacking. Koç Trading Company was contracted to provide plumbing and electricity for government housing projects such as Bahçelievler designed by Herman Jansen.[146] Pressures from Ankara's newcomers sped up the process of providing utilities, while the government decree of 1928 hastened the introduction of sanitary installations by builders.[147] New homes were to follow rational precepts designed to increase the standard of living for Turkish households.[148] Health was the primary precept.[149] Government projects largely complied with the health standards. Once again, Vehbi Koç was happy to provide these needs that were to serve to realize his vision of a materially comfortable and prosperous nation that geared for a dynamic future. Koç Zade Ahmed Vehbi company had installed central heating and plumbing amenities in government buildings during the 1930s, while the new Koç Trading Company meant to disseminate them into individual homes at the end of the decade.

World War II years were a clear blow to Turkey's development. Though the country did not enter the war, it still faced hardships of wartime economic austerity. Between 1939 and 1946, new construction almost came to a halt in Ankara due to World War II, but it resumed right after the war. Vehbi Koç had also managed to sustain his business while making expansionary plans to capitalize on post-war opportunities. By 1946, Koç Trading Company had become a modest advocate of the modernization that was taking place in Ankara and Istanbul homes. In a 1948 ad that ran in *Aile Dergisi* ("The Family Magazine"), the company promoted modern apartment fixtures for the health and happiness of the family.

> "A happy family is one all of whose members are healthy. In our day, everyone should know that the most important factor of health is cleanliness. In the meantime, the first thing that has to be clean and comfortable is the home that the family lives in. Providing the cleanliness of parts of the home like the kitchen and the bathroom, using the newest and the healthiest materials for their construction and repair should be the most important duty for every family. [Making] a beautiful home also comfortable is important both in terms of health and happiness…" [150]

The State of Domestic Comfort in the homes of Ankara's three income groups in the 1930s and the 1940s

Between 1923 and 1946, the formative period of the Turkish 'nation state,' certain infrastructure was put in place to provide the basis for a mobile socio-economic structure. Networks such as railroads, ports, utilities, and telephone companies were nationalized and major banks were established. The industrial workforce that was around 14,000 in 1925 had risen to 600,000 in 1945.[151] The necessary infrastructure for towns with over 10,000 population was in place by 1940.

Around 1946, the apartments that the Koç Trading Company catered to with its imported central heating systems and sanitary installations represented the ideal domestic life that was perhaps accessible to the upper-middle class minority, but this new ideal became an aspiration for all of Ankara's middle income groups. As external forms, cheap and luxurious apartment buildings that replaced traditional homes came together to create a modern urban pattern during the 1930s and 40s. However, there were visible disparities of comfort inside them.

Most apartments gained access to utilities like electric lighting and indoor plumbing, but other modern amenities like central heating and city gas remained luxuries. Most urban homes did not possess the standard that the Koç family set in the 1930s.[152] In small towns, change was even slower. Life in small towns resembled life in old Ankara prior to the founding of the Republic. New home construction was minimal.

Before 1950, extended families continued to live in traditional homes that were passed down from generation to generation.[153] It would take the 1950s for social and economic mobility to disseminate to the second tier towns and even to the villages in a certain way.

2.3 Liberalism and the Modern homes of the 1950s:

Vehbi Koç begins mass manufacturing for the home

Turkey was seeking a place in the new world order that was being established at the end of World War II. The 1950s brought a short experimentation with free-market economy for the country. It would prove to be a transitional period for Vehbi Koç. For the first few years following the end of war the new course of Turkey's political economy was still in question. How would Turkey continue to develop? What would its economic priorities be? How would it participate in the global ideas; adopt the new standards of living of the post WW II period? Would it continue to develop a technologically-independent economy, trusting individual well-being to improve as a by-product? Or would household modernization hasten and if so, by what method? During the war, Turkey had remained neutral and had stayed closer to the Allies towards the end. At the end of the war, Turkey found itself in a new geopolitical role as an ally of US and Western Europe. It also emerged as a new economic actor.

The Truman doctrine of 1947 brought Turkey under a strategic defense alliance with the US and an economic alliance through the post-war European Recovery Program (ERP) known as the Marshall Plan.[154] In exchange for military protection from the USSR, which the country shared its eastern border with, Turkey was asked to play dual roles of an agricultural-producer and a technology-consumer within the new global economic order that was being established by the US for its allies.[155] Turkey's new alliance meant a shift for the country; from seeking development through statist protectionism towards seeking it by implementing the rules of the free market. Vehbi Koç would once again transform his business according to this new political economy. From 1923 to 1947, he had functioned under statism. A paternalistic state

had provided infrastructure as a playing ground for individual businessmen like Koç, establishing the basis for national capitalism. Turkey's national capitalists had also served as its cultural elite who disseminated the ideals of the Turkish Republic. In the new era, Koç and others were to function under a new policy that prioritized rapid development that "reflected to the people" immediately.

Turkey's first multi-party elections brought to power a new government that promised to comply with American plans, abolish the nation's economic protectionism, and hasten the improvement of the private sphere. Rapid and thorough material development would be achieved by the individuals whose creative spirits were liberated by the free-market rules (figure 2.7).[156] The new government worked to foster a consumer-based economy; lowering import tariffs and encouraging the consumption of imported goods. New laws allowed more individuals to enter the housing market. Liberal economic policies also allowed Istanbul, Turkey's traditional center of trade, to regain its economic importance. These policies also urged Vehbi Koç to concentrate the activities of his trade company in Istanbul, where he remarkably expanded the scope and scale of his imported-goods business. As new economic policies encouraged home ownership and created a massive demand for amenities for the home, Koç sought joint-ventures to "manufacture" rather than to import them.

Liberalism and the new homes in booming Ankara and Istanbul in the 1950s

New economic policies that sought to foster a consumer culture had officially brought the home at the center of economic activity. Apartment buildings replaced the single-family home as the dominant residential form in the decade following the end of World War II.

A new law in 1954 legalized the ownership of individual apartment units, which encouraged small investors and families to invest together in home construction.[157] Previously, only wealthy families and small investors could afford to build apartments meant for rental. Now middle-income families joined them. A typical process occurred in this manner: the owner of a small home and garden turned the entire lot over to a contractor. The contractor then tore the house down and built a multiple-unit apartment building.[158] This process which was equally profitable for the lot owners, the builders, and the buyers instigated a boom in new residential construction in the 1950s.[159] As a result, large numbers of people moved from rental homes into apartment flats that they owned. In this way, the 1950s marked the beginning of a phenomenon in Turkey: home was turning from shelter into commodity. Creation of new and abundant ground-rent in the city allowed acquisition of imported goods, but most importantly it served to attain the comfort of central heating and indoor plumbing. As pressures mounted to acquire even more ground rent per each inch-square of urban land, government allowed even more flexible ownership rights — making room for more families in the expanding city.[160] This mass proliferation of apartments required lowering architectural standards of the buildings, dividing up city lots in even smaller chunks, and trimming public spaces for private use.[161] Apartment living went from being marginal to a mass reality in the 1950s.[162] (figure 2.8).

In the new decade, architects, planners, and the public had moved away from the frugal pre-war ideal of living quietly and modestly. Thus, the ideal of peace and quiet in the urban plans of the earlier period were replaced by a new vision, as the new government drafted plans that celebrated dense, massive urban landscapes (figure 2.9). The public of the 1950s gravitated towards a larger-than-life consumer lifestyle similar to what they saw Americans enjoying. They acquired a taste for bigger, faster, and more abundant material goods. Newspapers reported with certain awe about American achievements in architecture, such as large buildings erected within days.[163] Columns discussed technologies that served American housewives and their unavailability in Turkish homes was lamented.[164]

Homes built in the 1950s reflected this new ideal of living large. State housing projects now were mostly comprised of large apartment blocks rather than the previous two-story family homes.[165] Private builders erected buildings with more floors and more units per floor — that were characterized by massive window grids. This design aesthetic was taken from architecture magazines that featured the American international style. The Turkish interpretation was a "contractor's modernism".[166] Behind the new urban typology that dominated the urban landscape were several million families who demanded to live with the post-WW II standards that they aspired to. They had moved out of their single family homes into the apartments, but only a fraction of them could attain imported-amenities that Vehbi Koç provided.

Vehbi Koç probes the conditions for mass-manufacturing amenities for the home

Vehbi Koç was among Turkish businessmen who weren't entirely convinced with the Marshall Plan equation, that is, agriculture's ability to provide enough revenues for importing industrial goods. Koç anticipated the exhaustion of debt-financed, import-dependent economic development. Indeed, the demand for home construction, amenities, and consumer goods was so high during the 1950s that the country faced a foreign currency shortage due to the cost of importing raw materials and products.[167] Turkey did not have the domestic manufacturing capacity to meet the increases in consumer spending and government infrastructure. Vehbi Koç had foreseen this drive for massive social transformation long before the 1950s. He had also foreseen that modern lifestyles could not be sustained by importing its means indefinitely. He was personally dissatisfied by the fact that the necessities of modern life remained luxuries in Turkey while the majority of Turkey's economic partners enjoyed unprecedented material wealth due to the post WW II economic growth. Therefore, he set his mind on manufacturing in order to provide homes with amenities and conveniences on a mass scale.[168]

Koç's initial attempts at manufacturing were not successful. In 1934, his attempt at manufacturing cast-iron piping had failed due to a lack of capital and technology. His plans for joint-ventures to produce modern plumbing and radiators were turned down by the European companies he approached.[169] Post-World War II, though, Koç was no longer just a grocery store owner. He had become Turkey's biggest businessman in possession of

significant capital and resourcefulness.[170] This put him in a strong position to once again seek joint-ventures in manufacturing.

His first successes occurred immediately after the war when the Koç Trading Company acquired the Turkish distribution rights from several major US companies.[171] (figure 2.10). They included General Electric, US Rubber, Oliver Farm Equipment, Royal Typewriters, and Ford automobiles. By the late 1940s, Koç sought to persuade one of these companies to invest in producing in Turkey.[172] In 1948, Koç won a joint venture deal with the General Electric company to manufacture lightbulbs in Turkey. Around 1953, when Koç began to feel the effect of the depleted foreign currency on his import business, he began making even more concerted efforts to enter manufacturing. The following year, Koç laid two foundations for industrial enterprises: *Demirdöküm* would supply modern amenities to the ever-increasing number of Turkey's apartments and *Arçelik* would provide them with durable goods. The latter enterprise will be dealt in the next chapter.

The state of private industry and technology in the 1950s

In the early 1950s, modern housing needs in Turkey were met by a weak private industrial establishment. Raw materials, facilities and trained personnel hardly existed during the 1920s when most modern construction was performed with the help of foreigners.[173] In the 1930s, the state had begun training technicians to work on the modern building and industrial projects in the country. Technical education provided professionals with skills related to all aspects of modern construction. For example, schools trained students to perform all tasks that central heating systems required.[174] However, the growing needs of modern housing

construction were not met by these schooled technicians. At the time, the state which demanded high standards in construction and industry, was still the primary employer of skilled technicians. The majority of housing needs were fulfilled by private industry with an unskilled workforce. Thus, most buildings were fitted with poorly made fittings during the construction boom of the 1950s. In 1953, the editor of Turkey's leading industrial journal complained about this situation in his piercing editorial, "What are we to do with these shoddy domestic products?" Ibrahim Pertev Endüstri wrote these words:

> "If a home owner, out of his patriotism, attempts to fit his newly built house with domestic fittings, soon he gets frustrated. He sees the door locks failing, the fillings that cover up the holes of the water heater melting, the coating peeling off the galvanized pipe to reveal a cheap black metal plate. Then he loses faith in Turkish products." [175]

The author attributed this to the emergence of a degenerate type of industrialist who wanted to capitalize on the lucrative market by making a quick buck. Pertev saw a culture of deceit permeating domestic manufacturers, both large and small. As a result, the petty state of Turkish private industry had a poor image before the Turkish public and the world at large. Pertev suggested that the solution was to regulate manufacturing with legislative measures.[176] But legal action was not enough to get manufacturers to clean up their acts. It would take large capital and a concerted effort combining technical knowhow with modern sales and distribution. Vehbi Koç was the one man able to bring these things together when he founded a solid, long term, privately-owned iron casting venture in Turkey.

2.4 Vehbi Koç's foundry to mass-produce cast-iron amenities for the home: Demirdöküm, Istanbul, 1955

Twenty years after his first attempt, Vehbi Koç tried to seal another technical partnership deal with German radiator producer Hilden, and failed again. Nevertheless, Koç was able to establish his cast-iron building amenities company *Demirdöküm* with the help of technical partners who approached him for capital to realize their fully planned project. Jean Varsamis was a tobacco merchant who, like Koç, was hurt by the economic crisis and sought opportunities in domestic manufacturing.[177] Along with Turkish entrepreneur Mümtaz Fazıl Taylan, they imagined an iron-casting factory that would produce radiators. In 1953, Varsamis visited European foundries and acquired a plan that could be used in Istanbul. The two partners saw that their project was expanding beyond their investment capabilities. In 1955, they contacted Vehbi Koç, who joined forces with them in partnership.

Demirdöküm foundry marked a new beginning in Turkey as it redirected a vital public resource for private consumption. Iron was a precious resource for the Turkey, a newly industrializing country that was not able to supply it in quantities sufficient enough to satisfy private demand. Whether imported or produced domestically, iron was primarily used for large public projects such as railroads, government buildings, public works and more. Its availability for private consumption was limited. The factory opened the way for this industrial resource to be available for private needs, primarily for the modernization of the home. Koç's factory also promised to help ease the country's foreign trade deficit at a time when the government sought ways to produce certain products domestically.

In order to begin producing, Koç acquired technical knowhow through licensing agreements with a number of different companies.[178] He finally reached a license agreement with Hilden in 1956, when Hilden promised to assist the new factory in six crucial points of production:

1. Preparing scientific management plans for the factory

2. Helping prepare terms and conditions for the purchase of machinery and equipment

3. Providing tools and technical drawings for radiators and boilers (*kalorifer kazanı*)

4. Providing technical consulting services for the casting operations

5. Providing internships for technical personnel in German factories

6. Granting copyrights of patents (*alameti farika; bröve, telif, keşif*)

While the technical blueprints were acquired from abroad, the rest of the production depended on finding skilled technicians who could apply these techniques. The financial problems were not resolved either. To finance a serious industrial project in a country where private capital accumulation was relatively new and on a modest scale, new solutions were needed. Bartering of crucial raw materials and machinery for agricultural goods was one part of their solution. Raw iron and enamel was obtained in exchange for hazelnuts.[179] The iron was then used to acquire decoupage sheet steel. The partners also secured pig iron (*pik*), coke (*kok)*, and coal *(taş kömürü*) to fire the forge (*dökümhane*); and they acquired equipment for their forge in exchange for tobacco.[180]

By 1957, the government's liberal economic policies had depleted existing currency resources to a point where even basic necessities could no longer be imported.[181] Despite this additional hardship to both the general public and to business, the factory was completed and production began in 1958. Their foundry was given the name *Demirdöküm* which meant "iron casting" in Turkish. *Türk Demirdöküm Anonim Şirketi* (The Turkish Iron Casting Incorporated) was the first of Koç's many companies whose generic name suggested Koç's desire to create national monopolies in a number of industrial fields. The Demirdöküm factory began production of modern building equipment such as plumbing and radiators to distribute on a mass scale. The factory also produced pots and pans for which there was a ready market.

From the brazier to the stove and the hot water radiator: households define radiator-furnished home as a basic necessity in the 1950s

Even before Demirdöküm mass-produced and popularized radiators, people considered them as necessities of the modern world that was being built in the 1950s. Wealthier families were already installing imported central heating and plumbing systems into their buildings, and those families who lacked the means for them nevertheless were anxious to move into radiator heated apartments. The ideal home became an apartment flat fitted with radiators.

There was a reason for the impatience of middle-class families, since the comfort of central heating disseminated much slower than apartment-living. Throughout the 1950s, contractors were successful in luring households to give up their small homes in exchange for several apartment units to live in and rent out. Moving from poorly built, dark and cramp, moisture-ridden wooden (*ahşap*), stone or brick (*kagir*) homes into modern-looking concrete buildings

was appealing, but this did not necessarily mean that the newly built units were more comfortable than the old houses. The modern installations necessary for central heating were affordable only to a fraction of the apartment dwellers. There was a visible rift between comfort levels that frequently surfaced in newspapers. While many apartments made the switch from braziers to wood burning stoves, many others still used the older devices. For instance, in 1957 newspapers reported on one building engineer who stole coal from the boiler of his building to fire the charcoal-fired brazier (*mangal*) in his unheated basement unit, and his subsequent poisoning.[182] For most, the situation was not as drastic, but it was true that the majority of households had not received the comfort they expected to receive in exchange for the peace and quiet that they relinquished. The minimum comfort that the Turkish middle class aspired to was described in a weekly lifestyle magazine from 1953:

> "today people should not need to live in the extremes that characterized the past centuries. The minimum standard of living is known, it is neither luxury, nor misery, but a minimum: Light-filled large windows, flat walls without crevices (*girinti, çıkıntı*), simple but necessary things and details."[183]

This description of a well-built modern apartment building suggested the use of radiator heating in the elimination of extremes. It was part of a cry heard from the middle classes who could not access this minimum because it was offered as a luxury. As a 1954 ad suggested, Ankara apartments that featured centrally heated radiators rented at double the cost of stove-heated units.[184] Moreover, most new construction was poorly designed and poorly made. One critic likened the small interiors of apartments to matchboxes and thought that service areas

were thrown into the units as obligations.[185] New construction gave a modern appearance, but poor interior furnishings and primitive heating methods persisted. Some households were, at least, making a switch from charcoal burning braziers into safer wood and coal burning stoves in the 1950s. Cooking, however, was still performed on portable kerosene stoves (*gazocağı)* (figure 2.11). Hot water for washing, cleaning, and laundry was produced inside vessels that were heated on these same stovetops until the early 1960s.[186] Water for bathing, on the other hand, was supplied by a wood burning water heater (*banyo sobası*)[187] (figure 2.12). This device was convenient in one way, because most households already stored wood for space heating.[188] However, it was inconvenient in many other ways. Since the stoves were usually used in homes that lacked an on-demand water supply, water had to be manually poured into their tanks. Wood burning water heaters were made of cheap sheet metals that warmed up and cooled down very fast. Once they were lit, the entire family queued up to bathe as fast as they could. With both of these methods, cooking and bathing could actually be dangerous as well as inconvenient. Accidents such as poisoning, fires and explosions were frequently reported in newspapers of the 1950s.[189]

In 1955, a female social critic writing for the popular *Milliyet* daily used an ironic tone to reflect the embarrassment that middle-class people felt about the poor standards of living that persisted in their modernizing country:

> "American women will soon cook with radar cookers, they will cook an egg in 32 seconds, and a roast in 15 minutes. I am thinking of Istanbul…pictures come to mind of neighborhoods where coal gas (*havagazı)* is considered a luxury…in wealthy

> neighborhoods they burn kerosene (*gaz*). Then there are places where coal still reigns. The weather inside the homes [is] nausea mixed with headache…Time and time again news appears in the papers: they were poisoned by coal." [190]

"It's not over yet, there's more," continued the author, describing people cooking on open fires and using wood they scavenged from city lots. More miserable still were the conditions in the villages where people cooked by burning manure (*tezek*) inside a pit (*tandır*). "Be patient," the author sarcastically concluded, "women will cook with radar soon."

If we take the definition of physiological comfort as "the lack of discomfort in an enclosed space due to temperature and climactic changes" then comfort in Turkish homes, from small town houses to big city apartments, was not high.[191] The rooms were cool and kitchens and bathrooms were steam machines.[192]

Transitory solutions for space heating: *Demirdöküm* cast-iron stoves

While radiator heat was the ideal, there was often a step in the transition to modern space heaters. Simple space heaters such as braziers (*mangal*) were replaced by sturdy wood-burning stoves (*odun-kömür sobası*) (figure 2.13). In the early days, Demirdöküm sold stoves with modern lines combining brick-lined walls and cast iron bodies. The cast-iron stove not only contained fire better, it also transformed the orientation of the family in the living room as a structure that rose from the floor. In the traditional homes, households would gather closely around a portable, charcoal-fired brazier (*mangal*) that was placed on the floor. It was an open fire source with the need to constantly maintain the fire.[193] Modern stoves with their

sustained heat supply freed households from constantly attending to the heat source, and provided greater thermal comfort and freer movement. Advertising images promoted the stoves as elements that modernized living arrangements. The ads portrayed nuclear families who enjoyed the heat of the stoves while they were seated in modern furniture. They were apparently absolved from gathering around the open fire of the brazier. This ad reflected an ideal situation but also referred to the actual emergence of a "living room" in Turkish apartments in the 1950s. In newer plans, the central living space or *sofa* with its immoveable furniture was transformed into a hall (*hol*) with more flexible furniture arrangements. Cast-iron stoves were still considered modern until the mid 1950s.[194]

Ultimately, however, the modern family wanted to eliminate the chores that came with older heating methods. The activities needed to run a stove heater were seen as nuisances in the modern age. As one ad from the 1960s illustrated, one had to queue up to buy the wood, pay someone to chop it into finer pieces, store it, carry it up to the apartment, struggle to light it, and deal with the dirt it created (figure 2.14). More people began to demand central heating as a basic necessity.

In the mid-1950s, encouraged by a new law that granted ground rent ownership to individual apartment unit owners, middle-income families invented a method to attain the comfort of central heating. Those who were lucky enough to own homes on a city lot did not hesitate to hand their homes to a contractor in exchange for an apartment unit or two once a larger building was constructed on the property. Critics berated the public for turning their backs on traditional home life so easily. It was true that the apartments with indoor plumbing were

more convenient than homes that depended on water wells and pumps in the backyards, but new buildings also gobbled up the backyards.[195] The definition of comfort was changing for Turkish households. Whereas traditionally the desirable living conditions were described in terms of peace and quiet, in the 1950s these conditions were being crammed into the borrowed word "comfort" ("konfor"). The idea of comfort was extended to radiator heating, warm water supplies, and an indoor bathroom despite the fact that it came inside a crowded, boxy apartment.[196]

Thermal comfort in a middle-class apartment prior to modern water heaters during the early 1950s

The next step in improving thermal comfort in the home was to introduce a technological solution to provide warm water into kitchen's and bathrooms. This was more difficult to achieve, since city gas was too limited; and the introduction of warm water heaters required new patterns of use to be adopted for the kitchen and the bathroom. These were sections of the home where more culturally acquired, intimate practices took place. First, people had to be convinced of the value of abandoning manual provision of warm water for the "automatic."

Running water in the kitchen and the bathroom was costly and considered indulgent. Turkish way of providing warm water in the home was quite primitive. It was not provided automatically, but prepared and dispensed manually. Even in upper-middle class apartments kitchens and bathrooms were simple rooms during the first half of the 1950s. These buildings stood in the cusp between the traditional single-family homes and modern apartments. Their transitory nature was reflected in their facades that combined concrete modern slabs with touches of the traditional home such as bay windows and eaves (figure 2.15). The limited

availability of city gas, or home delivered LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) had kept the service areas of the homes from modernizing. Thus, the kitchen of the transitory apartment was a simple room that featured a wood-fired stove (*kuzine*) but no oven. These simple kitchens also lacked a proper source of hot running water. Western European apartments had received something comparable through the use of range boilers as early as the 1880s.[197] In Turkish kitchens, dishwater was boiled in copper vessels. Laundry was a larger task for which the home was not equipped. It was done with the professional help of laundry-women using washtubs (*leğen)*. Some apartments featured 19th century laundry devices such as wood-burning, cast-iron laundry boilers.

There were two rooms devoted to bathing in these transitory apartments. The *gusülhane* was a small private closet that was placed inside the bedroom of a couple, to be used for post-coital bathing. This feature was borrowed from traditional homes where extended families lived together. The main bathroom was traditional and square in shape (figure 2.16). It did not feature a modern bath tub, sink, or tilework. Floor surfaces were covered with a mixture of mosaic and cement (*karo taş)*. A tall, narrow log-fired stove was placed in the corner with a boiler on top, typical of a 19th century Western European installation. The stove replicated the feel of the traditional Turkish communal bath (*hamam*) by producing steam. It also produced hot water inside the boiler which was released from its built-in faucet. Hot water from the faucet was collected inside an elliptical shaped marble vessel (*kurna*) the size of a modern sink. The *kurna* rose 8-9 inches from the floor on four prismatic legs. Bathers would sit on a low stool next to the *kurna*, scoop hot water with a small copper bowl (*hamam tası*) and pour it over themselves repeatedly. Waste-water was discharged through a hole in the floor. The

bathrooms of these early apartments were modeled after the traditional communal bath, the *hamam*, which was considered an exclusive experience. The bathroom incorporated features of the *hamam* on a more modest scale and was an improvement over the bathrooms in traditional Turkish homes. The labor intensive nature of traditional ways of providing hot water had turned all activities around it into rituals. Activities that required warm water such as dish washing, laundry, and bathing required manual preparation of hot water, waiting in patience for the right temperature, and being cautious with heat. This was especially true for bathing that was historically a public ritual for Turks.

However, in this period of rapid transition, Istanbul's Muslim majority were exposed to alternative bathroom furnishings, such as showers and bathtubs that were installed in the homes of its non-Muslim minorities, that transformed their bathing behaviors. Bathing with running water was still considered an indulgence, yet the idea of freeing oneself from the labor of manually dispensing hot water was appealing. Some bathers were anxious to set down their water bowls (*hamam tası*) and to stand up to enjoy the convenience of running hot water through a shower. Although Turkish bathroom faucets were set low, bathers occasionally had the urge to get up from their stools and step inside the sink (*kurna)*, causing the fragile legs to break. It wouldn't take long for a majority of the people to demand a bathroom equipped with a bathtub, shower and an on-demand hot water supply.[198]

Bringing cheap, instantaneous warm water: Demirdöküm and Aygaz work hand in hand

Hot water radiators that were once limited to government buildings came to be adopted by families as a space heating method in the mid-to-late 1950s. Vehbi Koç's first industrial

enterprise Demirdöküm had begun to mass-produce radiators since the late 1950s, that were now considered necessities of modern life. Providing hot water for the kitchen and the bathroom automatically was another matter, considered a domestic indulgence in the 1950s. Vehbi Koç, nevertheless, was determined to capitalize on this seemingly indulgent demand. He sought a technology that would be economical enough for Turkish households to be adopted en mass. It was the instantaneous water heater that *Demirdöküm* set out to produce and popularize after the hot water radiators. Instantaneous water heaters, that were known with their French name "chauffe bain" in Turkey, were products of a long technological quest that had begun in Europe at the turn of the 20th century.

The Instantaneous water heater: affordable yet hardly convenient hot water technology for European, then Turkish households

In the mid-19th century, apartment living had emerged in order to accommodate the masses that populated cities. Few low-cost apartment buildings were designed for either comfort or style.[199] Comforts brought into the home by cast-iron heating implements were limited to a small number of luxury buildings in European cities.[200] Most apartment buildings did not offer much beyond providing space and shelter. They lacked modern installations, and they were poorly heated. Soon after World War I, new ideas on improving life in mass housing were developed in Europe. At the same time, new technology was also being developed.

Introduced in Germany after World War I, the instantaneous water heater came to be one of the most widespread methods of providing warm water to homes in Europe. Its technology was the result of a long quest by a German inventor. Hugo Junkers, an aircraft engineer,

developed the heater as a technological exercise in thermal power efficiency, creating warm water with less power.[201] As a designer, Junkers sought to bring technology and simplicity into the home in congruence with the modernization program of the Weimer Republic. His water heater, with its light and compact construction, transformed the bathroom into a specialized service area (figure 2.17).

The tankless heater, limited in its capacity to supply high volumes of hot water, was equally economical in its consumption of gas. This fact made it very popular in Europe after World War II. Despite the claims of its manufacturer Junkers, the water heater was not understood as a fully convenient replacement for the hot water tank boiler. In the 1950s, the boilers were reserved for the affluent. The modern boilers that combined the tank with the heating unit entered in a limited number of households. The combination boilers, or *termosifons* (figure 2.18) as they were referred to in Turkey, rendered the water supply a nearly independent matter for the household. The boiler owner, as it was advertised in the late 1950s, was immune from low city water pressure, or temporary shortages. The large water tank of *termosifon* stored and maintained large amounts of standing hot water, ready to use. The unit could be fired by inexpensive kerosene rather than city electricity. The thermostatic control allowed the bather to adjust the temperature of the water.

Instantaneous water heaters, or *şofben (*chauffe bain) as they were known in Turkey, had entered Turkish apartments as early as the 1930s. Junkers' water heaters were installed in Turkish homes that received city gas (figure 2.19). Government projects also adopted them as the ideal solution for modern kitchens and bathrooms. As mentioned earlier, state technical

schools provided training for central plumbing installations in the 1940s. Students built model bathrooms featuring instantaneous heaters (figure 2.20).

Given the huge costs of maintaining standing hot water in tanks, it was the instantaneous water heater that became popular in Turkey.[202] It fired and consumed gas only when in use.

The Convenience of Warm Water in Turkish homes in the late 1950s

Vehbi Koç's popularization of water heaters depended not only on an appropriate technology but also on finding a method to supply gas to a massive number of households. In the meantime, more affluent households who received city gas or ones who were within reach of home-delivered LPG, adopted imported water heaters as a modern alternative to wood burning stoves. Families embraced the new device because it absolved them from the primitive acts of storing burning wood and firing stoves. Water heaters were modern technological devices that matched the newly built apartments endowed with modern bathrooms and kitchens.

Newer buildings have shed their traditional features for a plainer look and eliminated labor-intensive rituals with water inside them. In the late 1950s, as typical upper-middle-class families moved into the new apartments furnished with modern fixtures, in city neighborhoods that received gas, they also traded their manual method which provided substantial hot water for the automatic, but more ephemeral method. In the new bathrooms water ran through the coils of an instantaneous heater and flowed from a shower head. As most households who made the switch soon realized, they were also trading a primitive but

functioning method for a technologically modern but imperfect one.[203] Low city water pressure made *şofbens* turn on and off randomly. Turkish households battled with their bathroom faucets to keep the water warm enough and flowing at the same time. This shortcoming, however, did not prevent their continued adoption as technological improvements for the apartments.

2.5 Planned economic development bolsters Vehbi Koç's industries, the drive for home modernization

Planned economic development builds systems for Koç's industries to grow

Making the wider household ideal for modern domestic comfort a reality depended on transformation of the nation's economic policy. *Demirdöküm* was born, in the mid-1950s, out of the necessity of producing formerly imported goods domestically in order to save precious foreign currency. But the company lacked the support of an industrial system that would allow it to develop properly. The government, at the time, failed to institute this system since it was caught unprepared. All industrial development was trusted to individual entrepreneurs who would somehow establish their factories within free market rules. Since, no over-arching plans existed for providing supporting infrastructure for private industries, no one truly came forward. There were piecemeal, last minute efforts to start an import substitution industrialization (ISI) policy and Demirdöküm was a product of this. However, even this company could not survive without supporting systems around it. The economy could not be salvaged by tweaking the liberal rules, and it entered a crisis that resulted in social upheavals and a military coup that forced the economically liberal government out of office in 1960. The new coalition government introduced "planned economic development" policies in 1961 that benefited *Demirdöküm* and encouraged businessmen to enter manufacturing. New policies provided the financing and infrastructure needed by private industrialists. Vehbi Koç was personally involved in the development of the policies and even served on the board of one of the new state enterprises. These supporting systems included a smelting furnace for pig iron, a new oil refinery for gas, and a new steel factory for steel goods. *Demirdöküm*, began

acquiring its pig iron in much larger amounts from the new state run smelting furnace which helped its production capacity immensely.[204]

From Demirdöküm's perspective, things were looking up. The economy was reenergized and residential construction began again. A new law was in the works that promised to grant increased residential ownership rights and bolstered home construction. Apartment living was more widespread, home heating habits were changing dramatically, and therefore demand for radiators was increasing exponentially. In 1962, radiator production rose by 56 percent within one year.[205]

Instantaneous water heaters were the next product that Demirdöküm set out to produce and popularize for Turkish households, whose mass production benefited from additional industrial systems established by the planned economy. Despite all its known shortcomings, in the 1960s, Vehbi Koç's *Demirdöküm* company was preparing to commercially present the Junkers water heater as an elegant and economic warm water solution for modern apartments in Turkey. Hugo Junkers had invented the instantaneous water heater in the 1910s as an alternative to costly tank heaters, as a utopian solution to democratize the use of hot water in European homes. In the 1950s, the Junkers instantaneous water heater, now produced by Bosch, was established as a household staple across Europe (figure 2.21). Popularizing instantaneous water heaters in Turkey was made possible by combining this technology with a "flexible" fuel distribution method. It required a revolution in the way that gas was supplied to Turkish homes.

2.6 LPG technology revolutionizes water-heating in the Turkish homes: Aygaz gas delivery network, 1962

As mentioned earlier, electricity and water were two resources that were delivered from central distributors, bringing the comforts of indoor lighting and running water into individual homes. However, cities were not able to distribute heating gas as widely. The highly speculative nature of Turkish housing had created uneven patches of neighborhood development that made it very difficult and costly to build gas grids.[206] Coal gas was provided to a very limited number of subscribers in a few planned neighborhoods. Most households bore the responsibility of carrying, storing and maintaining their own heating fuels. These fuels ranged from kerosene for cookstoves to charcoal for room-heating braziers, and wood or coal for space and water heating stoves. The provision and maintenance of these fuels was difficult, their performance was often unsatisfactory, and they were unsafe.[207]

Providing fuel for the Turkish home was revolutionized thanks to the state's planned industrial investments beginning in the 1960s. In a 1961 press conference, the state refinery proudly announced that it would provide LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) that would revolutionize the way fuel was brought into homes.[208] LPG was announced to be six times more efficient than the common coal gas and it promised to be safe from "poisoning, starting fires, and setting off explosions," common nuisances of the other fuels.[209] In the same press conference, authorities displayed the devices that could potentially use LPG in the home. They included a countertop stove that Vehbi Koç's Demirdöküm would make a household staple in the following years (figure 2.22). As the state refinery began producing LPG, Vehbi Koç, a former distributor of many forms of fuel, founded Aygaz to become its leading distributor in Turkey. In this way, Aygaz would end the reign of kerosene and uneven city

gas. Turkish households grasped the convenience of LPG very quickly. As journalist Hasan Pulur remembers, Istanbul households immediately got rid of their old cookstoves and canceled their subscriptions to city gas. LPG was delivered into the kitchen with a phone call, and one could begin cooking with the strike of a match.[210]

Demirdöküm began advertising in 1962 that, "with the strike of a match," households could also have instant hot water from their faucets. In 1962, the company introduced its first instantaneous water heater fired by LPG. Another mass-produced Koç product promised to bring comfort into the home, replacing the shoddily made and inconvenient bath stoves of Turkey.[211] Demirdöküm produced Junkers-patented water heaters with help from state run industries that provided its essential parts. Copper inner conductive bodies and pipes for water heaters were supplied by the state enterprise MKE and domestic manufacturer Rabak.[212]

Vehbi Koç finally possessed all the necessary means to make water heaters a reality for average citizens. Demirdöküm would mass-produce the water heaters and Aygaz would distribute gas to power them.

Aygaz tanks fire the first Turkish instantaneous water heaters:
with a strike of a match the home will be transformed

From the 1930s through the 1950s, ideal bathrooms and kitchens featuring instantaneous water heaters or *şofben*s could be seen in Turkish newspaper ads (figure 2.23). Early ads had promised that the *şofben* was the ultimate method for bringing warm water into the home. It was presented as the ideal solution for kitchens and bathrooms. The compact, wall-hung

device did not clutter or compromise modern spaces. It contributed to their rational organization. The *şofben* was a natural functional complement to modern service spaces, easily blending with sanitary installations such as built-in bathtubs and sinks.

Demirdöküm similarly marketed its Junkers-patented water heaters as ideal water heating solutions for modern homes (figure 2.24). Demirdöküm ads proclaimed that the *şofben* had genuine attractions, especially for the family desiring a modernized lifestyle. It provided continuous hot water from all faucets (figure 2.25) and did not require the water to be stored, placed on a stove top, or brought to the right temperature through constant attention. Prior to *şofbens,* households knew that water heated inside a vessel began cooling off as soon as it was removed from the stove, and it had to be carefully moved so that it did not spill. The instantaneous heater was promised to be a hassle-free solution for cleaning, dish washing, laundry, and bathing (figure 2.26). One ad likened the water heater to a natural geyser, suggesting it was almost an indulgence to use it (figure 2.27). Since they burned city gas or home-delivered LPG, instantaneous heaters also saved households from the necessity of storing fuel (figure 2.28).

The adoption of instantaneous water heaters and radiators was slow, however, even in the urban areas of Turkey because of the cost and limited availability of heating fuel, and proper running water. In rural areas and small towns, traditional methods persisted long after Koç introduced the *şofben*.[213] Nevertheless, as the '50s became the '60s, most people came to believe the *şofben* was a necessity. By the mid-1970s Turkish homes were certified as modern by the presence of Demirdöküm and Aygaz brands (figure 2.29). In poor urban and most rural

homes where modern space and water heating were not available, Aygaz still brought modernization into cooking. Introduced almost simultaneously with the şofbens, Demirdöküm brand stovetops that were fired with Aygaz LPG tanks were adopted quickly as a universal solution across Turkey (figure 2.30).

2.7 Conclusion

Technologies transform the layout of the home, carving space for bathroom and kitchen in the late 1950s

The Turkish home went through a long arch of transformation from the 1920s to the 1960s. At each stage, Koç's entrepreneurship introduced technologies to bring ease and comfort to the practices inside the home. These technologies simultaneously transformed the physical space of the home and behavioral patterns inside it. In the 1960s, after decades of home modernization — that was induced jointly by the state and private entrepreneurs, and hastened by pressures from the public — buildings were equipped with plumbing. Some also housed boilers that produced hot water, distributed via plumbing into units equipped with radiators. Separate radiator units distributed heat into individual rooms. In this way, central heating contributed to the disappearance of the central living space or *sofa* where the family had gathered around a charcoal-fired brazier or a wood-fired stove. In the new apartments of the 1950s this was a transitory space (figure 2.31). In the 1960s, it completely lost its gathering function and became a mere hallway. In Turkish homes, rooms were once designed to provide absolute privacy for couples in the extended family, including taking a private bath. The kitchen had been a small, cluttered space for women.

In the new apartment buildings, modern bathrooms and kitchens were given open access. Rooms for entertaining were cut out in favor of smaller living rooms. Once the primary goal of home design was to ensure the segregation of the sexes inside and the privacy of the family, as well as the isolation of the family from the surrounding neighborhood. The goal became the construction of modern apartment buildings on the city lots that once belonged to

single family homes. The modernity and comfort-seeking motive that was unleashed in the 1950s led to a big wave of apartment building construction which was transforming Turkish values, both economic and social. The goal of owning a modern apartment fully-fitted with modern installations also transformed Turkish industry to prepare for, meet, and fuel this demand.

In bringing these changes into reality, Vehbi Koç had gone from being a provisioner, to being a network builder, and finally a technologist.

Vehbi Koç as provisioner, systems builder and mass manufacturer

A new class of Turkish businessmen was enabled by the foundation of the Turkish nation state in 1923. The Turkish merchant class rising out of the nation's social and economic modernization also served as the members of its new cultural elite. Their entrepreneurship energized the national economy while the example of their consumption patterns set the standards of good life and generated aspirations in other income groups. Turkey's emerging middle-class households sought modernity by transforming their homes into technologically-endowed spaces. Among the new breed of Turkish businessmen, Vehbi Koç emerged as a pivotal agent for household modernization. He was driven by a desire to break the repetitive pattern that defined everyday existence in his own community, and sought practical means to inspire the same desire in others. Koç expanded his business throughout the formative period of the Turkish Republic that encompassed the statism of the 1930s and the 40s, liberalism of the 1950s, and the planned economic development of the early 1960s. In 1926 (Koç Zade Ahmed Vehbi), 1938 (Koç Trading Company), 1955 (Demirdöküm), and 1961 (Aygaz) Vehbi

Koç founded enterprises that each served a role to transform a certain aspect of the Turkish home.

Throughout the decades, the Turkish state had introduced various plans for national development. Whether the plans channeled resources to state enterprises, private businesses, or to public and private industries Vehbi Koç's own business, nonetheless, simultaneously sought ways to take advantage of the economic changes for the benefit of improving material comfort in the domestic realm. Vehbi Koç understood that, sooner or later, the family would sit at the center of economic activity. Koç strategized in a way that conceived modern domestic developments as a whole and his various companies, one by one, catered to modern needs that were connected to each other.

Koç also knew that his businesses would not survive if his companies behaved like traditional suppliers of commodities who operated with a lack of interest in/ or control of the general systems in which their products reached their customers. He had witnessed many cases in which Turkish businessmen who had made fortunes under favorable business conditions and privileged business deals had lost them due to singular unfortunate decisions or due to the first negative turn of the general business climate. Koç was determined not to remain a mere supplier, but to become a systems builder who saw that his products survived and proliferated.

Vehbi Koç was initially a small provider. As a grocery store owner he provided food and basic supplies to Ankara's households in the 1920s and the 1930s. Then he supplied construction materials as an import dealer in Istanbul.[214] After World War II, Koç began

transforming his business by expanding his role as an active public agent. He sought new ways to meet the growing desires/needs of Turkey's households who were going through a process of economic and social modernization. Koç capitalized on bringing heat into the modern home with radiator and boiler systems; and with water heating and cooking devices that were fueled by LPG. These methods had emerged as a preference of the affluent, but Koç proactively saw that they became necessities, then mass realities. From the beginning, it was understood that the *Şofben*-fired-by-LPG was an imperfect, jerry-rigged solution: *Şofben*'s performance suffered from insufficient and low water pressure in Turkish cities; and LPG was not as safe as it was reputed to be. Moreover, when in short supply, LPG paralyzed the lives of Turkish households. LPG use became the available choice in part due to the public's failure to agree on long-term public investments. LPG's spread was also the result of the public's inclination for admitting all kinds of ingenious solutions into their private homes that would bring them convenience at once — whether a better, long-term solution existed or not. Even the limited number of households who received city gas began canceling their services as soon as LPG distribution became widely available. Despite imperfections, Koç's Aygaz and Demirdöküm companies made LPG solutions look and feel modern. Koç's effective branding and marketing helped cement public opinion and normalized usage.

From his origin as a provisioner, Koç had grown to be a systems builder. When the planners of the 1960s proposed to use the portable LPG tanks as the modern method of supplying heating fuel for homes, Vehbi Koç was ready to develop a megalithic LPG distribution network. His company *Aygaz* acquired the LPG from the state's oil refinery *İPRAŞ* and bottled it inside iron tanks cast in his *Demirdöküm* foundry in Silahtarağa, Istanbul. Aygaz

distributed the containers using trucks acquired through Koç's Ford dealership — another network that he had painstakingly built since the late 1920s. Once delivered to apartments, the LPG tanks fueled instantaneous water heaters (primarily *Demirdöküm* models), kitchen cookers and ovens (a good portion of which were also produced by *Demirdöküm*). The expansion of Koç's operations network coupled with the city's inability to expand central gas distribution resulted in the cancellation of city gas across Turkey by the end of the 1970s. Koç's companies came to control most of the kitchen and bathroom warm water systems from fixtures to energy distribution networks that met 30 percent of all household energy consumption in Turkey.[215] The Aygaz LPG tanks became indispensable in Turkish households.

In the 1950s, Koç had become a manufacturer for two reasons. One was to mass-produce and meet the growing need for modern installations in the apartment units that were being built. Vehbi Koç's foundry and gas distribution operations were in line with his roots as a provisioner and a systems builder. Koç's companies, Demirdöküm and Aygaz, acquired the respective technologies as they were necessary. His other manufacturing enterprise served to bring the convenience of electric powered durables into the homes: Arçelik transformed Vehbi Koç into a technologist in ways he did not imagine. Koç had never made selling appliances his primary business when he had imported them as luxury items. Yet, by forging an institutional identity expressed in various modes of design, he was able to transform them from luxuries into necessities of modern life when he began their domestic production and distribution.



brazier

washtub

kerosene lamp

Figure 2.1 Koç Family home, a vineyard house. The house featured manually provided amenities such as water fetched from a water-well, fuel (wood or coal) carried into the home to fire a portable room heater (brazier). Water was heated inside washtubs and rooms were lit by kerosene fired lamps



Figure 2.2 Floor plans of traditional Turkish homes with typical sofa room arrangements. For example a "central sofa" is a room where sofa beds are arranged in each corner of the the space leaving a space in the center.



Figure 2.3 The signage for Koç's first trading company Koç Zade, founded in 1926.



Figure 2.4 View of Ankara's old town before and after construction, c. 1901 and c. 1928.

Figure 2.5. Apartment buildings on Ankara's new main boulevard, c.1946



Figure 2.6. Rental apartments shooting up in Ankara's old town, c.1930s.

Figure 2.7. Demokrat Parti [Democrat Party] election posters, 1957.
The party promises to create wealth by setting into motion the enterprising spirit in all members of the society.

Figure 2.8. Top: Advertisement, "Hayatiniza yeni bir istikamet verecek firsat [an opportunity that will give your life a new direction]", *Milliyet* 2 Nov. 1956: 5. Bottom: "Hayatin bu zevkli anini siz de tadabilirsiniz [you, too, can enjoy this pleasurable moment in your life]," *Milliyet* 15 Sep. 1959: 3.
In the 1950s, Turkish banks gave away apartments through raffles and the ads posed them as the ideal homes.







Figure 2.9 The vision of Ankara changed in urban plans from 1932 and 1957. The 1932 plan (left) had imagined Ankara as a city of green public spaces and low density housing. The 1957 plan (right) imagined it as high density metropolis.

K O Ç

TİCARET TÜRK ANONİM ŞİRKETİNİN
TÜRKİYEDE TEMSİL ETTİĞİ
AMERİKAN FİRMALARI

INTERNATIONAL GENERAL ELECTIC COMPANY

Ampul, radyo ve buz dolabından başlıyarak, generatör ve türbinlere kadar, her türlü elektrikli cihaz ve makinelerde bu markayı arayınız

UNITED STATES RUBBER EXPORT COMPANY

Otomobil ve kamyon lâstikleri dahil, emniyet edebileceğiniz kauçuktan mamûl eşyalar bu markayı taşırlar.

OLIVER FARM EQUIPMENT COMPANY

Oliver markalı ziraat makinelerinizin sağlamlığı hakkında daima müsterih olabilirsiniz.

ROYAL TYPEWRITER COMPANY

Son model bir Royal yazı makinesi, yazıhanenize hususi bir ciddiyet verecektir.

TOLEDO SCALE COMPANY

Her nevi tartma işlerinizde kullanacağınız en dakik âletler, Toledo Markalı hassas terazi, baskül ve sair tartı cihazları olacaktır.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Ankara Bölge Acenteliği
Otomobil, kamyon ve sair motörlü taşıtlar....

SOCONY VACUUM OIL COMPANY

(Ankara Acenteliği)

Motörünüzün kuvvetini, Socony akaryakıtları ile; muhafazasını da, Socony motör yağları ile temin ediniz!

Figure 2.10 Advertisement, "Koç ticaret anonim sirketinin Türkiye'de temsil ettigi Amerikan firmalari [American companies that the Koç trading company represents in Turkey]," c. 1944. Koç trading company announced a list of the US companies that it won rights to represent.

İsmi gibi NUR olan Gazocağı

NUR ALEV GAZOCAĞI

Tamamen pirinçten mâmûldür.

REKLAMCILIK: 2720 - 7654

Figure 2.11 Advertisements for portable kerosene fired stoves (*gazocagi*), c. 1958, 1959, 1963



Figure 2.12 Advertisement for a wood burning bathroom stove (*banyo sobasi*), *Milliyet* 23 May 1955: 4

Figure 2.13 The transition from brazier-heated rooms into stove-heated living rooms.

Top: Cartoon, *Akbaba,* 1 Jan. 1937: 156. reprinted in *Üç kusak Cumhuriyet* 140.
The cartoon depicts the life inside a room heated by a brazier

Bottom left: Sakir Zümre stove, advertisement, "375 bin aile bu sobalari zevkle kullaniyor [375 thousand families use these stoves with pleasure]," c. 1953.
Bottom right: Demirdöküm stove, edvertisement, "Bol hararet, konfor, tasarruf [abundance of heat, comfort, savings]," *Milliyet* 6 Oct 1959: 5.
Wood and coal burning stoves placed inside modern living rooms were a sign of modernity in the 1950s.



Figure 2.14 Advertisement for an Arçelik gas stove illustrates the chores that come with traditional fuels, c. 1964.

Figure 2.15 Façades of 1940s style apartment buildings in Istanbul, *Panorama*, c. 1954



Figure 2.16. Bathroom of a typical middle-class apartment in Istanbul in the early 1950s and other amenities inside the home.



Figure 2.17 Top: Modern bathrooms and kitchens where Junkers water heaters were installed, c. 1923. Bottom: Junkers instantaneous water heater advertisement, "Heisswasser-stromautomat für mehrere zapfstellen [Hot water current automat for several taps]," c. 1930s. The inset situates the water heater as the source of warm water for bathroom and kitchen.

Figure 2.18 Advertisement for a combination boiler (*termosifon)*, 1960.

Figure 2.19 Junkers water heater advertisement, "Tuvalet için, bulasik için, ufak çamasir için lüzumu olan en ucuz suyu havagazi sofbeni verir [the coal gas water heater provides the cheapest water necessary for bathrooms, dish washing, and small laundry]," c. 1930. Instantaneous water heaters (*sofbens)* were installed in Istanbul's homes that received city gas as early as the 1930s.



Figure 2.20 "Work of the students of Sanitary Installation Department,"
Technical Education for Boys (Ankara: 1949) 41.
A model bathroom built by Turkish technical high-school students in the late 1940s featured an instantaneous water heater (*sofben*) long before Vehbi Koç began manufacturing them.

Figure 2.21 Advertisement for a Junkers wall mounted instantaneous water heater, c. 1950s.

countertop stove
(*tezgahüstü ocak*)

gas stove
(*gazocagi)*

Figure 2.22 "Evlere Kaplar Içinde Havagazi Verilecek [homes will be supplied gas inside containers]," Milliyet 11 May 1961: 3.
LPG fired household devices, including a countertop stove (*tezgahüstü ocak*), and several gas stoves (*gazocagi)* were displayed in a press conference in 1961.



Figure 2.23 Ads featuring modern bathrooms with instantaneous water heaters *(sofbens)* installed, c. 1930s, 1950s.

Left: Coal gas advertisement, "Sihhat [health]," c. 1930s.
Right: "Bütün havagazi cihazlarinin tek rakibi ve dünyaca meshur, Alman mali Sanaa havagazi cihazlarindan sofbenler, sobalar, firinli ocaklar gelmistir [Instantaneous water heaters, stoves and ovens have arrived from …world famous German Sanaa coal gas devices]," c. 1950s

Figure 2.24 Demirdöküm/Junkers advertisement shows a *sofben* installed in a kitchen and a bathroom, c. 1966

Figure 2.25 Demirdöküm/Junkers advertisement, “Continuous and abundant hot water from all the faucets…,” c. 1967

Figure 2.26 Demirdöküm/Junkers advertisement, "You can being laundry, dishwashing [and] cleaning whenever you want," c. 1969.

Figure 2.27 Demirdöküm/Junkers advertisement, "[Provides] continuous and abundant hot water just like the geysers," 1967.

Figure 2.28 Left: Demirdöküm advertisement, "is it a bathroom or a fuel storage room? Right: Demirdöküm/Junkers advertisement, "your home is not a grocery store," c. 1972.

Figure 2.29 Aygaz and Demirdöküm advertisements feature the strong visual identities of the two companies, c. 1960s



"We got rid of manure and wood.
We bought Aygaz and got
comfortable."

"When Aygaz
came we
rejoiced. We
said goodbye to
wood and coal"

"Your gas is the
preference of
millions."

Figure 2.30 Aygaz publicity posters promote the uses of LPG tanks by rural, small town, and big city households, c. 1960s.
LPG improved the fuel uses of Turkey's three types of households. Rural and small town households abandoned burning manure, wood and coal; while big city households abandoned using coal gas and kerosene.

Figure 2.31
Gradual disappearance of the sofa room in apartment plans of 1955, 1958, 1960, and 1970.

a. Sofa as a living hall, 1955



b. sofa replaced by an entrance hall, 1958

c. entrance hall transforms into a corridor, 1960

d. a corridor, 1973

CHAPTER 3

THE ARÇELİK REFRIGERATOR: DESIGN IN A PLANNED ECONOMY

3.1 Popularization of industrial goods as personal conveniences in Turkey

Changing the perception of electrical durables, and putting Turkish industry at the service of private consumption

Throughout the 1950s, under liberal economic policies, private consumption began to move to the center of economic and social activity in Turkey. Apartment buildings replaced traditional homes as mass-produced residential solutions that concentrated larger numbers of families into Turkey's growing metropolitan centers such as Ankara and Istanbul. In the 1950s, Turkish families either gave up on or lost interest in domestic bliss defined as privacy, peace, and quiet within the perimeter of a single family home. Families redefined the idea of domestic happiness as living in a modern apartment flat that was equipped with technologies that absolved them from manual tasks of acquiring thermal comfort. Newly adopted amenities included radiators for space heating, modern bathroom and kitchen fixtures such as instantaneous water heaters and gas-fired cookers. Thanks to import liberalization, upper middle class families also began to adopt electric powered appliances in their homes that absolved them from a number of additional manual tasks. Refrigerators were the most sought after of these electrical appliances as they promised to bring convenience of storing food. It wasn't long before refrigerators claimed a central place in Turkish domestic life.

The refrigerator, as a mass-produced Turkish product, brought together multiple elements of design — architectural design, product design, advertising and branding design — to contribute to the founding of a modern industrial economy and a modern public sphere in Turkey. It was popularized by Vehbi Koç, whose Demirdöküm company was largely responsible for bringing technologies of thermal comfort into Turkish apartments.

The Demirdöküm foundry, in coordination with the Aygaz LPG distribution company developed as extensions of Koç's provision and network building activities that transformed him into a mass-producing industrialist. On the other hand, his electrical durable goods company Arçelik was an extension of his imported-goods business. Arçelik would not only adopt but also develop design and technology.

Demirdöküm's production rested on new residential construction, and its products pressed themselves more easily as necessities, as essential features for new homes.
Electrical durables, on the other hand, were largely felt to be indulgences by Turkish families. They weren't simply installations that improved residential infrastructure, but they were objects of possession, and potentially status symbols sold in luxury imported-goods stores in Istanbul.

Popularizing electrical durables required a wholesale transformation of Turkey's business and technology cultures, that meant transforming merchants into industrialists and putting engineers and qualified technicians to the use of servicing private consumers. But, before this

happened, substantial changes had to occur in national economic policies and cultural values.

In the beginning of the 1950s, 'flour, sugar, and cement,' which the public referred to as 'the three whites' dominated discussions of consumption. These were staples that most Turkish families depended on. For the Turkish families, the inability to afford electric powered 'white durable goods' was the obvious obstacle to their consumption. The other obstacle related to the public perception of electrical durables. Families were not comfortable with spending significant shares of their savings for durables, since they had the impression that doing so was indulgent, not essential. It took time and persuasion for the Turkish families to consider durables as essential features of contemporary life rather than displays of wealth and luxury.

Vehbi Koç as a dealer of imported consumer/durable goods until World War II

Mass manufactured consumer goods of all kinds had been introduced as imported goods during the second half of the 19th century for the consumption of a narrow group of people who lived in the trade districts of Istanbul. In the Ottoman imperial cultural realm they had been visible manifestations of alienation, considered to be objects of curiosity that could hardly ever become a natural part of the Turkish experience. Modern consumer goods had been attached to a lifestyle that had emerged during the second half of the 19th century in Istanbul that encompassed Western style education, commerce, art, and entertainment. Istanbul's minority-dominated district Pera had been the locus of this activity.[216] Pera had ascended to political, economic, and cultural prominence as a "little Europe" born in the heart of Ottoman Istanbul. However, when families of the Muslim majority adopted Western lifestyles, they could not serve to disseminate these values to a larger group, which at its core,

was quite conservative and insular. All these families could do was to constitute a fringe culture within the districts dominated by non-Muslim minorities.

The department stores catered to this group whose shop windows brought into their attention the latest technological developments in Western Europe. Initially, these department stores flourished after the re-enactment of constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire in 1908[217] (figure 3.1). Burla Brothers, who would become Turkey's largest distributor of imported goods in the 1930s (and a partner of Vehbi Koç in the 1950s), was established soon after the 1908 constitution.[218] Importers of the Pera and Galata districts provided the link between recent innovations in Western material life and the Ottoman public that wanted a part of it. The importers distributed goods to all of the major Turkish cities via local Anatolian merchants who made bids to buy and resell their products. One of these was a small Ankara merchant by the name of Vehbi Koç. In the 1920s, he managed to won a deal to become a first class agent for one of these large distributors. Koç's arrangement with Gesaryan initiated his entry into the circle of Istanbul's big merchants.[219] Gesaryan was one of those businessmen who had made an impression on young Vehbi Koç with his lavish spending?, his appreciation of finer things, and his gargantuan operation whose flagship was the Gesaryan department store. Koç, who then only owned a grocery store in Ankara, was awed before Gesaryan's store where each story was devoted to a separate department. Gesaryan, like many others in Pera and Galata, sold manufactured goods that were being enjoyed in Europe's great cities at the time such as Odeon records, AGA radios, and Miele washing machines.[220]

Broader dissemination and legitimization of Western ideas and culture in Turkey took place

under the rubric of the new Turkish nation state that was founded in 1923. Under the cultural atmosphere of the Turkish Republic that promoted the material conditions of modernity as essentials yet to be attained, modern consumer goods gradually came to be accepted as symbols of contemporaneity. And as electrification became more widespread, electrical durables were no longer considered to be curiosities although they were still practically unaffordable for the many. They had become visible symbols of a new ideal of modernity for the narrow, yet, emerging Republican middle class. In the 1920s and the 30s, Koç household, like others in mid-sized towns across Turkey, had slowly begun to experience the modernization of the home. With the arrival of electricity in the 1930s, many such families across Turkey enjoyed interior illumination with light bulbs and had bought radios, but they did not have access to a full range of electrical goods.[221] Ankara's stores did not make flamboyant displays of these goods. As with the emergence of modern apartments, electrical goods and modern conveniences emerged in Istanbul first. They were sold as luxury goods in the lavish department stores of the city's minority-dominated business and trade districts Pera and Galata. An early ad from the 1930s for Burla Brothers, the leading distributor of consumer durables, had announced that it would be a waste not to benefit from the comforts that electric-powered goods provided [222] (figure 3.2). Electrical durables gradually, but surely, presented themselves as necessities.

Foreign durables awed Turkish people as wonders of technology. They were objects that held power, literally and symbolically, within their sturdy construction. During the time between the two World Wars, there was strong loyalty to German appliances and English textiles among the Turkish public (expressed in sayings such as "German goods are always sturdy" or

"if you'll be hung, get hung by an English rope").[223] Ads for goods made in Germany such as vacuum cleaners, washing machines, radios, and various electrical home appliances, appeared in the pages of newspapers and magazines from the 1910s until the beginning of World War II. Among the goods on sale, radios were the most common and refrigerators were the hardest to attain. Refrigerators were usually American brands, especially the Frigidaire produced by General Motors. People referred to refrigerators as Frigidaires ("*Frijider*") at a time when a definitive term for them was lacking in Turkish. American refrigerators traveled from a faraway place unfamiliar to most Turks. They appeared to be imposing marvels of technology, true paragons of modernity. This image is well demonstrated in the Frigidaire ads from the 1930s (figure 3.3). Refrigerators were the ultimate expressions of ownership that brought status to families (figure 3.4). It would take decades for refrigerators to become common in Turkey, relegated from being luxury items into being friendly domestic devices. Until then, traditional methods of cool storage persisted such as ice delivery, keeping food cool in water wells, and keeping perishables away from flies inside screened cabinets. Screened cabinets (*teldolap*) were attached to the exteriors of windows like air-conditioning units are installed today.[224]

Prior to the end of World War II, refrigerator owners were primarily in Istanbul because electricity arrived and proliferated there first (figure 3.5) but also because families who could afford these expensive items lived there. In Ankara, where Vehbi Koç grew up and established his business, refrigerators did not really appear until the 1940s when the city became widely electrified.

3.2 Imported durable goods enchant Turkish households after World War II

Refrigerator enters the Koç home

One day, in the old Ankara neighborhood of Keçiören, the family of Vehbi Koç, now a prosperous Ankara merchant who had risen from a family of shopkeepers, received a package at their door.[225] It was a refrigerator, part imposing furniture and part technological wonder. As soon as electricity had arrived to Keçiören, Vehbi Koç made his home one of the first Ankara dwellings to boast a refrigerator. Looking at the refrigerator that stood at the door, Koç's mother protested. She thought there was absolutely no reason for this luxury spending, and added that the family was doing just fine using their water well.[226]

Despite the wealth the family had achieved, both Mr and Mrs Koç wanted to live modestly. Vehbi Koç acted in a way to keep his lifestyle within certain limits so that he could continue to relate with the common middle class.[227] Regarding the modernization of the home, however, they sometimes disagreed. Early on in their marriage Mrs Koç turned some of her focus toward the idyllic life of the vineyard house, where she continued to manage the household with some professional help.[228] For Vehbi Koç, on the other hand, modern conveniences were basic rights, whether for their summer retreat or their primary home. As early as 1931, he had seen the satisfaction and happiness that a thoroughly modernized and utterly fast-paced life had brought to people in Europe’s big cities. That was something Vehbi Koç had seen in European cities in the early 1930s as he walked through the giant halls of their department stores and witnessed the frantic pace of life with people on the streets who had an expression of fulfillment on their faces.[229] He did not share the romantic notions of his

Istanbul-bred wife. He remembered, and always recounted lucidly, his early life of deprivation in small town Ankara.[230] Koç was a man made by the enterprising spirit of the new Republic, both as an individual and as a businessman. He was energized and moved by it. His family's example would serve to demonstrate how to live comfortably with modern tools — be it modern fixtures, furniture, or appliances.

Two years after it arrived in their home, the refrigerator had nevertheless grown on Vehbi Koç's mother, who urged his son to buy one for his sister also.[231] It will come as a surprise to contemporary readers that the refrigerator was not located in the kitchen. Back in the 1940s, this was a simple, small section of the house. In the Koç family, refrigerators occupied a place of prominence in the living room. Vehbi and his mother would sit back and watch this impressive furniture, perhaps the most technologically sophisticated device that had entered their home yet.[232]

By the late 1930s, Koç was established in Istanbul as a big merchant, and his trading company came to supply many imported goods. But these goods were still considered luxuries, not enjoyed by the masses as Koç had observed in the rest of Europe. As Koç was dreaming of a way to relegate them to necessities in Turkey, World War II erupted, setting back many ambitious projects and making the provision of basic necessities a priority once again. Nevertheless, Koç realized that there would be ever more Turkish families who would demand improvements in their household conditions once the war over. He also knew that American products, which were mass manufactured, would be more appropriate to bring to the masses.[233] His trading company acquired the license to represent major US companies

immediately after the war, including such brands as General Electric (GE), US Rubber, Oliver farm equipments, Burroughs office equipments, and York.[234]

It was not easy for Koç to finance these import operations given the state of Turkey's economy. The limited currency resources were going into larger state-run projects. After the war, it became an important task for Koç to persuade the government to channel more national resources into consumer spending. This became especially true when Koç entered manufacturing in 1948 making GE bulbs in Istanbul. In order to make the GE bulb factory possible, he secured permission for GE to transfer its share of the profits back to the US in US dollars.[235] In later years, Koç would continue this strategy in other forms, such as persuading the government to trade strategic raw materials for capital machinery.

Imported refrigerators as symbols of status after WWII, and throughout the 1950s

Turkey's economic/strategic partnership with the United States after World War II brought about its new dual economic roles as an agricultural-producer and a technology consumer. The country's Marshall Plan-influenced new political economy promised to utilize free-market rules to achieve development that reflected to the people immediately—instead of achieving it slowly by building an industrial infrastructure as Turkey's founding government had aimed for. Turkey's Marshall Plan agreement had direct implications for its economy, primarily requiring the country to open its national market for American and Western European imports. The treasury's tight-fist loosened, US aid came flowing in, and new laws enticed consumer spending.[236] This liberal economic policy also meant dispersion of imported goods beyond Istanbul's Pera and Galata stores and across more towns in Turkey. It had

implications for the society, too, which was developing an ability to relate with the latest goods, not as producers, but as consumers of technological end-products. The public's vision of technology transformed from its frugal, necessity-based adoption for the public good. People began to regard technology as a means towards unrestricted material acquisition that served a private purpose. At the time when they abandoned their single family homes for apartment living, Turkish families also wished to surround themselves with imported technological products. Liberal economic policy had implications for technology, too. The new economic policies overturned the long-term, state-run industrial development plans of Turkey's former/founding government in favor of private enterprise and agricultural development. These two economic sectors were envisioned to generate new consumers in both rural and urban Turkey. When their Turkish partners balked at the cancellation of many strategic industrial enterprises, the U.S planners answered them that Turkey would industrialize the way Western Europe and the United States did; by taking its time. Turks would begin slowly by first making simple things like pots, pans and farm equipment like sickles, then moving on to more sophisticated products in subsequent decades.[237] Until then, Turks would sell agricultural produce abroad and buy imported manufactured goods in exchange.

Liberal economic policies also had implications for Turkey's businessmen like Vehbi Koç. Koç Trading Company expanded the scale and scope of its operations, making imported manufactures to enter into everyday lives in much greater numbers during the early 1950s. A larger domestic market allowed the company to reach out to a broader consumer base, while it improved its distribution, marketing, and advertising skills. But, for Vehbi Koç the

economically liberal 50s was also a period of transition. Koç was simultaneously seeking a method to provide these goods independent of importation — since he was aware of the limitations of importation whose costs was to be met by agricultural revenues. However, for the majority it seemed like importation was a dependable solution to acquire technological goods during the early 1950s.

All kinds of US goods hit the markets hard in the early 1950s — so hard that one newspaper reported that importers, who were used to dealing with much smaller volumes, did not have enough space to store them.[238] German goods were now replaced by imports from the US that were sold in a different manner. In the 1930s, when the volume of imports was low, imported-goods were sold to a much narrow consumer base, as finer things by employing decorative styles that appealed to those with finer tastes. US goods, of the 1950s, on the other hand, were dispersed to a much larger audience, thanks to the national resources devoted to import them. They were accordingly presented as/appeared to be democratized goods for the masses and were sold using American hard-sell methods. Advertising efficiency had been a point Marshall planners had promoted in their economic plans for Turkey, suggesting that the Turkish people be exposed to the "education of sound advertising," since it was "in the minds of the people that the desire for better living [began]."[239] Slogans were delivered with sensationalist lettering and illustration, telling households to change their ways at once (figure 3.6). In the meantime, Pera's department stores such as Philco, Odeon, and the aptly titled Konfor ("comfort") flourished with a variety of goods and options they have never had in the past. This situation brought an unusual liveliness and vigor to the advertising pages of newspapers, enticing consumers with images of a cornucopia of goods — from Ronson

lighters to Johnson's baby powder — that were now available to those who could afford them.

This image of post war abundance was misleading since the durables that were well above the reach of the salaried middle-class, were still limited to Istanbul's upper middle class families. Yet it was equally true that many Turks had grown an appetite for comfort and convenience during the early 1950s. Even rural families, who in the past bartered their produce for goods, now had paper money to spend thanks to agricultural credits, and could afford store-bought items for the first time such as clothes, pots, pans, and smaller goods.[240] Urban families, on the other hand, were trading their humble houses for apartment living with a goal of attaining complete modern material comfort. This ideal was presented most aptly in newspaper advertising for bank raffles where a life was portrayed as living in a radiator heated apartment flat, owning a refrigerator, a washing machine, and perhaps a car in the long term (figure 3.7). This image matched more or less the material condition of a middle class American. As published in a Turkish newspaper in the early 1950s, this typical American was, "a thirty year old man, married with two children, [who owned] a home thanks to loan givers…a car, a refrigerator, a radio, and a television." [241]

In the early 1950s, cars were a far away dream for most Turks but refrigerators were a more attainable item, even though they cost as much as the annual salary of a mid-level government clerk. They served as the highest symbols of personal/familial financial achievement and social status. Giant images of Servels, Hotpoints, Norges, and Philcos triumphantly stood in expansive full-page newspaper ads that were sometimes shown over the backdrop of the New

York skyline, to indicate their direct link with American modernity that was characterized by scale. Big was the new scale that Turks were getting to be fond of, in products and also in their cities. Both Istanbul's and Ankara's urban plans were revised in order to make them larger. Turkey's first skyscrapers were erected in these two cities in the 1950s, buildings that dramatically dwarfed the monumental architecture of earlier periods.

During the first few years of the 1950s, the new government's liberalism seemed to be working. It had brought liveliness to the markets and relative wealth to all levels of society. The public had grown an appetite for imported technological wonders, and did not quite show an interest in how they were made. A new materials exhibit designed by UNESCO received little attention when it arrived in Istanbul.[242] It seemed that the Turkish public, convinced that imported goods would continue flowing in, were not much concerned with how the country could afford it.

In the meantime, Turkish technical circles were frustrated that Turkey was left out of the post war technological development effort. Industry journals lamented the lack of well-produced goods in Turkey and accused the government of not giving enough emphasis to manufacturing industries. As it was foreseen by the economically liberal government's many critics, importation-based development policies were exhausted by the mid-1950s.

3.3 Import Substitution industrialization (ISI): industrial development that reflects to the people

The exhaustion of liberalism, and the restrictions on imported-durables

Turkey's experimentation with free-market economy must have truly awakened desires for material goods, since its obligatory end caused much public uproar. Unrestricted government spending depleted Turkey's foreign currency reserves by late 1953.[243] In the mid-1950s, when the government began backtracking from its policies, it found resistance from all levels of society.[244] Importers, consumers, and intellectuals alike protested the restrictions that were imposed on imported technological goods that were declared luxuries. For a growing number of metropolitan families, everyday life had come to depend on such items such as imported razor blades, photographic paper, radio tubes, and car tires.[245] Thousands of previously ordered goods got stuck in the customs yards of Istanbul.[246]

As for the ultimate technological wonder of the period, that is the refrigerator, there had emerged an unquenchable appetite that was now satisfied by indirect methods such as black-marketeering and smuggling. Only a small number of refrigerators were legally sold according to narrow import quotas allocated for them. Newspapers reported long lines to purchase refrigerators at legal places, while they could be readily bought on the black-market but for ungodly sums.[247] The scarcity of refrigerators in the Turkish market made Americans living in Turkey a major source for acquiring them, legally or illegally. In 1958, newspapers reported that an American corporal was arrested for selling refrigerators in the Turkish market that he had acquired from the PX store.[248] American military personnel who began leaving Turkey at the end of the 1950s were a major supply of used refrigerators, selling them in the

American markets established in cities where US military bases were located.[249] The trade fairs that promised material prosperity early in the decade had now become places where American display refrigerators were being sold to a hungry public. At the 1959 Izmir trade fair, all display models were sold within minutes.[250]

Members of the urban middle class were utterly frustrated, as their appetite was whetted and then abruptly denied by government restrictions on imported goods. From the beginning, the majority of intellectuals and the press (including those who had welcomed liberalism) criticized what they saw as the government's irrational and unrealistic policies.[251] The Turkish urban middle class lamented the fact that other Marshall Plan countries attained the modern comforts that were promised while Turkey had become worse off.[252] In Turkey, basic necessities became luxuries even as the rest of the world enjoyed postwar abundance. One columnist in 1956, expressed the frustration of Turkish middle class women who had found themselves in the midst of a black-market for basic necessities:

> "…who knows how far we are from civilized comfort yet. (One needs to ask that to a fortuneteller). Refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and prepared vegetables are still luxuries, worse yet they are dreams. We are still going from the sweeper to the washpot…" [253]

This lamentation was a clear reaction to the unfulfilled promise of achieving American style material comfort and convenience by following the Marshall Plan policies. Beginning in the late 1940s — thanks to the promises of the Marshall Plan, the rush of imported goods in their markets, and the celebration of all things American in the Turkish press — middle class Turks

had developed a yearning for American style living. As the decade came to a close, intellectuals wanted to understand the source of both American prosperity and Turkish failure to create it. It was understood, in general, that American wealth rested on two things: the productivity of the individual, and the rational organization of activities that were used in utilizing the resources.[254] The government was accused of using Turkey's resources in an unplanned, irrational, and a populist way.[255] In the beginning of the 1960s, a new government, was seeking ways to offset the negative trade balance and to rescue the economy. Turkish state re-determined its positions within the global economy for a third time since its foundation in 1923 by instituting 'planned economic development' — domestic production for a protected market. The new government introduced Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) primarily as an effort to level the nation's trade balance; secondarily to reinstate the Turkish Republic's original vision of attaining an independent, national technological establishment; and thirdly to realize certain consumption standards that were promised but not fulfilled within nation's own means.

Meanwhile, certain businessmen were already preparing for a new kind of economy. Of Vehbi Koç's two industries, Arçelik steel goods company was founded in 1955, but flourished under the planned economic development years of the 1960s. Planned development prioritized manufacture of investment goods, but also sought to improve the private sphere. It did not admit the creation of a full-blown consumer society, but introduced manufactured goods as things that satisfied a certain contemporary standard of living. Thus, the economic development plans admitted the introduction of consumer goods in a regimented way in gradual steps, in an order of necessity. However, this was not a strictly statist kind of

production. According to the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy, the state would provide financial and technological tools for private industrialist to produce consumer goods. The state also encouraged industrialists to adopt technology, but as a means to develop their own. The Turkish state wanted to turn the ISI policy into an opportunity to attain an independent, national technological establishment.

In the early 1960s, the state began to establish infrastructure and raw materials industries to provide for private industrial enterprises. These included power plants, an oil refinery, new iron foundries, and a modern steel plant.[256] The ISI policy restricted the importation of end products by making them subject to high tariffs. Parts would be imported to produce finished goods within Turkey.[257] The policy envisioned that as Turkish entrepreneurs learned manufacturing, the need for imports would drop, giving way to one-hundred percent national products at the end of the 1960s — saving the nation much needed foreign currency. High import tariffs and credit incentives guaranteed unusually high profits on domestic goods. This compelled many more private investors to join Vehbi Koç in entering industrial production. However, ISI policies made it clear to would-be industrialists that they were obliged to prove themselves as servants of national development, not of their own profit-seeking. Industrialist's success with acquiring technology was a potentially decisive factor in the failure or success of Turkey's ISI policy. It was crucial that Turkish industrialists invested a considerable portion of their profits into acquiring technology, and using durable goods parts domestically, instigating a part-supplying industry in Turkey. And because their production depended on the quotas allotted to them, Turkish industrialists were forced to justify their actions at every stage of production.[258]

The new economic policy would also bring Vehbi Koç's industries out of limbo and enable them to go from batch to mass-production. The policy gave Koç the playing ground to become an industrialist/technologist, with the potential power to instigate a thorough consumer culture. Turkish appetites were already whetted during the import liberation and debt-financed consumption period of the 1950s. Thus, Koç now had a small critical mass as consumers in Turkey's metropolitan areas to build something larger across the country.

ISI policies served to nurture the Turkish industrial/business culture during the 1960s. However, Turkey's emerging industrialists had to prove their positive contribution to the national economy before a public weary of scarcities caused by trade deficits. To be popular in the public eye, big Turkish industrialists stated their goal as serving the nation's trade balance rather than earning personal profit.[259] Vehbi Koç took the lead in fostering this benevolent private industry in Turkey. Koç became the godfather of industrialists who were born out of the community of Turkish merchants who established themselves during the planned economic period of the 1960s. He counseled businessmen to instigate rational business organizations and to be industrious. Besides their formal obligation to conform with the planned development policies, businesses should also prove their hard work to the public at large and eradicate their "incompetent industrialist" and "greedy merchant" image. According to Koç, the health of Turkish democracy depended partially on the integrity of the Turkish business culture. His leadership of the community eventually led Koç to unite Turkish industrialists and businessmen under a formal banner a decade later.

Vehbi Koç's early attempts at becoming an industrialist, and the foundation of Arçelik

Vehbi Koç became a paragon to Turkish merchants who prepared to venture into industry in the 1960s under the favorable conditions of the planned economic development and ISI policies. Koç's own adventure, as a businessman who tried his hand in industry, had begun three decades earlier, roughly at the same time when he had established his first trading company (*Koç Zade Ahmed Vehbi*, 1926). In the 1920s and the 1930s, Koç's operations had coincided with the national political economy that had placed the foundation of the country's urban and industrial infrastructure at the center of economic activity. From Koç's point of view, however, the families and their needs always stood at the center though they were not the central concern of the political economy until much later in the 1950s. Koç, nevertheless, strategized to make use of the financial opportunities of the "statist" political economy for his own business incentive. His business incentive was neither selling luxury imported goods with a large profit margin, nor becoming a contractor, or a technology-pursuing industrialist. Koç's idea for trade, as well as industry, always stemmed from his particular business perspective that conceived the needs of the home and the family as a whole to be supported by several systems to be built around it.

Throughout his early career, Koç had supplied commodities and goods that held more mass appeal. His first customers had been the farmers of Ankara, and then the government clerks who had populated the city in the 1920s and the 30s. Koç had been a painstaking builder of systems in which his products survived and proliferated. For example, he sold kerosene lamps but also built a business to distribute the kerosene cans that fired them. Vehbi Koç, the provisioner, had seen the potential for household durables in the 1930s. He had moved his

operation to Istanbul to sell imported durables, but he had never become an importer who simply unpacked and shelved luxury goods that only had a small group of ready customers. Koç had made efforts early on to enlarge the pool of consuming Turkish families, and also to enlarge the sphere of goods and commodities that each family admitted into their homes. He had acquired whatever skill that would help him to supply modern goods in mass quantities to the largest possible numbers of families. Koç's desire to control almost all variables in supply forced him to acquire the skills of a distributor, network builder and slowly a technology seeker and adopter.

Koç had made his first attempt at industry as he had gotten into supplying for construction in the 1930s, when he had immediately felt his dependence on imported supplies. His desire for independence from uncontrollable supply variables paralleled the young Turkish republic's yearning for economic independence. He had attempted to domestically produce some of these imported-necessities so that he could make them more available, and so that he could control their flow into the market. His joint venture plans to produce iron building fixtures, and his attempt at producing iron piping had both failed in the 1930s. Koç tried other methods to get closer to the source of industrial supplies and knowhow. He finally won representations of major US goods when the situation permitted in 1948. The same year he got closer to the source in one venue and began manufacturing besides distributing GE bulbs in Turkey, as his first step into industry.

In the first three decades, Koç's various ideas for industry were held back by the lack of broader systems to support it, but most importantly by the lack of a political economy that

truly supported private industrialists. Koç had foreseen the narrowing of his import-based activities even before the economic crises of the mid to late 1950s.[260] He had begun to investigate possible ways in which he could transform his business into a manufacturing enterprise. Around 1953, he began investing his resources in two manufacturing enterprises: one for casting iron and another for shaping metal products. Koç's iron foundry was discussed in chapter 2. His steel goods factory, on the other hand, would provide the market with a cornucopia of products made out of shaped steel — primarily American style office furniture that had become popular in private offices that have flourished during the liberal economy of the 1950s.

Producing refrigerators would be the most lucrative venture since there seemed to be endless demand for them in Turkey. But refrigerators were also the most technologically complex goods to produce. Koç knew that he had to start small and tap into the technology that was already available to him in Turkey.

Vehbi Koç, a long time supplier of sheet metal to small manufacturers, found his partner in a former associate in Ankara. Lütfi Doruk was a German-trained technician who had begun producing steel office furniture for the state offices that proliferated in Ankara in the 1930s under the brand name Erel. The two men envisioned building a factory together, but World War II had prevented that collaboration. In 1953, a conflict between Doruk and his workshop partner drew him to Koç, who at the time was seeking technical partners of any kind who could help him start manufacturing.[261] Vehbi Koç's excitement over producing steel goods made this collaboration easier. The two initially sought partnerships with foreign companies

primarily for technical help, but decided to go on their own when a German and then a Belgian company both rejected their technical demands.[262] The partners turned to the next available source for technical and financial input, which happened to be Turkey's primary importer of steel office furniture and production machinery, the Burla Brothers.[263] Fortuitously, they learned that Eli Burla, Turkey's leading distributor of imported goods, was ready to invest in manufacturing.[264] As their factory project advanced, the two merchants, and Doruk, the small workshop manager, became nervous about rising investment costs and the prospects of finding a reliable market for their goods. They came up with a unique idea: to bring in a state enterprise as an investing partner and buyer. Given that this investment could save the nation precious foreign currency, whose shortage was sorely felt in 1955, the State Supplies Office happily obliged their pleas.[265] It was this business approach that made Turkey's first substantial private industrial enterprise take off the ground.

As Burla and Koç sought employees for their factory, they resorted to the intellectual capital that the young Turkish republic had bolstered in its technical schools and heavy industrial enterprises beginning in the 1930s. It was during the late 1920s that Turkey's founding single-party government had seen private investors as too weak to undertake industrial enterprises. The state stepped in to establish domestic industry to produce for the immediate needs of the nation as well as to support would-be private enterprisers.[266] Both Koç, a contractor and parts supplier, and Doruk, a furniture supplier for the state, were men made by the Turkish Republic. Vehbi Koç always expressed his gratitude for the early republican efforts that invested in the nation's technical infrastructure.[267] Doruk saw his entrance into industry as part of the national challenge of the 1930s, that aimed to prove that a nation of farmers could indeed produce men of

technology.[268]

It was Lütfi Doruk who planned the management of operations, placed orders for the capital machinery, and drafted the layout of the factory. Since the partners also wanted to break their dependence on imported parts and control their production as much as possible, they invested in training personnel who could make the molds necessary for furniture production rather than purchasing them. They preferred to spend money on foreign technical consultants, not foreign parts.[269]

The steel furniture factory was built in Istanbul's historical industrial district Haliç. The modern Sütlüce factory was side by side with traditional industries such as meat packers and leather workshops. The factory began producing steel furniture for the state supplies office in 1956.[270] The partners used the name Erel Çelik on their products, the name of Lütfi Doruk's former workshop.

The Sütlüce factory did not begin its life as a facility of mass production. This was because the orders from its main customer were sporadic and of rather low quantities (like ten, fifty, or one-hundred per day). This prevented the company from establishing a stable daily production run. Typical orders were for fifty regular tables, ten chairman ("*reis*") tables, five chief executive tables, etc.[271] In a few years, the State Supplies Office dropped the orders to even lower levels, buying from the lowest bidders in the market.[272] Ordinary workshops were able to offer furniture at much lower costs due to small investment costs and short production runs. The partners turned towards more sophisticated production methods that existing

manufacturers would not even attempt. They produced windows from imported aluminum profiles. For this purpose a construction department and a galvanization facility was established, which helped the factory to make the transition into more sophisticated manufacturing.[273] Another challenge was production of household durables for which there was strong demand in metropolitan Turkey. The reason to produce durables came also from a desire to add the maximum value possible to the factory's difficult-to-obtain main input sheet steel.[274] Gearing the production towards more valuable products began with gas stoves. In 1957, the Sütlüce factory finally reached full production capacity, thanks to the popularity of its first mass consumer product.

In order to move from furniture to machines, Koç sought a technology far beyond the one he acquired for *Demirdöküm*'s relatively simple radiators and water heaters. There was no precedence in Turkey for producing electrical goods meant for household consumption. Thus, the first two products that Koç's new factory planned to introduce had to be technologically efficient, economical, and relatively easy to manufacture. Just like the *Demirdöküm* radiators and water heaters the first two Arçelik products, too, would not be characterized by distinction but by utility. Moreover, to acquire the necessary technology for his electrical goods Koç had to move up the ladder of global industrial hierarchy. In 1958, the partners took the next step and sought Western technical assistance to produce washing machines, their first product to house an engine within its body. Their pleas were rejected as before by companies who didn't take the Turkish operation seriously, and Arçelik was forced to develop its own type of washing machine, based on the English AEI brand, a subsidiary of General Electric, built with imported engines and agitators. For the first time, production bands were prepared

within the building to manufacture the factory's first true machine.

Transferring technology from secondary sources: Israel's Amcor, a GE subsidiary

An overwhelmingly positive response to the company's humble washing machine encouraged the partners to move production away from office furniture and towards electrical durables. As their next move, the partners decided to produce the first domestic version of the ultimate household durable, the refrigerator. They made many efforts to acquire the technology directly from its source, but once again forced to acquire it from the lower ranks of post-WW II industrial hierarchy.[275] The source of Arçelik's first refrigerator was as Amcor — an Israeli firm that produced refrigerators licensed by Philco which was in turn owned by the Ford Motor Company. [276]

In July of 1960, without much fanfare, a humble 10.5 cubic foot refrigerator, the sister of an Amcor/Philco, entered the Turkish market to compete against giants such as Frigidaires, Servels, and Hotpoints.

Arçelik managed to produce refrigerators within a local framework that was set up by German-trained engineers, product, and production designers, although the products themselves were American in origin.[277] Refrigerators were produced by assembling parts designed and engineered by Philco through Israel's Amcor. The first three models that the company had proudly announced as Turkey's own had, in fact, all been models originated with Philco. Still, Arçelik did much more than simply assemble a foreign product. Each year, the company made use of an increasing number of domestic parts, either produced in its own

factory or acquired from the domestic market. This did not change the fact that models B-1, B-2, and B-3 were actually Philco's designs acquired through Amcor (figure 3.8). The style of the cabinets derived from the production technology at the time. B-1, the first refrigerator that Arçelik introduced, had a streamlined style defined by soft corners and interior decorations that could be characterized as "tapered" forms. B-2 and B-3, on the other hand, followed the 1960s trend of a more boxy construction. Their interiors, such as freezer doors, vegetable trays, and cheese compartment lids were rendered in the popular American design styles of the postwar period featured on other Amcor products like radios, microwave ovens, and front-loading washing machines (figure 3.9).[278] There were hints of "taper" and "sculptural" forms, such as the sculptural wooden handles of the B-3s, but elements of "sheer form" dominated the interiors.[279] Perhaps the best place to identify this aesthetic is on freezer doors. Their surfaces were embossed with fine linear patterns and accented with lightly-stroked, square-shaped lettering (figure 3.10). Another application of the sheer form on Arçelik refrigerators was the square badge on their doors that featured elements such as fine line patterns and crisp glitter marks (figure 3.11).

Although design, in the early stages, was something that Arçelik simply borrowed and applied, it was in the plans to make it a part of this brand. From the beginning, the company had stated "the modern and beautiful look" of the refrigerators as one of the five reasons to buy Arçelik refrigerators.[280] In this period it was not product design that brought unity to the institution. There was another unifying element that Koç utilized for all Arçelik products: the Sütlüce factory.

3.4 Koç builds the Arçelik Factory and brand

Building a factory, an icon of modernity

Despite the technological pitfalls the Arçelik operation faced in its early years, the factory in which production had begun was perhaps a sign of the ambition of the Arçelik project.
The Sütlüce factory had opened in 1955 without much fanfare as Erel Çelik.[281]
Yet, it was the most significant private investment in Turkey known to that day and a bold architectural concept. It was an attempt by its investors to distinguish themselves as worthy among the domestic manufacturers, and perhaps to elevate the image of the petty merchant to the level of the father state, whose factories had a prestigious presence in the public eye.

Despite the fact that it was founded without much fanfare, the scale of investment in this enterprise was reflected in the design of the factory. The facility wasn't simply constructed by a contractor, like many smaller private projects were, but was treated like a state project and designed by a real architect. It was designed by Aydın Boysan, a young and aspiring architect who belonged to a generation of architects that emerged during the 1950s when public and private construction were booming in Turkey. These young professionals founded Turkey's chamber of architects in 1954. They took their inspiration from the corporate international style of the 1950s that was expressed in the many public buildings that were commissioned in the 1950s.[282]

Despite their ambition for this metal-goods project in general, the investors could neither provide construction machinery, nor a sizeable patch of land on which to build the factory.

Using “pickaxes and shovels” on what he called “a wretched piece of land,” architect Boysan, nevertheless, managed to erect an impressive four-story, concrete frame building with a floating-roof terrace. The small size of the lot had forced Boysan to design a multi-story structure. The lot’s irregular shape also dictated an L-shaped form.[283] It took Lütfi Doruk, the technical partner, some extra effort to design the flow of production in this asymmetrical, multi-story factory building. Despite its practical shortcomings, this sizeable investment would become something the company could use for two important purposes: first to create trust in a domestically produced product; and second to assume leadership in its field.

Turkish companies were not known for producing washing machines or refrigerators. The few household goods that were actually produced in Turkey had a very poor public reputation. Bathroom stoves and cookstoves were inefficient, broke easily and were unsafe. A domestic goods exhibit in 1958 had become a subject of amusement in the press.[284]

In 1957, a conflict over the name rights for Erel Çelik forced the partners to find a new name for the company. Lütfi Doruk’s former associate wanted to keep the name Erel for his own furniture business. The partners used this opportunity to establish a trustworthy brand name. They came up with the phrase “Ar Çelik” which meant ‘honorable’ steel. To name a durable with a domestic brand name demonstrated a degree of self-confidence — at the time domestic producers were thought to be incapable of producing even decent cookstoves. As it released its first machine in 1959, Arçelik had to appeal to a customer group that was loyal to foreign durables and prove to them that Arçelik products could rival those from Europe and America. Arçelik’s first challenge was to create confidence in a domestic product with a domestic brand

name. The company did this by introducing its capital investment to the public, in gradual steps, to establish a secure background for its humble durables-to-come.

A few months before Arçelik released that washing machine, the company published a full-page image of the factory in Sütlüce, showcasing in all its glory the concrete frame, exposed-brick and cast-iron window grid facade (figure 3.12) The iconic image of the factory's flat façade rendered in line art was reminiscent of another icon of industrialization, Ford's turn-of-the-century assembly plants (figure 3.13). This was especially true of the factory in Louisville, a location Koç executives visited for their business meetings with General Electric. It was a foreign factory image Turks would have become familiar with by the 1950s.

This image proved the substance behind Arçelik. It was not a typical Turkish private business, but "one founded with a large capital investment and full knowhow, where the state sector and private enterprise [had] joined hands." It was, "…equipped with the exact same means" of "well-known European and American companies." To name a few,

> "Technical personnel who [had] the full grasp of modern Western technique…
> Qualified workers who [knew] their trade…
> a brand new concept of work…
> full quality control…
> and painstakingly chosen quality materials"

These factors combined to make the Arçelik factory "a real source of pride for [the] country."[285]

The following year, when the washing machine was finally introduced, the image of the giant machine press appeared as part of the advertising campaign (figure 3.14). The ad, created by long-time Koç associate Eli Acıman's Faal advertising agency, announced that this giant press was the quality guarantee behind Arçelik washing machines; to underscore the ad Arçelik management regularly demonstrated the machine's power and precision to factory visitors.[286] A few months later, a row of mass-produced washing machines sprang from the factory, and a new ad appeared (figure 3.15). This time, the name Arçelik was placed atop the factory image and ran across the entire page. The imposing presence of the factory, now coupled with its equally imposing brand name, served as the guarantors of what was actually at that point a hand-assembled, jerry-rigged washing machine.[287] This confident visual statement also spoke to the large-scale projections of its founders even in the early days of the company.

Arçelik began its production of household durables by improvising with gas stoves. With the inclusion of several other durables, a product line emerged. The company, now more confident of its staying power and future prospects, began systemizing its product line with bold model names. Names like G-1 for gas stove number one, [W-1] for washing machine number one, and [R-1] for refrigerator number one reinforced Arçelik as the brand that was set to be the quintessential producer of durables in Turkey.

By the early 1960s, however, the government steered the country into a planned import substitution economy, many more producers entered into manufacturing, and Arçelik's earlier strategies would no longer suffice. Arçelik had to re-present its brand name and factory in a more sophisticated way. Because almost all of the new producers, despite the fact that their durables were produced in Turkey, sold them under foreign brand names, created the illusion that the scarcity of foreign branded goods was over. Under the ISI policy it was sufficient for Turkish producers to prove that they imported only parts, not end-products. The authorities did not care whether they sold them under foreign names as if they were imported. Foreign 'mother companies,' on the other hand, were happy to grant name rights along with patents, as long as it ensured the success of their Turkish subsidiaries in the market. Few Turkish producers attempted to enter the market with a Turkish brand name. Thus, newspaper pages were once again filled with brand names like Prestcold, Norge, and Coldspot. The message was clearly: "Who needed Arçelik, an interim solution, when one could get a real foreign branded good?"

Arçelik fought back with a new campaign based in national pride, and emphasizing the company's long history — longer than the government's new import-substitution strategy. Arçelik was a Turkish name, one established before the import substitution policy unleashed all these Turkish refrigerators with foreign brand names. The company chose to remind its customers of this fact in a Turkish newspaper ad:

> "Since the importation of refrigerators and washing machines has been restricted for years, every brand of refrigerator sold are made in Turkey…and only ARÇELİK is

manufactured in a modern factory like this."[288]

The ad coupled the phrase "modern factory" with an equally modern image (figure 3.16). This was completely different than earlier versions that demonstrated the building's massive concrete frame as a sturdy capital investment. While it was more or less the same building, the image now emphasized its modernity. The isometric perspective emphasized the L-shape. The line drawing de-emphasized the window grids in favor of horizontal bands that built up to the floating roof. Framed inside a rectangle, the factory was presented as a freestanding object. The graphic transformed the factory into a modern icon, and this image accompanied the products in newspaper ads in the early 1960s.

In their search for a modern representation of their pioneering factory, the advertising designers and their clients at Arçelik seemed to refer to another pioneering icon. This particular factory or, more accurately, the *image* of the factory, now bore undeniable resemblance to the Bauhaus School of Design that Walter Gropius had designed in 1926. The isometric drawing especially resembled the promotional images used to represent the Bauhaus building in Weimar, with its choice of angle, highlighted details, and stark negative background (figure 3.17).

In fact, the Sütlüce factory straddled modernity and pre-modernity. As architect Boysan remembers, the construction phase was painful, unglamorous, with methods that could hardly be called modern.[289] The idea of modern automated manufacturing co-existed with traditional workshop-type assembly. The multi-story layout that characterized Sütlüce had been

abandoned decades ago in most efficient factories in favor of single-story layouts that eased the flow of production. The building was “improvised,” to say the least, and grew like an organism in the years following its initial construction.

Despite all this, the rapidograph that rendered the building presented the public with an image of a pristine structure, concealing the disparity between the concept and reality of this building that Arçelik used for production until the end of the 1960s (figure 3.18).

Koç markets Arçelik to expand its reach: seeking comfort is not seeking luxury

Once the Arçelik brand was established as a brand capable of rivaling foreign brand names, Vehbi Koç’s next challenge was to persuade the public to invest in expensive goods. In the 1950s, there was strong demand for refrigerators as it was no longer considered extravagantly self-indulgent for urban households to own one. Moreover, Arçelik was able to sell refrigerators at a third of the market price of imported ones,[290] but then, this still approached the annual income of a government clerk [291]. Arçelik’s solution was to sell the refrigerator in installments.[292] This financing made it affordable for middle-class families living in larger cities. Soon, the company realized that it was able to sell this product in even the smaller towns.[293] Arçelik’s new problem became supplying enough refrigerators to meet much higher demand.

As the ISI policies began to draw many more domestic producers into the market, now the question became which refrigerator to choose from, since all domestic refrigerators were similarly priced. Around 1962, through its print advertising, the company gave its customers

five reasons to “choose Arçelik” over other brands including AEG, now a visible competitor.[294] First, Arçelik claimed that it was ‘truly inexpensive’ compared to the others. Its low price was not due to shoddy production, but rather of its high production volume. Second, it was of the highest quality thanks to its factory technicians and modern facilities. Third, Arçelik was sold with a ‘real guarantee.’ This was not lip service, but the assurance of a strong institution that stood behind its products. Fourth, unlike other producers, Arçelik provided for the ongoing maintenance of its products with a service organization that it had established. Finally, Arçelik was the ‘more beautiful and more modern’ refrigerator thanks to its use of modern plastics. (The last point was a stab at AEG who promoted its refrigerators for their use of enamel rather than plastics).

Arçelik was indeed working hard to fulfill the claims it made in its ads. The company was both organizing itself and institutionalizing at a rapid pace, and its production numbers were increasing exponentially.[295] In 1963, the company produced a full half of the refrigerators on the Turkish market. These high production numbers allowed Arçelik to cut the price of the refrigerator by half, vastly increasing its customer base. Koç used this as an opportunity to realize his original goal of changing the meaning of durables from luxuries to household necessities.[296] To that end, the company began targeting the urban poor and small towns in Turkey. However, the recruitment of this group into the happy families served by Arçelik appliances required some persuasion. People had to be influenced to change their habits. The ads for Arçelik’s three flagship products, the G-1 gas stove, the R-1 refrigerator, and the W-1 washing machine, all told households the same thing: that they did not have to put up with the uncomfortable methods with which they performed everyday chores at home. Ads showed, in

a few visual steps, how using Arçelik gas stoves and washing machines would free them from heavy manual chores. Arçelik also had to convince this group why they would be justified to invest considerable sums on these goods. Households did not have to feel guilty for putting down the money on these goods since they would ultimately save them money in the long run.[297]

When it came to the refrigerators, ads depicted the old and inconvenient ways of keeping foods cold and called on the public to attain "the comfort of Arçelik" as soon as possible. The price appeared high but Arçelik's "installments" or payment plans brought modern convenience within the reach of almost every family. Ads implied that the modern convenience was not an indulgence but a right that households of the modern age deserved. It was not a matter of "if" they should own one but "when." In 1964, Arçelik's holiday wishes for the public were not "happy new year," but "health and comfort."[298] Around 1968, ads began to speak to the country's most deprived group, rural families. This was the group most worried about price and for whom the price of the refrigerator was the heaviest burden. The ads addressed the conflict in the farmers' minds — should they spend the money or should they wait? — and gave them what promised to be the best advice: that the farmer stop worrying and place his money down now. Every month the decision was postponed would be a wasted month. The farmer should buy the refrigerator as soon as possible so that he could move on to other Arçelik products, "so that the Arçelik comfort in [his] home could be complete."[299]

Arçelik is re-branded with a design program: standing up to the competition of AEG

The ingenuity of Koç in placing Arçelik's products in the smallest towns and even in rural Turkey depended on two things. First was the state's assistance on the quest to lead a successful ISI policy. The state provided inputs for production (such as sheet steel) as well as new infrastructure, such as electrifying rural Turkey. [300] Second, Koç's placement of Arçelik depended on painstakingly establishing relationships with local sellers of all scales, the details of which will be discussed later.

These strategies could not suffice to compete with AEG, however, which entered the market with an established brand name, a large investment, and original product designs. AEG was a German electrical company which had a long presence in the Turkish market. Turkish families have encountered electricity mostly through small imported AEG devices such as irons, electrical lamps, and fans, as this new power source entered their homes in the 1930s. In the ISI period, AEGs were now manufactured by a substantial Turkish company called Profilo that was founded in 1954 with ambitions comparable to Vehbi Koç's industries. Arçelik, like other domestic producers, was producing goods based on foreign licensing. Design was something that was inscribed on the surface of its products. Profilo's strategy was to challenge Arçelik's leadership by foregrounding the AEG brand name that Turkish families had long trusted.

As early as 1962, Turkish producer Profilo used the prominence of the AEG brand name, a world leader in the field of electrical goods. AEG's ad campaigns featured its strong brand name, first and foremost. The ads suggested that AEG's quality (figure 3.19 a), reliability

(figure 3.19 b) and superiority (figure 3.19 c) were evident in its world-class brand name, and that the customers could choose it blindfolded (figure 3.19 d).

Beginning in March 1965, AEG ads began to suggest that being a prominent foreign product justified its higher price, too.[301] Another ad asked AEG's customers to bear with the higher price since they were purchasing a superior product.[302] This tactic prompted Arçelik, which had been promoting its lower prices for a long time, to confront its competitor in its own newspaper ads. Arçelik reminded customers that all refrigerators sold in Turkish markets were manufactured within Turkey, adding that Arçelik products were less expensive thanks to its production volume, larger than the combined output of all other producers, which resulted in its lower unit price. Arçelik also pointed out that its refrigerators were superior thanks to its technical workforce, facilities, and quality procedures with ads that were supported by the images of these investments.[303] In its responses to Arçelik, AEG continued to draw support from the image of the heavy masonry of its logo.

The following year, AEG entered the market as a serious competitor with many models and a series of powerful prestige ads (figure 3.20). The ads hit Arçelik in a sensitive spot: by calling into question Arçelik's position as the most beneficent company for the nation's development. The ads hit home, because they were not simply positioning AEG as the historic leader of electrical goods in the world. They pointed to AEG's long and pioneering presence in Turkey as an electrical goods supplier. AEG had been present for fifty-two of its eighty-two year career in Turkey, and had made possible vital projects such as Istanbul's power plant at Silahtarağa, as well as power plants of other major cities such as Ankara, Adana, and Konya.

AEG also provided turbines to the nation's largest dam in Sarıyar, and its biggest thermal power plant in Tunçbilek, among others. Beyond that, the campaign declared that AEG employed 1200 Turkish workers who were linked to its giant German workforce of 127,000 technicians, gaining know-how every day from this giant technical pool. These new ads generally used a large white space with a modestly sized typographic title in the usual space of the advertising image, followed by columns of skillfully-typeset paragraphs below. In the ad that mentioned its technical workforce, AEG's statement was coupled with an unsensational, finely rendered and framed image. These ads carried their message with a sophisticated graphic voice, calm and dignified.

Arçelik responded to these text-heavy messages with a typographic voice of its own, one that spoke louder and one that accused AEG for "hiding behind a foreign name." (figure 3.21). One ad stated that the truth would emerge from comparing the companies. "Arçelik [was] still the market leader despite the fifteen-some brands that [were] resting themselves on foreign names in order to dazzle the customers."[304] Another one, that took a harsher tack, called on the customers not to let foreign brand names fool them. The spiel went like this:

> "Don't let foreign brands fool you, the first condition for quality is where and how the product is made: Rather than taking some foreign name and [readily] applying it on its products, Arçelik has begun by establishing a modern and complete factory…the various foreign brands that you see in the markets, however, haven't established refrigerator factories…"[305]

In later ads Arçelik almost openly accused AEG without spelling out its name. “Arçelik which [was] superior in all counts, [did not] need to seek shelter of a foreign name…it [was] [the people’s] very own product.[306] Arçelik [wasn’t] a foreign name but the finished work [of art] that counted…all of its ingredients [came] from [the public], the Turkish nation.[307]

Arçelik’s final word on its superiority over foreign branded products was delivered:

> “Arçelik is your refrigerator
> Arçelik, which doesn’t hide behind a foreign name,
> but which is coming from within you
> which is your national product
> with its name, workers, engineers, and everything
> is your refrigerator.
> …it is your very own product.”[308]

Arçelik’s new ads featured a new sans serif logotype. A small abstract symbol also made its appearance in the corner of some of them — a symbol meant to speak for Arçelik succinctly and with weight. The company sought to appear with a unified visual presence before its customers, linking them to the Arçelik workforce — production and maintenance personnel and approximately a thousand dealers. The old vernacular logos (figure 3.22) were purged in search of a modern emblem with a design competition in 1965. [309] The winning design (figure 3.23) was a letter mark (monogram) that seemed to spell the letters a, ç and e, from the name Arçelik, as well as a picture mark (pictogram) that suggested the primary function of the

factory, that is, to give form to rolled sheet steel. It was produced by Mehmet Güleryüz, a young designer from Mengü Ertel's prominent design studio.[310]

All six runner-ups for this emblem came from Ertel's studio as well. Güleryüz himself had been trained by Turkish designers who had studied under educators who had escaped Hitler's Germany.[311] He came from a tradition of designers who sought to distill large concepts with the simplest graphic means. Güleryüz remembers the big corporate image that symbolized the 1964 Tokyo Olympic games as a favorite design.[312] (figure 3.24). All six runner-ups, including the winning designer, used letter marks that carried heavy and imposing linear strokes (figure 3.25). But Güleryüz's emblem was perhaps the most elegant solution, going beyond formal simplicity and graphic assertiveness to connect with the substance in a more intimate way. It was also the only logo that blended a picture mark with an elusive letter mark.

In the 1960s, under the banner of the international typographic style rationalized, controlled lines replaced trade marks from an individual hand. [313] This new design sensibility reflected a changing business culture that championed corporate anonymity, universality, a metaphysical sense of temporal transcendence, and the stability of the companies. Designers of the international style usually expressed these points by using bold linear elements suggestive of the basic elements of letterforms. The boldness common to these marks was usually explained by the practical need to reproduce the marks in small sizes.[314] Controlled lines, on the other hand, were justified by the need to unite the brand identity across a variety of media, from printed communication to architecture.[315] Thus, a great number of the trademarks of this

period were generated from grids rather than the freehand style that characterized logos of earlier periods. The grid was used as a communication device in the rationalization of the public image and internal communications of corporations. It also was a reflection of the tighter business organizations that many companies were undertaking at the time.[316]

The pioneers of corporate anonymity included American designers like Paul Rand, Saul Bass and finally the Chermayeff & Geismer firm which would design many corporate identity programs for the Koç companies in subsequent decades.[317]

At the time, the Arçelik company aspired to join the same league with the foreign industrial companies. Its production wasn't nearly as advanced as foreign industrial giants, but its public image began to surpass some of them in its modernity.

Several years later, Umur Çamaş, a young interior architect who has joined Arçelik's design team in 1965, combined the emblem with matching sans serif capitals to form the classic Arçelik badge (figure 3.26). The badge at first accompanied Arçelik's products, and in time as the products receded to the background, it held the center stage to speak for the company itself.

This image not only countered competitors like AEG; it also became a paragon of Turkish modernity. But, it was not a paragon inaccessible to the Turkish people. In every visual and textual context, Arçelik used its trademark to suggest a family crest that embraced the company, its personnel, and its customers, all in one. Ironically, some forty years later when

corporate sensibilities changed, it was Ivan Chermayeff who suggested stripping the emblem of its timeless dignity.[318]

In the mid 1960s, one classic ad represented the company's desire to bring unity to its emerging products through the image of a conductor who seemed to be orchestrating Arçelik's diverse products. A year later, the conductor remained with a title reading "harmonious cooperation creates harmony in performance." However, the vernacular logo was replaced by the graphically harmonious emblem and logotype (figure 3.27). The presence of these new graphic marks had also rendered the image of the factory unnecessary. The new wider product line was unified with the same line stoke. Arçelik had acquired a voice and was using it as a shortcut to connect with the public in various media (figure 3.28).

3.5 Searching for a modern, yet independent design idiom: The Design of Arçelik refrigerators throughout the 1960s and the 70s

The product design principle and the first line of originally-styled refrigerators

When it came to the products themselves design arrived in stages, first inscribed on their surfaces, then expressed in their form, but always in order to fortify the Arçelik brand-name. 1965, the year in which Arçelik sought to unify its corporate image, also marked the release of its first line of originally designed refrigerators. It was the same year in which Arçelik stopped working with Amcor and began developing original designs with technical assistance from General Electric (GE). This was a straightforward necessity. In the 1960s, the modern industrial design process—that required drafting, prototyping and die-making—was practically unknown in Turkey. There was neither industrial design education nor a cohort of industrial designers in the proper sense of the term. In many smaller workshops, people recruited from professions such as carpentry, iron-working, small machine-tooling created objects without the reference to a technical drawing, but from the reference of a finished product. Lütfi Doruk, Arçelik's co-founder and technical director had, however, set up an industrial design department with the help of a German manager. In 1965, Turkish director Feridun Civelekoğlu took over, the young Turkish interior architect Umur Çamaş was hired as part of a team — by which the company, at the time, emphasized "structural construction" ("*konstrüksiyon*").

The company defined its product development principle in its annual report in 1966. Arçelik goods were produced according to both structural ("*konstrüktif*") and aesthetic principles, as

well as to respond to consumer tendencies.[319] Besides its soundness, durability, tested quality, compliance with consumer's desires, economy, and safety, the Arçelik product had to "please the eye with its outer appearance."[320] As this statement implies, the Arçelik's product was not simply to be functional but to incorporate other values. The construction department ("*konstrüksiyon şubesi*") would work to make the product comply with the overall aesthetic principle.[321]

Wooden model makers, mold makers, technical illustrators, and an interior architect comprised Turkey's first industrial design department put together by Lütfi Doruk.[322] What had begun as a construction office had become a department, and appeared in a series of ads, along with other aspects of the company. The ads emphasized that design was the starting element in ensuring Arçelik's quality. The ads stated:

> "Our work for quality "begins" in the construction department, as we design the most appropriate product for you. The modern lines, ease of use, economical aspects of all your beloved Arçelik products are the works of meticulous and patient investigations."[323]

In late 1965, the efforts of Arçelik's construction/design department had indeed produced its first result, the company's first line of truly independent refrigerators. The line consisted of four models (B-190, B-230, B-290 and B-360) with names bumped to three digits to indicate the sizes of the refrigerators. The refrigerators came in three colors.[324] According to Çamaş, their cabinets were designed in a way to make the most of the existing molds.

Designers/constructors would first make a pressing from a larger mold, and then add their modifications by making partial pressings from the smaller new molds they prepared.[325] Metal forming machines helped designers add original details like the door handles designed by Mehmet Ali Peker for the 1965 line.[326] The emerging plastic forming vendors allowed fine details to be added to the plastic interiors through precise injections. The freezer doors, the lids of the door compartments, vegetable trays, and the decorative kickplates of the 1965 line were just such plastic parts; they were designed by Umur Çamaş.[327] Both the door handle and the plastic interior parts of the 1965 line were subtle and sophisticated applications of "sheer form" — a postwar American design style that was introduced in high-end refrigerators like Frigidaires (figure 3.29). Compared with the rather collaged look of the previous models, B-2 and B-3, Çamaş's design for Arçelik's first original line brought graphic harmony to the interiors in terms of color, texture, and typography (figure 3.30). Most visibly, the color of the plastic lining matched the color of the cabinet.[328] Secondly, the vertical lines of the ice-tray plate matched the lines of the vegetable tray and the kick-plate. Çamaş also brought harmony to the exterior inward by bringing the sheer look of the door handle into the interior. The fine linear pattern of the handle was applied to the freezer door and the door compartment lids. Furthermore, the line that underscored the decorative bar on the door was repeated on the freezer door. Finally, the interior was complemented by sharp cornered and squarish letterforms that completed its sophisticated 'sheer look' (figure 3.31).

The aesthetic value of the refrigerators was elevated by fine design gestures, as well as the quality of the injections and its construction. Arçelik's 1965 line was designed as consistently as the production methods allowed. Their design gave these refrigerators a more sophisticated

visual patina than their predecessors based on Amcor designs. The refrigerators still had similarities to the earlier Amcor models such as the two horizontal scores that were inscribed on the doors as a means of structural support. These unintended design elements were ignored in the advertising images.

Designer Umur Çamaş applied distinctive graphic and typographic elements to the freezer doors and grocery trays to give a distinct sense to this line. While it would be expected that later designs would carry on this measured aesthetic, this did not happen. Each consecutive line in the 1960s introduced a completely different look. This was because the designs were determined by the components, production machinery and capabilities of the outside vendors available at any given time. The intention had been to keep the number of new molds for the cabinet and the door compartments to a minimum. However, as production was increasing, new molds were being prepared for the new sizes that Arçelik introduced with each consecutive line. With the 1967 and 1969 lines, American sheer look was abandoned in favor of a decorative look that made use of “printed” patterns. Çamaş introduced original decorative patterns to the interiors, such as “the Istanbul Pattern” a Turkish style decoration, at a time the company was emphasizing its national brand identity. Its most impressive variant was a flamboyant motif that covered the entire surface of its deluxe mini model (figure 3.32). Çamaş also replaced crisp gothic letters that characterized the sheer look with a bold sans serif that was also used in Arçelik’s new logo. This was an early attempt to create some sort of unity across the company’s products.

Beginning in the late 1960s, as Çamaş notes, the company was trying to rationalize its product development process. [329] By the end of the decade, the design department had started a closer relationship with marketing and engineering.[330] The company began introducing prototypes to obtain public opinion on practicality and aesthetics. The designers would then finalize the design based on some of this information, but not simply conforming to it. As Çamaş suggests, the company's goal wasn't simply producing designs that followed the public taste, but to offer the public something more and to help elevate its taste.[331] Although technically fail-proof products were Vehbi Koç's main concern, aesthetic principles set by the visionary designer/engineer Doruk was another guiding principle. It can be argued that the limited efforts to imbue its product line with aesthetic consistency in the formative years gave the company an edge over its competition in later years.

Using graphic design to bring unity to designs

Design unity across Arçelik products other than the refrigerator was limited. There wasn't a true program to unify designs of the products themselves. This fact gave an edge over Arçelik's competitors such as Profilo who was able to introduce the entire AEG line already unified by a common stylistic language. The Arçelik operation, on the other hand, borrowed technology and product design from the most optimum sources. It produced hand-picked models of efficient electrical goods from a variety of sources. This strategy ensured the product's sales success and allowed Arçelik the playing room to modify product technology and design. With every new year Arçelik name was given to an increasing number of other products —bottle coolers, a new twin washing machine, vacuum cleaners, and a scooter joined Arçelik's washing machines and refrigerators in the 1960s. After the company fortified

its institutional identity with a new emblem in mid-1960s, it made further uses of graphic design to bring unity to its disparate products.

Thus, all of Arçelik's visual meeting points with its critical mass — including its customers and personnel — were redesigned with an overarching grid structure that served to accommodate these disparate products as members of the Arçelik family. Certain graphic guidelines emerged and came to be applied to advertising, user guides, annual reports, dealer windows, and transport vehicles. The new emblem and logotype were key to anchoring Arçelik as a unified idea across a variety of informational/ promotional documents.

The annual report of 1966 unified Arçelik's four flagship products of disparate design and technical resources with a crisp graphic line (figure 3.33). It also featured sketches by Umur Çamaş that sought to unify the graphic displays by giving them a minimalist and dignified look (figure 3.34). Çamaş conveyed dignity by establishing a modular scheme that left much room for white space. The drawing of an Arçelik showroom window displayed refrigerators that were defined by simple white slabs and line scores. The bold company logo, another horizontal slab, scored the corner of a large post in a dignified manner. The sketches evolved into a corporate identity standard applied across various media (figure 3.35).

Users guides were one especially intimate medium that Arçelik employed to connect with its customers and another place that the company sought to unify its products. Beginning in 1965, following Çamaş's corporate identity standards, the user's guides, too, took on a dignified look. They featured the company's bold new emblem and logotype as the dominant

visual elements coupled with bold color schemes and blocky sans-serif type brought together in modular compositions (figure 3.36). Even the products were rendered to fit this modular scheme. For instance, the drawing on the cover of B-230's guide reduced the refrigerator to delicate slabs while eliminating uncooperative details from the original (figure 3.37). The refrigerator was reduced to an upright white slab to the right of a large black band. The delicate handle was inside of a fine horizontal rule running across the door. This horizontal line was echoed by the kick-plate that lay directly below the door. The resulting composition rested between two red bands: a large band on top that featured a large emblem and logotype and a narrower one on the bottom.

The user guides also featured variations of the decorative graphics that were introduced in the refrigerator interiors (figure 3.38). These patterns were used as three-dimensional elements in the Arçelik pavilion of the 1967 Izmir International Fair, designed by architect Aydın Boysan (figure 3.39).[332]

Competitive product styling and the quest to design the most elegant refrigerator

The competition between AEG and Arçelik continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s. On one hand, the two companies tried to project strong brand images to prove superiority over one another: AEG through the weight of its international parent company and Arçelik through the weight of its domestic investment. There was, however, another crucial element of their competition, that is, the technical superiority of the refrigerators
that lead both companies to exhibit a continuous quest throughout the 1970s to produce the spatially efficient, and visually elegant refrigerator. The quest for spatial efficiency served

both a competition point and a reason to convince customers to replace their old refrigerators with the newer, more efficient and elegant ones. The companies informed the public about improvements made in the method of insulation — which contributed to the elegance of the product.

Beginning in 1969, both companies introduced models insulated with plastic foam injection, which was more efficient than glass wool insulation. A side product of this new insulation method was the trimming of the refrigerator's walls. Slimmer walls allowed for more storage space, occupied less room, and showed better. The question became which refrigerator applied this technology in the most elegant manner.

Between 1971 and 1974, both companies introduced models that they claimed were spatially more efficient — each new model being a more elegant implementation of the insulation technology. AEG described this as the ultimate goal of refrigerator design that began as early as the time when refrigerators were still clunky boxes with excessive hardware and minimal cooling space.[333] Ads showcased the trimness of the AEG refrigerators by flatly displaying their interior (figure 3.40), while Arçelik claimed that the refrigerator's interior volume justified its price.[334] In 1972, AEG added the phrase "polyurethane" next to its name as a logotype to solidify its position as the leader of the plastic-insulated type. A year later, Arçelik responded by using the phrase "Monoblock" for its new polyurethane models, making its refrigerators appear to be taking a unique advantage of the new insulation technology.[335] This prompted AEG to explain to the public that polyurethane insulation, by its very definition, created monoblock refrigerators. AEG accused its competitor of misleading the consumers by

its monoblock title, while claiming that AEG's construction was the only one that really qualified to be called "monoblock," if one was to use the title.[336]

A final comparison can be made by looking at the product shots in AEG's and Arçelik's catalogues (figure 3.41). The precision of construction was lacking in AEG's refrigerators — the joints were not precisely fitting and the surface of the plastic door interiors shows bowing rather than a smooth appearance. Both of these points are more refined in Arçelik's product images. Both producers knew that precision depended on production capabilities. AEG was produced through import substitution with its Turkish producer Profilo attempting to meet the minimum production specifications that its parent company AEG required. On the other hand, Arçelik was run by a dedicated technician from the very beginning.[337] As Arçelik's revenues increased, Lutfi Doruk cleverly forced Vehbi Koç to invest in further technology, gradually increasing the company's technological capacity to a level that its competitors could not meet.[338]

When Turkish producer Profilo was forced to introduce its own products in the 1980s, as the market production came to an end in Turkey, its inexperience with original production and lack of aesthetic direction was apparent. It could not keep up with Arçelik in either technology or product development.

Designing the ultimate model for the Middle East with General Electric, 1969

In Arçelik's case, truly competitive product development was the result of a collaboration that had begun in 1969. Production had moved into a modern factory in Çayırova a year earlier,[339]

the place envisioned by Doruk as a campus for engineering, where all types of processes were transparent to visitors.[340] The new facility in Çayırova was a single floor space equipped with machinery such as overhead conveyors and cranes that brought significant levels of automation to the work flow.[341] Arçelik undertook more ambitious production processes in this new facility, including the ability to produce one million refrigerators per year and the production of a truly sophisticated refrigerator.

By the late 1960s, Arçelik and its main partner Vehbi Koç had gotten the attention of the foreign press.[342] General Electric (GE) too had taken notice of Arçelik's successes. GE had been providing technical assistance to Arçelik since the mid-1960s.[343] In 1969, General Electric offered the Turkish company a long-term investment deal to co-produce the ultimate refrigerator for the Middle East region. It took a whole year of exchanges between Arçelik and American designers and engineers before this design was unveiled.

A team led by General Electric's Middle Eastern director Ed Rosenberg traveled to Istanbul to study Arçelik's line. Rosenberg's team photographed Arçelik's original designs as a basis for the design of the new model.[344] In 1969, Arçelik production personnel (Hasan Subaşı) traveled to the GE headquarters in Louisville to explain the capacities of the Turkish plastics and metal technicians, convincing GE that Turkish production of a new model was feasible.[345] The same year, designer Umur Çamaş also traveled to GE headquarters in Louisville where he was introduced to the advanced product development methods that GE employed. Çamaş watched user tests where American housewives were told to identify GE products among a series of unbranded products. He saw that giving a formal character to an entire product line could

indeed connect with customers. The functional aspects of a product, too, were a matter of testing. In the past, Çamaş and other constructors, lacking any sound information about how their products were used, had gone by intuition and by referring to previously designed models.[346] GE designers, however, started from scratch and developed every aspect of the refrigerator cabinet accordingly. Choices such as how many slots to allot in the egg container, where to place the drinks tray, and how to construct the cheese compartment were made after evaluating information from user testing.[347]

After a year of information exchanges between Arçelik and GE personnel the refrigerator was unveiled in 1972. It was a pristine design of unbroken surfaces and an integrated handle. The memorable form of the 1972 model finally matched Arçelik's modern logo (figure 3.42). It was also the first time that Arçelik proudly affixed its modern badge to the corner of this new refrigerator. The new refrigerator, as produced by Arçelik, was sold as a GE or Hotpoint in the Middle Eastern region[348] (figure 3.43), while similar models that adopted the style were produced and sold in the US using higher production values.[349] The most distinguishing element of the new refrigerator was the swirling door handle that ran vertically across the whole door. It was specified that this part should be produced from a single piece of aluminum that turned into a solid piece of plastic for the handle. Arçelik, unable to produce the part as specified, recreated it by a simpler solution by creating an aluminum profile bed and inserting a plastic band into it.[350] In 1973, for the first time, Arçelik boasted about the modern and beautiful looks of its product (figure 3.44). The appearance of this new model matched the elegance of its technology.[351]

Arçelik spent the next four years perfecting the model introduced in 1972, which continued to be the basis for all subsequent models until the mid 1980s. Arçelik's refrigerator design reached its ultimate simplicity, truly earning its monoblock nickname in 1976. In 1975, the company had gone to a larger scale of production with the goal of establishing a separate factory for each product. As a result, refrigerator production was moved to a modern factory in Eskişehir, the place where the quest for ultimate simplicity reached its end.

In the 1960s and 1970s, refrigerator manufacturers gradually eliminated multiple pieces and reduced the layers that made up the cabinet in favor of a lighter, complete whole. The cabinet would then take up less physical space while offering more storage space. As seen in Arçelik's refrigerators produced until 1971, the cabinet walls were thicker. The cabinets were insulated by filling the space between the inner-lining and the outside surface with thick glass-wool walls. The exposed cross-section between the insulated walls was sealed by several cover pieces called throat moldings (figure 45 a). Later, as refrigerators came to be insulated by plastic foam injection, the walls got thinner, since the injection was a thinner adhesive layer made between a thinner single-piece cabinet-outer and a single piece inner tub. The insulation did not expose a considerable cross-section, but it had to be simply sealed with a more insular element called the "break strip." (figure 3.45 b).

Later, as seen in Arcelik's 1973 models, the break strip and the lining were combined in one. The drain pan was moved to the rear, eliminating the kick-plate (figure 3.45 c).

Finally, as seen in Arçelik's 1976 models the outer-wall and inner-lining were produced by

folding a singe sheet of plastic on itself. The thin gap between the two folds was injected with foam, and the cross-section was covered by insertion of a condenser tube (figure 3.45 d). The tube also served as a minimally decorative concealment element, eliminating the need to drill holes to assemble the cabinet.

The result was a perfectly unbroken surface, an achievement after long and numerous iterations of design by engineers. This was proudly announced as the product of Arçelik's technology. This true monoblock refrigerator made its public appearance as the company launched its biggest investment yet, the Eskişehir refrigerator factory that was the product of long years of investments under the ISI economy (figure 3.46). "The new Arçeliks" as the ad noted, "were different with their doors, too." (figure 3.47) The doors were full length, descending until the [lower] end of the refrigerator. The spaces between its magnetic gaskets (*conta*) and bellows (*körük*) were adjusted using the most modern machinery. They [didn't] let out air, and they [opened] and [closed] with a unique ease.[352]

Moreover, Arçelik invited its customers to sensually interact with this object of technical fine-tuning and aesthetic refinement:

> "Take your time and investigate its back, top, interior.
>
> Open and close its door.
>
> Listen to its silence.
>
> Run your hands on its smooth inner and outer surfaces
>
> Touch its shelves with your fingers, its aluminum profiles, its clear vegetable drawer,

> and its unbreakable top lid…all of its pieces. You will feel that you are holding in your hands the most advanced refrigerator technology in the world. You will be struck by the new Arçelik. You will be sold to its allure.
>
> And you will wish that one of the hay yellow, avocado green, and snow white Arçelik's could be yours. You will become impatient."

Over a sixteen year evolutionary cycle, Arçelik went from making refrigerators that replaced traditional screened food cabinets to making objects of precision that commanded a finer appreciation from all of the senses.

3.6 Arçelik permeates daily lives

A nurturing hand behind Arçelik products: the dealer and service/customer support

By 1976, Arçelik had finally become a household name. Its products reached every corner of the country thanks to a devoted dealer network and strong service support. The Arçelik brand emerged as a family of customers, producers, and dealers all of whom benefited from a mutually supportive relationship. Its customers benefited from favorable payment options offered only by Arçelik; its dealers benefited from a continuing flow of buyers; and its production personnel benefited from the privilege of working at one of Turkey's most stable private companies.[353] Sometimes Arçelik was slower than its competitors in introducing a new product. But the company trusted the loyalty of its customers not to rush to purchase the first new product released on the market, such as vacuum cleaners or televisions. As the company introduced these new products, it told the members of its family that they could feel happy that they waited for Arçelik to introduce the next home convenience.[354]

Koç had chosen the right technical partner to trump his competition technically. However, technical superiority was not enough to achieve the level of dissemination of Arçelik's goods. Koç's contribution as a well-experienced provisioner was crucial. Importantly, he also built systems in which his products survived and proliferated. An example was Koç's creation of a fuel supply system to support his cast-iron home heating products. It was the same with his electrical goods. Success began with caring for the parts, but its continuation depended on the harmonious working of two other elements: a good sales organization and perfect maintenance service — which took information from the user and brought it to the

producer.[355] Unlike the early import dealers who were content with their customer base in the major hubs of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, Arçelik was vigilant in reaching out to every town. Unlike his experience as an importer, Vehbi Koç-the-manufacturer had a higher stake in moving his products. The Sütlüce factory needed healthy streams in which its products could seamlessly flow.

Service and maintenance

For the first time, a Turkish company stood behind its product with rigor. Arçelik told its customers not to buy a refrigerator that would be orphaned by its maker, promising to always father its product.[356] In the 1950s, when durable goods ownership concentrated in a few large cities and was limited to tens of thousands of units, there were few resources to provide repairs, and repair personnel were not professionals. Arçelik's production, however, was on a mass scale that required a professionally organized repair service. The company took care of its products by introducing the nation's first professional service network.[357] Arçelik managers recruited the service persons from various walks of life but trained them rigorously to transform them into professionals. In its ads, Arçelik soothed worried customers by mentioning the abundance of spare parts available and their stand-by repair service. In its early days, this meant a lot of responsibility for the small repair force that the company was gathering. Its service and maintenance personnel were loaded with many responsibilities in order to live up to the company's promises. They were technicians, mechanics, drivers and movers in one. They were aptly represented by a mascot called, "Hızır Usta," ("master Hızır") named after a Turkish folk hero of the same name, an immortal being reputed to come to the

rescue of those in need. This Master Hızır held a wrench, wore modern overalls, and had a calm, content, and earnest smile (figure 3.48).

Hızır Usta, being one of the earliest trademarked icons of Turkey, was Arçelik's contribution to modern Turkish popular culture.

Vehbi Koç's goal was to break a persistent negative business notion in Turkey by turning the tables in favor of the customer. The repairperson, that Arçelik managers have recruited from various walks of life but trained rigorously, would not try to argue with the complaining customer or try to extort extra money, but he would listen to them as their servant.[358] In ads, Arçelik's master repairmen could be seen in their crisp uniforms, leaving work with a look of satisfaction on their faces. This suggested that a hard day's work did not exhaust the repairmen, but gave them fulfillment (figure 3.49).

Dealers and sales

The same was true for selling Arçelik's products. Arçelik dealers had to become good sellers and the company had to change the culture of selling in Turkey. It was fortunate that Arçelik's foundation brought together Turkey's leading distributor of basic supplies and its leading distributor of durable goods. Vehbi Koç's partnership with Eli Burla made it possible to place Arçelik's products in many durable-goods dealers that were already in place across Turkey. There were also smaller dealerships that needed to be established across Turkey. In order to accomplish this goal, Arçelik followed the example set by the distribution of GE lightbulbs. Koç Trading Company was already changing the sales culture in Turkey in the way it

distributed the lightbulbs since the early 1950s.[359] The company had set up stations across Istanbul who brought supplies to the small dealers on their demand.[360] This was a revolutionary service, because the dealers no longer needed to go to the importers and wholesalers to acquire supplies. Koç had turned the tables in favor of the small-store owner before the wholesaler. In this manner, he had taken the sale of lighbulbs from the confines of electricians to many grocery stores.[361] Arçelik, similarly, won over dealers by providing them with this much appreciated service and more.

In the early days, Arçelik used an aggressive strategy to expand its dealership network. The company wanted to be the first to enter an uncovered region, find the best local sellers, and persuade them to convert from groceries into carrying the much more expensive Arçelik goods.[362] Arçelik distributors also convinced local merchants to bear the sales risk binding them in long-term agreements using the company's reputation of stability.[363] Dealers bought the product on credit against collateral that usually consisted of their homes and small savings.[364] It became the dealers' job to persuade their low-income customers to buy these pricey home goods. And since consumer credit did not exist as a modern financial tool [365], the dealer also offered payments flexible even beyond the installment plans suggested by Arçelik.[366] There were times that dealers accepted promissory notes for an installment that was not made on time.[367]

Arçelik had been a little over-ambitious in grabbing local stores, since more sellers than the company had hoped for proved to be eager to sell Arçelik products.[368] As a result, within the first five years of its manufacturing, Arçelik products were carried in nearly 2800 stores,

many of which were not up to par. In 1963, the company brought this number down to around 1000. It began monitoring the dealers, systematizing the network, giving sales training, and scientifically evaluating sales volumes.[369]

Arçelik also benefited from the import substitution policy in its sales. Arçelik products were protected by high import tariffs and were sold with large profit margins not previously known in industry. Thus, Arçelik products were both more profitable and much less expensive than competitors. In 1960 in Istanbul, B-1 refrigerators sold for 4425 TL, while a Frigidaire sold for 10 to 15,000.[370] This was the primary factor in creating an incredible demand among shop owners for Arçelik dealerships. Even established dealers in Istanbul switched from selling imported brands such as Hotpoint, Gibson, and General Electric to selling domestic Arçeliks. Being cheaper, Arçelik quickly replaced Frigidaires in Istanbul shop windows.

Arçelik outsells competition, produces its one-millionth product

Thanks partly to its rigorous investments in production and the systems that supported its products, Arçelik consistently outsold its competition[371] throughout the 1960s and 1970s — a fact that was celebrated annually in its ads.[372] Arçelik sold well, on one hand, thanks to Koç's collaboration with Burla that allowed a wider distribution for products from the outset and the management's aggressive reach across Turkey that helped Arçelik grab Turkey's best local sellers.[373] On the other hand, it sold well thanks to its ever-advancing technology that was easing concerns about being trumped by its main competitor Profilo.[374] This was thanks to Lütfi Doruk who consistently pressured Vehbi Koç to continue investing in technology.

Consequently, Arçelik's technology reached to such levels that by the mid-1970s none of its competitors could keep up with Arçelik refrigerators or washing machines.[375]

In late 1974 Arçelik produced its one-millionth refrigerator, prompting Vehbi Koç to make a public appearance to celebrate this milestone and to set the record straight about the success of Arçelik.[376] Koç announced that the company had made available, for the masses, a product that had previously been confined to the use of a few thousand wealthy families who had purchased imported refrigerators prior to Arçelik beginning production. Koç also accused critics of Arçelik's assembly production of being uninformed about how industry worked. Arçelik was a model of how new industries began as assembly operations and became true manufacturers over time with the emergence of supporting industries. At the time, Koç claimed that domestic parts represented ninety-six percent of Arçelik's production. In its ads, the company stressed that its success was not a coincidence but something Arçelik owed to being a good public servant who had proved to its customers that:

> "it [wasn't] a small workshop, and it always made efforts to produce the refrigerator — a product that demanded much care and attention — with the maximum care, and never perfunctorily; and it used the best materials to attain the best yield." [377]

Arçelik democratizes modern conveniences: comfort is no longer a luxury

Turkish families were motivated to improve their comforts as early as the 1960s when conveniences were still luxuries.[378] In the late 1960s, more families were eager to equip their

homes with electric-powered durables and they were motivated to channel most of their savings into purchasing them. What would it be like to fully immerse oneself in the comforts of modern life? Arçelik had demonstrated that situation in the mid-1960s by giving away modern apartment flats to select families who chose Arçelik products.[379] By the late 1960s, for most families it was a matter of time before they, too, would participate in Turkey's household modernization. Turkey's largest newspaper *Hürriyet*, became a venue for advertising and promoting Arçelik products thanks to Koç's partner Eli Burla's financial relationship with its publisher. *Hürriyet* contributed to the manufacturing of desire for the modern in a series of articles, promotions, and stunts; all designed to demonstrate how a family's life could be transformed overnight by the entrance of durables into their homes. Perhaps the boldest of these was a campaign in which the newspaper began giving away a full set of durables to lucky families which was publicized on the front page.[380] In the meantime, Arçelik progressively brought its products into more and more homes (figure 3.50).

Arçelik dealers and service personnel helped bring the Arçelik brand name to the public in every corner of the country. Taking sales to the next level, Beko and Arçelik set up their own showrooms in many towns beginning in the 1960s. Arçelik trade shows were public events held in festively decorated rooms. The shows full of balloons, ribbons, trademarks and electric gadgets created publicity for the company as well contributing to the germination of a popular culture in small towns — that rivaled traditional public life (figure 3.51).

The Arçelik brand finally spread throughout Turkey. In 1974, the year in which Arçelik sold its one-millionth refrigerator in Turkey, the company celebrated this event with a full-page

newspaper ad (figure 3.52) that proclaimed comfort to be not a luxury but a necessary condition of being civilized. The ad, titled "The Contribution to the Happiness of One Million Families," read like a manifesto for consumerism and its democratization:

> "Comfort. The comfort that is taking place in our daily lives. The necessary condition to be civilized and to live in the present day! The duty of the home equipment industry is to spread comfort. [It is] to stop the tools of comfort from being 'luxuries.' [It is] to submit [them] to public benefit. 'The one-millionth Arçelik refrigerator,' is, henceforth, the product of this thought!"[381]

The ad featured drawings of traditional homes that smoked "hearts of love" from their chimneys, suggesting that Arçelik was a democratic power bringing happiness — not just to apartment-dwelling folk — but also to two other groups: rural families, and most importantly rural-migrants who came to exert their presence in the cities.

Vehbi Koç, who enjoyed modern comforts in his own home, had begun disseminating this idea when his trading company sold apartment fixtures. In the early days, his trading company championed modern comfort that rested on health and hygiene in the home and provided it to a limited number of urban consumers. In the 1960s, as a merchant-turned-industrialist, Koç had become the producer of durable goods in Turkey, with a much higher stake in moving his products. His company, Arçelik, had become an active voice for wholesale modernization in Turkey. Arçelik's mission was not only to produce goods but also to prepare the social conditions for their acceptance in a frugal developing nation of citizens with limited

disposable income. As one ad suggested, Arçelik was permeating every hour of a family's life with one of its products, through which households "grasped the meaning of modern life…while [Arçelik] disseminated comfort to all income groups."[382]

3.7 Vehbi Koç rises to become Turkey's first significant capitalist: The Koç Holding, 1964

Koç companies and their activities made appearances in Turkish media and trade publications beginning in the early 1960s. Trade journals celebrated the Arçelik factory when it was recently established[383] and continued to support the company's assembly production[384] despite critics in the mainstream press.[385] The Koç Holding company was recognized in the foreign press as well. Both *Fortune* and the *Financial Times* celebrated Vehbi Koç and his rise from humble roots as the success of a self-made businessman.[386] In 1964, Vehbi Koç established Turkey's first private holding company in order to pool its resources, to finance larger operations, and to ensure the company's continuity.[387]

Koç saw himself as an exemplar for the private sector. He had won considerable public trust despite his critics. His products persuaded the Turkish public that domestic manufactures could be as good as imported ones. At a time when private businesses were still accused of being small-time profiteers, Koç mentored his colleagues to become harder workers, told them to make more investments, to create more job opportunities, to earn more, and to pay more taxes. Koç suggested that hard work would earn them trust and would elevate the reputation of the Turkish private industrialist. Above all, Koç thought that hard-working, reputable private enterprises were a necessary element for healthy democracy.[388]

3.8 National development obeys the laws of mass production: Arçelik's impact on the Turkish business culture, national economy, and Turkish standard of living

If Koç made himself the personification of modernization's virtues, his company became the equivalent symbol in the corporate world. Arçelik's operations were connected with the larger wave of household modernization that was transforming the Turkish urban landscape. Turks had already begun adapting certain forms of modernity by replacing the country's traditional housing stock with apartment blocks that featured massive window grids. But Arçelik products went into the full range of Turkish houses, from the traditional vineyard house to the modern apartment block—with the promise to bring modernity to every corner of the country. Farmers, recent migrants from country to city, cosmopolitan urbanites, and the older, established elite urbanites: all adopted Arçelik, with its modern, dignified but homely appearance, as their household brand of choice.

Dissemination of modern household fixtures and the proliferation of durables, however, had depended on the country allocating more resources for individual consumption. From the 1950s on, Vehbi Koç had fought to channel more public resources into the consumer goods sector. This had included pressuring the government for more resource allotments to be traded with production machinery, taking the state as an investment partner in his consumer sector companies, attaining more quotas for consumer sector inputs, and enacting legislation to allow consumer credits.[389]

There was one especially crucial resource for Arçelik's durable goods, and that was the availability of electricity. It was made possible as the state adopted the ISI policy, upon which

Turkish household modernization was rationalized by a program supported by government institutions. Arçelik's founder Vehbi Koç had purchased a refrigerator as soon as his Ankara home was electrified. In remote Turkish towns where city voltage was not strong enough to power a refrigerator, Arçelik shipped kerosene-powered models.[390] Then in the 1960s, in accordance with the economic development plan and the ISI policy, the Turkish government extended power to more and more towns, preparing the basis for easier dissemination of Arçelik refrigerators.

Above all, it was the Arçelik brand, painstakingly fostered by its founders across two decades, that helped the dissemination of household durables in Turkey. Arçelik promoted a vision of modernity that was distinctly Turkish in some aspects. Arçelik's branding and marketing was an indication that the company understood the communitarian ethos in Turkey, which suggested that consumer culture was not recognized as individuals differentiating themselves from their neighbors, ala Alfred P. Sloan and GM, for instance. By the early 1970s, the brand came to meet the emotional expectations of Turkey's emerging consumers. It became the image of a company that nurtured its products, its personnel, and its customers altogether — that reinforced the communitarian idea. This image also corresponded with Vehbi Koç's idea of a "mixed-economy," where private enterprise served the common good of the society while the state guarded its welfare.

Arçelik had also forged a modern idiom that came together from various modes of design representative of an idea that the Turkish nation could participate in the contemporary moment as producers and consumer of modern technology. It also suggested that

technological possessions could be acquired on a democratic basis. The Arçelik brand, as a friendly paragon of modernity, had helped Koç to bridge the disparity between aspiring and living with the comfort and convenience of durables.

In the meantime, the Turkish homes were changing according to the laws of mass production. Many more owners of apartment units were claiming their place in the urban space, while the interiors were being arranged to accommodate electrical durables. In the early 1970s, the modernity that was placed at their disposal empowered the Turkish people, while they hoped that the troubles that accrued from this rapid development — that were increasingly felt in terms of economic instability, and the anarchic growth of their cities — were ones that the nation could overcome once full blown development was reached.

Figure 3.1 Department store Istanbul, c. 1908.

Figure 3.2 Burla Biraderler imports advertisement, 1932.

Figure 3.3 Frigidaire advertisements, 1937.

Figure 3.4 Frigidaire advertisements, c. 1934.



Figure 3.5 Electric bills featuring ads for electrical devices, Istanbul, c. 1930s.

3.6. Advertisements for various electrical durables, early 1950s.



Figure 3.7 Advertisements for raffles, 1955, 1958.

Figure 3.8 Top: Arçelik, Amcor, and Philco refrigerators, c. 1959.
Bottom: Arçelik and Amcor refrigerators, c. 1962.

Figure 3.9 Amcor poster c. 1963.

1960



1961-4



Figure 3.10 Freezer doors of B-1 and B-2 model refrigerator, c. 1960, 1964.

Figure 3.11 Arçelik badge as it appeared on the refrigerator doors, c. 1964.



Figure 3.12 Arçelik advertisement, 1958.



Figure 3.13 Ford assembly plants, c. 1910s.

Figure 3.14 Arçelik washing machine advertisement, 1959.



Figure 3.15 Arçelik washing machine advertisement, 1959.





Figure 3.16 Arçelik advertisement, 1963.









Figure 3.17 Bauhaus building, Walter Gropius, 1926 (Left)
Arçelik Factory, Aydin Boysan, 1955 (Right)

Figure 3.18 Arçelik Factory, Aydin Boysan, 1955.

a.

b.

c.

d.

Figure 3.19 AEG advertisements a. 1963; b. 1964; c. 1964; d.. 1965.

Figure 3.20 AEG prestige advertisements, 1966.

Figure 3.21 Arçelik ads 1966, 1968.

Figure 3.22 Arçelik's old logos, 1958-1964.

Figure 3.23 Arçelik's new logo, Mehmet Güleryüz, 1965.

Figure 3.24 Tokyo Olympic games logo, 1964.

Figure 3.25 Runner-ups for the Arçelik logo competition, 1965

Figure 3.26 The Arçelik Badge, c.1969.





Figure 3.27 Arçelik magazine advertisements, 1966.



İstihdam edilen personel

1960 sonunda 400'ü bulan umum personel adedinin halen 900'ü geçmiş olması karşısında memleketin istihdam hacmine imkânlar çerçevesinde hizmette bulunmaktan dolayı sevinç duyulmaktadır.

1960 a nazaran 1965'de personel sayısındaki 2,5 misline yakın artışa mukabil ödenen ücretlerde ve aynı devre içinde 5 misli bir artış sağlanmış olması personelin refah durumu üzerinde ciddî olarak durulduğuna işarettir.

Devlete sağlanan gelir

Arçelik artan iş hacmi sayesinde Devlet'e çok önemli bir gelir kaynağı teşkil etmektedir. Nitekim 1964 yılı faaliyetlerinin bir sonucu olarak Kurumlar, Gelir Vergisi ve İthalâttan alınan vergiler olarak ödenen direk vergilerin toplamı 60 milyon liraya yakındır. Bu rakama mamûllerin satışını yapan teşkilâtın (genel bayiler ve mahallî bayiler) ödedikleri vergiler de ilâve edilirse, görürüz ki, **bir yıl içinde Arçelik camiası 87 milyon liraya yaklaşan vergi ödemeleri ile Devletin bütçe gelirlerinin tek başına 175'de birini sağlamaktadır.**

Figure 3.28 A page from Arçelik's 1966 Annual Report.



Figure 3.29 Sheer form, style elements

b.



a.

Figure 3.30 a. Arçelik's 1965 model refrigerator
b. Arçelik's 1962-4 model refrigerator B-3



Figure 3.31 Detail of handle and typography on Arçelik's 1965 model refrigerator.



Figure 3.32 Floral patterns applied to the deluxe mini models of Arçelik refrigerators, c. 1970-71.



Figure 3.33 Linear drawings of Arçelik's products from the cover of its annual, c.1966.

Figure 3.34 Sketches that became the basis of Arçelik's graphic standard, 1966.

application with the old logo

Figure 3.35 Arçelik graphics applied to buildings, vehicles.
The bold new logo enforced architectural unity to the disparate spaces that it was applied to, compared to the old one (top).

1964, cover with old layout

1965

1966

1968

Figure 3.36 Covers of Arçelik refrigerator user's guides.



Figure 3.37 B-230 model as it appeared on the cover of its user guide (L) the actual refrigerator (R).



Figure 3.38 Ice pattern from the B-130 guide, designed by Umur Çamas, 1966.

Figure 3.39 Interior of the Arçelik pavilion in Izmir trade trade and industry expo, 1967.

Figure 3.40 AEG polyurethane refrigerator advertisement, 1972.

1974

1980

1976



Figure 3.41 Interiors of AEG (top) and Arçelik (bottom) refrigerators, 1970s,

Figure 3.42 Advertisement introducing the 1972 model Arçelik refrigerators.

General Electric buzdolaplarını Arçelik'te yaptırıyor

ARÇELİK

GENERAL ELECTRIC

Hotpoint

Yanyana durmakta olan iki buzdolabı düşünün. Biçim, boyut, hacim, gösteriş yönünden ikisi de birbirinin aynı. Kalite, soğutma verimi kullanışlılık yönünden de. Aralarındaki tek fark, etiketlerinde. Birinin üzerinde Arçelik yazıyor, ötekinin ise General Electric. Ya da Hotpoint.

Bu nasıl oluyor diyeceksiniz.

Oluyor işte.

Arçelik'in başaramadığı ne var ki? Evet, Arçelik şimdi de dünya çapındaki yeni başarısıyla karşınızda.

General Electric adını herkes bilir. Dünyanın en tanınmış buzdolabı yapımcısıdır.

İşte bu yapımcı, markasını ve dolayısıyle bütün dünyaca kabul edilen kalitesini başka bir buzdolabı yapımcısına... Arçelik'e emanet etti. Hem de tarihinde ilk kez olarak. Ve büyük bir gönül rahatlığı içinde. Ortadoğu, Asya ve Afrika ülkelerine General Electric ve Hotpoint markasıyla ihraç edeceği buzdolaplarını artık Arçelik tesislerinde yaptırıyor.

Sebebi de, Arçelik'in dünya buzdolabı endüstrisindeki en son teknikleri kullanmasının ve kalitesine olağanüstü titizlik göstermesinin, General Electric'in benimsediği ve uyguladığı uluslararası prensiplere tamamen uymasıdır. İşte, 4-5 aydanberi Arçelik fabrikasından ihraç edilen General Electric ve Hotpoint markalı buzdolaplarının gurur verici hikâyesi.

ARÇELİK

DÖVİZ KAZANDIRAN BUZDOLABI

Figure 3.43 Arçelik refrigerator advertisement, 1972.

Figure 3.44 Arçelik refrigerator advertisement, 1973.



a. throat molding



b. break strip



c. break strip
integrated with lining



d. cabinet and
lining integrated

Figure 3.45 Construction of the refrigerator cabinet

Figure 3.46 Advertisement introducing the 1976 model Arçelik refrigerator.

Figure 3.47 Detail of the advertisement that introduced the 1976 model Arçelik refrigerator.

Figure 3.48 Advertisement featuring the Arçelik service mascot "Hizir Usta", 1966.

Figure 3.49 Advertisement featuring Arçelik's service personnel, 1966.



Figure 3.50 Arçelik advertisement, 1964.

Figure 3.51 Arçelik showroom, 1966; Arçelik truck in a children's day parade, 1972.

Figure 3.52 Arçelik advertisement, 1974.

CHAPTER 4

THE CAR AND THE TV:

TWO OBJECTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY IN TURKEY IN THE 1970S

4.1 Turkey's industrial landscape in the early 1970s

Turkish society entered the 1970s with big hopes and underlying anxieties. Manufacturing had reached an all time high and industry seemed to be booming. State banks were announcing their support for Turkey's emerging private industries in ads where factory smoke stacks puffed with smoke (figure 4.1). Was Turkey finally industrializing and thus reaching 'the level of contemporary civilization,' a goal that was set by the founders of the Republic in 1923. By 1971, Arçelik had sold a million refrigerators and promised to bring home appliances to further millions of homes. Hot water heaters and refrigerators had introduced forms of modernized material life to the most intimate locales of the Turkish home. The next stage lay within the means of mobilizing and interconnecting these nodes into a larger dynamic whole. Koç and his industrial empire sought to anticipate, satisfy, and benefit from this next stage. In the early 1970s, Vehbi Koç began a campaign to make cars available to the masses.

Koç's plans seemed, in the face of it, audacious. Massive parts importation for Turkey's manufacturing machine, combined with state expenditures on infrastructure had caused the country to accumulate huge amounts of debt. The government had resorted to massive devaluation of the Turkish currency to suppress wages and spending, triggering social unrest

and anger from the emerging industrial working class.[391] The military had even been forced to step in briefly in 1971, to suppress social unrest and control the economic anarchy. By the early 1970s, no one was sure if the country was at the threshold of disaster or prosperity.

There were two significant consumer goods in Turkey in the 1970s. These were designed products that played a significant part in this defining moment in the economic history of Turkey. These two products marked the achievement of economic status by Turkish citizens. The two objects were paradoxical: the TV, fixed in space, and the car, providing mobility. Alternatively, the TV might serve as an interface to a fluid outside world as the car parked in the driveway might serve as an object of status as a fixed display item. Yet, both objects did offer different kinds of mobility: the car was the agent of geographical mobility and the TV was the agent of information mobility. In the 1970s, this dual mobility generated a genuine, if incomplete, consumer culture in Turkey. Consequently, the country saw the emergence of a third element, mass media, marked by the transformation of communication media from an outlet of public information messages into one of sales messages, a subject that will be dealt in a separate chapter. It is worth opening the discussion, however, with such an image, one that mediated the Turkish landscape through advertising a consumer product.

A full-page ad in a Turkish magazine from the early 1970s featured a view of Istanbul's Bosporus strait as seen through the windshield of a car (figure 4.2). The title read "Sinerama" referring to Cinerama, the popular widescreen projection method of the time. The ad invited the reader to set foot inside this car and described what one should expect from this experience:

> "Have you ever [set foot] inside a Murat.
>
> Give it a try.
>
> (TOFAŞ dealers will be happy to comply with your request)
>
> This industrious and cute car that can fit almost anywhere will surprise you with the large volume of its interior, with its spaciousness and brightness.
>
> Because with Murat the priority was granted to you [the passenger], not to the engine. Eighty percent of the general volume of the car is for the passengers and the baggage. (The credit goes to Fiat who has the skill to fit a powerful 65 horsepower engine into a tiny space.)
>
> Murat's ceiling is high. Not squat. It's windows rise vertically. Not on a slope. So that there can be abundant light, so that you may feel refreshed.
>
> Murat's field of view is as wide as to encompass all directions through its large windows. It is uninterrupted. [It's] full of light.[392]
>
> So that, on a winter day, you may view the Bosphorus as if watching a movie on the widescreen of a theater. "

This was how Vehbi Koç's company TOFAŞ introduced the Murat 124, another pivotal consumer good, to the Turkish public. The year was 1971, the same year that Koç's Arçelik

company announced the production of its one-millionth refrigerator. Arçelik celebrated this moment in newspaper ads, announcing that "goods of comfort" were no longer luxuries. They had become necessities of modern life that were now enjoyed by households of various income levels throughout Turkey. Murat 124, taking its place next to the Arçelik refrigerator, would prove to be another powerful agent of change in Turkey.

It had taken a decade for Murat 124 to stand before the public. This was because the automobile was a very special consumer good. It was the costliest possession after a home and the potential driving-force behind a nation's industry that made its production a matter of national strategy. It took a while for Turkish policy makers to decide on the kind of automotive industry and the type of car that would benefit the country the most. Economic planners of the ISI period who gave permissions to the production of an increasing number of durable goods debated for a decade with all parties involved to decide the course of how the private automobile should be introduced into the Turkish society. Many points were debated. Should the private automobile be postponed until investment goods were well-established? Should the car be engineered domestically or borrowed and assembled in Turkey? What kind of car was suitable for Turkish families? How many different models and makes should be introduced? After all these debates were over, Vehbi Koç introduced Fiat 124, an Italian mid-sized sedan, as the quintessential car for Turkish families. The Fiat, re-branded as Murat, was another everyman's product that Koç presented to the Turkish society as a proud national alternative to its competition. Murat's story, just like Demirdöküm and Arçelik products, was similarly marked by Koç's struggle to ascend the ladder of global industrial hierarchy.

4.2 Creating a national automotive industry: national, borrowed, or bought?

Why create a national automotive industry?

Turkish economy was governed by five-year plans and manufacturing was regimented by an import substitution (ISI) policy since the early 1960s. Throughout the 1960s, many imported goods were 'substituted' by their domestically-produced counterparts. Production of a passenger car, however, was of strategic importance. Thus, their production was put on hold until the end of the 1960s — until a detailed plan could be devised to produce cars in a way that would make them beneficial to the Turkish economy. This was because cars were recognized as a powerful social force and a curse that damaged the trade balance since their introduction in Turkey as imported items during the liberal 1950s. As it was experienced in the 1950s, meeting the demand for cars by importation, more than any other consumer good, proved to hurt the trade balance the worst — since cars were the costliest of them all.

The demand for cars had been a reality since the early 1950s when the Turkish public's appetite for all kinds of consumer goods was unleashed by its economically liberal government. Throughout the 1950s, unrestricted admission of cars into the market had created an irreversible public lust for them.

Imported Cars of the 1950s: The promise and the price of mobility

Motor vehicles were a dynamic element that seemed to echo the jovial mood of the liberal government's economic policies. Relaxed spending would enable Turkish people's creative impulses and would make them more productive, thus wealthy. As the government always

propounded, loosen the grip on the ingenuity of the Turkish people, and there you loosened the grip on its prosperity[393]. While wider availability of durable goods signified increased economic mobility, admission of cars, trucks, and tractors meant increased geo-physical mobility. Vehicles became symbols of the government's eradication of hindrances on social mobility in general. Turkey's farmers drove tractors, carried their produce to the markets via their pickup trucks, and urban dwellers enjoyed private automobiles in numbers never seen before. Almost all models produced in Europe and the US were sold in Turkey, displayed in the showrooms of Galata and Beyoğlu in Istanbul.[394] The government boasted the existence of these imported technological wonders on the Turkish streets as signs of the wealth that its liberal economic policies had brought to the country.

This was a short-lived consumer bliss. Turkey's plans of paying for technological imports by agricultural revenues — "paying for steel with cotton" was the popular metaphor for this trade — fell apart quickly. US aid and agricultural revenues slowed down after 1952 and wartime reserves were spent, the combined effect of which caused a severe foreign currency shortage at the end of 1953. Around 1954, the Turkish government, in a state of panic, declared the end of much of its free market policies, restricted the importation of many consumer goods, and sought ways to kick start industrial investments that it had largely halted in 1950.[395]

Passenger cars, that seemed to be causing the biggest drain on the foreign currency reserves, were once again declared to be luxuries and the available models were restricted to few cheaper cars that could only be obtained through quotas allotted to importers or through visitors who brought their cars into the country.[396] The promise of personal transport liberty

was postponed indefinitely: Police hounded smuggled cars on the borders and officials detained them on the customs lots — that slowly turned into junkyards that displayed rusting cars as relics of Turkey's one-time fiscal liberty.

The attempt to develop a nationally designed and engineered passenger car: *Devrim* of 1961

As planners took control of the Turkish economy in the 1960s, they also inherited a social stimulus for consumer goods from the liberal 50s. They tried to balance allocations on investment goods that ensured future wealth with investments on consumer goods that satisfied contemporary desires. Thanks to the society's exposure to all things motor vehicle in the 1950s, there was now a critical mass who desired them. Furthermore, the spending excesses of the liberal 1950s had left some net gains. There was a certain level of road infrastructure built for the transport of agricultural exports. Bureaucrats, intellectuals, and businessmen began talking about establishing an automotive industry in Turkey.

Establishing an automotive industry was part of the first five-year program drafted in 1962, but not a central element. The first plan's goal was to build a machine industry. Thus, investment goods were made a priority, which included commercial vehicles. Consumer goods, on the other hand, were limited with clearly defined lists and quotas. But, this did not mean that the country was going back to the austerity of the pre-war years. Planners acknowledged certain consumer goods to be 'modern necessities' that served to satisfy social mobility goals by imbuing the public with a minimum modern material living standard. The private automobile, however, was still considered a luxury by the first five-year plan.

The bureaucrats of the 1960s, wary of the trade deficits of the past, cautioned against opening a large market for private cars. "We are sending a ship full of cotton to get 10 cars," Turkey's president declared.[397] State planners, considering the passenger car to be a luxury, suggested instead that trucks, buses, and other investment-vehicles to be manufactured in the country.[398] However, there were groups of professionals who thought that there was a considerable market for the car and that the car should be popularized and that its production should be regulated [399] or manufactured by domestic producers.[400] These professionals were joined by nationalist intellectuals who propounded that the country should put aside assembly attempts that were already in place in Turkey since the late 1950s (such as the Otosan and BMC truck and bus factories).[401]

It was argued that assembly plants, which at the time depended largely on imported parts, only perpetuated Turkey's financial and technical dependency.[402] Otosan, a Koç company that had begun the production of trucks, advocated the assembly industry. Meanwhile, proponents of national industry proposed an initiative that would help prove that top-down domestic car production was possible in Turkey.[403] An official report by the State Planning Organization (DPT) had renounced the idea in 1962 on the basis that demand was not high enough to substantiate mass production. But there was another question, and it was "an emotional one" as one planner later suggested. Nationalist intellectuals wanted to find out whether Turks had achieved a level of civilization that would allow them to produce automobiles. That was a question that rose from the nation's desire to shape its own destiny, "to assess itself and to measure the distance gone in the road to Westernization." [404]

In 1961, the government summoned the best of its engineering force, twenty-three top railroad engineers, to come up with a passenger car prototype for the Turkish consumer. The car was to be prepared for the Birthday of the Republic (*Cumhuriyet Bayramı*) celebrations. While the engineers set out to produce a mid-sized passenger car comparable to a Chrysler, Fiat, or a Chevrolet, they took pains in creating a unique design.[405] Working at a railroad spare parts casting workshop for one hundred and twenty-nine days, the engineers built four prototypes of the first Turkish car called the "Revolution" —with a license plate that read "experience".

The rollout, however, was less than auspicious. On the day of the celebration, one of the prototypes ran out of gas, stopped and halted the procession. The Turkish press, influenced by parties who feared that the state would monopolize all car production, divided sharply. Some newspapers reported that the car's public trial run was proof that cars could be made in Turkey, but a number of others declared the incident a failure of the "Revolution."[406] "The Revolution got stuck on the road," read one headline.[407] Some accused the state of wasting 800,000 liras (which equaled approximately $100,000 at the time) on the four prototypes.

The negative reaction was also due to a general mistrust of domestically produced technological products. Even if the car had succeeded, it seemed that many Turks would not accept it as a legitimate alternative to foreign cars. Many had perceived the domestic car project as an attempt to deprive the public of genuine automobiles — suggesting that the Turkish attempts could only fake a car given the country's inadequate technological foundations (figure 4.3). Among those who watched wearily as the project progressed, was a

businessman, the main Ford dealer in Turkey, who had been consistently working on producing cars in Turkey since 1928. Vehbi Koç was relieved, to say the least, that production of the Revolution was shelved. Koç later noted that state bureaucrats had hastily pieced together several car prototypes, yet, "unfortunately, it had not been possible to make them to run."[408]

The Revolution car was said to be put on a one-year trial run,[409] while railroad engineers hoped to begin manufacturing engines for it.[410] Foreign manufacturers, including General Motors, which produced Opel brand cars in Europe, were approached for the car's mass production. Around 1962, the country's policy about cars began changing. The first five-year plan drafted in 1962 considered private cars a luxury, while prioritizing the assembly of commercial vehicles of foreign origins, considering them as investment goods.[411] In 1964, the government regulated their assembly with a decree, as debates about launching a private car industry continued.[412] Vehbi Koç had already begun promoting the idea that if the nation launched a car industry, it should concentrate its resources in producing a single model.[413]

4.3 Turkey's first batch-produced passenger car: transferring design and technology from secondary sources

Vehbi Koç's efforts to mass-produce Fords

Vehbi Koç, had risen to preeminence in the consumer goods area as a provisioner from the start. At a time when indoor lighting was performed by portable lamps, Koç distributed cans of kerosene to convenience stores from the back of a truck. Later when gas supply in Turkish cities failed to meet the growing demands of Turkish cities, Koç had set up a network of LPG (liquid petroleum gas) deliveries to individual homes. His company Arçelik began producing simple models of washing machines and refrigerators, to make these formerly luxury goods available for the masses. But his biggest dream was to distribute and perhaps manufacture cars — the most magnificent of all consumer goods. The car was an object that summoned the forces of an entire industry — that would potentially move forward individuals, his business, and the nation towards wealth and prosperity. It would also provide literal, geo-physical mobility and by this account energize the entire socio-economic sphere.

Koç's own enthusiasm for products culminated from his regard of them as outcomes of industry and technology that instigated social, economical, physical, spiritual, and emotional mobility. The automobile was the ultimate expression of all of these qualities. The idea of selling automobiles excited young Vehbi Koç early in his career. However, unlike the guaranteed-to-sell staples that most of the Koç family business depended on, selling cars was a risky venture. In fact, it was too risky for his father who tried to talk his son out of entering car sales in the late 1920s.[414] Nevertheless, from the early days on, a question was brewing in

Vehbi Koç's mind: could he become Turkey's Henry Ford? (figure 4.4).

His entrance into the automotive business went back to the 1920s, in Ankara where he operated multiple business tasks simultaneously. As an Ankara businessman, Koç had benefited from the construction of a new capital. The city had become a place that supported a higher level of material culture which benefited his business in many ways. As roads were built, he had begun distributing fuel for cars. Soon after, Koç began selling Ford cars in Ankara.[415] However, he found his competitor Bernar Nahum to be better suited to expanding his automotive business, and he persuaded Nahum to run the automotive division of the Koç Trading company.[416]

As one of Ford's many dealers in Turkey, Koç had risen to be the largest by 1953 (accounting for 85 percent of Ford sales in Turkey).[417] In 1956 he was granted the "most successful Ford dealer" award among thirty-four Near East distributors (and seven thousand distributors in the world). That year Ford invited Vehbi Koç to the US where he arrived with a recommendation letter from Turkey's prime minister in his pocket. This visit gave Koç the opportunity to make his first serious attempt at a joint venture with Ford. It had not been easy. In two previous attempts Koç had failed to secure interviews with either Ford senior or with Henry Ford II. Ford's dismissal of this Turkish businessman may be attributed to an earlier and bitter experience that the company had in Turkey. Ford senior had already once attempted to concentrate his regional operations in Turkey when the company had built a factory in Istanbul in 1928. However, the Ford enterprise in Turkey had failed and the factory closed in 1932. After this bitter experience Ford had established its regional operations in Egypt, telling

regional dealers like Koç to cooperate with the Egyptian operation.

In 1956, Vehbi Koç finally met Henry Ford II. Koç arrived before the king of automobiles as a small but successful member of the Ford family and a businessman from a small country with a virtually bankrupt economy. This was a time when American influenced free-market policies had drained Turkey's foreign currency reserves and the Turkish treasury had little money to allocate to the importation of consumer goods. Koç was given the opportunity to make his plea for producing Ford automobiles in Turkey. He did this by explaining Turkey's prospects despite its economic challenges.[418] However, the Ford Company did not want to shake up its profitable business plan by introducing competition to its Egyptian plant. Koç's proposal was declined. It was only after further incursions by Koç in 1958 and 1959 that Ford finally agreed to a partnership, one that would be limited to the production of trucks. Ford also imposed stiff financial conditions on Koç. Significantly, Ford never gave Koç permission to produce engines. "You have to walk over my dead body," a Ford official responded to Koç's pleas.[419]

Koç produces Turkey's first private passenger car: The Anadol, 1967

In all his manufacturing endeavors, Koç had been seeking the most suitable technological means/solution to satisfy Turkish needs, yet not completely ignoring desires and seeking ways to satisfy that, as well. This had been the case when he introduced Chappe type radiators as space heaters, Junkers water heaters fired by LPG tanks, and GE patented refrigerators. They were all presented to the public as useful things that also served to make the individual become a part of the modern world. He similarly sought a car that would simultaneously

satisfy the need to acquire mobility, serve as an object of desire/possession, and a product of the modern Turkish nation. Before Koç mass produced Fiats, he found an intermediary solution in a batch produced sedan. As risky as it was to produce a car, Koç sought to minimize the risk, but not tone down the excitement. Ford Cortina, the mid-sized sedan widely marketed in Europe, was not too elaborate to produce, yet it was well-engineered, functional, and sufficiently alluring. Koç, who had lived with Ford products for two decades as a dealer, was dreaming of producing the Ford Cortina in the 1960s. The humbler European cousin of the American Ford was a reliable, world-standard family sedan supported by a global industrial giant.

However, Ford was unyielding on this point. Koç was once again forced to acquire design and technology from the lower ranks of global industrial hierarchy. He found an alternative way to realize this dream by collaborating with an English company called Reliant coupled with assistance from Ford in England. The car had to be manufactured inexpensively. However, the company found it despairingly expensive to produce a regular car. Koç's car project took off only when Bernar Nahum, one of his top associates, discovered vehicles made out of fiberglass.[420] Made of pressed particles of glass and coated with petroleum-based resin, fiberglass car bodies were much cheaper to produce than steel ones. Steel was expensive, scarce in Turkey, and steel factory production required heavy investments in molds and presses. The choice of fiberglass brought the cost of production from an estimated $50 million down to a mere $2 million.[421]

In 1963, Koç and his associates visited the Israeli firm that produced these fiberglass vehicles. They discovered that the production methods were actually rather primitive, thus not suited to Koç's more ambitious enterprise. Shortly thereafter, Koç and his associates discovered that the Israeli firm purchased its technology from an English company called Reliant. Koç associates were impressed by Reliant's modern production methods, and they signed a partnership deal with the company in 1964. Reliant, like most other Western European producers, was a small operation that sold know-how to manufacturers in developing countries. The company provided packages of materials and techniques for low volume assembly that usually involved hand-laying the bodies of the vehicles on simply fabricated chassis. Beginning in the 1950s, Reliant had helped produce Israel's utility vehicles, Greece's three-wheeled trucks, India's economy car, and Indonesia's large-capacity rickshaw.[422]

However, Turkish authorities refused Koç's project, finding fiberglass production to be too unusual.[423] On paper the project was dead, but Koç associates led by Bernar Nahum decided to persuade the state by constructing an actual car. They approached Reliant to produce a prototype. Until that day, the lightness of material and manual labor required to utilize fiberglass meant that it was only used in sports coupes produced in low numbers. Reliant produced two-door coupes such as the highly acclaimed Scimitar. Koç Holding, however, hired Reliant's design firm Ogle to develop a family car. Ogle's Tom Karen blended the edgy Reliant sports coupe Scimitar with the homely Ford family sedan Cortina and brought forth the "Sabre," or Reliant FW5 as the company code-named the project. [424] In the "Sabre," designer Karen brought together the spaciousness of the sedan and the dynamic figure of Reliant's coupe. Karen gave the Sabre a bigger belly, larger trunk space, and a flatter and

bulkier nose. Design and technical constraints had brought forth an unusual amalgam that belonged to a category of its own. It was a coupe that was neither a sports car nor a mini, rather a mid-sized family car (figure 4.5).

Bernar Nahum secured the main mechanical components for the car such as the gearbox, the differential, and the straight-4 Ford Cortina engine, from Ford England — despite the company's initial refusal to assist him in producing cars independently. The car's front suspension was adopted from the 1945 Triumph and its rear suspension from the Ford Cortina.[425] The front kit, steering wheel, brakes, and electrical components were purchased with Reliant's technical assistance. Wheels, tires, batteries, the windshield, body, interior lining, the seats, and the paint job would be provided domestically.[426]

In the meantime, Koç struggled to acquire government permission to manufacture the Anadol. The government was skeptical of a car made of fiberglass. They also required Koç to produce certain car parts domestically. The company had to agree to account for every part it produced by submitting an extensive list that proved the level of domestic production in each unit produced. Then in 1965, a business-friendly government replaced the one that had put planned economy measures into place, and matters changed.

Taking advantage of this window of opportunity, Koç Holding submitted a report to the government seeking its permission and support for the project. The report titled "The Establishment of a Car Industry in Turkey," emphasized that Koç's project was conceived as a service to the nation, not as a profit making operation.[427] In the report Koç acknowledged

that producing cars [for developing nations] was risky but pointed out that even communist Russia was establishing a Fiat car factory at the time. Koç proposed a folk type car with a stronger engine and a larger body compared to a Volkswagen. The report remarked that the company had already developed a substantial body, one comparable to a Ford Consul (Cortina). It was a modern design made of fiberglass. The report also noted that Koç's car would be the equivalent of a car priced for $1,400. Vehbi Koç concluded the report by appealing to the government for either an increase in the Holding's import-for-assembly quota (that it used for trucks) or for the allocation of a new quota position for this project.

The Minister of Industry expressed his concerns about fiberglass production as well as his worries about the physical look of this fiberglass car. He requested a test drive of the prototype before the government could approve Koç's project. In late 1965, two experienced drivers traveled to England and brought the car to Istanbul through 63 hours of snowstorms and freezing wind. The following day, Koç personnel parked the prototype in front of the Ministry of Industry in Ankara. The Minister of Industry, Mehmet Turgut, later remarked that the car was unlike any other that they had seen abroad at the time.[428] Unlike cars of the 1960s that were compositions of bulbous forms and angular counterforms (best exemplified by the Ford Cortina), Koç's car of modular parts came together seamlessly to form one compact solid. Bordering on the futuristic, the car looked like the kind of prototype that usually never left the drafting table (figure 4.6). It helped that Koç's operation was limited in scope and thus independent of international competition. This fact gave the company the freedom to realize the prototype for the masses. This futuristic and ultra-modern look helped sell the car to the Turkish bureaucrats who sought to establish Turkish car production as a progressive enterprise (figure 4.7).

In 1966, the Ministry of Industry granted permission to Koç's Automotive Division (Otosan) to manufacture the car—as long as Otosan would account for every car part it wanted to import and explain why the part was not available in Turkey. Otosan also had to guarantee that the assembly of each car would require 45% less foreign currency than an imported car did—thus preserving the nation's precious reserves.

Koç's next effort was to test the market. The company did this by first asking the Turkish public to propose a name for the car. In 1966, Koç Holding summoned the public to "Please join the [campaign to name] the car that is a product of our national industry." Referring to the forthcoming car the company simply asked, "What shall we call it?" implying that it was a baby to be born to the nation. With this campaign Koç did not only seek to gauge and excite the public's interest. The company also sought to legitimize a car that was the product of "assembly production"—a method condemned by many intellectuals in Turkey who had made Koç's project suspect in the public eye. The company expected 15,000 entries in the campaign (the equivalent of the annual demand for passenger cars in Turkey) but was pleasantly surprised when it received around 100,000 entries.[429] A jury of intellectuals, bureaucrats, and engineers narrowed the entries down to the name Anadolu (the Turkish phrase for the country's geographical mainland). However, dropping the last vowel from the phrase produced a more elegant name, a design that was brief, original and easy to pronounce around the world. Anadol promised to be an effective brand name for Turkey's first mass produced car.

In order to verify the market for the new car, Otosan also opened a waiting list to which more than 70,000 people applied.[430] This proved that there was a considerable market for cars in Turkey. Large car producers who warned against Turkish car production put that number at only 5,000. Before Otosan began production Ford made a final attempt to talk Koç, its main Ford dealer, out of the Anadol project. Ford officials argued that Koç's endeavor was too risky. It was an adventure that put Koç under too much financial liability. A Ford executive told Rahmi Koç, Koç's son who took part in the company's car operation, that Vehbi Koç was going to "break [his] neck."[431] There was also a lot of negative press around the car. The writers who helped bury the state's attempt at car production now ridiculed the Otosan project, saying that building cars of fiberglass was like building cars from scrap fabric, cardboard, and paper.[432] Nevertheless, the two-door family car Anadol A1 was produced in 1967. The A-1, Turkey's first mass produced car, (where "A" stood for the first letter of the Turkish word for car) joined the family of other Turkish firsts like the B-1 refrigerator and the Ç-1 washing machine produced by Arçelik.

Anadol A2, the four-door model issued in 1970, also became the world's first fiberglass sedan. Both A-1 and A-2 bore the trademark "Made in Turkey" on their vehicle info plates, a symbol that generally received responses from the Turkish nation from pride to dismissal when the Turkish consumer industry was in its infancy (figure 4.8). It also induced guilt because many Turks wanted their country to prosper through industrial development, yet they could not curb their desire for foreign-made goods.

Despite misgivings, the release of the Anadol proved that there was indeed a domestic market for Turkish-made cars. However, Koç knew that fiberglass production was a temporary solution. It was true that fiberglass and other labor-intensive methods helped Koç to avoid investing in steel molds. When Otosan received an order of a dozen buses its personnel had to travel to the town of Bursa and put local iron beaters to work there who hand-produced the bodies.[433] And when Ford introduced a new body style for its trucks, the company chose to hand mold the cabins with fiberglass rather than producing expensive steel molds. Similarly, the first batch of Anadol bodies was hand produced using wooden molds in the backyard of the assembly factory.[434] Although Otosan had made improvements in the process, working with fiberglass was still labor-intensive and yielded a limited production volume. Koç could not hope to increase car production to substantial volumes using this method.

4.4 From batch to mass production: Murat 124, another everyman's product

Koç persuades the state to invest in a large-scale car project

The Turkish car industry and Koç's automobile enterprises were soon stimulated by an earlier government initiative. In the 1960s, as part of the planned economy, the state established a modern iron and steel factory capable of meeting the needs of emerging Turkish industries—the goal being to reduce the nation's dependence on imported steel (figure 4.9). Vehbi Koç, who was well aware of the implications of abundant steel production in Turkey, happened to be on the board of directors of the Ereğli steel factory. As soon as the factory began production of sheet steel, several large-scale car projects were started as joint ventures between the state and private enterprises. The government oversaw all of these projects. Unlike the piecemeal Anadol operation of Koç, these projects addressed all levels of car production to assure the growth of a healthy car industry in Turkey.

The first approved project came from Koç to produce the mid-sized sedan Fiat 124. This was a partnership Vehbi Koç had settled for when Ford had repeatedly turned down his interest in a partnership. Compared with Ford, Fiat's technical know how and market reach was much more limited, yet securing a deal with them had still not been easy. Koç had to guarantee Fiat that it could sell 20,000 cars —while a total of only 15,000 cars were known to be sold in Turkey at the time. Fiat also asked Koç to contribute more money to the project. In 1968, the project became possible when Koç secured a partnership with the state enterprise MKE (Machine and Chemistry Industries) and the state bank İş Bankası. The new company was called TOFAŞ (Turkish Automobile Factories Company). Just like Demirdöküm and Arçelik,

TOFAŞ, too, was a joint-venture with state as a partner. This new Koç company, too, had a 'general' name that made a claim to dominate its given field of manufacturing. Unlike Otosan that resembled a workshop, TOFAŞ was a world-class factory for the manufacture of Fiats.[435]

Shortly after the acceptance of Koç's Fiat proposal, TOFAŞ found its rival in another joint-venture that was directly developed by the state. A semi-private organization called OYAK (The Army [officers'] Co-op) made an agreement with Renault of France to produce family sedans.

Choosing the models to be mass-produced in Turkey: The Fiat 124 and the Renault 12

Deciding on the right car model had not been easy either for Koç's TOFAŞ or the state's OYAK. Koç's desire was, once again, to produce a reliable, world-standard family sedan — another member to join the ranks of Koç's family of 'everyman's products' that served to define the consensus of what a car should be in Turkey. He also wished that this could be the only car available on the Turkish market, his model-T in a way. Koç's bid to buy OYAK was turned down by the government. Thus, there was OYAK's car to compete with. Size, power, design aesthetic, price and ease of production were variables to be taken into consideration. Turkish public would have to truly accept these models as satisfactory transportation solutions/automobility experiences. Fortunately, for both companies the competition would be limited by legislation to ensure the nourishing of the national automotive industry. The state would protect these companies from foreign competition by customs taxes on imported cars. These companies were likely to produce the same model for many years in order to save on

new investment costs. This was ultimately a factor that had lured Fiat into partnership with Koç.

During TOFAŞ's initial talks with the Italian manufacturer in 1965, Fiat pushed the 850 model, a two-door mini. For TOFAŞ, Fiat 850 would not do. Turkish people's purchasing power might be poor, but they would not get excited about fitting in a small car like the 850 just for the sake of mobility. TOFAŞ argued that the Turks who were used to large American cars would find the 850 too small to satisfy their aspirations for an automobile.[436] Past Turkish purchases of imported cars confirmed this belief. Over the years, Turks preferred large, luxury cars despite their higher costs.[437] In the 1960s, the majority of imported cars were six-cylinder American cars. They were exalted in popular sayings such as "if you buy a Ford, you become a Lord," and "buy a Chrysler [and get a wife] and the wedding bureau will ask for its cut."[438]

Thus, even under the protectionist economy of the 1960s, when their importation was legally restricted, the Turkish government was forced to offer roundabout ways to acquire foreign cars.[439] Among those legally acquired, luxury models prevailed.[440] Surprisingly, smaller economy cars like Volkswagens, Citroens, and Peugeots were not popular in this relatively poor country, indicating that car ownership was not simply about satisfying the need for transportation. That of self-expression, pleasure, and status seeking were also important factors in car choice.[441] Thus, the production model would have to be of equal status or at least size of the imports like the Cortina, the humbler European cousin of the American Ford.[442] The Revolution, Turkey's first passenger car prototype, had been a mid-sized family car in the same class with mid-sized Fords, Fiats, and Opels (GMs European line) (figure 4.10). The

same was true for Turkey's first mass-manufactured car the Anadol. Despite the bad press it received for its seemingly skimpy construction, the Anadol satisfied the desire to own a sizeable car (figure 4.11). The minis that were widely popular in Western Europe for their ability to bring car-ownership to the masses were never considered for production in Turkey.

Of the four main criteria —size, power, design, and price—that guided the decisions of the Turkish companies, size came first. The minis, for example, were cheaper—such as the two-door, fuel-saver 850 that Fiat initially pushed for production in Turkey. However, they were disqualified since they were not suitable for the large Turkish family. The mid-sized family cars, on the other hand, with four doors and a five-passenger capacity were more spacious and stronger. Volvo was initially considered with the modification to fit six passengers instead of five.[443] Yet, the models that the Turkish companies came to produce were a notch below the sedans that Western European and American middle-class families enjoyed. Volvo, Opel, and Renault 16 were cars that the Turkish producers found to be too luxurious,[444] and perhaps too refined for rough Turkish roads.[445] Turkish authorities had rejected Renault's initial offer to produce R-4, considering it too small and basic. Anadol, Fiat 124, and Renault 12 were chosen as mid-sized family cars, large enough to be also used as commercial cabs.[446]

In 1967, Fiat and Koç agreed on the 124 model, a sedan. OYAK, on the other hand, initially announced that it would enter the market producing the Swedish Volvo, yet quickly switched to the simpler and cheaper Renault 12. The Fiat 124 was a well-designed car geared towards the Western European family. Renault 12 was a specific attempt at an "economy car" for a broad international market including the developing countries of Eastern Europe and South

America. Renault's design brief, for example, dictated one principle: that the design be simple enough to allow the cars to be easily produced. This was an idea that had governed European car production after World War II. In order to make cars affordable to the masses, European producers developed chassis-less cars with smaller engines that were light, roomy, and not too powerful.[447] These cars combined the conventional backbone of the car with a platform-like structure,[448] aggregated the engine, gearbox, and the differential in one space in the front, and removed the bulky transmission tunnel.[449] Early economy cars were best exemplified by Citroen in France, Volkswagen in Germany, and Mini in England, all of which had very few features beyond what was necessary.[450] The cars lacked power-steering, the foot pedals were uncomfortable, and the rear windows did not open.[451] However, later examples such as the Swedish Saab introduced innovations in suspension and brake systems that were gradually adopted across the industry.[452] Ford and GM followed this idea of restrained and efficient car making in their European models as early as the 1950s.[453]

Fiat 124 and Renault 12 were specially designed to balance the need for fuel efficiency with a roomy interior. They were also engineered to function on rougher terrain. These cars were equipped with smaller engines that consumed less gas. But this meant that the cars could not pull large bodies. They had to be made lighter and slightly boxier than the mid- to upper end family sedans. These mechanicals had to be squeezed into a smaller space than usual. The mechanicals had to be kept to a minimum, best exemplified by the grading down of R16 to produce the R12. Simplification of mechanical components saved space in both cars. Fiat owed its interior room to an additional factor. 124's body was lighter and its interior roomier thanks to its extremely thin walls and window frames that barely met the safety standards of

the late 1960s.[454] The cavernous baggage space and its roomy interior made Fiat 124 one of Europe's most popular cars in the late 1960s.

Behind the design ingenuity of these mid-1960s models, was the desire of European companies like Fiat and Renault, to reach out to less-developed world markets with cheaper and simple cars.[455] Renault 12 was a car that could be manufactured by a producer in a developing country using simple methods. The brief stated that the car be usable as a base for multiple variations, reliable for the export markets and comfortable enough for France.[456] Producers like Renault lacked the necessary investment capital to expand to these markets. Both Fiat and Renault knew that they could only expand by forming partnerships around the world.[457] Local partnerships would lower the cost of distribution since the cars would either be built-up or completely-knocked-down and assembled at the partner's plant.[458] Producing simpler cars would lower the cost of servicing them. The simplicity of its structure and mechanical set up would also lower the car's risk of malfunction and make it possible for drivers to fix their own cars.

Renault 12 vs. Fiat 124: modesty or exuberance at an affordable price

The boxy Fiat 124's rival in the Turkish market was the longer, sportier Renault 12. Both were products of specific 'austerity-driven' design directives. They became legendary (not withstanding much lamented) cars that defined automobility from the Soviet Bloc to South America and Australia. And, as it was in Turkey, these cars sometimes co-existed on the roads.

Renault 12, the poor man's sports car, was promoted for its arrow-like, futuristic look. *Wheels,* reviewing the R12 for Australian consumers in 1971, praised the "advanced body design developed in the wind tunnel." But the car's patent application admits that the R12's inclined surfaces were the result of an effort to provide aero-dynamism cheaply:

> "This body shape, from which all rounded pressings are strictly precluded, and comprising only of flat surfaces (or at most very slightly curved surfaces) eliminates costly deep pressings. Therefore, this body can be constructed economically under mass-production…conditions to which it is perfectly adapted."[459]

Anadol, Fiat 124, and the Renault 12 were not spectacular when it came to power. These cars were equipped with small 1200cc straight-4 engines. Their 65 horsepower engines provided fuel economy but limited performance when compared with 130 horsepower family cars like the Ford Cortina or the Volvo. The speedometer of the Renault 12 promised up to 120 km/h but the car suffered from roaring at speeds past 90 km/h. The same was true for the 124.[460] Only Fiat 124 was compared with cars in the 1800-2000 cc class when it came to acceleration.

In terms of price, the three cars manufactured in Turkey were in the same class as the Volkswagen Beetle and Citroën 2 CV. However, this was not true of their design. The Anadol, Renault 12 and Fiat 124 were in a class of their own. They bridged the performance of economy cars with the design of family sedans. Anadol and Renault 12 were based on ambitious designs with the outwardly expressive forms found in sports cars, as if to compensate for their simpler engineering. Anadol boasted smooth curves while the Renault 12

had angles. Both cars were refined as restive family sedans while retaining part of their original bolting sports car aspirations. The Fiat 124, on the other hand, owing to the long heritage of economy cars the company had been producing, did not have an aggressive, darting form (figure 4.12). It looked like a descendant of the 1960s minis, but one that had grown into a family sedan. It lacked the outward personality of the Anadol or the Renault. Yet, as an American reviewer put it, its looks could potentially please those who took pleasure in "well-executed function."[461] The 124 employed a modular design that joined three boxes together. "A large people-carrying box in the middle, a smaller engine-box on the front, and a like-sized luggage-box on the rear."[462] The boxy form imbued the 124 with a certain humility. But Fiat suggested that the car was "a wolf in sheep's clothing," boasting that its 124 offered "more car for the money," [463] and many reviewers confirmed this affirmation.[464]

Despite their higher aspirations and more ambitious outward appearances, the three cars produced in Turkey were at a lower quality and price category than comparable economy models available in Europe at the time, such as Volkswagen Beetle, Citroen 2CV, and Ford Cortina.

The Anadol A-1, Fiat 124, and the Renault 12 were three distinct models that became the choice of Turkish manufacturers, partly because their designs did not readily admit their cost-reducing intentions. Neither were they sold solely as economical cars. The cars also had to satisfy the pleasure of owning a luxury object in Turkey. Thus, they were also presented as precious objects to help Turkish car buyers justify making large investments beyond rational economic reasoning.

These three cars with three distinctive forms — the Anadol a swelling coupe, Renault 12 a bolting arrow, and the Fiat 124 a humble box — defined the Turkish automobile landscape for three decades. The three rather narrow consumer choices that were presented in Turkey tried to capture the imagination of Turkish families in various ways.[465] Perhaps they helped divert Turkish desires from the unreachable choices that lay outside Turkish customs walls. Of Turkey's big two, the Renault 12 and the Fiat 124, it was the Fiat, Agnelli's vision of a world car for the 1960s, that the Turks come to identify with the most. Vehbi Koç took Fiat's world car, used the strategy of an overarching branding —this time a singular product identity — and managed to position it as the everyman's car, as he did before with Demirdöküm and Arçelik products.

4.5 The Fiat is branded as the "Murat," the domestic alternative to Renault 12

Vehbi Koç's persistent search for car manufacturing and Fiat president Gianni Agnelli's aggressive expansion into the world market brought the two together in laying the foundations of Turkey's automotive industry in 1971. The foundation of this was the TOFAŞ factory in Bursa. Koç's speech at the opening ceremony emphasized that driving a small car was not a luxury.

Gianni Agnelli, an agent of car manufacturing throughout the developing world, had initiated the USSR's car industry with a worldly and political speech. His brother Umberto, the vice president of Fiat, gave a similar speech in Bursa that emphasized the progressive spirit of car production.[466] Car production, Agnelli propounded, would expand industrial development in

Turkey by fostering an industrial ecology supported by local supply-chains. Moreover, the very act of driving was an expression of freedom, in Agnelli's words, and ease of mobility was a valuable element of contemporary civilization.[467]

The Turkish cars were promoted in different ways for many possible buyers. The Fiat 124's nationality was a question that TOFAŞ faced before the company introduced the car to the public. Koç and his associates knew that cars with purely domestic identities, such as the Revolution and Anadol, had been mocked partly because the public easily associated them with Turkish industry, which they did not trust to produce highly technical objects like automobiles. Announcing that Koç would assemble Fiats in Turkey would draw criticism, too. When Fiat refused to allow TOFAŞ to use its brand name, the Turkish company was forced to invent an original one. It was known that Vehbi Koç's domestic investments in Arçelik's production were widely celebrated. TOFAŞ combined national investment with the car's foreign technological origin in publicity about its production. The company produced a separate brochure of the factory, presenting it as a joint-venture with a strongly national setting in Bursa (figure 4.13), promising the Turkish public that using foreign know-how, TOFAŞ would eventually develop a national car industry.

The company presented its car as a counterpart of its Italian cousin. The Fiat 124 was renamed the Murat 124 in a newspaper campaign similar to the one made for the Anadol where the public was asked the name the new Turkish car. The Turkish word Murat means "yearning/goal," expressing the longing to own a car. The title also positions the Murat 124 as the object to end that longing ("muradına ermek"). The car was introduced with an image that

displayed its humble silhouette accompanied by a title that read "to make your dream come true". But would the humble Murat really fulfill the longings of Turkish households for car ownership? How could the Murat replace the dream of owning a large, luxurious American car from one of Istanbul showrooms? In order to overcome the image of its boxy shell, the Turkish manufacturer presented the 124 as a spacious car just like Fiat offered across Europe. Murat ads titled "Sinerama," and "The Glass Manor" boasted the car's interior comfort and the pleasurable experience of the interior environment (figure 4.14).

There were certain points of competition between Turkey's "big two" as Turks experienced the two world cars. Although both cars sold in almost equal numbers, they appealed to two distinct tastes. The Renault 12 fulfilled the dreams of those who wanted to own a car with a substantial physical presence and some flair. Its finish was excellent, at least on the day one picked the car up from the dealer. R12 was longer compared to the Murat 124, though a bit harsh and odd looking, partly because its body was born partly out of a desire to reduce production costs. Renault also introduced a pricier, flashier R12. Though not remarkably superior in performance, the R12 'TS' was distinguished from its sister R12 'TL' by a chromium band that ran across the side of the car. Renault also promoted its front wheel drive as a technical superiority over its competition. Turkish consumers, however, were not knowledgeable enough to base their choices on technical superiority.[468]

Appearance was a significant point of judgment for Turkish buyers. Body styles served to communicate qualities that consumers sought in their cars. Turkish producer OYAK boasted about the R12's relatively flashier look while TOFAŞ presented the Murat 124 as an

overachiever despite its humble look. The two choices before the Turkish public stood at opposite stylistic ends, and divided consumers into separate camps.[469] Someone who liked a Murat would probably dislike the looks of a Renault, and vice versa. TOFAŞ producer Savaş Arıkan, for instance, was convinced of the aesthetic superiority of his company's product, proclaiming Renault's looks awkward.[470] The Murat 124's plainer design made it open for adornment and customization by its drivers. Arıkan points to the flourishing of the car accessories industry that largely came into business as drivers bolstered the look of their humble Murats (124 and later 131 models) as far as their imagination would take them.[471]

The general advertising strategy for the Murat 124, like other Koç products, was to position the car as another everyman's product perfectly suited for the budget and needs of the Turkish family. However, knowing that the Turkish public aspired for exuberance in cars, TOFAŞ simultaneously ran ads that presented Murat also as a glamorous object. There were times when Murat was promoted as a symbol of individual freedom and lifestyle in ads like "Why is Murat Pleasurable?" (figure 4.15). Despite their frugal intentions, both cars could be esteemed as glamorous objects among serious drivers. The R12s and Murat 124s, however, were meant to accommodate a family of five and be embraced by the family. The Murat 124 was promoted as an object of yearning by the whole family (figure 4.16). Both cars promised to hold together the nuclear families in their leisure and pastimes, however, they were preferred by two different groups of Turkish families. In a study conducted in the 1970s, a larger number of Murat buyers defined themselves as underprivileged, despite the fact that the 124 was comparably priced to the R12.[472] It seemed that Koç's general strategy to position all of his products as the necessary and sufficient goods for the Turkish Family was succeeding

with the public. As with Arçelik durables, Murats were presented as the affordable, domestic alternatives to their luxurious competitors. Arçelik's competitor AEG had presented its refrigerators as objects of distinction. Similarly, Renault 12 seemed more like an object of prestige; presented as a car approved by technicians, appreciated by respectable businessman, or enjoyed as a thing of leisure by freedom-loving individuals (figure 4.17). On the other hand, Murat 124 was first and foremost a container-on-wheels for the Turkish family. Murat provided the room and necessary performance that lower income families sought. These families also sought the helping hand that they knew Koç provided. Koç's company "didn't orphan its goods" as one Arçelik ad suggested in the 1960s, but nurtured them with its service networks. Arçelik had become the lower income families' choice of appliance, and Murat their choice of car. The combined aura of Murat: its more easily digestible looks, its homely and frugal feel, the wider availability of parts and repairs, and its friendly domestic branding — contributed to its appeal to those who sought to participate in Turkey's consumer culture.[473] The modern, progressive exterior aesthetics of the Renault 12, combined with its flashy interior offered affordable modern luxury to those who sought a modern, contemporary way of life in a county of scarcities where tradition and modernity were mixed in the urban space.[474] Renault offered a relative complexity that surpassed the satisfaction of peoples needs, a factor that Turkey's long-time, middle-class metropolitan consumers with modern aspirations favored in choosing their products.[475]

Turkish cars were utilized beyond family leisure time mobility. They were inexpensive alternatives for cab operators and also helped the economic activity of the country by providing for the transport of goods to smaller markets. Since Anadol pickups were in short

supply, small business owners actually converted Anadol sedans into pickups (figure 4.18).

In the 1970s, the Renault 12 and the Murat 124 competed with other family investments. Marketing professionals worked to persuade families that putting their savings into a Murat was a better investment than placing the funds in real estate or property (figure 4.19). However, the Murat 124 and Renault 12 were not simply consumer goods in a free market. The cars were placed in the market on an allocation basis. They were produced using an allocated annual amount of Turkey's limited national reserves and steel production. While the government allowed manufacturers to keep high profit margins, it also fixed prices to make the cars available to a larger consumer base at a time when upper class consumers could have gobbled up the limited supply each year. However, the excess demand for cars that were priced under their market value resulted in waiting lists and a blackmarket. The manufacturers complained that additional revenues that they had rightfully earned were being claimed by the black-market.[476] The government, on the other hand, argued that the manufacturers should feel lucky that they did not have international competition, neither did they have to compete in the international markets. The government, acting as the "father state," had struck a delicate balance between producers and consumers, protecting both parties in different ways. Waiting lists, from the government's point of view, were a guarantee of democratic ownership in an economy of scarcities.

The introduction of the Murat 124 and the Renault 12 revolutionized Turkey's car landscape which had been dominated by imported American cars with their populuxe designs and their humbler European cousins with more restrained looks and power. [477] Until the 1970s the cars

in traffic were mostly commercial taxi cabs, official vehicles, and some private cars.[478] The Murat 124 and the Renault 12 displaced the opulent and propulsive American car aesthetics that dominated Turkish streets; one with its humble looks and the other with its futuristic appearance.

The enjoyment of the Murat 124 owed to the same quality that made all other Koç products popular with the people; it provided them with the experience of an everyman's product. The Murat 124 was a technological product sufficient to contain and mobilize Turkish families. The Murat's overall design aura simultaneously served as a visual expression of modernity that was both desirable and national. It satisfied Turkish public's aspiration to participate in the contemporary global moment, simultaneously serving to celebrate the communal ethos of consumerism that was emerging in Turkey during the planned economy of the 1960s and the 70s. Koç's everyman's products made Turks feel that they were on the same boat of a common 'national development.' They were similarly joined around Murat, a national car that helped fortify the feeling of much needed consensus, as the country was rapidly developing a complex socio-economic sphere.

4.6 Informational mobility for the Turkish households: The Arçelik TV

Introducing the Arçelik TV: another national product to steer Turkey's own consumer destiny

Under the planned and protected production, there were larger imperatives at play such as fostering an essentially Turkish design and technology and guiding Turkey's consumer destiny.[479] Many parties, public and private, sought a modernization that was not imposed from the outside by larger, hegemonic powers but one that was born from within the conscience of the nation.[480] When it came to car production, it was first state-employed railroad engineers, then Koç personnel who sought out a vehicle that would become the quintessential Turkish folk car. In the early 1970s, the television, another potentially transformative product was introduced to the Turkish public. Like the private automobile, it promised to bring mobility, yet in a different sense of the word. It also brought a challenge to Turkish producers to learn to manufacture with another borrowed technology. Koç companies had managed to assimilate each new household product and present them as the country's own under domestic brand names. But, they were not prepared to manufacture this particular product, an appliance that was composed of electronic parts encased in plastic injection boxes. So they waited.

In 1966, the first broadcasts from Istanbul tested the Turkish public's appetite for television. It proved unquenchable. People paid large sums for TV sets in order to receive the very limited test broadcasts. Newspapers reported that some individuals built enormous antennas to receive over-the-border TV broadcasts.[481] Istanbul's traffic authority had to refrain dealers from displaying live TVs in their windows as they drew large crowds that blocked the

roads.[482] Squatter dwellers placed antennas on their roofs waiting for the day when the city would bring electricity into their homes.[483] While sociologists debated whether TV was a public necessity or a bourgeois luxury,[484] and economic planners put off TV investments, those who had gotten a taste of television broadcasting did not have patience for TVs postponement.[485] The urban public put pressure on the government until TV-transmission investments were added as a national expense into the country's five-year development plan.[486] Soon, the urban populace was joined by every small town who demanded that the government to extend TV broadcasts into their territory.[487] Popular pressure made TV broadcast the fastest public infrastructure to be put into place in the country.[488] By 1972, the public had already begun demanding the extension of TVs limited broadcast hours.[489]

The question became one of who would capitalize on the production of TVs in Turkey. Arçelik, the leading brand behind millions of household goods intended to lead domestic production of TVs, too. The company had to introduce a superior product, one that could match its refrigerators in the public eye. Thus, Arçelik sought to produce a model that it could present as the quintessential Turkish TV. As it prepared to launch, the company let its customers know that as others flooded the market they had watched, waited and worked until they finally felt comfortable in introducing the perfect TV. They made sure that they produced one worthy of the trust of Arçelik's loyal customers. The fact that the company had actually rushed the production of its first, rather mediocre model didn't prevent its impressive launch.[490] Arçelik gave a glimpse of its TV on a newspaper teaser that showed a cardboard box with its lid cut open: "Such a TV is arriving that…[it] will worth your wait until today." This was followed by another teaser that showed the TV set coming halfway out of the box

that read: “Such a TV is arriving that…[it is just the one that you were already waiting for].” When the TV finally came out of the box, the company gave the public the good news that “here was Arçelik, the TV that they [have been] looking forward to [all this time].” The ad continued:

> “Arçelik waited until now to present a TV set that earns the name Arçelik before the millions of families who use various Arçelik products. [Arçelik] developed a TV by evaluating the experiences, taking into consideration our country’s conditions and by establishing a strong network of TV maintenance services before releasing the TV for sale. And now, it presents to you the TV that earns the name Arçelik.
> With confidence. You will thoroughly enjoy your Arçelik TV [like you enjoy other Arçelik products].

The ad ended with this punch line: “Arçelik TV: comfort for your eyes and your conscience” (figure 4.20). Arçelik implied, like all Koç companies did when they promoted their products, that one should buy a product only when he or she was fully confident that the company had established the systems to nurture it throughout its lifespan. Buying a product from other than Arçelik, the company implied, made customers vulnerable. They were, in a way, placing their money at the mercy of nature outside of a support grid. This statement appealed to families with low incomes who needed the extra economic cushion of their expensive purchases being protected.[491]

The Design of the Arçelik TV: seeking a style to signify the forefront of global technology

For their quintessential Turkish TV, Arçelik engineers sought to combine the most advanced technology with a cutting edge look. The company sent Ahmet Saraçoğlu, a young production engineer, to Germany who spent many months doing field study at the Nordmende factory that produced some of the most innovative TVs in Europe in the 1970s.[492] Saraçoğlu documented the factory's processes and took this information back to Istanbul to use it as the basis for producing Arçelik TVs. The control panel of the Arçelik TV was recognized as a vital visceral link between the product, the company image and the user. The control panel is also a portal to technological sophistication and mastery. Earlier models that were sold in the Turkish market such as Phillips, Radiola, and National featured circular dials for channel selectors and exposed knobs for audio and video controls, the type that had persisted in TV design for a long time. Germany's Nordmende that was innovating TV technology was also transforming the classic look of TVs.[493] Nordmende, that was Arçelik's source of technology also served as the design source that the company tapped to distinguish its model as the more progressive and modern.

The company acquired the components of the TVs interface panel from world markets where they were available as universal parts. The panel was composed of visually congruent, meticulously designed elements neatly packed within a horizontal rectangle.[494] (figure 4.21). The channel selectors were a stack of large keys with matt silver finish and slightly caving surfaces. These keys concealed the clumsy looking channel search dials while providing a stately look that the other brands lacked. Audio and video adjustments were made by horizontal sliders located inside a silver rectangular plate directly above the channel selectors.

The two groups of controls formed a compact whole that was framed with a silver rectangle that contrasted the dark wood of the front panel. This modular/rectangular design allowed the TV to serve as a module/unit that fit in the larger visual branding structure of Arçelik products. It also serendipitously resembled the interface of another Koç product, the Murat 124, which featured a rectangular dashboard that matched the boxy construction of the car. These world products projected a technical sophistication beyond the means of the nation's planned economy. The Renault 12's dashboard featured modern piano style keys, in fact more keys than necessary for the Turkish context. Some of the keys, like the AC, were left blank since the Turkish version did not support that function (figure 4.22). Similarly, of the six impressive looking channel selectors that the Arçelik TV's control panel featured, only one was needed for the Turkish context, since TV was broadcast from a single channel belonging to the Turkish state in the 1970s.

Informational mobility: new media transforms the flux of Turkish daily life

In Murat's newspaper ad titled "Sinerama," the screen was nested within the image of the car (see figure 4.2). The newspaper image, fixed in space, promised the experience of mobility for those who purchased a Murat. The car's windshield was the window that brought the Turkish landscape into motion for its riders. A few years later, the cars were nested within the TV as they were being advertised. Unlike the still image of the newspaper that required one's mental animation, TV ads could directly evoke the sense of motion that the cars provided to their riders. The Anadol ad depicted a car driving on a road that cut across a forest, a sequence that was parallel cut with the image of a white horse running through the woods. In the 1970s, both the TV and the car promised forms of propulsive freedom that were complete, utopian,

and absolute. Yet, these products operated in an economy of scarcities. The promise of freedom was channeled by roads (which caused traffic jams and acute parking problems) and the single channel broadcast (which caused power shortages and cuts in TV broadcast hours due to excessive power demand from a poor grid).

The dial of the old tube radio—the one that many families possessed in the 1950s—had promised a wide world to listeners. On its front panel, the long wave dial listed the world's great cities like Paris, London, Tokyo, and Moscow. The names remained as anchors that helped listeners imagine faraway places, while they tuned to the only broadcast available to them by the two state channels. In 1969 the daily TV broadcast began at 6:30 PM with a static test strip, a symbol of technology. Its programming was tightly regimented like the country's economy, yet the TV managed to deliver a dynamic vision of the world, that the radio, the newspaper and picture magazines had induced in the readers' minds. In its early days, TV dazzled its viewers with its spectacle, magnetized them on an individual basis, and began governing the movement of daily life.[495] Street activity slowed in the early evening hours when the TV broadcast began. Turkey's apartment dwelling families migrated to the units of families who owned TVs.[496] As families acquired their own TVs, the device demanded, located, and held the family's attention. Some argued that TV magnetized the family just like the brazier did during the cold winter nights.[497] It forced families to reorganize the furniture to provide maximum visibility to the TV.

Curiously, TVs were never shown the way in which they took part in the lives of Turkish families by the print advertisements that otherwise showed durables in their everyday-context.

This might be attributed to the perception of TV as an ephemeral thing,

a screen, so to speak, that displayed pictures. This conception was quite different from the way Turkish families understood TV. They treated it as furniture from day one. TVs were precious objects for a good reason; they were expensive. Besides, during most of the day Turkish TVs acted more as furniture that complemented living rooms than disembodied screens that streamed images. During its first two decades, TV broadcasting was limited to 4-5 hours that occurred from the early to late evening. As furniture, TVs had to complement the new Turkish living rooms as gracefully as they could. Soon, TVs replaced display cabinets as centerpiece furniture in these living rooms. Five decades of transformation had brought the layout of the Turkish home to a radically different position than the one it held in the 1930s, when most homes used separate rooms to entertain guests of opposite sexes. By the 1970s, the sofa, the home's central living space, had been transformed into an L-shaped space that functioned as a living and dining room for entertaining other nuclear families (figure 4.23). TV challenged familial rituals of the Turkish home including dining, which was known for its solemnity. When the TV was left on during dinner, it distracted family members by its picture, and added a soundtrack to the dining experience.

By the late 1970s, the typical Turkish middle-class apartment unit had taken shape as a "real-estate box" located in a multi-story building, which itself was packed as another box within the dense urban grid. The space of the apartment was organized into compartmentalized, functional, separated rooms — bathroom, kitchen, living room, bedroom — as contrasted with the traditional Turkish home with a common living space that opened to smaller multi-functioning spaces. Each of the separated rooms of the apartment was demarcated and

occupied by a durable — water heater, stove top cooker, refrigerator, or TV, except the bedroom which remained the last locale for the traditional home ideal of peace and quiet. The TV was the last box that was nested within a chain of boxes that came to define modern Turkish everyday existence. This process of physical and virtual compaction and congestion was the defining element of Turkish urbanization in the 1970s — that was brought about by the elimination of common urban spaces for the benefit of the individual apartment unit. The Turkish urban landscape was so congested that, as one critic put it, the TV the remained as the only truly open window of the home with a clear view of the outside.[498]

Despite the fact that it was still an economy of scarcities, there was now an ecosystem of small and large; simpler and more complex consumer manufactures in Turkey by the mid-1970s. The Turkish landscape was infested with promotional messages of this ecosystem of products. There was also a co-habitation of simpler, cheaper manufactures and more substantial durables in marketing and sales. Larger products were used to sell volumes of cheaper ones. Newspapers were flooded with advertisements for smaller products, such as a soft drink, that promised a refrigerator or a TV for its consumers who would enter a raffle. The cars were nested within the TV screens as they were advertised and they had also crowded the streets, while TV antennas had populated the red-tiled Turkish rooftops. The cars created multifarious industries around them and also kept thousands of repair shops busy. The TV and other electronic devices, on the other hand, put the plastic injection molder and the wooden furniture maker to work who manufactured the plastic and wooden parts of the TV cabinets. The mobility in the virtual and physical landscape of Turkey suggested a sense of self-sufficiency that encompassed its production and consumption. But, mobility did not bring

total self-satisfaction. Turkish appetites were only partially satisfied with these domestically assembled goods. They were not perfect substitutes for the items encountered on the pages of department store catalogues from Western Europe. In a shadow market, coveting these imported products continued. Roundabout ways were invented to acquire foreign versions of Turkey's import-substituted goods.

1977 was the peak year of production and consumption of cars in Turkey (a volume that the industry only met again in the mid-1980s). 1977 was also the peak year of publishing, political activism, and a big push towards modernity on all fronts. A Turkish middle class was rising that enjoyed the technical sophistication that these goods brought into their lives. This middle class was also troubled by the national cost of this consumption, signaled by an overburdened, failing power grid that caused shortages as well as growing national debt (figure 4.24).

As the newspaper was changing from an outlet for news to an outlet of sales messages, the urban space also changed from a landscape adorned by architecture to one covered by product signage. Its static character shifted as well. In the home, modern appliances were increasing the flexibility of home life and modernity within flats with their more open and efficient plans. Even in rural areas the promise, at least, of economic and social mobility had come to be symbolized by the appliances provided by Arçelik as emblems of a forward-moving Turkey. Outside, too, the streets were remade as vectors for auto traffic rather than as social and economic sites. The Murat ad campaign with its focus on the panorama of vision from the

cockpit interior exemplified a new dynamic in which everyday Turkish families were granted mobility and increasing engagement with the dynamics of modernity.

But this was by no means a seamless transition. Tensions between promise and product, desire and actuality grew over the decade between 1960 and the late 70s. The social consensus that Turks lived their lives by was slowly breaking apart partly due to the same socio-economic and informational mobility. Peace and quiet, two qualities that once defined family life were abandoned for a struggle to achieve modern material comfort. Economic mobility had brought mass consumer goods into the nation's markets as well new groups into the cities as mass labor. Planned economy was slow to meet the expectations of all social groups who now had a much better sense of how the others lived thanks to the new media devices.

4.7 Conclusion: Vehbi Koç; independent and national design practice; and the communitarian ethos of Turkish consumerism

The 1960s had begun with hopes of planned development, managing the country's trade balances, and adoption of a certain level of living standard in Turkey. It ended in 1979 as the country once again went virtually bankrupt and its production machine came to a halt.[499] However, there were antennas on the rooftops and passenger cars in traffic that were, to some degree, made in Turkey. The Renault 12 was a Renault 12; the Murat 124 was a Fiat 124 and the Arçelik TV was a Nordmende. In all of this, it is necessary to address the efforts to put in place an independent and national design practice. These efforts were first located in the Revolution of 1961, the car that was the state's attempt to remedy technological and financial dependency with a maverick project that said "experience" on its plates. This nationally designed and engineered prototype sought to be the basis for a truly independent automotive industry. The Revolution was buried by economic forces and self-interested parties. Private businessmen, including Vehbi Koç, did not want the state enterprises to monopolize automobile production, neither did foreign manufacturers who wanted to assemble their cars in Turkey. The buying public, too, was not ready to trust/support a Turkish made car. Efforts were then located in Anadol and its subsequent reincarnations that were buried by the larger forces of the global market. However, was there a residue of success in these projects? Were some national designers born out of those efforts?

Koç Holding had developed prototypes for a completely domestic car called the Contemporary ("*Çagdaş*"), and they implemented aspects of this project in local versions of the Fiats, based on the discontinued 131 model (figure 4.25). However, furthering an outdated

car concept proved to be an evolutionary dead end. When the state's protection of domestic production ended, TOFAŞ was forced to abandon this obsolete line, and unable to propose an original car that could compete in the world markets, it settled for being a Fiat subsidiary.[500] There were other small and more maverick attempts. Koç produced merely 300 units of its beach buggy ("*Böcek*"), and the car became one of the precursors of field vehicles like the SUVs.[501] Designers for Anadol's cutting edge coupe STC could not find the support to compete in world markets (figure 4.26). These were engineering driven concepts that were not given the chance to develop. For a car to truly survive and proliferate, the car maker has to carve a market for its model supported by its national government. This was the reason behind the success of Korean automobiles where the government truly limited the number of models assembled or manufactured in the country, giving the few makers ample room to grow.

However, as was the case of the aircraft engines of the 1930s, one client asked for cutting edge designs and innovative products in Turkey. This client was the military, a national institution that sought technological self-sufficiency as a strategic motive. In working with the military, the designers of the Anadol STC found a protected environment to develop boats. That bit of information brings into question the strategies that governed Turkey's automotive industry in its crucial first decades. It also makes one wonder what might have been the status of Turkish industry by 1979 had those twenty-three railroad engineers been given the opportunity to develop the Revolution in 1961.

Vehbi Koç's ambitious car manufacturing enterprise was supported by the state, within the bounds of a mixed-economy, a model that Vehbi Koç propounded and one that was adopted as a state policy in the 1960s. Murat's production was put into power with another resource: Arçelik. Profits from the sales of millions of Arçelik refrigerators helped finance costly car production. Refrigerators sales were driven by the exploding Turkish population and the emerging consumer culture that drove production in Turkey and ultimately fueled the car industry as well.

But the importance of these events lay beyond the industrial, and into the cultural. Koç's notion of a panoramic view of a modernizing future, exemplified in the Murat ad of 1972, was continued as well in the expanding vision promised by television and the news media. The first stage of Turkish modernity had been inner focused, located in the home and by extension in the development of a national network of nodes of modernity. Modern utilities and infrastructure served as the connectors of the homes. Each innovation, from the hot water heater through the washing machine and the refrigerator had enabled families to become connected with the contemporary world at a material level, bringing them a step closer towards a common future imagined to be socially progressive and materially advanced. Moreover, dissemination of these shared conceptions of a Turkish future simultaneously independent and national, yet modern and global, helped Turkish families to see themselves as active participants in the Turkish national development.

At the end of the first stage, Turkish families were physically packed together closer than before in the urban grid, yet separated into nuclear families demarcated by the walls of their individual apartment units. In the second phase, these nuclear families were virtually reunited through the

cabinets of their TVs. Expansion, propulsion, mobility, and panoramic vision were made possible by the introduction of television and the private automobile. Both of these technological devices promised to bring closer the realization of that shared future. Just as the automobile promised to bring into existence an expanding geography of an efficient, accessible modern Turkey, so also, with the television home and nation, and through nation, the world was brought into view. The streaming images of the television helped link the families of the nation as a critical mass, and brought the world within their view in a way that was more tangible and less ephemeral than the sounds of the radio. Throughout the 1970s, TV acted as a central source of information retrieval, much more powerful than the newspaper, helping middle-class families to grasp themselves as a unified body with common social goals, reinforcing the perception of the middle-class as the driving force behind the nation's development.

In all of this, Vehbi Koç's companies promoted a distinctively Turkish vision of modernity that recognized consumer culture as a communitarian idea rather than a race by individual families to distinguish themselves from their neighbors by shows of material wealth. This vision of consumer culture was shared by the urban middle-class families who still believed in and supported the common goal of developing as a nation. Turkey's growing rural migrants, however, were a group hungry for material well-being whose inner competition for showing wealth expressed in possessions became another kind of driving force behind consumption. The tensions that rose between Turkey's lower- and the middle-income groups, in the definitions of personal vs. national benefit, became a deciding vector for the course of Turkish modernization throughout the 1970s.

Figure 4.1 Türkiye Is Bankasi, advertisement, 1971.

Figure 4.2 Murat 124 advertisement, “Sinerama,”1971.



Figure 4.3 "Domestic brand car is being produced." Cartoon in *Milliyet* daily, 1958. The sign reads "broken."

Figure 4.4 Vehbi Koç poses next to a 1939 model De Luxe Ford convertible that he imported as a Ford dealer, c. 1940.

Figure 4.5 Ford Cortina, Reliant Scimitar and Anadol A-1.

Figure 4.6 The Anadol prototype.

Figure 4.7. Anadol A1 coupe (2-door) from a brochure.

Figure 4.8 Vehicle info plate of an Anadol car, c. 1970s.



Figure 4.9 Eregli iron and steel factory advertisement, 1962.

Figure 4.10 Turkey's national car Revolution compared with a similar sized Opel, 1961. Note the simpler lines and humbler proportions compared to the full-sized American Ford, 1960.

4.11 Anadol advertisement, 1967. “Anadol is a large car! 5 large people can comfortably be seated inside Anadol and travel long distances.”



Figure 4.12. Fiat 124, 1966.

Fiat 124 Murat 124

Otomobil teknolojisinin en modern makine ve tezgâhlarıyla donatılmış TOFAŞ Fabrikasında, Kasım 1970 Torino Otomobil Sergisinde teşhir edilen 1971 model FIAT 124'ün eşi MURAT 124 imal edilmektedir.

TOFAŞ'ın üretim gücü

TOFAŞ, 1971 sonuna kadar 6.000 adet MURAT 124 imal etmeyi programlamış bulunmaktadır.

Üretim, gitgide artan bir tempoyla 1972'nin ikinci yarısında günde 80 otomobile varacak ve 1973'te yıllık imalât hacmi 20.000'e ulaşacaktır. (MURAT 124'teki yerli mühteva ürün, bu süre içinde süratle artarak %67'den %85'e yükselecektir).

Gerçekte, TOFAŞ'ın yıllık 20.000 otomobillik üretim hacmi daha bir başlangıç olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Meselâ, İspanya'da FIAT işbirliği ile kurulan SEAT otomobil fabrikası 1953'te üretime açıldığında 20.000 üniteik bir kapasiteye sahipti. 1970 yılında ise SEAT Fabrikasında 283.678 otomobil imal edilmişti.

TOFAŞ'ın memleket ekonomisindeki yeri

TOFAŞ'ın yurdu Bursa'dır. Tarihî ve turistik zenginliklerinin yanısıra el sanatlarıyla da ünlü bu güzel şehrimiz yepyeni bir ekonomik gücün beşiği olmaktadır. İleri sanayi ülkelerinin belkemiği olan **otomobil imalâtı.**

Murat 124'ün şimdiden çelik saç gövdesini, motor ve kuvvet aktarma grubunun birçok aksamını imal eden TOFAŞ, %85 yerli mühteva ile yılda 20.000 otomobillik kapasiteye eriştiğinde milli ekonomimizin en önemli sanayi merkezlerinden biri olacaktır.

TOFAŞ, çelik, cam, lâstik, akümülatör, plastik, elektrik donatımı, radyatör, boya ve kimyevî maddeler imalâtı gibi yirmiye yakın yan sanayi dalını besleyen bir ana kaynaktır.

Daha ilk imalât yılında bu yan sanayilerre 130 milyon lira tutarında mamul madde sipariş eden TOFAŞ'ın önümüzdeki yıl için öngörülen sipariş tutarı 350 milyon lira civarındadır.

TOFAŞ ve FIAT

Merkezi Torino'da (İtalya) bulunan FIAT, taşıt araçları imalâtı alanında dünyanın en güçlü, en tecrübeli kuruluşlarından biridir.

FIAT'ın, İtalya'da 180.000 işçinin çalıştığı 30 tesisi mevcuttur.

İtalya dışında ise Almanya, Arjantin, Avusturya, Avustralya, Güney Afrika, İspanya, Japonya, Portekiz, Rusya, Şili, Bulgaristan, Yeni Zelanda ve Yugoslavya gibi 5 kıtaya yayılan 30'a yakın ülkede 33 kuruluş ve ortaklığa sahip bulunmaktadır.

FIAT'ın yeryüzünün dört bir yanında 12.000 satış merkezi mevcuttur.
FIAT'ın bütün tecrübe ve teknik yeniliklerini bünyesinde toplayarak dünyada inşa edilen en son fabrika TOFAŞ'tır.

TOFAŞ'ta, güzel Bursa'mızdaki bir sanayinin, Avrupa'sında önem kazanan üretim merkezinin Türkiye'ye müjdesi yükse

Murat 124

İşte TOFAŞ'ın ürünü! Kullanışlı, konforlu, ekonomik, çöllerden kutuplara kadar dünyanın dört bir yanında denenmiş FIAT 124'ün eşi MURAT 124.

FIAT 124, FIAT'ın olağanüstü ilgi gören modelidir.
Diyelim ki, Rusya'da, FIAT'ın kurduğu ve geçen yıl üretime başlayan dev fabrikada 1 yıllık üretim kapasitesi 600.000 otomobil 1 yılını FIAT 124 imal edilmektedir.

TOFAŞ, işte böyle bir otomobili, her iklime, her türlü yola uyabilen dayanıklı, ekonomik, güçlü MURAT 124'ü halkımızın istifadesine sunmaktadır.

Figure 4.13 Tofas factory brochure, 1971.

Figure 4.14 Murat advertisements titled “Sinerama” and “Camli Kösk [The Glass Manor], c. 1970s.

Figure 4.15. Murat 124 advertisement titled, "[Why is Murat Pleasurable?]," c.1970s.

Figure 4.16 Murat advertisement titled, "[Yearning for a Car]," c. 1970s.

Figure 4.17 Renault 12 advertisement, c. 1970s.

Figure 4.18 Anadol pickup and Anadol sedan converted into a pickup.

Figure 4.19 Murat ad titled "Dünya Evi," presents the car as a prime investment for newly weds, c. 1970s.

Figure 4.20 Newspaper advertisement for the Arçelik TV, 1975



Figure 4.21 Control panels of Arçelik and Nordmende TV sets, c. 1970s

Figure 4.22 Renault 12 dashboard

Figure 4.23
The gradual disappearance of the sofa room in apartment plans of 1955, 1958, 1960, and 1970.

a. Sofa as a living hall, 1955



b. sofa replaced by an entrance hall, 1958



c. entrance hall transforms into a corridor, 1960

d. a corridor, 1973

Figure 4.24 Newspaper advertisement for a voltage regulator, circa 1970s.

Figure 4.25. [The Contemporary] circa 1970s (left column),
and local versions of Fiats (Dogan, Kartal, and Sahin)
based on the discontinued 131 model (right column).

Figure 4.26 Anadol STC 16, sports coupe, c.1970s.

CHAPTER 5

INDICATORS OF MOBILITY: MEDIA AND INFORMATION

5.1 The landscape of consumption and information mobility

The tensions between Turkey's socio-economic groups was a deciding factor for the country's destiny of modernization in the 1970s. These tensions were caused by rapid social and economic mobility. The quiet 'social transactions' of a traditional culture were being displaced by the dynamic 'material transactions' of a modern consumer culture. The social tensions were primarily based on conflicting economic-interests that were manifested by ideological clashes both at the level of discourse and on the physical space of the country.

After the modernization of the home, introduction of the car, and TV— that transformed the ways in which Turkish households lived their lives by—a final type of mobility was the entire material/virtual sphere of goods and information flows that came into existence throughout the 1960s and the 70s. By the mid-1970s, decade and a half of uninterrupted growth under the planned development/ISI policy had created a rich consumer landscape — expressed by product images and sales messages that came to dominate the nation's media and information sphere. [502] This was perhaps not a truly engrossing consumer culture that encompassed all social groups which thoroughly permeated the core of people's existence. Nevertheless, this modest consumer culture, that had occurred in a country like Turkey, was coveted by other

developing nations, socialist countries, and applauded by the wealthy Western nations. Vehbi Koç's business enterprises contributed to Turkey's relative material richness as a developing nation as the leading producer of core household durables that were also essential products that provided households mobility. Koç was a special kind of businessman who operated his free-market enterprises under a set of market-protection rules. His businesses simultaneously satisfied the requirement to support a national, collective economic interest; as well as fostering a culture of competition by employing the tools of free enterprise in creating desire.

The Demirdöküm and Aygaz companies took the lead in introducing modern amenities to the homes and the Arçelik durables company mechanized those interiors with instruments of comfort.[503] By the mid-1970s, nearly 50 percent of urban Turkish homes featured refrigerators and 25 percent had washing machines. [504] TV had entered almost 30 percent of the homes within the first decade of its introduction, while areas where more than half the population lived received TV broadcasts.[505] TOFAŞ introduced nearly 30,000 cars to the market each year, the number that equaled a third of the total number of cars that existed in the country before the inception of the company.[506] There was also a flood of smaller manufactured goods produced by industries that were set up to support the production of the core durables. Products of packaging, bottling, plastic molding, and electrical goods industries filled the gaps in the consumer landscape and the affordability ladder. Koç Holding did this by introducing its Simtel brand a relatively unimportant side enterprise that nevertheless filled low-priced electrical goods niche[507] (figure 5.1).

As a result, the Turkish economic space was thoroughly mobilized. It wasn't simply large companies, but many smaller ones that operated, thus enabled inclusion of many more people into the workforce and consumer base. Smaller workshops also served to produce parts for larger products. Products and population were intertwined in a buzzing consumer economy. There was a product for every budget whose ads invited more and more people to join the Turkish consumer culture. Media's domination by consumer messages was an indicator of economic activity, while the rise of political activism and propaganda was a sign of emerging social turbulence and political instability.

The combined output of Turkish industry created a seamless material realm that filled the environment with small to medium and large industrial consumer goods in the mid-1970s. The consumer landscape was most visible in the cities, but it was expanding to small towns and villages as fast as the infrastructure (water, electricity, roads, and TV transmission) did. The material life that was promised in the images of newspaper raffles of the 1950s and the 60s became physical realities for large numbers of urban households. What's more, the four consumer products discussed in the previous chapters had become inextricably intertwined with the Turkish public. Larger numbers of Turks consumed the products and took part in their production and distribution[508]. This does not mean that Turkey had become transformed from an agricultural economy to a seamlessly industrial one. Farm income still supported most industrial activity, (accounting for 75 percent of export revenues), but the balance had tipped towards an increasingly consumer-good driven economy. [509] In 1950 only 25 percent of the population lived in the cities, while in 1978 that number had risen to more than 40 percent.[510] The country's industrial workforce also doubled from 7 to 14 percent in the same

period.[511] City dwellers shared the urban space with rural migrants who arrived to reap the benefits of Turkey's bustling consumer economy. [512] Yet, Turkey was still partly a welfare state that made large government spending to accommodate its mobile rural population. Most urban families that constituted the country's middle class were employed by the state while the number of private businesses and self-employed professionals were still low within the mix of Turkish middle class.

5.2 Media as an indicator of mobility

As an extension of this material development, communication media in the form of magazines, newspapers, billboards, radio, and TV constructed a densely knit virtual edifice that supported the physical reality of a buzzing consumer economy.

The media-based process that brought about Turkey's modern consumer landscape had begun in the 1930s. Independent publishers of the 1930s had propagated the progressive ideals of the Turkish Republic serving as tutelary channels. The Turkish media of the 1930s had supported the creation of a modern democratic consumer realm. Private publications of that era did not simply transpose modern goods onto the traditional and patriarchal social fabric. This approach had been used by the 19th century Ottoman modernizers for whom technology could be admitted but traditional social roles should remain untransformed.[513] Instead, the new publishers promoted the idea that modern consumer goods were naturally attached to modern lifestyles.[514] Public information as well as private sales messages used images of the modern urban nuclear family as a bridge to Turkeys rural families. [515]

In this area, Sedat Simavi, the publisher behind the popular lifestyle magazine *7 Gün* (Seven Days), took the lead in the communication of consumer-driven messages. Immediately after World War II, as the country began experimenting with a consumer-driven economy, the transformation into sales-message-driven communication accelerated. The most significant manifestation of this transformation was the popular daily *Hürriyet* that Sedat Simavi strategically introduced during the 1948 Olympics.[516] *Hürriyet* made an instant impression on public consciousness through its coverage of the Olympics in magazine-style pictorials that it featured on its front page and which were further accentuated by large swaths of spot colors. In a way, *Hürriyet*'s explosive imagery and color was a reflection of the sensual longings and consumer expectations of the Turkish public that were being set free right after World War II. *Hürriyet* appealed to the senses, magnetized its audience long before the arrival of TV, and transformed the content and delivery of information messages across Turkish media (figure 5.2).

Hürriyet came to occupy a significant place for the Koç Holding. Before Vehbi Koç's partnership with him, Eli Burla had given financial support to *Hürriyet*'s owner during the inception of the newspaper. After Burla and Koç became partners, *Hürriyet* became a venue not only for advertising and promoting Koç and Burla products, but also for publicizing both businesses on its pages.[517]

By the mid-1970s, all but a few newspapers were transformed by the example of *Hürriyet*, almost all supporting the country's drive towards consumption. As one academic put it, the Turkish press was standing up against history.[518] Turkey's media was governed by

progressive intellectuals who propounded this material drive that they thought could transform the country into a modern consumer society.[519] Indeed, in 1976, the country ranked twenty-seventh in the world for its advertising investments, which was much higher in than its rank for individual income that was somewhere near the fiftieth.[520]

Newspapers were being transformed from information outlets into sales outlets following *Hürriyet*'s example. They devoted more of their pages to exposés of new products and promotions, and mixed their news-messages with sales-messages, while bolstering both with the help of new printing technologies. In the mid-1970s, almost all newspapers switched from rotary press to four-color offset printing.[521] This renewal of technology had not happened even in more developed countries. In the 1970s, Turkish newspapers resembled tabloids by their mixture of color photography with explosive typography.[522] While their layouts became less serious and dignified, newspapers came to feature more specialized sections such as domestic and international news, economy, finance, weather reports, and sports. [523] Newspapers also began devoting full-pages to coverage of TV broadcasts.

The media's drive for consumer mobility also brought sophistication to newspaper advertising. In the 1930s, ads employed decorative styles if they had any visual strategy at all. In the 1950s, the ads for imported durables used sensationalism delivered with whiz-bang typography and pulp fiction style illustrations (while most ads didn't go beyond naively typeset classifieds.) The lack of creative strategies as well as beauty in advertising were matters of concern.[524] In the mid-1970s ads were not only taking up more space, they were also employing sophisticated creative strategies and offering aesthetic experiences (figure 5.3)

at times self-consciously interacting with and nesting their messages within a sea of smaller sales messages (figure 5.4).

There was a cohabitation/mutually supportive relationship between products in Turkey's consumer goods ecosystem. Three of the four consumer products discussed in the previous chapters — refrigerators, cars, and TVs — became driving forces behind the sales of smaller goods. Newspapers featured ads where larger durables were used to support the sales of smaller goods produced by the packaging, bottling, plastic molding, and electrical goods industries. These small companies sought to increase their sales by offering giveaways. The range and volume of the giveaways, too, reflected the abundance of manufactured goods that the country's industry could offer by the second half of the 1970s (figure 5.5). One example was the domestic soft drink company Meysu ("fru.-juice") that promised a plethora of goods through a giveaway that used the under-side of bottle caps. Consumers were invited to participate in a playful activity that required them to collect letters hidden under the bottle caps to spell out the names of the prizes. More valuable prizes required one to collect more letters which meant consuming more bottles of Meysu. With many of these promotional prizes, Koç Holding products held a prominent place. Meysu alone gave away forty Arçelik refrigerators. This was followed by forty German-branded TVs, fifty bicycles, one hundred radios, one thousand lighters, five thousand playing balls, and five thousand t-shirts (figure 5.6).

5.3 Physical space blends with the virtual as an indicator of mobility

The visual landscape of the cities had once been characterized by sparseness, austerity,

stillness, and quiet. As economic mobility geared up, gradually the landscape grew more crowded, dynamic and louder. The visual experience of streets had been defined by architectural facades and perhaps a limited number of street-level shop signs that could be seen in the traditional trade districts, and an even more limited number of public street signs. In the 1970s, street and directional signs were overwhelmed by an exploding number of sales messages that claimed the urban landscape. The architectural facades of prominent business and retail streets were covered with signage, billboards, posters, and banners. Prominent boulevards as well as many smaller streets of Turkey's large cities began resembling Galata, the traditional trade district of the Ottoman capital (figure 5.7). In Ankara, even the idyllic parliamentary district of the 1930s was transformed into a bustling business district, as the facades of the modern apartment buildings that lined its boulevard were covered by sales messages.

In the 1970s, the informational mobility brought by the print media was bolstered by the additional capabilities that TV offered. After mounting public pressure, TV transmission was introduced by the government as popular entertainment which could also expand the country's ISI industrialization into the electronics sector. TV's additional uses were quickly recognized. The TV helped sales messages to reach areas beyond newspaper circulation. In 1976, in a country of forty million people, newspapers appealed to two to three million people while TV to twelve to thirteen.[525] TV was, to an extent, effective in integrating the rural migrants into the cities.[526] It created the awareness of an emerging collectivity across all income groups. A consumer society emerged where common images were distributed from a central source.

Overall, the pervasive consumer images that overwhelmed the environment and stimulated the senses made industrial products a part of the social fabric more than ever. As social and urban mobility had increased between the 1946-53 period, conservative critics such as Peyami Safa condemned the loss of peace and tranquility, and the stability of physical space and the social transactions in cities.[527] The magnitude of this mobility made Turkish critics sound like turn-of-the-century German critics who lamented "the thousand nerve shattering impressions of the metropolis," and longed for the stable relations of the "pre-capitalist relations between producer, merchant, consumer."[528] In the 1970s, the Turkish physical landscape blended with the virtual one of sales-messages, in a loud pandemonium. A truly popular culture emerged that revolved around shared sounds and images that sprang from democratized products and increasingly more sophisticated patterns of consumption.[529] In the meantime, there were doubts whether the liveliness of this consumer realm could be sustained by Turkey's economic system.

5.4 Economic exhaustion and the rise of social and political conflict: the late 1970s

The 1973 world energy crisis had a much more negative impact on developing countries than developed countries.[530] However, in Turkey, its effects were offset until around 1975-76 by the foreign currency revenues that the Turkish temporary workers in Europe brought into the country. The government also acquired additional foreign currency by selling short-term, high interest government bonds through international finance markets [531] — to keep Turkey's industrial system going.[532] In late 1975, as revenues from Turkish workers slowed to a halt and as Turkey's borrowing abilities narrowed, anxieties about the continuation of Turkey's

consumer-based industrial system intensified. Compounding this problem, at this particular moment, all groups who were intertwined in this system[533] thought that this was their moment to claim more shares from the system: Government-employees complained about price hikes and the decline of their real wages; industrialists wanted more foreign currency that would allow them to expand their import-based production; Turkey's rising industrial worker class (though a mere six-hundred thousand in the late-1970s),[534] increasingly organized in unions, wanted higher shares from industrial revenues; Marginal laborers, the more silent group who dwelled in the city squatter neighborhoods, demanded more stable employment, and more city services.[535] All groups wanted an improvement of their living standards, and many feared losing what they already possessed.[536]

In the late 1970s, the parties involved in Turkey's consumer-driven economy, either uninformed about Turkey's industrial shortcomings or in ignorance of it, made irrational demands on the system. Availability of modern products and services, as well as the need for labor drew many more rural families into the cities. The system came to depend on rural migrants as 'temporary' workers and 'permanent' consumers but did not accommodate them in humane working or housing conditions. Divorced from their land and hometown support, rural migrants dwelled in self-made homes that they built on the public/treasury land that they illegally occupied. To legitimate their actions, in many cases, they adopted leftist ideologies that condemned Turkey's emerging capitalist mode of production. But land occupation frequently pitted them against the police.

A striking image that involved marginal urban dwellers demonstrated social tensions growing

within the system. In April 1976, a group of squatter dwellers clashed with the police who came to force an eviction. Several resisters were shot by the police. The body of one of the victims of the shooting was then carried by a ferry.

The scene was not a silent and somber one. First, because the funeral ferry was dressed up with loud consumer messages, decks were almost entirely covered by signage of some of Turkey's new quintessential consumer goods such as house paints and motor oils. Second, because the mourners had used the funeral procession as a visual stage for political propaganda by covering the decks with leftist banners that blended with the product signs underneath (figure 5.8).

The clash of consumer messages with the political ones revealed paradoxes. The advertising images were promising the Turkish public an unrealistic image: that anyone could attain modern material standards here and now. The presence of rural migrants was graphically celebrated in an Arçelik ad from 1971 which portrayed a picture of happiness, yet in reality, Turkey's urbanization process was creating a grim socio-economic picture where fewer and fewer families dwelled in regular housing supported by regular jobs.[537] While the system was promising a materially-abundant life to many more through sales messages, it was unable to provide or denied equal shares to one who participated in it. On the other side of the coin was another paradox: leftist banners condemning Turkey's consumer-capitalist system also sought a legitimate place in it. It was a physical space, land, the basis of a financial capital that could help rural migrants anchor themselves in the city, the locus of Turkey's consumer

capitalism.[538]

Turkey's physical and virtual space had gradually grown louder and more crowded during a period of increased mobility throughout the 1960s and the 70s that finally culminated in conflicts in which sales-messages clashed with political propaganda on the urban stage. Unfulfilled material promises and income inequalities were causing the Turkish national consensus to break apart in the mid-1970s, the end of a rapid industrialization process that was launched by the economic development plans from the early 1960s. These two decades of growth and change were part of a larger and uneven process of development that had begun in the 1920s with the founding of the Turkish republic that had instigated economic and social mobility in a traditionally immobile and regimented society.



Figure 5.1 Advertisements for simpler electrical goods, and plastic products by smaller manufacturers, c. 1977.

Figure 5.2. Newspapers as disseminators of public information messages: Newsrooms of popular dailies Milliyet and Cumhuriyet in the 1940 (top row).
Newspaper as outlet for disseminating dynamic images: Front pages of Hürriyet that cover the Olympic Games if 1948 (bottom left).
News stand in Istanbul, c. 1950s (bottom right).

Figure 5.3. Newspaper advertisements for clothing companies with creative design strategies, c. 1970s. Top: "Anatomy of a Beymen." Bottom: "Reduced by Half."

Figure 5.4. “Ka-çir-ma-yin.” (“Do-not-miss”). Newspaper advertisement, c. 1978.

Figure 5.5. "Unheard of Thing: Change upon Chance." Double page spread announcing a raffle by the Hürriyet newspaper, c. 1972.

Figure 5.6. Meysu fruit juice ad featuring various goods that were promised as giveaways, c. 1970s.



Figure 5.7. A boulevard and a side street in Istanbul, c. 1970s.

Figure 5.8 Leftist groups carry the body of an activist shot by the police on a city ferry. The mourners dressed the decks of the ferry by political banners, c. 1977.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: VEHBİ KOÇ, A PRIVATE AGENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY

6.1 Vehbi Koç as an active participant of broader national development plans

Throughout the period covered by this dissertation, Vehbi Koç represented the birth of a national capitalist, who was a supporter of national development both as the member of Turkey's cultural elite and as an entrepreneur who sought practical means to realize the material progress envisioned by the founders of the Turkish Republic. Koç operated, for the most part, under a protectionist economy that set constraints to private entrepreneurship and the consumer culture. Throughout this period, Koç's struggle was to push back those constraints to allow more room for the consumer culture to breathe, and to hasten its establishment as a pervasive phenomenon. His motivation was of an individual who wanted to participate in the contemporary global material culture, as well as to acquire power in its production hierarchy as an industrialist. He was able to accomplish his goals largely by adjusting his business strategies according to the changing national political economy, which during the time, was more powerful than him.

At the beginning of his career, Vehbi Koç's economic context was at a very primitive material

and organizational state, and at a very low socio-economic mobility. Koç was born into the Ottoman Empire that had been struggling since the mid-19th century to manage the first ripples of an economic mobility that was brought about by the opening of its markets to the West, and to cure social instability that was caused by this mobility. For centuries, Ottoman system had been an absolutist, religious, military monarchy — a political system that valued immobility of its society and sought to ensure the constancy of cultural values.[539] The Ottoman economic system could not afford the social mobility of the farmers who constituted the majority of its population, and who provided a substantial share of its revenues. The social class in which Vehbi Koç was born was the Muslim majority whose members had to choose between being a farmer or a small merchant. However, in the 1910s, in his hometown Ankara, Vehbi Koç witnessed the simultaneous development of a merchant class who had acquired alternative cultural values and living patterns, and who were much more open in their reception of new ideas. These merchants were empowered by their trade connections with port cities that served as the connecting points of the Ottoman system and the Western world since the late 19th century. The system allowed social mobility in these port cities, especially in Istanbul, the most prominent one. During the late 19th century, the Ottoman state was channeling most of its borrowings to sustain the Western consumption patterns of a limited number of people living in its imperial centers.[540]

Founded in 1923, the Turkish Republic aspired to bring these standards to the citizens of a nation state within its larger program that aimed to foster economic and social mobility, while avoiding social convulsions. During this formative period of nation building from 1923 to 1947, Vehbi Koç functioned as a servant to the national policies, as a catalyst of material

development. Vehbi Koç the entrepreneur was an agent of social mobility, first of his own. He broke away from the social role assigned to him when he began his career in the 1910s in the sleepy, mid-sized Ottoman town of Ankara.[541] Several years later, the Turkish Republic was established in his hometown, with ambitions that paralleled his. These goals included breaking away from economic dependence and disseminating modern consumption habits to the citizens in order to foster a technologically advanced and socially progressive nation state.[542] In the 1920s and the 30s, Koç became an agent, literally and metaphorically, who brought consumption habits from the confines of the old imperial capital to the new republican one in Ankara, and beyond.

There was another shift in the country's political economy after WW II. During the 1950s, known as the 'Marshall Plan years,' the new government redefined Turkey's national goal as achieving economic growth, as fast as possible. This brought increased mobility to the city and introduced social mobility to the quiet countryside. Government policies awakened desires in the urban as well as the rural population. For a short period, Turkey's new government liberated trade, allowing imported consumer goods to enter freely. Cash was also channeled into the farmland. This liberal trade policy gave observers the impression that its method could eventually modernize material life in the country for good.

The transformation of a Turkish village became a course-book example that was to prove the validity of the free-market method of the 1950s.[543] But, it was not to be. The country could not produce the capital resources to pay for these imported goods. Yet, one thing was certain. In the 1950s, more people had encountered modern consumer goods than ever before. Their

appetites were stimulated and their social goals were being redefined related to attaining modern comfort. Turkish households aspired to live in an apartment unit, radiator-heated and equipped with a refrigerator and other instruments of comfort. For many small farmers this had also become a goal that motivated them to migrate into the cities to seek shelter and work of some sort. However, in the 1950s, both long-time city dwellers and newcomers saw that a liberal economy dependent on the provision of imported-goods had failed to make this material goal a reality.[544] Government's promise to transform Turkey into a "little America" had failed.

Vehbi Koç was well aware of the crisis of Turkey during the Marshall Plan period, which served a transitory time for him to transform his entrepreneurial role. Vehbi Koç's desire for gaining independence from uncontrollable variables of imported supplies led him to seek ways to manufacture goods himself. However, Koç did not possess specialized knowledge of any given trade.[545] Nevertheless, he had a knack for finding the best specialists, from salesmen to technicians. He managed his businesses with a risk-averse, fiscal conservatism even as he was pushed forward by his specialist partners to invest in technology.

The success of Koç's companies required the special skills of direct contact with the end-seller and the end-buyer. Thus, when Koç wanted to go from batch production to mass industrial distribution, he was helped by the modern culture of sales and services that were established previously by the Koç Trading Company during the 1930s, 40s and the 50s.

Planned economic development and Vehbi Koç

However, at the outset of the 1960s, it would take a whole new political economy to make durables that were now considered necessities available for the masses. This was when Vehbi Koç's industrial enterprises were bolstered by a bold state initiative in the 1960s, 'the planned economic development' years. It was these systems of support that greased the wheels of Koç's production machinery that stirred consumer activity across Turkey in the road to full household mobilization. Vehbi Koç became the agent of the provision of durable goods in Turkey. His method was to mass invest, mass produce, and mass distribute them.

In the 1960s, providing for public happiness and creating a self-reliant economy were state policies. Five year economic plans introduced in the 1960s were designed to create a self-sufficient economy through the creation of a national industry capable of producing investment goods by the end of the full 15-year cycle.

Unlike the fiscally conservative, heavy-industrial development plans of the 1930s, the new plans took into account the awakened social desires. In the 1960s, popular demand had forced even the Soviet bloc to switch to a development "that reflected to the people."[546] The countries within the bloc, such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, were seen to be making a gradual transition from a public investment- into a consumer-goods driven economy. This process was followed with close interest by the Turkish press.[547]

The Turkish development plans of the 1960s also envisioned a bottom-up production that sought to make consumption a driving force for the industry.[548] The plans were meant to create

a smooth transition into a consumer economy, one that increased social mobility while avoiding clashes and social upheavals.[549]

The planners managed limited resources to make both goals happen: to improve material conditions while fostering a self-reliant industry. However, they could not allow the production of every consumer good at once. With each consecutive plan, more former-luxuries were recognized as modern necessities, and quotas were allotted for their production.

Emboldened by state incentives, Turkish domestic industry expanded rapidly. Workshops quickly converted into assembly plants to make modern consumer durables available for the benefit of households. For consumers, it seemed like imports were back in the market again, since most import-substituted items were sold under recognizable foreign brand names. There was one difference: these goods were almost all specifically made for Turkish consumption, within Turkish standards. They were created for distribution in Turkey and perhaps in other technologically inferior markets. For instance, AEG durables made in Turkey would never be sold in Germany, but would perhaps be sold in the Middle East.

6.2 Significance of Vehbi Koç's multiple roles in the making of the modern Turkish Household: Koç as a catalyst for national development

Vehbi Koç served multiple roles within the broader national development of the Turkish nation state, that culminated in his decisive role as the nation's mass producer of consumer goods during the 'planned economic development' of the 1960s and the 70s. His primary motivation, from the beginning of his career in the late 1910s, was to induce happiness by improving one's material living conditions. As a cultural elite, his example set new material standards that Turks aspired to live their lives by. As a national capitalist, Koç became a catalyst for national development plans. He was a systems builder and a technology adapter who helped national resources to reach and to enrich the private sphere. All of this work equipped the Turkish families with technologies that transformed their daily lives. Koç enterprises and products were significant in fostering the modern Turkish household with new social/cultural patterns.

Vehbi Koç's motivation came from his own experience. It was the feeling of being left out of the contemporary material experience that drove him to seek ways to acquire the means to make it happen. However, Koç did not seek these material means simply for overcoming the drudgery of daily life. He did it to enrich the everyday experience; to derive joy and delight from the utility of products and the aesthetic experience they provided. He did not want to enjoy this experience on his own isolated personal sphere. For Koç, the joy of materially abundant life arose when it was a shared experience in the public sphere. His work was to transform the public sphere. Thus, Koç developed a strong desire for the emergence of an active society where social groups were connected in a lively marketplace. Social and

economic mobility promised to break the cyclical rhythm that characterized traditional life. Koç envisioned a new rhythm of life where individual spirits thrived. He was also ready to pay the relative cost of relinquishing from peace and quiet that came with traditional life. However, he did not want individual competition to trump the common goals of the nation. This was, still a nation that struggled to develop and it was necessary, from Koç's perspective, to maintain a sense of communitarian spirit within economic development.

The complexity of Vehbi Koç as an entrepreneur derives from his personal vision of the constraints of material wealth as well as the specific economic and cultural constraints that influenced Turkish national development. Koç's vision mirrored the vision of the founders of the Turkish Republic who sought to achieve a kind of modernity that bridged the forward-pushing material ingenuity of the West and the contemplative reticence of the East. Koç was not a Howard Hughes who recognized no limits in exercising power for personal enhancement. He was neither an Agnelli who used power for personal indulgence. Uninhibited personal pleasure was not the end for Koç. He sought power for the fulfillment of mental/material completion; to be achieved by 'an organizational principle' that instilled order and stability; and thus, infused a certain civilized standard of living into everyday Turkish life. The smallest beneficiary of this process of material improvement was not the single individual but the household. Koç's own family served as the primary example. When Koç acquired wealth, he did not rush to build a mansion on an Ankara hill, but moved into an apartment on the new boulevard. Koç home served as a stage where engineered products first entered as imported 'prototypes', and then disseminated to families of lower income groups as the were multiplied by mass-production.

Vehbi Koç built industries around design. He created and fostered brands that fortified national consensus. Koç products were imbued with an institutional identity that reassured the Turkish people that, although they were now being reconvened/reconstituted as individuals to compete in the modern marketplace, they continued to share the same economic and social ideals as citizens. The identities of Koç products emerged as an amalgam of several modes of design — of architecture, graphic, and product design. Through their institutional identities Koç sent messages that advocated consumption as a necessary condition of being civilized. These identities worked to prepare/enable consumer reception of 'categories of consumption' that did not exist in Turkey. They also reinforced the idea that Koç Industries was a trustworthy national institution that served the people.

Through Koç's brands, came forth a design ethos for a planned economy that was not an expression of distinction but of a commonality, yet a 'desirable' one. The visual manifestations of the brands in architecture, graphic, and product design fulfilled the Turkish desire to experience the contemporary moment. The products themselves — a wall-hung water heater, a hand-cranked washing machine, a 10.5 feet refrigerator, and an economy car — were in fact common elements of the post WW II industrial production. The German Chappe brand radiator and Junkers water heater, the British AEI/Hotpoint washing machine, the Israeli/American Philco refrigerator, and the Italian Fiat automobiles all shared the same design and engineering ethos. They were 'necessary and sufficient' products defined by technical efficiency, production ease, and frugal looks. Yet, Koç managed to situate them as 'desirable' domestic alternatives to luxury imports.

Creating desirable domestic brands

Vehbi Koç's industrial enterprises were unique in that they fully embraced the national industrial concept well before the Turkish public came to support it. Vehbi Koç and his associates conceived, developed, and forged Turkish brands that were desirable over foreign imports. The large-scale distribution of Koç Holding products was an advantage, but time proved that the strength of the brands themselves sustained interest and created loyalty. Demirdöküm, Aygaz, Arçelik, and Tofas all devised products from disparate sources, but both the products and the producers were understood as inextricably linked to the nation's development program. These brands were able to unify the consumers in the belief that they were contributing to national development by choosing them. Koç's brands coexisted with products claiming the opposite, that they were arrivals from technically superior lands (figure 6.1). Arçelik refrigerators competed with AEG refrigerators and scores of German branded TVs, and Murat/Fiat competed against Renault. The presence of so many brands dominated the physical space and their promotional images dominated the virtual space — creating the appearance of a lively market competition.

6.3 Koç Industries transformed the home, mobilized households, and relocated national resources

Physical and informational mobility

After World War II, with the gradual awakening of the society, daily life's cyclical pattern, once defined around peace and quiet, broke apart. Happiness was redefined as the acquisition of modern comfort, and consumption patterns rapidly changed across all income groups. Throughout three decades, the constancy of the social order dissolved, giving way to a more mobile society. By the mid-1970s producers and consumers were inextricably united in a consumer economy that was signaled by the existence of pervasive brand images in the physical environment.

Simultaneously, several key consumer goods were instigating changes in the physical form of the homes and the living patterns inside them. Traditional Turkish homes had been characterized by their built-in furniture and fixed layouts meant to preserve the rigid social patterns of behavior. With the introduction of key consumer goods, social and physical rigidity began dissolving. This shift helped transform traditional households into modern consumer ones.

This process began with the transformation of home from shelter into commodity. Home was no longer simply a shelter that descended from father to son that was preserved throughout generations in a relatively unchanging residential pattern, in which a slow rhythm of daily life persisted. Throughout Turkey's decades-long process of economic mobility, home became a commodity; mass-produced, sold, or rented out where an employees family lived. Residential

patterns began to change dynamically. Once based on a single lot, home was now packed together with the other units of an apartment building. Apartment homes were stacked side-by-side and on top of each other and they shared the same lot. The pattern of this rapid urban mobility was jagged; its imprint on the land was anarchic. Planning was an after-measure.

In the meantime, Koç's technologically-equipped homes served as proto-types, that were exclusive/distinctive at their point of introduction, but promised to be generalized and disseminated to a broader range of families after mass-production. Koç family's gradual adoption of modern residential patterns served as the ideal process of material mobility for Turkish families. The Koç family had moved from the sleepy vineyard house to a new apartment on the modern boulevard in Ankara soon after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. After WW II, as the scale and pace of material life was redefined as 'bigger' and 'faster' by the American example, the family once again set an example by moving into a new apartment in Istanbul, the center of commerce.

This process of adopting technologies into the everyday life became a reality for the masses in the 1950s, with the introduction of the hot water heater and the subsequent transformation of the 'sofa room' into the living room (figure 4.23). It continued in the 1960s with Arçelik goods that brought many formerly communal practices into the rubric of the family home. The story began in the home as Demirdöküm brand hot water radiators dispersed space-heating into individual rooms. Then Demirdöküm brand water heaters and cookers, powered by Aygaz brand LPG gas tanks brought specialization to the home layout by bolstering the kitchen and the bathroom.

Later, an invisible force entered and energized the home. An early ad from the 1930s for Burla Brothers, the leading distributor of consumer durables, had announced that it would be a waste not to benefit from the comforts that electric-powered goods provided (figure 6.2).[550] Thirty-five years later, Burla helped distribute Arçelik products that equipped the home with instruments of comfort. Finally, in the 1970s, TOFAS automobiles and Arçelik TVs promised geographical and informational mobility to Turkish families.

In the period between 1969 and 1979, the dominant forms of Turkish consumer identity had become the TV and the private car. The TV and the car were products that celebrated and reinforced the nuclear family over the kinship family (figure 6.3). These two objects marked a shift from designs that helped modernize the home towards a design that linked the home to the larger national sphere. The TV, as well as the car, germinated a collective urban consciousness that found expression in the vibrant cultural activities and heated political activism of the 1970s.

In the cusp between urban and rural were the squatter homes of disenfranchised rural-migrants. For these dislocated individuals, the drive for social and economic mobility was the most intense. Inside these homes the poorest fixtures existed and some traditional consumption patterns persisted, yet these residents did not shy away from investing in durables.[551] Far from it; purchasing durables became a primary social goal. These squatter dwellers adopted consumption patterns that they observed in middle income groups.[552] Unlike metropolitan dwellers who valued goods based on quality, squatter dwellers desired quantities

of goods.[553] Building janitors, a small but critical group located between squatter homes and apartment buildings, established their status by the amount and variety of items that they owned. Unopened boxes of small electrical items might clutter a storage room, for instance.[554] These lower middle-class families accumulated goods, even when they did not have immediate use for them, as material embodiments of their relative success in the city that they showed off to their neighbors.

Among the durables popularized in the 1960s and the 70s, refrigerators were both the most pervasive, and the most common indicators of social mobility in Turkey. Labor-releasing instruments such as washing machines and vacuum cleaners were slower to be popularized. The pervasiveness of electric-powered durables also indicated the general mobility of the country proving that its infrastructure was growing significantly.

The physical mobility of the country was measured in two ways: by the influx of rural-migrants into the cities and by the increased transport within the crowding cities. Turkey's three private automobiles, the Anadol, the Murat 124, and the Renault 12, crowded the streets, congested the roads and blocked the sidewalks—since roads and parking spaces weren't built as fast as the cars were produced (figure 6.4). As a result, the geographical mobility and expulsive freedom promised by the cars was hardly realized.[555] However, their production brought mobility into the economic space. Many small to medium scale manufacturers were mobilized around Turkey's automobile production.[556] Moreover, existence of a domestic automotive industry made car ownership now a relatively more attainable goal, and brought with it hopes of social mobility. The general availability of domestic durables gave the hope of upward mobility to lower income groups,[557] contributing to the social peace between otherwise sharply divided

income groups in cities.[558]

The TV accelerated the integration of urban newcomers. Its integrative potential was realized by the Turkish political economists who invested in TV transmission as part of the nation's development plan.[559] The TV allowed the migrants to share common images with the longtime urban dwellers, allowing them to imagine rising the steps of the socio-economic ladder.

From the 1930s to the late 1970s Vehbi Koç had served the transformation of the traditional culture into a consumer culture with much higher levels of mobility. At the end of the process had emerged a critical mass, to ensure the triumph of the consumer-driven economy. This consumer society was the result of a hybrid situation, where new consumption patterns first emerged in the secular elites—represented both by bureaucrats and businessmen like Vehbi Koç—which were then disseminated to middle and lower income groups through a chain of aspirations. The masses adopted new consumption patterns and in response demanded even more improvements, that were once again introduced at the top of the chain. Koç's industries proved to be the primary manufacturer that provided the right instruments to fulfill the demands for material improvement. This hybrid process caused the evolution of some customs and broke traditional patterns of behavior. Yet, this development process created social and economic results that were somehow different than the projected ideal.

6.4 The triumph of the private sphere, and the dissolution/disruption of the public: National resources concentrated inside individual homes

With his each consecutive enterprise, all Koç did was to promote the supremacy of the private sphere, while operating under a political economy of a welfare state that did not openly admit the creation of a full-blown consumer society. Within such a political economy, the nation's capitalists could not admit a profit-seeking motive, even if there was one. Koç rose amongst the capitalists of the 1960s and the 70s, as one whose actions and messages convinced Turkish public of his public servant function.

The development plans that were put in place in the early 1960s managed to create rapid mobility but they could not avoid the emergence of social instability and physical disorder. As a result, common national resources were sacrificed at the expense of private ownership. Paradoxically, while his brands were trying to pose a vision of consensus, the kind of socio-economic mobility that Koç was partially responsible for, was indirectly causing the common good, the national consensus to erode. Despite Koç's leadership of the rising capitalists, private good began to trump the common good. Governments continued to develop infrastructure: they brought water, electricity, and paved roads to more areas. Yet, the development patterns did not conform to rational city plans, but to individual decisions that sprung from individual economic interests. The economy was governed to accommodate private interests, and the ISI policy was corrupted to serve pressure groups. Many more manufacturers than it was feasible to maintain productivity were allowed to enter key areas of production. The nation developed according to anarchic social, urban, and economic patterns. Thus, as the country's production machinery gradually geared up in the late 1960s, it caused

small economic and social tremors. Later, in the 1970s, waves of outbursts rocked the economy and the society. An unstable economy became the norm. The consequences of rapid social and economic mobility could be traced in the disorder that it brought to the country's physical space.

Apartment units were visible manifestations of disorder; of consumption of public good for private interest. These "real estate boxes," consumed the urban space by dividing it up horizontally and vertically in ever smaller chunks.[560] As comfort concentrated inside the home and the apartment unit became a vacuum that sucked public resources within its boundaries; Turkey's streets, with their irregularly patterns, mud-ridden roads, poor sidewalks, and decreasing public spaces, became utterly uncomfortable.

Urban poor emerged as a problematic social by-product of misgoverned ISI policy. This was a third population that was emerging in the cusp between rural and urban.[561] Farmers were thrust into the cities seeking work since the 1950s, but they became a more visible and pervasive group during the 1960s and the 70s, while no plans made, no social programs were invested in to manage their integration into the planned economy. Farmers-turned-urban-dwellers determined the course of their own integration using community-support and self-help. These rural-migrants wanted their socio-economic mobility to be expressed by the acquisition of material goods.[562] Lacking stable wages, they found a different method to attain capital and thus to anchor themselves in the cities. Though it was former farmland that they occupied in the cities, it was not possible to continue farming.[563] 'The urban farmer' planted a house on treasury land as if a sapling. He let it grow and rented out the extra rooms that were produced.[564] The result was a new marginal-yet-aspirational class, with its own geographical site, economic and cultural identity. These squatter dwellers were first treated as

marginal labor by the system, and then recognized as consumers beginning in the mid-1960s.[565] Yet, their demand for integration through a stable income source, a legal dwelling, and a minimum living standard were not met by the system that considered them as 'temporary' visitors of the cities. Thus they turned into an increasingly disgruntled group whose members became outsiders. This new brand of urban poor, whose demographic source was the vast farmland of Turkey, challenged the modernist ideals and threatened to define the socio-cultural future of the country. While Arçelik's advertising sought to emotionally accommodate this marginal group by picturing squatter homes as their smokestacks were blowing hearts, living conditions within poor urban homes exposed them to be otherwise; a flawed by-product of Turkey's industrial development (figure 6.5). Interiors of poor homes were defined by an hybrid/anarchic pattern of consumption; reflection of a jerry-rigged, corrupted, populist governance of ISI policy that ignored the social investment/planning aspect of development. Interiors of these homes were not governed by a rational system where parts fit together, but were pieced together in an ad-hoc manner. Altan Erbulak's cartoon from the 1970s (figure 6.6) is emblematic of squatter/urban poor homes. The cartoon portrays the anarchic development, material inequalities, nuisances and frustration that brew inside them. It also points to the fact that, the basic products of ISI have failed their ideal mission.[566] The cartoon serves as visual anthropology, suggesting an illegal squatter home not receiving city electricity. Inside of the room is a TV powered by a car battery (a by-product of the auto-industry), and coffee brewed on a traditional brazier; as people watch TV while sitting on the floor. In contrast to the poverty that exists in the room and the persistence of traditional living patterns inside it the dwellers express their aspirations for high fashion. The choice of TV is significant in hastening dissatisfaction. As opposed to the homogenizing messages of the radio, TV, a provider of information mobility, visualized, exposed disparities between lives lived and aspired to. It served to

hasten the growth of dissatisfaction, dissent, and political rights-seeking for the economically marginalized.

Squatter dwellers were also a by-product that promised political profits. Throughout the 1970s, political groups sought to gain power from this growing demographic mass. Social democratic and Marxist politicians, as well as the religious far-right reached out this population, promising to remedy their blight by eradicating Turkish capitalism. Koç was now leading a group of national capitalists who vied for the leadership of the country's economic and political future, who felt the need to defend the industrial-capitalist system against its political challengers. Turkish capitalists, under the banner of TUSIAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği [The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen]), ran full-page newspaper ads that propounded that the solution to eradicate socio-economic anarchy was not "to share poverty" but to share "wealth," and the source of that wealth was the entrepreneurial spirit that could only thrive in a liberal democracy (figure 6.7).

Were Koç, and other capitalists, truly, the source of Turkey's economic disorders and inequalities? Koç was partially responsible for the disorders. The material wealth that he caused to be created in the cities had become something to aspire to. While Koç companies cared for their laborers well, their success had inspired a group of industrialists who believed that national resourses should be used for private investments rather than for public programs. Koç, during this period, remained to be a promoter of 'mixed-economy,' upholding his belief in the role of the welfare state as a stabilizing agent.

6.5 Conclusion

Koç Industries: a stable corporation within a vulnerable system

In general, Turkish reality was messier than the relatively unambiguous image of stability and modernization projected by Koç Holding's branding. ISI was not governed according to the principles of the plans, but surrendered to pressures from interest groups — who acquired production quotas to turn quick profits and caused burdens on the nation's treasury. Yet, Koç's monolithic product images contrasted with the economic corruption, social instability and physical disorder in the country. Among the disparate brands that competed and crowded the Turkish market, there were few others that tried to institutionalize themselves as national brands. Transtürk Holding was one such corporation that launched its Evsan household durables brand in a big way in the early 1970s, that neither found a place in the market nor support from the state.[567] The majority of the brands portrayed a hodge-podge of manufacturers who seemed to be trying their hand in manufacturing— among whom Koç Holding's brands were also the only ones to project an image of cohesion. They evoked the institutional unity and authority of the state enterprises that came before them, like İş Bankası, Etibank, Sümerbank, TCDD, and MKE that were established by the state in the 1930s, but projected a less formal and more independent spirit. They were posed as brands that were both meant for national development and market competition. As they were introduced in the late 1950s, Koç products were positioned as legitimate substitutes for imports. In the 1960s, they were repositioned as the natural components of the nation's development program. No matter how improvised they actually were, each new product seemed to be thoughtfully calculated, presented as part of a larger, long-term program, and the result of a predetermined

goal to provide modern comfort. Koç brands were positioned as the quintessential brands to outfit the modern home.

Aygaz and Demirdöküm products branded the homes as modern.[568] TOFAŞ's humble-but-reliable Murat 124 became the car that Turkish families longed for, while Arçelik-branded durables embraced the widest reach of society by uniting its consumers, sellers, and personnel in a circle of trust within a larger economy of instability.[569] Arçelik's business model summoned all parties to have an economic stake in the company. State enterprises supplied its steel; small shop owners distributed its products, low-income families bought them on store credit; and employees enjoyed benefits granted by the company. Arçelik resembled US companies after WW II, such as GE, who sought public support by making its consumers aware that company success equaled national economic success. [570]

Arçelik was Koç Holding's most cherished company that contributed to the image of stability the most, one that projected a consumer realm where products were essential, nationally-produced, and serving to satisfy the civilized needs. Arçelik offered a modernity that was to make life easier for the many, not luxurious for a few. Products were stabilizing factors of everyday life and a destabilizing society. Its products originated from disparate technical and design sources, but the company unified them with a single brand image, one that reflected Vehbi Koç's vision of a sufficiently equipped but unadorned everyday life. In the mid-1970s, the company's product styling was dominated by the austere lines of its refrigerator, whose minimum visual unit was a simple rectangle. An overall institutional identity derived from this austere form. A modular grid of rectangles was devised where, otherwise disparate, parts

fitted together. A new product, such as the TV fit in the general grid, as an Arçelik module, doing its part in a more complete technological product system. Its bold and simple brand name and logo served to punctuate Arçelik as a modern technological institution. Moreover, the way Arçelik's emblem and logotype were positioned in advertising, suggested a generosity that embraced the modern Turkish family (figure 6.8).

The disparity between consumer desire and industrial provision

In the constant drive by Turkey's social groups to attain a better life lay a cultural disparity that the ISI policy, with its best intentions, had aimed to offset.[571] Turks demanded the products of technology but they were reluctant to pay the costs that would allow the establishment of a sound industrial future. It was the same disparity that had brought on the collapse of the 1950s liberal economic system. Allowances that were made for investing into and adding value to production were seen as opportunities for quick material acquisition.

An increasing number of small investors were lured by the high-profit margins offered by ISI production and were allowed to enter the market. While manufacturers like Koç established holding companies capable of exporting some of their products, many smaller producers simply crowded the market, lowered general profits, and consumed foreign currency reserves. As a result, between 1970 and 1975, Turkey's negative trade balance grew ten-fold.[572]

Around 1976, Turkey's financial shortcomings could no longer be hidden. Intellectuals and industrialists alike called on the government to abandon its populist policies and curb the haphazardly developing consumer goods industry in favor of a technology-driven, machine-producing one.[573] However, no government wanted to be responsible for policy changes that

could be unpopular. The third five-year plan, which aimed to steer the country into becoming a technology-producer, had been unpopular with the public, which cried for more provisions.[574]

In the end, all of the expenses accruing from the consumer goods industry were paid by the state borrowing on behalf of the public. Willingly or not, the Turkish people paid for their short-term consumption with future national revenues. This was viewed as more than just a temporary problem. Most intellectuals were united in this view, expressed by *Milliyet* columnist Kazgan in 1976: "For the sake of future generations we need to leave behind a different economic structure than the one that averts previous foreign debts by acquiring new ones."[575]

National industry falls apart, yet Koç brands survive

The consumption-driven national industry that continued its ascent until the mid-1970s did not bring its intended conclusion — that is, economic stability and full-industrial development — but instead came to an abrupt halt. A national industry with a satisfied workforce and a sound socio-economic basis was never achieved. ISI did not break the cycle of dependence.[576] Instead, the system broke down, just as Turkey's short-lived consumerism had broken down in the 1950s. Turkey could no longer pay or postpone its debt payments. In 1980, the system was adjusted with a top-down dictate.[577] IMF's economic stabilization/market liberalization measures were adopted by Turkey's government. Market liberalization policies declared many of the nation's industries to be incompetent in the free markets, and forced them to dismantle. Many manufacturers of consumer goods in the 1960-80 period went out of

business, closing their once-proud national factories.

Over the next decade, the country abandoned industrialization as a national policy. Instead, it was told by its Western creditors to produce what was deemed profitable in the global market using cheap labor. Accordingly, Turkey's industrialists abandoned much of their aspiration for becoming relatively autonomous technology producers and relinquished their authority over production. They rearranged their relationship with international capital and reaffirmed their role as local but junior partners, using this less potent but also less risky position as a means to resume capital accumulation.[578] With market liberalization, Turkey's remaining firms were taken over by their technology-producing parent companies.

The fate of Vehbi Koç's companies depended on the way he had managed to position them in the post World War II global industrial capitalist hierarchy. He had begun by manufacturing products designed by American companies and their Western European partners that were meant to be disseminated to less developed nations — presented as technology solutions for frugal families across the world during the post-WW II reconstruction years. DEW's Chappe brand radiators; Junkers water heaters; GE/AEI's mini washing machine; Ford/Philco's small 10.5 foot refrigerator; Fiat's economy car 124 were all specifically designed to extend Western industry into developing countries. Koç's struggle was to move deeper into the center of technical knowhow. Koç industries created their products first by employing the Complete Knock Down (CKD) method, using a complete kit shipped from abroad to assemble a product. This was followed by a Semi Knockdown (SKD) process where products were constructed partly from domestically produced components.[579] Later, they were

constructed entirely from domestic parts. It was those products that Koç Industries had invested in to design and engineer its own that survived beyond the planned economic period of the 1960s and the 70s.

Among the brands of Koç Industries, Demirdöküm, content with supplying the domestic market, followed consecutive heating technologies by continuing to adopt licensed products from a variety of foreign companies. Although Demirdöküm used an increasing number of domestic parts, it did not develop its own technology. It was exhausted and sold to the technology-producing company Vaillant, a long-time rival of Junkers in the field of water heaters.[580] Meanwhile, TOFAS exploited the government's extension of market protectionism by producing knock-offs of obsolete Fiat models in the 1980s and later settled on becoming a subsidiary of Fiat.[581]

Arçelik's fate, however, was different. While its main competitor Profilo-AEG was absorbed by Bosch and Telefunken, Arçelik survived. Decade after decade, Arçelik improved its position in the global industrial hierarchy. Arçelik had germinated from Vehbi Koç and his partner Eli Burla's import businesses, when Koç used to sell GE and Ford products; and Burla used to represent GM imports in the 1930s and the 1940s. As the next step, the two businessmen had joined forces to manufacture what they used to import. The Arçelik company, founded in 1955, elevated these businessmen from their fourth-hand position as dealers to third-hand producers of Philco/Ford, GE/AEI durables. Later, as production volume increased Arçelik had risen to a secondary (licensed) producer of GE goods. In the mid-1970s, the company made technology transfers and became a semi-primary producer.

Koç Industries: the 1980s and beyond

After its economic collapse in the late 1970s, Turkey may have surrendered some of its financial independence, but it was not a simple consumer culture anymore. Koç came to function within a system where global competitors were forcing their way into the market more than ever. Throughout the 1980s, Turkey's Western creditors, who now called the shots for this bankrupt nation's economic fate, pressed the government to end its market protection, if it wanted to continue receiving loans to keep its economic machinery running. Contrarily, Koç Industries wanted to postpone radical change to its line of operations posed by real global competition. Vehbi Koç influenced the government to continue its protection of ISI industrialists. In this decade, Koç products continued to display a similar design ethos where products were presented as unadorned containers.[582] In the meantime, Vehbi Koç was preparing the stage for the next phase of Koç Industries. He worked towards making the company transcend his own legacy, and to forge a corporation that would not dissolve after the passing of its founder. In 1984, 83 year old Vehbi Koç handed over the management to the next generation of Koç's, appointing his son Rahmi Koç as the new chair. The 1980s marked the dawn of the global market economy that began to challenge economic independence of developing nations. In this period, Koç industries' goal shifted from championing 'national development,' to acquiring power in the global hierarchy.

1990s, brought further transformation for Koç Industries. Turkey moved into a larger stage. Koç industries could not avoid global competition anymore. It was forced to break out of the box in its business strategy, design and technology. Vehbi Koç's daughter Suna Kıraç, who

became a vice president of Koç Holding, began to assume an influential role in guiding the fate of the industries. Kıraç took up the challenge of ensuring the survival of Koç's flagship company Arçelik in a much more financially integrated global economy. At the time when, several Koç industries dissolved into the global industrial sphere as joint-ventures, Suna Kıraç realized Arçelik's productive-potential and skillfully preserved Arçelik in the face of a buy-out. [583] Right before Turkey's customs union with EU came into effect in 1996, Arçelik managers faced a tough decision. They would either give in to signing a joint-venture agreement with its current licensor Bosch-Siemens or face stiff competition from it, as the German company would directly enter the Turkish market. Arçelik took an independent path by declining to sign a joint venture deal with Bosch and by ending its licensing agreement with the company in 1995.[584] Suna Kıraç worked to update and rectify Arçelik throughout the 1990s, finally elevating the company to the status of a primary producer with its own R&D, patents, and products (figure 6.9).

In the 1990s, Arçelik broke out of the box in design as well. At a visual/symbolic level, the company abandoned 'linear' simplicity and adopted the 'non-linear' look of an integrated global capitalism — where products, ideas, finances travelled across the globe according to the rules of liberalism. The company truly capitalized on its own application of the soft-edged design style that had emerged in automotive design in the 1980s. [585] Arçelik products not only adopted the soft lines, but they carried it in a specific manner, explicitly branded as 'the orbital look' that could be recognized to be a quality exclusive to them. All the looks from the Arçelik refrigerator, to the TOFAŞ cars, were 'smoothed' and 'softened' to embrace a new business/design ethos of 'flexibility' and 'ease' in global commerce. This included a

makeover of Arçelik's logo, a crisp, linear modernist mark that had come to symbolize an institutional modernity that was both national and remotely global. The new identity was to serve the 'easing" tactics of global capitalism as it was trans-mutating its corporate look. After designer Ivan Chermayeff re-envisioned its emblem in 2001, Arçelik was no longer appearing to be an imposing a male, tutelary 'industrial' power structure, since the new emblem implied the softness of a female serving to prepare Arçelik for the consumer-centered, 'post-industrial' new millennium (figure 6.10).[586] Arçelik's new soft identity was used to re-position Arçelik as a global brand that competed with other global brands within the Turkish market as well as on the world stage.

Another reason for Arçelik's survival and growth as a national industry beyond the planned economic period was fact that the ISI policy was more strictly applied to big industrialists than smaller ones. Arçelik was forced to become self-sufficient, acquiring a unique ability to produce component parts.[587] But its staying power had deeper roots. Household durables, led by refrigerators, thrived as the numbers of Turkish households grew in the period between 1960 and 1980. Turkey's rapidly rising population, while a misfortune that dwindled individual income and hampered the country's development in Vehbi Koç's opinion, paradoxically helped Arçelik to thrive.[588] Driven by refrigerator sales, Arçelik's large revenues allowed Koç Holding to invest in technology.

There was also another reason for Arçelik's success. While product development and design were limited, image design burgeoned; verbal and visual discourse, and surface applications were part of the Arçelik project from the beginning. Architectural, advertising, and branding

design contributed and added value to Arçelik's products from day one**.** The identity that culminated from several modes of design forged a paragon of Turkish modernity. The brand was embraced as a modern idiom evocative of the "modern completeness" and "socio-economic stability" that Turkish households imagined themselves to achieve at the end of Turkey's modernization process.

A majority of foreign brand-name producers disappeared in the 1970s, but Arçelik had established a unique brand identity and a culture of design and engineering that carried it into the 1980s. Arçelik was the only manufacturer able to offer original products. This was essential when it found itself exposed to international competition in the late 1980s. Its sister brand Beko, as Arçelik's were marketed abroad, became the only internationally recognized Turkish brand. The company, with its ability to add value to its products, is utterly unique in Turkey. The Arçelik of old is a virtual relic of Turkey's dreams of erecting a national industry in the 1960s and the 70s, while the contemporary brand seeks existence in the global stage.[589]

6.6 Koç Industries: Today and the future

Today, the majority of Turkey's industries are bound to the loci of power of industrial capitalism — in Europe and the United States — and lacking the ability to take an independent course of action : functioning as remote muscles for the global sources of know-how. The centers of industrial capitalism keep increasing organizational complexity and regimentation within their geographic borders, while they keep producing disorder in their peripheral devices — such as the nation state of Turkey.

Throughout Turkey's ISI production, the volatility of the country's political, economic, and physical space contrasted with the monolithic images of Koç Holding's household brands, and the image of stability they projected (figure 6.11). Even among the Koç brands, Arçelik was exceptional, a thriving company with a stable image since 1965. Among Koç brands, Arçelik's is the one whose status is established as a locus of technical know-how and strong organization. The company represents an institutional continuity that can be traced back to the Koç Zade Trading Company of 1926. Even at this early date, it was governed by a rational organizational principle and the fiscal conservatism typical of Vehbi Koç. Koç business strategies were coupled with a degree of risk-taking driven by Koç's technical partners which helped improve Arçelik's position in the global industrial capitalist hierarchy (see figure 6.9) by producing know-how.[590] Arçelik also benefited from Koç's trading companies that provided a healthy feedback loop, that helped it to maintain an unprecedented level of sensitivity to its consumers.[591] These strategies brought Arçelik, once merely a general dealer of GE products, into the unprecedented position of possibly acquiring GE's appliance unit. Arçelik was among the serious bidders for that unit in March 2010. Arçelik also acquired the

German TV electronics manufacturer Grundig in 2004, among others. No other Turkish company and few other companies originating in the developing world can claim the success necessary to acquire first world assets.

Vehbi Koç had instigated a consumer culture, almost singly, through a set of brands, from the 1950s to 1980. It was Koç's sensitivity to a changing Turkish self-identity that could be embedded in products, both responsive to, and forcing responses from the public, that defined his design and technology motive. Koç Industries caused to bring forth the universal apartment-dwelling middle-class family in Turkey as a consequence. In the new millennium, Koç Industries has dissipated into the background noise of modern everyday life, now, dominated by a global system of products, although Arçelik still maintains a voice in Turkey's loud and complex consumer realm. Koç Corporation succeeded its mission and faded among a wealth of global brands that engrossed everyday life. But its power did not fade away as the company is moving towards acquiring abstract forms of corporate power. Koç Industries no longer make publicly pronounced claims of creating a national industry. Its new management is walking in the footsteps of its founder, changing with the changing times. Now, seeking a new place within the hierarchy of global capitalism.

Koç Holding is moving into more abstract realms of corporate power, not expressed by tangible consumer products. In the past, the company's goal had been to seek refinement in product development. Now, it is seeking more refined forms of acquiring power. Finance and energy are found to be instruments less cumbersome and less risky for this purpose. As industrial capitalism financializes, Koç joins hands with global finance. Koç financial services

was established in 2001, and began a partnership with UniCredit, a pan-European banking organization, with over 40 million customers and operations in 22 countries, the following year. [592]

Koç Holding was able to use the liberal-economic window of opportunity to acquire national assets, as they were being dissolved by the Turkish government. The İPRAŞ petroleum refinery, once a state enterprise, the product of Turkey's planned industrial development that provided LPG gas to Aygaz, is now a Koç property. Koç Holding, having understood the power of knowhow in its industrial experience, also seeks to develop high technology. For this purpose a research university that bears the family name was established in 1993, that houses a number of laboratories devoted to subjects ranging from molecular biology to nano-particle chemistry.[593]

The dissolution of Turkey's national industrial tools into the loci of global economy simultaneously benefits powerful organizations such as Koç Holding to acquire even more power, regardless of the fact that the national situation worsens in general. While the Turkish national industry is still prone to economic shocks that keep undermining its organizational continuity, complexity, and stability, Koç Industry's rise to the center of global industrial capitalism enables it to become a stable organism within the vulnerable system of Turkish national industry – as design recedes to the background to give rise to the abstract powers of finance and know how.



Figure 6.1 Newspaper ads for AEG and Prestcold durables, c. 1960s.

AEG ad: "Allgemeine ElektricitätsGesellschaft, is A German institution that has reached the peak of the world electrical industry. …: Alman teknolojisi, c 1966.
Prestcold ad: ""if you'll be hang, get hung by an English rope," c. 1969.
The ad uses a popular phrase that expressed Turkish loyalty to English textiles, in a way to direct that historic loyalty towards English products for Prescold refrigerators.

Figure 6.2. Magazine advertisements by Burla Biraderler that advertises imported electrical goods by Frigidaire, AEG, and Telefunken, c. 1932.

Figure 6.3 Murat 124 advertisements, c. 1970s.
The ads portray the nuclear family at four stages, bonded by the idea of the car: A couple is courting (top left), and another couple gets married in the presence of the car (top right); a family yearns for the car (bottom left); while another family has lovingly bonded by the car (bottom right).



Figure 6.4 Automobiles are seen "triple" and "quadruple" parked on an Ankara street, c. 1970s. Source: Ilhan Tekeli, *Gecekondulu, Dolmuslu, Isportali Sehir* (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1976).

Figure 6.5 Arçelik advertisement, 1974.

Figure 6.6 Altan Erbulak, cartoon , c.1970s.
reprinted in Önder Senyapili, *Kentlilesen Köylüler [urbanized villagers]* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1978): 99.

Figure 6.7 TÜSIAD advertisement, 1979.

Top row: “Hopes that migrate to the city,” and “The enemy of prosperity and freedom: inflation.”
Bottom row: “Sharing powerty or providing wealth?,” and “The Nation Waits.”

Figure 6.8 Arçelik advertisements, 1974.
Left: "The Largest Family." Right: "One Million Families Deliberately Chose It."

1930s through late 1950s	Koç trading company represents Ford, GE products
1960-4	Arçelik produces Philco/Ford refrigerators through Ford subsidiary Amcor
1965-9	Arçelik produces refrigerators with technical assistance from GE
1969-80	Arçelik produces refrigerators with the technical partnership of GE, exporting a portion of the products
1990-now	Arçelik produces own refrigerators with original R&D, produces patents, becomes Turkey's foremost international intellectual property holder

Figure 6.9 Arçelik's ascent from its roots as an import dealer, into a primary producer of refrigerators.

Figure 6.10 Arçelik emblem, logotype and refrigerator design c. 1976 (left) and 2001 (right).

❸ Batı Trakya faciası

Yunanistan'ın Batı Trakya Türklerine yaptığı insanlık dışı baskılar geçtiğimiz hafta yine günün konusu oldu. Bu kez il-

Cumhurbaşkanı Fahri Korutürk ve eşinin çeşitli sanat dallarındaki sanatçılar için Çankaya Köşkü'nde verdiği kabul resmi, Köşke yepyeni ve renkli bir hava getirirken kamu oyunda da geniş ilgi topladı.

Yazarıyla çizeriyle, mimarıyla aktörüyle, ses ve sahne sanatçısıyla Türkiye'nin sanat ve düşünce hayatına yıllar yılı katkıda bulunmuş insanların devletin başı tarafından böylesine onurlandırılmaları yaygın bir sevinç yarattı. İki bin ikiyüz kişinin katıldığı davetin yarattığı izlenimi yılların tiyatro sanatçısı Vasfi Rıza Zobu, "Bir zamanlar tiyatrocuların tanıklıkları mahkemede kabul edilmezdi, şimdi cumhurbaşkanı tarafından kabul ediliyoruz" şeklinde dile getirdi.

Diliriz ki, "Bir zamanlar" gelsin, artık bu tür davetler ve değerlendirmeler sürü edilmeyecek kadar olağan sayılmaya başlansın, bugüne kadar niçin yapılmadı denmesin.

CHP'nin rolü olduğu ve bazı CHP milletvekillerinin de bu işe karıştığı söyleniyor. DİSK içindeki çekişmeyi kaybedip, yalnızca Maden-İş'deki genel başkanlık görevine dönen Kemal Türkler'in başına bu kez yeni bir dert daha açılmış oluyor.

Haklarının, bütünleşmiş bir sendikal hareket içinde korunmasını bekleyen işçiler ise, bu çekişmeyi ve bölünmeyi ibretle izliyor olmalılar. Ve "Akrabanın akrabaya yaptığını" diye başlayan atasözünü hatırlayarak.

ARÇELİK

TEKRAR PİYASADA

Bekliyordunuz...
şimdi alın, güle güle kullanın!

yeni ajans

Figure 6.11 "Arçelik is back on the market." Newspaper advertising, 1978. Despite the nation's low credit rating, Koç Holding was able to acquire credit from the global banking system to resume production.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 1

[1] Such as Jeffrey Meikle's discussion of American Industrial design between 1925-1939 in *20th Century Limited* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979).

[2] The world-systems approach interprets the expansion and deepening of the broad capitalist system as it emerged in Europe over the past 500 years.

[3] "The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality," *From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change, ed*. Roberts, Timmons (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) 180-190.

[4] Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002).

[5] Kemal Dervis and Sherman Robinson, "The structure of income inequality in Turkey: 1950-1973," *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*, eds. Ergun Özbudun and Aydin Ünsal (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1980): 83-122

[6] Poll results were reported in a series of articles by Zeynep Oral titled "Türk Toplumunun Siyasi Görünümü [the political landscape of Turkish society]" in the *Milliyet* daily c. 1976.

[7] Siegfried Gideion, *Mechanization Takes Command* (New York: Oxford University Press) 1969, 1948. Also see Roger-Henri Guerrand, "Comfort," *Industrial Design: Reflection of a Century,* ed. Jocelyn de Noblet (Paris : Flammarion/APCI, c1993) 75.

[8] Guerrand 75-76. Also see John Gloag, *Victorian comfort: a social history of design from 1830-1900* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1973).

[9] See Catharine Esther Beecher, *A Treatise on Domestic Economy* (New-York: Harper & Brothers, 82 Cliff Street, 1845) 6-7. Writing in the 1850s, Beecher understood the woman's role in the family as parenting and housekeeping. The housewife was a manager of demanding tasks that related to the home, that were summarized by the term domestic economy. Beecher proposed educational methods to prepare the housewife for performing the two tasks of parenting and housekeeping efficiently.

[10] Marion Talbot, *The Modern Household* (Boston: Whitcomb & Barrows, 1912).

[11] Talbot, *The Modern Household,* 3-4.

[12] Talbot, *The Modern Household,* 4.

[13] Talbot, *The Modern Household,* 5-11. Talbot notes that the newfound freedom from household tasks also brings responsibility to the new housewife. "The substitute of the older making — of yarn, cloth, bread, and beer — is spending money for ready-made clothing, household goods, and food almost ready to be served." However, the new housewife holds power over those who produce household products, both laborers and managers of businesses. Thus, Talbot advises housewives to spend the family money in an efficient way. She also asserts that the household has lost its social value as a productive unit and become a center of consumption.

[14] James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, *Theories of Political Economy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1.

[15] Caporaso, *Theories of Political Economy,* 1.

[16] Caporaso, *Theories of Political Economy,* 6.

[17] Allan Henry MacNeill, "New directions in the political economy of consumption" (January 1, 1997). Electronic Doctoral Dissertations for UMass Amherst. Paper AAI9737557.

http://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI9737557

[18] Caporaso, *Theories of Political Economy,* 160. For the defenders of market capitalism power does not exist. All power is surrendered to the impersonal play of the market, which replaces power with contract.

[19] Caporaso, *Theories of Political Economy,* 174. "The economy is political" approach to political economy challenges the notion of free agency within the market. The critics of political economy point to the notion of conditioned power that renders persons unable to exercise their own interests. The critics suggest that the conditioning of free-agencies by direct education, cultural conditioning, and subordination makes people act out of line with their own interests.

[20] Notably Hegelian dialectics, Feuerbach's critic of Hegel's theology, and Rousseau's socialism.

[21] Max Horkheimer and Theodor W Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). Adorno and Horkheimer formulated the notion of "culture industry" to designate a side production of the capitalist economy. The notion of culture industry suggests that the capitalist system uses mass media to produce a standardized, mediocre "popular culture" to provide society with a false sense of contentment;
Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste,* trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984). Based on his empirical research on French society in the 1960s, Bourdieu suggests that individuals are included in and excluded from various domains of capitalist cultural consumption based on their social class. He suggests that the dominant class exerts a metaphysical power over lower-ranking classes and forces them to adjust their consumption patterns accordingly.;
Mary Douglas and Baron C. Isherwood, *The World of Goods* (New York: Basic Books, 1979) 4. Douglas and Isherwood share Bourdieu's views that the attainment of status is not an authentic but a conditioned goal instilled by the capitalist system (Douglas 4);
Herbert J. Gans, *Popular culture and high culture; an analysis and evaluation of taste*. (New York: Basic Books, 1974) 171-75. Herbert Gans who had studied American culture in the 1960s and the 70s, like Bourdieu, sees a correlation between access to higher education and income ("status" in Bourdieu's words) and refined patterns of cultural consumption. Like Marxist and neo-Marxist social critics he views mass culture as a product of industrial capitalism. He neither condemns it the way Marxists like Adorno and Horkheimer do nor champions it the way neo-Marxists like Bourdieu do. Rather than promoting the status quo of these stratified cultures Gans points out to the possibility of progressive social change. For Gans the taste publics are not rigid, but they are constantly shifting thanks to the cultural mobility that takes place in a democratic society.

[22] See, for example, the study of the modernization of the Japanese household by Jordan Sand, *House and Home in Modern Japan*: Architecture, Domestic Space, and Bourgeois Culture, 1880-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003).

[23] Mihayl Csiksentmihalyi, "Why We Need Things," *History from Things: Essays on Material Culture,* ed. S. Lubar and W.D. Kingery (Washington, 1993) 20-29.

[24] Mihayl Csiksentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton, *The Meaning of Things* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)

[25] Gideion, *Mechanization Takes Command,* 512-625. Especially Part VI "Mechanization Encounters the Household."

[26] Gideion, *Mechanization Takes Command* 329-385. Gideion argues that human desires, obsessions, and ambitions might as well create a behemoth of mechanization. This behemoth materializes as the "ruling taste" that is fed by a cycle of senseless aesthetic and material consumption. The ruling taste emerged in the nineteenth century when machines were put to use in creating imitations of handcrafted objects for the masses.

[27] Maureen Ogle, *All the Modern Conveniences: American Household Plumbing, 1840-1890*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

[28] Ruth Schwartz Cowan, *More work for mother: the ironies of household technology from the open hearth to the microwave* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Susan Strasser, *Never Done: A History of American Housework* (New York: Henry Holt, 1982).

[29] Joel Mokyr, "Why "More Work for Mother?: Knowledge and Household Behavior, 1870-1945," *The Journal of Economic History* 60.1 (2000): 1-41.

[30] David. A Hounshell, *From American system to mass production 1800-1932: The Development of*

Manufacturing Technology in America (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

[31] Hounshell, *From American system,* 89-90; Adrian Forty, *Objects of Desire: Design and Society Since 1750* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986) 96-97.

[32] Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System (1979)," *From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change: a reader,* ed. Roberts Timmons (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 190-219.

[33] Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert eds. *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1916* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.)

[34] John Dewey, *John Dewey's Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World: Mexico-China-Turkey 1929*, ed. William W. Brickman (New York: Columbia University, 1964). The book collects Dewey's observations of Russia, Mexico, China and Turkey between 1920 and 1928. Dewey points to the enormity of the tasks that were necessary to transform semi-medieval systems of these countries. He emphasizes that for each country revolution also necessisated the nation to break their dependence on Western imperialism without breaking their ties with the West.

[35] The Soviet Bloc consisted of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the members of the Warsaw pact (1953). For discussions of the Post World war II economic alliances see Rudiger Dornbusch, Wilhelm Nölling and Richard Layard, ed., *Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993) 57-82.

[36] In the East, post-World War II development had humble as well as ambitious goals. Most Eastern European countries still had to break the Malthusian trap, that is, to create an economy that rested on industrial production and that broke the dependence on susbsistence agriculture.

[37] Paul Betts and David Crowley, "(Introduction to) Domestic Dreamworlds: Notions of Home in Post-1945 Europe," *Journal of Contemporary History 40*, 2 (Apr., 2005): 213-236.

[38] David Crowley and Jane Pavitt, eds., *Cold War Modern Design* (London: V&A Publishing, 2008).

[39] Victor Buchli, "Khrushchev, Modernism, and the Fight against "Petit-bourgeois" Consciousness in the Soviet

Home," *Journal of Design History* 10.2 Design, Stalin and the Thaw (1997): 161-176.

[40] Barbara Predan and Cvetka Pozar, ed., *Iskra: Non-Aligned Design 1946-1990* (Ljubljana: Architecture Museum of Ljubljana, 2010)

[41] Arthur Pulos, *The American Design Adventure 1940-1975* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) 224-265. In chapter 6 ("Altruism and Diplomacy") Pulos argues that the US government exported design and design education as a diplomatic tool during the Cold War.

[42] Paul Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 9.

[43] Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects,* 10.

[44] Betts, *The Authority of Everyday Objects,* 18.

[45] David F. Crew, *Consuming Germany and the Cold War* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2003) 4-5.

[46] Ernst Hedler and Ralf E.Ulrich, *DDR Design 1949-1989* (Köln: Taschen, 2004)

[47] Pulos, *The American Design Adventure,* 233.

[48] Pulos, *The American Design Adventure,* 233.

[49] Pulos, *The American Design Adventure,* 233.

[50] Emilio Ambasz, ed., *Italy: The New Domestic Landscape* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1972)

[51] Vittorio Gregotti, "Italian Design, 1945-1971," *Italy: The New Domestic Landscape,* ed. Ambasz: 315-340.

[52] Gregotti, "Italian Design, 1945-1971," 319.

[53] Gregotti, "Italian Design, 1945-1971," 325.

[54] Manfredo Tafuri, "Design and Technological Utopia," *Italy: The New Domestic Landscape,* ed. Ambasz: 388-404.

[55] Tafuri, "Design and Technological Utopia," 394.

[56] Sand, *House and Home in Modern Japan,* 372.

[57] Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999) 137-38. Partner identifies Japanese acquisitions as "the three sacred treasures" of the 1950s (television, electric washing machine, and refrigerator); the "three Cs" of the 1960s (car, room cooler, and color television); and the "three Js" of the 1980s (jewels, jet travel, and *jûtaku*—home ownership.

[58] Takuo Hirano, "The Development of Modern Japanese Design," *The Idea of Design: A Design Issues Reader*, eds. Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan (Cambridge: Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995): 225.

[59] Sand points out that Japanese design was reconciled with Western design in two ways: either by introducing native design into Western, or by introducing Western design into native design.

[60] Pulos, *The American Design Adventure*, 277.

[61] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_independence#Asia

[62] Rajeshwari Ghose, "Design, Development, Culture, and Cultural Legacies in Asia," *The Idea of Design,* eds. Margolin and Buchanan: 187-203. Ghose mentions Singapore as a country where the strong cultural divide that exists between its urban and rural society makes it difficult to agree on a common design idiom.

[63] Ghose 188; see also Victor Margolin, "Design for Development: Towards a History," *Changing The Change,* 21 Jan 2008 http://www.changingthechange.org/blog/2008/01/21/design-for-developmenttowards-a-history/; see S. Balaram, "Design in India: The Importance of the Ahmedabad Declaration," *Design Issues 25,* 4 (Autumn, 2009): 54-79.Ahmedabad Declaration on Industrial Design and Development (National Institute of Design, 1979) resulted from a conference to discuss the promotion of industrial design in developing countries. The conference was organized under the auspices of the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID).

[64] Ghose, "Design for Development," 188.

[65] See Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry and George Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York:

The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949). Also Max Weston Thornburg, P*eople and Policy in the Middle East: A Study of Social and Political Change as a Basis for United States Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.: 1964); Also see James Barker, *The Economy of Turkey*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1952.
Above cited are three of the several reports prepared between 1947 and 1950 by American economic planners proposed that US aid to Turkey should be used to foster a consumer culture as well as a mechanized agricultural production. The reports dismissed Turkey's pos-war industrialization plans and designated Turkey's role as a consumer of manufactured goods and a producer of agricultural commodities.

[66] Agricultural mechanization policies of the Marshall Plan aggravated rural-urban migration in Turkey in the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1954, 40,000 tractors entered the country and uprooted millions of small farmers who flocked to the cities.

[67] There is a rich literature that explores Turkey's trifold urban cultural divide. Rusen Keles and Michael N. Danielson, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey* (New York and London: Holmes&Meier, 1985). The authors study the role of political economy in the emergence of Turkey's cultural divide. Also see, Yildiz Sey ed., *Bilanço 98: 75 Yilda Degisen Kent ve Mimarlik [Report 98: Changes in architecture and urbanism in 75 years]* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi ve Türkiye Is Bankasi, 1998)*; 75 yildan koylerden sehirlere;* Mübeccel Kiray, *Kentleşme Yazılar* (Istanbul: Baglam Yayıncılık, 1998); Ilhan Tekeli, ed. *Kent, Planlama, Politika, Sanat [City, Planning, Policy, Art*] (Ankara: Middle East Technical University Faculty of Architecture Press, 1994)*;* Ilhan Tekeli*, Gecekondulu, Dolmuslu, Isportali Sehir* (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1976).

[68] Vehbi Koç's actions put in place systems of distribution as well as communities that sustained the products. His social networks began in the factory, where he fostered a strong sense of belonging among the personnel. The sense of belonging continued among the dealers who took on financial risks while feeling the support of the large Koç organization. The consumers were another group who felt themselves to be part of the larger Koç family since Koç companies offered their customers protection from the risks of purchasing expensive products. For discussions of product networks see Ruth Schwartz Cowan, *A Social History of American Technology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Cowan argues that the technological artifact needs a social network to survive. Also see Cowan, "The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in the Sociology of Technology," *The Social Construction of Technological Systems*, ed. Thomas Hughes, Wiebe E. Bijker and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge: MIT Press 1987): 262-280. Cowan stresses the importance of fuel sources, distribution mechanisms, price, and consumer choice on the development of technological systems more than individual inventors. Also see Victor Margolin, "The Product Milieu and Social Action," *Discovering Design: Explorations in Design Studies*, ed. Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995): 121-145. In order to understand the interactivity between products and actions, Margolin points out that, we need a frame that includes "the full complex of objects, activities, systems, services, and environments

that individuals engage with." Margolin calls this the "product web." At the center of each web is an individual or group that animates a set of relations with products.

[69] Studies by Turkish social scientists began recognizing the emergence of the modern Turkish household in the 1970s. See Önder Senyapili, *Kentlilesen Köylüler* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1978); Nuri Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan* [belongings and humans] (Ankara: Gündogan Yayinlari, 1991).

CHAPTER 2

[70] Zeynep Merey Enlil, "19. Yüzyil Istanbul'unda Konut Yapi Gelenekleri ve Kent Kültürü," *7 Centuries of Ottoman Architecture: A Supra-National Heritage*, ed. Nur Akin, Afife Batur and Selçuk Batur (Istanbul: Yapi-Endustri Merkezi Publications, 2000) 2.

[71] Yildiz Sey, "Apartman," *Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Ilhan Tekeli (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1993-1995) 281-83.

[72] Enlil, "19. Yüzyil Istanbul'unda Konut Yapi Gelenekleri," 286.

[73] Tugrul Akçura, *Ankara: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Baskenti Hakkinda Monografik bir Arastirma* (Ankara: Ortadogu Teknik Universtesi Mimarlik Fakultesi, 1971) 9-22; Sevgi Aktüre, *19.Yuzyil Sonunda Anadolu Kenti Mekansal Yapi Çözümlemesi* (Ankara: ODTU Mimarlik Fakultesi Baski Atolyesi, 1978), esp. chapter 3 ("Spatial Structure in Anatolian Cities: Case Studies," pp.108-193) where urbanization of three Anatolian cities are analyzed 16th through 19th centuries.

[74] See Aktüre, *19.Yuzyil Sonunda Anadolu Kenti Mekansal Yapi Çözümlemesi;* Suraiya Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance: House owners and house property in seventeenth-century Ankara and Kayseri* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 24-33.

[75] Erdogan Alkin, "Dis Ticaret," ["Foreign Trade"], *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Turkey in the Republican Period],* ed. Murat Belge (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1985) 448-459.

[76] Alkin, "Dis Ticaret," 449.

[77] See Can Dündar. *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç*, (Istanbul: YKY, 2008); Ayşe Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım: Koç Ailesi'nin yaşamı* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfi, 2005); Sevgi Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," *Tarih İçinde Ankara II*, ed. Y.Yavuz (Ankara: METU Faculty of Architecture) 35-74; Also see N. Akin, "Türk Evi," *Eczacıbasi Sanat Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: Yapı-Endüstri Merkezi Yayınları, 1997): 570.

[78] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç,* 15.

[79] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç,* 15.

[80] Ayla Ödekan, "Üç Kusagin Esyalari," *75 Yilda Degisen Yasam Degisen Insan: Cumhuriyet Modalari [Life and people that changed in 75 years: Fashions of the republic*], eds. Oya Baydar; Derya Özkan Yigit Gülöksüz (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari: 1999) 236-44.

[81] Ödekan, "Üç Kusagin Esyalari," 236-44.

[82] U. Toker and Z. Toker, "Family Structure and Spatial Configuration in Turkish House Form in Anatolia from Early Nineteenth Century to Late Twentieth Century," *Proceedings of the Fourth International Space Syntax Symposium* (London, 2003)

[83] Izzet Yüksek, "Kirklareli Geleneksel Konutlarinda Pencerelerin Karakteristik Özelliklerine Yönelik Bir Çalisma," *Trakya University Journal of Science*, 6.2 (2005): 93-102

[84] Gülsüm Baydar Nalbantoglu, "Between Civilization and Culture: Appropriation of Traditional Dwelling Forms in Eraly Republican Turkey," *Journal of Architectural Education* 2 (1993): 71.

[85] Akin, "Türk Evi," 570.

[86] Deniz Orhun, "Türk Evi" mi, Yasamada Tümlesik Ev mi?," *7 Centuries of ottoman Architecture: A Supra-National Haritage*, ed. Nur Akin, Afife Batur and Selçuk Batur (Istanbul: Yapi-Endustri Merkezi Publications, 2000): 261.

[87] Yüksek, "Kirklareli Geleneksel Konutlarinda," 95.

[88] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 42.

[89] G. Asatekin, "Anadolu'daki Geleneksel Konut Mimarisinin Bicimlenmesinde Aile-Konut Karsilikli Iliskilerin Rolu [The Role of Family-House Relationships in Shaping of Anatolian Vernacular Architecture)]," *Kent, Planlama, Politika, Sanat [City, Planning, Policy, Art],* ed. Ilhan Tekeli (Ankara: Middle East Technical University Faculty of Architecture Press, 1994): 65-88; Emre Madran, "Vakfiyelerde Sivil Mimarlık Örneklerine İlişkin Bilgiler," *Kent, Planlama, Politika, Sanat [City, Planning, Policy, Art],* ed. Tekeli (Ankara: Middle East Technical University Faculty of Architecture Press, 1994): 423-37.

[90] Akin, "Türk Evi," 570; Asatekin 76.

[91] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç,* esp. chapter 1.

[92] Vehbi Koç, *My Life Story* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Foundation, 1977) 9-10. Koç remembers that one could easily distinguish the homes and yards of Ankara's non-Muslims that seemed to receive much care and attention from their owners.

[93] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 27.

[94] Koç, *My Life Story*, 11-14.

[95] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 27.

[96] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 41.

[97] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 27.

[98] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 41.

[99] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 42.

[100] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 88-95.

[101] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç,* esp. chapter 6; Koç Holding A.Ş., *Koç Toplulugunun 75 Yili* (Istanbul: Koç Holding A.Ş., 2001): 162-199.

[102] Ilhan Tekeli, "Ankara'nin Baskentlik Kararinin Ülkesel Mekan Organizasyonu ve toplumsal Yapiya Etkileri Bakimindan Genel bir degerlendirilmesi [a general evaluation of the declaration Ankara as the nation's capital with regard to its effects on the country's spatial organization and social structure]," *Tarih Içinde Ankara: Eylül*

1981 Seminer bildirileri, ed. Erdal Yavuz and Ümit Nevzat Ugurel (Ankara: Ortadogu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1984): 312-34.

[103] Ali Cengizkan, "Cumhuriyet Donemi Kamusal Mekanlari Icin Bir Calisma Plani [A plan to study the public spaces of the Republican period], *Ankara'nin Mekansal Yuzleri*, ed. Güven Arif Sargin (Ankara: Iletisim, 2002), 215-243. Two consecutive plans in 1925 and 1932 to expand Ankara beyond the old town and towards the southern plain where they began developing a new district.

[104] Gülsüm Nalbantoglu, "1928-1946 Döneminde Ankara'da Yapilan Konutlarin Mimari Degerlendirmesi," *Tarih Içinde Ankara: Eylül 1981 Seminer bildirileri*, ed. Erdal Yavuz and Ümit Nevzat Ugurel (Ankara: Ortadogu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1984): 297.

[105] Yalçin Ergir, "Ankara: 1920'ler ve Ötesinden Beriye," ergir blog, <http://www.ergir.com/Ankara.htm> the memoir of Halil Makaraci, a lawyer who lived in Ankara in the 1920s; also see Falih Rifki Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk'ün dogumundan ölümüne kadar [Çankaya: from Atatürk's birth until his death]* (Istanbul: Dogan Kardes, 1969): 412-13.

[106] Bulent Batuman, "Cumhuriyetin Kamusal Mekani Olarak Kizilay Meydani," *Ankara'nin Mekansal Yuzleri*, ed. Güven Arif Sargin (Ankara: Iletisim, 2002): 46. These families along with the local families that they influenced formed the basis of the modern Turkish bourgeoisie in central Anatolia.

[107] Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," 60.

[108] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 91

[109] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 88-9.

[110] See Tansi Senyapili, *Ankara Kentinde Gecekondu Gelisimi (1923-60) [The Development of Squatters in the City of Ankara]* (Ankara: Batikent Konut Uretim Yapi Kooperatifleri Birligi, 1985) 63.

[111] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 89.

[112] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 90.

[113] Kiraç, *Ömrümden Uzun* 30, 36.

[114] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım*, 125; also see Kiraç, *Ömrümden Uzun*.

[115] Sibel Bozdogan, *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (University of Washington Press, 2001) 231; Enlil, "19. Yüzyil Istanbul'unda Konut Yapi Gelenekleri," 291.

[116] Mete Ünal, "Tarihsel Siralama Içinde Istanbul'da Apartman Cepheleri," Yapi 50 (1983): 34-40. Ünal quotes Esad Arseven, a Turkish architect who had witnessed the development of early apartments in Turkey.

[117] Mustafa Esenduran, "Türkiye'de elektrik üretiminin tarihçesi" http://www.haberortak.com/Haber/Teknik-Makale/17112010/Turkiye-8217de-elektrik-uretiminin-tarihcesi.php ; Mehmet Mazak and Ali Şen, "İstanbul'da İlk Modern Aydinlatilan Mekan: Dolmabahçe Sarayi Ve Dolmabahçe Gazhanesi" http://www.mehmetmazak.com/dolmabahceaydinlatma.html

[118] Slowly, apartment living spread to government employees and wealthy Muslim families. Yildiz Sey and Cengiz Bektas, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Konut [housing in the republican period]," *Bilanço 98: 75 Yilda Degisen Kent ve Mimarlik [Report 98: Changes in architecture and urbanism in 75 years],* ed. Yildiz Sey (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi ve Türkiye Is Bankasi, 1998) 273.

[119] Ugur Tanyeli, "Erken Cumhuriyette Kentsel Konut Gerçegi," *Üç Kusak Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998) 140; Mete Ünal, "Türkiye'de Apartman Olgusunun Gelisimi: Istanbul Örnegi," *Çevre dergisi* 4 (1979): 73; Cem Behar and A. Duben, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. Chapter Chapter 7 ("Westernization and New Family Directions"): 239.

[120] See Yasemin Sayar, Tugba Sormaykan Akdur, "İzmir Karsiyaka'da Apartman Tipi Konut Yapılarında Mekansal ve Morfolojik Dönüşümler: 1950-1980," *Mimarlik* 349 (2009): 85-92; Enlil, "19. Yüzyil Istanbul'unda Konut Yapi Gelenekleri"; "Apartman," *Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi,* 1994 ed. 281-3.

[121] In the 1920s and the 30s the notion of "modern home" fascinated the Turkish public as its examples became visible in the urban landscape. There were extensions of this notion in furniture and various consumer goods. See Feride Çiçekoğlu, "Asri, Modern, Çağdaş," *Üç Kuşak Cumhuriyet*, (Istanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998): 148-149.

[122] Sevgi Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da Günlük Yasam," *Tarih Içinde Ankara II: Aralik 1998 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Yildirim Yavuz (Ankara: ODTU Mimarlik Fakültesi, 2001): 58-62;
Eftal Sükrü Batmaz, Kutret Emiroglu and Süha Ünsal, *Insaatcilarin Tarihi [The History of the Builders]* (Ankara: 2005) 74.

[123] Nalbantoglu, "1928-1946 Döneminde Ankara'da Yapilan Konutlarin," 260.

[124] Novelist Karaosmanagaoglu qtd in Nimet Özgönül and Fuat Gökçe, "Ankara'da Kaybolan Kültür Varliklarimiz: Bag Evleri," *Tarih Içinde Ankara II: Aralik 1998 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Yildirim Yavuz (Ankara: ODTU Mimarlik Fakültesi, 2001): 271; Ilhan Tekeli and Selim Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin Öyküsü: Bir Bati Kurumunun Yeniden Yorumlanmasi* (Ankara: Kent Koop, 1979) 22. The authors mention Karaosmanoglu's novels *Ankara* and *Panorama*. The novels point to the fact that the new districts of Ankara was taking shape according to the consumption patterns that its high level bureaucrats and businessmen were acquiring in the 1920s and the 1930s.

[125] Nalbantoglu, "1928-1946 Döneminde Ankara'da Yapilan Konutlarin," 262.

[126] Çiçekoğlu, "Asri, Modern, Çağdaş," 148-9; Tanpinar qtd. in Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," 62.

[127] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım,* 92; Suna Kiraç, *Ömrümden Uzun Ideallerim Var* (Istanbul: Suna ve Inan Kiraç Vakfi, 2006) 29. Kiraç remembers that Koç family's apartment in Ankara was decorated by Selahattin Refik, an Istanbul decorator.

[128] Tansi Senyapili, "Emek Pazarinda Degisimelere Iliskin Bazi Düsunceler," *Kent, Planlama, Politika, Sanat [City, Planning, Policy, Art],* ed. Ilhan Tekeli (Ankara, Middle East Technical University Faculty of Architecture Press, 1994): 546.

[129] Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," 60.

[130] Gönül Tankut, Ankara Imar Plani Uygulamasinin 1929-1939 Arasindaki Dikkati çeken Verileri: *Tarih Içinde Ankara II: Aralik 1998 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Yildirim Yavuz (Ankara: ODTU Mimarlik Fakültesi, 2001): 12.

[131] Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," 61.

[132] Falih Rifki Atay, *Çankaya: Atatürk'ün dogumundan ölümüne kadar [Çankaya: from Atatürk's birth until his death]* (Istanbul: Dogan Kardes, 1969): 422-23.

[133] Aykut Kansu, "Jansen'in Ankara'sı için Örnek Bir "Bahçe Şehir" ya da Siedlung: Bahçeli Evler Yapi Kooperatifi 1934–1939," *Toplumsal Tarih* 187 (2009): 54-65. Ankara's city planner Hermann Jansen spoke against multi-story housing in the 1930s referring to them as "rental barracks" in the Turkish press.

[134] Tekeli and Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin* 67. Planner Jansen's idea was to provide peace and quiet to the dwellers of the Bahçelievler housing coop; Also Tekeli and Ilkin *Bahçelievlerin* 132. Planner Jansen was dismayed to see that the old town (Ulus district) was being torn down and rebuilt with apartment buildings, although his plan aimed to preserve the traditional pattern of the district.

[135] Tekeli and Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin* 72. Bahçelievler houses were designed with interior courtyards that used to provide the privacy of traditional homes.

[136] Tekeli and Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin* 36.

[137] Tekeli and Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin* 73.

[138] Most researchers have overemphasized the significance of the Turkish government housing projects of the 1930s and the 1940s. This is because they have chosen to study and place significance on what was available to them: iconic, static, architecturally significant state developments whose plans are available to researchers. The stories of government housing are told by reading statements made by state developers, that seem to give away the grand ideological impulses behind these projects. Developments of private contractors that account for the majority of urban housing are not sufficiently studied. This is because researchers argue that their histories are not significant. It may also be true that their stories are hard to tell, given that the life of a privately developed housing is fleeting and ephemeral in Turkey. A great share of privately developed homes did not have license, or their plans did not reflect their realities. They were either not documented or did not survive, since most sections of modern Ankara were rebuilt several times over in the second half of the 20th century. Thus the history of privately built apartments is a messy history to write. It is a history of an active, fleeting, hard to grasp force. Their history needs to be written with better research to help us understand better the active social force behind Turkish modernity.

[139] Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," 59.

[140] Aysil Yavuz, "Izzet Aykurt Evi: Bir Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Konutu. *Tarih Içinde Ankara II: Aralik 1998 Seminer Bildirileri*, ed. Yildirim Yavuz (Ankara: ODTU Mimarlik Fakültesi, 2001): 289

[141] Batmaz, *Insaatcilarin Tarihi* 66; Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım,* 48.

[142] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 86; Batmaz, *Insaatcilarin Tarihi* 66.

[143] Demirdöküm, *Demirdökümde 50 Yil* (Istanbul: Demirdöküm A.S, 2004) 49. Vehbi Koç's first big government contract involved installing central plumbing and heating systems for Ankara's Numune hospital that were imported from the German company Hilden; Ihsan Bilgin, "Modernlesmenin ve Toplumsal Hareketliligin Yörüngesinde Cumhuriyetin Imari, *Bilanço 98: 75 Yilda Degisen Kent ve Mimarlik [Report 98: Changes in architecture and urbanism in 75 years],* ed. Yildiz Sey (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi ve Türkiye Is Bankasi, 1998) 255-272. Bilgin notes that, in Turkey, government contracts accounted for the majority of the construction activity until the 1950s.

[144] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım,* 70.

[145] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 115.

[146] Tekeli and Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin* 94.

[147] Aktüre, "1830'dan 1930'a Ankara'da günlük yaşam," 58.

[148] Tekeli and Ilkin *Bahçelievlerin,* 33-34.

[149] Tekeli and Ilkin, *Bahçelievlerin* 10.

[150] *Aile Dergisi*, 2.7 (1948): 53.

[151] Tevfik Çavdar, "Devralinan Iktisadi Miras," *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi,* 1048-1060.

[152] Tekeli and Ilkin *Bahçelievlerin* 12-13; Batmaz 67. In 1935, 13 percent of Ankara's homes received water, 32 percent received electricity, and 7 percent gas. It isn't clear whether these numbers take into account the Altindag district that was illegally developing on the outskirts of the city. In 1960, 60 percent of Ankara homes received water, 91 percent received electricity, and 25 percent received gas.

[153] Aydan Keskin Balamir, "Kent Mekanlari Sonati," *Kent, Planlama, Politika, Sanat [City, Planning, Policy, Art],* ed. Ilhan Tekeli (Ankara: Middle East Technical University Faculty of Architecture Press, 1994): 107-108. Balamir tells the story of his childhood home in Denizli, a mid-sized Turkish town in Western Turkey.

[154] See Altan Öymen, *Degisim Yillari* [*the years of change*]," (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2004): 101 . Öymen describes the conditions which influenced Turkey's inclusion into the Marshall Plan.

[155] The government to a large extent followed proposals made by Marshall Planners who situated Turkish economy in the larger post-war recovery program as an agricultural producer and a consumer market. In 1947, Turkey signed the Marshall Plan treaty with the US, abandoning its positive balance and domestic industrialization policy. The Marshall planners advised the state to cease industrial investments and ease the importation of consumer goods in order to create a broader consumer base. The country was also advised to employ modern advertising techniques to absorb the newly released cash. The new Turkish government began redirecting its resources towards the rural agricultural sector, as advised, hoping to increase the national revenue via mechanized agriculture. As a further liberalization measure the government also freed the rental rates that were frozen during the World War II years in 1954, that led to a construction boom in the cities. During this period, some large landowners—aided by the agricultural emphasis on the economy—transformed themselves into building contractors, small industrialists and merchants.

[156] Demokrat Parti [Democrat Party] that became Turkey's new ruling party amplified the nation's goal from the humble "catching up with the civilized world" to creating "The Great Turkey."

[157] Sey and Bektas, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Konut," 294.

[158] Sey and Bektas, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Konut," 294.

[159] Bilgin, "Modernlesmenin ve Toplumsal Hareketliligin Yörüngesinde," 263-66; Sayar and Akdur, *Mimarlik* 349.

[160] Murat Balamir, "Kira evi"nden "kat evleri"ne apartmanlasma: Bir zihniyet dönüsümü tarihçesinden kesitler," ["Proliferation of apartment buildings from rental housing to condominiums"] *Mimarlık dergisi* 260 (1994): 29-33. Also see Sayar and Akdur; Sadun Tanju, Hilmi Sahen, and others, "Kira Faciasi [rent disaster]," *Panorama*, c. 1955. Architecture and construction standards were high for apartments and their rents were out of reach of the middle class prior to the 1960s.

[161] Bilgin, "Modernlesmenin ve Toplumsal Hareketliligin Yörüngesinde," 268; Mübeccel Kiray, "Azgelismis Ülkelerde Metropolitenlesme Süreçleri," *Bilanço 98: 75 Yilda Degisen Kent ve Mimarlik [Report 98: Changes in architecture and urbanism in 75 years],* ed. Yildiz Sey (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi ve Türkiye Is Bankasi, 1998) 99. Kiray notes that, in industrialized countries metropolitan areas emerged as hubs in networks of industrial production. Meanwhile, in the developing countries where industrial production was not a significant economic

source, trade activity concentrated in single "primate" city. Istanbul is an example of such a city that attracted massive concentration of trade leaving little room for public spaces.

[162] "Memleketimizde Yapi Konusundaki Istatistikler [statistics regarding building construction in our country]," *Mimarlik* 4 (1963): 5. Also see Sayar and Akdur; Sadun Tanju, Hilmi Sahen, and others, "Kira Faciasi [rent disaster]," *Panorama*, c. 1955.
Between 1954 and 1961 an average of 50 thousand apartment units were built each year in Turkey. In the same period an average of 7500 units were built in Istanbul. Number of apartment units built in Istanbul more than tripled between 1947 and 1954. Meanwhile, single family home construction in Istanbul dropped from approximately 3000 in 1954 to 1000 in 1961.

[163] "Bir Gunde Biten 22 Katli Apartman [A twenty-two story apartment building that was completed within a day]," *Milliyet* 27 June 1954: 1; Also "Türkiye'nin gök deleni Misantasin'da insa edilecek [Turkey's skyscraper will be built in Nisantasi," *Milliyet* 21 Jan 1956: 2; "Istanbul Gökdelenleri [Istanbul's skyscrapers]," *Milliyet* 29 Dec. 1957. In the 1950s Turkish newspapers reported multi-story apartment building projects with excitement.

[164] Neyyire, "Radar Ocaklari," 4.

[165] *Emlak Kredi Bankasi, Türkiye Emlak Kredi Bankasi Imar ve Insaat Hizmetinde [Turkish Real Estate Bank is in the Service of Building and Construction]* (Ankara, c. 1957). The Levent Evleri project conceived briefly after World War II was the precursor to multi-story public housing developments that were undertaken by the Real Estate Bank (*Emlak Bankasi*).

[166] Sayar and Akdur; Tanju, Sahen, and others; Dogan Kuban, "A Survey of Modern Turkish Architecture," *Architecture in Continuity*, ed. Sherban Cantacuzino (New York: Aperture, 1985). Also see Abdi Güzer, *Konut Üzerine Denemeler* (Ankara: Mimarlar Derneği 2002) for a discussion of Turkish apartments as an urban typology. Early examples of apartment buildings were faithful applications of the American international style with higher production values, and they were built in expensive neighborhoods such as Nisantasi.

[167] Alkin, "Dis Ticaret", 448-459. See also Gündüz Ökçün, "Iktisadi Gelismenin Evreleri" in the same publication, pages 1061-1071. In the 1950s, 22.5 percent of all imports were made for consumer spending.

[168] Demirdöküm 49.

[169] Koç, *My Life Story*.

[170] Dündar , *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 143-44.

[171] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 153-54.

[172] Bernar Nahum, *Koçta 44 Yilim: Bir Otomotiv Sanayii Kuruluyor* [My 44 years at Koç: An automotive industry is being established] (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1988) 71.

[173] Batmaz 49-88; Sey and Bektas, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Konut," 290-95 text inset.

[174] *Technical Education for Men in Turkey* (Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1951): 41.

[175] Ibrahim Pertev, "Bu Çarik Çürük Yerli Mallarla Halimiz Ne Olacak [what are we to do with these shoddy national goods?," *Endüstri 39* 4 (1953): 87.

[176] Pertev, "Bu Çarik Çürük Yerli Mallarla," 87.

[177] Demirdöküm 49.

[178] A timeline of the Demirdöküm Company can be found at <http://www.demirdokum.com.tr/eng/kurumsal/kurumsal_icsayfa.aspx?SectionId=183&ParentId=171>

[179] Demirdöküm 52.

[180] Demirdöküm 52.

[181] See Turkish dailies *Milliyet, Hürriyet*, and *Cumhuriyet* between 1964 and 1960 for news reports about the difficulties of importing basic necessities.

[182] "Tesvikiye'de Bir Çifti Kömür Zehirledi [A couple in Tesvikiye were poisoned by coal," *Milliyet* 28 March 1957: 3.

[183] Sadun Tanju, Hilmi Sahen, and others; also see "2 Avuç Altina 1 Avuç Toprak [two fistfuls of gold buys one fistful of land]," *Panorama*, c. 1953. A follow up to the rental article that appeared in *Panorama* repeated the same view that owning an apartment was a civilized right. It was a need as natural as breathing air and drinking water, and enjoying freedom in the twentieth century. In the article, the minimum for an apartment is specified as two rooms, a hall, a kitchen and a bathroom.

[184] *Akis*, 30 Oct 1954.

[185] Süheyl Ünver, "Günün Meseleleri: Türk Evi." Editorial. *Milliyet* 16 Oct. 1952: 2.

[186] See articles and advertisements in *Milliyet* daily regarding the use of kerosene stoves (gazocagi) in homes; Also, c. 1950s, Ege Cansen, e-mail to the author, 6 Dec 2009. Cansen is a former Arçelik manager who served between 1961 and 1980.

[187] For people's experiences with the wood-burning bathroom stoves (*banyo sobasi*) see online blogs, "Banyo Sobasi ya da Odunlu Termosifon," *Sourtimes blog,* <http://sozluk.sourtimes.org/show.asp?t=banyo+sobasi> "Banyo Sobasi," *itusozluk blog*, < http://www.itusozluk.com/goster.php/banyo+sobas%FD>
Also see Cansen e-mail to the author, 6 Dec 2009.

[188] Nuri Bilgin, e-mail to the author, 23 Dec. 2009.

[189] The number of newspaper reports about gas stove, and bathroom stove related accidents decreased in the 1960s when LPG was introduced. Nevertheless, there were still repots of such accidents throughout the late 1968s.

[190] Neyyire, "Radar Ocaklari [radar stoves]," *Milliyet* 11 Nov. 1955: 4

[191] Leopold qtd. in Celal Okutan, "Konfor," *Mühendis ve Makina* 12.145 (1969): 475.

[192] Balamir, "Kent Mekanlari Sonati," 106.

[193] For memories of how Turkish households warmed up with braziers see Burhan Felek, "Geçmis zaman olur ki: o devirde nasil isinirdik [once upon a time: how did we warm up in that period?]," *Milliyet Magazin* 4 Sep. 1977: 14. Also see Ulunay "Takvimden bir yaprak: havadan sudan [a leaf from the calender: about this and that],' *Milliyet* 22 Jan. 1961: 3.

[194] Ödekan, *75 Yilda Degisen Yasam Degisen Insan,* 236-44

[195] Balamir, "Kent Mekanlari Sonati," 106.

[196] Dr. Recep Ferdi and Nezih (ill), "Mesken ve Saglik [home and health]." Editorial. *Milliyet* 11 March 1955: 4. An illustrated editorial portrayed pointed to the fact that modern apartment living was forcing itself on the Turkish families as an economic necessity. The double pressures keeping up with the modern times and ground rent speculation was cramming people together in multi-story apartments. Thus, the peace and quiet of the low-tech single family home was being replaced by the technological comforts of the congested apartment unit.

[197] Lawrence Wright, *Clean and Decent: The Fascinating History of the Bathroom and the Water Closet* (London: Penguin Books, 2000) 188.

[198] Brief corporate histories of ECA armatures can be found at http://www.elmor.com.tr. For a brief account of Vitra see Dr. Nejat F. Eczacibasi, *Kusaktan Kusaga* (Istanbul: Dr. Nejat F. Eczacibasi Vakfi Yayinlari, 1982). Also see http://www.capital.com.tr/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=%203698 for an account of Vitra Ceramics global ventures. Thanks to Turkish public's demand for them Turkey's two bathroom armature and furniture companies that were founded in the 1940s reached production volumes that made them significant players in the international markets.

[199] "Apartment House," *Britannica Online Encyclopedia*
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/29370/apartment-house
"Apartman [apartment]," *AnaBritannica*: *genel kültür ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Yayıncılık, Encyclopaedia Britannica , 1986-90)

[200] "Apartment House," *Britannica Online Encyclopedia*; Sükrü Er, "Tarih Boyunca Konfor," *Mühendis ve Makina* 11.132 (1968): 397. Er points to statistics that show that as late as 1958 in Paris nearly three quarters of Paris homes were devoid of radiator heating. Also see Roger Henri Guerrand "Comfort," *Industrial Design: Reflection of a Century*, ed. Jocelyn de Noblet (Paris: Flammarion/APCI, 1993): 75-82. for the dissemination of radiator heating in Paris. Guerrand notes that the percentage of French homes with bathrooms were a mere 30 percent in 1962.

[201] "Developing the tankless gas water heater for 109 years," *Bosch*,
<http://www.bosch.com.mx/content/language2/html/2503.htm>

[202] "Evlerde modern tesisler: sicak su döseminde kazan, boru, ve depolarin hesabi [modern facilities in homes: calculations for boilers, pipes, and storage containers regarding warm water installation]," *Endüstri Dergisi* 4-6 1957: 66-67. The article points to extremely large energy input that is needed to heat water inside a *termosifon* (approximately 3000 kcal) compared to the *sofben* (1000 kcal) and the manual bath (450 kcal).

[203] Ege Cansen, e-mail to the author, 2010.

[204] "Üçüncü Firini Hangi Genç Kiz Atesleyecek? [who will fire the third furnace]," *Milliyet* 15 Dec. 1962; Dökümcülere Müjde [good news to the foundry-men, advertisement, *Milliyet* 21 De. 1962. Newspapers reported the inauguration of the new furnaces built in Karabük in 1962, while the State Iron and Steel Works (Devlet Demir ve Çelik Isletmeleri) gave the good news to private foundries by additional announcements saying that its new furnace would make, the once scarce, pig iron freely available

[205] Demirdöküm 68.

[206] Ilhan Tekeli, *Tarih Içinde Ankara: Eylül 1981 Seminer bildirileri*, 321-338. Also see Tansi Senyapili, *Ankara Kentinde Gecekondu Gelisimi,* 190-200. Both informal and formal housing developed in sporadic patterns in Turkey. For example, Ankara's co-op housing developed far outside the planned axes of the city, in areas where the land was much cheaper. This type of development undermined the formation of efficient city clusters, and increased the cost of municipal services. Exceptions to this pattern were earlier co-op neighborhoods like the Bahcelievler.

[207] Peyami Safa, "Objectif: Bursa Yangini ve Gazocaklari." Editorial. *Milliyet* 30 Aug., 1958. Journalist Safa was prompted to devote an editorial in the wake of a fire caused by a gas stove (*gazocagi*) that burned down Bursa's historic marketplace in 1958.

[208] "Evlere Kaplar Içinde Havagazi Verilecek [homes will be supplied gas inside containers]," *Milliyet* 11 May 1961: 3.

[209] *Milliyet* 11 May 1961: 3.

[210] Hasan Pulur, "Olaylar ve Insanlar: Haspaya Artik Ne Giyse Yakismaz." Editorial. *Milliyet* 12 May 1979 : 7.

[211] Cansen, e-mail to the author, 2010.

[212] Demirdöküm 75.

[213] Mehmet Sahin "Iste Köy 3: 8 Kisinin ayni odada yattigi ev var [here is the village 3: there are homes where 8 people sleep in the same room]," *Milliyet* 18 Aug. 1964: 5. The author described the primitive living conditions that persisted in a typical Turkish village in 1964. People bathed inside a closet by pouring down water that they heated on open fire.
Nuri Bilgin, e-mail to the author, 23 Dec. 2009; Also see Hasan Sinan Ertay and Arif Ileri, "Türkiye'de Konut Sektöründe Enerji Tüketimi [Energy consumption in the Turkish housing sector], *ULIBTK 97 II. Ulusal Isı Bilimi ve Teknigi Kongresi Edirne, Eylül Bildirileri* (Edirne 1997).

[214] Ayse Bugra, "Türk Isadamlari ve Türk Devleti [Turkish businessmen and the Turkish State]," in *75 Yilda Carklari Döndürenler* ed. Oya Baydar and Gülay Dinçel (Istanbul: Türk Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari, 1998) 67-96.

[215] For a brief history of the Aygaz LPG distribution network see
<http://www.aygaz.com.tr/kurumsal/content/tanitim/Tarihce.aspx>

CHAPTER 3

[216] Kemal Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman social and political history* (Leiden, Boston and Tokyo: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002): p. 276.

[217] Orhan Kologlu, *Reklamciligimizin Ilk Yuzyili (1840-1940) [The First Century of Our Advertising]* (Istanbul: Reklamcilar Dernegi, 1999) 193.

[218] Burla Brothers were established in 1911. Lori Burla, interview with Şelale Kadak, "Ticaretin temelini attı hep 'mütevazı' kaldı," *Sabah* 6 Feb. 2008
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/kadak/2008/02/06/Ticaretin_temelini_atti_hep__mutevazi__kaldi; also see "İşke Koç Grubu'nu Koç yapan Burla Ailesi'nin öyküsü," *Patronlar Dünyasi*, 18 Apr. 2010
http://www.patronlardunyasi.com/haber/Iske-Koç-Grubu-nu-Koç-yapan-Burla-Ailesi-nin-oykusu/82121

[219] Can Dündar. *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç*, (Istanbul: YKY, 2008): 61.

[220] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 62.

[221] Ayla Ödekan, "Üç Kusagin Esyalari," *75 Yilda Degisen Yasam Degisen Insan: Cumhuriyet Modalari [Life and people that changed in 75 years: Fashions of the republic*], eds. Oya Baydar; Derya Özkan Yigit Gülöksüz (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari: 1999) 236-44.

[222] Burla distributed Telefunken radios, AEG electrical goods, and Frigidaire fridges.

[223] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya: Arcelik Kurum Tarihi 1955-2000 [The corporate history of Arcelik 1955-2000]* (Istanbul: Mepa Medya, 2001); also see Altan Öymen, *Degisim Yillari [The Years of Change]* (Istanbul: Dogan Kitap, 2004) 185.

[224] Arçelik 50; Also Serpil Yilmaz, interview with Rahmi Koç, *Milliyet* 24 June 2005 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/06/24/yazar/yilmaz.html>

[225] Vehbi Koç, *My Life Story* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Foundation, 1977)

[226] Arçelik 50; Yilmaz, interview with Rahmi Koç.

[227] Suna Kiraç, *Ömrümden Uzun Ideallerim Var* (Istanbul: Suna ve Inan Kiraç Vakfi, 2006) 36.

[228] Ayşe Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım: Koç Ailesi'nin yaşamı* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfi, 2005): 129.

[229] Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım* 70.

[230] The Arçelik company reminded people of the deprivation of the pre-refrigerator days in a series of ads in the 1960s. The ads showed how the refrigerator relegated the old ways of cooling water to the past. See Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 26 May 1968: 3.

[231] Yilmaz, interview with Rahmi Koç.

[232] Semahat Arsel, interview, *Mamulattan Markaya* 50.

[233] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 153.

[234] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 154; Koç Türk Ticaret Anonim Sirketi. Advertisement. *Ankara Telefon Rehberi 1944* (Ankara: Münakalât Vekâleti, PTT Umum Müdürlüğü, 1944); Advertisement. *Ankara Rehberi [The Guide of Ankara]* (İstanbul: Pulhan Matbaası, 1949).

[235] Dündar, *Ozel Arsivinden Belgeler ve Anilariyla Vehbi Koç* 160.

[236] Government credits to importers were instated in 1950 and annulled in 1955. Ali Naci Karacan, "Basmakale: Çok Yerinde Bir Karar [A very well-thought decision]." Editorial. *Milliyet* 22 June 1955: 1

[237] James Barker, *The Economy of Turkey* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1952) 100; Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry and George Soule, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949).

[238] In the summer of 1951 an unheard number of 14,000 refrigerators were imported to Turkey. "Otomobil ve Buzdolaplari," *Milliyet* 11 Sep. 1951: 2; Also see Sevket Pamuk and Ercan Kumcu, *Artik Herkes Milyoner [Finally Everyone becomes a Millionaire]* (Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari, 2001) 23.

[239] Thornburg 251. In his report, Thorburg claimed that in order to promote democratic values Turkish people needed exposure to "the type of education which sound advertising [provided]," since it was " in the minds of the people that the desire for better living [should] begin."

[240] Daniel Lerner, "The Grocer and the Chief: A Parable," in *Readings in Rural Sociology*, ed. Oguz Ari ((Istanbul: Bogazici University Publications, 1977) 58-83. The essay portrays Lerner's observations of economic development in a Turkish small town in the early 1950s. Lerner observed that the market liberalization policy had transformed a traditional small town economy into a modern one.

[241] "Kisa Harici Haberler [Brief Foreign News]," *Milliyet* 10 Jan. 1952; Also see Sami Kohen, "Sami Kohen'in Amerika Mektuplari [Sami Kohen's Letters from America]: How do you do Mr Hill" Editorial. *Milliyet*, 2 June 1958; and "Sami Kohen'in Amerika Mektuplari: Hepsi Bey Gibi Yasiyor [They all Live like lords]" *Milliyet* 16 June 1958.

[242] Ümit Deniz, "Plastik Esya Sergisinde Nelerle Karsilastik," *Milliyet* 3 May 1953.

[243] See dailies *Zafer* and *Cumhuriyet* c. 1953 for a dramatic reportage of Turkey's emerging currency crisis.

[244] See *Milliyet* daily c.1954-59 for Turkey's foreign currency shortage and many policies that the government instituted to restrict importation.

[245] "Bol Miktarda Çesitli Ithal Mali Geliyor [Plenty of Various imported goods will arrive]," *Milliyet* 14 Oct., 1957: 2.

[246] The government eventually confiscated the goods and resold them to the public in various ways including auctioning.

[247] "Piyasada Yildirim Kontrolü Basladi," *Milliyet* 27 June 1956. The government fought the black-market by public scares, price controls, distributing them upon request, by undercover inspections, and finally by policing the markets.

[248] "Kaçakçilik Yapan Amerikali Onbasi Mahkum Oldu [American corporal Convicted for Smuggling]," *Milliyet* 1 March 1960.

[249] "Izmir'de Amerikan Pazarlari Kuruldu [American Markets are established in Izmir]," *Milliyet* 29 Oct. 1959: 3.

[250] "Fuara Gelen Mallar Bir Günde Satildi [The [foreign] goods that were brought to the fair were sold within a day]," *Milliyet* 16 Oct. 1959.

[251] See editorials in *Milliyet* daily *Kim*, and *Akis* newsweeklies c. 1954-59.

[252] Abdi Ipekçi, "Alman Mucizesi: Amerika bombalari ile yiktigi Almanya'yi dolarlari ile kalkindirdi [America destroyed Germany with bombs and helped it to develop with dollars]." Editorial. *Milliyet* 5 July 1957; Also see *Akis* weekly c. 1950s. The magazine published exposés of countries that were developed thanks to Marshall Plan. *Akis* 9.148 (1957) featured U.S. president Truman on the cover; *Akis* 10.160 (1957) featured German prime minister Konrad Adanauer.

[253] Neyyire, "Biz Kadinlar: Ev kadinligi ne güzel seydir[we woman: what a wonderful thing is housewifery," *Milliyet* 17 April 1956: 4.

[254] Ümit Deniz, "Onlar Niye Öyle, Biz Niye Böyleyiz?: Üç Katli Ev Bes Dolara [why are [Americans] are like that and why are we like this?: three-story house sells for five dollars.]" Editorial. *Milliyet* 12 Dec. 1960: 4; Also see journalist Burhan Felek's editorials in *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet* c. 1950s and 1960s that criticize disorganized and ineffective business practices in Turkey.

[255] Tevfik Çavdar and Doç. Dr. İlkay Sunar, "Demokrat Parti [the democrat party]," *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Turkey in the Republican Period]*, ed. Murat Belge (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1985).

[256] Arçelik, company memo, no. 57/30, 2 Feb 1960 in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 59. Vehbi Koç contributed as an investor to the Eregli steel plant.

[257] "Buz Dolabi Aksami Ithal Edildi [refrigerator parts are imported]," *Milliyet* 10 Nov. 1960

[258] Yilmaz Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü: Türkiye'de otomotiv sanayii nasil kuruldu?: anilar, belgeler, fotograflar [The story of the automobile. How was the Turkish automotive industry established? memoirs, documents, photographs]* (Bagcilar, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1996); Also see Bernar Nahum, *Koçta 44 Yilim: Bir Otomotiv Sanayii Kuruluyor* [My 44 years at Koç: An automotive industry is being established] (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1988)

[259] *Arçelik [1966 annual report],* Istanbul, 1966; *Profilo Holding Anonim Sirketi [1976 annual report],* Istanbul, 1976.

[260] "Ithalatçilar dün bazi kararlar aldilar [importers made certain decisions yesterday]," Milliyet 30 Sep. 1952: 2. Foreseeing the coming currency shortage Turkish importers adjusted their business plans as early as 1952.

[261] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 223-23.

[262] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 23.

[263] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 23. Importers such as Burla had experience in repairing and installing the machinery besides selling it.

[264] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 23.

[265] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 29.

[266] See Ekonomi Bakanlıgı Sanayi Tetkik Heyeti, *II. Beş Yıllık Sanayi Planı [The Second Five Year Plan] 1936-1941* (Ankara: Basvekalet Matbaasi, 1936) for president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's foreword.

[267] Vehbi Koç, "Cumhuriyet Devrinde Türk Ekonomisinin Dünü ve Bugünü," Harp Akademisi, 9 Feb 1994 <http://www.vehbiKoç.gen.tr/arasayfalar/diyorki/m7.html>

[268] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 22.

[269] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 27.

[270] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 30.

[271] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 31.

[272] Kayakan qtd in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 59.

[273] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 35.

[274] Arçelik, company memo, no. 40/13, 7 Jul 1958 in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 36.

[275] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 59; Yilmaz "Koç's CEO says creativity crucial for economies," *Turkish Daily News*, 21 Jun 2005 http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=16315&mailtofriend=1. Refrigerators, however, were technically much more challenging to produce than washing machines. As a result, the two partners sought technical assistance from giant international electrical goods manufacturers that their trading companies represented at the time. Specifically, they requested licensing and know-how agreements. Both Eli Burla's plea to Frigidaire, and Vehbi Koç's plea to General electric (GE) were rejected. The partners also went to German companies such as Siemens, Linde, and Bauknecht, to no avail. The bigger companies scorned the production capacity of the Turkish factory and thought the project to be inefficient and uninteresting. The smaller companies, despite that fact that they possessed much lesser technologies, however, demanded very

high licensing fees. The partners then went to an even smaller manufacturer for help. In 1959, they offered the same proposal to an Israeli firm called Amcor. Amcor was not interested in a partnership either, but wanted to share technology. According to the agreement made with Amcor, the Turkish company would not pay a licensing fee. The Israeli firm, on the other hand, would supply all of the parts for the refrigerators, along with assembly instructions, and technical assistance when needed.

[276] Ege Cansen, personal interview, May 2010.

[277] Cansen interview, 2010; *Arçelik [annual report 1966]*; Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 2 Sep. 1962. As it became evident that the factory in Sütlüce was becoming a mass producer of household durables, Lütfü Doruk revised the production management scheme and re-organized the factory space for the assembly of multiple products. However, the new system was not developed as ad hoc, piecemeal responses to new needs (as one can falsely conclude from the accounts of many Arçelik personnel who took part in it). The expansion gave Doruk the opportunity to establish a long-term system based on the traditions of the German industrial culture. It was implemented by managers such as Adnan Bensel and Feridun Civelekoglu who were trained in the German method, under the guidance of a German technical consultant. The factory space was rearranged to produce a variety of durables through a singular scheme that involved mechanical production, first assembly, dyeing, plastic galvanization and production, and the last assembly.

[278] Ann Ferebee, *A History of Design from the Victorian era to the present; a survey of the modern style in architecture, interior design, industrial design, graphic design, and photography* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970) 103-4.

[279] Jeffrey Meikle, *Design in the USA* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 154.

[280] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliye*t 4 Dec. 1962: 7.

[281] Aydın Boysan, personal phone interview, Feb? 2010; also Boysan qtd. in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 25; Also see Aydın Boysan, *Hayat, tatli, zehir: Aydın Boysan Kitabi*, ed. Ümit Bayazoglu (Istanbul: Türkiye Is Bankasi Kültür Yayinlari, 2007): 114.

[282] See Mete Tapan, "International Style: Liberalism in Architecture," in *Modern Turkish Architecture* ed. Renata Holod and Ahmet Evin (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984) 106. The liberal reorientation of the economy required new specialized building types that were still financed by the state. Turkey's partnership in the Marshall Plan and its increased connectivity with the West also brought the introduction of new construction techniques. Access to international stylistic and formal concepts, too, became easier; Also see Dogan Kuban, "A Survey of Modern Turkish Architecture," *Architecture in Continuity*, ed. Sherban Cantacuzino (New York: Aperture, 1985) 67. Since the post war economic relief created an increased demand for new construction private architectural offices proliferated. Turkish architects established themselves firmly as an organized professional body, marked by the foundation of the Turkish Chamber of Architects in 1954.

[283] Cansen, Boysan interviews, 2010.

[284] Peyami Safa, "Milli Sanayi Sergisi Kapanirken [As the National Industry Exhibition closes]," *Milliyet* 6 Nov. 1958: 2. While exhibitions such as the one in 1958 were ridiculed in the press, author Peyami Safa pointed to few good examples, that the author thought were proof that if they used care and attention, Turks, too could manufacture industrial goods.

[285] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 10 Dec. 1958: 5.

[286] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 25 Oct. 1959: 5.

[287] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 25 Dec. 1959: 5. This time the company proclaimed that "the soundest guarantee for the value and quality of this washing machine [was] the Arçelik brand."

[288] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Cumhuriyet* [Istanbul] 19 Mar. 1963.

[289] Boysan, *Hayat, tatli, zehir* 114, 117-119; Boysan, personal inteview, 2010; see also Arçelik 25.

[290] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 136.

[291] Ayse Bugra, "Non-market mechanism of Market Formation: The Development of the Consumer Durables Industry in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 19, (Fall 1988): 6 in footnote 2.

[292] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 9.

[293] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 136.

[294] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 4 Dec. 1962: 7

[295] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 9.

[296] Arçelik, company memo, no. 74/47, 10 Aug. 1962 in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 72. The associates decided to disseminate Arçelik products across the country according to the results of a long-term feasibility report.

[297] Arçelik refrigerator. Advertisement. *Hürriyet* Jan. 1968; Arçelik washing machine. Advertisement. *Hürriyet*, c. 1965; Arçelik gas stove. Advertisement. *Hürriyet* c. 1965; Arçelik gas stove. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 10 Oct. 1966: 3

[298] Arçelik, advertisement, *Cumhuriyet* 27 Dec. 1964.

[299] Arçelik, advertisement, *Hürriyet* Jan 1968

[300] Mustafa Sönmez, Türkiye Ekonomisinin 80 Yili (Istanbul: Istanbul Ticaret Odasi, 2004)106-128.

[301] AEG refrigerator, advertisement, *Milliyet* 25 Apr. 1965: 3.

[302] AEG refrigerator, advertisement, *Milliyet* 13 May 1965: 5.

[303] Arçelik, advertisement, *Milliyet* 4 May 1965: 3.

[304] Arçelik, advertisement, *Milliyet* 16 July 1966: 3.

[305] Arçelik, advertisement, *Milliyet* 30 June 1966: 3.

[306] Arçelik, advertisement, *Milliyet* 6 May 1968: 3.

[307] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 9 May 1968: 3.
The title read "it's not the foreign name but the [finished work] that counts. The phrase "finished work" was framed inside a rectangle and hung from the ellipsis at the end of the sentence. Arçelik ads delivered their message with a sense of play that made them accessible to a popular audience.

[308] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 22 May 1968: 3

[309] *Arçelik'te Bir Ay* 3, 1965. The winners were announced in the company newsletter. And the criteria for the awarded emblems were stated like this: "The [Arçelik] company has recognized that using multiple brand-emblems has had an adverse effect on customer psychology and that it has caused errors in the application of the emblem. For a long time the company has felt the need for an emblem that would represent Arçelik on its

products and on advertisements and one that would provide the unity [of Arçelik's corporate identity].” Also see *Milliyet* 23 Oct. 1965: 3 for the announcement; see *Hürriyet* c.1965 for the call for entries.

[310] Mehmet Güleryüz interview in *Grafik Tasarim*, no. 25, 2008: 29-31.

[311] Güleryüz interview, 2008.

[312] Güleryüz interview, 2008.

[313] Cigdem Demir, “Markalarda Kurumsal Kimlik Yenileme Kavrami [Corporate Identity Renovation Conceptions in Trademarks],” *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi Sanat Yazilari* 14 (2006). The same article was also published in *45e-grafik.net-elektronik grafik tasaryim dergisi* 1.1 (2005): 45-58.

[314] Ivan Chermayeff, Tom Geismar, Steff Geissbuhler, *Trademarks Designed by Chermayeff & Geismar* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2000)

[315] Chermayeff, Geismar, and Geissbuhler *Trademarks*.

[316] Meikle, *Design in the USA*, 170.

[317] Chermayeff, Geismar, and Geissbuhler *Trademarks*. Chermayeff and Geismar designed logotypes and emblems for Aygaz, Demirdöküm, Otosan, and Arçelik.

[318] Aylin Varol, “Tasarim Problem Çözmektir [design menas problem solving],” interview with Ivan Chermayeff and Tom Geismar, *Milliyet* 2 Apr. 2007 <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/02/04/pazar/paz01.html>

[319] Arçelik. “Imalat faaliyetleri hakkinda kisa bir bilgi [a brief information about manufacturing]” *Arçelik [1966 annual report]* Istanbul, 1966.

[320] *Arçelik [1966 annual report]*.

[321] *Arçelik [1966 annual report];* also see articles about the Arcelik company and the factory in trade journals. “Arçelik Kuruluşlarına Toplu Bir Bakış,” *Türkiye İktisat Postası* [Istanbul] 13 (1967): 13-17; Ekrem İrge, “Arçelik Fabrikaları,” *Türkiye İktisat Gazetesi* [Ankara] 491, 30 Aug. 1962, 4.

[322] Umur Çamaş, interview, *Mamulattan Markaya* 64.

[323] Arçelik. Advertisement. *Milliyet* 12 May 1966: 3.

[324] Umur Çamaş, personal interview, 2007.

[325] Çamaş 2007.

[326] Umur Çamaş, personal interview, 2010.

[327] Çamaş 2010. The plastic parts were produced by a vendor called Plastas, founded by Mordehay Çukurel.

[328] Çamaş 2007.

[329] Çamaş 2007. Arçelik began to modernize its product development principles around 1969 after the company made a partnership deal with General Electric.

[330] Çamaş 2007; Arçelik 203. Arçelik hired the marketing firm PEVA to help rationalize sales and product development.

[331] Çamaş 2007.

[332] Aydın Boysan and Ertem Ertunga, "1964 İzmir Fuar'ındaki Arçelik Pavyonu" *Mimarlik* 6 (1964): 31-34.

[333] AEG, advertisement, *Hürriyet* 9 Nov. 1971; AEG poli-üretan, "Paranizin darasi [the weight of your money]," advertisement, *Milliyet* 17 Mar. 1973: 3

[334] Arçelik, "Ne ödüyorsunuz, ne kazaniyorsunuz [what you get for what you pay]," advertisement, *Milliyet* 16 Aug 1972: 9

[335] Arçelik, "Dünya sogutma endüstrisinin en son yeniligi: Monoblok Polilüks [the latest advancement of the cooling industry of the world]," advertisement, *Milliyet* 10 Jul 1973: 3; Arçelik, advetisement, 27 May 1974

[336] AEG, "AEG'den zorunlu bir açiklama [an obligatory explanation from AEG]," advertisement, *Hürriyet* 3 Jul. 1974

[337] Cansen 2010; Çamaş 2007, 2010.

[338] Çamaş 2010.

[339] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 158.

[340] Ahmet Saraçoglu, personal interview, 2007.

[341] Saraçoglu, 2007.

[342] Hulki Alisbah, "Koç Holding Neden Kuruldu ve Gayesi Nedir?" *İktisadî Yürüyüş* [İstanbul] 434 (1964): sayfa: 3-7. The Turkish trade journal peinted articles on Koç that appeared in the *Fortune* and *Financial Times* magazines.

[343] Çamaş 2010; Salih Karabacak, personal interview, 2007. Karabacak stated that Arçelik collaborated with General Electic between 1965 and 85. Consequently the company began collaborating with Bosch-Siemens which lasted until 1995.

[344] Çamaş 2007.

[345] Çamaş 2010; Arçelik, "General electric buzdolaplarini Arçelik'te yaptiriyor [General electric gets its refrigerators to be produced at Arcelik]," *Milliyet* 28 Jun. 1972: 11.

[346] Çamaş 2010.

[347] Çamaş 2010.

[348] Arçelik, company memo, no. 138/111, 9 Jun. 1972 in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 209.

[349] Çamaş 2010.

[350] Saraçoglu 2007; Çamaş 2007.

[351] Arçelik, "Sessiz güzel [silent beauty]," advertisement, *Hürriyet* 2 Jul. 1974.

[352] Arçelik, "Türkiye'nin, yalniz buzdolabi üretecek olan tek fabrikasi Eskişehir'de hizmete girdi. Iste Dünyanin en modern buzdolabi fabrikalarindan biri, ve iste memleketimizin en mükemmel buzdolabi [Turkey's only

factory that is set to produce only refrigerators has opened. Here is world's one of the most modern refrigerator factories, and here is our conuntry's most perfect refrigerator]," advertisement, *Milliyet* 5 May 1976: 9.

[353] Arçelik family ads; Arçelik, *Aramiza Hos geldiniz…* (Istanbul 1966 and 1969). Arçelik published special brochures that boasted the benefits that the company extended to its workers; Arçelik 130-31. Arçelik dealers were brought together in Istanbul Hilton in April 1966. The dealers felt such an awe before Vehbi Koç that they rushed to get their photos taken with the man.

[354] Arçelik elektrik süpürgesi [Arçelik vacuum cleaner], advertisement, *Cumhuriyet* 28 Aug. 1966; Arçelik, "Beklediginiz televizyon Arçelik'ten [The tv you have been looking forward to is delivered by Arçelik]," advertisement, *Hürriyet* 20 Apr. 1975; Arçelik washer drier, "Beklediniz…kazandiniz [you waited …you won]," advertisement, *Hürriyet*, Mar. 1969

[355] Vehbi Koç, letter to Mehmet Sari, March 1969, in Arçelik 69

[356] Arçelik, "Öksüz buzdolabi almayiniz [do not buy an orphaned refrigerator]," advertisement, *Milliyet* 12 Jul. 1964: 6.

[357] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 75.

[358] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 69.

[359] Distribution was undertaken by a separate company called Beko in 1956.

[360] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 126.

[361] Bugra , "Non-market mechanism,"15.

[362] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 148.

[363] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 16.

[364] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 16.

[365] Aytekin Yildiz, "Tüketiciler için kredi fonu kurulmasi istendi [[Ministry of finance] requested the foundation of a consumer credits fund]," *Milliyet* 15 Feb. 1973: 9.

[366] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 16.

[367] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 17.

[368] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 129.

[369] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 142.

[370] Ugur Eksioglu, interview, in Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 136.

[371] Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 10.

[372] Arçelik, "Arçelik daha ucuzdur [Arçelik is cheaper]," advertisement, Milliyet 16 May 1963: 3; Arçelik, "Arçelik Geçen yil kendisinden sonra gelen buzdolabi markasindan 4 misli fazla satti [Arçelik sold four times as much as its closest follower]," advertisement, *Hürriyet* Mar. 1968.

[373] Çamaş 2010, Cansen 2010.

[374] Çamaş 2010.

[375] Çamaş 2010; Also Cansen attributes Arçeliks success to Vehbi Koç's business genius and his choice of the right technical partner.

[376] "Bir milyonuncu Arçelik Buzdolabi imal edildi [one millionth Arçelik refrigerator is produced]," *Milliyet* 10 Nov. 1974.

[377] Arçelik, "Milyonluk Tecrübe [the experience of a million]," advertisement, *Milliyet* 15 Apr. 1975: 6.

[378] Arçelik raffle, "Simdi Paris'e gitmek imkani elinizde [now you have the chance to visit Paris]." advertisement, Hürriyet 1965. The raffles of the early 1960s targeted the upper middle class by offering Arçelik customers the chance to win luxury automobiles, apartments, and foreign travel with their purchase; Arçelik raffle, advertisement, Milliyet 26 Dec. 1968: 1. By the late 1960s Arçelik products were more widely available. An Arçelik ad from the late 1960s offered newspaper readers the chance to win durables by collecting newspaper coupons. The ad proclaimed that the durables "were no longer luxuries, but have become natural needs for every home."

[379] Arçelik, "Mesut bir Aile [a happy family]," advertisement, *Hürriyet*, c. 1965.

[380] Aydogan Önol, "Artik onlarin da yepyeni buzdolabi, Çamaşir makinesi, elektrik süpürgesi var [Now, they, too have a refrigerator, a washing machine, and a vacuum cleaner]," *Hürriyet* 26 Mar. 1969: 1.

[381] Arçelik, "Bir milyon ailenin mutluluguna katki [contribution to the happieness of one million families]," advertisement, *Hürriyet*, 28 Oct. 1974.

[382] Arçelik, "Günlük yasantimizda Arçelik [Arçelik in our daily lives]," advertisement, *Hürriyet*, 1975.

[383] Ekrem Irge, "Arçelik Fabrikaları," *Türkiye iktisat gazetesi* 491, 30 Aug. 1962: 4

[384] M. Fuat Yücesoy, "Montaj Sanayiimiz ve Sağladığı Sonuçlar," *Ticaret ve Sanayi Dergisi* 587 (1964): 5-7; Also see M. Fuat Yücesoy, " Montaj Sanayiimizin 1965 Yılı Faaliyetleri," *Türkiye İktisat Gazetesi* 715 (1967): 1, 4; Mehmet Yaman, "Aleyhindeki Tenkidlere Rağmen Montaj Sanayiindeki Gelişmeler Ümitler Vaad Ediyor [developments in our assembly industry is promising despite its critics]," *Ticaret ve Sanayi* 29, (1969): 8-10.

[385] Mükerrem Hiç, "Sanayilesmede Montay Modeli [The assembly model within industrialization]," *Milliyet* 25 Jul. 1972: 2.; Erol Manisali, "Türk Sanayilesmesi ve Montaj Sanayi [Turkish industrialization and the assembly industry]," *Milliyet* 12 Jul. 1973: 2. "Ortak Pazar genel sekreteri ikaz etti: satacaginiz mallari imal edin," *Milliyet* 20 Feb. 1971 : 1. As Turkey's trade deficit worsened the country's Western creditors warned the country to produce goods not solely for the domestic market but better ones that Turkey could actually export.

[386] "Yabanci basinda Vehbi Koç [Vehbi Koç in the Foreign Press]," *İktisadî Yürüyüş* 475 (1967): 6-7, 10.

[387] Hulki Alisbah, "Holding Sisteminin Yurdumuzda İlk Örneği; Koç Holding Neden Kuruldu ve Gayesi Nedir? [The first example of the holfing system in our country: why was the Koç Holding founded and what's its purpose?]," *İktisadî Yürüyüş* 434 (1964): 3-4.

[388] "Koç: Demokrasi için özel sector çok çalismalidir [Koç: the private sector must work hard for the sake of democracy]," *Milliyet* 13 Apr. 1966: 1. In his speech at the 1966 Arçelik dealers meeting Vehbi Koç emphasized that Arçelik had won considerable public trust, despite sham, package industry accusations; "Özel Sektör, sermaye aleyhtari egilime karsi tedbir istiyor [The private sector wants precautions against the anti-capitalist tendencies', *Cumhuriyet* 19 Aug. 1967. In the late 1960s, the Turkish private sector was increasingly targeted as the source of Turkey's economic troubles by the rising leftists.

[389] Yildiz, "Tüketiciler için kredi fonu," 9; Bugra, "Non-market mechanism," 22.

[390] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 148.

CHAPTER 4

[391] Ahmet Azcanli, *Türk Otomotiv Sanayii'nin Tarihsel Gelisimi [The Development of Turkish Automotive Industry]* (Istanbul: Otomotiv Sanayii Dernegi, 1995): 145. In 1970, the government devaluated the Turkish Lira before the US dollar by 67 percent. Also see http://www.frmtr.com/ekonomi-iktisat-isletme/697580-devaluasyon-ekonomi.html for a history of overnight devaluations of the Turkish lira.

[392] Murat advertisement, "Rüyanizin gerçek olmasi için," *Hürriyet* 12 May 1971.

[393] "Demokrat Parti'nin Inkilapçi Iktisat Politikasi [The revolutionary economic policy of the Democrat Party]," *Zafer* 20 Feb. 1953:1, 3. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes defended the liberal economic policies of his government in these words: "Democrat Party government forbids the principle that develops the country's economy as a planned economy which is governed from the top and the center. The great economies of the world have not come to being with five year plans that belong to totalitarian states and with production plants that depend on state budgets, but they have come to being as the product of private enterprise and the intelligence of the citizens, as the product of the effort spent with their own free wills." Also see Mümtaz Faik Fenik, "Niçin Sanayi Planlari Yapmadik ? [why didn't we make industrial plans]" on the same issue of the *Zafer* newspaper.

[394] Önder Küçükerman, "Centuries Of History: Transition From Carriage To The Automotive Industry In Anatolia", *Turkishtime: Sectors*, (Istanbul: Türkiye İhracatçılar Meclisi (TİM), 2004): 160–173.

[395] Can Kiraç, "Kisiler ve Olaylar [people and events]," Izzettin Calislar, *Türk Sanayii* (Istanbul: ISO, 2002): 152-3. Kiraç notes that, the economic environment of the 1950s was not conducive for businessman like Vehbi Koç to get into industry.

[396] "Bedelsiz Ithalata Ait Son Kararlar [Recent Decisions Regarding Duty Free Importation]," *Milliyet* 6 Mar. 1956. Also see, "Otomobil Getirme Yollari [methods of bringing automobiles into the country]," *Milliyet 1968 Otomobil Ilavesi* 28 Dec. 1968: 2.

[397] Önder Küçükerman, *Türk Otomobiliyle 50 Yil [50 years with the Turkish automobile]* (Istanbul: Rahmi Koç Müzesi, 2004): 17. Also see "Türk-Japon ticareti [Turkish Japanese trade]," *Milliyet* 16 Dec. 1953: 2. For example, in 1953, Milliyet newspaper reported that Turkey has imported car parts and electrical durables in exchange of tons of raw cotton. President Cemal Gürsel's comments were confirmed by many such newspaper reports during the 1950s and the 1960s when Turkey was primarily an agricultural exporter and an industrial product importer.

[398] *Kalkinma Plani (Birinci Bes Yil) 1963-1967 [the first five year development plan 1963-1967]* 348; Kemalettin Vardar, "Devrimi Nasil Yaptik? [how we produced the Devrim]," Izzettin Calislar, *Türk Sanayii* (Istanbul: ISO, 2002) 120.

[399] A. Nejat Ölçen, "Yerli Oto ve Plan [domestic car and the plan]," *Milliyet* 29 Dec. 1966: 2.

[400] "Yerli otomobil yapmak için dokuz sirket birlesti [nine companies united to produce a domestic car]," Milliyet 16 Jan. 1961: 1. Also see "Oto imaline dair bir konferans verildi [conference regarding automobile production]," *Milliyet* 13 Feb. 1961: 3. The first of the two conferences that were held in 1961 was titled Financial Feasibility of Automobile Production in Turkey. Engineer Necmettin Erbakan delivered a rousing

speech promising that Turkish engineers were capable of producing automobiles and they would prove it if they were allowed to use the money spent on importing cars for manufacturing them nationally.

[401] Many members of the new government, state economic planners, and Turkish engineers opposed the assembly industry. These intellectuals gathered in two conferences in 1961. The second conference was organized by organized by the Chamber of Mechanical Engineers and titled as The Turkish Automobile Congress. "Otomobil imaline derhal baslanmasi mümkün [it is possible to begin production of cars immediately]," *Milliyet* 18 May 1961: 1.

[402] Kiraç 152. Kiraç attributes the criticism towards the assembly industry to the lack of dialogue between Turkish intellectuals and the Turkish bureaucracy.
Also see Oguz Öngen, "Getirilen 42 bin traktörden yarisi çalisiyor [only half of the tractors that were brought into Turkey are functioning]," *Milliyet* 29 Jul. 1962: 7. In the early 1960s, intellectuals criticized previous government's industrial purchases to be wasteful. They especially pointed to the thousands of imported tractors that were left irreparably broken due to the lack of government's technical investments. Also see Sitki Ulay, "Gürsel'in Sanayi Direktifi [Gürsel's orders for industry]," *Milliyet* 17 Sep. 1966: 2. The interim government that took over from the deposed Democrat Party made it a priority to break Turkey's technological dependence.

[403] "Otomobil imaline derhal baslanmasi mümkün [it is possible to begin production of cars immediately]" *Milliyet* 18 May 1961: 1. Also see Yilmaz Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü [the story of the automobile]* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1996) 220-21. When the government sought Germany's support in this endeavor, the German prime minister advised the Turkish minister of industry against establishing fully national car plants. Nevertheless, "the congress for a national automobile industry," that was gathered in 1961, declared that a folk type car could be produced domestically, and it would eventually sell for 20,000 Turkish liras (less than the price of a Volkswagen).

[404] Ölçen, "Yerli Oto ve Plan," 2.

[405]Arif Ergin, "Devrim arabalarinin tasarim boyutu [The design dimension of the Revolution cars]," *Cumhuriyet Bilim ve Teknik*, 13 Feb. 2009: 7, 15.

[406] Erdogan Bayraktar, "Türkiye'de otomobil yapilamaz iddiasi 'Devrim' ile çürütüldü [Devrim refuted the claim that cars can not be produced in Turkey]," *Milliyet* 30 Nov. 1961: 3.

[407] Mahmut Kiper, "Ilk yerli otomobil Devrim'in sonu…Umutlar benzinle tükendi [the end of the first domestic car…hopes were exhausted along with gas]," *Cumhuriyet Strateji* 215, 11 Aug. 2008: 6.

[408] Quoted in Can Kiraç, *Anilarimla Patronum Vehbi Koc* (Istanbul : Milliyet Yayinlari, 1995) 137.

[409] "Yerli otomobil bir yil tecrübe edilecek [the domestic car will be tested for a year]," *Milliyet* 1 Nov. 1961: 1.

[410] Erdogan Bayraktar, "Devrim otomobillerine yerlestirilen motörler netice verirse, Eskisehir D.D.Y. fabrikasi sadece motor yapacak [if the engines of the Revolution car yield good results, the State Railroads factory in Eskisehir will only produce engines]," *Milliyet* 6 Nov. 1961: 1.

[411] *Kalkinma Plani (Birinci Bes Yil) 1963-1967 [the first five year development plan 1963-1967]* 348.

[412] "Montaj Sanayi Talimati [Instructions for Assembly Industry," *T.C. Resmi Gazete* 14 Apr. 1964: 1. Also see Özdemir Kalpakçioglu, "Çelikbas'a göre vergi ve gümrük politikamiz yerli sanayi aleyhine [according to Çelikbas our taxation and customs policies are working against domestic producers]," *Milliyet* 18 Dec. 1961: 3. Nilüfer Yalçin, "Yurtta imal edilen mallar ithal edilmeyecek [the goods that are produced in the country will not be imported]," *Milliyet* 29 Jul. 1964: 1. Birol Maral, "Türkiye'de Kara Vasitalari Montaj Sanayi [the road transport vehicles assembly industry in Turkey]," *Mühendis ve Makina* 10.115 (1967): 221-23.

[413] "Otomobilde az tipe gidilmeli [production of fewer models of cars must be pursued]," *Milliyet* 3 Sep. 1965: 7. In 1965 participants in a seminar proposed that the country should focus on the production of a few models of passenger cars. Vehbi Koç, on the other hand, proposed that the country concentrate its resources on a single model.

[414] Vehbi Koç, *My Life Story* (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Foundation, 1977) 59. Vehbi Koç's father was too anxious when his son informed him about his idea of opening a Ford dealership in Ankara.

[415] Ayşe Üçok, *Sadberk Hanım: Koç Ailesi'nin yaşamı*, (Istanbul: Vehbi Koç Vakfi, 2005) 48.

[416] Bernar Nahum, *Koçta 44 Yilim: Bir Otomativ Sanayii Kuruluyor [My 44 years at Koç: An automotive industry was being established]* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1988) Also see Rahmi Koç "İş"le Geçen 50 Yılın Öyküsü [the story of 50 years spent with work]," *Capital* 1 Jun. 2008, M. Rauf Ates, <http://www.capital.com.tr/haber.aspx?HBR_KOD=4835>

[417] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 127.

[418] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 170.

[419] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 160.

[420] Nahum, *Kocta 44 Yilim* 121.

[421] "Anadol Arabalarinin Tarihi [the story of Anadol cars]," *Anadol Club*, <http://anadolclub.net/tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12>
Also see Ölçen, "Yerli Oto ve Plan," 2. State planner Ölçen noted that fiberglass was a feasible alternative to metal bodies if the annual volume of a car plant stayed within 7500 and 40000 units.

[422] Daniel Lockton, *Motor Vehicles in the developing World: options for sustainability* (Cambridge: Lockton Motor Limited, 2005) 5.

[423] Nahum, *Kocta 44 Yilim* 124.

[424] *Anadol Club*.

[425] *Anadol Club*.

[426] Nahum, *Kocta 44 Yilim* 125.

[427] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 234.

[428] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 246.

[429] While Çetiner reports that there were 80,000 entries to the naming campaign, Bernar Nahum puts this number as 150,000.

[430] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 241.

[431] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 244.

[432] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 244. Also Bernar Nahum mentions the mocking articles by journalist Çetin Altan that appeared in the *Milliyet* newspaper.

[433] Çetiner, *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 265.

[434] Ahmet Saraçoglu, personal interview, 2007. Also Nahum, *Kocta 44 Yilim* 114. Ford officials suggested Koç associates to do the assembly inside a warehouse and to avoid bricks and mortar investments.

[435] In the following years, TOFAŞ would gain even more significance, forced to improvise and manufacture most parts in-house, including parts that car producers acquired through third parties.

[436] Nahum, *Kocta 44 Yilim* 162.

[437] Izzet Pekarun, *Research on Automotive Industry: Supply and Demand in Automotive Products* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sanayi Kalkınma Bankası A.S., 1977) 36-37.

[438] Kiper, "Ilk yerli otomobil Devrim'in sonu," 7.

[439] Rüçhan Ünver, "Uçan Otolar [Flying automobiles]," *Milliyet* 14 Mar. 1956: 1. A Milliyet photographer caught a Cadillac in Istanbul streets whose importation was restricted in Turkey. The news report mockingly states that "this car definitely did not fly over the customs," but most probably brought into the country by a roundabout method.

[440] Pekarun, *Research on Automotive Industry* 36-7.

[441] Pekarun, *Research on Automotive Industry* 17.

[442] Hubert Bonin, Yannick Lung and Steve Tolliday eds., *Ford, 1903-2003: the European history vol 1* (Paris, P.L.A.G.E., 2003) 179

[443] "Volvo: Fabrika 700 bin metrekarelik bir saha kapliyor [Volvo: the factory covers a 700 thousand meter-square area," *Milliyet Otomobil Ilavesi* 12 Dec. 1969: 15.

[444] Orhan Tokatli, "Montaj imalatina izin verilmiyor [assembly production not permitted]," *Milliyet* 26 Oct. 1967: 1. The Turkish Ministry of Industry contacted seven manufacturers, some of which made offers for strictly assembly type production. The ministry favored offers from Fiat, Renault, and Opel, firms that expressed a commitment to establish a full-scale automotive manufacturing;
Also see "Dört otomobilden Fiat ve Volvo seçildi [Fiat and Volvo were chosen among the four cars considered]," *Hürriyet* 28 Mar. 1968: 1. The Ministry of Industry permitted the assembly production of Fiat 124 and Volvo P-144, while it rejected Renault 4 and Opel Record.

[445] Daniel Lockton, *Motor Vehicles,* 15. Lockton and others point that cars used in developing countries must withstand rough terrain, and they must also last longer.

[446] Orhan Tokatli, "Montaj imalatina izin verilmiyor [assembly production not permitted]"

[447] Joe H. Wherry, *Economy Car Blitz* (Westport, Connecticut: Associated Booksellers, 1956) 9-22.

[448] Wherry, *Economy Car Blitz* 10.

[449] Andrew Nahum, *Alec Issigonis* (London: The Design Council, 1988) 41.

[450] See Wherry *Economy Car Blitz* and Nahum *Alec Issigonis*.

[451] Wherry, *Economy Car Blitz* 20.

[452] Wherry, *Economy Car Blitz* 13.

[453] Hubert Bonin ed. *Ford, 1903-2003: the European history* (Paris: P.L.A.G.E., 2003). Most American companies were forced to adopt European methods of engineering in the following decades. See *Car and Driver 121* Jan 1971; *Car and Driver 189* Oct. 1976; *Car and Driver 210* Jul. 1978.

[454] Savas Arikan, fax to the author, 30 Jan. 2010.

[455] Jean-Pierre Bardou, Chanaron, Fridenson, M. Laux, trans. James M. Laux, *Automobile revolution: the impact of an industry* (University of North Carolina Press, 1982) 188-89; also see "Volkswagen Almanya disinda tesisler kuracak [Volkswagen will establish factories outside Germany]," *Milliyet* 2 Dec. 1969: 9.

[456] Andrew Roberts, "Classic Car: Renault 12," *The Independent*, 4 Sep. 2007.

[457] "Export: an economic necessity (1955-1975)," *Renault.com* <2http://www.renault.com/renault_com/en/main/10_GROUPE_RENAULT/70_Histoire/_55_75_Le_devoir_d_exporter___Nouvelles_orientations/>
Also see "1970 Fiat 124 - Road Test: A bigger engine, along with numerous subtle modifications, strengthens its position in the highly competitive small car market," *Car and Driver* Feb. 1970 : 57-58, 81.
The article pointed to Fiat's aggressive expansion to become world's leading small car manufacturer.

[458] "Export: an economic necessity (1955-1975)," *Renault.com*

[459] Broyer, Robert, Automobile bodies, Patent 3,672,718, 27 Jun. 1972.

[460] "1970 Fiat 124 - Road Test," *Car and Driver* Feb. 1970 : 81.

[461] "1970 Fiat 124 - Road Test," *Car and Driver* Feb. 1970 : 56.

[462] "1970 Fiat 124 - Road Test," *Car and Driver* Feb. 1970 : 58.

[463] Fiat advertisement, "Small cars Europeans have to choose from," *Car and Driver Jul*. 1974.

[464] "Fiat 124 TC," *Car and Driver* Nov. 1974. The review of Fiat 124 TC suggested that the "mild mannered exterior [hid] a far more appealing identity."

[465] These included advertisements, numerous promotions, and raffles that were related to the three Turkish cars that appeared in the media in the 1970s. "Murat'lariniz Hayirli Olsun [Good luck with your Murats," *Hürriyet* 25 Apr. 1971; "Hürriyet 71 model 7 sahane otomobil 77 bisiklet veriyor…[Hürriyet gives away 7 magnificient automobiles and 77 bicycles]," *Hürriyet* 15 May 1971: 1.

[466] Giles Chapman, "Umberto Agnelli : Urbane chairman of Fiat," *The Independent* 29 May 2004 can be found at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/umberto-agnelli-755507.html

[467] Umberto Agnelli, "Fiat sirketinin idare müdürü Umberto Agnelli'nin açilis konusmasinin Türkçe metni [the Turkish translation of the opening speech of Fiat executive director Umberto Agnelli,] Bursa 12 Feb. 1971," *e-ucy Web Günlüğü,* ed. Ugur Cem Yildiz, <http://www.e-ucy.com/site/downloads>

[468] Inan Kiraç, e-mail to the author, 8 Feb. 2010.

[469] Inan Kiraç, e-mail to the author, 8 Feb. 2010.

[470] Savas Arikan, fax to the author, 30 Jan. 2010.

[471] Savas Arikan, fax to the author, 30 Jan. 2010; Companies like Evsan and Plastas sold accessories for Murat 124 to help drivers both to bolster and to beautify their cars. For contemporary modifications of Murat's see

websites such as *Modifiyeli Arabalar* [modified cars] <http://modifiyeliarabalar.net/>, "Murat 124 Fan Club," *Facebook* <http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=26176528984>

[472] Kemal Büyükkurt, *An Inquiry into Some Variables of Buyer Behavior in the Market for Domestic Cars in Turkey*, M.S Thesis, (Istanbul: Bogaziçi Üniversitesi, 1976). While 82.9% of Murat owners identified themselves as "men of limited income," only 9.4% of Renault owners did so. Furthermore, 86.6% of Murat owner defined it as an "economy," and only 38.5% of Renault owners did so.

[473] Büyükkurt, *An Inquiry into Some Variables of Buyer Behavior* 63. According to Büyükkurt's study brakes, air conditioning, roominess, and the windscreen held strong significance for Murat owners.

[474] Büyükkurt, *An Inquiry into Some Variables of Buyer Behavior* 63. According to Büyükkurt's study, Road holding, design, and comfort held strong significance for Renault owners.

[475] Nuri Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan [belongings and humans]* (Ankara: Gündogan Yayinlari, 1991) 348-9.

[476] Çetiner , *Otomobilin Öyküsü* 305. Former Oyak-Renault manager Ates Ünal Erzen notes that the prices were controlled and the production run was limited. There were people who took advantage of the scarce supply. They made their down payment, got on the waiting lists and once they received their cars they resold them at much higher prices making unfair profits.

[477] Jeffrey Meikle, *Design in the USA* (New York : Oxford University Press, 2005) 151.

[478] T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati, *Kalkinma Plani (Birinci Bes Yil) 1963-1967 [the first five year development plan 1963-1967]* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Devlet Matbaasi, 1963) 349. Nevertheless, the percentage of passanger cars within the total number of vehicles was increasing throughout the 1960s. Between 1962 and 1967 the percentage of cars increased from 50 to 65.3 percent, yet a considerable number of commercial vehicles.

[479] Ölçen, "Yerli Oto ve Plan," 2.

[480] T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati, *Kalkinma Plani (Ikinci Bes Yil) 1968-1972 [the second five year development plan 1968-1972]* 4. One of the goals of the second five-year-plan was to achieve development without resorting foreign aid.

[481] Orhan Türel, "Sehrimizde TV ile Dünya Kupasi takib ediliyor [people watch the World Cup on TV in our city]," *Milliyet* 14 Jul. 1966: 1. "Evine 52 bin liraya 25 metrelik televizyon anteni insa etti [he spent 52 thousand liras to build a 25 meter tv antenna for his home], *Hürriyet c*. 1968.

[482] Oya Baydar; Derya Özkan eds., *75 yılda ddegisen yasam, degisen insan: Cumhuriyet modaları [Life and people that changed in 75 years: Fashions of the republic*] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari: 1999) 320.

[483] "Gecekonduda Televizyon: yalniz elektrigi yok [squatter has TV, but it has no electricity]," *Milliyet* 15 Nov. 1967: 1.

[484] Vedat Aslay, "TV gelirken [as the tv arrives]," *Milliyet* 3 Aug. 1967: 2. "Ecevit: Köprü yerine ormanlari isletecek yatirim yapilmali [instead of the bridge, investments must be made for the management of the forests]," In the 1960s Turkey's right-wing government promoted visible investments such as building an impressive bridge over Istanbul's Bosphorus strait, establishing an automotive industry and founding TV broadcasting. Leftist intellectuals and politicians opposed all three, considering them to be luxuries; Abdi Ipekçi, "Izahi gereken bir çelisme [a contradiction that needs explanation]," *Milliyet* 10 Apr. 1968: 1. Ipekçi accused the government of not fulfilling its promise to establish the TV broadcast. Burhan Felek, "Televizyon ve Dertleri [The TV and its troubles'" *Milliyet* 22 Dec. 1971: 2. In the late 1960s Felek frequently used his column to rally for the TV and to answer leftists who accused TV for being a bourgeois luxury.

[485] "Televizyon, 1968 programina alinmadi: planlama teskilati yeterli etüt olmadigi gerekçesiyle televizyonun kurulmasini erteledi [the tv was not includen in the 1968 budget: state planning organization put off the establishment of tv on the basis that there was not sufficient feasibility studies at hand]," *Milliyet* 11 Sep 1967: 7.

[486] Milliyet'e mektup: televizyon için her kafadan bir ses çikiyor [letter to Milliyet: everybody sings a different tune for TV]," *Milliyet* 21 Jan. 1970: 7; Haluk Altindag, "Milliyet'e mektup: Istanbul televizyon'a derhal kavusabilir [Letter to Milliyet: TV can reach Istanbul immediately]," *Milliyet* 23 Mar 1971. Milliyet readers pleaded with the government to estanblish TV in Turkey. Also see "Devletin yapamadigini bir genç yapiyor: Kolejli bir genç 15 gündür TV yayini yapiyor [he did what the state could not: a high school kid has been broadcasting for 15 days]," *Milliyet* 26 Mar. 1971: 1.

[487] Engin Cenkçi, "Kur'a çikinca muhtar TV'yi öptü [when he won the raffle, the head of the village kissed the TV," *Milliyet* 20 Aug. 1972:1. The Turkish Radio and Television institute (TRT) distributed 150 TV sets to 150 villages across TV, as the government worked to extend the broadcast across Turkey.

[488] Yavuz Gökmen, " 26 Milyon 350 bin kisi TV'yi izliyor [26,350,000 people are watching TV]," *Hürriyet* Jan 1977: 3. By the mid-1970s more than half the population received TV broadcast, and the government planned to extend the broadcast across the country by the end of the decade. There were 1,544,323 registered TV sets, which meant that there was a TV set for every 27 people. Also see Abdi Güzer, "Evin tek açik penceresi: Televizyon [the only open window in the house: television]," *Konut üzerine de(ne)meler* (Ankara: Mimarlar Derneği 2002): 43-45.

[489] Yener Süsoy, "Televizyon yayinlari bir saat uzuyor [daily TV broadcast will be extended by an hour]," *Milliyet* 22 Aug. 1972: 1; "Radyo TV Anketi: halk radyodan umudunu kesti, TV'yi begenmiyor [Radio and TV survey: the public gave up hope on the radio, and it does not like the TV]," *Hürriyet* 1 Jul. 1973. Despite extensions people's biggest complaint about the TV was still the short daily broadcast hours.

[490] Ahmet Saraçoglu, interview with the author, 7 Jun. 2007. Saraçoglu was a production engineer who worked for the Arçelik company in the 1970s.

[491] Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan [belongings and humans]* 348-9. Nuri Bilgin's study in 1979 pointed that village and small town households demanded durability from their purchased goods more than metropolitan households did.

[492] Saraçoglu, 2007.

[493] "Nordmende," *Wikipedia* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nordmende<wiki>

[494] Saraçoglu, 2007. The engineers wanted to achieve the most pleasing layout given the components that were purchased from the market. Their mission was to fit the controls inside the space left on the speaker column.

[495] Güzer, "Evin tek açik penceresi," 43.

[496] Halit Kivanç, *Telesafir: Bizde TV Böyle Başladı [tele-guest: this is how TV began [in our country]]* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002) Telesafir ("tele-guest") was a term invented by TV anchor Halit Kivanç.

[497] Rasim Adasal, "TV, kari-koca kavgalarini önlüyor [TV prevents domestic quarrels]," *Milliyet TV Radyo* 22 Jan. 1973: 3.

[498] Güzer, "Evin tek açik penceresi," 43.

[499] In 1978, Turkish newspapers began reporting factories that were closing due to the foreign currency shortage. Pürsas plastics co. advertisement, *Hürriyet* 22 Jan 1978. Some companies announced their closing by newspaper ads where they promised to resume production when foreign currency supply returned to normal.

[500] Lockton, *Motor Vehicles* 3. The author notes that majority of the vehicles produced in developing countries were based on obsolete or rarely current models from Western manufacturers.

[501] The beach buggy was designed by a second-generation Koç personnel, Bernar Nahum's son Jan Nahum who was trained in the Royal College of Art in car design.

CHAPTER 5

[502] Sevket Pamuk, "Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey," *MERIP Reports 93, Turkey: The Generals Take Over* (Jan., 1981) 28.

[503] *Aygaz: Bir Enerji Öyküsü*, <www.aygaz.com.tr> Aygaz has maintained a 30 percent market share of LPG distribution in Turkey since its inception in 1961.
Koç Toplulugu 2002 Çalisma Raporu. In 2002 Demirdöküm held 45 percent of the market for radiators, 34 percent for combination boilers, and 75 percent for water heaters.

[504] My approximations are based on a number of sources: Rusen Keles and Michael N. Danielson, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth in Modern Turkey* (New York and London: Holmes&Meier, 1985): table 2-4. According to a survey made in 1973, 39.7 percent of urban homes had refrigerators and 21.7 had washing machines.
Nuri Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan [belongings and humans]* (Ankara: Gündogan Yayinlari, 1991) 177.
According to the study Bilgin conducted in 1979, 65 percent of Turkish homes had refrigerators, 72 percent had TVs, and 29.5 percent had vacuum cleaners.
Annual production numbers of durables can be found in *Statistical Indicators* 1923-2008 (Ankara: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2008): 333.
My sources for the "number of Turkish households" are reported by Kemal Dervis (1973) and *Statistical Indicators* 1923-2008 (1975, 1980).
Kemal Dervis and Sherman Robinson, "The structure of income inequality in Turkey: 1950-1973," *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*, eds. Ergun Özbudun and Aydin Ünsal (New Yor and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1980): 83-122.

[505] My approximation is based on several newspaper reports that were published in 1975, 1976, and 1977 as well as Bilgin's study in 1979. "Her bin kisiden sadece 17'sinin televizyonu var [only 17 out of a thousand people have a TV set]," *Hürriyet* 22 Dec. 1975. There were 3,279 registered TV sets in Turkey in 1970. This number grew to approximately 680,000 in 1975 (in dicating that 10 percent of the households owned TVs in 1975).
"Dayanikli tüketim mallarina 1975'te 17,5 milyar lira gitti [17,5 billion Turkish liras were spent on durable goods in 1975]," *Milliyet* 20 Mar. 1976: 9. In 1975, almost a million TV sets were sold in Turkey.
Also Yavuz Gökmen, " 26 Milyon 350 bin kisi TV'yi izliyor [26,350,000 people are watching TV]," *Hürriyet* Jan 1977: 3. In 1977, there were 1,544,323 registered TV sets, which meant that approximately 17 percent of the households had TV sets.

[506] This number is compiled from several tables. "The growth of Turkey's Total Volume of Cars in Use (1950-1976)," *Transport Statistics 1966-1974*, SIS. In 1965, approximately 90,000 passenger cars existed in Turkey. TOFAŞ's annual production numbers can be fount at "TOFAŞ'in Tarihçesi," *e-ucy Web Günlüğü,* ed. Ugur Cem Yildiz, <http://www.e-ucy.com/site/downloads>

[507] In the 1970s, several companies introduced small electrical goods with injection-molded casings for the consumption of lower-income groups. Koç Holding's Simtel, Transtürk Holding's Evsan ("home-ind."), and Imesko were leading brands of small electrical goods. Other brands such as Ugurlu offered electric ovens, tv regulators, radios, irons. Another brand called Huzur offered carpet sweepers, hair dryers, bathroom cabinets, electrical space heaters, and go-carts.

[508] Tansı Senyapılı, "Charting the 'Voyage' of Squatter Housing," *Urban Spatial 'Quadruped'', European Journal of Turkish Studies, Thematic Issue 1 : Gecekondu* (2004). The isi model allowed even the squatter population to take over "vital functions in economic space and in turn obtained permanency both in economic and physical urban spaces."

[509] Akgün Aydeniz, "Gübreye Dikkat [pay attention to the feed]," *Milliyet* 8 May. 1974: 9

[510] *Statistical Indicators 1923-2008*. In 1950 urban population accounted for 5.2 million out of the total 20.9 million, and in 1975 it comprised 16.8 of the 40.3 million total.

[511] Mustafa Sönmez, Türkiye Ekonomisinin 80 Yili [80 years of the Turkish Economy] (Istanbul: Istanbul Ticaret Odasi, 2004) 122.

[512] Keles and Danielson, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization* 166 (Table 7-3).

[513] Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* London: Hurst & Company, 1964: 360-61. Ottoman conservatives viewed culture and civilization as separate concepts. Conservatives understood civilization to be related to technology, which could be borrowed. While they equated culture (*hars*) with Islamic tradition. In the 1910s, the Islamists warned against the cultural dangers that awaited Turkish students abroad. They stated: "If we must send our youth to Europe, we should send them only after having taught them our own customs and morality.... We are Orientals, and we shall always remain so."

[514] See *Aile Dergisi* published by Vedat Nedim Tör and Sevket Rado c. 1940s. The editors were progressive intellectuals who published a mixture of original and translated articles and that promoted the making of modern Turkish subjects and families. Also see *Yedigün* published By Sedat Simavi c. 1940. Simavi had close business relation with Turkey's leading importer Eli Burla, and his magazine weighed on promoting a consumer lifestyle.

[515] See Turkish poster artist Ihap Hulusi Görey's work for state enterprises such as Sümerbank and state banks such as Ziraat and Is Bankasi, c. 1930s, and 40s; Turkey's largest importer Burla Brothers also portrayed the modern family in its advertising.

[516] Nükhet Vardar, *TM 1: Türk Markalari: Her Ulke Markalari Kadar Zengindir [TM 1: Turkish brands: every country is as rich as its brands]* (Istanbul: Reklamcilik Vakfi Yayinlari, 2007). İrem Barutçu, *Babıâli Tanrıları: Simavi Ailesi* [the gods of Babiali: the Simavi family] (Istanbul: Agorakitapligi, 2004).

[517] Barutçu, *Babıâli Tanrıları: Simavi Ailesi*.

[518] Haydar Kazgan, "Tüketim için degil yatirim için borçlanma [borrowing for investment not for consumption]," *Milliyet* 13 Mar. 1976: 2.

[519] "Reklamin önemi ve sorunlari tartisiliyor [the importance and the problems of advertising is being discussed]," *Milliyet* 22 Feb. 1977: 3. Chairs of the Association for Improving Advertising (RGD) and the Turkish Businessmen and Industrialist Association (TUSIAD) expressed their commitment to improve private sector ads in order to set good examples to the public.

[520] "Türkiye reklam yatirimlri açisindan dünyada da 27. sirada," *Milliyet* 3 Feb 1977: 10.
"GDP per capita 1976 by country," *Nationmaster.com*
<http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_percap-economy-gdp-per-capita&date=1976>

[521] Önder Senyapili, "TV'nin etkisiyle gazetelerin hem göruunüsü hem de içerigi degisti," *Milliyet* 8 Jul. 1976: 5. 8.7.1976. Also see Önder Şenyapılı, Aysel Aziz, and İnci Gürel, *Karacan Armağanı yarışması* (İstanbul : Milliyet Yayınları, 1977).

[522] See dailies *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Tercüman*, and *Günaydin* c. 1970s.

[523] Halit Kivanç, *Telesafir: Bizde TV Böyle Başladı [tele-guest: this is how TV began [in our country]]* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2002) : 35. Ali Esin, Turkey's first TV weatherman, began a popular weather page in the Hürriyet newspaper.

[524] "Güzel lüks degildir [beautiful does not mean luxurious]," "Sahifelere hücum [rush to the pages]," *Hayat* c. 1954.

[525] Önder Senyapili, "1960'larda Türkiye'de TV'ni gerçeklesmesi için kosullar hazirdi [the conditions for tv's arrival in Turkey was ready in the 1960s," *Milliyet* 7 Jul. 1976: 5.

[526] Önder Senyapili, "TV kente yeni göçenleri kentlle bütünlestirmede bir ölçüde etkili oluyor [tv is successful to a degree in integrating recent migrants into the cities]," *Milliyet* 11 Jul. 1976: 5.

[527] Peyami Safa, "Daha çok'un pesinde [chasing the "more"], *Milliyet* 11 Feb. 1955: 2.

[528] Frederic Schwartz, *The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996) : 88.

[529] See Ayfer Tunç, *Bir Maniniz Yoksa Annemler Size Gelecek* (Istanbul: Anlatı, YKY, 2001) Tunç's discussion of the emergence of a consumer culture in the 1970s originates from her own memories.

[530] Paul Lewis, "The Poor Nations Still Await Most of OPEC's Promised Help," *New York Times* 16 March, 1975, E3. The five-fold rise in oil prices was bad enough for industrialized countries but it was even harsher for developing ones.

[531] The government issued bonds for savings in Turkish liras that were convertible to foreign currencies known as *dövize çevrilebilir mevduat* (DCM).

[532] Sevket Pamuk, "Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey," *MERIP Reports 93, Turkey: The Generals Take Over*, Jan. (1981): 29. Pamuk notes that the surprise remittance revenues caused government to abandon attempts to establish intermediate goods industries. Remittances were used by the industrial bourgeoisie "for another round of accumulation by fueling the production of consumer durables." Fuel crisis made exchange reserves to disappear quickly. But the right-wing coalition in 1975 chose to delay the crisis at all costs. "Consumer durables mania was continued with short-term borrowing in international markets under extremely unfavorable terms."

[533] See Dervis, *The Political Economy,* 101 for a breakdown of Turkey's households by occupation.

[534] Several sources indicate that there were approximately 600 thousand skilled and 800 thousand unskilled workers in Turkey in the late 1970s. See Dervis 101; Feyyaz Berker and Güngör Uras, *Fikir üreten fabrika : TÜSİAD'ın ilk on yılı 1970-1980 [the factory that produces ideas: the first decade of TUSIAD 1970-1980]* (Şişli, İstanbul : Doğan Kitap, 2009): 55; Also see Ertugrul Soysal, "Ekonomide hovardaliga paydos [put an end to squandering]," *Milliyet* 4 May. 1975: 2. Soysal, an industrialist, complained about the excessive demands of unions calling the situation a comedic quarrel made over a mere 500 thousand union-workers.

[535] Zeynep Oral, "Gallup Enstitüsü ve PEVA arastirmasi: Türk toplumunun sosyal görünümü [Gallup Institute and PEVA Poll: the social profile of the Turkish society]," *Milliyet* 21 Apr. to 3 May 1976: 5. The poll results were published with Oral's analyses in the Milliyet newspaper in thirteen consecutive articles.

[536] Zeynep Oral, "Çogunluk için yarin endise demek [for the majority tomorrow means anxiety]," *Milliyet* 22 Apr. 1976: 5.

[537] Keles 106, 40. Proportion of families living in regular housing and holding regular jobs decreased radically between 1960 and 1980. Proportion of families living in regular housing in Ankara decreased from 44 percent in

1960 to 27.6 percent in 1980. Proportion of families living in squatters who were supported by regular jobs (factory workers and civil servants) decreased from 53 percent in 1971 to 28 percent in 1978.

[538] Dervis *The Political Economy* 103. Rent from dwellings, that was a crucial source of income for white colloar workers, also became a source of income for unskilled, non-wage earners in the city in the 1970s.

CHAPTER 6

[539] Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert eds., *An economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1916*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.) Also see Mehmet Genç. "Ottoman Industry in the Fifteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics, and Main Trends," *Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500-1950,* ed. Donald Quataert (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994): 59-121.The Ottoman Empire channeled all its resources to provide for the imperial centers within its medieval provisionist economy. The Ottoman Empire could not risk making investments in technology that required a complete overhaul of its religiously sanctioned, closely guarded guild system.

[540] Kazgan, *Milliyet* 13 Mar. 1976: 2.

[541] See Inalcik *An economic and social history*. The social and economic roles ascribed to muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire were more closely guarded. This was especially true for small farmers who provided the bulk of the empire's revenues. The imperial authority sought to prevent the small farmers from dismantling their farms ("çift bozmak") to seek other occupations. Also see Sevgi Aktüre, *19. Yuzyil Sonunda Anadolu Kenti Mekansal Yapi Cozumlemesi* (Ankara: ODTU Mimarlik Fakultesi Baski Atolyesi, 1978). Private ownership was a new phenomenon that had emerged in the mid-nineteenth century.

[542] Vehbi Koc, speech, "Türk Ekonomisi'nin Dünü Ve Bugünü," Military Academy, Ankara, 9 Feb. 1994 <http://www.vehbikoc.gen.tr/arasayfalar/diyorki/m7.html>. Koç mentions the Izmir Economy Congress held in 1923 by Turkey's first president Kemal Atatürk, where principles for the creation of a national economy were put forth, as an encouragement for him to enter business.

[543] See Daniel Lerner, "The Passing of Traditional Society (1958)" and W.W. Rostow, "The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960)" in *From Modernization to Globalization: Perspectives on Development and Social Change*: *a reader*, ed. Roberts Timmons, (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000)

[544] Tansı Senyapılı, *Urban Spatial 'Quadruped'*. <http://www.ejts.org/document142.html.>
The Marshall Plan recommended the promotion of "agriculture, small scale manufacturing and consumer goods manufacturing" in developing countries. This liberal economic plan failed in Turkey and other developing countries for several reasons that were manifest for its critics from the beginning. Empowered by mechanized agriculture, landowners absorbed the small farms, creating millions of unemployed small-farmers. When these farmers came to the cities to seek work, being unskilled in manufacturing, they were not able to contribute to the establishment of a productive manufacturing sector. They remained as marginal workers with low labor efficiency.

[545] His closest counterpart in the developing world, Argentinian Torcuato di Tella, had started as a breadmaker.

[546] Sami Kohen, "degisen Romanya: kalkinma halka yeni aksediyor [the changing Romania: development just recently began to be felt by the people]" *Milliyet* 7 Feb. 1966: 3.

[547] Abdi Ipekçi, "Sovyetler Birliginde 10 Gün: Rusya'da halk çesit ve kalite ariyor [In Russia, people are looking for variety and quality], *Milliyet* 7 Dec. 1969: 7. In te 1960s, Turkish journalists visited countries of the Soviet block to report the living conditions of the people.

[548] T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati, *Kalkinma Plani (Ikinci Bes Yil) 1968-1972 [the second five year development plan 1968-1972]* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Devlet Matbaasi, 1967). See primer minister Süleyman Demirel's foreword to the *Second five year development plan*.

[549] T.C. Basbakanlik Devlet Planlama Teskilati, *Kalkinma Plani (Birinci Bes Yil) 1963-1967 [the first five year development plan 1963-1967]* (Ankara: Basbakanlik Devlet Matbaasi, 1963). See prime minister Ismet inönü's foreword to the *first five year development plan*.

[550] Burla distributed Telefunken radios, AEG electrical goods, and Frigidaire fridges.

[551] Önder Senyapili, "Kentlilesen Köylüler: gecekondu sorunu öncelikle bir gelir dagilimi sorunudur [urbanized villagers: the squatter is, before all else, an income distribution problem]," *Milliyet* 15 Jul 1976: 6. Senyapili mentions a squatter dweller who bought a modern dining service set with installments. Yet, the family still ate by squatting on the floor, from a single pot that they shared. Also see Önder Senyapili, *Kentlilesen Köylüler [urbanized villagers]* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1978).

[552] Senyapili, ""Kentlilesen Köylüler." Also Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan [belongings and humans]* (Ankara: Gündogan yayinlari, 1991). Senyapili's views were confirmed by Bilgin's study in 1979. Besides, as Mübeccel Kiray and others note, although squatters looked like them, they were not village homes. Bilgin's study confirms this view, aswell. In 1979, almost no village homes had showers, but 14 percent of squatter homes, and 50 percent of metropolitan homes featured them (Bilgin 177).

[553] Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan* 370.

[554] Senyapili, "Kentlilesen Köylüler," 6. Also Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan* 227. Squatter owners stocked up on small, cheaply produced items such as blow-dryers, electrical coffee grinders, mixers, and portable mini TVs. Many small electrical good manufacturers (such as Evsan, Simtel Teva/teba) emerged in the 1970s to tap into the urban lower-middle class market.

[555] Zeynep Oral, "Gallup Enstitüsü ve PEVA arastirmasi: En önemli ken sorunu trafik: [Gallup Institute and PEVA Poll: traffic is the most important urban problem]," *Milliyet* 30 Apr. 1976: 5. One of the subjects of the poll complained that that it took 45 minutes to drive down the Cagaloglu slope, "the same Cagaloglu slope that one used to walk down in five minutes."

[556] Oral *Milliyet* 30.04.1976: 5. In the mid-1970s car manufacturers were introducing nearly 50 thousand passenger cars into the traffic, most of which was absorbed by Istanbul. By 1975, there were nearly 300 thousand vehicles on Istanbul's streets.

[557] Senyapili, "Kentlilesen Köylüler," 6.

[558] Sevgi Aral, "Social Mobility in Turkey," *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*, eds. Ergun Özbudun and Aydin Ünsal (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1980): 496. The author suggests that the imagination of mobility is a stabilizing force in the society.

[559] The economically government that came to power in 1965 added investments to be made for TV broadcast to the Second five year development program.

[560] Abdi Güzer, *Konut üzerine denemeler* [writings on housing] (Ankara: Mimarlar Derneği, 2002): 78. Güzer notes that apartment buildings also absorbed commercial service functions becoming the dominant urban form in Turkey.

[561] Mümtaz Peker, "Türkiye'de içgöçün degisen yapisi [the changing structure of internal-migration in Turkey]," *75 yılda köylerden şehirlere [from the villages into the town in 75 years]* (ed. Oya Köymen (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999.): 295-304.

Rural migrants began asserting themselves in the cities, yearning for upward mobility in the 1960s and the 1970s. Yet, very few of these former-farmers were transformed into industrial workers in the real sense of the word. Those who were lucky found jobs in Turkey's isi factories. Many more simply catered to the main industries as cheap, unqualified labor and the rest simply served the rural-migrant communities (most women served without earning wages). Rural migrants acquired their income from the marginal ("*türedi*") jobs that they invented on their own.
Also see Mübeccel Kiray, "Azgelismis Ülkelerde Metropolitenlesme Süreçleri," *75 yılda değişen kent ve mimarlık [the city and architecture that changed within 75 years]*, ed. Yildiz Sey (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998): 99-106.
Rural migrants produced services for the market (services, repair, restaurants) on the periphery of industrial campuses. They contributed to the system by a chain of cheap, marginal labor that began in the small repair workshop (where the boys worked) and continued in the grocery store with help from no-wage children and ended in the home by a no-wage care-giving housewife.
Also see Hakan Yilmaz, "Küçük Üreticiler Cenneti [a small producers' heaven]," *Üç Kusak Cumhuriyet [Three Generations of the Republic],* ed. Ugur Tanyeli (Istanbul: Turkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi, 1998): 87-88. Typical income sources for squatter families were providing unskilled services and running small grocery stores (bakkal). The patriarch ran the business. Paid workers were kept to a minimum. Boys who drove tractors in the village, were sent out to work in the machine/repair shop. Women, who were agricultural producers in the villages became housewives in the cities.
Kiray in "Azgelismis Ülkelerde Metropolitenlesme," notes that the repair economy was essentially a rural economy where labor was cheaper than exchanged goods.

[562] Bilgin, *Esya ve Insan.*

[563] Kiray, "Azgelismis Ülkelerde Metropolitenlesme," 99.

[564] Ayse Bugra, "The Immoral Economy of Housing in Turkey," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 22.2* (1998): 283.

[565] This was when metropolitan markets were saturated and manufacturers began reaching out to small town and village populations, and down to the urban poor. See Senyapili *Urban Spatial 'Quadruped.'* Senyapili notes that between 1960 and 1970 the squatter population earned permanency in the urban economic space and sustained the internal market. Also Mustafa Sönmez, e-mail to the author, 20 Dec. 2010. Sönmez notes that, after they established themselves in the cities, the squatter dwellers became capable of purchasing durable goods.

[566] See, for example See Önder Senyapili's critique of TV brodcasting, "Düzensiz haberlesmenin kisilere yarari yok," *Milliyet* 15 July 1976. The author points to the lack of productive programming in the Turkish state TV, pointing that "disorganized communication has no benefit for the individuals. While accusing the government for deliberately distorting the educational mission of TV for the populist end of entertainment.

[567] Personal interview with former Transtürk Holding /Evsan engineer Nejat Olgaç, 24 May 2010; For a discussion of Transtürk Holding see Ahmet Cumhur Aytulun, *Türkiye Ekonomisine Yön Veren Holdingler [holding companies that createte the path for the Turkish economy]* (Ankara: Tüm Iktisatçilar Birligi Yayinlari, 1977).

[568] Aygaz dominated 30 percent of the LPG market, and Demirdöküm dominated the cast iron sanitary installations.

[569] Ayse Bugra, "Non-market mechanism of Market Formation: The Development of the Consumer Durables Industry in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 19, (Fall 1988): 10. Arçelik products consistently dominated the durable goods market in Turkey. In 1974, Arçelik sold 54 percent of all refrigerators and 83 percent of all washing machines.

[570] "GE Launches Drive to Build Sales, Jobs," *Pittsburg Press* 23 Apr. 1958: 29

[571] "Dayanikli tüketim mallarina 1975'te 17,5 milyar lira gitti [17,5 billion Turkish liras were spent on durable goods in 1975]," *Milliyet* 20 Mar. 1976: 9. Milliyet reported that in 1975, Turks spent a total of 17.5 billion Turkish Liras "to live a better life." The spending on durable goods had increased by 50 percent within a year. Most of the money was spent on automobiles, TVs, refrigerators, washing machines, sewing machines, and radios. Although the number of automobiles that were sold did not exceed 50 thousand units they accounted for two-thirds of the total amount spent on durables.

[572] The value for Turkey's negative trade balance is compiled from Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya: Arcelik Kurum Tarihi 1955-2000 [The corporate history of Arcelik 1955- 2000]* (Istanbul: Mepa Medya, 2001)

[573] Soysal *Milliyet* 4 May; 1975: 2; Erol Manisali, "Türk Sanayilesmesi ve Montaj Sanayi [Turkish industrialization and the assembly industry]," *Milliyet* 12 Jul. 1973: 2; Abdi Ipekçi, "Tüketim sanayi [consumption industry]," *Milliyet* 30 Apr. 1973: 1. Suat Aray, "AET ve Türk sanayiinin fiuat düzeyi [the price levels of industries of the European Community and Turkey]" *Milliyet* 1 Jun. 1972: 2.
The authors complained that there were too many produces in any given field of production (Soysal), bringing down overall profits. Besides these producers operated with high profit margins (Aray), got too comfortable with customs tax protections, and did not produce goods that could compete in the world markets.

[574] Ali Gevgili "Nasil bir tarih süreci içindedir Türkiye [the historic process that Turkey is going through]," *Milliyet* 9 Dec. 1975: 9.

[575] Kazgan, *Milliyet* 13 Mar. 1976: 2.

[576] Sevket Pamuk, "Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey," *MERIP Reports 93, Turkey: The Generals Take Over* (Jan., 1981) 29.

[577] Mustafa Sönmez, *Türkiye Ekonomisinin 80 Yili* [80 years of the Turkish Economy] (Istanbul: Istanbul Ticaret Odasi, 2004), 130-1. In January 24, 1980 the Turkish government issued economic stability measures to ensure the flow of foreign loans. The measures aimed at lowering the wages, liberating Turkey's national market, and privatizing state-run enterprises. These socially unpopular measures were enforced by the military government that took power in September 12, 1980,and were continued by its civilian successor throughout the 1980s.

[578] Pamuk, "Political Economy," 30.

[579] Salih Karabacak interview 2007.

[580] "Vaillant Acquires DemirDöküm from Koç Group," *Appliancemagazine.com*, 30 May 2007
< http://www.appliancemagazine.com/news.php?article=1072414&zone=0&first=3651>

[581] See TOFAS annual report at http://www.tofas.com.tr/backup/Documents/en/pdf/fr_2010.pdf. Koç Holding holds equal shares with Fiat Auto S.p.A in the TOFAS company.

[582] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 281. Arçelik Refrigerators were now being produced by a licensing agreement with Bosch-Siemes.

[583] Suna Kiraç. *Ömrümden Uzun Ideallerim Var* (Istanbul: Suna ve Inan Kiraç Vakfi, 2006)

[584] Arçelik, *Mamulattan Markaya* 302. Arçelik's decision to take independent action was celebrated in a corporate meeting report dated from 19.09.1996.

[585] Ümit Altun, personal interview, 2007. Altun pointed out that Arçelik products had more or less followed the general stylistic trends in durables design throughout its first three decades. However, the company truly capitalized on its own application of the soft-edged design style that had emerged in automotive design in the 1980s.

[586] Aylin Varol, "Tasarim Problem Çözmektir [design means problem solving]," interview with Ivan Chermayeff and Tom Geismar, *Milliyet* 2 Apr. 2007. <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/02/04/pazar/paz01.html>

[587] Nejat Olgaç, personal interview, 24 May 2010. Also Salih Karabacak, interview with the author, May 2007. In the 1970s, Arçelik managers still wanted to keep the designing of new parts to a minimum. They pressured their engineers to find ways to copy refrigerator designs as much as possible. Thus, Arçelik could not develop its refrigerator technology until the 1990s, when the company, wanting to break its dependence from foreign licensing, established an R&D department.

[588] See Vehbi Koç's bio "Founder" at <http://www.koc.com.tr/en-us/Corporate/Founder/Pages/Founder.aspx>.Vehbi Koç considered population explosion to be the primary factor that diminished per capita income and hampered the improvement of living standards in Turkey. In his later life, he worked towards family planning, receiving the United Nations World Population Planning Award in 1994.

[589] In the three decades that followed 1980, global capitalism gradually disabled Turkey's local bureaucracy from governing an independent industrialization policy.

[590] "Arçelik A.Ş. Is The Patent Champion Of Turkey Again By Fair," *Arçelik A.S.* <http://www.arcelikas.com.tr/Cultures/en-US/MedyaIliskileri/KurumsalHaberlerBasinBultenleri/05032010_en.htm?LANGUAGE=en-US&MENUID=3> Arçelik A.Ş. is the only Turkish company that is included in the list of 500 companies announced by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

[591] Bernar Nahum, *Kocta 44 Yilim: Bir Otomativ Sanayii Kuruluyor [My 44 years at Koç: An automotive industry was being established]* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1988). Vehbi Koç's primary associate in the automotive branch, Bernar Nahum, points to the significance of the balance of power between Koç's trading and industrial companies in ensuring the success of the corporation

[592] See the "Koçbank" article at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koçbank; Unicredit Pres Release. December 12, 2001. "Italian unicredit and turkish koc group enter into exclusive negotiations for a possible parthership, to establish leading financial group in Turkey" http://www.unicreditgroup.eu/en/pressreleases/PressRelease0993.htm;
Koç Holding Press Release 2002. "Unicredit & Koç Holding Cooperation That Was Established In 2002 On A Sound Foundation Within Koç Financial Services Has Exhibited Powerful Progress" http://www.koc.com.tr/en-us/Media_Center/PressReleases/Press_Releases/22.pdf >

[593] <http://www.ku.edu.tr/en/research/laboratories>