

Manufacturing Leviathan: International Order, States, and Failed States

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DISSERTATION

Submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Chicago, 2013

Chicago, Illinois

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRIC	Brazil-Russia-India-China
COW	Correlates of War
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPI	Foreign Portfolio Investment
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International Organization
LDC	Least Developed Country
MIFFS	Middle-Income Failed or Fragile State
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAT	Net Aid Transfers
OAU	Organization for African Unity
ODA	Official Development Aid
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

SUMMARY

This research focuses on the economic, political, and social relationships and interactions that constitute the contemporary international order and their effect on nation-state viability. The first four chapters outline the history and theory behind state development and international order from Seventeenth Century Europe to modern times. The argument advanced in these chapters is that Westphalian sovereignty along with economic and political liberalism eventually transformed themselves from novel policy innovations undertaken by a minority of European states into a normative and institutional incentive structure applicable to all. This is problematic for younger states because it fosters the expectation that developmental convergence via elections and open markets will be relatively quick and painless, certainly not the centuries long and often violent process that took place in Europe.

The final chapters outline the contemporary failed state debate and identify its emphasis on the domestic arena of states as limiting and problematic. Chapters six, seven, and eight develop an international model of nation-state failure and implement an empirical analysis of nation-states from 1970 to 2002. The findings indicate that diplomatic relationships with major powers, ideological alignment with major powers, and economic and social interdependence bolsters the viability of most states. These international variables out perform domestic variables, like state legitimacy and capacity, in terms of significance, effect-size, and consistency across models. What is more, the empirical results raise serious doubts about the efficacy and appropriateness of democratic and free market reforms, in their current formulation, for state development and stability, particularly for younger less developed states.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s there has developed an alarming number of nation-state failures indicated by the fragmentation of political legitimacy and deterioration of governing capacity within states.¹ Such states have tended to cluster geographically, predominately in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Goldstone et al., 2010). Nation-state failure has become a phenomenon largely of the Global South that poses general problems of human suffering and international instability.² More specifically, the ramifications of nation-state failure are multifaceted, having been linked to generating “instability, interstate, and civil war in their neighbors and near regions” (Iqbal and Starr, 2008, 328); facilitating “zones of impunity” where transnational criminal and terrorist organizations thrive (Carment et al., 2008); and contribute large destabilizing refugee flows, which according to the United Nations Refugee Agency, numbered 43.7 million people worldwide by the end of 2010. Together, these negative externalities jeopardize the functioning of global capitalism itself since “capitalism *requires* sovereign territorial entities to render coherent... the institutional and administrative arrangements (property rights and market laws) that underpin its functioning” (Harvey, 2010, 198 emphasis

¹ Though often accompanied by violence, a definition of nation-state failure must recognize that “violence alone does not condition [state] failure” (Rotberg, 2004, 4). Hobbes (1651, 185-186) understanding of “warre” supports skepticism of limiting a definition of nation-state failure to instances of physical violence since “Warre, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known.”

² While state failure has been most prevalent throughout the global South even Europe, long considered a stable “security community” (Deutsch, 1969) largely immune to violent domestic instability, has felt its effects with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia during the 1990s (Fukuyama, 2004). These failures stemmed, in part, from the multi-national aspects of these states, to their lack of “nationness”, which, in a period of political and economic decay, overrode ideologies of communist solidarity and fragmented fragile political authority.

added). Most ominous, efforts of nation building and foreign aid have proved mostly incapable of addressing nation-state failure (Bates, 2008b). Belatedly, scholars and policy makers alike have been compelled to recognize nation-state failure as an issue of the highest order but explanations are incomplete and remedies elusive.³

The occurrence of nation-state failure challenges our standard civilizational narrative, which posits a “unilinear” or progressive evolution of state development based, awkwardly, upon a unique Western European historical experience (Spruyt, 1994). Indeed, applications of this narrative to today’s states ignore discrepancies in the timing, sequencing, and international environment that were only operative for European states, like the possibility of foreign conquest. Contemporary explanations of state failure have it as fundamentally a problem associated with the lack of political community and provision of basic public goods caused by venal or inept political leadership often including a more general lament of disparate and traditional societies (Bates, 2008b; Rotberg, 2004). From this perspective states fail primarily by their own actions or inactions, from within. However, this accounting of failing states is difficult to reconcile with an age exemplified by unprecedented velocities of international political, economic, and social interactions along with deep interdependencies and dependencies. In the globalized world of the early twenty-first century it is difficult to uncritically maintain a *states fail by themselves* thesis.

³ In 2002 President George W. Bush laid out a U.S. National Security Strategy, which placed greater emphasis on failing states, arguing, “the events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.” Academics and policy makers view nation-state failure as principally a security issue but it only becomes a security issue after a prolonged unaddressed period of foreign policy neglect where weak states are allowed to become failed states.

Historically the viability of individual states has been as much a reflection of the nature of international order backed by powerful states as it has been of domestic political decision-making. Whether or not world order was premised, for example, on hereditary monarchy and balance of power or mercantilism and imperial expansion mattered for the decision-making and viability of individual states. Since the Westphalian Peace settlements of 1648 international orders have presented various types of incentive structures for states that constrain state action in some cases while compelling it in others. The intent of such orders has been to remedy the problems associated with the previous order and, less successfully, to anticipate the problems of the future (Holsti, 1991). It is from this vantage point that the nature of the contemporary international order becomes an object of interest for the current phenomenon of failing national states. Do states fail solely by themselves, or are there aspects of today's international order that raise the likelihood of state failure? The story of state failure is likely to remain incomplete and poorly understood without a serious consideration of past and present international orders and their impact on nation-state viability.

A. The Incentive Structure of the International Order

International order can be basically defined as “the pattern of activities or the set of arrangements that characterizes the mutual behavior of states” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, 269).⁴ In the absence of world government these patterned activities and sets of

⁴ This definition reveals a common bias towards the centrality of states relative to other international actors, such as international institutions and organizations, multinational corporations, and INGOs etc. However, states remain the most basic unit of the international system without which other international actors, arguably, could not exist or, at least, would have a much more difficult time existing without.

arrangements are fundamentally the byproduct of the interests of the world's more powerful states, states that have the military, political, economic, and cultural wherewithal to impose or insinuate their will at a global level.⁵ As such, international order is not solely a fixed system of control or a consensual system of regulation or even a disciplinary system. Rather, international order can be characterized as incorporating all of these elements, where the deployment of mechanisms of control, consensus or discipline is mediated by great power interest and the context of the moment. This state of international affairs has led some (Waltz, 1979) to question whether or not it is even useful to conceptualize international order beyond its most basic element of power asymmetries between states and to argue that what actually exists is, in fact, not order but anarchy. However, the appropriate question is not whether international order is rigidly "institutionalized", it is not, but whether despite gaps and inconsistencies its essential elements are "durable" persisting over time and adaptive to changing circumstances, which they are (Krasner, 1999). From this perspective core elements of today's international order, such as national sovereignty and economic and political liberalism, are quite durable, if not fully institutionalized.

There is a tension inherent within the demands projected by the contemporary international order, a tension that pressures nation-states to both centralize *and* disperse domestic political and economic authority, often simultaneously. From where does this

⁵ Susan Strange (1987) defines the influence powerful states, like the U.S., wield as "structural power." Structural power refers to a states ability to choose and shape the structure of the global political economy in which all states must operate, control the ability to deny or increase other states security from violence, control the system of production of goods and services, determine the contours of finance and credit, and have the most influence over knowledge, communication and the storage of knowledge and information.

tension derive? First, nation-states are to be nationally sovereign, that is, they are to hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders and are responsible for population, necessitating a *centralizing* of political and economic power. Second, nation-states are to be liberal, that is, they are to be first and foremost economically liberal, open to penetration by an international market economy by way of establishing an open domestic economy. States are also expected to be politically liberal, representative of their invariably disparate societal groups. Both of these liberal impulses necessitate a *dispersion* of economic and political authority. Nation-states which fail or resist conforming to these conflicting impulses of international order risk political and economic isolation, or at the extreme, pariah status, sanctions, or military intervention. In its essence, the contemporary international order manufactures nation-states along the lines of national sovereignty and economic and political liberalism, and where possible disciplines states that deviate from these models. The long established nation-states of the West have largely, over time and through titanic struggle, reconciled these discordant demands for political and economic centralization and dispersion. For young and poor states of the global South (also the majority of states), however, this tension can be overwhelming to the point where the center can no longer hold and state failure suddenly becomes a very real possibility.

The contours of the contemporary international order constrain state action generally and delineate specific pathways of state development in particular. These constraints and developmental models are doubly in effect for most states of the global South. In order to catalyze the universality of national sovereignty, states have not been suffered the time to earn national sovereignty through demonstrating the institutional

capacity to act on the behalf of their societies, thus earning legitimacy. On the contrary, the legitimacy and capacity of a state are not necessary criteria of contemporary national sovereignty (Krasner, 2001). Instead, new states have been granted de facto sovereignty along juridical lines by universal membership within the United Nations, establishing what has been called a “negative sovereignty” regime (Jackson, 1990). The maintenance of this negative sovereignty regime undermines the stability of the international system of national states, spreading, as it does, the number of weak states within the system. Indeed it is from this vast reservoir of weak states, comprised primarily of former colonies, from which failing states ultimately derive. In another age failing nation-states would likely invite foreign conquest, but wars of conquest no longer threaten the existence of states and conflict in general is declining (Mueller, 2009; Goldstein, 2011; Pinker, 2011). Today’s young and weak states have little to fear from foreign conquests prevalent in earlier eras of international order. One need only recall the predicament and ultimate dismemberment of Eastern European states in the 1930s between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia or the Dutch Republic, Austria, Prussia, and Russia during the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century to appreciate the real novelty of today’s conquest free environment. Since the end of WWII U.S. military preponderance vouchsafes the territorial integrity of the majority of nation-states from the predation of other states.⁶ This “territorial integrity norm” (Zacher, 2001) has insulated weak states

⁶ This does not mean that there has not been significant and persistent foreign intervention into the domestic affairs of other states, there has been, only that such interventions have very rarely resulted in the redrawing of territorial borders or the outright secession of territory common in earlier eras.

from the threat of foreign conquest, which has historically been a prime motivator for state strengthening development and reform (Tilly, 1992).⁷

The contemporary international order also puts tremendous pressure on individual states to open their economies and link up with a global market economy. Access to capital, in many ways the lifeblood of states, is given or withheld according to the degree to which states have opened their economies and lowered barriers to trade (Gilpin, 2001). Indeed a globe spanning institutional apparatus has been constructed since the middle of the twentieth century, comprised of the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), along with other regional organizations (NAFTA, the EU, ASEAN etc.) to help ensure that the world's states adhere to the principles of a liberal economy. In affect there is a disciplining of states towards "good behavior" that has been taking place, a discipline that has had many names: shock therapy, fiscal austerity, the Washington Consensus, neoliberalism, but which all amount to the same imperative: states must liberalize their economy (Harvey, 2010). Increasing wealth inequality within and between North and South states, an uptick in debt and speculative financial crises, along with occurrences of nation-state failure, have not yet tempered the demands for a more liberal global economy.

In short, the foundations of the contemporary international order instantiated in national sovereignty, and economic and political liberalism appear capable of undermining the viability of many of the world's newer states. Yet for all its seeming

⁷ There might, however, be an important qualifier to Tilly's (1992) argument that "states make war and wars make states." According to Sorensen (2001) war making as a force for state development is largely limited to European history and has been much less effective for the worlds' youngest states.

importance, rarely has the nature of the international order been considered central to the logic of nation-state failure. International order cannot be viewed as incidental to the occurrence of nation-state failure. The historical evolution of national sovereignty and economic and political liberalism were presented and gained strength as solutions to the problems presented by previous world orders e.g. mercantilism and monarchy. Yet universalizing national sovereignty has not produced viable nation states as originally conceived, while many states groan under the weight of liberal trading regimes or fracture under the demands of political liberalism. What were once solutions have increasingly become problems. Nation-state failure needs to be firmly situated within the context of the international order and investigated as an indication that aspects of contemporary world order may be edging closer to a limit. A historical understanding of the international orders that ushered in national sovereignty and economic and political liberalism along with the theories that justified their efficacy lies at the heart of understanding the contemporary international order and failing nation-states.

B. Towards an International Framework of Nation-State Failure

In order to make sense of this project one must appreciate the implications of our standard civilizational narrative of progressive state development.⁸ The dominance of this narrative was such that until the early 1990s most states of the South, despite many indications to the contrary, were unambiguously conceptualized as *developing* states. That is, these sovereign nation-states were on their way towards increasing the well being of their societies by establishing market economies and representative government.

⁸ This civilizational narrative “assumes movement in a single direction ending at a territorially sovereign state open to international trade” (Scott, 2009, 187).

Elements of the international order increasingly appeared to orient themselves towards aiding in the development of new states.⁹ Global financial institutions (the WB and IMF), initially consumed by the issues of macroeconomic stability and global exchange rates in the late 1940s to 1950s, eventually became, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, development banks, technical advisors, and arbiters of what constituted appropriate state development (Gilpin, 2001).¹⁰ However, the rise of nation-state failure after more than half a century of independence and development aid suggests that there is something seriously wrong with our narratives of developing states.

I submit that the goal of the contemporary international order has rarely been the development of the world's states. On the contrary, the overriding purpose of the contemporary international order has been, first and foremost, to make the world *visible* and *legible* by making states nationally sovereign and liberal. Visibility and legibility are distinguished by the amount of information they convey, from general recognition provided by visibility (national sovereignty) to detailed knowledge implied by legibility (liberal economic and political interactions). In and of themselves projects of visibility and legibility do not necessarily imply development, understood as rising society-wide

⁹ Holsti (1991) notes key elements of international order include great powers in general and the international and regional institutions, organizations, and arrangements that they cultivate in particular.

¹⁰ In the aftermath of WWII the U.S. and its West European allies established the Bretton Woods Institutions (1945), the IBRD (now the WB) and IMF, with the immediate goal of revitalizing a global economy ravaged by two decades of depression and war; re-establishing global macroeconomic stability and exchange rates were deemed necessary first steps to achieving this goal. Only after it was clear the global economy was stable and improving in the late 1950s did the Bretton Woods institutions begin to consider a broader development role (Gilpin, 2001).

well being and stability. They do, however, imply the use of power for the purpose of disciplinary control.

The idea of projects of “visibility” and “legibility” come, respectively, from the pioneering works of Anderson (1983) and Scott (1998) who analyzed the implementation of such projects under colonial and post-colonial administrations.¹¹ Projects of visibility and legibility were often heroic in design and intention but most fell well short of their object and *all* produced unintended results (Scott, 1998). The use of these concepts is rooted in the development experiences that took place *within* individual states. This raises questions. Is it appropriate to think of the international order, tenuous as it sometimes seems, as implementing projects of visibility and legibility? Also, can one meaningfully extrapolate from the domestic to the international in this case? Foucault’s (2008; 2007) work on European state development describes the culmination of a nationally liberal governance regime that focused on interests rather than subjects. This view was universalized and projected abroad and helps bridge the gap, so to speak, between the domestic and systemic. Indeed, Foucault (2008) argues that processes of European state development laid the foundations for a nascent economic globalization that sought to rationalize the establishment of the non-western world as a domain for Western economic activity, remaking it in its own image. This perspective opens the possibility for a new understanding of nation-state failure, not only as a failure of domestic leadership and state-society, but as an unintended byproduct of the incentive

¹¹ Benedict Anderson (1983) provides examples of colonial “visibility” projects in his well-known chapter “Census, Map, Museum.” James Scott (1998) provides examples of post-colonial “legibility” projects including “villagization” and mono-crop agricultural policies in West Africa in “Seeing Like A State.”

structure of the international order, which seeks less to develop its environment than to *know* it.

Translating the concepts of visibility and legibility into an analysis of the international order and nation-state failure requires that they first be elaborated, adapted, and generalized beyond their original applications in domestic studies of colonial and post colonial administrations. Indeed, despite the fact that these terms imply a varying degree of information and action, from the general (visibility) to the specific (legibility), their original usage has them as essentially similar. This analysis will place greater emphasize on their differences, in the depth of information they convey and activity they facilitate, in order to apply them to the international order and nation-state failures of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Finally, Foucault's idea of a liberal governance regime focusing on interests will be presented and elaborated as an ideological link connecting the history of European state building with what would eventually become the incentive structure of the international order for states.

II. MAKING THINGS VISIBLE

The era of Western colonialism began in the fifteenth century and did not end until the late twentieth century.¹² Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most of the world was formally or informally under the colonial control of a handful of powerful states: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S. (Hobsbawm, 1989). Hobsbawm (1975, 131) elaborates that in early stages of colonization Western states “were not particularly interested in occupying and administering colonies, so long as their citizens were given total freedom to do what they wanted...[however] they found themselves [over time] drawn into growing involvement in the affairs of such countries by the crumbling of indigenous regimes under the Western impact, as well as between rivalries of Western powers.” Compelled to fill the power vacuum caused by their presence, European colonizers increasingly deployed governing apparatuses, similar to ones used for their own state-building projects at home, abroad in an attempt to make visible and control local populations and resources.

For Anderson (1983) the census, map, and museum, together, provided a “totalizing classificatory grid” to make visible and control colonial peoples, territory, and resources. Visibility became the overriding but elusive goal of colonial administration of

¹² Despite a 1960 United Nations declaration formally ending colonialism, multiple small island/territory colonies remain under major power administration: Guam, Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands under U.S. authority; Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, St Helena, the British Virgin Islands, and the Pitcairn Islands under U.K. authority; and New Caledonia under French authority. Conventional explanations for continued foreign control is that these territories and their populations are too small and isolated to become viable states on their own, however, there may be other more self interested reasons such as several of them also providing strategic ports for navies or off-shore havens for capital.

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The populations and geographies of most colonies are diverse and presented a real challenge to colonial administrators seeking to comprehend and control their subject populations and territory. Absent familiar markers, colonial administrators often superimposed social classifications of Western origin, involving class and race, which had no real counter point in local populations. However, despite a lack of congruence between the visions of colonial administrators and what actually existed locally, colonial policies were ultimately profound in their effects. Anderson (1983, 169) is persuasive on this point.

“The new demographic topography put down deep social and institutional roots as the colonial state multiplied its size and functions. Guided by its imagined map it organized the new educational, juridical, public-health, police, and immigration bureaucracies it was building on the principle of ethno-racial hierarchies... The flow of subject-populations through the mesh of different schools, courts, clinics, police stations and immigrations offices created “traffic-habits” which in time gave real social life to the [colonial] state’s earlier fantasies.”

For Western colonizers the condition for establishing “visibility” was to make everything from people, territory, and resources “bounded, determinate, and -in principle- countable” (Anderson, 1983, 184-85).¹³ In short, by the late nineteenth century colonial administrations were self consciously applying a version of their own state-making policies but without the concern, of course, for fostering a unifying national identity and

¹³ Anderson (1983) elaborates that the image of “perfect visibility” colonial states aspired to create was deeply ambitious, influenced by Bentham’s Panopticon of total surveyability, and derived, in part, from “the deep driving power of capitalism.”

with a major emphasis on extraction for home country use. Such policies would have lasting negative political, economic, and social legacies long after independence from colonial rule (Migdal, 1988). Nevertheless, European colonial policies did establish a crudely effective visibility that facilitated, on the whole, their stable control of colonies.

Just as colonial administrations actively sought to make their colonial territories and populations visible in order to more fully control them, so to have major powers (primarily at U.S. behest), in the latter half of the twentieth century, attempted to engineer an international order conducive to establishing a broad but basic level of visibility that facilitates international politics. The principle method for establishing this sought after visibility has been the propagation of national sovereignty in states globally via the mechanism of universal United Nations membership. Jackson (1990, 76-77 emphasis added) has been one of the few scholars to describe in detail how this was accomplished and is worth quoting at length.

“The negative sovereignty ideal of self-determination as a categorical right of all colonial peoples was asserted by a succession of UN General Assembly resolutions which eventually shaped international legitimacy on the issue. Among the most significant were Resolution 421 (1950) which called for a study of the ways and means “which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination”, Resolution 637 (1952) which declared that the right to self-determination “is a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights”, and Resolution 1188 (1957) which held that self-determination was a right deserving due respect from member states...[these resolutions led to] the celebrated 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514) which proclaimed that “all peoples

have the right to self-determination” and “*inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.*”

After UN Resolution 1514, sovereignty has, with few exceptions, rarely been a status achieved through struggle and the demonstrated capacity to govern and has since most commonly been achieved externally, through UN bureaucratic fiat. This raises several important questions as to why major powers in general and the U.S. in particular were so adamant on precipitously ending colonial rule, even milder forms of foreign control such as trusteeships, despite the pervasive and obvious “inadequacy of political, economic, social, and educational preparedness” of many colonies for sovereign statehood.¹⁴

Clearly liberal norms of self-determination and the growing illegitimacy of colonialism played a significant role, as did American Cold War security concerns that maintaining colonies would enhance the foreign policy position of Soviet Russia as a defender of the dispossessed (Jackson, 1990). However, liberal norms and major power security concerns were not the only motivations or even, in retrospect, the most compelling for rapid decolonization.

The capitalist world economy after WWII was in shambles and the very idea of economic liberalism was being subjected to intense scrutiny. Even bastions of liberal economics (the U.K. and U.S.) had become much more receptive, after two world wars, the Great Depression, and rise of communist Russia, to anti liberal ideas of economic

¹⁴ To be clear the push for decolonization among major powers came primarily from the U.S. and Soviet Union acting through the UN. According to Krasner (1999) there was considerable foot dragging by the UK (in Kenya) and France (in Vietnam and Algeria) but U.S. pressure and the high costs of postwar reconstruction at home eventually brought recalcitrant European states around to the decolonization position.

planning, the welfare state, and Keynesian policies of full employment, epitomized by post Beveridge Report policies in the U.K. and New Deal and Great Society policies in America (Hobsbawm, 1994). These were compromises intended to salvage and rebuild confidence in capitalism, domestically, by blunting some of its excesses. Likewise, the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions was also intended to salvage and rebuild confidence for global capitalism by facilitating a return to prosperity through establishing macroeconomic stability, global exchange rates, and, later, development (Gilpin, 2001). Placed within the broader context of rescuing capitalism abroad, rapid decolonization and the creation of many new sovereign states out of former colonies can be seen, in part, as yet another attempt at revitalizing global capitalism. Indeed, Harvey (2010, 198) notes that global markets rely heavily on stable sovereign nation-states “to render coherent (by force if necessary) the institutional and administrative arrangements (such as property rights and market laws) that underpin its functioning.” From this perspective it is significant that decolonization greatly expanded the number of potential open markets available to foreign capital and increased prospects for raising global aggregate demand, this during a time when traditional markets were either devastated or stagnant and demand anemic. If capital is the lifeblood of states, then opening new markets and maintaining strong global aggregate demand to soak up excess capital (profits) is the lifeblood of global capitalism (Harvey, 2010).¹⁵

¹⁵ According to Harvey (2010) in order to solve capitalisms “demand problem” of exporting excess accumulated capital, new markets must be constantly cultivated abroad. Without new profitable investment outlets for capital, such as the emerging markets of young states, global capitalism courts recession or at the extreme economic depression.

Prior to decolonization, colonial markets were mostly the exclusive domains of colonizing states. Indeed, it was precisely the granting of sovereign statehood to former colonies that facilitated their visibility, incorporating them, as it did, into the global political and economic system. After all, sovereign status gave political leaders of these new states the legal authority to, “enter agreements, receive funding for development projects, borrow money from private banks and public institutions to finance other projects, grant to other nations concessions to their natural resources, or enter treaties that commit their people to legally binding obligations” (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, 18). In short, sovereign status was the condition of possibility for these new states to make credible commitments and, thus, be visible to the international order. Once visible, new states could be engaged in international politics and economics. However, the massive increase in responsibilities and duties inherent with the granting of sovereign status combined with the pervasive “inadequacy of political, economic, social, and educational preparedness” of newly independent states, forces one to marvel at the initial confidence many scholars and policymakers had towards prospects of post colonial development.¹⁶ The proliferation of failing nation-states indicates that the short term success of making former colonial states visible through sovereign independence has had long-term consequences that have been both costly and unintended. This has been the case largely

¹⁶ Huntington (1968), along with Myrdal (1968), took a minority position during this period of development optimism and argued that political and economic decay were just as likely as development and pointed to the rise of “praetorian” or “soft” states beset by domestic violence and political instability as evidence. Huntington’s classification of “praetorian states” marks the beginning of a trend of growing pessimism towards state development and modernization theories in political science. Following this negative trend, scholars have classified “weak states” (Migdal, 1988), “anarchic states” (Buzan, 1989), “quasi states” (Jackson, 1990), “collapsed states” (Zartman, 1995), “failed states” (Rotberg, 2004), and “fragile states” (Osaghae, 2007).

due to the great difficulty new states have had in making their societies legible to state administration and state institutions legible to the international order, a subject we now turn to.

A. Making Things Legible

Sovereign status provides the visibility that is the condition of possibility for states to interact internationally but it is economic and political liberalism that are the normative and institutional mediums through which engagement mostly operates. Liberal states are *legible* to the international order and, thus, preferred. What is more, the degree to which states become legible, that is more economically and politically liberal, is often a strong indicator of state viability. Unfortunately, the routes to developing economic and political liberalism are only generally understood. Indeed, international development institutions are frequently criticized for applying one size fits all policies that ignore the specific context of individual states (Stiglitz, 2002). Development policies advocated by international development institutions are frequently premised on the prior existence of hierarchical state leadership with the means to organize society. Yet state leadership endowed with the capability to organize society is precisely what is so often lacking and what needs to be developed before reforms meant for civil-bourgeois society can be successfully implemented.

Scott (1998) argues that “legibility” has long been a central problem of statecraft and reflects the operation of a “high-modernist ideology” first articulated in early modern Europe. Like visibility, the use of legibility as a term of analysis has its origins in domestic studies of state building where the object was the establishment of greater

knowledge and centralized control of populations and territory. In Europe, state building projects of legibility were “devoted to rationalizing and standardizing” their territory and population into an “administratively more convenient format [that] permitted a more finely tuned system of taxation and conscription...[and] also greatly enhanced state capacity” (Scott, 1998, 3). This process lasted centuries and, at times, could be quite violent. European states that are considered, today, to be strong unitary actors and models for global emulation, like the U.K., had to first hammer populations they claimed authority over into state administration. For example, when expanding its scope of authority into Wales in the early fifteenth century England fomented and brutally suppressed a 15 year long Welsh revolt, led by what would be the last Welsh Prince of Wales, Owain Glyndwr; a Scottish rebellion (the Bishops’ War) in the mid seventeenth century against tightening Anglican religious authority that led to the military occupation of Scotland; and in the early eighteenth century another Scottish (Jacobite) revolt against English rule over its Hanoverian succession.¹⁷ The histories of most European state building projects are replete with similar violent reactions by populations against being made legible by projects of state centralization. Indeed, Scott (1998, 82) argues, “modern statecraft is largely a project of internal colonization, often glossed... as a civilizing mission.” In many respects and not without irony, former colonial states would be motivated to undertake their own projects of “internal colonization” or development, in order to make legible and control their populations and territory.

¹⁷ For histories of the Welsh and Scottish revolts, respectively, see Glanmor Williams (2005) “Owain Glyndwr”, University of Wales Press and Edward Hyde Earl of Clarendon (2009) “The History of the Rebellion: A New Selection” edited by Paul Seaward, Oxford University Press.

Independence signaled the beginning of state building projects for most former colonial states. In the latter half of the twentieth century, newly independent states were expected to develop in stages, in a process that would eventually lead them to become much like liberal Western states (Wallerstein, 2004). This “convergence thesis” rests upon the idea that since industrial society requires a complex division of labor and international interdependence and the amount of international trade is great, the accompanying conceptual and institutional convergence must also be great (Gellner, 1983). However, state development is not a frictionless process, particularly for newly independent states dealing with the divisive political, economic, and social legacies of colonialism. Scott (1998, 183-184) argues persuasively on the challenges new states typically face.

“Most states, to speak broadly, are “younger” than the societies that they purport to administer. States therefore confront patterns of settlement, social relations, and production, not to mention a natural environment, that have evolved largely independent of state plans...the result is typically a diversity, complexity, and unrepeatability of social forms that are relatively opaque to the state, often purposefully so.”

Unlike former colonial states, European states were able to employ a full spectrum of state building strategies, including war, conquest, and mercantilism, over the span of several centuries before they even approached becoming the strong states we recognize today. These development options are no longer legitimately available to states.¹⁸ Also,

¹⁸ Huntington (1968, 46) emphasizes the significance that Western state building, “was spread over several centuries; in general, one issue or one crisis was dealt with at a time. In the modernization of the non-Western parts of the world, however, the problems of the

new states are expected, not least by their own populations, to achieve economic and political development in a few generations, certainly not centuries. Contrary to expectations, however, many states since independence have not achieved development, understood as growing open economies and stable representative government. Economic and political reforms initiated by new states have typically been thwarted by the illegibility of their societies and not without consequences for state viability. Scott (1998, 78) is specific on the potential consequences of illegible societies for states.

“An illegible society...is a hindrance to any effective intervention by the state, whether the purpose of that intervention is plunder or public welfare. As long as the state’s interest is largely confined to grabbing a few tons of grain and rounding up a few conscripts, the state’s ignorance may not be fatal. When, however, the state’s objective requires changing the daily habits (hygiene or health practices) or work performance (quality labor or machine maintenance) of its citizens, such ignorance can well be disabling.”

Changing the daily habits and work performances of populations is, of course, what development is all about and requires a high degree of societal legibility to be accomplished. Political development requires more than ratifying a constitution; subjects need to become informed and active citizens. Likewise, economic development requires more than building infrastructure and increases in GDP, masses of peasants and lumpenproletariat need to become educated and diversified labor forces as well as

centralization of authority, national integration, social mobilization, economic development, political participation, [and] social welfare have arisen not sequentially but simultaneously.” Consequently, prospects for successful state development in the South have proven much more elusive.

entrepreneurs. Indeed, what liberal political and economic development requires is no less than a total “transformation of society” (Stiglitz, 2002). However, such a transformation is unlikely to take place if a society remains illegible to the state center. Without the “administrative handles” provided by successful projects of legibility, the exercise of state power and the establishment of domestic order become extremely difficult (Scott, 2009).

Establishing system-wide legibility has been a major goal of the international order just as it has been a domestic goal of individual states. Global legibility requires that the international system of states be comprised, first and foremost, of economically liberal states and preferably, but not necessarily, politically liberal states as well. Indeed the absence of economically and politically liberal states over significant sections of the world, not to mention the alarming number of failing states, makes the exercise of international order difficult and prospects for violent instability high. States that are economically and politically liberal have the necessary “administrative handles” that makes the exercise of international order, through major powers, international institutions, organizations, and trade possible. From this vantage point, the establishment of international organizations (like the UN) espousing democratization and universal human rights and international financial and trade organizations (the WB, IMF, WTO etc) pushing for the liberalization of state economies can be seen for what they truly are, global projects of legibility. These global institutions, created, funded, and led by major powers, together produce the broadly liberal incentive structure of the current international order that states are expected, and pressured, to conform to. But, like their domestic counterparts, global projects of legibility have often fallen short or helped

produce unintended consequences, like the failure of nation-states. Some may take this as an indication that there is no meaningful international order. However, this indicates only that liberal international order is not rigidly institutionalized and that, despite its inconsistencies and gaps, it remains durable.

B. Governing: Subjects vs. Interests

The works of Anderson (1983) and Scott (1998) present critical studies of state administrations and their confrontations with opaque populations and territories. They argue, persuasively, that state administrations are constantly struggling, sometimes successfully but very often not, to make populations and territory both visible and legible in order to more fully control them. But both authors confine themselves to the domestic analysis of states and individual projects of state building. The possibility that their theoretical insights on domestic state building may have broader international implications and applications is beyond the purview of their impressive analyses. Part of the contribution this study seeks to make rests on adapting the concepts of visibility and legibility, in order to apply them to a broader international context of world order as incentive structure for states and the unintended consequences that result. Foucault provides a conduit that links the evolution of state building that took place in Europe with the incentive structure that came to define the international order.

According to Foucault (2008) by the mid eighteenth century in Europe the evolution of the “arts of governing men” began to increasingly reflect radical-utilitarian logic promulgated in England. Liberal political economy and the idea of mutually beneficial international trade via divisions of labor according to comparative advantages

presented a “radical” challenge to the zero-sum logic of mercantilism (Foucault, 2008).¹⁹ The idea of liberal political economy altered views on how the state should develop as well as the meaning of development itself. Previously, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was the art of governing that rationalized a governance regime of *raison d’état* where the issue before the “police” state was a politics of necessity, “governing with sufficient intensity, depth, and attention to detail to bring the state to its maximum strength” (Foucault, 2008, 19). The state that governed according to *raison d’état* became similar, in practice, to the “Leviathan” Hobbes (1651) envisioned as the salvation of a civil war torn England, a state increasing its scope of activity and strength through the centralization of political power in an absolute monarch.²⁰ In contrast, the new governance regime of liberal political economy focused on, “governing at the border between the too much and the too little, between the maximum and the minimum fixed by the nature of things...[that resulted in the]... emergence of this regime of truth as the principle of the self-limitation of government” (Foucault, 2008, 19). The “regime of truth” that measured success or failure for *raison d’état* was premised on whether or not the state itself grew, in population, wealth, and military power relative to other European states. The *raison d’état* state was expected to achieve this success by heavily intervening

¹⁹ The zero-sum logic of mercantilism (and contemporary Realist theory) is pessimistic about the absolute gains of trade and, instead, worries about the relative gains of trade, which could threaten the balance of power between states (Grieco, 1988).

²⁰ As an acute analyst of power during the English Civil War (1642-1651), Hobbes (1651, 185-186) famously argued “during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre, and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man...[which makes]... the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” Society required a “Leviathan” or “Mortal God” in the form of an absolute monarch to secure the “Common-Wealth.” England eventually ended up with Cromwell’s dictatorship (1653-1658) rather than absolute monarchy under Charles I (beheaded) or II (exiled), but the result was the same, a more politically centralized and powerful English State.

in all aspects of society via the active centralization of political and economic power to harness and control territory and population, usually but not always under absolute monarchy. The “regime of truth” applied by liberal political economy sought similar ends, growing state strength, but by very different means. The liberal state, in contrast, succeeds when it, “functions in terms of interest...But no longer the interest of an entirely self-referring state which seeks its own growth...interest is now...a complex interplay between individual and collective interests, between social utility and economic profit, between the equilibrium of the market and the regime of public authorities, between basic rights and the independence of the governed” (Foucault, 2008, 44). In Short, the liberal state is successful to the extent that it functions according to “natural” and “spontaneous mechanisms” exemplified by how markets determine value or deliberation leads to decision-making.²¹ For liberal states, civil society and its freedom of (economic) action is what increasingly becomes the central concern of government. A “bio-politics” obsessed with the individuals that comprise society would eventually transcend the prior fixation of states developing an ensemble of strong and centralized governing institutions overseen by an absolute monarch.²² This implies that where civil society was weak or lacking liberal states would, paradoxically, have to intervene in its protection or construction. Indeed it is the absence of civil society and the inability of liberalizing

²¹ Foucault (2008, 30-31) argues previous to this, in the Medieval Guild markets of Europe, the market acted as “a site of justice...[where]...What had to be ensured was the absence of fraud...[But]...When you allow the market to function by itself according to its nature...it permits the formation of a certain price [as a result of the interplay between supply and demand]...which no longer has any connotations of justice.”

²² Foucault (2007, 277) is specific that with the *raison d'état* state of the 16th and 17th centuries, “It is not men who must be happy or prosperous...it is the state itself...[and]...This is in fact one of the fundamental features of mercantilist politics at this time...The problem is the wealth of the state and not that of population...*Raison d'être* is a relationship of the state to itself.”

young states to cultivate one that compounds their weakness, for the liberal state is mostly blind without the organization of social interests telling it what it needs to do and not do. We will return to the significance of political economy, particularly from the mid twentieth century onwards, for state development in the section on economic liberalism.

The real significance of liberal political economy, however, was less what it implied for changes in the internal arrangements of states, though this was significant, but what it implied for changes in international arrangements between states. Hobsbawm (1989, 62) argues “the major fact about the 19th century is the creation of a single global economy, progressively reaching into the most remote corners of the world...[where a]...tightening web of transport drew even the backward and previously marginal into the world economy.” Mutually beneficial trade theorized by liberal political economy implied not only a reversal of the zero sum game of the *raison d'état* state utilizing mercantilist policies of jealous development but also a significant expansion of market activity. Indeed, Foucault (2008, 58) argues that the liberal ideal of “Perpetual Peace”, first envisioned by Immanuel Kant, required the “commercial globalization” implicit in the universalism of liberal economic theory to take effect.²³ A critical development facilitating liberal political economy and “commercial globalization” was the growing participation of European states in carving out colonies abroad. According to Hobsbawm (1989, 45) in nineteenth century Europe, “it is quite undeniable that the pressure of

²³ Kant’s (1795) “Perpetual Peace” envisioned all states having republican constitutions, the establishment of a federation of free states, and conditions of universal hospitality for the citizens of the world’s states. Today, these three elements have been re-conceptualized as the “Kantian triangle” of liberal international peace denoting a positive triangulation of democracy, international organizations, and economic interdependence (Russett and Oneal, 2001).

capital in search of more profitable investment, as of production in search of markets, contributed to policies of [colonial] expansion-including conquest.”²⁴ The competition for overseas colonies during the long peace of the Concert of Europe (approximately 1815-1870), for a time, helped assuage the fierce military-economic competition within Europe. The commercial globalization associated with colonial expansion temporarily addressed one of the central problems of European politics, how to manage transitions of state power, by relocating conflict prone competition abroad, in the race for colonies. It is no mere coincidence that a return of serious European conflict in the early twentieth century happened after the near total colonization of the world by European states. Once European colonization had reached its physical limits and further expansion was no longer available to remedy potential imbalances of power, conflict between European states made an epic return in the early and mid twentieth century (WWI and II).²⁵

Through the ascendance of liberal political economy in Europe we find the rationale for a global division of labor and the imperative for establishing a global market that required the world to be as open as possible to the flow of European capital. This became a central reason underpinning the motivation for colonial expansion in addition to the symbolism and prestige associated with attaining a colonial empire. Indeed, Harvey (2010, 192) notes “the rise of the modern state parallels the rise of capitalism and it was

²⁴ Hobsbawm (1989, 73) argues further, “All attempts to divorce the explanation of imperialism from the specific developments of capitalism in the late 19th century must be regarded as ideological exercises.”

²⁵ Continuing the theme of colonial expansion as “safety valve” Hobsbawm (1989, 37) notes that in addition to helping temporarily mollify a precarious European balance of power, colonial expansion also enabled mass emigration from late 19th century Europe and was “the safety valve which kept social pressure below the point of rebellion or revolution.”

the main capitalist powers that partitioned much of the Earth's surface into colonial possessions and imperial administrative forms, particularly in the period 1870 to 1925.” Thus by the late nineteenth century one can tentatively identify the beginnings of a liberal based international order backed by Europe's great powers in general but by the U.K. in particular. As the progenitor of the industrial revolution and liberal economic theory, the U.K. has long been noted as a hegemonic stabilizer during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that “created and enforced the rules of a liberal international economic order” (Gilpin, 1981, 144).²⁶ According to the theory of hegemonic stability the maintenance of liberal international order requires the active stewardship of a great power (Kindleberger, 1973). However, after WWI the U.K. was exhausted and no longer able to effectively play the role of hegemonic stabilizer and global economic depression and world war quickly followed. Only after WWII did the U.S. take on the role of hegemon and revitalize its experimentation with liberal internationalism dormant since Woodrow Wilson's administration.²⁷ The U.S. along with its allies remains the chief proponent and steward of the liberal incentive structure of the international order. From the eighteenth to twentieth century, liberal political economy evolved from a novel policy adopted by a handful of European states to become the dominant ideology underpinning

²⁶ According to Keohane (1984) the principle means by which a hegemonic state maintains international order is through its control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and by having a competitive advantage in the production of high value goods. Hegemonic stability relies on a mix of coercion and “asymmetrical cooperation” owing to the hegemon's ability to deny or grant access to capital, markets, resources, high value goods, and security to other states.

²⁷ Fukuyama (2004, 106) suggests, despite a history of isolationist and realist foreign policy choices, “Liberal internationalism...has a long and honored place in American foreign policy. The United States was the country that promoted the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a host of other international organizations.”

an international order backed by the world's most powerful state. The following section explores frameworks of international order provided by international relations theory and discusses how the decline in the occurrence of state death and the rise of state failure calls for a reappraisal of conventional understandings of international order.

III. INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY OR INTERNATIONAL ORDER?

Most international relations theory concedes a vital role for anarchy in structuring state behavior towards self-interest and survival. Anarchy provides powerful incentives for power maximizing behavior and states that do not act accordingly risk death by foreign conquest. These assumptions raise an important question, if international anarchy is pervasive, leading to processes where only the fit survive, then how do we explain failed states? Under conditions of self-help, failing states should be tempting targets, yet these vulnerable states avoid being selected out of the system. Failed states exist because international order is based on state sovereignty and backed by major powers. International order is more salient than anarchy generally and provides new vantage points to understand state failure in particular. Elements of the international order, like great powers and IOs, no longer tolerate state death but gaps in this order can provide conditions for state failure.

The sovereignty regime established by major powers after 1945 has made the occurrence of state death very unlikely. Wars of conquest no longer threaten the existence of states and conflict in general is declining (Mueller, 2009; Goldstein, 2011; Pinker, 2011). Such trends contrast sharply with theories that assume the international system is anarchic. Under conditions of anarchy (no universal government) the international environment should be pervasive with fear over the intentions of other states punctuated by violent conflicts of interest. However, today's international environment is marked more by increased democratization (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006) and the expansion of economic and social globalism (Keohane and Nye, 2000) than it is by war and conquest. These developments in international order have consequences for all states

but this study limits itself to the consequences it has for young and peripheral states in particular. For more than half a century now, the near absence of international anarchy means that the most severe threat to states is no longer death, understood as foreign conquest, occupation or annexation with the loss of policy control (Fazal, 2007). Instead the absence of anarchy has made state failure a more likely and, arguably, more severe threat to states. State failure occurs when a state's domestic authority and capacity to act deteriorates and leads to instability but its international juridical sovereignty remains secure.²⁸

State death rarely occurs because international order supports state sovereignty, diplomacy, aid, trade, and is backed by International Organizations (IOs) and major powers. Together, these elements of international order have largely supplanted anarchic conditions of self-help. However, international order is no panacea for weak states and states that would otherwise experience death by foreign conquest in a state of nature are now more likely to fail. In terms of the human health and security of state populations it is unclear whether failure is a superior position relative to death. Arguably state populations are worse off under conditions of failure since there is no incorporation or stabilization that comes from conquest, punitive as it may be. Instead the populations of failed states are forced to adapt to prolonged periods of instability and face dim prospects for future development (Collier, 2007). It is relatively clear why state death is possible

²⁸ Debate over defining state failure continues and ranges from abstract understandings of state failure as a process of nonlinear decay (Carment, 2003) to the occurrence of specific types of domestic instability (Goldstone et al., 2010). Here state failure is understood as deterioration in state legitimacy (economic and/or political) *and* the occurrence of domestic instability (rebellions, adverse regime changes, genocides and politicides, and/or revolutionary or ethnic wars).

under conditions of anarchy (only the fit survive) but we know much less about why state failure is possible under conditions of international order. Anarchy obscures more than it illuminates in international relations theory (Lake, 2011) and if we want to better understand the failure of states we need to revisit international order and identify elements that bolster and undermine state viability.

A. A Multiverse of International Order

Despite the predominance of viewing the international system as inherently anarchic there is a rich (but neglected) tradition within international relations theory that highlights the relevance of international order. Relational hierarchy, hegemonic stability, world systems, and international society perspectives all describe an international order that deeply impacts what is possible for state behavior and outcomes. Unfortunately, there has been little cross-fertilization between these international frameworks with each occupying a, mostly, distinct theoretical universe. These perspectives capture important elements of international order but none of them has adequately explored the issues of state death and state failure. Nevertheless, the respective strengths and limits of these systemic perspectives can help us identify where we should look to find an explanation for the ascendance of failure over death as the most severe outcome for states as well as new ways to address state failure.

Traditionally, the quality of international order (whether it is stable or not) in international relations theory has been understood as a byproduct of balance of power and diplomacy (Morgenthau, 1948). However, Waltz's (1979) Structural Realism gave a decisive role to international anarchy in determining state behavior and reduced the role

of international order to a pure state of nature. Evidence of liberal internationalism, the proliferation of IOs for example, can be explained away as merely the creation of new arenas for pursuing national interests as usual (Mearsheimer, 2001). In the *real* world each state possesses some offensive capability and you can never be sure about the intentions of other states. Consequently, states are motivated by the interest to survive and maximize power by balancing, bandwagoning or buck-passing. The pursuit of absolute gains (comparative advantage and trade openness) is often abandoned in favor of securing sub optimal relative gains (internal subsidies and external barriers) that maximize state power over other states (Grieco, 1988). Under conditions of anarchy weak and peripheral states take a back seat to the global spectacle of great power politics and are mostly limited to the roles of bystander, pawn or victim. Importantly, states that are weak and do not maximize power risk death by foreign conquest. However, instead of experiencing death by conquest such states are now much more likely to fail. The relative paucity of state death means that the international system is far less anarchic than some believe. International order safeguards most states from death, but not always from failure, and is the subject we now turn to.

Conventionally, hierarchy in international relations has been understood to reflect the distribution of capabilities amongst states and tells us whether the international system is multipolar, bipolar, or unipolar. However, polarity is too blunt an instrument to discern individual patterns of hierarchy between states and is limited to gauging whether the international system as a whole will be more or less stable, indicated by the prevalence of war. International relations theories in general and state failure theory in particular need to rediscover the nuanced pervasiveness of hierarchy in international

relations. The formal legalistic ideal of Westphalian sovereignty dominates our theoretical constructs but it does not always reflect real world practice since most states do not enjoy an indivisible sovereignty (Krasner, 1999). On the contrary, when major powers interact with minor powers *de jure* equality is a poor match against effective power and states are well aware of this fact and mostly act accordingly. Since the establishment of the United Nations (1945) and formal decolonization (1960) a “negative sovereignty” regime, where the criteria for sovereignty is juridical rather than empirical, backed by all major powers has ensured the continued existence (but not development) of weak or “quasi states” (Jackson, 1990). This does not mean that all hierarchy in international order is based on coercion, although it is implicit, and “relational hierarchies” between dominant and subordinate states can be based on legitimate authority that is mutually beneficial instead of exploitive (Lake, 2011).²⁹ The real value of the relational hierarchy approach is its focus on the relationships between dominant and subordinate states. From the standpoint of understanding processes of state death or failure the presence or absence of a relational hierarchy is likely to be a key factor. Indeed, the relational hierarchy framework provides a new vantage point to better understand state failure, which has primarily been understood as resulting from factors internal to states, like the presence of extractive political and economic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Any framework of state failure that does not focus on the absence or presence of hierarchical relationships between states as a causal factor is missing a fundamental fact of international order. As architects and stewards of

²⁹ According to Lake (2011) states engaged in relational hierarchy with the U.S. have sometimes benefited economically by adopting principles of trade openness and in the realm of security often have had their defense burdens diminished, freeing up resources for state development.

international order major powers have the ability to help, hinder, or ignore weaker states in the system and need to be incorporated into state failure theory and analysis.

Major powers possess military, economic, and (sometimes) cultural power that can be projected abroad. The ability to project power on a global scale means that these states help shape the rules of the game for international order, particularly in the realms of security and trade. According to Kindleberger (1973) the international system of states is most stable when a single state is dominant, when there is a hegemon. International order is conceptualized as a public good that few states are willing or capable of taking responsibility for and is plagued by collective action and free rider problems, which requires hegemonic power to solve. A hegemonic state, like the U.S., provides order through leadership that involves inducing and coercing other states to support the system (Keohane, 1984). Hegemonic power derives from the Hegemon's ability to grant or deny access to markets, credit, and from its ability to punish most wayward states with overwhelming political and military power (Gilpin, 2001). Consequently, states that buy into the hegemonic order, especially weak states, enhance their prospects for survival and those who resist face isolation, sanctions, and, at the extreme, armed interventions. U.S. hegemonic stability is based on the global dissemination of free market capitalism and democracy and despite the tarnishing of the Washington Consensus (Stiglitz, 2002) and mixed record of new democracies (Plattner, 2005) these policy ideals remain dominant within U.S. foreign policy circles and relevant IOs. The state-capitalism prevalent in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) states and Asian Tigers (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) is not a viable model for the majority of states to adopt and U.S. policy preferences for limited government and market liberalizations are still tangible for most

states working with global development institutions like the WB and IMF (Harvey, 2010). One of the weaknesses of HST is that it focuses primarily on the positive effects of hegemony, like global security (absence of state death) and economic growth but largely fails to evaluate possible unintended side effects, like state failure. Furthermore, the theoretical lens of HST is fixated on a single actor and misses the role played by other major powers in helping to maintain or, possibly, undermine the international order. A harsher criticism is that HST is little more than an apologia for U.S. power, which brings us to world systems analysis.

Since the nineteenth century a major facet of international relations has been the establishment of a global economic system based on capitalism. Most hail free market capitalism, with its secure property rights and rule of law, as the single most important contributor to the rise in global prosperity (North, 1981) and some for setting the conditions for a capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007).³⁰ Nevertheless, world systems analysis provides a critical framework of international order dominated by global capitalism and focuses on asymmetries in state development and wealth. According to Wallerstein (1979) international order is premised on an exploitive hierarchy with a developed core, semi-periphery, and underdeveloped periphery. The capitalist international order rests on a mix of interdependent and dependent economic relationships between states. Peripheral states are shielded from death by conquest but have their national interests realigned according to the needs of global capital and core economies. Some argue dependent economic relationships block autonomous state-society development and are prone to

³⁰ Gartzke (2007) argues that the liberal peace is less a byproduct of shared democracy and more connected to economic development, free markets, and shared economic interests between states, which discourages conflict.

ushering in periods of authoritarianism and socio-economic stagnation (Cardoso, 1972; Frank, 1975). In such scenarios high unemployment and stark inequalities in wealth are likely to follow and provide conditions for social alienation and domestic instability.³¹ Peripheral states avoid death in the capitalist world system but they can certainly fail. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) and the incorporation of China and Russia into the WTO in 2001 and 2012 respectively, radical theory of global capitalism has lost footing in international relations theory and has been criticized for its economic determinism and inability to account for post Cold War international developments, the Great Recession notwithstanding. While international economic interactions and relationships are important for all states other prominent issue areas remain that cannot be ignored, like the stock of norms that instantiate international society.

Norms are broadly understood as common values and preferences that evolve over time from repetitive practice. Norms can coalesce into regimes and help shape what is possible for the interactions between states since interactions that begin as a novelty can, in principle, evolve into imbedded routines (Ruggie, 1982). In the English School of international relations international society is more important than anarchy because states persistently recognize a basic set of norms regarding balance of power, diplomacy, international law, sovereignty, trade, and war (Vincent, 1974; Bull and Watson, 1984). The international society of states has largely succeeded in establishing a set of habits and

³¹ According to the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report high unemployment is a significant contributing factor for the internal instability of many Southern states. Unfortunately, unemployment is often associated with liberal reforms targeting inefficient state run industries and/or policies of fiscal austerity to control debt.

practices shaped towards the realization of common goals, like self-restraint in war and upholding the sanctity of agreements and contracts. While insecurity remains for the “anarchical society” of states, common values and expectations of reciprocity between states attenuate its grosser effects (Bull, 1977). Unfortunately such perspectives do not say very much about state failure, indeed, from international society perspectives states in general have long been in position to lose their preeminence. In this case, all states are on the threshold of an era of neo-medievalism where the overlapping jurisdictions and loyalties which fragmented early modern European authority (amongst king, noble, clergy, and burgher) will be cast anew with transnational corporations, supranational institutions, and other global networks taking the stage (Bull, 1977). In a neo-medieval international order states are in for a sizable downgrade in stature and will be more limited in their ability to control their own destinies. While it is certainly true that states have lost degrees of autonomy in relation to various international non-state actors, from social movements (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) to international financial institutions (Strange, 1996), the centrality and desirability of states remains firmly intact for the foreseeable future.³² Indeed, the issue today is less about the growing irrelevance of states and more about what can be done to make them stronger and more legitimate (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008). If any set of actors bears a disproportionate responsibility for the condition of international order and its states it is the world’s major powers.

³² The staying power of states as the preeminent unit of political organization for society is reflected, in part, by the continued desire and struggles of stateless peoples (Balochs, Basques, Chechens, Igbo, Kurds, Palestinians, Scots, Tamils etc.) to obtain their own national state.

Together these systemic approaches highlight a variety of ways international order, not anarchy, structures (negatively and positively) what is possible for states. World systems analysis tells us that the quality of economic relationships between states seriously impacts economic and political development, and for peripheral states this impact is often perceived to be negative. Yet despite the consequence of underdevelopment for peripheral states these states are also part of a global division of labor, which protects them from death by conquest since core economies rely on open doors to raw materials and new investment outlets for global capital. International society frameworks, likewise, point to the sets of normative practices operative in international law, organization, and trade and the resulting loss of policy autonomy and ability of states to control their own destinies. But the loss of policy autonomy experienced by most states is counterbalanced by other international norms, like respect for sovereignty, which safeguards them from state death. Finally, hegemonic stability and relational hierarchy perspectives find that the bulk of international order is provided by the most powerful state(s) in the system and individual states that buck this order pay consequences. However, there are rewards for states that buy into hegemonic order (security from conquest and access to capital) and states that subordinate themselves to other dominant states may enhance their security and development prospects as well. Clearly the international order matters for the viability of many states and has succeeded in making state death from wars of conquest an extremely rare event in international relations relative to earlier eras of state history (Holsti, 1991; Wallensteen, 2011). But closing off the possibility of state death has not been the only effect of international order. On the contrary, the same systemic forces that work against the occurrence of

state death likely play a role in shaping conditions for state failure. Unfortunately the international order has not been considered central to the logic of state failure and is the topic we now turn to.

B. The State of State Failure Research

Current trends in state failure research reflect a strong preference for intermediate and micro frameworks of analysis. This means that the majority of state failure research concerns itself with the internal dynamics of states, usually the legitimacy of leaders and capacity of state institutions (Lichbach, 1995; Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2004; Goldstone, 2008). What is more there is an implicit understanding in most state failure research that states exist in an anarchic system where external help is suspect and unreliable requiring them to solve their own problems, ideally through democratic and free market reforms. Democratization holds the key that unlocks state legitimacy since voters can throw bad leaders out of office and have an agreed upon framework (constitutional rules and the electoral process) to peaceably resolve disagreements. Likewise, economic liberalization is essential for achieving prosperity and wealth, which facilitates taxation and expansions in the states capacity to bureaucratically incorporate and service society. In principle democracy and market liberalization work together creating a positive feedback loop that reinforces state legitimacy and capacity while ushering in long periods of prosperous stability. However, the conclusions drawn from these intermediate and micro frameworks, like the idea that state failure is primarily an internal process best served by liberal reforms, are subject to an important limitation.

One problem with remedies most often prescribed by domestic frameworks of state failure (liberal reforms) is that the routes to successfully developing liberal economic and political norms and institutions are only very generally understood and, historically, have been long and difficult to achieve. This is doubly the case for states with mass rather than civil societies and colonial border legacies have all but assured most young states confront the former (Migdal, 1988). For example, Western states in general are often hailed as models for young states to emulate when it comes to the design of institutions and markets yet it took these states more than a century to hammer these processes out and most experienced periods of titanic struggle and severe instability along the way (Huntington, 1968; Tilly, 1992). European state development, much like state development today, was a highly contingent process, the difference being most European state entities did *not* survive. Indeed the various independent principalities, bishoprics, duchies, city leagues, and city-states of the Holy Roman Empire and Italian peninsula, the “states” of the early modern era, all experienced a mix of voluntary and coercive incorporations into the nation-states of Germany and Italy (Spruyt, 1994). Anarchic conditions can help explain this specific period of European history rather well since states that successfully maximized power frequently selected out other states that did not. Critically, it was the different types of issues these older states faced (internal *and* external threats, rivalry, war, and death), which place them in an incomparable category in relation to younger states. Today’s international system of states is far less anarchic than 17th and 18th century Europe, which means that states face weaker incentives to bureaucratically incorporate their populations for military conscription or develop an industrial capacity for an independent arms industry to avoid death by

conquest. Instead, a pervasive respect for state sovereignty and lack of external security threats provides conditions for some state leaders to engage in kleptocratic and patronage-based activity and to rule on the cheap by opting out of traditional state development frameworks (Herbst, 1990; Clapham, 2002; Ross, 2003; Bates, 2008). Under conditions of international order states no longer fear death and this, in part, provides incentives for unscrupulous leaders to focus on self-aggrandizement instead of state-society development.

Unfortunately, the apex of what we know about liberal economic development is that it requires, at minimum, an efficient property rights regime underwritten by state authority (North, 1981), while Moore (1966, 418) remains authoritative on liberal political development, “No bourgeois, no democracy.” There are no universal tried and true instruction manuals for developing a liberal state-society. Newly sovereign states in particular have struggled and in some cases given up the effort of making their societies more liberal. Indeed the majority of young states are only partially democratic and many more remain autocratic. Partial democracies are states that exhibit a mix of democratic and autocratic practices and are highly susceptible to experiencing internal conflict associated with state failure (Hegre et al., 2001; Goldstone et al., 2010). On the other hand autocratic regimes face constant uncertainty over future leadership successions (Olsen, 1993), which predispose them to failure as well. Consequently, many young states have large unincorporated selectorates with small unrepresentative winning coalitions and, without external threats, state leaders often choose to focus on their own political survival rather than state-society development (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003). While such states are essentially fearless when it comes to external security threats (like

foreign conquest) they do fear market forces that lay outside state control, like fluctuations in commodity prices, the herd mentality of foreign capital, and other exogenous shocks associated with a global market premised on creative destruction (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In this sense bad economic policy (barriers to foreign trade and investment) is often good domestic politics for leaders more interested in political survival than general state prosperity for the long term.

The value of democracy and free markets are supposed to be self-evident and the positive demonstration effect of Western stability and prosperity should be sufficient motivation for the rest of the world's states to follow suite. However, the occurrence of state failure makes it clear that there are problems with this rational convergence thesis. There has been an equally negative demonstration effect associated with the failure of elections to successfully establish democratic governance and the mixed track record of WB and IMF prescriptions of market liberalization successfully leading to development. Regarding democratization, the process all too often begins and ends with elections. The recent democratization efforts associated with the Color Revolutions suggests that the initial victory of successfully holding an election can be Pyrrhic and is often followed by the maintenance of the illiberal status quo. For example, the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia (2003), "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine (2004), "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan (2005), and "Cedar Revolution" in Lebanon (2005) did not bring lasting progress in democratic governance for these states. After all, elections without well-developed state institutions, organized political parties, social trust and tolerance or elections undertaken in the midst of pervasive poverty or conflict have limited prospects

for success (Rose and Shin, 2001).³³ There have been mixed results for states experimenting with market liberalization as well. For younger states in particular it is often difficult for state leaders to enlist society's support for liberal economic reforms. Indeed, good economic institutions do not, generally, generate their own popular demand (Fukuyama, 2004). Historically, the best hope for states achieving liberal economic reforms has been the presence of centralized state authority strong enough to weather the almost guaranteed push back from the large segments of society that do not immediately benefit from such reforms. In practice this tension between the need for the state and the requirements of markets can be insurmountable for younger states.

The near exclusive focus of state failure research on the internal dynamics of states is unwarranted since most would probably agree that state failure is a multi causal phenomenon with important motivating factors at all levels of analysis. According to Carment (2003, 410) there are three levels of state failure analysis that need to be explored: micro (internal violent interactions and events), intermediate (state-society relations), *and* macro (systemic interactions and transformations). We have little understanding of how current systemic interactions and transformations influence state failure. Indeed, the systemic transformation of the end of the Cold War is one of the few examples where a macro framework has been used to help understand state failure. The end of super power rivalry diminished the rationale for their external support of other

³³ The negative relationship between high poverty and the level and viability of democratic governance is well known. Lipset (1959) found evidence that the more well to do a nation, the greater its chances of sustaining democracy. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) have, likewise, found evidence for a positive relationship between wealth and democratic viability and identified a wealth threshold (a per capita national income around \$3000 to \$6000) where democracies become, essentially, "immortal." The opposite was found for impoverished democracies, which typically do not last long.

states and the resulting halt or limiting of support has undercut the legitimacy and capacity of many Southern states. Importantly, this fall in external support may have increased conditions for state failure (Ayoob, 1996; Van De Walle, 2004). Such a finding suggests that relationships between major and minor states play a key role in maintaining the viability of minor states yet major-minor relationships are not generally considered central in state failure theory.

There are, at least, two reasons why state failure research has focused almost exclusively on the intermediate and micro levels of analysis at the expense of macro perspectives. First, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 state failure has mostly been understood as a security threat instead of an issue of state development (Patrick, 2011). Failed states are thought to provide sanctuaries for transnational terrorism (Rotberg, 2002) and help establish zones of impunity that can draw in neighboring states (Iqbal and Starr, 2008). Second, when viewed principally as a security threat the demand for policy relevant analysis increases and leads to an emphasis on short-term risk assessment, presumably for the purpose of preemptive short-term humanitarian or military intervention. In an academic and political environment that stresses risk assessment and immediate policy relevant analysis systemic interactions and transformations are neglected because they are more associated with long-term analysis and solutions that are not readily applicable to immediate cases of state failure. In short, we have been focusing on the state failures of yesterday and today, cases for which we have a poor track record of success (Afghanistan, D.R. Congo, Haiti, Somalia, etc.), at the expense of anticipating the state failures of the future, which we may be in a better long-term position to prevent.

The reality that weak states are more likely, today, to undergo processes of state failure rather than experience state death raises serious questions about assumptions that the international system is anarchic. More importantly, it means the tendency to assume that the international system is anarchic distorts our understanding of state failure with omitted variable bias. Elements of the international order, like the relationships weak states have with major powers, are not central to the process of state failure as currently understood. Elements of the international order are frequently limited to the role of intervening variable (understood as episodic military interventions or humanitarian responses by major powers and IOs) outside the domestic logic of the state failure process. Under conditions of anarchy states are forced to engage in self-help and should be wary of forces that lie outside the state generally. It follows that if an individual state fails it has done so principally because its leadership was too inept or corrupt to recognize the need for democratic governance to maintain legitimacy and free markets to enhance state prosperity and capacity. From this perspective the failure by state leaders to make hard development choices, often in the face of disparate mass societies, threatens state viability. But states do not fail by themselves and we must move beyond this construct in order to more fully comprehend all of the dynamics at work in the process of state failure. By not sufficiently accounting for international order we increase the likelihood that our responses to state failure will be frustrated or even counterproductive and the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Somalia suggests that this has indeed been the case. In helping maintain international order major powers limit conditions for anarchy, which has largely solved the problem of state death but inadvertently increased conditions for

state failure. By forging relationships with peripheral states some major powers can be a force for greater state viability.

C. **Agents and Structures**

In the study of international politics analysis of international order is rare relative to the study of individual states and pairs of states. It is almost always assumed that states are rational unitary actors akin to firms or individuals. This may be an accurate conceptualization for some highly developed states but it is very misleading to view young and weak states (also the majority of states) as rational unitary actors with identical motivations and goals as the more developed states. For many states of the South it is precisely their lack of unity that distinguishes them from their Northern counterparts, not to mention large inequalities in wealth. States of the South exist but many do not yet exist enough (institutionally) to be conceptualized as rational unitary actors with wide freedom of action to determine their future. For these states the international order plays a very real and tangible, albeit loosely coordinated, role delineating appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Unfortunately, much of the content of the international order provides an incentive structure that prefers “thin” states; states that have dispersed economic and political power along lines envisioned by liberals e.g. open markets and democracy. Most Southern states, however, would clearly benefit from having a “thicker” state, one capable of earning legitimacy through the provision of essential public goods.³⁴ International order is both the by-product of (strong) state action

³⁴ In addition to the bare necessities of rule of law and property rights, modern states are expected to also provide basic health care and education in order to have any chance of benefiting from an increasingly technical and global market. Gellner (1983, 33) goes

and what subsequently shapes (weak and strong) state action. This constructivist approach to international politics is, admittedly, a minority position that sacrifices the parsimony of rational choice theory, where all states are essentially autonomous self interested firms or individuals, for a much more complex rendering of international politics and the varying positions and roles of states within it.

The case for employing a constructivist perspective in this study of nation-state failure rests on the argument that the structure of the international order provides more than just a static backdrop to international politics. Indeed, history demonstrates that international orders come and go along with the rules of the game that were appropriate to their historical contexts (Holsti, 1991). This creates problems for theorists of international politics, particularly for neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, who assume that *all* states are essentially similar both in terms of what they want and how they act to get what they want, regardless the context of international order (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore, 1996). From conventional rational choice perspectives any structure that is granted to exist is usually derived from an aggregate of individual state preferences and is limited to a secondary, sometimes tertiary, role that merely constrains some state action, structure becomes an elusive epiphenomenon of state activity (Finnemore, 1996). Effects of international order fade into the background and often fall out of analyses of

further arguing that our modern era of interdependence and industrial society requires a high level of literacy and technical competence of state populations and that this has been achieved mainly by states able to impose a “high culture” through “a modern ‘national’ educational system, a pyramid at whose base there are primary schools, staffed by teachers trained at secondary schools, staffed by university-trained teachers, led by the products of advanced graduate schools.” Clearly this is a monumental task and one poorly suited to “thin” states concerned mainly with providing basic rule of law and property rights.

international politics altogether. Consequently we know much more about what happens within states and between states and decidedly less about what happens within the interactions between states and a complex international order that encompasses and projects political, economic, and social preferences such as national sovereignty, free markets, democracy, even human rights.

An essential insight of constructivist research is that agents and structures (states and international order) are mutually constitutive (Wendt, 1999). From this perspective states and the international order are both socially constructed and historically contingent, as are the rules of the game more powerful states happen to establish. It follows that the international order, though contingent, has clear and independent ontological status, which requires that it be brought to the forefront of analysis. The international order is not limited merely to constraining state action but is itself “generative” of both states and the spectrum of action that is considered appropriate within the social structure of the international order (Finnemore, 1996).

As the primary content of international order, sovereignty and economic and political liberalism provide the norms that bind and give meaning to contemporary international social structure. The position that international structure is more than the sum of its parts has some history of scholarly support, first by the English School of international politics (Bull, 1977), sociological institutionalists (Bergesen, 1980), regime theorists (Ruggie, 1982), and more recently by constructivists revisiting the agent-

structure debate (Finnemore, 1996).³⁵ The clear advantage of a constructivist approach to nation-state failure lies in the possibility for a holistic understanding of the phenomenon, one not trapped by the intellectual construct of level of analyses and the attendant concern over ecological fallacy. To date, the study of nation-state failure has been almost solely from a rational choice perspective that focuses on the state itself, the legitimacy of its administration and the capacity of its institutions. Unsurprisingly, the findings of these studies have located the causes of nation-state failure within the state itself, which incidentally is the only place most analysts have been prepared to look. One cannot analytically isolate states from international institutions as realists do or isolate international institutions from the actions of states, as neoliberal institutionalists are prone to do, without deleteriously oversimplifying the complexity of international politics. Scholars must grapple with this complexity not assume it away.

A holistic understanding of nation-state failure requires exploring the historical developments of the pillars of the international order, sovereignty and economic and political liberalism, along with their consequences for states. As we shall see, conceptualizations of sovereignty and liberalism have not gone unchanged through history, nor have states. Indeed, it has been their ability to be adapted to changed context and in the process to continue providing a degree of visibility and legibility, which has insured their continued relevance to international order. This study seeks to demonstrate, not only do states conform to international order for “rational” reasons associated with

³⁵ Finnemore (1996) notes that the English School, sociological institutionalists, and regime theorists have consistently pointed to the expansive power of the West and its notions of liberal rationality as the core of an international social structure that privileges the state and markets. In these conceptions social structure itself can be causative of state action.

costs-benefits, but also because they become “socialized [or disciplined as the case may be] to accept the values, rules, *and roles* prescribed” by the international order (Finnemore, 1996, 29 emphasis added). We will begin the historical analysis with sovereignty followed by economic and political liberalism. It is not the intention of this study to recount complete histories of these complex subjects but to highlight important historical developments that have held lasting consequences for the international order and states. The study will transition, in chapter five, to an empirical analysis of the international order and its impact on nation-state viability.

IV. SOVEREIGNTY

The idea and practice of sovereignty grew out of the Westphalian Peace settlements of 1648 and ended forever the possibility of Catholic hegemony over Europe.³⁶ Instead European rulers gained authority within their territory over population and the right to choose which religion would be practiced without warrant of external interference. The practice of *investiture*, whereby the Pope legitimated princely authority by official church recognition, and the threat of *excommunication*, whereby the Pope disciplined independent minded rulers by refusing their subjects salvation, lost their efficacy. States and their rulers would no longer derive their visibility from their position within the Catholic hierarchy under the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor. Indeed, after Westphalia the visibility of individual states increasingly came to be tied to how successfully rulers claimed and implemented their sovereign authority both internally and externally. The pretense of a universal Christendom gave way to the formal practice of sovereign particularism. Seventeenth century European rulers unknowingly established a foundational institution of international relations, one that would increasingly spur, by emulation and attrition, the development of an international system of *sovereign* states.

The ramifications of this new Westphalian sovereignty for European political order were substantial. Previously European order was characterized by a dizzying array

³⁶ The Peace of Westphalia was comprised of two separate treaties signed in Osnabruk and Munster, which ended the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) that raged within the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years War (1568-1648) between Spain and a young Dutch Republic. While there were diverse motivations for these wars they were fundamentally religious conflicts born of the Protestant Reformation (1517-1648) and Catholic Counter Reformation (1545-1648) pitting Protestant and Catholic communities and rulers against each other (Holsti, 1991).

of competing and overlapping feudal jurisdictions (between king, noble, church, and burgher) embodied in the late medieval period (Spruyt, 1994).³⁷ Territorial and population demarcations were highly contingent and fluid relative to modern expectations and demands for one land, one people. Attempts at political centralization in such an environment of simultaneous and competing loyalties, sometimes within a non-contiguous territory, were difficult in the extreme. State weakness, understood as an inability to systematically collect taxes and implement the king's law, was the almost uniform result. It would be the application and practice of sovereignty that would finally provide a modicum of autonomous state-space necessary for projects of state strengthening centralization to take root. Indeed, it was Westphalian sovereignty that was principally responsible for solidifying and ushering in an age of *raison d'état* and mercantilism. Previously *raison d'état*, literally "reason of state", encompassed only the aggrandizement of the royal lineage or the Catholic faith but after Westphalia it became tied to the state itself, to its increase in wealth, population, and, where possible, territory. These were accomplishments of state strength that would be achieved by employing mercantilist policies of state development, which centralized political and economic power.

Thus by the late seventeenth century mercantilism dominated Europe as the preeminent technique of government and management of the economy (Foucault, 2007). Through laws, edicts, and regulations rulers feverishly sought to develop the economic

³⁷ 17th century sovereign states also had external competitors, such as city leagues and city-states, which did not have the same prerogatives towards territory (the Hanseatic League was not territorially contiguous nor did it aspire to be) and population (city-states like Venice did not have to incorporate large disparate populations).

and military strength of the state by insuring that population grew, territory expanded, and more wealth entered state coffers than left.³⁸ A commonly cited example of early mercantilist success is Bourbon France under the ministerial guidance of Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683). Colbert's mercantilist policies coincided with rising French economic and military power providing a strong demonstration effect that spurred broad emulation (Spruyt, 1994). But processes of state development by way of mercantilist capital accumulation necessarily had a zero-sum quality to them, as one state's gains were perceived to come at the expense of others. Thus uneven processes of mercantilist state development went hand in hand with the rise of a European balance of power (Foucault, 2007). States that excelled in the game of mercantilist development always ran the risk of fomenting a temporary countervailing alliance of alarmed states to halt the potential rise of a European hegemon. Thus in the late seventeenth century did England and the Dutch Republic work together to successfully stifle growing French power.³⁹ Despite their conflicting interests, European states remained committed against hegemony, Catholic or otherwise. It did not take long for European states to become intensely jealous of their sovereignty, eager mercantilists, and ever watchful for potential disruptions of political equilibrium.

³⁸ The principle means of ensuring that wealth entered but did not leave the state was the adoption of a high external barrier to trade in the form of tariffs such as England's Corn Laws designed to protect domestic grain prices. It was the ideal for mercantilist states to be as self-sufficient as possible, to be exporting not importing states (Gilpin, 2001).

³⁹ Though allies against rising French power, England and the Dutch Republic also fought each other in no less than four Anglo-Dutch Wars spanning the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries over who would dominate the seas. Indeed England won the monikers *Perfidious Albion* and *Holder of the Balance* for its history of switching alliances whenever an ally was thought to be rising too much in power.

Westphalian sovereignty thus revolutionized both the international and domestic incentive structure for European states. The visibility formerly supplied by official church recognition increasingly came to rest on gaining the diplomatic recognition of other sovereign states as well as the ability to force recognition by becoming economically and militarily powerful. Indeed, European states that successfully fused the capital of their cities with the coercion of centralized rule gained a decisive military and organizational advantage over states and other entities that did not (Tilly, 1992). In a sense, sovereign states became self-replicating since it was no longer a non-state entity (the Catholic church) that supplied validation, but other sovereign states through the act of diplomatic recognition.⁴⁰ Sovereign states had multiple advantages over their non-sovereign counterparts (city leagues and city-states), which led to the eventual ascendance of sovereign states. Spruyt (1994, 28) notes three advantages of sovereignty in particular.

“Systematically, from a top down perspective, there are three main reasons why [sovereign] states survived and displaced other forms of organization. First, the internal logic of organization of the sovereign state had less deficiencies than its rivals. Sovereign, territorial states were better at rationalizing their economies and mobilizing the resources of their societies. Second, state sovereignty proved to be an effective and efficient means of organizing external, inter-unit behavior. Sovereign states could more easily make credible commitments than their non-sovereign counterparts. Third,

⁴⁰ Spruyt (1994) notes that in the immediate diplomatic maneuvering after Westphalia it became increasingly difficult for the competitors of sovereign states (city leagues, city states, and the Catholic Church) to meaningfully participate in European affairs as newly sovereign states refused to recognize them as equals and increasingly limited or barred their participation in conferences and treaties.

sovereign states selected out and delegitimized actors who did not fit a system of territorially demarcated and internally hierarchical authorities.”

Critically, Westphalia represented a terminus for one type of European order, a universal Christendom, and the foundation of another based on sovereignty that, within itself, held the possibility of a nascent international order not limited by religious affiliation and universal obeisance.

Ironically, most European states of the mid seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, especially “strong” states like France and England, would most likely be characterized by contemporary observers as weak or at times even failing states. Though sovereign most European states still faced a domestic Gordian Knot of disparate populations and competing power centers in addition to rivalries with other sovereign states. Revolts, civil wars, palace coups, and foreign invasions were not unusual events for seventeenth and eighteenth century European states (Holsti, 1991). With the exception of foreign invasion, today’s newly sovereign states experience much the same internal fragmentation along with violence and instability, yet such events are not heralded as the inevitable growing pains of state development, as they commonly are in histories of European state development. Instead domestic violence and instability has come to signify the failure of sovereign nation-states. Indeed today’s states are expected to have the good taste to develop in an orderly and bloodless fashion and those that do not are commonly ostracized, sanctioned, subject to foreign intervention or left to fester like Somalia, Haiti, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nevertheless in seventeenth century Europe, establishing internal legibility became a central problem of European statecraft, one that would be met by any means available. According to Scott

(1998, 2) “The premodern state was...partially blind...knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, landholdings and yield, their location, their very identity.”

Collecting and bringing order to such necessary information obviously called for unprecedented social intervention by state rulers, interventions not hallowed by tradition. Consequently, early European state building projects, which sought to centralize political authority often looked similar to *domestic* processes of colonization. For state development along mercantile lines to take place state provinces often had to be, as they were in eighteenth and nineteenth century France, “linguistically subdued and culturally incorporated” (Weber, 1976). Processes of European state development and the centralization of political authority, which mercantile policy demanded, were consequently contested events prone to resistance and sometimes violence.⁴¹ No longer can states *legitimately* employ blood and iron policies that seek to centralize state authority without risking international condemnation or military intervention as Serbia did under Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s or Libya under Moamar Gadhafi in 2011. Recognizing that European processes of state development were frequently violently contested events deflates many social science theories, which today delineate the possibility of neatly progressive stages of state development based upon historically sterilized Western European models.

In its initial manifestation, sovereignty, though tied to the state, was nevertheless the prerogative of those who ruled. The territory and population of states represented the

⁴¹ While there was a good deal of resistance to projects of internal political centralization, predominately from the nobility and clergy, there was also a demand for such centralization, mostly by burghers, who sought standards in weights, measures, coinage, and taxation as well as security from pirates and highwaymen to facilitate greater profits and stability in trade that only a strong centralized state could provide (Spruyt, 1994).

yet to be incorporated patrimony of kings (Holsti, 1991). The acquisition of sovereignty thus marks the threshold for the beginning of the *nation*-state, which during the seventeenth century and later remained to be fully constructed or even “imagined.” Indeed the essence of state development is standardization, incorporation, and making one people out of many, which, in turn, makes the operation of state authority efficient and more amenable to planning further development. This brings us back to *raison d’état* and mercantilism, which by virtue of the autonomous state-space provided by sovereignty, was able to supply the ideological justification and policy repertoire, respectively, for projects of early European state building. The internal duties of state rulers became limitless, consumed by the objective of *knowing* their patrimony in order to more fully wield it as state power.⁴² This strongly contrasts with the position of contemporary young states, which are expected to limit as much as possible interventionist activities while maintaining, at most, a skeletal state limited to setting the most basic parameters of society.⁴³ This is so largely because the era of mercantilism eventually gave way to an era of liberalism, which will be discussed in the following sections.

To summarize, the advent of Westphalian sovereignty had two key consequences for the development of European states. First, sovereignty provided an appreciable

⁴² Paraphrasing Foucault (2007, 274) the “necessary knowledge” of the mercantile state encompassed: knowledge of the population, its quantity, mortality, and natality, different categories of individuals, their wealth and potential wealth; natural wealth such as mines, water ways, and forests; assessments of wealth circulation, balance of trade, as well as the effects of taxes and duties.

⁴³ According to North (1981) the most basic societal parameters requiring state action include establishing rule of law and a coherent property rights regime. Nevertheless, North (1981, 47) also argues, “Strong moral and ethical codes of a society is the cement of social stability which makes an economic system viable.”

amount of autonomous state space whereby rulers could begin to challenge and disentangle feudal jurisdictions blocking projects of political and economic centralization with less concern for external interference. There followed the rise of state strengthening ideologies (*raison d'état*) and policies (mercantilism) whose successes encouraged wide adoption. Second, sovereignty supplanted investiture and became the dominant means for making European political entities (sovereign states) official and visible to each other. What is more, states became increasingly self-replicating by only recognizing other states as equals while limiting their diplomatic engagements with non-sovereign entities, denying them equality of status. From a contemporary perspective, the autonomy enhancing aspects of sovereignty have weakened relative to its role in providing the principle means of international visibility, which has solidified in strength. Indeed, for the world's younger states sovereignty no longer provides the same autonomous state space necessary for political and economic centralization to take place, as it once did for most European states. On the contrary, today's younger states have much less room to maneuver domestically and must, instead, heed the call for economic and political liberalization as projected by the liberal incentive structure of the international order (Strange, 1996). Ignoring the incentive structure of the international order is not without costs and states that do so are commonly denied access to credit, markets, sanctioned or, at the extreme, targeted for intervention. Today's states exist in an international order where the rules of the game have changed and old strategies of state development (*raison d'état* and mercantilism) no longer legitimately apply.⁴⁴ Naturally, developments in the

⁴⁴ There are, of course, exceptions to the degree states feel compelled to conform to the incentive structure of the international order. Besides major powers there are other states endowed with potential elements of state power (large territory, population, resources,

practices and application of sovereignty over time have had consequences and have reshaped the contours of states. Arguably it was the development of liberalism that has most affected changes in sovereign states. Slowly, liberal ideas on the economy fatally undermined the logic of mercantilism (but not *raison d'état*) while political liberalism challenged the legitimacy of monarchical political centralization. So, Westphalian sovereignty has endured but it has become inextricably entwined with economic and political liberalism, a subject whose developments and consequences for states we now turn to.

A. Economic Liberalism

As the eighteenth century progressed and sovereign state development became closely associated with mercantilism, a new counter ideology was being crafted alongside an unfolding Industrial Revolution. Those articulating this radical new ideology (Smith, Ricardo, Bentham etc), “denounced the [mercantile] state as the structure that prevented each individual-the actor [now] considered to be basic to the constitution of society- from perusing their own interests as they saw fit” ultimately weakening the state itself (Wallerstein, 1995). From its beginning, economic liberalism was an ideology broadly critical of state interference in what was understood to be the natural operations of markets. When broadly applied, in the practice of state development throughout the nineteenth century, “Liberalism was the anarchism of the bourgeoisie and it had no place for the state”, at least as it had previously existed in an age that mixed *raison d'état* with

united population etc.) that can successfully dictate the pace of liberal reforms. The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) states, in particular, have all tried to approach state development incrementally and, largely, on their own terms, a luxury not always available to most Southern states.

mercantilism (Hobsbawm, 1989, 40).⁴⁵ Economic liberalism and the global capitalism it eventually facilitated was, and remains, a tremendous force of instability, which led to, and requires, a continuous process of “creative destruction” to sustain itself (Schumpeter 2008).⁴⁶ Where Sovereignty demanded the active centralization of state power liberalism, economic and political, rationalized and legitimated its dispersal.

Foucault (2008) roughly designates the middle of the eighteenth century as the point at which economic liberalism or “political economy” began to break free from the confines of pure theory and started, slowly and intermittently, to be applied as state policy. Where mercantilist thought stipulated the zero sum nature of economic competition liberals believed that, under specific circumstances, such competition could provide the means for mutual enrichment. Very roughly, Adam Smith (1723-1790) argued that the individual acting in accord with their self-interest would contribute more to the betterment of society than one who self-consciously sought such a goal; David Ricardo (1772-1823) maintained that the gains of mercantilist autarky were illusory and eclipsed by absolute gains from divisions of labor according to comparative advantage; and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) made it plain that a society attuned to the individuals

⁴⁵ Hobsbawm (1975, 220) elaborates, “For the world of economic liberalism insecurity was the price paid for both progress and freedom, not to mention wealth, and was made tolerable, only, by continuous economic expansion.” It follows, economically liberal states that fail to provide for continuous economic expansion risk losing the legitimacy necessary to govern effectively.

⁴⁶ Schumpeter (2008, 83-84) argues that the “process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism...[however] the problem that is usually being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures [like states, international organizations, and firms etc], whereas the relevant problem is how it creates them and destroys them.”

“calculus of pleasure and pain” limits the responsibility and scope of government.⁴⁷ In short, eighteenth century liberalism (like sovereignty before it) radically challenged the internal and external responsibilities of European states and by the nineteenth century it began to reverse their objectives.

The European balance that derived from mercantilist logic compelled states to limit their external objectives versus each other in order to ensure the survival of the institution of sovereignty; it also rationalized the internal objectives of states as limitless in order to increase state strength via the bureaucratic incorporation and centralization of economic and political power (Foucault, 2008). Economic liberalism essentially elaborated different routes to the same ends, state sovereignty would be maintained but not only through a competitive military-diplomatic balance, and state strength was still the goal but would not be accomplished automatically at the expense of others. Instead, liberal political economy would facilitate an economically competitive mutual empowerment and enrichment between sovereign states, displacing the Darwinian scenario of mercantilism where only the strong could thrive. Foucault (2008, 14) is instructive on this point.

“Political economy [economic liberalism] offered to ensure suitable, adjusted, and always favorable competition between states. It proposed precisely the maintenance of an equilibrium between states such that competition can take place. It took up exactly the

⁴⁷ Foucault contrasts the ascendance of this English “radical approach,” where governments’ sphere of competence is defined on the basis of what is *useful* for it to do or not do, and the relative decline of the “revolutionary approach” identified with Rousseau (1712-1778) which starts from the *rights of man* in order to arrive at the appropriate constitutional or legal limitation of government (2008, 39-41).

objectives of *raison d'être* and the Police state that mercantilism and the European balance had tried to realize.”

In its ideal formulations economic liberalism facilitated a role reversal of the states external and internal objectives, the external objectives of states now became limitless and its internal objectives limited. How was this reversal justified? The external activities of states could be conceived as limitless only if economic competition was not, as mercantilists had it, of a zero-sum nature. Adam Smith (1994) argued that the zero-sum nature of mercantilist competition made no sense when one conceptualized a free market that brought into play (natural) mechanisms of mutual enrichment where each state benefited from specializing in what it could produce most efficiently. Accordingly, since European states were *not* uniform in regards to their “locally abundant factor endowments” (of land, labor, and capital) all European states would benefit from specializing in the production of what they could produce most efficiently (their comparative advantage), which in turn would lead to a division of labor across European states, ultimately stabilizing prices and increasing every states material well being through efficiently integrated market economies (Rogowski, 1989). This could only work, of course, if closed markets became free markets where states did not automatically begrudge the economic gains of other states as an overt threat to their own security. The implications of economic liberalism, however, went far beyond the confines of providing for a stable and demilitarized competitive equilibrium between European states.

The logic inherent within economic liberalism is universally applicable; its theoretical claims are commonly presented as being, “transhistorical, transcultural, and

transracial” (Harvey, 2009, 37). The universal applicability implicit within theories of economic liberalism, such as visions of a global division of labor and the unfettered movement of capital, thus held within itself a strong expansionary component. Indeed a capitalist system cannot properly exist within any framework other than that of a world-economy (Wallerstein, 2004).⁴⁸ Consequently, the fact that economic liberalism was first thought through and applied in Europe would have lasting effects for the rest of the world. Foucault (2008, 55-56 emphasis added) draws out the implications of the early development and application of European economic liberalism.

“The logic of political economy [economic liberalism] implies a *globalization* of the market, an unlimited and *collective enrichment of Europe* where the whole world is summoned around Europe to exchange its own and Europe’s products in the European market...the game is in Europe, but the stake is the world.”

The logic of economic liberalism brought a reversal of the external and internal objectives of European states that, importantly, coincides with the era of the Concert of Europe, an unprecedented period (about half a century) of major power cooperation and peace in Western Europe.⁴⁹ It was also a time of expanding European colonialism and

⁴⁸ This reality was made unusually explicit by Woodrow Wilson when, in a 1907 lecture at Columbia University, he stated, “Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed to him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process.” It is doubtful *President* Wilson would have been as clear in his explication.

⁴⁹ The Concert of Europe refers, roughly, to the period 1815 to the early 1870s when Europe’s major powers (England, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and later France) worked *in concert* to maintain a permanent balance of power. During this half-century period there were no European wars between great powers. Europe’s concert system resulted from

imperialism abroad. Indeed for most of the nineteenth century colonial expansion reinforced peace between European states (but not within them) by relocating conflict prone competition and expansion abroad, where great distances and travel times blunted the immediacy of the thrust and parry of colonial competition.⁵⁰ What was more, during the colonial era power disparities between European states could, at least in principle, be reconciled by prospects for further colonial expansion to bring states in Europe back into balance with each other. Only after the world had been almost completely colonized in the late nineteenth century, thus exposing unbridgeable (at least via further colonization) power disparities between European states, did war mount a serious comeback. Indeed, the twilight era of colonialism was punctuated by two World Wars that had their epicenters in Europe. The expansionary logic of economic liberalism, with its assurances of mutual enrichment, was initially compatible (at least for Europeans) with colonial expansion, that is, until its physical limits came clearly into view. The resulting wars in Europe mark a historically brief but stark interregnum of globalized economic liberalism. Nevertheless, the two World War's unexpectedly served to bolster the later revitalization of economic liberalism highlighting, as it did, the perils of "the Monster state", Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, prone to "grandiose schemes for organization on a colossal

the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which brought an end to the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) and halted France's attempt at hegemony (Holsti 1991).

⁵⁰ Polanyi (1944, 5) argues that the Concert of Europe really facilitated "a hundred years' peace" (1815-1914) between European states since the total amount of war documented for this long period was relatively small, only eighteen months. Polanyi also notes that while there may have been peace *between* Europe's states during the long nineteenth century there was also a precipitous rise in conflict *within* these states and "civil wars, revolutionary and antirevolutionary interventions, were the order of the day" most spectacularly demonstrated in 1848 where nearly the whole of Europe, minus England, exploded in revolutionary revolt against conservative regimes.

scale” (Hayek, 2007, 221).⁵¹ However, before colonial expansion physically exhausted itself, there was a clear affinity between economic liberalism and the commercial globalization that colonialism helped facilitate. It is no accident that precisely at this time when Western states were internalizing the logic of economic liberalism, which made the external duties of states limitless, we see an intensification of colonialism and a related commercial globalization.

In its essential aspects colonialism and imperialism saw the division of the non-western world amongst western powers, where each colony became a symbol of prestige and a domain of economic extraction for the colonial power. Colonial borders were the result of either major power competition or through major power mediation such as took place at the Berlin Conference (1884) that undertook the successful division of Africa amongst Europe’s great powers. The establishment of colonial borders typically bore little relation to how local societies were distributed and it was common for formerly intact cultural and economic groupings to find themselves suddenly divided or straddling newly imposed borders.⁵² Economically, prior local economic activity, such as subsistence agriculture and regional trade, were extirpated and reorganized according to

⁵¹ Foucault (2008, 189) argues that “monster states” exacerbated economic liberals fear of the state, already well developed, and the states, “intrinsic dynamism which means that it can never halt its expansion and complete takeover of the whole of civil society.” This has facilitated a pervasive mindset, mainly among Western states, that is deeply suspicious of any active or expanding state authority, at home or abroad.

⁵² Interestingly, despite the foreign imposition of colonial borders newly independent states have mostly resisted temptations to redraw them. Indeed the Organization for African Unity (OAU) passed Resolution 16 in 1964 which adamantly declared that all member states would respect the territorial borders established under colonialism. Clearly newly independent state leaders were worried that moves to redraw borders could easily lead to internal and external conflict. Unfortunately, maintaining colonial borders has not spared states from conflict, particularly internal conflict.

the imperatives of global capitalism e.g. cash crops and resource extraction for home country consumption and refinement (Migdal, 1988). Consequently, colonies became satellites of European metropolises in which one of the purposes of the system was to extract resources for metropole consumption and industrial refinement into finished goods that could be sold back to satellites and other European states. As local methods of social organization and economy gave way to this European project, colonial populations became increasingly dependent upon the west. According to proponents of dependency theory these asymmetrical relationships, where former colonies provide the raw materials and former colonizers the finished goods, have remained largely intact despite the eventual independence of former colonies (Cardoso, 1972).⁵³ Indeed, world system theorists have largely incorporated the logic of the metropole-satellite relationship established during the age of colonialism, recasting it, with slight modification, for modern times. Wallerstein (1979) has given the most coherent description of what he considers to be the nature of the contemporary global capitalism.

“The mode of production in a given region creates a certain class structure, which emanates in a certain kind of state; the character of that state and the relations of the regions of producers and merchants to the rest of the world economy determine the regions position- core, periphery, or semi periphery- in the world economy, which in turn significantly affects the states organization...[in this scenario the] state figures primarily

⁵³ According to Hobsbawm (1987, 65) relying on raw material exports was not always an inferior economic position, “until the vertical fall in the prices of primary commodities (rubber and tin, cocoa, beef, or wool) during the 1929 slump, this vulnerability did not seem of much long term significance compared to the apparently unlimited expansion of exports and credits, on the contrary, before 1914 the terms of trade appeared to be running in the favor of the primary producers.”

as an instrument of the national ruling class, an instrument that serves the interest of that class in the world.”

Again, the dominant mode of production within colonized states was limited largely to agriculture and the mining of natural resources, which is significant to the extent that the economic class cultivated by colonial administrations were mostly landed elites. The cultivation of this particular class within colonial states would have repercussions for these states’ post-independence experience in state development and government.⁵⁴

Indeed it has long been recognized that the presence of a strong landed elite within a state can significantly impact the nature of its political authority. Charles Tilly (1992, 14) is worth quoting on this subject.

“The class coalitions prevailing in a given region at a given point in time strongly limited the possibilities of action open to any ruler or would-be ruler, regions of early urban dominance, with their active capitalists, produced very different kinds of states [democracies] from regions in which great landlords and their estates dominated the landscape [producing dictatorships]”

Specifically, the presence of a strong landed elite increases the likelihood that political authority within the state will develop along authoritarian lines. This was the case in Europe with Germany and Russia, and it was also the case for many former colonies when independence finally came (Moore, 1966).

⁵⁴ According to Scott (2009, 274) when European colonizers searched for local surrogates they often “selected for autocratic rule” because “diffuse societies with overlapping and criss-crossing loyalties were subversive to colonial administrators... they provided no institutional handles with which to enter the community, negotiate with it, or govern it.”

Returning to developments in the middle of the eighteenth century much was also changing for what was considered the appropriate *internal* responsibilities of European states in addition to its now limitless external responsibilities. As discussed, under a regime of mercantilism internal duties of state administration were deemed limitless, bent towards the subordination of all interests to a centralized authority concerned with the vitality of the state itself. This made little sense, indeed was counterproductive, from a liberal viewpoint, which takes individuals, their interests, and (economic) freedom as the privileged object of governance. However, this is not to suggest that liberal states took an unequivocal laissez-faire approach to domestic governance, quite the contrary. According to Foucault (2008, 65) “Liberalism is not acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to arouse it and produce it, with, of course, [the system] of constraints and the problems of cost raised by this production.” The sounding board for European state policy increasingly became disassociated from the desires of the monarch, atop the social pyramid, who could not hope to comprehend the totality of natural and spontaneous economic processes.⁵⁵ Instead the sounding board for state policy increasingly became associated with the interests of civil society (the bourgeoisie in particular) who, at the ground level of economic activity, were deemed to be in a better position to tell the state what it needed to do, and not do, to ensure economic growth and expanding wealth. For Foucault (2008, 102) this switch encapsulates how economic liberalism in Europe was able to, paradoxically, “move towards more state by less

⁵⁵ Foucault (2008, 16-17) argues that the ascent of economic liberalism made “success or failure, rather than legitimacy or illegitimacy” the new criteria of government action. Indeed, what makes mercantilism under monarchy “bad government, is not that the prince is wicked, but that he is ignorant” of the totality of the natural and spontaneous operations of markets and how to create general and expanding wealth.

government” redefining the criteria of state success from the vitality of the state itself to economic growth in general and the expanding wealth of the population in particular.

The idea of “more state by less government” presented a major challenge for nineteenth century European states, one that remains relevant for today’s younger states under pressure to liberalize their economies. For Foucault (2008, 87) this novel approach towards state governance raised the problem of how to get the state, “to exist on the basis of this non-state space of economic freedom.” This simple formulation of “more state by less government”, after all, assumes and requires the existence of a fairly coherent community or, at least, a subsection of the community that is capable of articulating its interests as policies of economic growth and expanding wealth. For European states the subsections of society whose interests coincided with an ethos of “more state by less government” were, initially, burgher and yeoman entrepreneurs and, later, industrialists and financiers. Indeed it was this petty bourgeoisie who, over time, displaced the aristocracy and clergy from governance, bringing forth both a diminution of rule by personal ties and increasing secularization (Hobsbawm, 1975). Spruyt (1994, 101) notes in addition, “The bourgeois were...preferred administrators because they were literate and numerate...[and because] Business knowledge was applicable [and increasingly necessary] to running government.” But what of states that lack a coherent civil society or entrepreneurial class capable of articulating interests that can be transformed into state policies of economic growth and wealth expansion? This, in part, seems to be the crux of the liberal economic development problem facing many of today’s younger states, particularly former colonies. Economic liberalism calls for the dispersal of the states economic authority but for many younger states it is unclear how this authority can be

dispersed or whom to disperse it to.⁵⁶ For Fukuyama (2004, 32-33) this scenario is indicative of the greater problem associated with the assumptions underlying liberal economic development, namely that, “economists believe that if an incentive exists, it will automatically motivate behavior, but good economic institutions do not always generate their own demand.”⁵⁷ Furthermore, Fukuyama (2004, 35, emphasis added) argues, “In the absence of strong domestic demand, demand for [liberal] institutions *must be generated externally*”, which of course it is, though in an uncoordinated fashion and often unsuccessfully. This is why, after all, much of the content of the international order is instantiated within international and regional finance and trade organizations (the WB, IMF, and WTO, NAFTA, ASEAN etc) tasked with the responsibility for diffusing norms and practices of economic liberalism, in short, to help make the world’s state’s *legible* to an international order premised on free trade and the unfettered movement of capital across nation-state borders.

There are, of course, problems associated with dispersing internal economic authority in order to make the state legible to the international order. Dispersing the states economic authority, essentially privatizing or outsourcing it to sections of civil

⁵⁶ Huntington (1968, 88 emphasis added) argues that for younger states, instead of civil society there is usually, “a disparate *mass society* [which] lacks organized structures which can relate the political desires and activities of the populace to the goals and decisions of their leaders.” Consequently, political leaders of Southern states have had to implement liberal economic reforms, almost always, from the top down and in the face of broad societal resistance.

⁵⁷ Fukuyama (2004, 35) argues, “Insufficient domestic demand for institutions or institutional reform is the single most important obstacle to institutional development in poor countries. Such a demand when it emerges is often the product of crisis that create no more than a brief window of reform.” It is also, arguably, the obstacle least amenable to outside control or influence. Yet this is precisely where analysts concerned with nation-state failure tend to focus their attention, on the slippery foundation of domestic governance.

society, is fine, so long as the society in question has already been made legible to the state center and there exists basic rule enforcement and some level of cohesiveness that ties a critical mass of the society together. These conditions, however, do not always obtain for states of the global South and even when they do it is often difficult to enlist societal support for liberal economic reforms. Schumpeter (2008, 144-145) has identified why this is typically so.

“rational recognition of the economic performance of capitalism and of the hopes it holds out for the future would require an almost impossible moral feat by the have not, that performance stands out only if we take a long-run view; any pro-capitalist argument must rest on long-run considerations. In the short-run, it is profits and inefficiencies that dominate the picture.”

Historically, the best hope for states achieving liberal economic reforms has been the presence of centralized state authority strong enough to weather the push back from segments of society that do not immediately benefit from such reforms. In practice this tension between the need for the state and the requirements of markets can be insurmountable. Even in the airy realm of liberal economic theory the state has become, simultaneously, that which is needed and what needs to be subdued.

According to Foucault those of a neoliberal persuasion in particular engage in a precarious balancing act on the topic of the state and its proper role. On the one hand neoliberals argue that the state cannot target the market as its domain of activity since it cannot hope to know the totality of economic processes, while on the other the proper functioning of the market requires sustained vigilance, activity, and intervention.

Consequently, an inversion takes place between the relationship of the social to the economic. It is not the market that will be tamed or acted upon for the benefit of society but the taming of society to coincide with the needs of the market. Thus the state must eschew a direct economic policy (like import substitution, infant industry protection, and capital controls) and instead implement a social policy or “biopolitics” understood generally as a “policy of growth focused precisely on one of the things that...[the state]...can modify most easily, and that is the form of investment in human capital” (Foucault, 2008, 232). When a liberalizing state starts from a foundation of political centralization, like most European states did, it has been possible to incrementally develop a social policy conforming to liberal economy. When, however, the state starts from a fractured foundation, with no or little institutions and sense of community, the deployment of liberal social policy can quickly run into obstacles.

In taking charge of social processes as opposed to the market, the neoliberal agenda essentially seeks to colonize the social by projecting onto it or placing within it an economic rationality. In this sense one no longer talks of a social or political society but an “enterprise society”, which “involves extending the economic model of supply and demand, and of investment-costs-profit so as to make it a model of social relations and of existence itself, a form of relationship of the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family” (Foucault, 2008, 242). With liberal economics as the foundation of social relations we have the establishment of man as *homo economicus* or the individual as rational utility maximizer whose action is determined solely by cost-benefit analysis. More critically, we have the insertion of social Darwinism since the application of an economic model upon social relations necessitates, indeed privileges,

competition. This creates problems for the viability of social life that even neoliberals have become aware of. According to Ropke, “competition is a principle of order in the domain of the market economy, but it is not a principle on which it would be possible to erect the whole of society...Morally and sociologically, competition is a principle that dissolves more than it unifies” (Foucault, 2008, 242-243). Ironically, neoliberals often advocate the need for the state (the traditional foil of liberals) to interpose itself between society and the market, providing the counterweight of a “political and moral framework.”

According to neoliberals, in order to assuage the dissolving effects of competition within social relations one “requires a state that can maintain itself above the different competing groups and enterprises...[and that] ensure[s] a community which is not fragmented and guarantee[s] cooperation between men” (Foucault, 2008, 243). The neoliberal state does not govern society per se so much as it governs a collection of disparate and competing enterprises, groups, and/or individuals. Despite the arguments and mental contortions that neoliberals undertake in order to safeguard society from the full implications of their economic logic they fundamentally downplay the power disparities that appear to arise inevitably from the unleashing of market forces upon society.⁵⁸ Indeed this is a problem that has long been recognized and cited regularly. Schattschneider famously and accurately identified the flaw in American liberal pluralism (asymmetric competition), which seems to have a strong equivalence to the neoliberal

⁵⁸ North (1981, 44) argues, “The measurement (and enforcement) costs of constraining [economic] behavior are so high that in the absence of ideological convictions to constrain individual [or firm] maximizing, the viability of economic organization is threatened.”

demand for a “political and moral” role fulfilled by the state to sit above and arbitrate social competition. Accordingly, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven [and the neoliberal heaven] is that the chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent” which, in the near term, dissolves society as much or more than it enriches it (Schattschneider, 1975, 34-35).⁵⁹ For new states in particular, the liberal incentive structure of the international order projects yet another source of social competition, one that overlays and exacerbates ethnic, sectarian, religious, regional, and other group competition within states. Clearly many states are aware of the instability often associated with economically liberal reforms and some have attempted to insulate or isolate themselves from this externally derived incentive structure. But even the most obdurate of states find it hard to completely disengage from the international order, given the potential consequences of isolation, sanctions and interventions, and nevertheless economically liberalize to some limited extent. But as Fukuyama (2004, 18) notes for newer states fractured by various group-isms even “a little liberalization can be more dangerous than no liberalization at all.” Indeed, twenty years after the Cold War and the triumph of liberalism, the failure of many national states seems to bare this statement out.

To summarize, the economic liberalism that developed in European states transformed the globe into a domain of economic activity that required sovereign nation-states able to deploy economically liberal property rights and market laws facilitating global capitalism. State building as a process of political and economic centralization, by

⁵⁹ Linblom (1977) makes a related argument; “the privileged position of business” within liberal polyarchy can easily lead to the end of elite political competition and the start of elite collusion facilitating the development of corporatism and the diminution of social representation.

the mid twentieth century, was increasingly eclipsed and delegitimized by liberal arguments calling for the dispersal of the states economic authority. Access to capital necessary for state development has become increasingly tied to how much states have conformed to the liberal incentive structure of the international order (Gilpin, 2001). States that open their economies, limit capital controls, and otherwise do not intervene in the economy are legible to a world order premised on economic liberalism, states that do not are illegible and potentially suffer consequences.⁶⁰ Thus, younger states are in quite an unenviable position, if they resist economic liberalization they pay external consequences (denied access to capital and markets) and if they embrace such liberalization they likely pay internal consequences (civil instability associated with unemployment and inequality). Often states will hedge their bets, and undertake a partial or limited liberalization, and consequently pay both external and internal consequences. Economic liberalism is not, unfortunately, the only source of instability projected by the incentive structure of the international order. Political liberalism has been just as destabilizing a force as economic liberalism has been for the world's states, often more so, but remains a crucial aspect of international legibility and is the topic we now turn to.

B. Political Liberalism

Political liberalism, like economic liberalism, facilitates the greater legibility of states within the international order. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of

⁶⁰ Even when Southern states have earnestly conformed to the liberal incentive structure of the international order they have still been at risk. The 1997 Asian financial crisis made it plain for states, like Thailand and Indonesia, that the herd mentality of global capital can devastate a state as much as it can enrich it (Stiglitz, 2002). Tellingly, states that had strong capital controls in place (South Korea and China) weathered the financial crisis much better than states that did not.

communism in Russia political liberalism is an unrivaled ideology, heralding, some argue, “the end of history” as far as new developments in political organization are concerned (Fukuyama, 2006).⁶¹ With few exceptions, legitimate and legible states are politically liberal states. Given the broadly liberal incentive structure of the international order, states that are not politically liberal open themselves to criticism and ostracism, and, at the extreme, sanctions and foreign interventions. However, despite great enthusiasm for its expansion, from international organizations like the UN and major powers like the U.S., political liberalism has clearly been more susceptible to compromises, relative to economic liberalism, concerning the degree to which elements of the international order demand its implementation by individual nation-states.⁶² Nevertheless, political liberalism, broadly understood as representative government, democracy, popular elections, assemblies, pluralism and constitutionalism remains, “the only serious source of [internal and external] legitimacy” for states (Fukuyama, 2004, 26). Like its economic counterpart, political liberalism requires the dispersal of the states

⁶¹ Wallerstein (1995, 18) argues, “The collapse of communism was the final collapse of the ideology of national development. If even the USSR could not make it, with the full Leninist model at its disposal, surely no other third world state was likely to catch up by a program of collective self-help within the framework of the existing world-system.” Cuba, Myanmar, North Korea, Syria, Zimbabwe and many other states give credence to skepticism towards the long-term viability of ideologies of national development at odds or against the prevailing liberal international order.

⁶² The clearest indication of this fact is that major powers, like the U.S., despite an official foreign policy position advocating democratization have allied with and supported politically illiberal regimes that possess vital natural resources (Saudi Arabia and oil) or are located in important geopolitical regions (Pakistan in South Asia). Indeed, despite an official foreign policy unequivocally advocating democratization and human rights, the U.S. has a long history of covertly undermining democratic regimes it finds unpalatable, Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1955), Brazil (1960s), Chile (1973), and Nicaragua (1980s) are familiar examples (Forsythe, 1992). Arguably these politically liberal regimes were targeted for their resistance to liberal economic reforms and tendency for nationalizing vital sectors of their economies formerly owned and/or operated by Western firms.

authority to a broader civil society and is largely anathema to state development implemented by centralized state authority. Despite the close associations between economic and political liberalism they often, in practice, work at cross-purposes, particularly for younger state's attempting to build both a legitimate and stable state apparatus and a open national market. By itself, a states adoption of political liberalism and the dispersal of political authority has been as much a source of internal instability as it has been a source of legitimacy. The instability frequently associated with the development of political liberalism is not new and impacted European states of earlier eras just as it impacts today's younger states.

The origins of modern political liberalism can be traced back to seventeenth century England where a Glorious Revolution (1688) formally asserted parliamentary authority over monarchy. However, for Anderson (1983, 194) it was the “revolutionary ruptures” of 1776 in America and 1789 in France which set “historical precedents and models” of political liberalism that spurred lasting emulation. The difference in experience between the earliest adopters of political liberalism and today's states under pressure to democratize cannot be discounted. Though punctuated by revolutions and revolts, the development of modern political liberalism in the West was largely sequenced and incremental and the culmination of a century or more of liberal economic and political development. According to Huntington (1968, 115), in the West “the rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structure clearly preceded the expansion of political participation”, so much so that throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constitutional monarchy, “in which the monarch reigned but did not rule” represented the limit of most European political liberalism. The expansion of

political participation in European states proceeded slowly and not without friction, “from aristocracy to upper bourgeoisie, lower bourgeoisie, [and finally] peasants and urban workers” by the early twentieth century (Huntington, 1968, 127). The great appeal of political liberalism and how it was eventually successful in overturning the conservative regimes of European states was its ability to be effectively tailored to the desires of most social groups. Wallerstein (1995, 255) explains political liberalism’s strategic appeal for diverse social groups in European states from the seventeenth century onwards.

“Liberalism has offered itself historically as the immediate solution to the political difficulties of the right and the left. To the right it preaches concessions; to the left it preaches political organization. To both it has preached patience. Liberalism is centrism incarnate.”

However, political liberalism’s inherent centrism is, by itself, not enough to stabilize a political process, which inevitably heightens political competition and starkly lays bare social cleavages from class, religion, language, to region. Without some sense of shared community or level of tolerance, processes of political liberalism could just as well unravel society.⁶³ This was indeed the predicament that many European states found

⁶³ Fukuyama (2004, 62-63) argues that viable political liberalism requires high levels of social capital, defined as, “norms that promote cooperative behavior...[and which] substitutes for elaborate formal incentive systems...Social capital pervades [successful] organizations and is critical to their proper functioning.” Putnam (1994) argues as well that in order for democratic government to properly work there must be a corresponding civic tradition of trust, community, and participation denoting high levels of social capital. Absent high social capital the viability of democratic governance is low.

themselves in the late nineteenth century and beyond, how to unify or pacify a liberal but disparate state society with the idea of a common community, a nation.

The competitive element of political liberalism is, of course, overlaid with the competitive element of economic liberalism facilitating, in many respects, societies of perpetual competitive confrontation. Indeed, “modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process” and exposes political society, as well as entrepreneurs and firms, to processes of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 2008, 297).⁶⁴ Some European states did not survive the disruptive combination of liberal economic then political reforms, which facilitated an internal incentive structure for dispersing economic and political authority. For example, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires staunchly resisted implementing liberal economic and political reforms, and from the standpoint of maintaining the conservative status quo for good reasons, but the few limited reforms they did manage to implement (such as the abolition of serfdom in Austria-Hungary and a short period of constitutional experimentation in the Ottoman Empire) helped, in part, facilitate their eventual collapse as multinational states by exacerbating already stark disparities in wealth and political influence.⁶⁵ For the majority of cases, European states that successfully achieved liberal democracy followed a pattern establishing “capitalism and the rule of law first, and then democracy” (Zakaria, 2004, 55).⁶⁶ Unfortunately and

⁶⁴ Huntington (1968, 357) makes a related argument, “In no society do significant social, economic, or political reforms take place without violence or the immanent likelihood of violence.”

⁶⁵ See Hobsbawm (1987) chapter 12 “Towards Revolution” for more on the impact of liberalism on the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

⁶⁶ Zakaria (2004, 251) argues further that, “over the past fifty years every success story in the developing world has taken place under a [economically] liberal authoritarian

with few exceptions, today's states do not have the luxury of sequencing state development and are, instead, pressured to rapidly liberalize their economies and politics. Regarding democratization, elections have been problematic. According to Rotberg (2004, 39-40) "elections can and have exacerbated competition, polarized already fractured societies, institutionalized existing imbalances of power, and retard...the transition from war and failure to resuscitation and good governance." This is a common scenario for the world's younger states attempting politically liberal reforms. Between the Charybdis of international pressure and Scylla of domestic backlash, many liberalizing states falter. Huntington (1968, 167) describes this paradox of political liberalism.

"Elections, parliaments, [and] political parties are the methods of organizing ... participation in modern societies. Yet the modernizing reforms...require the absence of elections, parliaments, and political parties. The success of the reforms, on the other hand, undermines...legitimacy."

A problem with the politically liberal incentive structure of the international order is its implicit conceptualization of state society in the South as a tabula rasa ready to rationally self-will itself into modern (also Western) forms of political organization.⁶⁷ However,

regime... governments that were able to make shrewd choices for the long term were rewarded with strong economic growth and rising levels of literacy, life expectancy, and education." In this scenario premature democratization can threaten successful state development. However, such arguments are poor consolations for populations denied basic freedoms by economically liberal, but nevertheless, politically authoritarian regimes.

⁶⁷ Prominent democratic theorists, like Jurgen Habermas (1984), often over assume the dispassionate rationality of people in order to make viable the concept of "coercion-free discourse" conducive to sustainable deliberative democracy. In Habermas's "theory of communicative action" the only coercion or force that is legitimate is the force of the

more often than not, state societies in the South remain highly factionalized, “political competition is dominated by ethnic or other parochial groups that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas” (Goldestone et al., 2010).⁶⁸ Disparate mass societies are quite capable of overwhelming state attempts at political liberalization. After all, democracy essentially superimposes decision by ballot over decision by bullet, where the stakes of democratic outcomes can, in cases, be as existential as the outcomes of armed conflict. Thus, Schumpeter’s (2008, 295) argument and warning, “Every system can stand deviating practice to a certain extent...But even the necessary minimum of democratic self-control evidently requires a national character and national habits of a certain type which have not everywhere had the opportunity to evolve and which [importantly] the democratic method itself cannot be relied on to produce.”⁶⁹

The challenges associated with establishing a politically liberal regime are real but there are also good reasons to appreciate and support an international incentive structure facilitating greater political liberalism. Not only do politically liberal states provide the freedom (property rights and market laws) necessary for liberal economics and global capitalism. Democracies also, after all, are premised on safeguarding

better argument where instrumental or strategic reasoning gives way to intersubjective understanding.

⁶⁸ Clapham (2002) argues that states beset by factionalism often facilitate the development of patrimonial forms of government that effectively abrogates the logic for national development. Instead, political leaders cultivate a narrow base of support via patronage at the expense of the broader society to ensure a precarious hold on power.

⁶⁹ Schumpeter (2008, 295) is emphatic, “Effective democratic competition for leadership requires a large measure of tolerance for difference of opinion.”

individual rights and providing justice (Rawls, 1971), are unlikely to go to war with other democratic states (Doyle, 1986), and no substantial famine has ever occurred in a democratic state with a free press (Sen, 1999). However, for many younger states of the global south, successful and sustained development of political liberalism has remained elusive. Hobsbawm (1987, 284) identifies a fundamental disconnect at work by an international order that uncritically projects an incentive structure favoring political liberalism resulting in “saddling the [Southern] state with the classical liberal constitution, multi-party parliamentary system[s] and the rest, designed for bourgeoisie countries in which governments were not actually supposed to govern very much, since the affairs of society were in the hidden hands of a dynamic and self regulating capitalist economy.” The successful development of political liberalism runs, inevitably, into the same problem economic liberalism often confronts, the lack of a coherent civil society capable of political participation and decision-making that does not heighten social cleavages that foment instability.⁷⁰ Indeed, for effective political liberalism, “the problem is not to seize power but to *make power*, to mobilize groups into politics and to organize their participation in politics... This takes time, and it also usually *requires* struggle” (Huntington, 1968, 145 emphasis added). However, the struggle that typically results from states undertaking politically liberal reforms often leads to instability, which in turn, takes away the motivation for implementing politically liberal reforms. Instead, agendas of political liberalization are frequently dropped in favor of an agenda of the

⁷⁰ Anderson (1983, 158) describes the typical society confronting Southern state leaders at independence as, “a huge, illiterate, exploited peasantry, a miniscule working class, a fragmentary bourgeoisie, and a tiny, divided intelligentsia.” These social conditions are hardly fertile ground for the successful and simultaneous development of political and economic liberalism, at least in the short term.

“politics of survival” where maintaining social control overrides the rationale for state-society development (Migdal, 1988).⁷¹ Even when factionalism is not pervasive in states and there is no corresponding turn to the “politics of survival” political liberalism still poses challenges to the state and its successful development. Since (electoral) competition is of the essence of democracy it too often forces upon democratic leaders “a short-run view and makes it extremely difficult for them to serve...long-run-interests”, such as state development, and often facilitates “professional politicians whom it then turns into amateur administrators and ‘statesmen’” (Schumpeter, 2008, 287-288).⁷² Despite the difficult nature of successfully transitioning to a system of political liberalism it remains a pillar of the international order, so much so that politically illiberal states, nevertheless, often maintain the trappings of democracy, (by ratifying constitutions that are then selectively enforced or holding sporadic single party/candidate elections or referendums that give the illusion of popular participation), while remaining authoritarian in practice. One must bear in mind, however, that the unraveling potential of political liberalism is not only a phenomenon of the contemporary global South.

⁷¹ Migdal (1988, 214, 217, 223) describes the “politics of survival” as encompassing three basic strategies: the “big shuffle” involving frequent replacement of ministers of state, military commanders, party leaders, and or top bureaucrats; “nonmerit appointments” as a means of providing patronage to loyal followers; and “dirty tricks” where potential rivals are illegally imprisoned, deported, disappeared, tortured, or killed. The goal of such policies has been to prevent the consolidation of competing power centers within the state. However, engaging in the “politics of survival” is mostly counterproductive, in the long term, since it, “facilitates a kind of deinstitutionalization, where loyalty displaces functional relationships” (Migdal, 1988, 226).

⁷² The perils of short term thinking for rulers and their societies can be severe and has been linked to the total collapse (via resource exhaustion) of several world societies long predating modern states, Anasazi, Easter Island, and Mayan societies are known examples (Diamond, 2005).

In the West, the principles of political liberalism continue to provide a firm foundation for their own modern movements of autonomy and separation that challenge the viability of national states. These movements have been, with some exceptions, much less acute than their Southern counterparts, given Western state's higher standards of living and level of comfort, but are impressive for their resiliency and for what they intimate for political liberalism and the potential for social fragmentation generally. Indeed, Strange (1996, 197) recognizes that "Democracy is as apt to decline as a result of boredom and frustration as of the violent overthrow of constitutional government." Thus, in Belgium the Dutch speaking Flemish have been working to extricate themselves from the French speaking Walloons; in Canada the Quebecois French strive for greater autonomy; in Spain Catalans and Basque work for autonomy and separation respectively; and in the UK, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish nationalists strain the very idea of a *United* Kingdom. So, while the presence of a homogenous national society is *not* a prerequisite for viable political liberalism, impressively demonstrated by India, it certainly appears to help. Unfortunately, for the vast majority of states societal heterogeneity and not homogeneity is the norm. The real difference, of course, between the potential state-dissolving effects of political liberalism in the North versus the South is its level of impact on the safety and well being of state populations. For example, Belgium recently established a new record for longest time without an elected government (541 days), surpassing the previous record holders Cambodia (353 days) and Iraq (289 days), but life in Belgium continued without violent instability, indeed Belgium's divided citizens are still going to work and paying their taxes while economic growth is "ticking along

nicely” (Mulvey, 2011).⁷³ Belgium politics may be inextricably divided along northern Flemish and southern Walloon lines but it remains a *civil* society. The same cannot always be said for many societies of the global South dealing with divisive colonial legacies and compelled to liberalize their politics.

In sum, the successful development of political liberalism in the west established enduring models of emulation for the rest of the world’s states. International organizations and major powers, together, project an international incentive structure favoring the expansion of political liberalism generally. States that adopt political liberalism are legible to the international order and gain legitimacy that illiberal states are often denied, freeing up access to capital and insulating them from sanctions and interventions. However, the degree of legitimacy gained by individual states transitioning to a regime of political liberalism is often contingent upon their reciprocal movement towards implementing liberal economic reforms as well. Politically liberal states that are not also economically liberal are rare and have, historically, sometimes been targeted by powerful states for regime change, such as Iran under Mosaddegh or Chile under Allende. Within states, the dispersal of political authority, which exemplifies political liberalism, has been a persistent source of instability, particularly for younger states of the South. While it has been relatively straightforward for states to write up constitutions and hold elections, adhering to constitutional rules and electoral outcomes

⁷³ One could attribute Belgium’s peaceful and “stable” political division as a variant of “the EU effect” where, “The further away from the EU and so the less credible the prospect of EU membership, the worse [nation states]... have done” (Collier, 2007, 139). Safely ensconced within the EU “security community” (Deutsch, 1966), Belgium society feels confident that acute political and economic disagreements will not devolve into violent instability.

has proved more elusive. Indeed, state efforts of implementing politically liberal reforms can lead to sustainable democracy, “but it can also hasten state collapse” (Ottoway, 1995). The costs associated with becoming legible to the international order, by becoming more politically liberal, have too often been prohibitively high for the world’s younger states.

Historically, it is unambiguous that international order does indeed matter for states and their viability. International orders project incentive structures, whether premised on *raison d’être*, mercantilism, and balance of power or sovereignty and economic and political liberalism. Such incentive structures set important conditions of possibility for the world’s states, which impacts their freedom of action and viability. The following sections will empirically explore the impact of measurable elements of the international order on states.

V. NATION-STATES FALLING APART

Does the international order lead some states to fail? Current perspectives argue the essential factors leading to state failure are domestic. States fail because state institutions are extractive and lack legitimacy. Yet all states exist in an international system of increasing interconnectedness. Greater interdependence means states are susceptible to political, economic, and social forces that lie outside their control and it is evident that there is a double edge to enhanced interdependence. Are such interactions positive, negative or unrelated to state failure? The following sections contribute to our knowledge of state failure by linking the impact of important international relationships and interactions of states from 1970 to 2002 via an “outside-in” empirical analysis. States with limited diplomatic relationships with major powers, ideological perspectives at odds with major powers, and low international economic and social engagement are susceptible to failure. The international order matters for states.

A. What Do We Know About Nation-State Failure?

Since the middle 1990s scholars and policy makers have struggled to comprehend the phenomenon of state failure. After a half-century of universal sovereignty and development assistance occurrences of state failure strike at the heart of modernization theory and the expectation that developed and underdeveloped states will eventually converge. The state failures of the 1990s (Afghanistan, Haiti, Tajikistan, Somalia, former Yugoslav states etc) appeared to herald a bleak future for many younger states in the system and raised serious questions regarding state development. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, state failure is only secondarily viewed as a development issue and primarily viewed as a security threat (Patrick, 2011).

This impacts how scholars and policy makers understand state failure; it also impacts the goals of state failure analysis primarily by sacrificing a long-term view of the problem in favor of short-term views that emphasizes risk assessment and early warning (Goldstone et al., 2010). Short-term perspectives and a focus on risk assessment have, in turn, led researchers to limit their attention to the internal dynamics of failing states.

Most scholars and policy makers would agree that state failure is a multi-causal phenomenon with macro, intermediate, and micro components (Carment, 2003). However, there is a trend amongst studies of state failure, which focuses on the intermediate and micro components at the expense of macro perspectives. State-society relations and internal violent interactions and events have displaced interest in long-term processes of systemic interactions and transformations when it comes to state failure analysis. According to intermediate perspectives, states fail because state leaders and institutions lack the legitimacy and capacity to act (Goldstone, 2008) while micro perspectives argue social fragmentation provides short-term incentives for resorting to theft and violence instead of dialogue and compromise (Lichbach, 1995). The application of intermediate and micro frameworks of state failure has succeeded in presenting the issue as primarily a problem internal to states and best solved by domestic reforms, namely rapid and simultaneous democratization and market liberalization. This *states fail by themselves* thesis represents only a partial understanding of state failure and it downplays the central role played by the international order and its major power custodians, a curious position to take in an age of continued US hegemony and diverse

globalism's.⁷⁴ In an era of deep interdependencies and dependencies a philosophy of states pulling themselves up by their bootstraps is unlikely to successfully ameliorate the problem of state failure. When it comes to the viability of states the international order matters.

This study starts from the position that the domestic framework of analysis, by itself, is insufficient for explaining state failure and that one must also grapple with the broader international context in which states are imbedded. Indeed, it is accepted that states are compelled to play “two-level games” and are largely incapable of severing the influence of domestic politics on international politics and, importantly, the impact of international politics and events on domestic politics (Putnam, 1988). Major power diplomacy, ideological alignment with powerful states, and globalism's (economic, political, and social) need to be investigated as key elements of today's liberal international order, which effect the viability of states.

The layout of the following sections is as follows. First, a review of the literature on failed states will be undertaken to pinpoint strengths and gaps. Second, will be a discussion of this study's research design as a monadic study employing logistic regression analysis. Third, will be the results of the analysis for the entire population of states and population of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) from 1970 to 2002. The study will then move to a discussion on the role elements of the international order can play in bolstering states.

⁷⁴ I am *not* suggesting that domestic analysts of state failure completely ignore elements of the international order, only that they are usually relegated to the role of intervening variable and not considered central to the logic of state failure.

B. Literature Review

In the twenty odd years scholars have studied state failure there is still disagreement over how to define the concept. Definitions of state failure run the gamut from the highly abstract, where state failure is understood as “a nonlinear process of relative decay” (Carment, 2003) to the highly specific, state failure as the occurrence of any one of a number of domestic instability types (Goldestone et al., 2010). Clearly the concept of state failure is elastic and takes up more than one slot in the state strength spectrum. Indeed, The Economist (2011) identified “MIFFs” (middle-income, failed or fragile states), which are semi prosperous in terms of individual income but still beset by weak institutional capacity and political instability. MIFFs broaden our conception of state failure beyond the wreckage of Afghanistan and Somalia, expanding it to include relatively cosmopolitan states like Nigeria, Colombia, and others. The concept of state failure is broader than one would prefer and encompasses three slots at the end of the state strength spectrum: weak, failing, and collapsed. For example, if you average out the number of states placed in the “alert” and “warning” categories of the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index from 2005 to 2011, 60% of states in the system experienced some level of failure. From this conceptual range and list of suspects we can infer likely risk factors for state failure, namely youth and poverty, which unfortunately are attributes that correspond to the majority of today’s states. It seems, in principle and for the foreseeable future, that the potential for state failure is rather high given the pervasive youthfulness and relative poverty of most states.

In a seminal article on state failure, David Carment (2003) developed a threefold causal framework that addressed levels of analysis holistically. Unfortunately, most of

the recent work on state failure has focused on only two of these frameworks, the intermediate and micro. Researchers adopting these predominately domestic perspectives of state failure frequently employ a predatory or exploitation theory of the state measured against Max Weber's (1918) classic definitional criteria of sovereign statehood, territorially bound with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.⁷⁵ From this perspective state effectiveness (institutional capacity to act) and legitimacy (whether state action is broadly perceived as just) help determine the stability and viability of states (Goldstone 2008; Carment et al., 2008). An emphasis on domestic state effectiveness and legitimacy naturally leads researchers to focus on domestic political institutions and leadership.

Consequently the state failure literature is replete with explanations of kleptocratic and patronage based domestic politics. Recourse to these strategies of political practice have been connected to myriad potential causes from colonial border legacies that untenably lumped different societies together (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Herbst, 1997), the presence of natural resources (oil, gas, and minerals) that leadership derives rent from but which takes away incentives to incorporate the broader society via taxation and the provision of state services (Chauvet et al., 2008; Ross, 2003), to the lack of external threats and war that spurred European state development (Lustick, 1997; Herbst, 1990). Regardless of which of these explanations are operative the conclusions drawn from such analyses present a picture of domestic politics throughout much of the

⁷⁵ A predatory conception of the state views the state as an "agent" that represents a specific group which seeks to extract revenue from the broader society under its control (Thies and Sorbek, 2010), see also Douglas North (1981).

South as a zero-sum game that strongly motivates losers to violently contest the political status quo.

This brings us to the key finding of domestic frameworks of state failure, which posits what is essentially a three-step process ending at the legitimacy and capacity of state leadership and institutions. First, states susceptible to failure have low levels of sociopolitical cohesion either along regional, religious, and/or ethnic lines undermining prospects for building state legitimacy (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Migdal, 1988). Second, this lack of national cohesion facilitates political leadership to rely upon a narrow base of support and to utilize patrimonial politics to stay in power further alienating groups that make up the broader society (Clapham, 2002; Zartman, 1995). Third, the political fragmentation resulting from patrimonial politics contributes to breakdowns in the states capacity to provide basic public goods such as public health and education, not to mention security or employment, on a broadly equitable basis (Bates, 2008b). Consequently, periods of electoral competition or regime succession are viewed as zero-sum events where the political and economic stakes involved are high enough that recourse to violence is seen as rational and legitimate (Bates, 2008a). What this amounts to is that state legitimacy (measured by regime type) and state capacity (measured by infant mortality rates) appear to play a critical role in a states inclination to fail. According to Goldstone et al. (2010) the most stable regimes, historically, have been full autocracies followed by full democracies, with partial democracies (political regimes

that exhibit a mix of authoritarian and democratic practices) representing the most at risk category for state failure.⁷⁶

But what is the utility of this finding? Presumably, researchers are interested in developing effective policy that limits the occurrence of state failure in addition to explaining the phenomenon. Yet with few exceptions the quality of a states domestic political regime is insulated from *direct* outside influence by virtue of the sacrosanct status of national (Westphalian) sovereignty, which stipulates individual states have the legal prerogative to determine what transpires within their borders (Krasner, 2001).⁷⁷ Despite recent upticks in humanitarian interventions to protect vulnerable populations, the sanctity of sovereignty is still upheld more often than it is violated. Furthermore, some argue that labeling problems, like state failure, “as elements of bad or weak governance does not get us very far in identifying what precisely the main problems are, how they might be addressed, and in what sort of order...governance is a very slippery concept” (Riddell 2008, 373). Good governance requires high social capital from civic traditions of community trust and participation and it remains unclear how one can go about creating these components of civil society in environments of social fragmentation and/or acute economic deprivation. If the history of European state development has any

⁷⁶ While autocratic regimes often appear stable, Olsen (1993, 572) argues that they are, “susceptible to succession crises and uncertainty about the future” and this predisposes them to instability.

⁷⁷ There are, of course, exceptions to the inviolability of sovereignty. Beyond the ability of major powers to violate others sovereignty when it suites them, there is a growing international human rights regime as well as international advocacy networks that have made it more difficult for state leaders to act with impunity domestically (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). International finance and trade organizations (IMF and WTO) also limit the ability of most states to determine their own economic policies, at least ones strongly at odds with liberal economic principles (Strange, 1996).

insight for today's states it is that development usually requires a substantial period of political and economic centralization, which initially foments a lot of instability, before a disparate mass society can begin to view itself as a single civil society (Tilly, 1992; Huntington, 1968). Researchers are well aware of the need for civil society for the operation of good governance but we remain mostly in the dark when it comes to how states can *peacefully* transition from a mass to civil state-society.

Macro or systemic perspectives focus on state weakness rather than state failure. This is the case because most of these studies were undertaken before the 1990s, when the concept of state failure first began to be adopted by researchers and policy makers. Nevertheless, there is a rich literature on the relationships between the international system and various incarnations of state weakness.

During the 1970s dependency theorists argued that the world capitalist system helped perpetuate the underdevelopment of certain regions of states (Cardoso, 1972). Multi-national corporations domiciled in the West but operating locally reoriented the national interests of Southern state leaders along the lines of international capital increasing growth at the expense of social equality, unity, and development. The typical result was the establishment of a technocratic-authoritarian state and broad social alienation, perfect conditions for igniting cycles of revolts and crackdowns. The causes of state weakness were understood to be primarily economic and required national economic autonomy understood as policies of import substitution, infant industry protection, capital controls, and the nationalization of natural resources and industrial firms to break out of dependent relations. World Systems analysts made a similar but more elaborate argument highlighting how the differentiated structure of the world

capitalist system perpetuated a peripheral zone of state weakness. According to Wallerstein (1979) the weak states of the periphery are a natural byproduct of a global division of labor, which seeks to rearticulate the domination of core states that existed during the ages of colonialism and imperialism. Options available to weak states are largely limited to adopting production modes recently played out in core economies and struggling to transition into the semi-periphery. From these perspectives the asymmetry of economic relationships lies at the heart of the state weakness dilemma.

During the 1980s state weakness was presented as a lasting historical legacy of colonialism and the arbitrary borders imposed by the great powers of the West. Former colonial states, despite formal independence in the 1960s, all inherited state institutions predicated on elite resource extraction and the stifling of domestic dissent. Even leaders that earnestly desired equitable state development were often thwarted by the fragmentation of their societies and the overriding desire to stay in power. According to Migdal (1988), social fragmentation associated with colonial legacies provides incentives for state leaders to engage in the “politics of survival” at the expense of state-society development.⁷⁸ In such scenarios society is stronger in its disparate opposition than the state that purports to rule it and a process of slow but steady socio-economic stagnation is likely to set in. The negative impact of colonial border legacies has been perpetuated by a “territorial integrity norm” (Zacher, 2001) backed by US military preponderance *and* the decision by most former colonial states to take issues of territorial revision off the

⁷⁸ Migdal (1988) describes the “politics of survival” as engaging in frequent administrative shuffling, non-merit appointments, and dirty tricks designed to forestall the development of competing power centers within the state.

agenda. Reconciliation between state and nation for most former colonies has yet to take place and this predisposes them to weakness.

Others present state weakness as the effect of a more recent phenomenon and point to the sovereignty regime established under the United Nations. According to Jackson (1990) the problem of state weakness or “quasi-states” is largely the result of liberal norms, Cold War rivalry, and great powers working through the UN to rapidly end colonialism regardless the inadequacy of former colonial states to transform themselves into modern nation-states. The privileging of juridical sovereignty via UN bureaucratic fiat over the ability to demonstrate empirical sovereignty means weak states eke out a precarious existence thanks to a regime of “negative sovereignty” backed by international organizations and major powers (Jackson, 1990). In this scenario states are weak not because of unequal economic relationships, weak states exist as a political byproduct of international order. Half a century of independence and foreign aid have not solved the “quasi state” dilemma.

C. International Order and Nation-State Failure

We need to update our perceptions on how failing states are impacted by elements of the international order and balance our over reliance on domestic analysis. Levels of international political, economic, and social interactions between states have never been greater than they are today, particularly when the scope and velocities of these interactions are taken into account (Keohane and Nye, 2001).⁷⁹ Northern states are well

⁷⁹ Keohane and Nye (2001) note that globalization from 1848 to 1914 was predominately economic and military in nature whereas contemporary globalization has added a strong social dimension.

positioned to take full advantage of and benefit enormously from these interactions, reflected in rising global inequality levels between North and South states. However, the majority of states, in particular young and poor states of the South, are at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to benefiting from enhanced international interactions and many feel threatened by these developments (Putzel, 2005). Such states do not have the luxury of deciding whether or how fast to adjust to external change and frequently they do not seek adjustment (Stiglitz, 2002). This raises questions, namely, which international economic, political, and social relationships and interactions enhance state viability and which ones threaten it?

This study understands failing states within the context of the interactions and relationships that comprise the contemporary international order. As an “outside-in” or systemic study state behavior is primarily accounted for on the basis of attributes of the international system (Keohane, 1984). While reference is often made to the destabilizing effects of global political and economic arrangements and their likely contribution to political instability within states they are often relegated to the role of intervening variable.⁸⁰ More critically, relationships between elements of the international order and state failure have yet to bear a similar level of sustained critical and empirical scrutiny, as have domestic relationships. Major power diplomacy, ideological alignment with major powers and economic, political, and social globalism’s need to be investigated as

⁸⁰ Cronin (2003) makes a compelling argument to the contrary when she notes that U.S. backed globalization, “is projecting uncoordinated economic, social, and political power...in forms including Westernization, secularization, democratization, consumerism, and the growth of market capitalism [and] represents an onslaught to less privileged people in conservative cultures repelled by the fundamental changes that these forces are bringing or angered by the distortions and uneven distributions of benefits that result.”

important elements of international order effecting state viability. Focusing on these relationships will provide new insights on state failure and, potentially, lead to more viable ideas for ameliorative reforms.

In a world comprised of individually sovereign states interstate diplomacy represents a foundational aspect of international interaction. States that have high quality diplomatic relationships with major powers gain advantages that bear directly on state viability over more diplomatically isolated states. On the surface it would appear natural to assume that the quality of a states diplomatic relationships with major powers, the states most capable of undertaking or eliciting economic, political, and security action on a global scale, would figure largely in many states susceptibility for success or failure. It is commonly asserted that when in need it pays for individuals to have friends in high places and this is likely the case for states as well. As the Cold War demonstrated, states with major power patrons (cultivated through diplomacy) were insulated from instability by being given access to credit and markets, technology assistance, or arms transfers and military training to solidify domestic order (Berridge, 2010; Strange, 1996). Greater political globalism via dense major power diplomatic relationships provides avenues of external support before, during, and after periods of domestic crises associated with state failure.⁸¹ Such states are integrated into the international order and unlikely to experience the types of instability associated with more peripheral states.

⁸¹ Berridge (2010, 89) notes, “Embassies provide advantages of local knowledge and contacts that come from being on the spot, larger embassies [like major power embassies] often have their own experts (attaches) in commerce, defense, immigration, and drugs.” In short, major power embassies have resources that aid in the development and stability of hosting states.

Hypothesis 1: States with low diplomatic linkages to major powers are more susceptible to experiencing episodes of state failure.

Ideological alignment with major powers represents another source of state viability. States that share a common ideological perspective with major powers are more legible to the prevailing international order and are preferred candidates for trade and aid suited to head off domestic crises associated with state failure. Indeed peripheral states that align their interests with those of major powers within the UN are affectively signaling their desire for engagement, increasing the likelihood they will be added to the diplomatic agendas of major powers. Such like-minded signaling is likely to succeed in attracting attention as North-South interests have diverged substantially since independence (Berridge, 2010). States who ideologically align themselves with major powers are cultivating a patron to enhance prospects for stability.

Hypothesis 2: States that do not ideologically align themselves with major powers are more susceptible to experiencing episodes of state failure.

While globalization is multifaceted it is most commonly discussed as a liberal economic phenomenon. Indeed much of the edifice of the international system is instantiated in institutions and organizations of a liberal economic nature (the WTO, IMF, WB, the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA etc). Greater economic globalism, understood as trade openness, foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI), is linked with the absence of civil conflict (Barbieri and Ruveny, 2005). Indeed, according to the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report states which struggle to link up with a liberal global economy are subject to greater domestic strife driven by persistent

unemployment, scarcities, and unequal distributions of wealth. States that fail to adopt open economies risk economic isolation, stagnation or worse economic collapse associated with state failure.

Hypothesis 3: States with low levels of economic globalism are more susceptible to experiencing episodes of state failure.

States that join International Organization's (IOs) and adhere to international treaties may also find insulation from experiencing episodes of failure. It is now generally accepted that the growing number of and membership in IOs facilitates greater global stability, understood generally as fewer occurrences of interstate war (Russett and Oneal, 2001). However, it may also be the case that individual states that are IO joiners help inoculate themselves from domestic instability as well. Cooperative and reciprocal interactions within IOs over time (ideally) provide a demonstration effect for stable domestic political practices, (hopefully) provide peer pressure for greater domestic restraint or (at least) facilitate greater international attention and action in times of need. States wracked by persistent domestic instability risk the opprobrium of the international community and further abandonment. States that join IOs and adhere to treaties partake in the prevailing politically liberal international order of states and should benefit in terms of greater domestic stability.

Hypothesis 4: States with low levels of political globalism are more susceptible to experiencing episodes of state failure.

Social globalism or how cosmopolitan a states population is reflects whether or not states view other aspects of international interactions and relationships, trade and

diplomacy for example, favorably. The populations of such states integrate themselves globally via modern communication technology and consumer habits propagated by a global capitalist system. Through these links Northern political, economic, and social values are projected abroad and, in cases, foster the extension of cosmopolitan world-views derived essentially from a Western commercial tradition. Cosmopolitan states valuing tolerance, reciprocity, and societies able to peacefully sustain a multitude of identities are more likely to take the “correct” or rational posture when it comes to international economic and political relationships making themselves more legible to the international order. They are also more likely to adopt domestic policies that emphasize tolerance and restraint. Non-cosmopolitan states view international interactions and relationships suspiciously and may suffer because of it.

Hypothesis 5: States with low levels of social globalism are more susceptible to experiencing episodes of state failure.

The general argument here is that states benefit from cultivating international relationships and engaging in diverse international interactions. On the other hand, isolated states are at serious risk of experiencing failure. The problem is many states fear international engagement and, in cases, self isolate. After clarifying the significance and relative impact of the identified elements of international order, in the analysis section, I will discuss a causal process in which they enhance state viability.

VI. RESEARCH DESIGN

The argument up to this point has been one justifying the need for systematically studying the international context of state failure not at the expense of domestic analysis but to complement it. Accordingly, this study employs a monadic analysis of state failure for an approximate population of 195 states from 1970 to 2002 with six independent variables denoting important economic, political, and social international relationships. The unit of analysis will be the individual country year. An additional analysis focusing on the population of LDCs will be employed to determine how this study's independent variables are mediated by the socio-economic context of state populations. Logistic regression, reporting coefficients and odds-ratios, will be the method of empirical analysis.⁸²

The dependent variable of this analysis is dichotomous representing (1) state failure and (0) the absence of state failure for individual country years. The study will employ the definition of state failure developed by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) and states will be identified as failing whenever rebellions, adverse regime changes, genocides and politicides, and/or revolutionary or ethnic wars are taking place.⁸³ This means that it is possible for a state to be coded as failing if it experiences any number of instability episodes, from as little as one (rebellion) to as many as six

⁸² Logistic regression is common in epidemiological analysis of risk factors for disease that occur rarely and in diverse populations. In this case the subjects (states) that are victims of a given disease (state failure) are matched with a randomly drawn control set not experiencing failure and examined together to identify factors consistently associated with higher risk (King and Zeng, 2001).

⁸³ See appendix A for a complete list of recorded instability types for the time series (1970-2002) under analysis.

(rebellion *and* regime change, genocide, politicide, revolution, and ethnic war).

Historically, it has not been unusual for multiple instability types to manifest together.

There are, however, issues with the PITF definition of state failure. Beyond endogenous problems of using potential causes (conflict/instability) to define the concept (Iqbal and Starr, 2008), it would be preferable to have a working definition of state failure that was not completely derived from internal instability. Unfortunately, we still lack compelling non-instability indicators.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, a sole focus on instability episodes has the advantage of staking out an agreed upon threshold for what counts as failure. Adhering to this threshold provides some useful parameters for the failed state debate and holds the prospect for an accumulation of basic knowledge about acute cases.

The major power diplomacy variable will be defined as a states diplomatic linkages (embassies in country and a presence abroad) with the five major powers that sit permanently on the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, U.K., and U.S.). These states send and receive the most ambassadors abroad. The diplomacy variable will range from 0 to 5 with a zero score denoting full international abandonment and 5 denoting full inclusion. Diplomacy data is derived from the Correlates of War (COW) Diplomatic

⁸⁴ There is a growing appreciation that violence alone does not condition state failure (Rotberg, 2004) but scholars have yet to identify or agree upon *measurable* non-violent criteria. This is due, in part, to a lack of good or enough data to empirically test such definitions. Consequently, this study relies on a conventional definition, focusing on instability episodes, for the purpose of empirical analysis and contributing to the current failed state debate.

Exchange data set (Bayer, 2006). States that are more diplomatically linked to major powers should be unlikely candidates for state failure.⁸⁵

The ideological alignment variable is based on UN voting affinity and ranges from (-1) no voting affinity to (+1) unanimous voting affinity. UN voting affinity data is derived from the United Nations General Assembly Voting Data set (Voeten and Merdzanovic, 2009). The investigation and coding of ideological alignment will be limited to the ones aligned (or not) with the U.S. and Russia. However, for the purposes of interpretation the U.S. will serve as proxy for France and the U.K. while Russia proxies for China. This short cut makes sense insofar as the ideologies of the U.S., France, and U.K. like the ideologies of Russia and China are largely similar according to their General Assembly voting records. UN voting data is complete and covers the time series under analysis.

The economic globalism variable encompasses multiple elements. States that are economically globalized have open economies indicated by high levels of trade, FDI inflows, FDI stocks, portfolio investments as a percentage of GDP as well as low trade restrictions i.e. limited import barriers, tariff rates, taxes on international trade, and capital account restrictions (Dreher, 2006). Accordingly, the economic globalism variable used in this study encompasses all of the before mentioned elements as an aggregate score that ranges from (0) no economic globalism to (100) total economic

⁸⁵ There are issues with the major power diplomacy variable. The Diplomatic Exchange data set only records diplomatic relationships between states at five-year intervals. This means that variations in diplomatic relationships are potentially underdetermined. Rather than interpolate the diplomacy data to fill in the gaps this study assumes, conservatively, that diplomatic relationships do not vary between recorded observations. While this may bias the results against the diplomacy variable it seems preferable to presuming variation.

globalism. All globalism data used in this analysis is derived from the KOF Index of Globalization data sets and is complete for the time series under analysis.

The political globalism variable (IO joining) is determined by several factors. These include the total number of foreign embassies in a country, the number of IOs it is a member of, its participation in UN Security Council missions, and the number of international treaties it is party to. The political globalism variable is an aggregate score of these attributes and ranges from (0) no political globalism to (100) total political globalism (Dreher, 2006).

Social globalism will be approximated by multiple factors. These factors include telephone traffic, international tourism, foreign population as a percent of total population, international letters per capita, internet and television users per 1,000 people, trade in newspapers as a percent of GDP, the number of McDonalds and Ikeas in country, and trade in books as a percentage of GDP. These factors are aggregated producing social globalism scores that range from (0) no social globalism to (100) total social globalism (Dreher, 2006).

There are four variables that need to be controlled for in this analysis. First, as regime type has been consistently identified as important by domestic studies of state failure it needs to be included in the analysis. The regime type variable from Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2003) will be used and regimes that are consolidated democracies (score +6 or higher) should be at less risk of experiencing state failure. Second, states with high institutional capacity have proven largely immune to experiencing failure while low capacity states have been highly vulnerable to such occurrences. Accordingly, a state

capacity variable denoting infant mortality rates that measure the number of deaths of infants less than one year of age per 1,000 live births annually will be employed. Third, some argue that when the Cold War ended the international environment changed drastically for weak states, cutting off or diminishing sources of external support (Van De Walle, 2004; Ayoob, 1996). This system change may have increased conditions for state failure. As such the post Cold War era will be controlled with a dichotomous variable denoting (0) the Cold War era from 1970 to 1989 and (1) the post Cold War era from 1990 to 2002. Finally, foreign development aid will be controlled for. Designed to right historical injustice, advance modernity, and ultimately develop states it nevertheless has not closed the North-South development gap. This study employs an aid variable denoting a recipients' Official Development Aid (ODA) determined by its Net Aid Transfers (NAT). NAT data is derived from the Net Aid Transfers data set compiled by the Center for Global Development and covers the time series under analysis (Roodman, 2006).

A. Analysis

According to the model outlined above we should expect occurrences of state failure to be associated with low international engagement along political, economic, and social lines. State viability is, in part, a product of fitting in with the prevailing liberal international order. In an international system predicated on liberal economic, political, and social globalisms, *un-globalized* states are illegible and at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to building or maintaining state viability.

The empirical results confirm the general argument. States that lack substantive international relationships along economic, political, and social dimensions are, with variations between the entire population of states and LDCs, at greater risk of experiencing failure. The findings of the analysis are summarized below in two tables. Table one presents results for the entire population of states and table two provides results for LDCs. Data presented in both tables describe for each independent variable, in rows, a coefficient denoting the direction of the relationship (positive for occurrences of state failure and negative for its absence), an odds-ratio indicating approximate effect size, and a P-value denoting the level of statistical significance.

Table 1. State Failure and the International Order 1970-2002						
		Model 1 All States				
		<u>Coef</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>P Value</u>		
DV: State Failure						
Major Power Diplomacy		-0.266***	0.765	0.000		
Ideological Alignment, US		-0.336	0.714	0.161		
Ideological Alignment, Russ		-0.454	0.634	0.144		
Economic Globalism		-0.012**	0.988	0.011		
Political Globalism		0.018***	1.01	0.000		
Social Globalism		-0.033***	0.967	0.000		
Democracy		-0.017***	0.982	0.000		
Infant Mortality		0.001	1.001	0.502		
Post Cold War		0.396***	1.48	0.001		
Development Aid		0.001	1.001	0.000		
Constant		-0.357		0.331		
Log psuedolikelihood		-1377.23				
Obs.		3003				
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.						
Data presented in rows for each independent variable denote the coefficient, odds-ratio, and P-value.						

From a global perspective including all states (located in table one), there are several international relationships that provide pathways for greater state viability. According to model one, states that succeed in cultivating diplomatic relationships with

major powers, ideologically align themselves with major powers, participate in economic and social globalism, and which successfully consolidate democratic governance are less likely to experience state failure. On the otherhand, states have become more susceptible to experiencing state failure in the post Cold war era and do not appear to benefit from greater participation in political globalism (IO joining) when it comes to enhancing or maintaining stability. Contrary to expectations and extant literature development aid and infant mortality do not appear to measurably impact a states susceptibility to failure. Each independent variable will be discussed in turn beginning with negative associations indicating the absence of state failure.

States benefit from substantive diplomatic relationships with major powers. Indeed, the association between major power diplomacy and the absence of state failure is highly significant (at 1 percent). A direct and continuous local major power diplomatic presence decreases the likelihood that simmering domestic problems will go undetected or will deteriorate without pressure or inducements to resolve disagreements. From the perspective of hosting states, major power embassies are repositories of technical and advisory knowledge, conduits to markets and foreign investment, and facilitators to gaining access to domestic security resources. The more states are engaged in diplomatic relationships with major powers the more they have access to critical sources of support before, during and after domestic crises. It pays for states to have powerful friends in high places that are *locally accessible*.

States also benefit when they ideologically align themselves with major powers. While the association of ideological alignment with the absence of state failure falls to the outer limit of what conventionally qualifies as “significant” (just above 10%) the

effect size of ideological alignment is competitive with that of major power diplomacy.⁸⁶ States that vote along with major powers in the General Assembly signal their like-mindedness, increasing prospects for developing supportive relationships. Indeed, given the make-up of the General Assembly (Southern state majority) and its decision-making mechanism (single vote 2/3 majority rules), such signaling can be quite effective in gaining the attention of powerful states. When coupled with North-South estrangement, it is probable some major powers take special notice of the minority of states that do support them in the General Assembly. Indeed from the support of a small number of weak states coalitions of the willing can be hobbled together, providing the appearance of international legitimacy when needed.⁸⁷ Such support for major powers increases the likelihood of gaining access to major power markets, investment, and other forms of assistance that maintain or enhance state viability.

States benefit from participating in economic and social globalism as well. When looking at the entire population of states economic globalism is, as expected, associated with the absence of state failure. While the coefficient value for economic globalism is relatively low (-0.012), it is significant (just above 1 percent) and the effect size (0.988) is

⁸⁶ For example, in model one the effect-size of major power diplomacy is 0.765. This means that a one-unit change in the independent variable (establishing a diplomatic relationship with a major power) increases the odds of a state *not* experiencing state failure by an approximate factor of 0.765. For ideological alignment with the U.S. the odds of a state not experiencing failure falls slightly to a factor of 0.714 and for Russia it falls further to a factor of 0.634.

⁸⁷ For example, in the build up to the second Iraq War the U.S. was unsuccessful in convincing powerful states in the UN (Russia, China, France, and Germany) on the need for invasion. In response the U.S. created a coalition of the willing comprised of peripheral states that had signaled their support, like Albania, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, and the Ukraine. These states raised their profile vis-a-vis the U.S., increasing prospects for future bi-lateral relations.

large. Rising openness to global trade can advance the development and viability of states and this finding follows a general trend of increasing trade openness amongst states globally over the past several decades. This macro perspective suggests there may be a grain of truth in ideas that a rising economic tide raises most boats. Social globalism also enhances state viability. Indeed, social globalism is highly significant (at 1 percent). Socially globalized states are less susceptible to state failure, reflecting, in part, the presence of cosmopolitan segments of society less likely to support or engage in the self-defeating “politics of survival.” In a world premised on increasing interdependence, economically and socially globalized states have the institutional and normative handles that facilitate interdependence, which in turn, enhances state viability.

Out of all the independent variables employed in this study only political globalism is associated with occurrences of state failure. This is a counterintuitive finding, contrary to what this analysis expected, and at odds with what the literature suggests.⁸⁸ Though the coefficient value of political globalism is low (0.018) it is highly significant (at 1 percent) with a large effect size (1.01). One might hazard a guess that as membership in and the number of IOs created has proliferated, to include peripheral states and regional organizations comprised primarily of peripheral states (such as ECOWAS in Africa), any viability enhancing affects of IO joining have correspondingly been diluted. It is also plausible that leaders of some peripheral states view IO joining as a pathway to securing greater internal and external legitimacy that bolsters their rule. In this scenario IO joining is little more than a calculated move to enhance prestige rather

⁸⁸ The political globalism variable used in this analysis does not distinguish between different types of IOs (economic, political, social or security) and this may be what is at work here. Future work will test alternative IO variables to see if the finding holds.

than an earnest commitment to multilateralism and adherence to international norms. Either way the association between greater political globalism and state viability appears to be dubious for many states.

Development aid does not appear to impact the viability of states for good or ill. Though the development aid coefficient is positive and “significant” its coefficient value is essentially zero and cannot help explain the failure of states. This is an interesting finding if one is familiar with the polarized (good/bad) debate over the impact of aid. Results suggest that both positions are off the mark and that development aid does not play a critical role in the stability of states.

Turning to the control variables, all but infant mortality perform as expected. After the Cold War many weak states lost vital sources of external support and suffered because of it. The association between the post Cold War era and occurrences of state failure is highly significant (at 1 percent) with a large effect size (1.48). Democracy, on the other hand, is associated with greater state viability. The democracy coefficient is low (-0.017) but highly significant with a large effect size (0.982) suggesting processes of democratization, though difficult and uncertain, have a big stability pay-off when democratic consolidation is successful. Infant mortality rates are not, contrary to expectations, associated with occurrences of state failure (for the entire population of states) and suggests state legitimacy is more valuable than state capacity for securing stability.

When controlling for the socioeconomic context of state populations we find that LDCs respond differently to certain elements of the international order. According to

results in table two the only continuity with table one results is that major power diplomacy and social globalism remain associated with the absence of state failure.

Continuity between models one and two ends here.

Table 2. State Failure and the International Order 1970-2002						
		Model 2 Least Developed Countries				
		<u>Coef</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>P Value</u>		
DV: State Failure						
Major Power Diplomacy		-0.425***	0.653	0.000		
Ideological Alignemnt, US		-0.078	0.924	0.876		
Ideological Alignment, Russ		0.847	2.33	0.192		
Economic Globalism		-0.011	0.988	0.214		
Political Globalism		-0.003	0.996	0.735		
Social Globalism		-0.102***	0.902	0.000		
Democracy		-0.024***	0.975	0.000		
Infant Mortality		0.015***	1.01	0.000		
Post Cold War		1.26***	3.55	0.000		
Development Aid		0.001	1.001	0.000		
Constant		-1.48		0.055		
Log psuedolikelihood		-402.81				
Obs.		907				
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.						
Data presented in rows for each independent variable denote the coefficient, odds-ratio and P-value.						

Ideological alignemnt with major powers works quite differently when controlling for the socioeconomic context of states. Ideological alignment with the U.S. loses its association with state viability and LDC alignment with Russia appears to hieghten the risk factor for state failure, albeit the association is weak (just above 10 percent). It is likely the U.S. views LDCs as poor candidates for engagment generally and prefers, instead, middle income states or states that provide some strategic benifit. But what of Russia? The curious association between LDC ideological alignment with Russia and an increased risk factor for state failure seems counterintuitive. However, the tendency for Russia to act within the UN as a counter hegemonic pole to the U.S. means that LDCs

which ideologically align with Russia are also aligning *against* the U.S., U.K., and France and not, apparently, without costs.

Economic and political globalism do not impact an LDC's inclination to fail but neither do they enhance state viability. Omnipresent as these two forces of globalisms have become, LDCs remain politically and economically isolated. Regarding political globalism, its lack of association with LDC failure clarifies the previous model. Specifically, this finding suggests that the positive association found between greater political globalism and state failure in model one is applicable mainly to middle income states or MIFFs, which exist between the extremes of prosperity and poverty. The lack of an association between greater economic globalism and state viability is more frustrating. Conventionally it is taken for granted that opening one's economy goes hand in hand with state development. However, any administrative moves in LDCs that reforms domestic markets clearly is not sufficient to attract foreign capital. On the contrary, economic reforms are likely to be futile if there is not also the necessary infrastructure in place (transportation, communication, labor, and law enforcement) which global capital requires. This finding suggests that the heavy emphasis placed on free market reforms for development is inappropriate for LDCs. Proper sequencing of development is not a luxury and basic infrastructure (physical and social) necessarily precedes and makes possible lasting international investment, trade, and state development.

For the control variables the empirical results for LDCs matches all of the expectations of researchers. LDCs are more prone to experiencing state failure in the post Cold War era. Likewise, LDCs which succeed in consolidating democratic governance decrease the risk of experiencing state failure. Development aid remains

inconsequential for LDCs. Finally, LDCs unable to curb high infant mortality rates increase their risk factor for state failure.

B. Discussion

The results of the empirical analysis suggest that elements of the international order play a big role in the absence of state failure. While there are variations in the empirical results, depending on the socio-economic context of state populations, there is a clear enough pattern that suggests scholars can no longer justifiably limit their study of failing states to the domestic sphere alone. However, we still lack a sense of causal process concerning how these international interactions and relationships of states work themselves out. The following discussion sketches out how key elements of the international order can work to bolster the viability of states.

I suggest, heuristically, there is a probable sequence of interaction between states and elements of the international order, which culminates in greater state viability *over the long term*. The process begins when states ideologically align themselves with major powers, which increases their visibility and attractiveness as “clients” vis-a-vis major powers. Such states are subsequently more likely to diplomatically engage with major powers. Next, positive diplomatic engagements with major powers can lead to the development of “relational hierarchies” (Lake, 2011), which provide economic, political, and social conduits between states through the establishment of embassies and consulates. A relational hierarchy exists when a pair of states agrees that one will subordinate themselves to the other for mutual benefit. The cultivation and eventual establishment of diplomatic relationships, then, helps unlock broader engagement with

processes of economic and social globalism, increasing domestic conditions for prosperity and peace. Finally, the stability enhancing elements of this process can be reinforced and expanded by the successful cultivation of additional major power diplomatic relationships. From this perspective major power diplomacy can be a lynchpin for state viability and, potentially, a potent force against state failure. However, this clearly is *not* a short or medium term solution to state failure. The successful establishment of a major power diplomatic relationship is almost certainly a long term process, which relies to some degree on the ability of individual states to effectively signal and attract major power attention, no mean feat given the peripheral nature of most states and the overcrowded agendas of major powers. Thus, while major power diplomacy may be a reliable bulwark against state failure such relationships are, nevertheless, difficult to establish for the majority of states and likely to take a while to develop. During a time when many are focused on policy relevant analysis geared towards early warning, presumably for some type of preemptive intervention, questions of utility are unavoidable. I will conclude this section with a response to the question of this study's relevance for the state failure dilemma.

An unfortunate reality of major power foreign policy is that it is often plagued by 90 day thinking that sacrifices the coherence of long term planning in favor of short-term calculations prioritizing quick and cheap fixes. While such short-term thinking is rarely fatal to major powers, it can take a heavy toll on the stability of the international system as well as the viability of states. The U.S. in particular has recently lurched from a series of poorly thought out foreign interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq) intended to bolster international stability and rebuild nations but which have subsequently become fiascos

for America and devastating to those on the other side of US policy. Arguably it was short-term thinking, which, in part, undermined achieving the ostensible goals of American foreign policy. Given the possible costs associated with implementing policy based on short term goals and thinking scholars should be wary of enabling such action by privileging short term perspectives, early warning, and policy relevant analysis designed for quick consumption. We all could benefit from more long term thinking on the possible relationships between major power diplomacy and state failure, especially since our track record of responding to state failure (Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia) has thus far been dismal.

While it is correct to view state failure as an intermediate result of extractive economic and political institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), failing states also reflect broader shortcomings of critical elements of the international order like major power diplomacy, which plays out over the long term. Unfortunately, the debate over state failure has elements of a *blame the victim* narrative. Conventionally, it is argued that states fail first and foremost because their political leaders and societies are overly traditional, divided, corrupt or all of the above. From this perspective major powers and the international order they cultivate bear little responsibility for the phenomenon of state failure and have limited policy tools available to remedy the situation. This perspective has bred such a degree of pessimism over the issue that some have suggested states would be better off in the long run if we “let them fail” (Herbst, 2004). However, the example of Somalia, a failed state since 1993, explodes arguments in favor of the

recuperative potential of letting states fail.⁸⁹ Eighteen years of state failure in Somalia has not galvanized a domestically led rehabilitation of the Somali state. Instead, Somalia has continued to smolder with instability and has drawn in neighboring states Ethiopia and Kenya. Much the same could be said about the Democratic Republic of Congo or Yemen. Essentially, scholars and policy makers alike have focused their scrutiny on the domestic sphere of state failure, expertly identified the process and effects of falling state legitimacy and capacity, despaired over the double edge of state sovereignty, and largely ignored elements of the international order as warranting primary evaluation. Yet the results of this analysis suggest the international order matters.

A major power diplomatic approach to state failure would, obviously, require some serious policy reorientations by (at least some) major powers in order to be effective. The growing tendency of policy makers to militarize diplomacy and view international relationships through the prism of a global war on terror or as a balancing act is likely to be counterproductive in the long term.⁹⁰ For a diplomatic response to work there must be something positive about diplomatic relationships, an understanding that such engagements will go beyond the immediate security concerns of powerful states and narrow interests of local elites. Major power diplomacy can be much more than a

⁸⁹ Collier (2007, 37) argues “the evidence is against...internal solutions...Democratic rights... do not reduce the risk of civil war, and they do not reduce the risk of coups... breaking the conflict trap and the coup trap are not tasks that these societies can readily accomplish by themselves.”

⁹⁰ Berridge (2010, 122) notes U.S. embassies in particular have, “since 9/11... become command posts in the war on terror and have witnessed a major influx of military personnel.” This raises the danger of further militarizing diplomacy, which could crowd out non-security issues (like state development) and make host countries wary of diplomatic engagement generally.

mechanism for propaganda, espionage, and cultivating fifth columns; it can also be a force for development and stability.

To be clear, I am *not* advocating for direct applications of major power diplomacy for ongoing cases of state failure. On the contrary, the benefits of major power involvement in already failing states (if Afghanistan, Haiti, and Somalia are any indication) have proven mostly dubious. Short (month to a year) and medium (5-10 years) term time horizons are inappropriate when contemplating a major power diplomatic response to state failure; one must take a long view (15-30 years). What I am advocating is a discussion about a preemptive major power diplomatic response to the *possibility* of state failure. Such a response would entail a proactive policy of diplomatic engagement with peripheral states that have not yet failed and which emphasizes broad based development. Indeed, if the causal process I laid out earlier is accurate such a policy would go far in overcoming the challenge peripheral states have with the initial attraction and establishment of major power diplomatic relationships. This idea is worth pursuing and future work should undertake comparative case studies of diplomatic interactions and hierarchy relationships between weak and powerful states to help clarify the full nature and impact of these causal relationships.

The goal here is not to displace domestic frameworks or forecast occurrences of state failure. Instead, the goal has been to bring balance to the study of state failure by incorporating a long-term system level perspective that links the phenomenon to the critical relationships that constitute the contemporary international order. We must recognize that states do not fail solely by themselves and that the international order matters for the viability of states. International order premised on economic growth

without development, capitalism without democracy, and major power policy without coordination (or appeal) threatens the viability of many states. Fortunately the international order and its structural elements are not immutable and can, as history demonstrates, be changed to address new challenges. Whether this change will be incremental and the result of proactive long term reform or precipitous and the result of neglect have yet to be decided. Only by addressing the failings of the international order can we begin to substantively address the failure of states. The following section will assess the utility of the relational hierarchy framework by exploring two case studies of relational hierarchy and their effect on subordinate state viability.

VII. INTERNATIONAL ORDER BY RELATIONAL HIERARCHY?

An international framework of state failure requires focusing on the relational hierarchies between major powers and the states most at risk of state failure, namely, young, poor or otherwise peripheral states of the South. Major powers are here understood to include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, U.K., U.S.). Relational hierarchy research has been limited to the analysis of U.S. relational hierarchies and has yet to fully explore alternative hierarchy relationships (Lake, 2011). The initial focus on the U.S. makes sense to the extent the U.S. remains the most powerful state in the system and has the ability to cultivate a large number of diverse relational hierarchies, from Dominican Republic to Japan, but it does not provide a systematic picture of international order by way of relational hierarchy. Consequently, a sole focus on U.S. relational hierarchy is not sufficient to explore the relationship between international order and state failure. Unfortunately, data on other major power relational hierarchies is limited (Lake, 2011). The lack of sufficient data requires a first cut at the problem and illustrative case studies can be helpful for beginning to correct the exclusive focus on U.S. relational hierarchies.

Looking at international order through a framework of relational hierarchy provides a view of order as an incomplete tapestry of bilateral relationships, which sometime overlap. International order is incomplete insofar as not all states are engaged in relational hierarchy with major powers, weak and peripheral states in particular. In principle, relational hierarchies vary in intensity with the dominant state enjoying a high or low capacity to influence the subordinate. Similarly, subordinate states vary in the amount of autonomy they have from the dominant, with some subordinates having more

autonomy than others. The relative dominance of the dominant state and autonomy of the subordinate depends on the perceived legitimacy of the relationship as well as the ability of the dominant to reward and punish subordinates (Lake, 2011). The following section will provide illustrative case studies of non-U.S. relational hierarchies and will focus on China and Russia. These case studies are not theory testing and are instead meant to be exploratory (Ekstein, 1975), designed to bring attention to and encourage further research of other major power relational hierarchies as they relate to state failure. More importantly, case studies of Chinese and Russian relational hierarchies can help us determine if U.S. relational hierarchies are typical or not. This matters because relational hierarchy research has thus far been limited to the study of U.S. hierarchies. In short, focusing on China and Russia provides a non-Western authoritarian and semi-authoritarian example of relational hierarchy and will help identify distinctions in types of major power relational hierarchy and how they might affect state failure differently. The China-North Korea and Russia-Syria relational hierarchies provide the cases under analysis. These cases were selected on the assumption that they are different from U.S. relational hierarchies, which could help stake out a typology for relational hierarchy research.

A. The Dragon

The China-North Korea relational hierarchy demonstrates that major powers are sometimes willing to bare a high cost in maintaining relations of dubious value. The relationship between China and North Korea grew out of the Korean War era (1950-1953) when the two countries found common cause in challenging the post WWII reestablishment of Western power in Asia, the Korean peninsula in particular. The

legitimacy of Chinese authority over North Korea rests on ideological solidarity associated with communism as well as a shared history of imperial victimhood at the hands of Western states and later Japan. North Korea benefits from the relationship it has with China economically and militarily. Massive food and military aid help prop up an otherwise isolated and anemic North Korean regime. More importantly, China has shielded North Korea from harsher sanctions from the international community by wielding its veto power in the UN Security Council. China benefits from its relationship with North Korea, in theory, by having a proxy it can rely on to keep the West cautious and off balance in the region. However, in the early 21st century the value of a diversionary pariah, like North Korea, appears to be losing some of its appeal for a more prosperous and confident China.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong was preoccupied with solidifying internal control of the population and state development. North Korea provided a convenient distraction that kept potential rivals, like the U.S. and Japan, from focusing their security resources on a still vulnerable China. However, the mutuality of the China-North Korea relational hierarchy has come under mounting pressure as China has sought increasing economic integration with the West, exemplified by its joining the WTO. The 2006 North Korean nuclear weapons test further strained relations with China and brought a rare public rebuke. The motivation for continued Chinese support for the North Korean regime increasingly appears to be driven by fear and uncertainty over what a pullback in support might lead to (Moore, 2008). Indeed, one might expect the curtailment or end of China's support for North Korea to lead to state failure, refugee flows, and greater regional instability and conflict.

It is difficult to visualize a viable North Korean state without China's relational hierarchy, especially if North Korea maintained its current policies and actions. Despite an outward appearance of strength by virtue of its large military, possession of nuclear weapons, bellicose rhetoric and willingness to use force, policymakers have long anticipated a North Korean collapse. The two countries began to diverge when China began to reform and open its economy under Deng Xiaoping during the 1970s. Meanwhile, North Korea, under Kim Il Sung, implemented a state ideology of self reliance (Juche) that isolated North Korea from the global economy. As China's economic development and growth gathered momentum in the 1990s North Korea experienced a string of famines from 1994 to 1998. Instead of galvanizing North Korean reform, however, Kim Jung Il initiated a Military First policy to ensure the maintenance of the status quo and China acquiesced. Clearly North Korea has been undergoing a prolonged process of economic deterioration and meets part of the definition for state failure, ongoing deterioration. But the China-North Korea relational hierarchy helps North Korea avoid revolts and adverse regime changes, demonstrated in 2011 by Kim Jong-un's smooth transition into power, and thus avoids meeting the full criteria of state failure employed in this study (deterioration *and* instability). Whether or not North Korea would fail if China ended the relational hierarchy is an open question but it certainly seems plausible.

The China-North Korea relationship cuts a stark contrast to the typical U.S. relational hierarchy. Specifically, the security and economic benefits provided by the U.S. is more often associated with diminishing subordinate defense burdens and greater economic openness and welfare (Lake, 2011) whereas China has enabled *increased*

defense burdens and economic deprivation for North Korea. Chinese and U.S. relational hierarchies both contribute to international order but they vary in the quality of order produced. North Korea has been allowed to pursue a security policy based on nuclear proliferation and has developed a talent for blackmailing the West for aid with its nuclear weapons program, antagonizing the very states China is in the process of forging new relationships with. What is more, North Korea enjoys significant autonomy from China when it comes to the use of force against neighbors.⁹¹ China appears trapped in a relational hierarchy that half a century ago served its interests but now appears only to undermine its position. The viability of the China-North Korean status quo is questionable and this raises the specter of state failure for North Korea if China ever decides to disengage from its relational hierarchy.

The China-North Korea relational hierarchy demonstrates that democratization and economic liberalization are not the only pathways to state viability, though they may be more sustainable. On the contrary, North Korean political and economic institutions are highly extractive, traits typically associated with state failure, but the benefits of mild subordination to China helps ensure the regime has enough resources to carry on. However, the order provided by the China-North Korea relational hierarchy is, arguably, the lesser of two evils (a belligerently insecure state instead of a failed state) and does not seem likely to endure. In short, the Chinese contribution to international order, in this case propping up a weak North Korean state, is tenuous relative to most U.S.

⁹¹ North Korea dramatically upped its use of force against South Korea in 2010 when it sank the ROKS Cheonan and bombarded Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea also has a history of provocative missile tests, weapons proliferation, and kidnapping Japanese and South Korean citizens, not to mention human rights violations against North Koreans.

contributions. Whether or not the China-North Korea relational hierarchy represents a distinguishable Chinese brand of hierarchy requires more systematic research. Russian relational hierarchy may have much in common with China's comfortableness with kleptocratic-authoritarian subordinates and is the topic we next turn to.

B. The Bear

The Russia-Syria relational hierarchy provides an example of a subordinate state failing despite receiving benefits associated with relational hierarchy under a major power. The relationship between Russia and Syria was forged during the height of the Cold War and was based on a common interest in limiting Western influence in the Middle East. The legitimacy of Russian authority over Syria rested, in part, on the appeal of the single party model of state led development offered by the Soviet Union, which helped legitimize continued Ba'ath Party dominance, as well as a shared history of suffering invasion or colonization at the hands of the West. Syria benefits from its relational hierarchy with Russia economically and militarily. Russia provides Syria with military resources and conducts significant trade and investment in the country. More importantly, Russia shields Syria from international sanctions and interventions by wielding its veto power in the UN Security Council. Russia, likewise, benefits from its relationship with Syria. Russian weapons trade with Syria is worth millions of dollars annually and the relationship makes Russia, at least potentially, relevant to Middle East politics and a force to be taken into account by the West. Also relevant, Russia's last military base outside the former Soviet Union (Tartus) and its only Mediterranean fueling station is located in Syria and attenuates the Black Sea Fleets reliance on traversing the Bosphorus (controlled by NATO member Turkey) to refuel. The military value of the

Tartus naval base may be questionable but it undoubtedly has prestige value and represents a nostalgic last link with former Soviet military prowess. However, the failure of the Syrian state in the summer of 2012 threatens the very existence of the Russia-Syria relational hierarchy. More importantly, the case of the Russia-Syria relational hierarchy reinforces the idea that not all major power relational hierarchies provide anything near the same quality of order. How did Syria fail and why was Russia unable to anticipate or stop it from doing so?

Syria has been under Ba'ath party control since the early 1960s but the party was initially plagued by infighting. The Syrian regime stabilized and would eventually become hereditary after Hafez al-Assad, a minority Alawite, took power in 1970. Where the North Korean regime confronted a mostly homogenous society, Syrian rulers have always contended with a disparate society and have relied on continuous emergency rule since the early 1960s to maintain control. From the standpoint of establishing legitimate state authority this is problematic, especially when authority is vested in an Alawite and the country is majority Sunni with sizeable Kurdish, Christian, Palestinian, Turkmen, and Druze populations. Consequently it was much easier, from the viewpoint of Syrian leadership, to enhance state power through external assistance rather than making hard negotiations and compromises with Syrian mass society. Indeed, a year after Hafez al-Assad took power (1971) Syria signed an agreement allowing the Soviet Union to establish the Tartus naval base solidifying the Russia-Syria relational hierarchy. The Soviet Union then provided the Assad regime with the security resources necessary to quell a Sunni insurgency that began in the late 1970s and which was only put down with the Hama Massacre in 1982. However, the stability gained by brutal crackdowns did not

resolve the underlying motivations for widespread social discontent, especially since provisions for better incorporating Syria's Sunni population never took place. Thirty years later Bashar al-Assad confronts a similar, largely Sunni, uprising inspired by the Arab Spring movement against corrupt authoritarian regimes that began in Tunisia in 2010. The Assad regime has responded to popular demands for an end to a half-century of Ba'ath party rule the same way it responded in the 1970s and 1980s, with a brutal military crackdown. Likewise, Russia continues to supply its Syrian subordinate with military resources to crackdown on the opposition and has protected Syria from sanctions and interventions by using its veto power in the UN Security Council. However, what worked during the Cold War seems much less effective today and the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad is increasingly isolated internationally and unable to control population and territory domestically.

The Russia-Syria relational hierarchy, like its China-North Korea counterpart, cuts a stark contrast with the typical U.S. hierarchy. Syria has maintained a heavy defense burden over the years, only partially opened its economy (mostly benefiting supporters in Damascus and Aleppo), and experienced state failure (deterioration of political legitimacy and instability) in 2012. On the other hand, Russia's primary benefit from its relationship with Syria seems mostly symbolic, tied to an earlier era where Russia was at the center of world politics. If the Russia-Syria relational hierarchy is representative of its other hierarchy relationships (weapons for prestige no questions asked) than Russia's contribution to the stability of international order is highly questionable. Central Asian, Caucasus, and other states in Russia's near abroad would be much better served, in the long run, to pursue democratization and economic

liberalization to secure the legitimacy and adequate capacity of state institutions.

Difficult as these liberal reforms may be to implement, for young states with disparate populations, their pitfalls and challenges are likely to be preferable to the risks associated with Russian hierarchy.

The China-North Korea and Russia-Syria relational hierarchies indicate there is a potential for sharp variations in the quality of international order provided by major powers. Authoritarian major powers are unlikely to act as conveyer belts for good government practices and this increases the likelihood their subordinates will suffer deficits in domestic legitimacy. Moreover, China and Russia are similarly susceptible to deterioration and instability associated with state failure owing, in part, to their own authoritarian natures. Russia's experimentation with democracy has, for the moment, settled into a state of semi-authoritarian oligarchy but after 14 years of leadership the resonance of Vladimir Putin's legitimacy appears to be waning. Similarly, it is not at all clear if the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party rule can endure a prolonged slowdown or reversal in economic growth. In short, major power regime type matters for dominant *and* subordinate state viability.

These case studies are only illustrative and further research will be required to verify if they are indeed representative of Chinese and Russian relational hierarchies. Nevertheless, the case studies are suggestive and should motivate further investigations of all major powers of the UN Security Council as well as regional powers like Brazil, India, and South Africa. Relational hierarchies with powerful states can enhance the viability of minor states but they can also facilitate their failure. U.S. subordinates typically bare lighter defense burdens and are more likely to embrace liberal reforms

(Lake, 2011) but China and Russia have encouraged heavy subordinate defense burdens and remain ambivalent or hostile to reforms associated with greater subordinate viability. Such negative hierarchy relationships threaten the long-term viability of subordinate states and identify another potential pathway to state failure, one less directly connected to domestic interactions and events. On the other hand, a relational hierarchy led by a dominant state advocating and encouraging economic and political reforms and which provides security in a manner that frees up subordinate resources for development can be a bulwark against state failure. States are deeply integrated into an international system of order provided, largely, by major powers, which means many of the decisive causes of their politics come from without not within. The international order matters just as much or more than domestic order when it comes to the long-term viability of states.

C. Discussion

Over the past half-century, international anarchy has been replaced by a patchwork system of international order. Major powers are key architects and stewards of international order and have the ability to help, hinder or ignore other states in the system. The relational hierarchies of major powers stitch states into the fabric of international order but the quality of this stitching varies and there are gaps in the fabric, most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁹² While states are unlikely to die under conditions of international order they are capable of failing, even when subordinated to a major power.

⁹² According to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy's 2011 Failed State Index, of the 20 worst performing states, 14 of them (70%) were located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the region with the least amount of direct major power involvement.

The framework provided by relational hierarchy helps us understand that states do not always or even principally fail by themselves. Democracy and open markets are consistently identified as traits associated with state success but the extent to which the stimulus and ability to sustain such reforms derives from relationships with major powers, like the U.S. and possibly France, the U.K., and others, are underappreciated. Likewise, the negative impact of relations with authoritarian major powers (defense burdens and maintenance of illegitimate status quos) is under accounted for. Instead, analysts tend to understand the accomplishment of liberal reforms in Southern states to derive, essentially, from a rational self-willing where leaders pull state-society up by its bootstraps guided, in part, by the demonstration effect of Western prosperity. Such a conception suggests, implicitly, that the international system is anarchic and that states are best served by self help and being suspicious of other actors. This may be sound advice when it comes to hierarchy relationships with China and Russia but it downplays positive contributions to international order made by the U.S. and possibly other major and regional powers. More critically, it reduces our understanding of state failure by presenting it as a domestic problem soluble only by domestic reforms. Relational hierarchy provides us with a much-needed international framework for state failure and opens up another level of state failure analysis.

By highlighting the significant role played by major powers in helping stabilize or destabilize minor states, relational hierarchy gives academics and policy makers a new target for reform, the relational hierarchies of major powers. Major powers need to be held accountable for the quality of order they contribute and this is unlikely to occur if state failure continues to be understood as resulting principally from domestic

incompetence and corruption. International order matters for the viability of states and the relational hierarchy framework can help us understand why some states fail while others thrive. The following section will explore the regional context of international order and its effect on state failure.

VIII. REGIONAL CONTEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND NATION-STATE FAILURE

With the exception of the North American and West European regions, nation-state failure has become a global phenomenon. Yet it is clear that nation-state failure is much more likely to occur in some regions than it is in others. While we have only one prevailing international order this order is nevertheless mediated by the geopolitical context of regionalism.⁹³ Regional variations inevitably pose problems for the appropriateness or viability of the incentive structure of the international order, advocating, as it does, specific behavior and activities for all states, regardless of regional location. Accordingly, *all* states are supposed to be nationally sovereign, not internally divided, and politically and economically liberal, not authoritarian and definitely not mercantile or autarkic. However, the limitations of one-size-fits-all approaches are well known generally.⁹⁴ In a complex environment with only nominally similar units (a rich sovereign nation-state is quite different from one that is poor) prescribing a single path of behavior and activity is likely to be further affected and, in cases, frustrated by regional effects.⁹⁵ A greater understanding of the regional occurrences of nation-state failure could facilitate a much-needed corrective in developing new and more tailored ideas on

⁹³ According to Buzan and Waever (2003, 27) “Regions, almost however defined, must be composed of geographically clustered sets of such units, and these clusters must be embedded in a larger system, which has a structure of its own...Regions have analytical, and even ontological, standing, but they do not [the EU notwithstanding] have actor quality.”

⁹⁴ One-size-fits-all approaches are frequently held as suspect aptly demonstrated by the popular admonishment: for the person with a hammer every problem looks like a nail.

⁹⁵ Buzan and Waever (2003, 19) argue, “conditions and dynamics differ sharply from one region to another.” It follows; the international order is likely to vary in its impact according to regional context.

how to mitigate their occurrence. Finally, a regional understanding of nation-state failure will help guard against fallacies of single causes and solutions.

The following sections will identify important regional variations in the impact of the international order on the likelihood of nation-state failure. Major power diplomacy, ideological alignment with major powers, and globalisms will, again, comprise the model of the international order. Nation-state legitimacy (according to regime type) and capacity (according to infant mortality rate), the post Cold War era, and development aid will be controlled. The study will, again, employ a monadic empirical analysis with individual country years as the unit of analysis for the population of nation-states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, respectively, from 1970 to 2002.⁹⁶ The method of empirical analysis will be logistic regression reporting coefficients and odds-ratios. The dependent variable will remain dichotomous representing (1) state failure and (0) no state failure. Nation-states are coded as failing whenever rebellions, adverse regime changes, genocides and politicides, and/or revolutionary or ethnic wars are taking place. Sub-Saharan African nation-states will be the first regional case study, followed by nation-states in Asia and the Middle East.

A. Africa

In no other region of the world are nation-states more likely to fail than in sub-Saharan Africa (Failed State Index 2011; Goldstone et al 2010). Hobsbawm (1994, 352) argues that at the dawn of African independence from colonial rule, “most [sub-Saharan African] people would have managed pretty well if left to themselves... [and] most of its

⁹⁶ See appendix B for a complete list of Sub-Saharan African, Asian, and Middle Eastern states included in the analysis.

inhabitants did not need their states, which were usually too weak to do much harm, and if they grew too troublesome, could probably be bypassed by a retreat into village self-sufficiency.”⁹⁷ However the incentive structure of the international order backed by powerful states helped ensure that African state leaders would, nevertheless, feel induced or compelled to project their sovereign authority domestically and liberalize their economies and politics. More than half a century after independence from colonial rule and repeated experiments with foreign aid and economic and political liberalism, too many African states remain more of a juridical phenomenon than an institutional reality.⁹⁸ Clearly the incentive structure of the international order has not facilitated congruence between African and Western states. However, it is not the case that the international order has been without affect on African states. On the contrary, according to model three results in table three, located below, there have been measurable impacts of elements of the international order, which either decrease or increase the likelihood of African states failing.

⁹⁷ Moore (1966, 506) argues in addition that “it is well to recollect that there is no evidence that the mass of the population anywhere has wanted an industrial society [which requires a strong centralized state], and plenty of evidence that they did not...At bottom all forms of industrialization so far have been revolutions from above, the work of a ruthless minority.” Much the same could be said about state development in general.

⁹⁸ There are, of course, exceptions to the dire straights of African states. Botswana and South Africa, for example, have made impressive progress in state development and have grown their economies while, mostly, adhering to democratic principles of governance (Collier 2007).

Table 3. State Failure and the International Order in Africa 1970-2002				
		Model 3 Sub Saharan African States		
		<u>Coef</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>P Value</u>
DV: State Failure				
Major Power Diplomacy		-0.466***	0.627	0.000
Ideological Alignment, US		-0.741	0.476	0.128
Ideological Alignment, Russ		-0.155	0.856	0.804
Economic Globalism		-0.017**	0.982	0.038
Political Globalism		-0.006	0.993	0.404
Social Globalism		-0.079***	0.923	0.000
Democracy		-0.023***	0.976	0.000
Infant Mortality		0.007**	1.001	0.01
Post Cold War		0.899***	2.45	0.000
Development Aid		0.000	1.01	0.003
Constant		0.576		0.453
Log psuedolikelihood		-436.59		
Obs.		1112		
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant 10 percent.				
Data presented in rows for each independent variable denote the coefficient, odds-ratio, and P-value.				

Major power diplomacy and consolidated democratic governance maintain a strong association with the absence of nation state failure and both have a large effect size, and high level of significance for states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, ideological alignment with the US is not associated with nation state failure and has a relatively large effect size but falls to the outer limits (slightly above 10%) of what is commonly accepted as statistically significant. The benefit of ideological conformity with the US seems to be weak and reflects, in part, the peripheral status of Sub-Saharan Africa in global economics and politics and divergent interests.⁹⁹ Africa remains one of the most isolated regions of the globe when it comes to major power involvement.

⁹⁹ The West lost its majority following in the UN General Assembly in the 1960s and has, since the 1980s, drastically scaled back its funding of the organization (Berridge, 2010, 156).

Regarding the globalism variables, only economic and social globalism is associated with the absence of nation-state failure in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the relationship between economic globalism and the absence of nation state failure is less robust than one might expect, indicated by its relatively low coefficient value, and suggests that opening ones economy is not primarily what safeguards African states from domestic instability. Maintaining open economies without an attendant uptick in economic growth and employment (for the last half century most African states have either experienced low or no economic growth regardless the level of openness of their economies) washes out the potential stability enhancing effects of greater economic globalism (Stiglitz 2002). The association between social globalism and the absence of nation-state failure in Africa is slightly more compelling, indicated by a higher coefficient value and level of significance. African states with a significant cosmopolitan citizenry appear to be more tolerant of otherness than more insular societies and less likely to support a domestic agenda favoring the politics of survival, which seeks to monopolize the state for the benefit of a minority group within the state-society.

Variables in model three that are associated with occurrences of nation-state failure in Africa include, as expected, the post Cold War era and high infant mortality rates. The association of the post Cold War era and increased occurrences of nations-state failure is unambiguous, indicated by a high and positive coefficient value, large effect size, and high level of statistical significance. The association between high infant mortality rates (indicating low state capacity) and nation-state failure in Africa is less clear. Though high infant mortality has a large effect size and high level of significance, the coefficient value is close to zero. This suggests that low state capacity does not

explain very well the occurrence of African state failure for the latter half of the twentieth century. Next we turn to a regional analysis of international order and nation state failure in Asia.

B. Asia

Unlike the African region Asia is anchored by the presence of several powerful states (China, India, and Japan), which may affect the impact of the international order regionally and the likelihood that Asian states will fail. Results from the empirical analysis of Asian states from 1970 to 2002, located below in table four, suggest that this is indeed the case. As expected, major power diplomacy provides a bulwark against state failure in the region. Asian states that ideologically align with major powers appear to do well in safeguarding state viability, indicated by a high negative coefficient and high level of significance. Likewise, Asian states with strong democratic regimes appear well insulated from experiencing failure and the effect size of consolidated democracy in particular is large, especially when comparing it to the effect size of ideological alignments with Russia and China.

Table 4. State Failure and the International Order in Asia 1970-2002					
		Model 4 Asian States			
		<u>Coef</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>P Value</u>	
DV: State Failure					
Major Power Diplomacy		-0.479**	0.619	0.002	
Ideological Alignment, US		-1.62**	0.197	0.017	
Ideological Alignment, Russ		-2.23**	0.106	0.006	
Economic Globalism		-0.011	0.988	0.369	
Political Globalism		0.051***	1.05	0.000	
Social Globalism		-0.019	0.98	0.225	
Democracy		-0.031***	0.969	0.001	
Infant Mortality		0.002	1.001	0.562	
Post Cold War		-0.277	0.757	0.411	
Development Aid		0.000	1.001	0.007	
Constant		0.103		0.92	
Log pseudolikelihood		-224.02			
Obs.		451			
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.					
Data presented in rows for each independent variable denote the coefficient, odds-ratio, and P-value.					

The empirical results for Asian states have commonalities with previous models. Major power diplomacy, ideological alignment with the US *and* Russia, along with consolidated democracy are all, as expected, associated with the absence of nation-state failure. Only political globalism is associated with the occurrence of nation-state failure in Asia, though the coefficient value is relatively low. While Asian states are, generally, heavy joiners of IOs they still struggle to reconcile conflicting national interests (over resources in the South China Sea in particular) and subsequently, have not provided demonstration effects or impulses for greater domestic emulation, restraint, and stability as theorized. But the results from model four are more interesting for which variables turn out to *not* be significantly associated with state success or failure.

Greater economic and social globalism, along with the post Cold War era and state capacity all point in the expected direction but fail to reach any level of significance. Provisionally, one could argue that Asian states have been much more successful in employing neo-mercantilist economic policies (involving capital controls, tariffs, and infant industry protection) than states from other regions. Indeed, the economic “miracle” story in Asia has relied heavily on the support of major powers cultivating the strength of their respective spheres of influence, mainly by giving open access to their home markets while allowing Asian states to protect and develop their domestic markets (Strange, 1996). Arguments that authoritarian Asian values associated with Confucian conservatism are principally responsible for regional economic successes downplay the likely role plaid by major power patrons. The unusually high amounts of support many Asian states receive from major powers probably accounts, in part, for the relative stability of Asian states in the post Cold War era as well. Unlike most other regions,

Asian states have not, on average, been more prone to experiencing nation-state failure in the post Cold War era. Regarding social globalism in Asia, its coefficient value (close to zero) suggests that either the societies of many Asian states remain insular or social globalism does not play a primary role in Asia for state viability. Finally, Development aid and low state capacity, despite positive coefficient values, are not associated with occurrences of nation-state failure in Asia from 1970 to 2002. The following section discusses results from a regional analysis of nation-state failure and the international order in the Middle East.

C. The Middle East

For the greater Middle East, the construction of a state system followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. Four Hundred years of Empire gave way to British and French colonialism and, eventually, independence after World War Two. Broadly speaking, the political experience of sovereign Middle Eastern states has been one of authoritarian government and single party systems of rule and, since the establishment of Israel and the discovery of vast oil wealth, intense interest and intervention by major powers, particularly by the U.S. (Owen, 2000). Authoritarian states in the Middle East, whether premised on hereditary monarchy, Arab nationalism or Islamism, often give the illusion of conservative, unified, and stable state-societies. However, whenever the “veil of omnipotence” that Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes cultivate falls away, as they recently have in the Arab Spring of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, it often exposes a, “bundle of competing, and often contradictory, interests that had always lain just behind” (Owen, 2000, 42). Accordingly, the potential for violent political instability within authoritarian Middle Eastern States has

been rather high. The empirical results from model five, located below in table five, indicate which elements of international order have been factors for state success and state failure in the greater Middle East from 1970 to 2002.

From 1970 to 2002 Middle Eastern states that have successfully cultivated diplomatic relationships with major powers and which have embraced economic globalism have been less likely to experience episodes of nation-state failure. On the other hand, Middle Eastern states in the post Cold War era and that ideologically align themselves with the US, embrace political globalism and democracy, and have low state capacity are more susceptible to occurrences of nation-state failure. Ideological alignment with Russia, greater social globalism, and development aid has no discernable relationship with nation-state failure in Middle Eastern states.

Table 5. State Failure and the International Order in the Middle East 1970-2002				
	Model 5 Middle Eastern States			
	<u>Coef</u>	<u>OR</u>	<u>P Value</u>	
DV: State Failure				
Major Power Diplomacy	-0.454**	0.634	0.006	
Ideological Alignment, US	1.59**	4.91	0.006	
Ideological Alignment, Russ	0.132	1.15	0.853	
Economic Globalism	-0.025	0.975	0.13	
Political Globalism	0.031***	1.03	0.001	
Social Globalism	-0.009	0.99	0.585	
Democracy	0.020**	1.02	0.049	
Infant Mortality Rate	0.012**	1.01	0.028	
Post Cold War	1.18***	3.25	0.000	
Development Aid	-0.001	0.999	0.347	
Constant				
Log psuedolikelihood	-223.04			
Obs.	439			
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent, **significant at 5 percent, *significant at 10 percent.				
Data presented in rows for each independent variable denote the coefficient, odds-ratio, and P-value.				

The main counterintuitive finding of model five is the positive association of political globalism and democratic governance with occurrences of nation-state failure. However, the low coefficient values of these variables along with their large effect size make it difficult to parse the meaning of these results. Regionally, political globalism is only associated with nation-state failure in one other model, Asia (model four). The theoretical expectation that greater IO joining would have a demonstration effect or provide other impulses for domestic restraint is not born out, at least for Middle Eastern states from 1970 to 2002. Model five is the first, and only, model in this study that associates democratic governance with occurrences of nation-state failure. This finding makes sense to the degree that the Middle Eastern region is almost entirely bereft of consolidated democracies (only Israel, Turkey and, periodically, Lebanon have met this threshold). Regarding Lebanon, its consociational democracy, which precariously balances the interests of Christian, Druze, and Shia and Sunni Islamic communities, has not provided a reliable bulwark against violent domestic instability, as the recent assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005 unfortunately demonstrates. Also, repeated foreign interventions, by the U.S., Israel, Syria, and Iran (through its support of Hezbollah) have probably exacerbated the fragility of Lebanon's precariously balanced democratic parties and institutions. In such an environment of political fragmentation and intervention, the stabilizing effects typically associated with consolidated democratic governance appear to have been overwhelmed. The following concluding section will discuss the implications of the empirical analysis for our understanding of the international order and nation-state failure.

IX. CONCLUSION

The results of the empirical analysis for all states, LDCs, and the African, Asian, and Middle Eastern regions suggests that elements of the international order play an integral role in both occurrences of nation-state failure and in the stability of states. While there are several important variations in the empirical results, depending on the socioeconomic status of individual states and regional location, there is a clear enough pattern that suggests scholars can no longer privilege intermediate and micro frameworks. The most relevant international variables associated with the absence of nation-state failure are, in order of effect and consistency across models, major power diplomacy, ideological alignment with the U.S. followed by Russia, and economic and social globalisms.¹⁰⁰

As elements of the international order major power diplomacy, ideological alignment with great powers and economic and social globalisms represent potential pathways to enhancing the viability of states. Beginning with major power diplomacy, there seem to be multiple aspects of such relationships that serve to bolster the viability of states. Major power diplomacy reinforces the stability of most states, weak and strong alike. Speaking generally, and from the perspective of hosting states, major power embassies have often been repositories of technical and advisory knowledge, conduits to markets and foreign investment, and facilitators to gaining access to domestic security

¹⁰⁰ When reaching levels of statistical significance out of five total models, major power diplomacy is associated with the absence of nation-state failure five out of five times; ideological alignment with the U.S. four out of five times; ideological alignment with Russia three out of five times; economic globalism five out of five times; and social globalism four out of five times.

resources. From the perspective of major powers, resident embassies have made it easier for them to gain local influence, gather information, handle crises, and are a major power's "first line of defense abroad...and nearest thing to a mind reader bolted onto the side of a hosting government" (Berridge, 2010, 253). Major power diplomacy is unambiguously associated with the greater viability of the world's states.

States also enhance their relative viability when they ideologically align themselves with major powers. Specifically, it is ideological alignment with the U.S., U.K., and France followed by alignment with Russia and China, which provides avenues of support not available to more independent minded or revisionist states.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, given the make-up of the UN General Assembly (majority southern states) and its decision-making mechanism (single vote majority rules) there have been periods of major power estrangement from the UN as the interests of the weak have diverged from the strong. This estrangement makes it all the more likely that major powers take special notice of the minority of states that do support them in the General Assembly. Such support for major powers can be relied upon to increase the likelihood of developing bilateral relationships that can provide avenues for greater state viability. Results from regional analysis, however, provide evidence that not all states benefit from ideologically aligning with major powers. While most states benefit from ideologically aligning themselves with the U.S. and its closest allies, this is not the case for Middle

¹⁰¹ According to General Assembly voting records the voting positions of the U.S. with France and the U.K. as well as the voting position of Russia and China are essentially synonymous. Because of these similarities a state having an ideological affinity with the U.S. can reasonably be expected to have ideological affinities with France and the U.K. as well. Likewise, states sharing a Russian ideological perspective can be reasonably expected to ideologically align with China.

Eastern states, at least for the time series under investigation. The saliency of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (its violence, longevity, and broader symbolism) in particular, and a popular local view that the U.S. helps perpetuate the conflict, ensures that political leaders in the region either avoid overt displays of U.S. support or become reliable belligerents against U.S. interests in order to avoid potentially wrathful populations. Leaders of Middle Eastern states that choose the latter policy option cut off potential avenues of external support while increasing the risk of experiencing state failure. In short, regional issues matter, particularly ones that negatively resonate with large populations, are conflict prone, and which linger unresolved. This suggests elements of the international order can be overwhelmed by the development of contentious unresolved issues that resonate against it, and may in the process close off limited avenues of external support for states.¹⁰² Regarding other major powers, there are advantages for states that ideologically align themselves with Russia and China as well, though this relationship is not as strong as it is for the U.S. and is, unsurprisingly, most operative for states in Asia.

There is also, as expected, a relationship between economic and social globalism and enhanced state viability. However, these positive relationships are subject to several important conditions and exceptions. Regarding economic globalism, the picture is more muddled than one might expect as to its clear association with state viability.

¹⁰² Fortunately most regions lack highly contentious unresolved issues that resonate broadly. The only other region in danger of developing a contentious issue on a level of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Asia, where the Indo-Pakistani rivalry over Kashmir has fomented broader regional conflict. There is a potential for the Indo-Pakistani rivalry to further deteriorate, drawing in other states and undermining the limited stability enhancing aspects of the international order. This does not bode well for the U.S. which has become increasingly involved in the region.

Conventionally, there is the theoretical expectation that rising openness to global trade is sure to advance the development of all states and there has indeed been a general trend of increasing trade openness amongst states globally. Yet empirically, the association between greater economic globalism and enhanced state viability is decidedly mixed and depends very much on what population of states you are looking at. Specifically, the benefits of economic globalism stand out when one looks at the entire population of states. The more one controls for specific populations of states (wealth and region) the more tenuous is the connection between economic globalism and greater state viability. The relationship between social globalism and greater state viability adds a new dimension to the failed state debate but is subject to exceptions as well. Like economic globalism, this relationship stands out when one looks at the entire population of states. But unlike its economic counterpart, social globalism appears to positively reinforce the population of poorest states (LDCs) as well. The strength of this relationship is further confirmed by the regional case study of sub-Saharan Africa, whose states account for the majority of the LDC population, where social globalism is associated with the absence of nation-state failure and greater state viability. In Africa, socially globalized states have been less susceptible to occurrences of failure and reflect, in part, the presence of cosmopolitan segments of society less likely to engage in the self-defeating politics of survival. Nevertheless, the strength of this relationship (empirically) disappears for Asia and the Middle East.

The international order plays a role in facilitating the failure of nation states as well. Political globalism and development aid, in particular, are often touted as forces that enhance the viability of the world's states. However, the empirical results suggest

otherwise. Regarding political globalism, there is the conventional expectation that the institutional arena provided by IOs lengthens the shadow of time for participating states providing, in the process, motivations for greater trust and reciprocity amongst states in order to cultivate a good reputation. This suggests the possibility that such reciprocal interactions within IOs over time could provide demonstration effects that socializes states to act with greater restraint domestically as well. This does not appear to be the case. Indeed from a perspective that includes all states, greater political globalism is found to have a weak association with the failure of nation-states and when controlling for the regional location of states, Middle Eastern states appear to be adversely affected by IO joining as well. However, it remains unclear on whether or not IO joining is, in itself, what contributes to nation-state failure. This association may be more a byproduct of the significant expansion in the number of, and membership in, IOs globally and the increasing inclusion of many weak and otherwise peripheral states. From this vantage point it is not IOs themselves that foment occurrences of nation-state failure but a selection effect whereby the increasing accessibility of IOs for states, raises the probability that some members will fail.

The relationship between international development aid and nation-state failure remains a bit of a mystery. Empirically, there is no compelling association between receiving development aid and the increased likelihood of nation-state failure beyond a consistently positive coefficient value. However, neither is it the case that increased development aid is associated with the absence of failure. Indeed the results indicate that both poles of the development aid debate, whether aid's impact is positive or negative, are off the mark. This is not to say that development aid, in particular emergency aid, does

not positively impact the lives of many individuals, it undoubtedly has. But development aid has clearly failed in closing the north-south development gap. In short, the amount of development aid is likely much too miniscule and poorly coordinated to have a substantive impact on the stable or unstable development of the world's states.

The proliferation of nation-state failure raises many questions for the social scientist, from the efficacy of uncoordinated globalization to the distribution and use of power in the international system. While to date much attention has been given to the domestic dynamics involved with state failure far less attention has been given to the global environment in which these states are imbedded. As such, the analysis undertaken here has sought to redress this imbalance. The international order projects political, economic, and social preferences that affect the viability of states. Ignoring these international interactions and relationships clouds our understanding of nation-state failure and inaccurately presents it as, fundamentally, a domestic issue soluble only by domestic action.

The narrative established by the empirical results suggests, provisionally and generally, that states that successfully engage with the prevailing international order enhance state viability while those that do not expose themselves to the risk of nation-state failure. The question remains, however, whether or not individual states are masters of their own destiny and fail or succeed solely according to their own actions. If one accepts Moore's (1966) contention that in most cases, "smaller countries depend economically and politically on big and powerful ones means that the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries" then the answer is no. For many of the world's states the international order plays a very real and tangible role in impacting the

nature and scope of what is possible for domestic policy. This delimiting of the spectrum of possibility for states by the international order is, unfortunately, mostly uncoordinated, often capricious in its application, and too often works at cross-purposes. Instances of individual nation-state failure reflect more than venal and inept political leadership struggling with inchoate society; failing states reflect a broader failure of the prevailing international order.

This study has identified the quality of international interactions and relationships across political, economic, and social lines to be important factors associated with nation-state viability. However, we have traded the narrow but “thick” view offered by the domestic perspective of individual state failure for a wider but “thinner” view provided by an international framework. While the analysis does indicate that there are significant associations between state viability and diverse aspects of the international order much work remains in more fully accounting for these associations. The broad nature of this study prohibits anything more than a provisional account for how these international interactions and relationships actually play themselves out. The results, tentative as they are, nevertheless provide fertile ground for reform ideas that bypass some of the restrictions and problems traditionally associated with the debate on state failure, like national sovereignty and good governance. The following will discuss one of these possible reform ideas derived from the empirical results.

The analysis strongly suggests that major power diplomacy plays a key role in buttressing state viability. This finding holds for both the international community of states, LDCs, and (most) regional communities of states. Specifically, it is high quality diplomatic relationships with major powers, which appears to successfully stitch states

into the fabric of international order. Whether it is gaining access to capital, markets, technical assistance or security aid, nation-states can benefit from substantive diplomatic relationships with major powers. Unfortunately the art of diplomacy has declined since its nineteenth century European apogee (Wight, 1978), and has deteriorated further since the end of the Second World War (Berridge, 2010).¹⁰³ Competition between the U.S. and Soviet Russia during the Cold War necessitated that diplomatic engagement rely on persuasion and compromise in addition to the traditional threats and use of force. The subsequent period of U.S. preponderance, which despite many arguments and indications to the contrary continues (Strange, 1987), has witnessed a rise of coercive unilateralism mixed with indifference in place of persuasion, compromise, and competitive diplomatic engagement.¹⁰⁴ The resulting diplomatic abandonment of large numbers of nation-states has increased the risks that some of these states will fail. Without pervasive major power diplomatic engagement conflicts fester out of site until they explode onto the scene of international and/or regional politics, the damage already done. Reviving the art and changing the orientation of major power diplomacy thus constitutes a potential key

¹⁰³ Berridge (2010, 113) argues, “The resident embassy has been on the defensive throughout most of the post WWII period. In the U.K. traditional diplomacy came under increasingly hostile official scrutiny after the mid 1960s and suffered remorseless attacks on its budget. The same trend was observable in the U.S. and other countries.” Perversely, at a time when embassies are in high demand and could potentially ameliorate significant political instability in hosting countries, their funding and stature have been under domestic political attack. For the U.S. in particular, the Department of Defense has increasingly asserted itself in the realm of foreign policy, displacing the authority of the State Department.

¹⁰⁴ Berridge (2010, 122) notes U.S. embassies in particular have, “since 9/11... become command posts in the war on terror and have witnessed a major influx of military personnel.” This raises the danger of further militarizing the art of diplomacy, which could crowd out non-security issues (like state development) and make host countries more wary of diplomatic engagement generally.

avenue to limiting future occurrences of nation-state failure as well as stabilizing the international order generally.

Unexpectedly, it was the classical Realist Hans Morgenthau (1952) who argued, “Of all the factors that make for the power of a nation, the most important, however unstable, is the quality of diplomacy.” One way or another major powers pay for allowing nation-states to fail. Failing nation-states have been linked to myriad problems: transnational terrorism, interstate and intrastate war, massive human dislocation and refugee flows, and the rise of underground economies (Rotberg, 2004). In short, nation-state failure is a source of international instability. Ideally, the best way to deal with nation-state failure would be to halt it before it happens and avoid the avalanche of attendant problems that follow. Greater diplomatic engagement with the world’s states by major powers represents a compelling and relatively straightforward approach to address nation-state failure.

The potential advantages of a major power diplomatic response to nation-state failure are several. A continuous major power diplomatic presence in states could decrease the likelihood that simmering conflict would escape unnoticed or go without support and/or pressure to address the underlying issues of contention. Traditional responders to nation-state failure, like the UN, are often criticized for their inability to anticipate such crises, slow response time, constricting rules of engagement, and the tendency to freeze rather than resolve conflict (Berridge, 2010). This is not to say the UN is an ineffective institution, only that it is limited by the nature of its decision making processes and its primary guiding principle of safeguarding the sovereignty of the world’s states. The UN was not designed to deal with nation-state failure but to establish

collective security protecting all sovereign nation-states from other predatory states. Historically major powers have not felt constrained by aversions to violating the sovereignty principle, when it suits them, and for the problem of nation-state failure this may potentially be a good thing. Finally, motivation for increased major power diplomatic engagement, arguably, already falls within the purview of their respective national interests and requires only affective advocacy and the realization that diplomacy is a viable (and probably cheaper in the long term relative to military intervention) policy tool to defend against occurrences of nation-state failure. Achieving international consensus, cooperation or the establishment of new institutional mandates to address nation-state failure would be inordinately difficult and, fortunately, not required for a major power diplomatic approach to work since it could be undertaken unilaterally by individual major powers. In an age of political, economic, and social globalism reliant on global stability, large swaths of diplomatically abandoned nation-states prone to failure should not be suffered to continue both for reasons of self-interest and morality.

International order is a public good that mitigates the zero sum logic of international anarchy. Critical elements of international order, like major powers, can, in cases, provide a bulwark against occurrences of state failure. However, like all public goods benefits are non-excludible, which makes the maintenance of international order subject to collective action problems, like free riders. From this vantage point limiting ones search for the causes of state failure to the domestic arena of individual states seems inappropriate. Instead, the architects and stewards of international order, particularly major powers, need to be scrutinized and held accountable for the quality of order or disorder they contribute. Focusing on the weak links of individual failing states is

important but, in the final analysis, it is the manufacturer, not the link, which bares primary responsibility and state failure research should reflect this basic reality.

The goal of this study has been to bring balance to nation-state failure research by beginning to incorporate a system level perspective and to link the phenomenon with the diverse relationships that constitute the contemporary international order. This order derives from a unique history of European state development, which fused sovereignty with liberalism. Knowledge of this historical legacy suggests that processes of state development are inherently difficult, prone to conflict, long in duration, and uncertain in outcome. Placed within this context nation-state failure seems much less an aberration and more of a foreseeable outcome that could be better anticipated. It has become increasingly apparent that state development is not a process that can be sped up by technocrats, nor can it be accomplished on the cheap. State development is fundamentally a process of struggle where grand designs typically give way, at best, to a politics of “muddling through.”¹⁰⁵ We must recognize and accept that nation-states do not fail solely by themselves and that critical elements of the international order also matter for the viability of states. We remain at the beginning, not the end, of this important research.

¹⁰⁵ Charles Lindblom (1959) describes “The Science of Muddling Through” as a response to the limits of rational decision-making and frustration with the slow pace of progress in large organizations.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Cases of Nation-State Failure, 1970-2002.¹⁰⁶

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Afghanistan	1978-	Complex
Albania	1996-1997	Complex
Algeria	1991-2002	Complex
Angola	1975-2002	Complex
Argentina	1976-1980	Complex
Armenia	1995-1996	Regime Change
Azerbaijan	1991-1997	Complex
Bangladesh	1974-1991	Complex
Belarus	1995-1996	Regime Change
Benin	1972	Regime Change
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992-1995	Complex
Burkina Faso	1980	Regime Change
Burma	1970-	Complex

¹⁰⁶ Cases of nation-state failure for the time series 1970-2002 are derived from the Political Instability Task Force criteria. The “Complex” instability type indicates more than one type of violent political instability took place during the years in question.

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Burundi	1970-1973	Complex
	1988-	Complex
Cambodia	1970-1991	Complex
	1997	Regime Change
Chad	1970-1994	Complex
Chile	1973-1976	Complex
China	1970-1975	Complex
	1988-1998	Complex
Columbia	1984-	Revolutionary War
Comoros	1976	Regime Change
Comoros	1995-1999	Complex
Congo-Brazzaville	1997-1999	Complex
Congo-Kinshasa	1977-1979	Complex
	1992-	Complex
Croatia	1991-1995	Ethnic War
Cypruss	1974	Complex

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Ecuador	1970-1972	Regime Change
Egypt	1992-1999	Revolutionary War
El Salvador	1977-1992	Complex
Equatorial Guinea	1970-1979	Complex
Ethiopia	1970-1993	Complex
	1999-2000	Ethnic War
Fiji	1987	Regime Change
The Gambia	1994	Regime Change
Georgia	1991-1993	Complex
Ghana	1972	Regime Change
	1981	Regime Change
Guatemala	1970-1996	Complex
Guinea	2000-2001	Revolutionary War
Guinea-Bissau	1998-	Complex
Guyana	1978-1980	Regime Change
Haiti	1991	Regime Change

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
	1999-2000	Regime Change
India	1970-1971	Ethnic War
	1983-	Complex
Indonesia	1970-	Complex
Iran	1977-1992	Complex
Iraq	1970-1975	Complex
	1980-	Complex
Israel	1987-	Ethnic War
Ivory Coast	2002	Complex
Jordan	1970-1971	Revolutionary War
Kenya	1991-1993	Ethnic War
Korea, South	1972	Regime Change
Laos	1970-1979	Complex
Lebanon	1975-1991	Complex
Lesotho	1970	Regime Change
	1998-1999	Complex

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Liberia	1985-	Complex
Mali	1990-1995	Ethnic War
Moldova	1992	Ethnic War
Morocco	1975-1989	Ethnic War
Mozambique	1976-1992	Revolutionary War
Nepal	1996-	Revolutionary War
Nicaragua	1978-1988	Complex
Niger	1996	Regime Change
Nigeria	1970	Complex
	1980-1985	Complex
Oman	1970-1976	Revolutionary War
Pakistan	1971	Complex
	1973-1977	Complex
	1983-	Complex
Papua New Guinea	1989-1997	Ethnic War
Peru	1982-1997	Complex

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Philippines	1970-	Complex
Romania	1989	Revolutionary War
Russia	1994-	Ethnic War
Rwanda	1970-1966	Complex
Rwanda	1990-2001	Complex
Senegal	1992-1999	Ethnic War
Sierra Leon	1970-1971	Complex
	1991-2002	Complex
Solomon Islands	2000-	Regime Change
Somalia	1988-	Complex
South Africa	1984-1996	Complex
Sri Lanka	1983-	Complex
Sudan	1970-1972	Complex
	1983-	Complex
Swaziland	1973	Regime Change
Syria	1981-1982	Genocide/Politicide

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Tajikistan	1992-1998	Revolutionary War
Thailand	1970-1983	Complex
Turkey	1971	Regime Change
	1980-	Complex
Uganda	1966-	Complex
UK	1971-1982	Ethnic War
Uruguay	1971-1973	Regime Change
USSR	1991	Regime Change
Vietnam, South	1970-1975	Complex
Yemen, North	1970	Revolutionary War
Yemen, South	1986	Revolutionary War
Yemen	1994	Revolutionary War
Yugoslavia	1991-1992	Complex
	1998-1999	Complex
Zambia	1970-1972	Complex
	1996	Regime Change

<i>Country</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Instability Type</i>
Zimbabwe	1972-1987	Complex

**Appendix B: List of African, Asian, and Middle Eastern States Included in the
Regional Analyses.**

Sub-Saharan African states

Angola

Benin

Burkina-Faso

Botswana

Burundi

Cameroon

Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Chad

Comoros

Congo-Brazzaville

Congo-Kinshasa

Djibouti

Equatorial Guinea

Sub-Saharan African states continued

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Gabon

The Gambia

Ghana

Guinea-Bissau

Guinea

Ivory Coast

Kenya

Liberia

Lesotho

Mauritania

Madagascar

Mauritius

Malawi

Mali

Sub-Saharan African states continued

Mozambique

Namibia

Nigeria

Niger

Rwanda

South Africa

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Sao Tome-Principe

Sudan

Swaziland

Tanzania

Togo

Uganda

Zambia

Sub-Saharan African states continued

Zimbabwe

Asian states

Bhutan

Bangladesh

Brunei

Cambodia

China

India

Indonesia

Japan

Kyrgyzstan

Kazakhstan

Laos

Maldives

Malaysia

Myanmar

Asian states continued

Nepal

Philippines

North Korea

South Korea

Singapore

Sri Lanka

Tajikistan

Taiwan

Thailand

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Vietnam

Middle Eastern states

Afghanistan

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Middle Eastern states continued

Bahrain

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Oman

Pakistan

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Somalia

Syria

Middle Eastern states continued

Tunisia

Turkey

United Arab Emirates

Yemen

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