

**Minding the Gap:  
Case Study of a Police Organization and Attempted Innovation**

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THESIS

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For my Dad who always knew I would  
and my Mom who made it happen.

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## SUMMARY

This dissertation used a case study methodology to explore how police officers in one large urban department responded to the administration's attempts to change their behavior. The administrators focused on changing information sharing and accountability to tighten disconnects in the organization. I explored how the administration tried to democratize and centralize information and establish deeper accountability, the mechanisms by which they thought changes would occur, and how the 'rank and file' perceived and incorporated changes.

Observations and interviews conducted from 2003 to 2008 inform this case study and highlight perspectives of police officers in various roles across the department. I referenced several clusters of organizational theories including leadership, procedural justice, and bounded rationality, and current understandings of police culture, to conceptualize change influences.

The effort to connect field officers' actions in the field with administrators' objectives was largely unsuccessful. Simply telling employees to collaborate and share, even if you are the leader, will not make them do it. Internal motivations, incentives, feelings of organization justice, organizational culture, and relationships are important factors in understanding actors' motivation to innovate.

## I. Introduction

### A. Background

Law enforcement agencies are under constant scrutiny to deliver fair and equitable treatment to their constituents. They are pressured to introduce new and innovative ways of delivering services and fighting crime. Most recently, growing public concern about police misconduct sparked by high profile cases of police action resulting in civilian deaths (see Freddie Gray, Laquan McDonald, Tamir Rice, and Rekia Boyd to name a few) have pushed agencies to consider organizational changes. Crime rate increases, budgetary restraints, political jockeying, and new information technology capabilities (i.e. CCTV) also add to the pressure. “The War on Terror” has added further public safety responsibilities, requiring unprecedented collaboration with federal and state agencies in the hope of anticipating and thwarting possible terrorist acts. Rooted in efforts to improve public image, legitimacy, effectiveness, and outcomes, police administrations have implemented various innovations aimed at changing their organization and/or officers’ behavior in order to maximize productivity, responsiveness, and resources (Rosenbaum, 2007; Weisburd & Braga, 2006).

Using case study methodology and archival observational and interview data collected over five years (2003-2008), I explored the perspectives of police officers and their responses to an organizational innovation focused on collaboration and accountability within the organization. This exploration provided insight into how police administrators introduced innovations and

managed organizational changes in one large police agency and how the rank and file responded to these attempts. The overarching question was: how did the organization respond to attempts to more closely align the administration's stated goals and methods with the execution thereof by the rank and file. In other words, what was the response to efforts to tighten the "coupling" between the administration and the field officers?

### **B. Statement of the Problem**

When the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released the annual 2001 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), Chicago saw a dramatic uptick in homicides. That year, Chicago led New York City and Los Angeles in both homicide rate and absolute number, despite having a smaller population. Local and national media labeled Chicago, "the murder capital of America."<sup>1</sup> Shortly thereafter, then Mayor Richard M. Daley promoted Philip Cline, a veteran police officer with over three decades of experience, from within the ranks to serve as the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department (CPD).

Although CPD administrators had long considered gangs, drug markets, and guns to be significant contributors to violent crime, Superintendent Cline and his administration went further. Cline expressed his intent to exclusively address gang-involved individuals and activities as THE way to decrease homicides and other violent crime. Because 70 percent of Chicago's homicides at the time were committed with a firearm, and over half of homicides were

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<sup>1</sup> Directly comparing cities' homicide numbers and rates to each other should be done cautiously because there are myriad factors to consider, including population density and other socio-structural issues (see Monkkonen, 2002). Media, politicians, and the public typically do not consider these nuances.

determined to be gang- and/or drug-market-related, police administrators often considered these factors to be inextricably linked.<sup>2</sup> According to the 2001 Chicago Police Department Annual Report, gang-involved individuals and their illegal activities – namely carrying guns and dealing drugs – contributed to the bulk of violent crime recorded in Chicago.

In 2003, in response to this violence, the CPD introduced a department-wide initiative to unify organizational focus and direct police resources into areas where violent crime was concentrated – i.e., “hot spots.” The administration centralized data analysis responsibilities and several police units so that it could quickly deploy officers from those units to hot spots on a discretionary basis.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) was created and DOC-assigned officers gathered, vetted, and circulated “actionable intelligence” to officers across the department. All officers, no matter their purview (e.g., beat cops, robbery task force), were to access and use this information to achieve the same goal: reduced gang homicides and shootings. The DOC also specified the hot spots – areas where there was a higher anticipated risk of violence. Officers carried out enhanced enforcement and visible patrol activities in these places. DOC analysts used multiple sources of information gleaned from the department’s increasingly comprehensive and sophisticated information technology systems including a

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<sup>2</sup> CPD attributed the bulk of drug and gun-related crime to gangs, but there are researchers who question whether drug-related crime is as tightly connect to gangs as many police administrators claim (Howell & Gleason, 2001), whether police are effective at identifying gang members (Katz, 2003), and whether focusing solely on gangs ignores other important factors contributing to violent crime (Manning, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> At the time, Chicago was divided into 25 police districts run by District Commanders within six oversight areas run by Deputy Chiefs. Under the new plan, Deputy Area Chiefs assumed a much broader strategic role. They were responsible to coordinate deployment decisions regarding the gang teams that fell under their purview as part of the managerial adjustments. Previously, gang team officers were under the district management.

number of internal police databases (see Skogan et al. 2005, for a description of CPD's data collection systems and analytical capabilities).<sup>4</sup> Additionally, increased emphasis was put on "real time" accountability and on weekly meetings intended to drive the innovation and evaluate the quantity and quality of police work toward reducing violence (Rosenbaum & Stephens, 2005).<sup>5</sup>

Regardless of the operational specifics, hot spots policing was appealing to police administrators because they could specifically target violence and maximize their limited resources by directing officers and efforts into the most expeditious geographic areas. Because of this appeal, along with the building evidence that crime and disorder were reduced by hot spots policing (see Braga, 2001, 2005; Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Sherman, 1997; Braga & Weisburd, 2010, and Weisburd & Eck, 2004 for reviews of this research), CPD's interest in this model was not ill-founded.

### **C. Purpose of the Study**

Police administrators have long faced political and community pressure to address crime, fairness, and police legitimacy. Such pressures have no doubt increased following recent high

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<sup>4</sup> Notably, DOC analysts would also use other data systems beyond the internal police databases, including Department of Corrections' data and other state and local information sources when compiling and vetting data.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to note the historical context of CPD's "management accountability" agenda. In the late 1990s, CPD had begun to pursue a "management accountability" agenda with a goal of getting crime and operations data all in one unified system. To that end, the CPD began centralizing and streamlining data systems and, in conjunction with a private developer, began creating a data warehouse called the Chicago Law Enforcement and Reporting (CLEAR) system. In early 2000, the CPD administration founded the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability (BCSA) to provide "the necessary authority and the appropriate organizational purview to bring about an overall improvement in the management of the Chicago Police Department and to intensify the city's community policing strategy in all organizational bureaus of the Chicago Police Department." (Quote from the BCSA mission statement cited in Skogan et al., 2005). So the Chicago Police Department's strategic decision to be more data-driven predated Cline's tenure as Superintendent and the Deployment Operations Center in 2003. The administration certainly benefitted from and used the informational technologies and analytics that were developed as part of the overall accountability agenda for the hot spots policing strategy.

profile incidents, often caught on camera, in which African American civilians have died during encounters with police. Administrators thus have fresh impetus to tighten the coupling between themselves and the rank and file. Chicago's DOC and accountability initiatives provide a modern example of police administrators attempting to recognize and address the long-standing problem of "loose coupling" – i.e., weak links between the front-line and the administration.

There is a tension in police organizations between autonomy and interdependence. Officers have a certain degree of discretion and independence in producing safety, but they must also collaborate with the many to ensure that police departments are a unified force. Given the hierarchical structure and size of large law enforcement agencies, it is particularly challenging to ensure that innovations are faithfully and effectively conveyed to the rank and file, executed with fidelity, and that agency actors actually buy into and do the work as prescribed (Greene, 2004). There is not a substantial body of research looking at organizational processes in police agencies (Mastrofski, 2006; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Nor are there many studies examining organizational behavioral change in large police agencies. Efforts to understand how to introduce and manage innovation in police organizations have yet to be validated or confirmed; although, there have been some preliminary examinations of innovation in police organizations with the National Police Research Platform (Rosenbaum et al., 2011).

In order to implement effective organizational change, police administrators need to understand how field officers adapt and respond to change attempts so they can maximize buy-

in and address resistance or mismatch between what leadership envisions and what street officers execute. Organizational and individual officers' responses to attempted change and the process of organizational change have received little research attention (Rosenbaum et al., 2011; Skogan & Frydl, 2004). Few studies have explored police organizations' accountability mechanisms or how they process information and share data. Few have looked at barriers and facilitators to knowledge and information sharing at the organizational and individual officer levels. And yet these mechanisms and processes are central to how police organizations function (Abrahamsom & Goodman-Delahunty, 2014; Reay, 2006).

Through the CPD's attempt to tighten communication, collaboration, and execution, I explored organizational behavior using the perspectives of police officers at all levels in the organization and I looked for discernible patterns or themes that would help us understand organizational change within police agencies, and in particular, change that is focused on accountability, information sharing, and collaboration.

#### **D. Potential Contributions**

Recent strategies used by departments to enhance crime control efficacy and to maximize resources include "COMPSTAT", "intelligence-led" policing, and "hot spots" policing. Fundamentally, these strategies are variations on the use of data to guide targeted enforcement. COMPSTAT is short for "computer statistics." It is a strategy that integrates comparative data to detect spikes in crime and emphasizes managerial accountability with respect to such spikes. Intelligence-led policing, as its name implies, relies on information from

intelligence officers to guide operations. And hot spots policing, as noted above, focuses on identifying relatively small areas where crime is concentrated.

Sometimes these change attempts are undertaken merely to appear responsive to political and constituency pressures. Other times, police administrators want to change organizational and officer behavior to maximize productivity, responsiveness, and/or legitimacy (Weisburd & Braga, 2006). Regardless of motivations, understanding whether and how innovation proliferates in police departments will be helpful to policy makers and practitioners alike. Police agencies often emphasize outcomes (e.g. number of arrests and crime statistics), and thus do not identify how change occurs and which organizational mechanisms are material to an innovations' success or failure (Skogan & Frydl, 2004; Tellis, 1997; Weick, 1976). Although there have been more recent efforts directed at capturing and understanding the capacity to implement policies and practices beyond evaluating outcomes (Rosenbaum, in press; Braga and Weisburd, 2010), there is a need for more research exploring organizational processes and officers' responses to change attempts.

As noted, CPD under the Cline administration sought to implement a hot spots policing strategy. Given that national support for hot spots policing has grown, and that technological advances allow for quicker and more refined data analysis and dissemination, hot spots policing will likely proliferate and remain the subject of discussion for some time. But despite widespread implementation and several comprehensive evaluations of crime outcomes of hot spot policing (see Braga, 2005; Braga & Weisburd, 2010) little has been done to study

organizational capacity to implement the strategy and achieve officer buy-in. If officers do not support an innovation, they may ignore or even undermine it.

Without exploring how different organizational actors understand and perceive a policy or strategy, public policy analysts, evaluators, policy makers, and program managers will not have sufficient information about how the strategy really works and what factors inhibit or facilitate successful innovation. Hopefully, the present study can generate insights into how initiatives are translated and understood as they move through an organization – from administrative directive to street level implementation. Police agencies will not be able to replicate strategies and will be unable to modify ineffective ones, if they cannot identify and respond to areas of weakness, resistance, or failure. Related to the need to understand what influences innovation attempts is the debated topic of what processes and outcomes should matter and be measured when evaluating police organization performance.

This exploration reveals that the divide between management and street-level officers can be difficult to bridge. Findings from this exploration may thus help police administrators, when attempting organizational change, to anticipate where and when friction may result between street-level officers and middle managers and administrators. It may further provide insight into how such obstacles may be addressed. In sum, this dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the processes by which large agencies might introduce innovations, and how employees might react to such change attempts.

### **E. Summary of Methodology**

When studying organizational behavior change, several overlapping constructs must be considered: the change, the actors, and the organization. None of these constructs is a discreet element in an organization. This makes studying organizational processes challenging. Therefore, I first examined how the Cline administration attempted to change organizational behaviors. I then explored actors' perceptions and responses to the innovation attempts. Lastly, I compared the alignment of the leadership's vision and mission with officers' perceptions and practice in the field.

A further difficulty in studying organizational change is the difficulty in pinpointing key variables. Organizational research does not lend itself to conventional experimental design, where experimenters manipulate one variable and examine the outcomes (Barnes, 1967). Researchers who study organizational change – and perhaps even more relevantly, managers who enact organizational change – understand that it involves “multiple sets of complex variables whose identity, interaction and impact vary from situation to situation.” (Barnes, 1967, p. 58). Because the complex variables here were subject to fluidity and innovation, and because organizational change often does not happen as intended, I determined that a case study was a highly useful methodology to capture the dynamic organizational processes at issue (Patton, 1987).

The case study methodology is centered on incorporating the perspectives of the actors. It allowed me to explore how administrators implemented change and how officers responded.

The data included: observations of various meetings, including DOC meetings; observations of police activities, including during “ride-alongs” with officers, primarily in hot spots; and interviews with police officers over time and across departmental and hierarchical roles to better understand the philosophical, administrative, and strategic innovations as envisioned and as executed. This multi-perspective approach captured organizational complexities, including the voices of officers, in order to better understand the impact of change on organizational behavior (Tellis, 1997).

The concepts of “loose coupling” (Weick, 1976) and “street level bureaucracy” (Lipsky, 1980) framed my understanding of police organizations, particularly as they pertain to collaboration and accountability. Knowledge management theory also influenced my understanding of structures and data management in organizations. I also considered theories and literature concerning leadership, organizational justice, and learning organizations to understand characteristics of successful organizational change (Barnes, 1967; Willis, Mastrofski and Weisburd, 2004). I used these theories as lens through which to both interpret and communicate the data.

With respect to loose coupling, Weick (1976) proposed that researchers should attempt to discover how people understand loosely coupled worlds and how they respond to attempts to change them. Weick felt that it was important to ask perceptual questions of organizational actors because loose coupling in an organization is directly relevant to how practitioners behave. When exploring how organizational actors respond to change or attempted change, it

is important to consider what was changed, how change was attempted, who was impacted by the change, and the reactions to the change. Each factor can influence whether or not the change attempts are successful.

Weick also stressed that descriptive studies were needed to elaborate the types of couplings that could exist, the patterns of coupling, and degree of strength between elements. This type of exploration is important to practitioners because it helps them understand how influence spreads and with what intensity. Adequate descriptions of coupling patterns could also demonstrate how organizations could be more sensible and adaptive when attempting to innovate. Weick also felt that full descriptions of coupling patterns may suggest which locations and which questions about loose coupling are most likely to explain sizeable portions of the variance in organizational outcomes.

Applying these factors and considerations with a focus on tighter coupling, I sought to determine what we could learn from the CPD's organizational shifts and adaptations that would help the CPD or other police organizations during future innovation efforts. I sought to answer how street-level officers viewed CPD administrators' attempts to tell them how to behave. I also sought to learn whether the top-down innovation directives were problematic for street-level officers or easy to interpret as consistent with what they do every day.

From a methodological standpoint, typical research concerns for case studies include methodological rigor, researcher subjectivity, and generalizability. To address the first concern, I created and followed a detailed data collection and analysis plan as systematically as possible

within the case study method. To minimize subjectivity, several researchers were utilized to gather data, data collection protocols were implemented, and checks and balances were put in place to address and/or acknowledge biases as they arose. Chapter IV contains a detailed methodological discussion of these issues.

#### **F. Document Overview**

The literature review is divided into three sections: Section One provides a summary of police organizations, including a reflection on the current organizational climate and culture. This section also includes an overview of the concepts of loose coupling and street level bureaucracy. Section Two begins with a brief overview of organizational behavior studies. I then discuss factors that can influence organizational change, including leadership, organizational justice, and technological innovation. Section Three finishes with a summary of hot spot policing. The conceptual framework summarizes ideas about policing and organizational change attempts and considers how organizational change might be received by the actors. The methodology provides an overview of the case study method employed, the data sources used and the limitations of the study. The findings explore how the organizational change was conceived and how it was implemented, highlighting any disconnects observed.

## II. Literature Review

### A. Police Organizations

#### 1. Current Policing Climate

Police agencies' roles have broadened over the past several decades. The generic 'law and order' mandate expanded to include counter-terrorism and community policing responsibilities all of which can have incongruent and conflicting implications for organizations (Mastrofski, 2006). With expanded police roles, information and knowledge sharing remains central, if not more important to how police organizations function (Abrahamson, 2014). There is huge emphasis on inter- and intra-departmental cooperation, resource, and data sharing.

These vague policing mandates may be interpreted differently by the various officers across the organization (Mastrofski, 1988; Manning, 1977). And so police leadership has a vested interest in influencing their employees to unifying their understanding of the organizational objectives and gain coherence in how to achieve them. The reality of police organizations though is that there is slippage between top managers' expectations, middle managers' ability to communicate and manage the expectations, supervise, and accommodate their subordinates, and finally frontline officers' capabilities in the field.<sup>6</sup> Reuss-Ianni (1984) characterized this divide as the difference between "management cop" and "street cop." And Lipsky (1980) called this the "organizational paradox" of street level bureaucracies. Lower-level organizational actors (aka street level

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<sup>6</sup> Klockars (1980) posited that these gaps between what police are expected to achieve and what they can achieve encourages apathy at best and brutality and perjury at worst.

bureaucrats or field officers) either develop coping mechanisms that are contrary to the agencies' goals and objectives or there are 'alignment challenges' where by all the actors have different expectations about how things should happen (Lingaard, 2014). Although this slippage may be adaptive and even necessary for the organization as a whole to function effectively, ultimately it can result in loose connections between the administrators and the field which makes carrying out any type of change or innovation difficult (Crank, 1988; Lipsky, 1980).

Tension between administrators, middle management, and street level officers is mediated by law, policy, written and unwritten rules, general orders, and contracts, and the norms and the street-level realities of the job. The degree of correspondence between departmental objectives and street-level actions depends on a host of factors, including the quality of leadership, supervision, knowledge management, and accountability processes. Front-line police officers represent their organization and translate organizational policy into practice every day (Lipsky, 1980). They are the (literal) face of their organization. Often line officers are the only physical connection that community members have with police organizations and thus their collective behavior then sends messages to the constituents about the organizations' priorities and objectives. And so it behooves police administrators to get line officers as closely aligned with the mission and the way in which officers should implement the mission.

Some attempts to address alignment challenges have included attempting to flatten and decentralize police organizations (see community policing). However, given the hierarchal, bureaucratic structure defined by layers of ranks between the central administrators and the field

combines with the police culture and norms creating a difficult terrain to navigate let alone change.

## **2. 'Police Culture'**

Organizational culture is defined as the all the shared assumptions, beliefs, values, and norms that exist in an agency (Schein, 2004) including all the sub-cultures that exist within the various organizational units, sections, or departments (Hofstede, 1998). The success or failure an organizational attempt to collaborate can be attributed to the organizational culture (De Long & Fahey, 2007). If employees are not given guidance, organizational values, even if they are known to employees, may become perverted if left up to personal and cultural interpretation especially if there is little or no management or follow-up by leaders (Schein, 2010).

There is a misnomer to define 'police culture' as monolithic (Filstad and Gottschalk, 2010) as the reality are subcultures for different types of groups of officers and perhaps even a team of officers could exhibit their own subculture. Chan (2007) adapts Bourdieu's framework to define police culture as a combination of habitus, one's physical, cognitive and emotional dispositions, and the environment or field in which one works. With this conception, much of police culture or subcultures are localized and mostly defined by the interactions and the day-to-day contact police officers have with each other. To permeate police subcultures would mean addressing and changing both the habitus and the field. The administration is far removed from the street level activities of police and may be unable permeate the culture without deliberation and targeted intervention.

### 3. Loose Coupling

A helpful way to elaborate the 'management cop' and 'street cop' dynamic is to examine it through a coupling framework. Weick (1976) proposed that *loose coupling* as a sensitizing device when exploring informal structures and processes that he felt primarily drove organizations. Although he was not the first person to explore the concept of coupling in organizational research, he was the first to use the concept to illustrate how social service organizations function. Much of discussion about social service organizational functioning had been erroneously predicated on the idea that rationalized processes and hierarchical decision-making drove organizations.<sup>7</sup> Although some aspects of organizations life are highly rationalized others cannot be analyzed using rational assumptions. Loose coupling theory then states that one simultaneously considers the interdependence and indeterminacy in the pattern of interactions among organizational elements (Glassman, 1973; Orton & Weick, 1990). Simply put, organizational elements, people and/or processes, are connected and depend on each other in various ways to do their work. Some of these relationships may be more tightly defined while others may be loose and most cases connections are somewhere in between (Lingard, 2014). Loose coupling theory does not necessarily place value on the strength of the coupling, i.e., tighter is better, just that loose coupling happens and it can be functional or dysfunctional and often the functionality depends on an actor's perspective and where they are located in the organization.

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<sup>7</sup> Much of the original discussion in organizational theory centered on production factories and assembly lines – you must do “a” before “b” to get “c” and the idea that workers followed and communicated in a tight and prescribed pattern in order to produce outcomes. For example, if you observe a car assembly line, you are probably going to see processes executed by tightly coupled elements. There is a specific way the car must be assembled and the people (or machines, as the case may be) responsible to put the car together must operate in a prescribed, tightly coupled fashion.

Loosely coupled systems or loosely coupled elements within organizations, can be adaptive, protect an organization from dissonance among various elements and can facilitate work. If organizational elements are loosely connected, for example between a supervisor and a police officer, it allows for discretion, that may further the work of the overall organization, whereas more tightly coupled systems would not necessarily allow for these adaptations and self-determination.<sup>8</sup> The existence of loose coupling between the intent of actors at the top and bottom of an organization can be advantageous for frontline workers, especially when the policies and practices being promoted by the administration cannot realistically be executed by the front line staff. For example, if a police department said that all instances of disorder will not be tolerated, it would be impossible for officers take formal legal action with every instance of disorder witnessed and so they use discretion. The advantage of loose coupling in this situation for front line workers is that they have the freedom to tailor their responses to meet community and individual needs as they encounter them. The goal of many front line officers is to be and/or look productive, while at the same time staying safe and making sure the job is not too demanding or stressful.

Glassman's (1973) basic argument was that loose coupling exists and it may allow some portions of an organization to respond to the external environment without upsetting the entire

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<sup>8</sup> Eisenstein and Jacobs' (1991) book, *Felony justice: An organizational analysis of criminal courts* provides a concrete illustration of how loose coupling between organizational elements is often critical for organizations to function smoothly. When they examined how courts processed felony cases in three cities, Eisenstein and Jacobs found that many of the "off the books" interactions between the various actors, interactions that were independent of formal court proceedings, were essential for the courtroom to run smoothly and efficiently. The various court actors discussed and sometimes settled many issues out of the purview of the judge and off official court time. They concluded that if the court actors (i.e. prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, etc.) did everything and made all their decisions on the official docket, the court proceedings would grind to a halt and the cases and people entering and working in the courtroom would be mired in official, tightly coupled court proceedings. Notably, another implication of Eisenstein and Jacob's study was that even though the courtroom ran efficiently, it did not necessarily mean justice was served.

organization. It also can lower the likelihood that the organization will have to—or be able to—respond to every environmental change (Weick, 1976). Elements in a loosely coupled system can adjust to and modify their functioning without affecting the whole system. Additionally, if there is a breakdown in one part of a loosely coupled system then the breakdown can be sealed off and not impact other parts of the organization (Weick, 1976).

This is potentially an illustrative way to frame and understand the complexity of police organizations that add or lose special units, change superintendents, change missions or priorities, lose or gain staff and/or sustain major upheavals from corruption to dramatic upticks in violence while still executing their public safety functions with little disruption (Weick, 1976). Particularly as police administrators today are focused on risk management in the face of multi-million dollar lawsuits. Training, supervision, and accountability efforts are therefore largely directed at minimizing risk, while simultaneously trying to achieve crime control objectives. In some cases, loose coupling can insulate management from culpability by distancing them from questionable or even illegal behaviors that street level bureaucrats commit while attempting to achieve their agencies' objectives (Crank, 2004). Conversely, police administrators can be held accountable regardless of their actual culpability. And because police administrators are often held accountable for the misdeeds of their employees, they try direct and monitor officers more closely. Another major disadvantage for administrators when an organization is loosely coupled is they can lose control over the street level resources, namely the personnel, whose very actions they rely on to achieve their publicly-stated organizational objectives.

Loose coupling is the antithesis of standardization and organizations may lack the benefits that come with standardization, including consistency, predictability, and control of the work force. Although as discussed above loose coupling can isolate and protect an organization from trouble experienced in one part of the organization, it could also make it difficult for the system to access and repair defective or poorly performing elements. An organization in which loose coupling is pervasive may be particularly resistant to innovation (i.e., think of a game of telephone where the message gets distorted as it gets passed down the line). And finally, the heightened autonomy that actors often experience in a loosely coupled system can dilute any sense of accountability to the larger organization and its goals. The existence of loose coupling and high level of discretion can confound attempts to innovate.

#### **4. Street Level Bureaucracy**

In his book, "Street level Bureaucracy", Lipsky (1980) explored the perspectives of *street level bureaucrats* or frontline social service workers to see how they adjusted their work to reconcile organizational imperatives with the realities of their work including limited resources, crushing demands for services, and conflicting role expectations. Street level bureaucrats are characterized as having relatively high degrees of discretion in their day-to-day job and relative autonomy from organizational authority. These markers are particularly consistent with police officers' experiences and organizations with loose coupling. They decide who to stop, who to arrest, who to ticket, what calls for service receive priority, and who to leave alone. They "make decisions

about people that affect their life chances” all the time (Lipsky, 1980: p. 9).<sup>9</sup> Police officers in the field are relatively free from oversight and spend most of their time either working alone or with a partner with little to no direct oversight (Auten, 1981).<sup>10</sup> Although oversight in the field is changing with the advent of GPS and in-car camera technologies and most recently body cameras to monitor police field actions. These new capabilities to monitor officers in the field have the potential to change and curtail discretion in ways that are yet to be determined.

Street level bureaucrats develop and adopt coping mechanisms to guide discretion, as well as deal with conflicting role expectations and uncertain environments (Lipsky, 1980). One of the main mechanisms used to navigate their work are *simplifications*. Field officers create symbolic constructs to deal with people and situations they encounter in order to make their environments easier to handle (i.e. youth hanging on the corner equals trouble... particularly in certain neighborhoods). Street level bureaucrats also adopt *routines* to simplify their work and alleviate bureaucratic strain. Officers’ simplifications and routines may compromise their ability to deliver fair police services (Crank, 2004; Lipsky, 1980). These adaptations may be rooted in police culture as well as practice. Although police officers are defined by discretion, ironically it may be these unfettered decisions that results in mechanisms that help them gain control over so much leeway.

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<sup>9</sup> Obviously there is a substantial difference between a decision to ticket someone with a broken tail light and a decision to arrest and process someone for a drug dealing offense but regardless, police are faced with innumerable decisions every shift.

<sup>10</sup> Field officers typically check in at the beginning of their shift, take part in roll call, receive assignments which could be anything as vague as concentrate on traffic violations to as specific as directives to look for a certain person over the course of their shift), are usually assigned to a car, and then they patrol their district or beat with “their ear on the radio” for their assigned geography and check in with their supervisor at the end of their shift.

## 5. Knowledge Management

Precipitous information technology advancements have also permeated police organizations, leading some researchers to refer to the current policing climate as the 'information age of policing' (Christmas, 2013; Rosenbaum, 2007). Front line officers have Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) in their cars and can instantly enter and access information that would have taken time and trips to the station house a short time ago. Some of the smallest police agencies in the country dedicate officer time to crime analysis and many larger agencies often have whole teams dedicated to analysis. Police organizations have always collected data (i.e., carbon copy tickets) and analyzed crime (i.e. push pin boards to explore robbery patterns) but now police are using technologies to collect, vet, and analyze vast amounts of data in real time, something they could not have done without significant effort 20 years ago. Crime data has always been a mainstay of police departments but now it is can be instantaneously accessible and triangulated with other sources of data to create rich understandings of the community landscape, troubled places, situations, and even potential 'troublemakers'.

Knowledge-based theory "conceptualizes the ability to transfer and utilize data as an organization's greatest asset (Alavi & Leidner, 2001)." Public and private organizations are no longer passively collecting data but are creating new information in a movement called *knowledge management* (KM). Organizations invest time, money, and resources into KM systems in order to maximize their performance and improve decision-making.

Police agencies are "knowledge intensive" and rely on information for all their administrative, operational, and strategic initiatives (Abrahamson & Goodman-Delahunty, 2014; Gottschalk,

2010; Radcliffe, 2012). Given the political, social, and economic environment in which police operate is increasingly complex and scrutinized (Radcliffe, 2012) and that there is increasing demand from the public for accountability and efficacy and evidence to those effects (Stone and Travis, 2011), law enforcement organizations often fail to effectively communicate in their own department and across jurisdictions, let alone with public constituents. Most police organizations do not have KM strategies and/or fail to understand that a comprehensive knowledge management approach goes beyond ensuring all officers have access to Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) and are trained on how to use them (Abrahamson and Goodman-Delahunty, 2014; Gottschalk, 2008).

IT systems then are only tools that facilitate the interactional process of gathering information from databases, individuals, organizational units, and external partners but these tools cannot objectify the data. There are always opposing and competing positions when considering and evaluating data; there are no objective facts as everything is subject to interpretation and perspective on the front end of data gathering and the backend of data interpretation. Just compiling information is not enough. There needs to be appropriate infrastructures to support all aspects of the knowledge acquisition, processing and use – a KM system. Inhibitions and even hostility to sharing or using data is influenced by maladaptive information behaviors and culture as well as inadequate structures, technologies, policies, and practices. The "end goal is to create a system that facilitates the conversation of intelligence into a form that can be operationalized" (Abrahamson & Goodman-Delahunty, 2014).

Chicago police administrators saw the Deployment Operation Center (DOC) as their system to “facilitate the intelligence conversation” or KM mechanism for their organization. A group of officer/analysts that could exploit all the departmental IT data sources, use their collective and individual experiences, leverage their connections in the field, and produce intelligence for the department to act on.

Subcultures, organizational structures, and processes can either facilitate or hinder knowledge and data flow (Gottschalk, Filstad, Glomseth, & Solli-Saether, 2011). Even data savvy police agencies with high tech COMPSTAT meetings and smart boards focused on accountability and intelligence sharing are impacted by impediments to information and knowledge sharing – the system is only as good as the data going into it. Do organizational policies and strategies support the knowledge management systems? Are there appropriate *technologies* in place? And does the *culture*, the organizational values, norms and behaviors regarding information, support knowledge management?

## **6. Accountability**

By virtue of their authority, ability to use force, and their potential to undermine the due process of law, police are in a special position that requires oversight (Skolnick, 1994). To whom should police be accountable and to what expectations should they be held accountable to are hotly debated issues (Gellar, 1985; McMullan, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2004). In a broad sense, police accountability is concerned with controlling line-officer behavior. Police oversight typically falls into two main areas: internal (i.e., management and organizational directives or internal affairs

types of oversight) and external (i.e., Civilian Review Board) and the merits and ability to effect change and the mechanisms to engender accountability are hotly debated.

The management model that has received the most attention in recent decades is the Compstat model that originated in New York. Compstat is an acronym for "compare statistics." Compstat started in New York in the early 1990s, first as a managerial tool to compare statistics among police managers, analyze crime patterns and respond but it evolved into a catchall label for a strategic process that included "zero-tolerance policing" strategies to address crime in identified hot spots (Bratton, 1998; Dodenhoff, 1996; McDonald et al., 2001). Chicago police emulated aspects of the Compstat in its attempts to tighten accountability and held weekly "DOC meetings" where all the middle-level managers convened in front of the central administration staff and accounted for all the activities and outcomes in the geographic areas or hot spots they were responsible to staff and oversee. These meetings evolved out of the "Chicago-style Compstat" accountability meetings that were already being held in the department on an ad hoc basis (Skogan & Harnett, 2003).<sup>11</sup>

When considering how police organizations function, many influences need to be considered. The internal and external pressures on an organization, the degree of connectedness across organizational actors, motivations of and relationships between actors, the way knowledge is constructed, delivered and probably most importantly, received by the actors, and finally, the way everyone in an agency is held accountable to the established organizational goals.

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<sup>11</sup> These accountability meetings focused on reviewing all types of crime, police activity, and administrative trends (e.g. sick day usage) for particular areas in the city.

## **B. Organizational Change**

What drives organizational change? What facilitates change and what inhibits change? Is there something about the leaders that influences planned change? Do they need to inspire their employees or simply give them clear direction? How does the clarity and communication of mission impact the innovation attempt? How do you obtain buy-in from the rank and file? Can technology foster or even drive organizational change? Organizational literature cites many factors that influence attempted innovation including leadership, technology and employee buy-in and empowerment. This next section will summarize sum key factors in organizational change and examine several clusters of organizational change theories.

### **1. Organizational Studies**

For centuries there has been speculation about how organizations work. Plato stressed that leadership was essential and incentives were motivators. Aristotle believed that persuasive communication was central to functioning organizations. Machiavelli's work gave attention to organizational power and politics. Weber wrote about rational organizations and charismatic leadership. And while there were no codified organizational theories until the 20<sup>th</sup> century, these big thinkers provided us with ideas that influenced our current understanding of organizational behavior (Chauhan & Anbalagan, 2013).

In the 1930s, organizational study became an academic discipline with Kurt Lewin's push to study group dynamics scientifically and manage employees' behaviors through '*scientific management.*' Fredrick Winslow Taylor introduced goals and rewards as a way to motivate employees. And Elton Mayo and colleagues conducted productivity studies at a factory that resulted in the

observation of the widely cited “Hawthorne effect.” Organizational studies were based in a rational depiction of organizational life. If employees had precise instructions, productivity would increase. As the field evolved, researchers observed that organizations and the people in them were more complex and how they functioned was based on a complex set of internal and external factors beyond routinization and rationalizations (Chauhan & Anbalagan, 2013).

After World War I, organizational studies shifted to focus on how human factors and psychology impacted organizations. This *Human Relations Movement* focused on teams, motivations and goals of individuals within organizations (including Maslow, Victor Vroom, Barnard, Fayol, and McClelland). After World War II, there was a renewed emphasis on the rationalist approach. James G. March and Herbert Simon, theorists of the *Carnegie School of Organizational Behavior* studied organizational behaviors using systems theory and complexity theory perspectives. In the 1960s and 1970s, the organizational behavior studies produced theories such as *Bounded Rationality*, *Contingency Theory*, and other *ecological theories* influenced by social psychology with an emphasis on quantitative research. In the past 20 years, researchers embraced cultural explanations of organizational behavior influenced by anthropology, psychology, and sociology and qualitative methodology became a more acceptable way to study said behavior (Chauhan & Anbalagan, 2013). There is no dominant theory. And surprisingly many organizations fail to relinquish traditional management approaches and do not consider social and psychological needs of their employees. These considerations need to be addressed in order for employees to adopt reform efforts.

## 2. Organizational Change

Police organizations usually are prompted to change because of sustained external pressures which are often preceded or coincide with crystallizing events. Often policing innovation targets improving efficiencies, addressing crime, issues of legitimacy or constituents' concerns and usually all of these factors influence change. Effective changes are usually led by solidly positioned, motivated leaders who consider and integrate the need spectrum of the people and their organizational relationships, the organizational structure and technologies that can facilitate change into the change attempt. The learning organizational literature offers some key considerations regarding how change permeates an organization. Organizational change should be guided by systems thinking, organizational actors should be involved in building a shared vision, engaging in team learning, and much dialogue and communication. Goal ambiguity, role conflict, and a climate of poor organizational justice detract from an organization's ability to learn. When any of these situations exist they limit and can halt an innovation from propagating.

Chauhan & Anbalagan (2013) provide a cyclical definition of organizational behavior study and an illustrative framework. They first suggest one consider the groups, individuals, and structures relative to the organizational growth and culture. Second, focus on the impact that the organizational structure has on human behaviors. And third, the knowledge gained from this examination should be applied toward furthering the organizational effectiveness and growth. Important concepts to consider within this type of exploration include leadership, communication, politics, relationships, organizational culture, decision-making, and power dynamics.

When considering what happens in an organizational change it is important to isolate what is being changed, how it is being changed, and who are crucial actors in the change. This is a helpful way to think of how people respond to change, although admittedly dividing the types of actors up as seen in the table below is an oversimplification of reality and there would be overlaps in any given actor. Certainly structural forces, aspects of the change, also could influence how certain groups of actors respond to change and push them into one category over another depending on what they may gain or lose under the proposed innovation.

**Figure 1: Persons within Organizational Change Situations (Barnes, 1967)**

	<b>Change Advocates</b>	<b>Change Resisters</b>
<b>Rational Objective</b>	<b>Rational Advocates</b> Tend to represent upper management	<b>Rational Resisters</b> Stand to lose power or influence with changes
<b>Emotional Subjective</b>	<b>Radicals</b> Believe change is necessary for organization	<b>Traditionalists</b> Cling to conventional practice as an end in itself

Change can be helpfully conceptualized in phases (Lewin, 1958). At the beginning of a change attempt an organization has to change old patterns or *unfreeze*. Usual pressures from outside and inside an organization, usual from *rational advocates* and *radicals*, lead this first push for change. A *change initiator*, like the Superintendent in this case study, is either brought up from

the ranks or brought in from the outside with a successful track record. During the change period, the change initiator proposes how the problems should be solved and what approaches should be used. Specific change steps involve the organizational structures, people, tasks, and technology in various ways. The changes are rolled out in a way that is in line with the power dynamics and approach in the organization. In most police organizations, change is top down with little rank and file input at the outset. At this point *rational resisters*, those who stand to lose power and influence, and *traditionalists*, those who want to remain static, may resist changes. The third part of change or the *refreeze* is when change is either gets integrated into organizational life to some degree. During the transition, organizational actors can change their attitudes, goals may be adjusted and changed, and new relationships and alliances are forged, all of these shifts serve to solidify or undermine the change attempt (Barnes, 1967).

Power dynamics in organizational change strategies may be considered on a spectrum moving from unilateral change to mutually shared decision-making (Greiner, 1957). At one end, there is the *technocratic approach* which involves unilateral goal setting but shared power – one party defines the goal and the other party helps reach the goal but has no input as to the goal's value. The *decree approach* which follows a one-way proclamation originating on high and passed on to the lower ranks of the organization. And finally the *structural approach* which instead of decreeing or sharing power, organizational managers change the relationships of the subordinates whereby the structure changes and then organizational behaviors, in theory, follow. Police organizational changes tend to fall into the first two typologies.

Empowerment theory insists that in order for change to be successful people must feel ownership in order to buy-in to change and they may actively resist if they are not active participants. If there is any goal ambiguity, the direction and purpose is not clear to the organizational agents and/or the mechanisms by which to achieve the change is not clear then actors will rely on old habits and change will not root.

### **3. Leadership**

As discussed in preceding sections law enforcement agencies are complex and this complexity makes implementing new initiatives challenging (Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 2006; Zhao, 1996). Researchers and practitioners alike assert that leadership is a key factor in implementation for managing the behavior changes that are necessary and achieving organizational success (Bass, 1990; Mastrofski, 2006) but this is a presumption and there have not been many studies of police agencies testing that hypothesis. Additionally, the degree of importance and the way leadership actually influences organizational change is widely debated and interpreted. This next section highlights some of the theoretical understandings of leadership and organizational change relevant for this dissertation.

#### **a. Defining Leadership**

Can leaders reshape organizations or do leaders serve as figureheads caught in the momentum of organizational culture unable to assert an agenda? Neither heroic nor helpless leadership views are totally accurate – and in most situations leaders probably fall somewhere in between omnipotent and powerless (Tobert & Hall, 2009). Organizational and environmental constraints on leadership cannot be understated and leadership needs to be evaluated in larger context of

the internal and external forces acting on the organizations. The confounding nature of many leadership studies is mainly an issue of causality - Are employees productive because they have a good leader or is the leader considered good because the employees are productive? Impact of leadership may be most evident at the small group level. Getting at whether leadership has an independent effect on the outcomes of a large complex organization is a difficult, perhaps an impossible task.

Historically, researchers focused on understanding leadership through three different lenses including: (1) characteristics of the individual leaders, (2) the behaviors and/or styles leaders' exhibit or (3) the characteristics of the followers and/or the situation in which leaders inhabit (Tobert & Hall, 2009). Although most contemporary theories suggest it is a nuanced mix of all of these factors (Tobert & Hall, 2009; Yukl, 2002) and even within each leadership theory constellation, there is variability and crossover. Below are some of the leadership theories and their relevance to this dissertation.

Bass (2008) defined leadership as a "set of characteristics, attributes, competencies, abilities, traits, actions or behaviors that encourage followership and the achievement of organizational outcomes." Simply put, leadership is the ability to get people to do things that are in-line with and contribute to the mission, goals and outcomes (Tobert and Hall, 2009). It is key variable in managing organizations and spearheading reform and innovation and an important component to understand how an organization works (Tobert and Hall, 2009). There are two overarching ways leadership influences organizational actors' behaviors. One way is transactional; leaders may manipulate consequences for employee performance (e.g., promote or demote). Another is

transformational; these leaders are thought to inspire employees to adopt the organizational values and priorities (Bass, 2008). Given these ways in which leadership is thought to function it is often considered an important mechanism for leading organizational change. Leadership alone may be unable to change organizational behavior as leaders' ability to influence change may be constrained by organizational structure, power coalitions, and environmental conditions but it certainly may be one important mechanism for organizational change.

### **1) *Transform or Transact***

Transformational leadership can inspire employees to adopt changes and instructive leadership gives employees the tools and directives to execute the plan. Transformational leadership, the ability to inspire the attitudes and motivation of subordinates, was a theoretical shift away from the more conventional idea of transactional leadership or the "contractual relationships" between employer and employee (Burns, 1978; Silverestri, 2007). Employees do not conform because of reward or punishment but rather because they buy into the organization's vision (Mastroski, 2004).<sup>12</sup> Under this theory of leaders, change may be driven by leaders' emphasis on participation and inclusion (Silverestri, 2007). Transactional leadership is characterized by self-interest. Exchanges between leaders and followers are motivated by self-interest including salary and promotions and leaders are content that contractual obligations are filled. Some theorists consider transactional and transformative leadership to be opposite ends of a leadership

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<sup>12</sup> There is an ongoing debate among leadership theorists on whether transformational leadership creates dependency (De Vries et al., 1999) or empowerment and independence among subordinates (Bass & Avolio, 1994)

spectrum whereas others propose that these are separate states and leaders may exhibit both (Bass, 1985).

## **2) *Functions of a leader***

Selznick's (1957) four major functions of formal leaders are helpful for defining leadership in the upper administration. First, their role is to define the organizational mission and role. This is an ongoing and dynamic process because an organization mission evolves as the external and internal environment and pressures change. Secondly, they enact the "institutional embodiment of purpose" and choose and direct the way by which the organization is going to get the job done and accomplish the mission. Thirdly they are responsible to defend the organizational integrity by securing external and internal support for the organization and not allow constituencies to sway or redefine the mission and course of the organization. And finally they are responsible to assuage internal organizational conflict. These functions are generally considered to be more relevant to leaders at the top of a hierarchy and less relevant to lower-level managers (Tobert & Hall, 2009). Effective leadership at one level of an organizational hierarchy may be less important or relevant at other levels. This is an important consideration when considering how or if leadership within a police department impacts implementation of an innovation.

## **3) *Position matters***

It is often assumed that leadership is the primary domain of the upper ranks and administrators in police agencies but leadership is evident across police organizations in different forms and with different functions. To illustrate the various types of leadership in a typical police agency, Swanson et al. (1998) defined three 'supervisory planes' with each plane associated with a

different set of leadership responsibilities. There is the top management that includes superintendents, chiefs, and deputy chiefs, middle management which includes captains and lieutenants, and front line supervisors which includes sergeants. Line officers with have no formal leadership titles are also called on to demonstrate leadership during their day-to-day work. Some have called for an expanded definition of leadership in policing to include the leadership demonstrated by front line officers. Often their decisions are localized and imbued with more urgency and they must “make split second decisions and take control of a potentially high-voltage situation (Vinzant and Crothers, 1998).” The idea of different ‘supervisory planes’ is a helpful way to consider the impact of police leadership on organizational change.

## **b. Leadership Theories**

### **1) Trait Theories**

Trait theories focus on the leadership qualities of individuals rather than their relationships with those that they lead. With trait theories leadership, characteristics are innate, fixed, and relevant in all situations (Hollander & Offermann, 1993).<sup>13</sup> The most notable of these theories is the *Great Man* theory; leaders are born rather than made. Some researchers have tried to specify leader qualities and in early theoretical iterations, even physical characteristics such as height, were considered *Great Man* traits. Bass (1990) conducted a meta-analytic study of leadership and

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<sup>13</sup> The psychodynamic approach falls under the individual leadership theory umbrella. Leaders under this paradigm are labeled obsessive and narcissistic (Bass, 1990) and there is a focus on the leader as a charismatic (Bass, 1990; Stech, 2004). This theory was influenced by Freud proposed that individuals who embody confidence and heroism have “charismatic authority” (Weber, 1964). The charismatic leaders were thought to have experienced some sort of trauma that “propels them to use leadership in order to bolster their own self-esteem” (Haberfeld, 2006) and in turn their “subordinates cope with their own shame, jealousy and hate by idolizing leaders” (Bass, 1990). The major criticism of this theory is its reliance on psychological abnormalities; leaders cannot arise from “normal” experiences or backgrounds.

concluded that there were specific traits that effective leaders possessed but that there was no definitive profile of a leader. In the 1950s, trait theory lost footing because much of the research concluded with ambiguous findings, leading many to doubt whether individual characteristics could consistently be identified that set apart leaders from followers.<sup>14</sup> *Leadership skills theory* rose in response to these critiques with Sheriff (1968) challenging trait theories with the idea that leadership skills can be learned and are developed over the course of a career. This theory emphasized that formal education and experience augmented leaders' abilities. Depending on the specific theorist, they proposed it could take a leader anywhere from seven to 20 years to learn and master all the skills necessary to become an effective leader (Mumford, 2000).

## **2) *Situated Behavior theories***

Moving away from the trait approach, researchers looked to types of behaviors that might define leaders (Haberfeld, 2006; Tobert & Hall, 2009). This includes the related style and situational leadership theories. Style theory arose from several studies coming out of Michigan, Harvard, and Ohio State Universities. These studies focused on leader behaviors rather than traits and generally concluded that leadership style falls along two dimensions or leadership concerns: task-orientation and relationship orientation. Some concluded that these orientations were on a spectrum and others concluded leaders could blend both orientations into their leadership style at the same time (Tobert & Hall, 2009).

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<sup>14</sup> Trait theory has recently gained traction again with psychologists focusing on something called "The big five" personality characteristics of leaders (Digman, 1990).

### **3) Follower/Situational Characteristics**

Situational approaches focus not only on the group and environment but on the nature of the interactions (Tobert & Hall, 2009). Leaders influence followers but their followers' reactions, in turn, influence leaders. Within this theoretical framework several characteristics have been held up as important determinants of leadership. First, *task structure* influences the impact of leaders with the idea that when tasks and problems are highly structured and defined, a task oriented and directive leader is more likely to be accepted. Second, *intergroup relationships* are important in this theory; when there is understanding and consensus about how to do the work. When consensus is low and chance of conflict high, individuals with more participatory style of leadership are more likely to be accepted.

*Situational Leadership theory* hinges on the idea that leaders vary and adapt their approach depending on their subordinates' job maturity (experience and ability) and level and psychological maturity (commitment and motivation to do the work) (Yukl, 1994). Under this theory there is no particular style but rather good leaders are flexible enough to adapt and accommodate their subordinates and help them reach organizational goals. Undergirding the theory is the notion that organizations are open systems that are influenced by outside forces (Bass, 1990) and theory has the most coherence when considering small teams rather than large, hierarchical settings. This theory has received a lot of criticism because of claims that it lacks theoretical cohesion and it is empirically hard to capture the concept of employee maturity. Although situational leadership theory has some traction in policing because of its compatibility with the idea that leaders may be able to assess officers' abilities and willingness to complete a

task and adapt to environment influences (Haberfeld, 2006). Many of the leadership and organizational behavior theories may not apply to a quasi-military bureaucracy with a strong chain of command.

*Path-goal theory* like the situated behavior theory is embraced because of emphasizes that leaders consider individuals' motivations rather than considering all subordinates as a uniform mass with similar needs and wants. This theory recognizes that there is a complex set of situational variables that combine to moderate the effects of leader behavior including external pressures, employee characteristics, internal and external environmental factors. Leaders are responsible to make 'situational diagnoses' and determine the factors that affect motivation, the degree to which those factors are influenced by environment and finally, what types of leadership could be employed to motivate their subordinates to act (Haberfeld, 2006). This theory has been criticized as too broad and encompasses too many possibilities.

*Contingency theory*, one of the most researched leadership theories, looks at how leadership styles are suited to certain situations. With this theory leadership is comprised of three relevant considerations including the leader-member relations including confidence and loyalty, task structure (clarity of task), and position power (amount of leader authority) (Haberfeld, 2006).

#### **4) Policing Leaders**

Research suggests that police organizations are difficult to lead from the top and that many police administrators feel challenged in their capacity to get employees to follow their direction (Wilson, 1968; Mastrofski, 1998; Mastrofski, 2002). There are paradoxes for police leaders trying to implement as they must integrate and account for the discretion that defines an officers' day and

their authority to push and motivate change when considering how to try and innovate successfully (Abrahamson & Goodman-Delahunty, 2014). Police leaders have to consider the 'hearts and minds' of the police force but also the strategy execution and implementation and sometimes these two considerations run counter to each other. There is often disappointment and confusion when police leaders are unable to direct or change organizational behavior. Cockcroft (2014) blames this on a simplified assessment of police culture and the credence given to the transformational leadership to effect change. One suggestion is that "hierarchical organizations may be inherently transactional" because they lack flexibility to adapt and meet needs of the situation and/or the actors.

Pearson-Goff & Harrington (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of 57 qualitative and quantitative studies to assess the traits and activities of *good* police leaders. Seven traits and five activities came out of their thematic analysis. Leadership is heterogeneous and you need to consider supervisory plane - frontline, middle manager, upper administrator to understand what leadership functions are important to their role in the hierarchy (Pearson-Goff & Harrington 2013; Tobert & Hall, 2009). And there are people with authority that are not formally recognized but can be authoritative nonetheless within an organization (Bass, 1990; Pearson-Goff & Harrington, 2013).

One relevant field of research is that of the team policing. It is difficult to find team policing in police environments as this construct can be precluded by organizational and culture structure. The idea of collaborative culture, central to team policing, runs contrary to police subcultures that often are suspicious and insular. And given that leadership in police organizations is associated

with hierarchy and rank, the joint, two-way dialogue necessary for team policing would be difficult to achieve (Nahavandi, 2003). Admittedly team policing may not be a pervasive model in police organizations however aspects of team policing may provide helpful ways to augment collaboration.

#### **4. Technological innovation**

Advanced information technology systems can drive organizational behavior change. Often IT models assume that more information is better, but the 21<sup>st</sup> century “data saturated” police officer may be so overwhelmed with information that they have no clue how to use it. So they either throw it out or disregard it or adapt one piece that works for them. Technological trends permeate and make possible hot spot policing practice; increasingly sophisticated information technologies, makes collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information easy (Alderden et al., 2010; Braga and Weisburd, 2010; Chan, 2001a and 2001b). These technological advances are central to both the administrative and strategic aspects of hot spot policing and accountability (Rosenbaum, 2007). Advocates of hot spot policing and accountability initiatives that are supported by IT say that these changes are revolutionizing policing (Bratton, 1998) but some research shows that these developments may be actually reinforcing the traditional, paramilitaristic, hierarchal structure that many police agencies have been trying to move away from in favor of flatter, more democratic, adaptive, problem solving, tailored forces (Weisburd et al., 2003).

### C. Hot spot Policing

Touted as a recent, important policing innovation, hot spots policing focuses on small geographic places or areas where crime is concentrated (Koper, 2014). It emerged as a viable police strategy from research indicating that crime was not spread evenly but that specific places experienced disproportionate amounts of the total crime (Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989). Hot spots, places or situations, could range from actual physical structures (i.e. abandoned buildings or vacant lots) or features of a locations (i.e. open-air drug markets or lack of lighting, etc.) to the presence or absence of certain types of people (i.e., motivated offender, suitable target, and absence of capable guardian) and oftentimes all situations coincided and fostered criminogenic situations (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cornish and Clarke, 1986).<sup>15</sup> Even though this idea of crime clustering in certain places is grounded in conventional wisdom, police traditionally have engaged in random patrol whereby they had to balance their attention between known hot areas and rest of the communities under their purview because of the imperative to provide equitable coverage to all citizens.

Chicago's police administration, like many other United States' police agencies in the past two decades, embraced the hot spots policing approach (Weisburd et al., 2003). Hot spot policing is

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<sup>15</sup> Several theories explain the clustering of crime, including rational choice theory, routine activities theory, and environmental criminology. Rational choice theory entails how people weigh costs and benefits in their decisions where to commit crime, how to do it, and whether or not they should (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). Routine activities theory considers how individual make decisions including the motivated offender's decision to engage in crime during their regular activities when the encounter a suitable target and believe they have a low risk of getting caught (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Environmental criminology further supplements these theories by considering both space and time. These theorists focus on the space or environment as the unit of analysis rather than the person and posit that there are aspects of the environment that foster criminal opportunities for offenders (e.g. lighting, blind corners). These three theories provide the basis for situation crime prevention and the compelling rationale to concentrate police actions in specific areas and/or on specific offenders within specific areas.

predicated on the idea that this convergence in time and space can be anticipated, even predicted, and based on existing information, police can preemptively respond, and significantly reduce crime. Unlike traditional policing, conducting policing activities generally targeting offenses and communities, hot spot policing involves the identifying of specific locations, defined by high concentrations of crime and/or high risk for criminal behavior and targeting police action there (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Anthony Braga and David Weisburd documented the support of hot spot policing in their book, *Policing Problem Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention* (2010). They laid out the research evidence to-date and argued for the expansion of hot spot policing because they contend: (1) it is supported by criminological theory, (2) has been tested empirically and results have consistently been positive, (3) it can be used in conjunction with problem-oriented approaches, and (4) fits with current technological trends (Alderden et al., 2010). However, there is evidence that the application of problem solving in hot spots varies widely.

It is important to note, but beyond the scope of this dissertation, that little is known about the long-term impacts of hot spot policing on communities or what mechanisms produce results (Braga, 2007). Certainly concentrating police resources in low income, minority communities may result in over surveillance, excessive and negative law enforcement encounters. This type of policing may cause community alienation, dissatisfaction with the police, and exacerbate the already corrosive problem of disproportionate minority confinement (Rosenbaum, 2006; 2007).

Although the common conceptual thread across hot-spot policing implementation is focused attention on smaller geographic areas within a larger area or community, hot spot policing eludes

a succinct operational definition. What constitutes “hot” and what strategies are executed in these hot spots varies widely from department to department. Mastrofski (2004) labeled these different manifestations ‘low discretion’ and ‘high discretion’ hot spot policing depending on the degree of discretion officers had in selecting and policing hot spots. The ways in which data are used and the types of data used to determine hot spots and the variety of strategies employed in hot spots, even the size of the hot spots can range widely depending on the department. Some police departments engage in problem-oriented policing in hot spots areas to reduce criminal opportunities (Sherman et al., 1989; Braga et al., 1999; Hope, 1994; Criminal Justice Commission, 1998; Braga and Bond, 2008). Other departments flood hot spots with officers and activity in an attempt to saturate an area without a tailored strategy or approach past a crackdown (Alderden et al., 2011; Rosenbaum, 2006).


### III. Conceptual Framework

Administrators of a large police agency attempted to change organizational behaviors via an innovation with philosophical, administrative, and strategic components emphasizing communication, collaboration, centralized direction of street-level activities. Management was trying to tighten loose coupling and incentivize collaboration. The innovation focused on how police officers collected, vetted, shared, used, and acted upon information. The *institutional mechanisms* the administration initiated included a unifying mission, accountability meetings, and hot spot policing strategies. All of these tools were used to assert greater bureaucratic control on the front line officers (Lipsky, 1971). This chapter lays out the conceptual framework for this dissertation; the key concepts and ideas —and the presumed relationships among them. How did police officers respond to the administration’s attempts to shape and change their behavior?

#### A. Idea Context

When considering how innovation is managed by an organization one must consider existing organizational structures, organizational actors’, their needs and motivations, and relationships. All of these components contribute to understanding how the innovation influences the organization and vice versa. To explore the impact of innovation at the center of this dissertation, I first considered the change itself – in particular the inputs and activities, and then how change was mediated by the organizational structure, the actors - their habitus and motivations, and the organizational culture and norms. Below I depict these components and then elaborate on the theoretical constructs that guided my inquiry.

**Figure 2: Components of Organizational Change Effort**



## **1. Police Organizations**

Police organizations are not monoliths, but rather are complex organizations made up of many components including people, policies, technologies, and relationships. Police organizations are defined by layers of bureaucracy, steep hierarchies, differing agendas depending on position, and subcultures. These factors influence police behaviors resulting in a reluctance to change and may see attempts at innovation as just another “flash in the pan” idea by yet another reform minded superintendent or external requirements promoted by the mayor.

### **a. Coupling Matters**

Police organizations, especially large agencies, are often loosely coupled, both horizontally (officer to officer) and vertically (‘rank and file’ to management). Police organizations may be horizontally and vertically disconnected which can cause tenuous understanding between what the administrators say and do and what the line officers say and do. This space between the levels of the hierarchy can be adaptive for an organization but when the top and bottom are not closely aligned in their understanding of organizational objectives and implementation of strategies then this disconnect may adversely affect innovation introduced by administration and ultimately the desired outcomes.

Loose connections exist in two broad and overlapping areas: logistical and adaptive. There are logistical reasons for loose connections; namely, the sheer size of some police agencies and the specialization of certain police units can limit sharing. Additionally, police officers engage in covert activities to uncover any number of criminal activities (prostitution stings or large scale drug busts) which must remain secret so as to maximize plausibility in the field.

### **b. Police Culture Matters**

Organizational culture is widely believed to be a powerful influence on the practices and performance of police organizations, and many argue that it is a major obstacle to innovation and reform (Crank, 2004; Mastrofski & Willis, 2010). The adaptive and logistical reasons for loose coupling help shape a culture that is fostered by informational silos, insular policing teams, and special unit fiefdoms. Police officers tend to be proprietary about their work and any intelligence they gather while working in their domain. This attitude or culture is fostered by the reward and reprisal structure in police organizations as incentives for good work (and sanctions for bad) are individualized to specific officers or specific units with little reward or motivation for sharing information or collaborating across units or even within units in some cases. Often police officers talk about the “numbers game” and how their performance is evaluated based on their arrests, tickets, and other quantifiable actions which hinge on individual action and information with little incentive to share and act in a collective way. This proprietary attitude can be exacerbated further with special units, such as gun or gang teams. These special units often exist in their own special sphere, exempt from the expectations of line officers and their currency and legitimacy is established because of their specialized information.

An additional aspect police culture is the adaptive antagonism that exists in many agencies. There are bureaucratic realities fostering this, the beat officers could never realistically enforce the “letter of the law” at all times as the organization would grind to a halt with officers constantly writing tickets and processing arrests. And so with every street level bureaucracy, including police departments, there exists an understanding rooted in officer discretion that there are only certain times, situations and people that require formal police action, be it intervening, stopping, ticketing, and/or arresting. This discretion is shaped and guided by the prevailing organizational culture and/or subculture in which they learned how to “police”, their own internal motivations, and the directives from their superiors.

### **c. Position Matters**

Police agencies often have steep hierarchies with many layers, particularly large agencies. This hierarchical structure may foster loose connections between the top and the bottom and as stated before this can sometimes be a good arrangement for all the links in the chain of command. Line officers may feel that the larger organizational structure does not support or understand their day-to-day work and the realities of the street and at worst impedes them. If officers perceive that they are evaluated on their “numbers” (i.e. arrests, traffic stops, and tickets), they have no incentive to share and collaborate, as this would take away from their performance measures. Thus position in the agency and perceptions of performance measures may influence buy-in and adherence to innovation.

## **2. Policing Innovations**

The Superintendent made it clear that to have a maximum impact on violence the department had to coalesce around a unified mission. Public violence became the expressed focus of the department. Officers were to change “how they did business” as part of this unified agenda. Collaboration, accountability, and hot spot policing were determined to be the way in which this would be done. Officers across the agency were expected to share information across the silos. A centralized unit was created to synthesize and share information or *actionable* intelligence to help direct police actions on the street. He emphasized collaboration and data sharing as the new practice of the department rather than proprietary data and unit insularity. Weekly meetings with administrators and many of the middle managers was the mainstay of the accountability. It was at these meetings where collaboration was explicitly rewarded with award ceremonies and implicitly rewarded with the directions, encouragement, and chastisements given to administrators and middle managers. However, the perpetuation and translation of *new accountability* to the rank and file relied on middle managers as the weekly meetings and DOC hand outs were the only official channels of communicating the mission.

**a. External Pressures**

Organizational changes efforts do not occur in a vacuum; political realities and organizational culture can impact implementation and pervert even the most solid programs, policies, and practice. Assuming attempted organizational changes are grounded in research and best practices, leaders must be mindful of other priorities and pressures from inside and outside the organization that influence implementation.

**b. Organizational Justice**

Employees perceive that an organization is just when management seeks input/ideas from and explains rationale for change, keeps them informed about the process, and makes adjustments based on feedback. When the decision-making power and ownership of an innovation is decentralized and the mid-level and front-line officers feel empowered and included in the organizational change orchestration, then innovation can influence organizational behavior in a substantive way. Even if innovations are steeped in best practice and have support from administrators, if officers do not think that they are treated fairly or their best interests are being served, they may be reluctant to implement and may even subvert implementation of the innovation.

**c. Hot Spot Policing**

The application of hot spot policing strategies varies. The only constant appears to be geographic focus. The data used to decide the hot spot, the police action in a hot spot, even the optimal size of the hot is debated. This department focused on public violence and hot spots that were determined using police databases, analysts' field experiences, and intelligence from the field to formulate the best place to concentrate police resources – places that either were in the midst of experiencing violence or were anticipated to experience violence based on analysts' calculations. The policing strategies in hot spots involved a combination of saturation policing and order maintenance policing in order to deter and

incapacitate. Special units were created for this initiative and deployed by the central administrators to the areas of perceived highest need. Even if this innovation was implemented exactly as planned, hot spot policing as practiced in Chicago may not have been effective.<sup>16</sup>

#### **d. Influence of IT**

At its core, law enforcement is about information sharing and communication in order to respond to crime or solve crime. Data collection, sharing, and distribution in law enforcement settings typically occurs in a highly segmented ways usually primarily face-to-face contact between officers. As IT advances this has fostered organizational change in law enforcement communication (see advent of radios in police cars how policing practices changed as a result of this technological development), recent advancements have the potential to overcome many of the impediments inherent in this type of information sharing (Manning, 1992). Data analysis and mapping capabilities have been exploited by police departments and used to augment or even change police administrative and strategic practices by deploying resources in more prescriptive, *data-driven* ways, share more and more information among officers, and monitor performance and give feedback a la COMPSTAT. It is unclear the extent to which new information technologies have impacted police officers in the field – how do they use the information at hand and how do they access and use the information technology available to them in the field? How do officers perceive the knowledge management structures, technology, and culture?

### **3. Organizational Change**

Several clusters of theories help frame and guide exploration of officers' perceptions and responses to attempts to change their behavior in one large police agency. The main construct clusters to consider when looking at actors' motivations and organizational change are their orientation to their work, to the

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<sup>16</sup> The NIJ evaluation did not find a relationship between the hot spot deployment areas, policing activities in these areas, and violent crime (Alderden et al., 2010).

community, to management, to coworkers and to their family. People's decisions tend to be based on maximizing their (perceived) best choice. They consider all the situated factors at hand including their emotional, mental, and knowledge states and they consider the broader organization goals and they may try to align their choices with the organizational imperative but it is not a primary consideration. Thus when an administration is attempting organizational behavior change, they should consider individual motivations and how those fit within the broader organizational context.

**a. "Hearts and Minds"**

The quality of human relations within the organization is hypothesized to influence the employees' emotional health/stress, job satisfaction, productivity, willingness to achieve organizational goals, and the quality of their interactions with the public. Are officers' socio-emotional needs being met in the work environment? If officers perceive that their opinions, expertise, and the realities of their day-to-day work are recognized or at least considered in the face of change efforts, then they are more likely to buy-in. "Hearts and minds" or human relation organizational theories stress fairness and justice within organizations. Procedural justice theory specifically suggests that if the policies and application of the organizational rules are perceived to be fair then employees will be more committed to the organizational goals and values (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, Callahan & Frost, 2007). Positive peer interaction and opportunities for personal and professional growth are also important to consider when introducing change. Then there is the idea of procedural justice: organizational actors must believe and experience fairness and equity in their work from their supervisors, their coworkers, and they must believe the organization is positioned to help them *do* their job rather than detract from their work (as they see it), then they may better buy into and even embrace attempts to change their organizational behavior and ultimately organization.

### **b. Leadership Matters**

Although there are various perspectives on the mechanisms of leadership and *how* leadership influences organizational actors' behavior, leadership at all levels is considered an important, albeit situated, influence on organizational behavior. Some research found that police leaders find it difficult to get their officers to follow directives implying that police organizations are generally difficult to direct from the top down (Wilson, 1968; Mastrofski, 1998; Mastrofski, 2002; Schafer 2010). However, there is also a strong presumption that leadership matters when attempting to change organizational behavior (Mastrofski, 2006; Isenberg, 2010). Leaders try to influence and manage employees' behaviors in order to achieve organizational goals. Leadership theories emphasize that leaders and management's capacity to influence employees' actions are key to influencing organizational behavior (Bass, 1990). Leaders can influence behavior in two broad ways either inspirationally or instructionally. Inspirational or transformative leaders motivate employees to pursue the mission and embody the values set by them. Transactional leadership employs *carrots and sticks* to influence employees' behavior by manipulating material consequences: rewarding and promoting high performers and withholding benefits from low performers (Bass, 1985). Although some researchers see leaders as either/or, I prefer the idea that leaders adjust their response on an inspirational - instructional spectrum depending on the situations in which they exert their leadership. I expect that the proximity to the leadership matters but it probably matters less and less the further from the top an officer is positioned.

### **c. Guidance and Support**

Understanding how a police organization introduces and manages an innovation is just as important as understanding the innovation itself (Rogers, 2003; Wolfe, 1994). Strategic planning, education, and training can facilitate change from top down. A large part of executing a successful organizational change is ensuring that administrators and managers effectively communicate purpose, progress, and desired

outcomes to the 'rank and file.' This idea is predicated on Herbert Simon's (1976) rational decision-making theory whereby the administration creates a "bounded rationality" by communicating the organizational values and expectations and providing the accompanying supports (training and communication) so employees will be better informed, skilled, and committed to pursue to the organizational goals and objectives. I considered the planning and training support for the innovation. Were officers adequately prepared to understand and implement?

#### **d. Philosophical shift**

Organizational change is more likely to be embraced when it is a meaningful change rather being viewed as just another strategy tacked on to existing practices.<sup>17</sup> Some researchers argue that many innovation attempts have been superficial and that police agencies have not changed how they police in decades. Innovation initiatives then are only "window dressing" to cover up entrenched organizational behavior that organizations are unable, unwilling, or reluctant to change. Some argue that many advances in policing have just been tacked onto existing organizational structures rather than truly revolutionizing policing practice (Mastrofski & Willis, 2010). This is frustrating possibility for any police reformers (internally and externally) who see real potential to increase the efficacy and effectiveness of police.

Organizations are complicated, dynamic, nebulous entities not easily parsed into discernible pieces and components. They are comprised of people, relationships, processes, technologies, all of which interact in various ways to produce organizational outcomes. Organizational behavior studies explore the impact of individuals, groups, and structures on processes and outcomes. Individuals respond differently to organizational structures and context given a range of reasons, position, context, and collective or

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<sup>17</sup> See Skogan's work regarding CAPS implementation for more of that debate of whether the Community Policing program was an embraced and integrated into the philosophy of the department or existed and operated as a nonessential appendage with only symbolic significance to the larger departments' operations or just served as public relations, window dressing with little significance to the day-to-day policing work.

individual needs. This dissertation then is centered on what can be learned from the actors in a large police agency in the midst of innovation.

#### **IV. Methodology**

Organizational change and behavior is difficult to study because it is hard to pinpoint the variables of importance and it does not lend itself to conventional experimental design – manipulate one variable and examine outcomes (Barnes, 1967). Researchers who study organizational change and perhaps even more relevantly, administrators who oversee organizational change efforts know that, “Changes involve multiple sets of complex variables whose identity, interaction and impact vary from situation to situation” (Barnes, 1967, p. 58). Case studies then are useful when studying organizational innovation. When we are not sure of the exact processes by which change occurred, it is helpful to explore and try to understand which organizational elements and relationships facilitated or inhibited change.

##### **A. Research Design**

I use a case study methodology to explore how police officers in one large urban department responded to the administration’s attempts to change organizational behavior. Specifically, the focus is on how administrators tried to change communication, collaboration, and enhance accountability across the department. This is a challenging organizational proposition with any large bureaucratic structure, let alone one with a rigid hierarchy and entrenched silos. To this end, the case study methodology allowed me to explore how police officers’ responded to organizational changes specifically targeting how they used information to make decisions and how they collaborated with the rest of the department. I explored how the administration tried to democratize and centralize information and establish deeper accountability. I also looked at

the ways in which the administration thought change would proliferate and the expected outcomes associated with change, and how the 'rank and file' perceived and incorporated innovations.

Observations, interviews, and ride-alongs conducted from 2003 to 2008 informed this case study and highlighted the perspectives of police officers in various roles across the department. Using several clusters of organizational theories to frame the exploration including leadership, procedural justice, and bounded rationality, this dissertation explores how the innovation was conceptualized and operationalized. Ultimately this work exposed some of the factors that influenced organizational change and helped to make it stick or not.

This chapter outlines the case study methodology, why it is an appropriate strategy for this inquiry, the intended outcomes from using this method, and how this type of study informs the research questions. I also discuss the data sources and provide details necessary to understanding the setting and context for the timeframe of study. I review the data analysis approach and finish this chapter with a discussion about the limitations and biases in this study.

### **1. Case Study Defined**

Organizational behavior can be complicated and complex and the case study methodology allows for latitude and fluidity of inquiry when exploring organizational processes (Barnes, 1967; Patton, 1987). Case study methodology provides a way to look at the how of organizational behavior, processes, and change. Rather than just look at the violent crime outcomes, this dissertation focuses on how police administrators attempted to shape behavior

and how officers adapted, integrated and interpreted directives and executed them in their daily work.

Organizational processes take place in a black box in which mechanisms that influence change are often not understood or examined. Also, when and if outcomes are observed after change attempts, practitioners, and researchers are often uncertain what mechanisms or processes influenced the outcomes and are left guessing if change was implemented properly. Case study methodology allows me to explore processes using the perspectives of the actors and my observations. This methodology allows me to explore how police administrators' conceptualized and implemented organizational changes with the 'rank and file' officers and how the 'rank and file' perceived and responded to these change attempts.

The study of organizational behavior has a decidedly more micro-level focus on individuals, groups, and organizational structures, in contrast to organizational theory which is complementary but more macro-level focused on systems-level variables. Case study methodology emphasizes multi-perspectival analysis and to this end, I considered the voices and perspectives of all the actors and the interactions between these groups of actors. Using mixed qualitative methods, including interviews and observations, I collected data about organizational processes from many angles and gathered input from many voices in order to examine the connections, relationships, and processes that "make up an organization" (Barnes, 1967). To this end, the data collected and the theories used to understand the data were

triangulated to organize a narrative that represents the organizational innovation as experienced by one police department (Gerring, 2007).

## **2. System of Action**

The unit of analysis for many organizational case studies including this one is often characterized as the system of action. Case study methodology then is a helpful way to capture organizational behavior that makes up the system of action, particularly in an organization as dynamic and multifaceted as a police agency. Certainly the way in which individuals behave within organizational constraints is not uniform as there are many individuals with a spectrum of unique personal and organizational needs, relationships, and intersections and disconnects between their individual objectives and organizational strategies and objectives (Chauhan and Anbalagan, 2013). But case study methodology allows one to look for commonalities across individuals' perspectives and actions to see if patterns could be discerned while acknowledging that organizational behavior is complicated. To understand how this police organization or system of action responded to innovation attempts, the voices and perspectives of actors across the department and the interactions between them were considered.

Understanding the crucial parties and relationships in an organizational change situation is important as relationships can facilitate initiatives or create resistance to change and thus determine organizational outcomes. As discussed in the introduction, loose coupling with street level bureaucracy such as a police department has both functional and dysfunctional impact on organizational function and influences the system of action. The coupling and communication

between administrators and street level officers tends to have considerable static whereby the top administrators hand down policies and directives and the line officer interprets and implements in the way that best suits his/her immediate needs and this may affect how changes are perceived and implemented. Some of the important mechanisms to consider when exploring a system of action with inherent loose coupling are leadership, accountability, role of technology, and organizational justice. This case study focuses on these mechanisms as a helpful way to understand change and frame the analysis as expounded on below.

### **3. Goal, Objectives, & Questions**

This dissertation examines how the administration attempted to democratize and centralize information sharing and establish a comprehensive accountability process, and how the 'rank and file' reacted to these organizational change attempts. The goal of this dissertation then was to explore various organizational actors' perspectives when administrators tried to achieve broad organizational behavior change focused on information sharing and accountability. Using observational and interview data collected, I accessed the perspectives of police officers occupying various roles, to explore how innovation was interpreted and integrated. Using organizational change theories and current understanding of police organizations, I explored and categorized response patterns from the officers studied. The objectives deriving from this goal are:

1. DESCRIBE THE STRATEGY/ ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE/ INNOVATION - Depict the rationale for and the theory behind the innovation as described by the police administrators.

2. RUBBER HITS THE ROAD - Describe the translation from policy to practice using findings from interviews and observations. Describe how officers perceived these attempted organizational changes and practiced them in the field.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE & RESISTANCE - Explore the consistencies and disconnects between officers' perceptions and descriptions of the innovations and attempts to direct discretion.

The above objectives will be addressed by the following research questions:

**Objective 1 – DEFINITION – DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATION/STRATEGY**

1. Describe innovation as planned and perceived.
  - a. Why did administrators say they needed the innovation?
  - b. How was this innovation described by police administrators?
  - c. What was management's theory behind the organizational innovation?
  - d. What were administrators' expectations of the organizational actors?

**Objective 2 – IMPLEMENTATION – RUBBER HITS THE ROAD**

1. How did officers, middle managers and field officers, characterize the innovations?
  - a. How was information sharing and communication described by middle managers and field officers?
  - b. How was collaboration described by middle managers and field officers?
  - c. How was accountability described by middle managers and field officers?

**Objective 3 – ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE & RESISTANCE**

1. What were disconnects between administrators' vision and officers' perceptions?
  - a. How did officers respond to hot spot policing?
  - b. How did officers respond to attempts to direct discretion?
  - c. How did officers respond to attempts to tighten accountability?
  - d. How does what we know about organizational change articulate with this case study?

**B. Case Study: Setting, Participants & Data Sources**

**1. Data Sources**

This dissertation is an expansion of two research projects that documented and evaluated the impact of policing strategies and organizational changes on violent crime in one large police

department in the United States. The qualitative data collected for these projects was exploratory and included observations of and interviews with officers from across the department. Multiple perspectives were gleaned in order to describe the organizational strategies and how they were implemented. These data also pertain to the fidelity of the strategy implementation and helped to surface important variables that were considered in the outcome analysis for one research project.

**a. BJA Project**

The first project was indirectly funded by the Bureau of Justice (BJA) via the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) and had been approved by UIC's Institutional Review Board (IRB) (Research Protocol #2003-0563). These data had an active IRB protocol at the time of collection but does not need one for this dissertation. The dataset is de-identified (no identifiable information about the subjects) and does not involve an interaction or intervention with individuals for research purposes. This project was funded to create a comprehensive description of all of the CPD's "Violence Reduction Initiatives" (See Rosenbaum and Stephens, 2005). In 2003 and 2004, researchers including me, reviewed archival crime data, conducted interviews, and observed meetings to gain an understanding of recent innovations and of administrators' perspectives on hot-spot policing strategies, accountability, and organizational change.

The BJA project provided a descriptive rather than evaluative overview of CPD anti-violence strategies and tactics conducted in 2004 for the benefit of the public, government officials,

police scholars, and other law enforcement agencies. The BJA-funded project used five data sources: (1) Face-to-face semi-structured interviews; (2) meeting observations; (3) content review of agency documents; (4) a paper and pencil questionnaire administered to 80 exempt police personnel and; (5) crime and police activity statistics. For this dissertation, I used the data collected from 19 interviews with police department central administration officers and staff and over 20 meeting observations.

#### **b. NIJ Project**

The second source of data came from the National Institute of Justice's (NIJ) jointly funding the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC) to evaluate the effectiveness of the CPD's violence reduction strategies and this collection was approved by UIC's IRB (Research Protocol # 2006-0553). Researchers at UIC, in partnership with CPD, designed an evaluation to see if the strategies undertaken were associated with reductions in violent crime. Researchers adopted a "theory of change" approach to evaluate strategies (Pawson, 2003; Weiss, 1995) and from 2005 to 2008 collected both qualitative and quantitative data that focused on the Deployment Operation Center (DOC), the impact of strategies on the organization, officers, and violent crime. The qualitative data collected were used to clarify the "guts" of the strategy as implemented (not just as theorized) and to explain why the DOC was successful or not and these data helped to surface and define the variables that were considered in the outcome analysis. The process data collected focused on multiple perspectives about the efficacy and effectiveness of the department's managerial and strategic

initiatives. This dissertation is a continuation and elaboration of the qualitative work focused on officers' perceptions of the organizational changes.

The data collected for this project included: (1) face-to-face, semi-structured interviews, (2) direct observations during "ride-alongs" with field officers, (3) meeting observations, (4) crime statistics, and (5) police activity statistics. The interviews and ride-alongs were conducted over a 14-month period from September 2006 to November 2007. And the meeting observations continued weekly from mid-2005 through mid-2008. For my dissertation, I used the data collected from the first three methods listed: interviews, ride-alongs, and meeting observations. There were 30 face-to-face interviews conducted mainly with central administrators and supervisory officers. On rare occasions there was more than one officer involved in an interview but this was not specifically detailed in the field notes and so individual breakdowns are not provided. We did not explicitly collect demographic data as part of this study due to the sensitive nature of the research. However, researchers would try to identify subjects' ethnicity and gender and noted this in their field notes particularly with the ride-alongs. In total, 46 ride-alongs were conducted with a total of 97 officers. Of these officers, 76 percent were identified by researchers as White, 20 percent were identified as Latino, 4 percent were identified as Black, and 88 percent were male. Over 30 meetings were observed over the course of the data collection including weekly DOC meetings, VISE meetings, DOC roundtable meetings, and community forums.

## **2. Police Department**

In this section, I will briefly review the organizational hierarchy, the roles, and the geographic composition of the department, particularly as they pertain to this dissertation. First I will review the relevant administrative layers and then the geographic layers that existed at the time of this study. The department was headed by the Superintendent who was assisted by a First Deputy Superintendent and together they oversaw five bureaus. Each bureau was administered by a Bureau Chief and covered different operating functions for the department (i.e. Patrol or Administrative). The composition of each bureau was dependent on its function however the hierarchical ranks remains consistent across the department (chief, commander, lieutenant, sergeant, and 'rank and file' officers). The Bureau of Patrol was responsible for the oversight of the bulk of officers on the streets.

At the time of this dissertation, geographically the city was divided into six police areas (areas one through five and the Central Control Group). Each of the five areas was overseen by a Deputy Chief. Each area was further divided into districts with about five to six districts contained in an area. There were twenty-five police districts that were divided among the police areas and each of these districts were led by a Commander. Districts were further divided into smaller geographic chunks called sectors and even smaller chunks called beats. These distinct geographic specifications were relevant because police actions and directives referenced the relevant geographies so that officers knew where they were assigned.

### **3. Research Teams**

I had a primary role in the qualitative data collection for both research projects. The BJA research team included two members, Principal Investigator and me, the dissertation author. The broader NIJ research team included members of the police department, University of Illinois at Chicago professors, and graduate students. The qualitative team for this project included five graduate students from the Criminology, Law, and Justice Program at UIC. I coordinated the qualitative data collection activities and was involved in collecting the bulk of the data. Others supported the field work and helped with data collection, namely the Principal Investigator, who participated in several of the higher profile interviews (e.g., Superintendent, Chief of Patrol, etc.).

### **4. Participants**

#### **a. Officer type**

Researchers interviewed and rode along with many types of officers including Patrol and Tactical officers housed in police districts, Saturation and Gang officers under the purview of area command, and Tactical Response Units (TRUs), and other centralized police units including the Special Operation Section (SOS), Narcotics and Gang Intelligence Section (NAGIS), Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), and Vice officers. In order to analyze the data and answer the research questions, police officers were categorized into three broad but conceptually relevant categories: field officers, middle managers, and administrators. Admittedly, these categorizations cover a wide range of officers across the hierarchy but they are relevant and

manageable, consistent with policing literature, and valid distinctions, given my field work experiences.

1. Administrators: This group of officers included any of the executive officers who were responsible for setting organizational policy, establishing strategies, and overseeing department accountability. Typically, these officers did not participate in day-to-day street level operations.
2. Middle managers: This group included any officers who supervised field officers and were responsible for translating and conveying the administration's mission and expectations to field officers and were held accountable for the work that field officers carried out. These mid-level supervisors were held accountable for ensuring street-level outcomes and explaining why certain outcomes had or had not been achieved.
3. Field officers: The largest category of officers in most police departments is field officers or front-line officers. Field officers are considered the 'face of the department' and are responsible for the day-to-day street-level operations in a police department. They carry out the work typically associated with police, namely answering calls for service, patrolling the streets, and enforcing laws (Ricucci, 2005). For this dissertation, I considered two relevant subcategories of officers within this field officer categorization: patrol officers and special unit officers. Patrol officers were assigned to specific geographies and they typically engaged in patrolling and responding to calls for service ranging from domestic violence calls to noise complaints. Special unit officers also worked in the field and had substantial face-to-face contact with the community

members. Unlike the patrol officers, special unit officers were considered discretionary “manpower” and they were not assigned to any specific geographic regions but rather were dispatched to the places that administrators determined needed extra resources and/or specialized types of policing actions (e.g. ‘Buy Bust’).

### **C. Data Collection**

Interviews and observations captured rich data about how hot spots were identified and communicated to police personnel, how and why officers were deployed, and what happened when they were deployed. Interview protocols included questions about the hot-spots policing process including: impression of department mission; theory of action (i.e. why does hot spotting work/not work?); resources (i.e. staffing concerns); hot spot activities; coordination (between units and department-wide); accountability; effectiveness, efficacy, and hot spotting; fairness and hot spot policing; and the intersection of community and hot spot policing. Police officers offered their perspectives and perceptions of strategy effectiveness, they discussed their concerns about the strategies, and impact on coordination in the department and between officers. Researchers also gathered information on the department’s efforts to evaluate the process and how these accountability efforts were perceived by officers. The data collection protocols are included in Appendix A for the BJA study and in Appendix B for the NIJ study. This next section provides more details on the research protocols for both the BJA and the NIJ projects.

## **1. BJA Data Collection**

Departmental support of the research was expressed in a letter signed by the police Superintendent, this along with researcher persistence, allowed researchers to access to officers and meetings throughout the department. Researchers conducted interviews with command-level personnel and attended police meetings related to various police strategies over a 12-month period with the bulk of the interviews occurring in August and September of 2004. The sampling goal for this project was to interview as many of the administrators directed involved in strategy orchestration as possible. Interview participants included the Superintendent, most of the Bureau Chiefs, several district Commanders, most of the special unit Commanders, and several officers considered to be key administration personnel for the violence reduction strategies. Handwritten notes were taken during these meetings and transcribed shortly after to ensure validity and record researchers' impressions as well as interview content. If both researchers attended the interview, then one would take notes and transcribe them and pass them along to the other researcher to review and add any additional observations about the data collection.

In several cases interviews consisted of a group of administrative officers, and so 19 interviews with 36 command-level personnel were conducted. These groups varied from two administrators up to larger groups of five to eight. Sometimes administrators were specifically brought together for the interview and sometimes the interviewee decided to bring other people in at the time of the meeting to provide more breadth of input. Interviews tended to last anywhere from 45 minutes to two hours. Researchers followed a semi-structured interview

protocol but allowed participants to elaborate on their areas of expertise and delve into topics of which researchers wanted further elaboration. If participants did not provide sufficient detail when answering questions, researchers probed with qualifying questions. The purpose of the interviews was to get input from a cross-section of upper-level supervisory staff about strategy efficacy and rationale, why violent crime in Chicago declined, and their perspectives on the police role in that decline. In particular, we asked what impact they thought the organizational changes had on crime rates and how the DOC and its accompanying activities contributed to the decline of reported violent crimes. The interview protocol included questions that required officers to reflect on the organizational mission, why they thought crime in Chicago decreased, what police strategies might have contributed to the decreases and why, what strategies they perceived were not effective, and how the department could improve organizationally and/or strategically to be more effective.

Researchers also observed over 20 CPD meetings including Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability (BCSA) meetings. These BCSA meeting were considered to be and referred to as the Chicago-style COMPSTAT meetings. We also attended the Deployment Operation Center (DOC) meetings and several community forum meetings. Researchers attended the majority of the DOC weekly meetings during the 12 months of the study. Sometimes researchers took handwritten notes during the meetings, as part of the research protocol, but we did so discreetly because officers often shared sensitive, investigatory information, and we did not want to draw attention to ourselves by furiously scribbling notes. There were several occasions when we were asked to stop taking notes during these meeting. After meetings, researchers

transcribed any notes taken and/or impressions of the meeting into an electronic format and added their reflections.

## **2. NIJ Data Collection**

The police personnel interviewed and observed spanned the entire department and included field officers, middle level supervisors, and central administrators. Departmental support of the research was expressed in a letter signed by the police Superintendent. This letter, along with researcher persistence, gave researchers access to officers and meetings throughout the department.

### **a. Sample**

Three police districts and the accompanying areas were selected to concentrate the field work because collecting qualitative data in every police district in the city was not practical or feasible. The key selection criterion was a high level of policing activity as defined by the volume of police reports and calls for service. Only high-activity districts were considered for inclusion. District crime rates, size, both geographic and population density, number and concentration of previous hot spot areas, and racial and ethnic composition were also considered in the district selection. These criteria ensured that researchers selected racially and ethnically diverse districts with varying levels of population density with a lot of DOC-related activities that they could ask about and observe.

**b. Meeting Observations**

Researchers observed three types of meetings related to the policing organizational changes including: (1) DOC Roundtables – weekly meetings with DOC supervisory staff and analysts to discuss hot spot intelligence and designations and finalize the gang hot-spots and intelligence for the week and (2) DOC meetings – weekly meetings with all CPD command staff to review and evaluate previous hot spot activities and outcomes and announce the new hot-spot deployments for the week. Researchers also attended (3) Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability's (BCSA) Violence Initiative Strategic Evaluation (VISE) meetings held to evaluate crime rates and activities in specific police areas. VISE meetings were held on an ad hoc basis as determined by the BCSA staff and involved a thorough review of crime, arrest, activity, and personnel data. Although the BCSA meetings were considered to be 'COMPSTAT-like,' researchers also found that both the VISE and the weekly DOC meetings had elements of the accountability emphasis that defined New York's COMSTAT. Chicago's meetings were not considered as punitive or 'tough' as New York's meetings. Over 30 meetings were observed over the course of this project.

**c. Interviews**

Interviews were not recorded. This was an access, time, and cultural consideration and so every effort was made to capture the interviewees' words. It is well known that the police culture is generally suspicious of outsiders, especially researchers, and recording devices only enhance those suspicions. To ensure reliability and accuracy, researchers reviewed and electronically transcribed interview notes immediately following interview. Face-to-face interviews were

typically conducted by two researchers, one researcher served as a note taker and the other interviewer. The note taker would type up their hand written notes and add their impressions of the interview subject and content and then the interviewer would review and augment these electronic notes if they felt something was missing or clarification was needed.

Researchers started every interview by letting officers know why they were being interviewed. We tried to maintain the flow and provide feedback that encouraged the officers' candor and sustained their motivation to be open and responsive. Even with guarantees of anonymity, interviewees may still be sensitive to how the questions sound. We did not want to appear accusatory or intrusive and in some cases the interviews and observations veered into areas that were uncomfortable or even offensive to the researchers including offensive racial or community characterizations or explanations of crime scene details. Often we began interviews with noncontroversial questions to which respondents could provide straightforward descriptions (i.e. Describe your various roles since becoming a police officer). Making interviewees comfortable set the stage for asking them about opinions and feelings later in the interviews.

As researchers we had to balance neutrality and rapport. Neutrality is how you respond to their responses and rapport is communicated by how you convey respect during an interview or observation. What they were saying was important because of who they were, not what they were saying. We often used illustrative examples to convey our interest in officers' perspectives, for example "Some officers have said DOC provides helpful directives, and some

officers have said directives are not helpful, and still others are unclear on what the DOC is asking of them. What is your impression of the DOC? Would you describe how your perspective falls under one of these categories?”

The questions posed during interviews and ride-alongs were designed to be truly open-ended and attempted to minimize or eliminate any presuppositions by allowing the officers to answer using their own words and take whatever direction they want (Patton, 1987). Whereas unclear questions could have made interviewees uncomfortable, feel ignorant, and confused, we tried to keep the questions clear and as the interviews progressed, we tried to use the officers' language regarding setting and activities as they described it. Often we had to probe for additional information or elaboration to further clarify answers provided by an interviewee. When asking probing questions, researchers tried to stay within the “flow of the interview” and tried to make the interviewee feel like their responses were adequately and thoroughly addressing the questions without being overly effusive. We also used simulation questions where we asked the interviewee to become the observer in a particular situation and explain what they would see or experience. One example of this type of questions was, “Please explain how your job would change when an area you work in becomes a DOC hot spot.” This type of questioning provided context to the interviewee and allows them to visualize and describe the experience of a simulated experience. Finally, we attempted to maintain control of the interview, we knew time was precious for all those interviewed and so we tried to maximize everyone's time and glean the answers needed in an appropriate timeframe.

Researchers engaged in extensive note taking, capturing verbatim quotes when possible, reviewing interviews and adding any impressions, recording memos, denoting interpretations, thoughts, and ideas that occurred during interviews. After the interviews was a critical time for reflection and elaboration as researchers' memories are fallible I engaged in memo writing and held bimonthly meetings with the field research team to review findings, discuss the data collected including themes and data convergence, and missing pieces of information or unclear information.

In each study district, researchers followed the same data collection protocol. We contacted district Commanders in order to introduce the research and conduct an interview. Researchers interviewed district Commanders in each of the three study districts and then used snowball sampling to recruit additional interviewees. Researchers then asked for the Commander's input on the officers in their district that were the most knowledgeable about the DOC and hot spot policing, researchers followed up with these officers, and attempted to interview them. Researchers tried to interview all the commanding officers in the selected districts and area units and conduct interviews and ride-alongs with at least two field officers from each type of policing unit within each district and area. The goal was to get input from officers from every rank in the district (administration through field officers) and every rank in the area teams which was achieved. Some of the interviews were conducted with several officers and researchers conducted 30 interviews with approximately 60 officers.

#### **d. Ride-Alongs**

“Ride-alongs” were observations where researchers followed one or more officers throughout their shift, which including riding with officers in squad cars, accompanying officers to the stationhouses to process arrests, to scenes of crimes or scenes of calls for service, and lunch and dinner breaks. During ride-alongs researchers had an opportunity to both observe behaviors and interact with research subjects, asking questions when clarifications were needed. Interviews were scheduled with specific individuals but ride-alongs were scheduled with teams of officers and the exact officer(s) being observed was/were not known to the researchers until the time of the ride-along and the subjects were typically selected by the lieutenant or sergeant on duty.

The ride-alongs were also used to interview officers about the DOC strategy. Researchers began to use the ride-alongs to not only observe police actions but to ask interview questions. This adjustment was made when researchers noted that there was substantial downtime during ride-alongs (even in busy districts) and thought this may be a good time to ask questions. This adjustment was helpful to get ‘rank and file’ perceptions because as the project progressed it became clear it would be hard to get front line officers’ to sit down for a face-to-face interview outside of their normal shift. Researchers also asked officers why and what they were doing while an event was happening. This allowed researchers to ask more relevant questions and to observe and question officers’ street-level actions. The interview protocols were designed to be flexible and allowed researchers to expand or focus on certain topics during interviews when participants appeared to know more about a certain topic. Additionally, researchers often had

to adapt or curtail the interviews conducted during ride-alongs because officers' shifts were often unpredictable (i.e., an arrest and the subsequent processing could prematurely end a ride-along observation).

Researchers attempted to conduct ride-alongs with at least two officers from every central administered field unit and every type of officer in the study districts. To that end, researchers interviewed and rode along with patrol and tactical officers from the districts and gang and saturation teams from the areas and Tactical Response Units (TRUs), and other centralized police units including the Special Operation Section (SOS), Narcotics and Gang Intelligence Section (NAGIS), Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), and Vice.

Typically, one researcher participated in the ride-along, observing and interviewing officers during their shifts. During the ride-alongs, researchers noted what officers did on their shift and tried to capture the general nature of police-citizen contacts. These data were not intended to measure event frequency at the district or beat level, but rather to characterize the type and intensity of police enforcement actions in and around hot spots. The researcher would transcribe their handwritten notes into an electronic file shortly after the ride-along (usually the next day because ride-alongs consistently took place at night) and then I reviewed the notes and sent them back to the researcher for clarification if needed.

### **3. Data Storage**

Data from both research projects was stored the same way. Face-to-face interviews, field interviews, ride-along observations, and meeting observations were recorded using

handwritten notes and then researchers reflectively reconstructed the notes into an electronic format (adding their own commentary, reflections, or questions about what they heard and observed). After notes were electronically transcribed and all identifying information saved except for officers' rank and unit were stripped, they were stored on a password protected computer. Researchers kept all the electronic copies of the notes on a password protected computer with identifiers stripped and hand written notes were kept in a locked file cabinet and ultimately destroyed with a shredder once the data collection concluded.

#### **4. Validity Considerations**

There were some validity concerns related to conducting interviews and participant observations. Interviews are interactive processes and participants are often eager to tell researchers what they think they want to hear and participants try to read cues and make inferences from questions that researchers ask or participants can be reluctant and evasive, even deceitful sometimes (Morse, 2008). Observations of participants' behaviors were also subject to these same biases. Participants do not behave or do things they would usually do when no one is watching. These biases were unavoidable when conducting field work but were minimized by researchers asking a broad range of participants the same questions, training interviewers and observers to remain as unobtrusive as possible.

Organizational actors may construct a social reality and may over-rationalize their activities and contribute greater meaning and coupling among them than in fact they have (Mitroff and Kilmann, 1975; Weick, 1976). J.G. March (1978) felt that researchers could address these

limitations by using a 'contextually sensitive methodology', one that highlights and preserves rich detail about context. The data collection addressed this limitation to some degree in that it was collected using multiple methods and from a variety of sources, and thus provided context in which to consider while exploring the organizational actors' perceptions and responses.

As part of the University of Illinois at Chicago's IRB process all interview participants were informed about the intent of the research - evaluate gang hot spot policing strategy in the case of the NIJ project and document the violent crime reduction initiatives for the BJA project - and asked to sign a consent form acknowledging that they were informed, understood their risks, and consented to be part of the research. These steps obviously primed participants to focus their activities and perceptions solely on hot spot policing and thus researchers may have missed other or more important insight from the participants.

Another data collection limitation was the accommodations made for the ride-alongs. For the comfort of the researchers and to make communication between officers and researcher easier, ride-alongs were often conducted in sergeants' cars – these cars do not have "cages" (i.e. wire mesh between the front and back seat that separates officers from arrestees transported in the car). And so during many of the ride-alongs conducted for the NIJ project, officers being interviewed and observed were not driving their typical car and this may have influenced the types of activities in which they chose to engage (i.e., not making an arrest because they had nowhere to transport arrestees).

Also to note, officers' regular activities during the ride-along often would interrupt the flow of interviews and curtailed the amount of data that researchers were able to gather. Researchers had to synthesize the opinions and perceptions of multiple officers sitting in often dark and cramped back seats. This may have compromised the data researchers were able to capture. Due to departmental scheduling and officer availability, researchers sometimes had to interview more than one officer at a time. This situation may have reduced the officer's candor if he or she did not agree with his or her partners' response, again compromising the quality of the data. Researchers tried to minimize these limitations by remaining flexible and sometimes extending the ride-along period for an officers' entire shift, joining them for their meals to continue the interviews and using the information and examples gleaned during an arrest or traffic stop to further inquire about the overall process.

#### **D. Data Analysis**

*Qualitative analysis is creative process that requires careful judgments about significance and meaningfulness in the data. (Patton, 1987)*

Ultimately this case study offers "data-based conjecture and speculation" (Patton, 1987: 158) that emerged from and was grounded in the observations and interviews about organizational behavior and innovation in one police organization. This case study centered on the organizational actors' perspectives and so to this end, I reviewed and synthesized data, described the processes and context, and answered the research questions. This next section summarizes my analysis or my "data-based speculative" approach. Below I describe the logic model approach that guided my exploration and then discuss the theories and ideas or

sensitizing concepts that imbued my data coding, analysis, and interpretation. Also I discuss the role of data collection as analysis. The final part of the section outlines the steps I took when evaluating the data.

### **1. Logic Model**

My analysis was guided by Marks' (2000) logic model approach to examining organizational behavior and innovation which acknowledges that the expansive connections and variables that make up organizations but simplifies the analysis of organizational behavior by focusing on specific aspects of innovation and relevant organizational elements. Marks proposed this model which included looking at the inputs, activities, and outcomes specific to the innovation. When applying this model, I considered (1) the innovation itself and how change was mediated by (2) organizational culture and norms, (3) the personal habitus or individuals' motivations and behaviors, and (4) the organizational structures.

### **2. Sensitizing Concepts**

*"According to Yin (1994) analysis hinges on linking the data to the propositions and explicating the criteria by which findings are to be interpreted." (Zucker, 2009)*

I used both deductive and inductive approaches with this case of innovation in a police organization. While I was open to ideas or concepts that surfaced from the data, I also started the case study with an overarching research questions and a priori constructs or sensitizing concepts of organizational change and behavior. When I explored the data looking for possible patterns and relationships to understand the innovation experience, these sensitizing concepts provided lenses with which to approach the data. These concepts served as guidance not

gospel for understanding and exploring the data. I discussed many of them in detail in the conceptual framework and lay out concepts below following Marks' logic model framework including:

- The innovation or attempted change
- The organizational culture and norms and personal habitus and behavior of the actors
- The organizational structure

First, I considered sensitizing concepts pertaining to innovation and organizational change. A police department faced escalating rates of violence and responded with innovation that had philosophical, administrative, and strategic elements that centered on targeting knowledge management and accountability in the organization. In order to implement organizational change effectively we know there are key elements that should be included and considered with the change: systems thinking, building shared vision, dialogue, leadership, and team learning. We know that role conflict and ambiguity, climate of organizational justice, and lack of communication can interfere with change. Any of these elements can either define or detract from organizational change and were considered when reviewing the data and constructing the case study.

Secondly, I considered the actors and their organizational culture and norms and personal habitus and behavior. This is a blend of Marks' mediators of professional culture and norms and the personal motivations of organizational actors as there were many overlaps in these sensitizing concepts. I considered the guidance and support that officers' received from the organization including their perceptions and my observations of the monitoring systems,


incentives, and communication about the innovations. In my analysis, I considered how officers' perceived and characterized systems, formal or informal and how the innovation may have impacted systems and relationships. I also considered how the actors perceived leadership within the innovation efforts.

Thirdly, I considered organizational structure. The paradoxes of police organizational structure were examined when conducting this analysis. Police departments are often defined by rigidity and hierarchy with highly defined structures and chains of command. Conversely, police organizations are defined by officers' discretionary and loose connections between the administration and the street-level work. Hierarchical organizations like police agencies in large cities can have trouble pivoting organizationally due to their size and these loose connections between the top and the bottom of the organization. The change studied here came from the top down and was driven by centralized accountability efforts and pushed via various information technologies which is typical of modern day police departments.

In this case study, I explored many of these interacting variables presented above as they manifested themselves in the focal intervention. While reviewing and summarizing the thematic coding, I used complimentary organizational theories to help me interpret my findings. Loose coupling, leadership, organizational justice, and systems theory stood out as useful frameworks for understanding how actors' respond to a police organization trying to integrate changes targeting collaboration and so I used these theories as lenses through which

to analyze and understand my case study findings. The figure below helped organize the theories and concepts I considered while analyzing the data.

**Figure 3: Logic Model for Analysis**



### 3. Data Collection as Analysis

Consistent with qualitative analytic approaches, analysis began with data collection. While collecting the data, we engaged in an ongoing discussion about the possible patterns and categories emerging from the data. During these beginning stages of analysis, researchers discussed evolving interpretations and understandings of the data with an open mind to new data and possibility of different meanings or characterizations. I considered transcribing and reviewing data as the first stage of analysis. When transcribing, I also wrote memos that shaped my eventual analysis and interpretations of this case. The immediacy of transcription and

reflection also served as a quality control mechanism ensuring some measures of validity and reliability (Patton, 1987).

#### **4. Analysis**

Qualitative analysis requires researchers to consider the data and the classification system to verify the accuracy of the categories and to ensure the data properly coded (Patton, 1987). By “moving back and forth between induction and deduction, between experience and reflection on experience” (Patton, 1987:160) I tried to verify patterns and categorized data. I looked for what data fit together or converged and also where data diverged. The criteria that established convergence was “reoccurring regularities” and the “extent to which the differences among categories are bold and clear” (Patton, 1987). In order to “flesh out” categorizations, I relied on building on information I already knew (extension), making connections between different items (bridging), and proposing new information and making sure it fit with the data (surfacing). The qualitative analysis was complete when the categories reached redundancy and my analysis began to extend beyond the issues and concerns guiding the analysis.

My exploration was both inferential and deductive as I was guided by themes and “theoretical notions” and I constructed themes from within the data (Graue & Walsh, 1998). The following provides a step-by-step account of how I approached the data, analysis, and interpretation for this case study. The first step was reading and reviewing the data collected and looking globally at the organizational changes that the administration emphasized in interviews and observations. I decided to explore more the impact of the agency’s attempt to control and

shape the relevant police statistics and the actors; the 'knowledge management' and the accountability – the agency's attempt to more closely align administrators' objectives with line officers' behaviors. My research questions about organizational behavior focused on these primary organizational objectives of the strategy including communication, collaboration, and accountability.

For the second step, I used the qualitative analytical software Atlas.ti and open coded 25 percent of the interviews and observations looking for emergent themes not represented in my initial themes. With this first analytical review of the data, I used reflective memos to augment my thematic review. I then reviewed and refined the codes that emerged and applied the revised coding structure to the entire data set. Reading and re-reading the interview and ride-along data helped confirm anticipated themes and determine new themes and memos.

The third step was to code the entire dataset. I created a coding check list and used families to define the different primary documents, i.e. define their position within the organization. I wrote memos illustrating the conceptual themes and compared these descriptions with field notes while coding the data. I was able to validate the themes by looking for supporting and disconfirming evidence. I also made extensive use of memo writing to elaborate on and understand the data and the connections among the "informational units." With second pass at the data, I sought to bring "order to the data, organizing it into patterns and categories and basic descriptive units" (Patton, 1987:144).

The fourth and final analytical step was to analyze the coded data in order to answer the research questions. I ran these queries by each relevant subgroup – line officers, middle managers and administrators.

#### **E. Ethical Considerations**

Participants of the semi-structured interviews for both the BJA and NIJ project were not asked any questions that fell outside the scope of their professional responsibilities or their expertise and they received the benefit of a full informed consent process. During interviews, detailed hand written notes were taken, typed into electronic files, and then handwritten notes were destroyed. Any identifying information was replaced with codes in the electronic files. Code and data files were maintained in a separate password protected folders on the computer of the PI and one Co-Investigator, who oversaw all field work. Chicago police administrators or anyone outside the research team did not have access to field data collected in this project at the individual or small group level.

The protocol for police ride-alongs was similar to that of the interviews. The ride-alongs and accompanying observations and interviews posed minimal risk to participants. Officers were not asked to engage in behaviors outside the scope of their daily professional activities. Observations and interview protocols captured police activity and officers' perceptions of hot spots policing respectively, but were not used to analyze the performance of any individual officers. During the course of the ride-alongs, no citizens were interviewed and no information pertaining to any citizen was recorded. Hand written notes were taken during ride-alongs and

then typed in an electronic format and any direct identifiers were removed and replaced with codes and the hand written notes were destroyed. All electronic files were maintained in a secure, password protected environment. Moreover, police officers who permitted research staff to ride-along with them received the benefits of an informed consent process. For interviews and ride-alongs, officers were free to terminate the research process at any point or refuse to answer any questions they did not feel comfortable answering.

Observations of CPD meetings posed minimal risk to participants. These meetings were part of routine professional requirements of Chicago Police Department employees and, thus were part of the daily professional lives of participants. Names or other identifying information were not included in any field notes or meeting reflection notes, which were destroyed after electronic files were created. Furthermore, all electronic files were maintained in a secure, password protected folder on the computer of the PI and one Co-Investigator, who oversaw all field work.

#### **F. Trustworthiness**

Certainly there were distortions in the sampling as laid out in the data collection section above which impact case study validity. We selected specific situations for the observations, the time period(s) of data collection was limited, and the people sampled for both interviews and observations were limited and skewed. In order to ameliorate or at least balance these distortions, I conducted analysis with these precautions. I looked for rival explanations and negative cases or “exceptions to the rules” as this technique can strengthen case study validity.

Additionally, using multiple forms of triangulation also enhanced the validity of this study. Different fieldworkers and interviewers helped avoid the bias of one person collecting data. Multiple methods and data sources including all those detailed above helped the study validity. And finally using different perspectives (and theories) to interpret and understand data augmented the case study validity.

### **G. Potential Research Bias**

*“It is the ongoing challenge of qualitative analysis that we maintain perspective as we move back and forth between the real world of the program and our abstractions of that program, between descriptions of what occurred and our analysis of those descriptions, between the complexity of reality and our simplifications of that complexity, between the circularities and interdependencies of human activity and our desire for linear, ordered statements of cause and effect.” (Patton, 1987: 158-159)*

Project researchers tried to minimize biases at each stage of the research process. While designing the data collection protocols, researchers received input from police scholars and practitioners. Potential data collection biases were discussed at weekly meetings during the data collection periods. In order to both minimize and acknowledge biases during data collection, the field research team reflected on findings and discussed potential or perceived prejudices during data collection and collectively addressed biases in the field notes and strived to minimize them in the field. Acknowledging my own biases during analysis was iterative and ongoing. Discussion of potential biases and self-reflection during data collection and analysis is crucial and while these biases cannot be completely eliminated, they should to be recognized, discussed, and minimized when possible.

When people are observed or interviewed, they may try to impress the observer or interviewer. This social desirability tendency is a bias encountered in all types of data collection. People tell you (or show you) what they think you want to hear (or see). In order to minimize this, field researchers explained the purpose of the research was to understand a typical shift or day in the life of an officer and encouraged participants to talk about their day-to-day activities and to carry out their activities as they usually would. Researchers found that despite these entreaties go about “business as usual,” some officers may have engaged in activities for our benefit. For example, they may have stopped more people than they typically would have or behaved more (or less) assertively during their shift. There is no way to know whether or not officers changed their behavior during observations but it was important to consider that possibility when exploring the data.

Most of the officers that I encountered over the course of data collection were relatively open, reflective, and generous with their time. We should consider that some officers’ openness may have been due to a selection bias. Commanding officers may have directed us to interview the officers they considered to have good work ethic and morale. The commanding officers on duty during ride-along observations may have chosen officers that would be receptive to or least not hostile to researchers accompanying them on their shift. I consider this a potential bias.

During the ride-alongs and interviews, officers of all ages, genders, and race and ethnicities answered my questions and talked with apparent transparency/openness about the strategies they employed, the communities they patrolled, issues of race and ethnicity, policing, and

violence. Ride-alongs in particular seemed to engender candor; the longer the observation continued (some lasted 6 or more hours), the franker and more open officers became. As a field researcher on many of the longer ride-alongs, I found that some officers seemed compelled to recount powerful stories or experiences that were not part of the data collection protocol. It appeared that these officers wanted to let someone outside of the police ranks know how difficult, frustrating, and emotional their jobs could be. These officers talked about aspects of their work that they found particularly hard, even sad, during longer ride-alongs.

Another experience that seemed to ironically demonstrate candor, was that some officers used derogatory language, expletives and epithets for various racial and ethnic groups, when we observed and interviewed them. In our field research discussions, we concluded that officers may change their language when confronted with Black or Latino researchers. Just as researchers' own assumptions and biases could impact interpretations and validity of the study results, we found that researchers' characteristics affected some of the participants' actions and candor.

While data was collected for the NIJ project, field researchers met biweekly to reflect on interviews, observations, and ride-alongs, and to discuss the aspects of the policing strategies that needed further elaboration. And while, I cannot specifically attest to the validity and reliability of the data collected by the other field researchers and used in this case study, I can say the research team met frequently to discuss possible biases along with other data collection

issues throughout the whole data collection process and reflected on these potential threats in our field notes.

### **1. Researcher Effects**

“Does your husband know what you are doing?” An officer asked me this at the start of one of my first ride-alongs. He expressed concern that I was unduly exposing myself to the risks that he felt that he and his partner faced. He expressed that he did not think that my family would approve of these risks. Generally, the sentiment expressed by this officer summed up how many officers responded to me. They were surprised that I would expose myself to the risks they felt they faced during ride-alongs but they were generally willing to shepherd and educate me in the process. Being a 30-something White woman appeared to disarm and be nonthreatening to many officers and I seemed to gain confidences fairly quickly during both interviews and ride-alongs. Officers tended to treat me in patriarchal, instructive, and courteous ways. My age, gender, and race, perhaps even my marital status, appeared to disarm officers and they seemed to perceive me as nonthreatening which may have translated into more candor. During my biweekly debrief with the other field researchers, we discovered that I had a comparatively easy time gaining access to officers in order to conduct ride-alongs and interviews. Officers’ apparent rapport with me may have also been because I had previous experience interviewing and working with police and thus I was more comfortable with the situation and which may have made participants more comfortable.

Field researchers with whom I worked, particularly the males, ran into more resistance during interviews and ride-alongs. They felt that they were treated “roughly” and that officers tended to be more graphic in descriptions of police work as if trying to scare or shock them. One White male researcher in his early 20s said he tended to be treated either suspiciously (“Are you internal affairs?”) or collegially (“So, you trying to get into the [police] academy, let me tell you how?”). Male researchers tended to experience extremes - officers either remained fairly closed for the course of the interview or ride-along or officers regaled them with the gory details of their jobs. Male researchers were not treated hostilely per se but rather with guarded skepticism during many of their ride-alongs. The other female field researcher aside from me, a young Latina researcher in her 20s, reported that officers generally appeared to be trying to impress and/or protect her during ride-alongs. Our fieldwork debriefs indicated that officers tended to be more suspicious and guarded with the male researchers and more patronizing and protective of the female researchers. Consistent with literature on researcher effects, officers acted and revealed different information, regardless of the consistent protocol, depending on characteristics of the researcher asking the questions. Given the research projects from which the data was gleaned were not ethnographies, there was no way for researchers to establish long term rapport with participants. Researchers tried to balance objectivity with empathy to engender some degree of trust in the relatively short time frames we had with participants. Acknowledging that researcher biases and participants’ candor can be dependent on the “type of researcher” remains an artifact of the data. Our biases were acknowledged and minimized as much as possible by sticking to our protocols and ensuring confidentiality but cannot be erased.

Another notable observation during the field work was researchers observed broader community impacts when riding around with police officers. As noted above our presence in the squad car influenced the police officers and in some cases, our presence also affected the behavior of the citizenry with whom the officers interacted. Oftentimes when we researchers got out of the car, either during a stop or a call for service or just to interact with citizenry, community members would ask about who we were. The following illustrates an example of a “community effect”. The officers with whom I was riding stopped a group of people outside a liquor store, they had one man stand with his hands on the hood of the car while they searched him and dumped out the alcohol he had concealed in a small, brown paper bag. I stayed in the car per the officers’ request. As the man was waiting, he peered in the car and saw me and he got agitated and was animatedly talking to the officers. After minutes of interacting with the officers, the man seemed calmer, the officers let him go, and they got in the car. They told me that man was upset because he thought I was a crime victim driving around with the police trying to “finger” my attacker; he assumed I had pointed him out as my assailant. In other instances, people thought researchers were supervisory staff observing the officers’ behavior and/or providing back up.

## **2. Self-reflexivity**

I grew up in a middle class household in a small, relatively homogenous (predominately White and Christian), Canadian city on the West Coast. During my adolescent years, I had minimal contact with the police and any contact I did have was generally positive. Since moving to the Chicagoland area over 20 years ago, I have worked and collected data with and about law

enforcement as part of various projects. The police officers I have encountered during my work were generally professional and courteous and they seemed to see their work as necessary but many were skeptical of the broader impact that policing could have on societal problems. Often officers expressed that their efforts only minimally addressed byproducts of the bigger issues such as poverty, joblessness, homelessness, gangs, drug-selling, and addiction. I have worked in communities of color with high rates of poverty and high levels of police presence and collaborated with men and women for whom law enforcement encounters were a weekly or even daily occurrence and often these encounters were not positive experiences but rather perceived as harassing and in some cases violent treatment by police. I have also worked with people who expressed hostile views towards police officers and law enforcement – whether those views were shaped by actual experiences with the police or their general impressions of the police as shaped by their environment, I do not know but I recognize that I am steeped in my previous experiences and that these experiences may influence how I interpret and understand data.

Researchers' biases are an inevitable part of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. No matter how objective researchers try to remain, their experiences influence data collection and interpretation. Rather than putting an emphasis on minimizing inherent biases, qualitative methodology stresses recognizing the researchers' possible influence at each stage of the research project from design to interpretation (Miller and Glassner, 2011). I strived to minimize potential biases by using carefully designed interviews and observations and employing restraint and measure in data analysis. However even with careful self-reflection at each stage

of the research process, I cannot completely remove personal and professional influences that I bring to my work but with acknowledging this subjectivity, I can recognize and minimize biases I may have.

Acknowledging that I have a mixture of negative and positive perspectives on police and policing, I consciously approached review and analysis of the data with fresh eyes trying to mute or at least turn down my perspectives on law enforcement. Similar to the approach we took when collecting data in the field, open-mindedness was achieved by carefully listening, observing, and clarifying without leading participants; this was an evolving and iterative process during all the data collection while recognizing we come to the collection and analysis with pre-conceived ideas of police and policing.

#### **H. Limitations**

Some view case study design skeptically, calling it undisciplined and informal research design with ambiguous methodological designations that cover a multitude of "inferential felonies," with too much attention focused on a single example (Achen & Schidal, 1989). Certainly cautions about generalizing from case studies are valid, particularly if the goal of the research is to establish causal claims that are generalizable. However, when the purpose of the research is to explore organizational change mechanisms, the flexibility of a case study is its strength and provides an adaptive framework to explore such nebulous topics. When case studies are used carefully, they can facilitate and focus any future cross-case methodologies being used to study organizational change. Indeed, there are some methodologists who feel dependence on single

case studies does not limit generalizability but rather provides useful insight on organizational behavior that otherwise might be obscured (Yin, 1993).

An organization as large and complex as the Chicago Police Department with so many people cannot be tidily summed up with any type of research. There are several limitations specific to this case study that should be noted. First, this study only covered a brief time in the life of this organization and so the observations and discussion should be considered with the timeframe of study in mind. The second limitation, typical to all case study research designs, is that of weak empirical leverage - too many variables and too few cases – limiting our ability to generalize to other departments or organizations. Often generalizability is cited as the main criticism of case study. However, it is a misnomer to say a case study has a small sample size as this implies that a case study represents a single respondent. The purpose of case studies, including this one, is not to make causal inferences but rather to make theoretical and practical observations and further understandings of police organizations and change attempts (Yin, 1984).

A third limitation to note is that the researchers only selected high crime and high activity districts and areas; observations and discussion about the organizational innovations were predicated on perceptions of officers working in those places only. And although I recognize this as limitation, this study was not sampling research but rather the case selection was done to maximize what could be learned in a limited timeframe (Yin, 1994).

The final limitation leveraged against case study methodology is that the observations and conclusions are subjective. Although important to recognize researcher subjectivity, I tried to incorporate rigor into my analysis by using “controls” – referencing extreme, deviant or even normal cases that are counter to the observations and serve as a comparison to the patterns observed. Also, multiple researchers were involved in collecting the data. Overall the case study limitations are mitigated when considering the rich, nuanced information and perspectives that were captured and the insight that these data provided regarding police officers and their incorporation and adaptations to attempted organizational change. Certainly the observations and discussions surrounding this dissertation can help this specific department when attempting future organizational change. Furthermore, the findings may also suggest important cautions and considerations for other police departments attempting change focused on collaboration and accountability.

## V. Findings

This dissertation explores how police officers perceived a top-down effort to "reengineer" an organization and to innovate, and what was learned from the effort. The proceeding sections focus on the organizational actors' perspectives. The various perspectives are important because CPD was described by administrators as having a culture of "silos" and proprietary inclinations that impeded the organization's ability to address violent crime. The purpose of the DOC initiative, besides the overriding crime control mandate, was to transform the organization from one that was secretive and proprietary about data and information to one in which the actors value collaboration and information sharing across CPD. The expectation was that centralizing data collection and analysis would give CPD a more holistic understanding of area conflicts and produce "actionable intelligence" for field officers. This would, in turn, result in more precise and efficacious policing. Officers would be directed on where to go, who to target, and why, and this would produce less violent crime. These changes had philosophical, administrative, and strategic implications for the entire organization.

The primary unit of analysis was the organization itself. However, embedded subcases – including groups of police officers that occupy different positions within the hierarchy – are explained in the methods above. It is these groups of officers that embody the action of innovation. In this analysis, the actors' words define the rationale for change and the central

elements of the innovation. The following sections set forth the attempted innovation as envisioned, as implemented, and where there was resistance.

### **A. The Innovation**

As laid out in the research methods, several overarching questions guided this analysis including:

- Why did one large police agency attempt to innovate?
- How was innovation envisioned by the administrators?
- How did middle managers and front line officers perceive this innovation?
- How does this case add to what we know about organizational change?

In the first part of these findings, I answer the first two questions above. I also set forth: the rationale for change using the administrators' words and observations; the central elements of the innovation as characterized by administrators; and the theory of action used to explain why they expected change to occur. In the second part of the findings, using front line officers' and middle managers' words, I describe the translation from policy to practice, focusing on the ways in which change efforts were understood by officers and how communication, accountability, and discretion were affected.

#### **1. Problems**

*Cline's stated mission is fighting violent crime – especially homicide – by zeroing in on gangs, guns and drugs. Nobody knows precisely what share of Chicago's stratospheric murder rate emerges from that deadly nexus: maybe half, maybe two-thirds. (Chicago Tribune, Nov. 23, 2003)*

### a. Public Violence

Why did this police organization decide to innovate? In a 2004 community forum meeting, then Superintendent Cline said, "[g]angbangers use drug proceeds to buy guns, to get legal help, to bail one another out of jail, and to finance more dope dealing." He expanded on his theory of crime in Chicago and how inextricably linked gangs, guns, and drugs are in fueling violent crime. Chicago police department strategies then were designed to attack all three. He reported that most Chicago homicides are led by "Black on Black" incidents, followed by "Hispanic on Hispanic," claiming, like many officers did, that the former are fighting over drug markets and the latter over turf (P114).<sup>18</sup> This claimed markets/turf distinction between Black and Hispanic gangs was one of the most consistently quoted across all the data collected for this dissertation.<sup>19</sup> Like Cline, the police administrators interviewed and observed continually alluded to the lethal nexus of "gangs, guns, and drugs" as responsible for violent crime in the city. Drug dealing and gang conflicts seem to be so intertwined to administrators that they were referred to simultaneously when discussing strategy. One commander (P98) claimed that over

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<sup>18</sup> The source of the quotation or observation is included in brackets at the end of the reference and refers to the primary document from which the data was retrieved (e.g. P10). Additionally, when presenting field notes, I use a combination of quotes and paraphrased statements from the field notes. Quotation marks are used with all direct quotes to distinguish them from paraphrased citations or observational data.

<sup>19</sup> Both field and middle manager officers offered this same distinction between Black and Hispanic gangs. Police officers characterized them in essentially the same way – Hispanic gangs are about "pride and colors" and Black gangs are "all about business" and drug sales. This raise two concerns: 1) are these are tropes and generalizations perpetuated and have no solid data evidence and 2) if these distinctions are accurate, then strategies to address each gang should probably be different depending on their motivations and primary ways of offending.

50 percent of the homicides were gang and narcotics related and that if the CPD could get that under control then that alone would take care of a lot of the problem.<sup>20</sup>

**b. “Same story, all dope-based (P64).”**

The money that drug dealing generated was cited as the reason for much of the violence. One commanding officer stated that, “[i]n most cases, yes [gangs and drugs are synonymous]. Drug dealers are looking for more turf in which to sell. It’s a matter of money (P98).” Another administrator explained that “they [gang leaders] are running three lines out of the project 24 hours a day (P64).” This administrator went on to discuss how financial considerations can even result in cross-gang collaborations, stating, “[a] lot of time we talk about gang conflict but it is not the same as it used to be [gang versus gang] (P64).” He explained that he once pulled over some “GDs and Vice Lords [two gangs with a history of violent interactions] in the same car.” “We got an understanding (P64)” they explained. Another analyst elaborated on this point by sharing how gang members switch gang affiliations or allegiances based on who they deal with when their turf changes due to something like public housing coming down: “They pitch with who they pitch (P69).”

**c. “Beefs”**

Although much violence was viewed as having been fueled by money from drug sales, violence is also rooted in gang conflicts – or “beefs” – which arise over personal affronts involving

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<sup>20</sup> It is important to note that although people involved in gangs and gang activity can contribute to violence, a reductionist view of gang membership and gang violence does not help with solutions. Research shows that there is no definitive definition regarding gang membership (Decker, Katz and Webb, 2008) and the way in which gangs, guns, and drugs contribute to violence is complicated (Blumstein, 1995; Howell, 1999; Rosenfeld, Bray and Eagly, 1999)

girlfriends or instances of perceived disrespect, for example (Wilkenson, 2008). According to one administrator, all a rival gang member has to do in certain district is “walk down the street” and they will be killed (P113). It might take very little to spark shootings involving gang members. In one example, 10 homicides purportedly resulted (over some unspecified time-span) from one gang member insulting another’s mother (P113).

Analysts often made deployment recommendations based on such anticipated conflict. Analysts said that hot spots were determined to be places where trouble was “brewing” due to such perceived personal affronts or any other number of factors. They labeled these types of situations as having a “high retaliation level (P59).” During one deployment meeting the analyst noted that the “big story is the funeral of a gang member.” The analysts discussed the funeral and bases for anticipated violence – namely, that the victim’s brothers and uncle pledged to avenge their relative and that the funeral may be targeted (P67).

#### **d. “Bad Actors”**

In many of the observed meetings, administrators talked about how “taking down” specific individuals would have a “major impact” on the activity in the area (P58). These high profile individuals were deemed responsible for much turmoil and violence, including – and especially – if their absence (either in death or incarceration) caused a leadership void. In reference to a sting and the subsequent arrests and incarceration of many high ranking gang members, one analyst said that now “they [gang members] got to be scurrying to get some leadership (P98).”

Following incarceration, gang member reentry was also seen as an anticipated cause of violence. During one meeting, an administrator discussed how a high-ranking gang member would be released from prison soon and that “problems” [violence] were anticipated: “[t]hat’s what we want to prevent (P68).” Thus, such leadership disruptions or voids were significant factors to be considered when analysts selected hot spots (P62). But they also create a dilemma: Police actions that take out or disrupt gang leadership or drug dealing can also contribute to leadership voids and resulting conflicts, thus exacerbating problems.

**e. Public Housing**

Prior to and during this period, Chicago was in the midst of eliminating high-rise public housing. In many cases, public housing residents were relocated to other areas of the city that were already plagued by rival gangs and/or drug markets. These population shifts also precipitated changes in schooling, forcing some students to walk through competing gang turf to attend school. Many of the central administrators alluded to public housing changes and gentrification as contributing to changing gang structures, creating churning among gang leadership, and in turn increasing the violence. Their rationale was that public housing changes destabilize drug markets, and that gangs subsequently struggle for dominance within the markets’ changing landscapes. Thus, during DOC meetings, analysts also considered public housing relocations and

anticipated problems that could arise when opposing gangs and their families move into previously occupied areas.<sup>21</sup>

#### **f. Organization**

CPD's innovation attempt was also driven in part by accountability. Superintendent Cline and other command staff reported that prior to the DOC, Deputy Chiefs did not feel enough responsibility for outcomes. Deputy Chiefs reportedly had little power to leverage resources for their police areas and too little understanding of the areas under their purview to even assign resources properly (P102). Deputy Chiefs were housed at headquarters and were considered "paper tigers" (P107). Additionally, central command felt that middle managers (commanders, watch commanders, lieutenants, and sergeants) needed to feel more responsibility for the places and people under their purview. According to their theory of management, if middle managers felt more responsible for their geography and their officers, they would be more effective in producing positive results. One central administrator highlighted this perceived disconnect by saying that she believed some commanders did not even know the names of streets in their district (P107).

An additional organizational hurdle identified by central administrators was CPD's reliance on the crime index of offenses to measure performance. This accountability mechanism was only

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<sup>21</sup> Many central administrators talked about how public housing changes were also pushing crime problems into the suburbs and changing how the suburban and metro police departments had to interact and collaborate.

defined by keeping the numbers below what they were in the prior year. The department's focus was summarized as, "what are you going to do about that number to keep it down rather than problem solving (P75)."

## **2. Solutions**

The solutions offered to address violent crime were initially laid out in the Violence Reduction Strategy Initiatives. Other facets of these initiatives included community components and collaboration with external agencies; however, the initiatives relevant to this dissertation were the DOC, the hot spots policing, and the accountability emphasis. Using the central administrators' words and perceptions and researcher observations, I explore each of these initiatives and their main components and then describe the anticipated outcomes.

In order to facilitate these initiatives, the Superintendent made several overarching organizational changes. First, the Deputy Chiefs were moved to their areas of responsibility and given staff in an effort to make them more than paper tigers. Second, the Superintendent created a position called "gang lieutenants." These middle level supervisors were allowed to jump the chain of command, giving them freedom to put their resources and people where they perceived problems, rather than having to get permission. Finally, the Tactical Response Units (TRUs) were created. These were large (80 officers per team) units that would be deployed to any area across the city that was perceived to need extra police resources. The idea behind these organizational changes was to provide the mobility and flexibility to move

more officers to hot spots when needed, rather than having them tied to district or beat boundaries.

In addition to a unified mission (gangs, guns, and drugs), the department's attempts were also influenced by advances in IT capabilities, emphasis on data sharing, targeted enforcement and saturation, and accountability. It attempted to effect the desired change in three broad and overlapping dimensions: the philosophical, administrative, and strategic. Ultimately, the innovation hinged on the centrality of collaboration, communication, and accountability and the perceived impact that these organizational mechanisms could have on violent crime. The central administrators pushed an agenda which included centrally vetted knowledge and evaluated progress in ways that constrained or guided (depending on your perspective) the discretion of front-line police officers in ways not done before. Officers were expected to pursue certain crimes and people in specific geographies, to collect and act on specific data, and to collaborate with each other in ways they previously had not.

**a. Unified Mission**

*"It is about all of us working together to reduce the violence caused by guns, gangs and drugs." (P104)*

The Superintendent wanted to unify the department under a singular mission and ensure that all officers felt ownership over the mission and felt more responsibility to enact it through their work. He believed that for the Chicago Police department to have an impact on violence, every officer in the department would have to coalesce around this unified mission. Public violence, particularly gang-related violence, then became the expressed focus of the department. With

an emphasis on collaboration, hot spots policing, and accountability strategies, the organization could drive down public violence by “Getting everybody inside [the department] to talk to each other (P71).” This attempt to focus the organizational culture on one goal was one of the Superintendent’s first responses to high homicide numbers.

#### **b. Information, Collaboration & Intelligence**

Then Superintendent Cline expressly wanted to “get everybody on the same page” and eliminate barriers to data sharing and access. “Information silos” and special units with their own subculture were referenced as the main barriers. Cline wanted to change how information was collected, vetted, shared, and used. He wanted to tighten perceived disconnects between the administrators and the front line officers, and between and within units. The Superintendent said that officers would have to substantially change “how they did business” and that he wanted to “get people into the same room” as part of the change. Police officers and units that previously operated in an insular fashion were expected to collaborate with each other and share information. Cline emphasized that collaboration and data sharing would become the way of the department. He wanted to change the organizational information culture in order to tighten and centralize both information management and deployment.

##### **1) Sharing information and Collaboration**

*“Everything is based on communication.” (P99)*

Central command talked about its desire to change a departmental culture that emphasized individual credit, and instead have officers share information more freely. The idea was that if

officers collaborated and shared intelligence, they could address crime more quickly and effectively.

One officer's reasoning as to why the emphasis on collaboration would reduce violence was as follows. In the past, crime analysts would have to wait for the Detective Division to label a case. From a detective's standpoint, this makes sense, as it helps ensure prosecution. But "from an analytical perspective this is disastrous (P98)," because officers need "real time" information in order to understand the community context and the potential for further acts of violence. With the changed emphasis on sharing and collaboration, crime analysts and officers would have up-to-date information about crime and patterns, and could therefore do better work.

Officers' previous inclinations were to hoard data in order to "make the collar." Under that paradigm, when an officer clocked out for the day, any leads that officer may have had about particular crimes or disturbances "left with him until he came back the next day for his shift" (P71). The Superintendent wanted to stop this practice. He even offered his own example – of multiple police officers responding to repeated calls for service at a known problem address on Saturday nights without sharing information – to highlight the inefficiencies encountered when failing to collaborate. Cline and Central command ultimately wanted to incentivize collaboration among officers in order to address problems collectively. This required a philosophical shift in police organizational culture.

## **2) *Intelligence gathering***

Another facet of collaboration was a renewed emphasis on intelligence gathering. Central administrators thought that in order to build robust crime fighting capabilities, their department needed a clearinghouse of intelligence. “We [central administrators] weren’t using our guys on the street for intel purposes (P71).” Contact cards and gang cards were the main intelligence gathering tool; officers collected information on people they stopped and the information was entered into a data base. Administrators reported several perceived advantages to this type of data collection. First, they saw this type of information-gathering as a way to show police presence and action. It was a “way to show people that you’re there. You get people on your side. It makes you stronger (P2).” Second, administrators reported that this type of “useful intelligence” helped officers understand the conflicts at issue and the people involved in them. “We know where the ‘Achilles tendons’ are (P2).” And the contact card database even helped solve crime – “[i]t’s a solver (P71)”. Analysts confirmed that they used gang cards to establish the history of conflicts as well as gang member affiliations. The latter was deemed useful because “[g]angs’ greatest asset is their anonymity (P69: DOC Roundtable).” Finally, some administrators saw the intelligence gathering as a deterrent and several offered an example: if an officer took someone’s information and they were about to commit a crime, they would be less likely to commit that crime knowing that the officers had all of their pertinent information (P71).

### **3) Outcomes**

When asked, central administrators reported several organizational outcomes as a result of the information sharing and collaboration. First, they perceived that organizational processes had changed and that everybody in the department now knew what was going on, whereas they “used to not know why things happened (P91).” They perceived improved communication as a result of meetings being focused on information sharing and because of the push from administrators to change the priority of data collection at all levels of the department. One administrator summed up the perception among administrators, saying “everyone feels free to call whoever they need” to support their missions. Previously, district commanders would not even think about “going out of the bureau” to get help. Now everyone “feels more cohesive (P107).” Another administrator reiterated the improving collaboration: “We are rock solid. We need to see the units connecting. We are touching and clicking but we need to be like this [fingers enmeshed] (P102).”

Administrators also reported thinking that this organizational adjustment would make officers feel more responsible for outcomes. One administrator said that officers would not be “graded on numbers and detectives aren’t graded by pinches [arrests] anymore; they are graded by clearances (P73).” Additionally, administrators perceived an improved crime control outcome and said that officers were solving more crimes due to better and more intelligence. During an interview with some commanding officers, they offered as evidence a “success story” of a detective who was able to solve a crime utilizing the contact card database (P71). This was an

illustration of the way in which commanding officers emphasized the potential usefulness of the database.

Under the organizational push to share information, credit for success (i.e. an arrest) was reportedly spread across groups of officers or the district that produced the arrest. Information sharing was emphasized and reinforced in the weekly meetings (i.e. *“Did you collaborate with relevant officers to address the specific problem? No? Why not?”*). The Superintendent publically rewarded officers in meetings when collaboration led to successful outcomes, usually arrests, to emphasize and reward collaboration. Weekly DOC meetings began with an awards assembly whereby the highest ranking officer, usually the Superintendent, would recognize a group of officers that collaborated to some successful end. Often the officers’ families were present and they would all be called up to have their picture taken with the Superintendent (P129).

### **c. DOC as a Knowledge Management Mechanism**

Data sharing and intelligence analysis was an expansive and daunting task. The DOC was created as a centralized crime analysis unit for “the expansion and exchange of information (P1).” It allowed the department to be “more proactive and predictive (P99).” Central administrators characterized the DOC as tightening the perceived disconnect in communication and coordination across all actors in the organization. “Cline took the good data that’s available and appointed a good analyst (P112).” The DOC inventoried and pushed out intelligence and

facilitated weekly meetings in which the hot spots were identified and officers' performance was evaluated.

### **1) DOC Analysts**

DOC analysts were responsible to gather, interpret, and prioritize information and intelligence gleaned from databases, from other officers, and from their own experiences. Each week DOC analysts culled and prioritized data using real-time and archival information culled from police databases and street officer intelligence and made decisions about deployment. They presented all the relevant rationale and data in a "DOC packet." The packets included geographic parameters of the hot spots and the rationale undergirding each designation. The packets also included summaries of the history and nature of gang conflicts and the key people suspected of contributing to the violence in each area.

DOC analysts were sworn officers who had been on a gang or tactical teams prior to the DOC. They had knowledge and connections that allowed them to develop an informed picture of conflict and designate hot spots. Analysts based their deployment recommendations on the following: "high propensity for violence in a geographic area" (P98) shootings "centered around gang conflict"; and any anticipated retaliation connected to previous conflicts (P91). With respect to analysts' thought processes regarding deployments, one analyst explained that she considered a troubled building, with over 100 calls for service, to be a place where a shooting was likely to happen. She thus highlighted the building in the DOC packet for that location. Other analysts reported talking to detectives about their cases and leveraging their knowledge

of particular shootings to inform analyst deployment recommendations (P91). Analysts reported finding the district gang (and tactical) teams to be the most helpful, with one analyst explaining “[gang and tact officers are] covering a whole district, [and we] get a lot of second hand info from them (P91).” Another analyst stated that “some intel is instrumental in how and why we decide on a hot spot. Some information is weak and doesn’t pan out - need to verify (P75).”

The interviewed DOC analysts reported that they often drove around the districts to try talking to people face-to-face. This was because officers seemed more willing to talk in person than by phone. Analysts reported that when they accessed information from officers on the street they could get more accurate, real time information. But they also felt that the information could be controversial or biased or incorrect. “We have no way of knowing for sure if we have the right info (P91).” The formal intelligence avenues, including databases, could be quick, verifiable, and expansive. The weaknesses were that they had access only to the information documented and entered, and information may have been entered incorrectly. But the biggest weakness, and the reason that most analysts favored street intelligence over databases, was that officers do not collect written information or contact cards from people every time they stop or talk to someone. Thus, all of the information gathered during such “dark stops” resided only in the officers’ heads. To truly understand the area, one needed to talk to the officers in the field.

## **2) Information Technology**

Central administrators stressed the importance of information technology for facilitating information sharing, collaboration, and intelligence gathering. Most administrators reported that technology allowed the department to be more proactive rather than reactive. Specifically, the CLEAR (Citizen Law Enforcement and Analysis Reporting) system housed much of the formal data collected by officers and was cited as an important way in which officers could get immediate data. And even though case classification was imperfect, analysts reported that they could make “best guesses [as to] what patterns or trends are we seeing (P98).” CLEAR allowed officers to check criminal histories. Although, several analysts interviewed used their personal knowledge and field officers’ knowledge of conflict before turning to CLEAR to verify problems and to identify the hot spots. Analysts reported that they thought police databases were not as timely for immediate information.

## **3) Outcomes**

One top administrator characterized the most important strategy as, “information at the DOC that is gleaned from the officers, offenders and community organizations.” He said, “[the] DOC just isn’t about putting officers in locations after something has happened but it is preventative.” He stressed the importance of dispatching officers to areas where there could be possible retaliations based on all sources of information (P104). When interviewed, another central administrator said, “I want to credit DOC with [a] major part of our successes.” He said that everybody in the Department was talking about homicides and he was excited that people in the department, from the beat officer to the top brass, were aware of the violent crime

numbers. “It is refreshing that the beat cop knows the homicide decrease (P111).” Another administrator reported that the DOC was an effective crime fighting tool because it combined incident data and street intelligence to determine where to deploy manpower (P112). The DOC was perceived to be effective because, according to administrators, for the first time the officers in the department were given actionable intelligence and knew when, where, and who in addition to knowing what happened. “It [DOC information] is timely and geographically tells a great story (P105).” And this information was shared across the department in ways which had never been done before. As one administrator explained, “everyone was on the same page” and “it drives deployment.”

In responding to how analysts evaluated their work, one analyst thought for a few seconds and responded, “[t]hat’s a hard one. If shootings are down in your area, then you have done your job.” This analyst reflected on an example of how DOC deployment decisions could not always be exact. “On Cinco de Mayo we had a shooting outside of the deployment zone, maybe if I’d put it [DOC hot spot] further east it would never have happened. I usually expect to see at least one shooting in the area (P73).” There was another analyst who characterized it as, “We can never lose.” If nothing happens, the deployment worked in that spot, and if “five shootings happen, then we can say, “see I told you (P91).”

#### **d. Policing Smarter**

When asked to describe Chicago’s policing strategy, administrators use “intelligence-led” and “hot spots” policing to define it. Some administrators called their efforts “predictive policing.”

Simply put, if specific geographic boundaries or people were identified by the DOC as being currently or potentially violent, then resources and police efforts were to be directed to those areas. “Send resources to the places where they are needed” (P91) and make “... the best use of the department’s resources (P99).” Strategically, Chicago’s hot spots policing was consistent with what was practiced in police departments across the country in so much as they emphasized focused attention on specific geographies. However, the specifics of the policing in those geographies varied. In Chicago, hot spots received increased police attention from all types of officers. Acceptable activities in hot spot areas ranged widely but included enhanced citizen contacts (i.e., stopping and talking to people in the hot spot), increased visibility (i.e., driving in a group of two or more police cars around the hot spot area), enhanced moving and parking violations and tickets for misdemeanor crimes, and arrests. The section below details the strategic elements of Chicago’s efforts to tighten and centralize deployment and in turn, officer discretion.

### **1) “Hot Spots” & “Key Players”**

*“I want the gang members to fear us and good guys to be glad to see us. At the same time, we want ‘high visibility.’ Number 1 thing is to reduce crime and increase arrest (P2).”*

As administrators described, “[the] biggest change [under the Superintendent’s tenure] is the move away from random patrol (P71). Another described the change with, “shooting at a target now rather than shooting at the wall (P2).” The DOC recommended the hot spots and then officers saturated these spots and thus these places received a “high concentration” of police presence and activity. The saturation strategies can be globally described as (1) high visibility

policing, (2) enhanced patrol or “Over patrol (P5),” and (3) Targeted enforcement/surveillance. High visibility was broadly defined as more officers in the hot spot. The calculus for administrators was simple, the more officers, the more deterrence and incapacitation possibilities. One administrator summed up this perception with, “If we had no other resources, I think the best thing would be overwhelming presence (P96).” Officers were expected to engage in high visibility activities including outdoor role call while in the hot spots. Under the enhanced patrol imperative officers were expected to engage in more street stops than usual, they were to collect contact cards, enforcement any gang loitering ordinances, and liberally ticket ‘movers and parkers.’ As one administrator said, officers were to, “disrupt it [drug trade] as much as we can do to make it hard to deal (P111).” The hot spot designation was also described by several administrators as enhancing probable cause, “to get gang bangers rather than church going folks (P10).” “Targeted enforcement” involved specifically targeting those who either had committed violent acts in the past or who were perceived to potentially be assailants in the future. As we observed the DOC over time, more emphasis was put on targeting specific individuals who were deemed hot. This individual emphasis remained a secondary emphasis of the DOC innovation during this study.

**e. Deterrence & Incapacitation**

*“High visibility deters crime.” (P1)*

*“Getting the bad guy off the street” (P71)*

Although administrators, like the two above, did not explicitly talk about crime prevention theories, incapacitation and deterrence were implied foci of these saturation strategies.

Administrators discussed what happened when police suppressed or “overwhelm[ed]” a hot spot: (1) no money comes in to buy drugs and (2) there is no one to whom to sell drugs. “So once we [police] shut down an area, they lose money.” They suggested that eventually, people turned to different crimes, for example you might see robberies increase (P75). Administrators believed that if officers targeted specific individual offenders or potential offenders – the “biggest, baddest asses out there” (P1) – the organization would have a “major impact” on violent crime (P58). The DOC packets often detailed “Persons of Interest” when describing conflicts, and “key players” would be identified. Fugitives were sometimes featured in the DOC packets and were often discussed at the weekly deployment meetings. One analyst encouraged officers to use the DOC packet as leverage to violate someone’s parole. For example, if someone was listed as a featured person, then they would have several eyes on them, catching potential parole violations. “Keep it hot and heavy on him (P63).” The Superintendent even mused that the traffic safety in hot spots probably increased since instituting the DOC because gang-involved people may be driving safer because they did not want to be scrutinized or pulled over.

### **1) *Notable Strategies***

There were many street-level strategies that administrators emphasized as part of the hot spot policing strategy. Most of the strategies were not new to Chicago police; they were just expected to be carried out with more frequency and more vigor in the hot spots. In the observed meetings, the strategies emphasized by administrators changed over time. Sometimes seatbelt missions or outdoor role calls were emphasized as ways to demonstrate

presence and deter crime. Other times, contact cards and traffic violations would be emphasized as important.<sup>22</sup> Administrators tended to differ on their view of strategies' purpose. In one example, administrators insisted that seatbelt missions were conducted to ensure safety. Others saw this strategy as a way to show police presence: "[it is] not all about writing tickets, it is about presence (P104)."

Two strategies that were consistently talked about as effective were "wolf pack" missions and Street Corner Conspiracies (SCC). Wolf pack missions involved three or more police cars driving around a hot spot in a group. In contrast, the SCC required collaboration across units and sometimes other external criminal justice entities in order to conduct a long-term investigation. These often involved visual recordings in order to arrest and prosecute a large group of drug dealers. Many in the department believed this was one of the most effective strategies they had to curb drug activity, and in turn, violent crime. Ironically, SCCs were not usually executed in DOC areas because the heightened police presence that defined the hot spots would deter such activity. An investigation aimed at taking out a drug dealing hierarchy needs robust drug dealing. Originally, the SCCs operated under the Chief of Organized Crime, but they became a tool that individual districts could use as well. One administrator stressed how SCCs had to be comprehensive and that no one division could be in charge because then it would fall short of the goal of eradicating drug dealing, and would have long-term effects (P102).

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<sup>22</sup> Seatbelt missions involved putting up a road block, checking if people were wearing seatbelts, and ticketing those who were not. Officers differed on their understanding of mission purpose and outcome. Some thought they were conducted to show their presence in the community, others thought they were to catch people who were trying to get out of line for the check (i.e. those who did a u-turn and drove away from the check) and still others thought it was to make contact with the citizenry and make sure they were driving safely.

### ***Discretionary Forces***

The main administrative changes included the creation of the Deployment Operation Center (DOC), the bulking up of centralized discretionary forces or special units, increased responsibility of the Deputy Chiefs, and regularly held accountability meetings. Deputy Chiefs were moved out of headquarters to directly oversee the areas and assigned gang teams which had previously been under district purview. This move centralized some manpower and gave central administrators more leverage over resources so they could deploy as needed to various areas the city. The Tactical Response Units (TRUs), which were 80 person teams, were created as part of this initiative and were certainly one of the most visible manifestation of administrative changes.

### ***Special Unit Deployment***

Central administrators deployed Special Units to augment police presence in hot spots. A TRU or SOS (Special Operations Section) unit would “cover the conflict” and saturate areas to try to eliminate conflict or make it move to another area in order to prevent retaliation or to chase down perpetrators (P7). P104 said, both the TRU and SOS served as “directed patrol” and “they are as preventative as possible by their presence (P104).” SOS existed before the DOC’s inception and was already used as a discretionary unit to address places with extra needs. The SOS teams were smaller but were also expected to provide saturation in hot spots. Additionally, they served warrants and engaged in more investigatory activities in hot spots, whereas TRUs were expected to generate activity by ticketing, data collection via contact cards, and arrests. TRUs were newly created with the explicit idea that they “... provide high visibility, [because our

presence] leads to less shithheads on the street (P85).” TRU officers were responsible to “saturate” problem areas, and they did not have to worry about “getting a job [answering a call for service] when they’re filling out a contact card or something. They can stay focused on suppressing crime (P107).” Although administrators said TRU deployments varied depending on the need, TRUs may have stayed in hot spots for up to four weeks. One administrator summed up another TRU purpose, which was to police the perimeter of the DOCs, stating that “TRU stayed just outside the DOC area to make sure they pick up displacements (P101).”

## **2) Outcomes**

Administrators implied that because of the added pressure of the DOC deployment area, people were trying to avoid police attention. One administrator explained that “violence has been reduced due to the DOC being there,” but the higher ups do not want it [DOC deployment area] moved just yet because the main players in the area are lying low (P63). Another stated that “[r]ecognized leaders [gang leaders] are all laying low because they are nervous of being pinched (P64).”

### **f. Accountability**

*“The days of handing you [officers] the car keys are gone (P73).”*

As one administrator explained, “[t]here was no structure in place to ensure accountability; it used to all fall on the Super (P104).” Accountability had existed before, but this new accountability emphasis was introduced as a way to unite officers across the department. Philosophically, officers were seeing their role in the larger departmental mission. All of their actions, from the street-level decisions to the command deployment decisions, were subject to

evaluation. Administratively, the Superintendent expressly made the supervisors responsible for the actions of officers under their purview. Strategically, commanding officers attended meetings where crime and police activity numbers were discussed and various managers were called on to comment on their actions or numbers and any crime spikes or conflicts in their areas.

As discussed in the Methods section, there were two types of meetings in which accountability was addressed. VISE meetings were held on a semi-regular basis every three to five months. These were facilitated by the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability (BCSA) and they focused on one police area and its subsumed districts. VISE meetings were much more detailed and broadly focused on many indicators perceived to be relevant to area and district function, including many administrative variables (e.g. sick and vacation days taken and parking tickets). The weekly DOC meetings were held in order to distribute the weekly intelligence and to serve as an accountability review. These were split into two parts – an accountability portion run by a high ranking administrator, and a deployment recommendations and conflict review portion. The accountability portion of the DOC meetings were focused on violent crime, documented conflicts, key players, why crime was not dropping despite police actions, what was being done to achieve the crime decreases observed, and what specific activities were being conducted to address current violence.

When administrators reflected on how meetings impacted accountability, they talked about how command staff had to now know their areas, districts, and beats. One commander

summed up meeting impact by saying that it “makes everyone aware” and “puts the district commanders front and center. The weekly meetings put the responsibility of responding to violent crime effectively on them. [District commanders] have to go there and say, ‘I did this’ or ‘I did that’ (P107).” Administrators perceived that the information and attention from the weekly DOC meetings combined with the VISE meetings forced district commanders to become experts on their districts. Additionally, administrators asked supervisors about collaboration. “Guys [Command staff during meetings] know that they will be asked about their coordination with other units (P71).” Administrators saw the meetings as effective crime fighting tools because everyone was made aware of the violent conflicts or potentially violent areas. The meetings also served as a forum for feedback, exchange of information, and criticism (P107).<sup>23</sup>

### ***1) Rise of the Middle Manager***

One administrator talked about his role as an area deputy chief, stating “I was there as it was being decentralized, areas were given more power,” and the department was undergoing a “cultural change (P95).” In accountability sessions, the command staff “put the onus” on area and district management because these middle managers (area deputy chiefs, district commanders, watch commanders, lieutenants (gang and otherwise), and even sergeants) were considered key to changing how the department functioned. As one administrator said, the organization “needs good supervisory oversight to counter some of the complacency (P73).”

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<sup>23</sup> This component was nothing new in policing – it was a facsimile of COMPSTAT, started in 1994 by the New York Police Department. But it was new to Chicago’s operations.

This complacency was characterized by administrators as the status quo prior to the innovation; middle managers just moved from crime to crime without a holistic approach to violence or any feelings of responsibility for curbing the violence. The accountability push was also perceived as a problem solving push. One administrator said that “[y]ou are trying to make people think about why they are doing something.” “If you don’t look behind the numbers to see if the numbers are solving the problems then you have a problem (P73).” “The police were not sitting back and saying, “oh there was another homicide,” we began to treat every shooting as a major event (P95).”

Administrators saw the watch commander role as a particularly important role in the department. Watch commanders “run the shifts” (P107) and thus set their communicated expectations which would be responsible for “transforming attitudes of police officers (P95).” One administrator summed up the accountability expectations as follows: “In order to get the right people in the right spot, there needs to be a clear articulation to the sergeants about why they are being asked to do the mission (P73).” Police supervisors were expected to make sure their officers were aware of all information in the DOC packets and use the information while planning activities. For example, if the DOC packet reported that a gang was preparing to retaliate, then officers were expected to put pressure on that particular gang via enforcing gang loitering ordinances or beefing up their patrol of streets or other areas where gang members were known to congregate. All officers in the department were expected to review and use the information relevant to their patrol area. Even if an officer was not working in a designated hot spot, they were still expected to know hot spot boundaries and the reasons for its status.

## 2) What Counts?

*“If you ask for guns, then all the officers will do is chase down guns, ignoring everything else (P96).”*

*“... it is about problem reduction – I’m okay if they don’t produce numbers but the problem goes away.” “It is not about numbers; it is about solving the problem (P73).”*

*“Excellent job with numbers Area 5.” (P126)*

As expressed by the administrators above, there were three prevailing perspectives regarding accountability and the outcomes that matter. And often administrators expressed all three perspectives in one interview or observation. First, administrators were adamant that the policing strategies had to be more than number generators. As one administrator explained, “[t]he strategies we are using are sound but we need to reinvigorate it.... Because it can’t become about the numbers (P91).” An administrator provided an example of how an outdoor roll call was conducted just to get numbers and that this motivation for police activity was an “abomination.” Administrators insisted that implementing a strategy had to have a sound rationale over and above numbers generation. To understand motivations for police activities, middle managers were asked about strategies in meetings: “Why are you doing it and where are you doing it at (P73).”

*“Our success is measured by what doesn’t happen. When an expected retaliatory shooting is prevented, we’ve done our job (P113).”*

Secondly, administrators talked about the importance of problem solving to address and prevent violent crime. In one example, an administrator told of how police officers befriended a gang member and learned that retaliation was being planned. And then they “flooded the area

with officers and prevented a homicide.” This administrator noted that people do not hear about these successes – these *nonevents* – but this was an important aspect of policing (P114). Administrators stressed that they no longer wanted to spend time counting the traditional things like arrests. Instead they acknowledged the absence of things that indicated that “trouble is going away” and “filler arrests” were no longer needed. In meetings, administrators talked about declines in violent crime and calls for service.

*“If shootings are down in your area, then you have done your job (P75).”*

And finally, despite the acknowledgement that counting numbers was secondary outcome to solving problems, administrators still put much emphasis on numbers in determining success and productivity (P107). A declining homicide rate was still an indication that strategies are working. And weapons recovered and impounded cars were evidence that the strategies were being executed (P113). Administrators explained that the main evidence used to determine whether an approach was working was “a reduction in murders and violent crime” and “a drop in the number of calls and an increase in the number of quality arrests (P107).” These numbers were how administrators said they knew officers were doing their job and that things were working (P102).<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> One high ranking administrator related that the number of aggravated batteries was actually the better number to look at, because a murder was really an aggravated battery carried out by a better marksman. And thus a decline in aggravated batteries was indicative of effective police activities (P107).

## **B. Implementation**

This next section explores the translation from administration's policy and expectations to the street-level practice and officers' perceptions using data collected from interviews and observations. If I observed a difference of perception between the two types of the frontline officers, field or special unit officers, I highlighted it. Obviously when observing and interviewing a wide range of people, there was a wide range of perceptions and opinions. Thus, I looked for patterns, and where opinions and perceptions coalesced to form a trend and reached an opinion consensus, I summarized it. I also looked at any differences among officers' perceptions and noted when and where there was disagreement that reached a noticeable threshold. First, I looked at how line officers and middle managers characterized the innovation as they perceived and experienced it. I then explored how these actors perceived and characterized collaboration, accountability, leadership, and management under this change attempt.

### **1. DOC Implementation**

There were many opinions about how and if the DOC had changed organizational function. These ranged from officers who perceived that the DOC fundamentally changed how they policed to officers who reported that their job and responsibilities had not changed at all. A prevailing sentiment from many officers was that the DOC had changed the organization but that nothing had changed for them. All officers, even those who reported that the innovations did not impact their work directly, conceded at there were two things that did change: (1) *where* they policed and (2) the *accountability* emphasis regarding what was expected of them.

There was a prevailing perspective among field officers and middle managers alike that *good* police officers were doing DOC before DOC came to be. They were looking at the intelligence and assigning officers troubled areas before this strategy. One officer stated this succinctly as follows: "Nothing has changed if you did your job before."

Special unit officers were most likely to say that their activities and how they policed were specifically related to and dictated by the DOC. This finding was expected given that the TRU was initiated and closely associated with the DOC, both strategically and symbolically.

Regardless of how officers perceived the DOC impacted their job, the strategy was described as being "proactive," "saturating," and providing "high visibility." The DOC geographically targeted an area determined to have a high propensity for violent activity and filled it with police officers in order to deter and incapacitate potential offenders. Also, the Superintendent was directly referenced when describing organizational changes. For example, one officer explained that "[i]t's excellent. He has reduced all violent crime and all crime. We have never had a superintendent who lets us work the way we do. Before we were 'reactive;' now we are 'proactive.' He has put good leadership in positions. He has done a lot! (P42)." Another officer described the organizational innovations with, "[The] department under Cline is really proactive and moving towards things [strategies] we can really use....taking property away from landlords enabling the drug trade, rather than going and knocking them on their ass (P24)." Another field officer described officers' activity in the DOC this way: "[We] really inundate an area. And we try to clear the area. Less people out there, the less homicides and aggravated batteries (P9)."

And yet another officer characterized the DOC strategy as “aggressive enforcement.” This officer felt that he still had large amounts of “discretionary power,” and that how he policed did not really change that much even with the new geographic emphasis (P43). These officers’ quotes capture just some of the perceptions of field officers regarding the innovation. In the section below, I further elaborate on field officers’ and middle managers’ perceptions regarding the DOC and the policing activities associated with the innovation.

**a. Hot Spots Defined**

A small group of field officers’ reported that they thought the DOC was reasonably good at identifying the typical players, conflicts, and hot spots. Another group of officers perceived the DOC was relatively accurate, but because they were removed from the district, did not understand context, and did not receive up-to-date information, they were not nimble enough to respond adequately to street level changes. A quote from one officer sums up this sentiment: “Information is a good thing and deployment suggestions [from DOC] are good, but they [DOC analysts] don’t actually know the district like the district officers (P25).”

A third group of officers expressed no confidence in the deployment decisions made by the DOC analysts. Below is an example of one officers’ experience with the DOC’s knowledge of the local area:

*I was part of the Robbery Team a little while ago. I don’t know if you heard about it but we had a bunch of robberies taking place at pizza places on the west side. We were working the case and knew all the players when all of a sudden we see a report from the gang guys in the DIBs [District Intelligence Bulletin] saying that they knew who was committing the robberies and that it*

*was some gang. Well, I knew all the players and called them up and told them they had the wrong info. Needless to say I didn't have too many good things to say to them (P50).*

Most field officers did not think that the hot spots designations were accurate or they felt that the hot spot predictions, while perhaps accurate at one point, were out of date – too little, too late. One officer summed up line officers' perception, stating that “[t]hey [administrators] are so far removed from the day to day activity” that they cannot make the right designations (P17). Another officer gave a more specific example, saying that “[i]t [DOC bulletin] will say two-six [gang] are rivaling with so and so and you're just like WHAT? This isn't true. [Officer chuckled] Where did they get that? That's just there to verify the DOC's existence.” Later in the interview, this same officer said, “[you] wonder where it come from because it's all bullshit and when you ask them where they got that information from they can't tell us (P5).” Even though most field officers did not perceive that the hot spots were correct or timely, there were officers who supported the idea of concentrated resources on perceived problems.

Few middle managers agreed with field officers regarding the veracity of the deployments. “Sometimes the information is not 100 percent. I'm here every day. They [DOC analysts] decide on Monday, sure the place was hot on Monday but within 48 hours something has changed. Another spot is hot. I once went to the meeting where they make the decisions on where to put the level 2 and I gave my opinion but it fell on deaf ears. The place they had decided to put the DOC prior to my arrival stayed the same even after I gave my opinions (P1).” Another middle manager expressed similar frustration with his perception of the inflexibility of the DOCs, explaining that “DOCs stay for weeks but the streets change every day (P5).” Middle managers

generally conceded that the DOC strategy had merits with statements such as, “[we are] shooting at a target now rather than shooting at the wall. [The DOC] focuses things and attacks the problem.” “Do I think DOC is a good idea? Absolutely! It forces the district to target problems. Everybody learns. It’s bringing the fight to a certain area (P2).” Although, P2 also summed up many field officers’ and middle management officers’ sentiments by stating that “[y]ou are relying on your DOC to be smarter than you (P2).” This concern highlights the importance of information and intelligence, which I discuss further in the findings below.

Another middle manager summed up the sentiment by saying that the DOC listened to local officers and usually picked the right area. “We do have some input. For example, if there is an area with no shootings, we might ask them to leave the DOC in that spot so nothing flares up. We have a lot of influence. They do work with us (P42).” Another middle manager echoed this support. He said that “[We can] empirically examine what’s going on in terms of crime in the city, identify where police should be, and then apply resources.” He called this strategy “putting cops on the dots.” However, he conceded that, “we just need to figure out which dots (P23).”

## **2. Every Spot is Hot**

A tension about the innovation that arose repeatedly in interviews with middle managers, and expressed by some field officers, was: how can you do hot spots policing when everything is hot? Hot spot designations seemed arbitrary to officers who felt that the DOC could justifiably designate a hot spot anywhere in their district because of the prevalence of violent activity in that district. One district commander stated, “[r]eally the whole district could be a hot spot

(P14).” This contention was supported in one meeting (P65) when a DOC analyst declared that he “threw a dart at the dart board” in order to pick a hot spot because the whole area could be considered hot. Similarly, a patrol officer reflected that “[m]aybe in a slower district the DOC makes sense, but in a busier district, the whole place could be hot spot (P21).” Another middle manager recognized the issue through contrasting metaphors. “[We] put out the fires. In a district like this, we just try to keep the flames down.” He continued with, “[we try to] keep our heads above water (P15).” Other officers elaborated on this idea and talked about how the DOC was really just an “imaginary line (P7)” and another officer said that the demand for police actions and the amount and extent of demand made police boundaries insignificant with, “this is no beat integrity here—it’s too busy (P22).”<sup>25</sup>

Conversely, another analyst responsible for a much quieter area jokingly started the meeting by saying: “Where do I start, the activity has been overwhelming. Activity, I meant, is the number of administrative changes.” The lack of activity in a police area with less crime, but also an imperative to establish and police hot spots, presented another problem of resources and enforcement. And although the organization seemed to implicitly recognize that areas in the city did not really need hot spots (by covering them tersely in deployment meetings, for example), every area was assigned and expected to police DOC hot spots.

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<sup>25</sup> “Beat integrity” is the inclination of officers to stay within their beat boundaries when patrolling and not crossing over borders into nearby beats to help out. This is also related to making sure any activity that they engage in is connected to their beat so another beat does not get credit for their work.

**a. Hot spot Activity: The Right Kind of Activity**

A major contradiction observed was the differences in officers' perceptions of the expected activities and the actions in DOC hot spots. There were some who reported that their main responsibility was to be *highly visible* in DOC hot spots and make contacts (but not arrests) with as many people as possible and look for "high quality arrests" befitting a DOC hot spot. One middle manager summed up this situation by recounting how a police officer and some probationary officers got in trouble for trying to arrest someone for public drinking in a DOC hot spot. He shared that this type of arrest activity did not fit "the spirit of the DOC (P45)." In contrast, there were other officers who reported that the DOC hot spot should be entirely *shut down* with arrests and ticketing. One middle manager characterized his officers' activity in DOC hot spots as making minor arrests of anything that goes wrong in the DOC deployment area and "saturate where the powers that be think the next problem is (P15)." He said that his officers were expected to quell anything going on by ticketing drivers, arresting drinkers – "everything." An officer highlighted this perception with the following: "An arrest in DOC is like the holy grail.... An arrest for any little thing in the DOC is big versus a big arrest outside the DOC (P36)."

One would expect that different types of police officers would engage in activities specific to their role in DOC hot spots. For example, gang officers collected information about gang members and did gang dispersals, TRU officers patrolled in a group and ticketed "movers and parkers," and patrol officers primarily responded to calls for service. However, the understanding of officers and middle managers was cleaved between the idea that officers should be highly visible and remain on the street, only pursuing high quality arrests if they

presented, versus the perception that officers should be clearing out hot spots, arresting and ticketing everyone doing anything remotely illegal in the hot spot. This contradiction exposed an innovation weakness; officers, particularly middle managers, were unclear about the inputs in the hot spots and what officers should be doing there.

#### **b. Changing Roles**

*Officer #2: "The DOC changed the entire department drastically."*

*Officer #1: "Well except for beat and rapid response cars (P5)."*

This exchange highlights the finding that line officers did not perceive that their responsibilities or roles under the innovation had really changed. Many officers, front line and middle managers, perceived that middle managers were at the center of the innovation. "It [DOC] doesn't affect the street officers' job, just the command staff (P72)." Consistent with this claim, the observed and interviewed middle managers expressed that they felt more responsibility for deployment of officers under their purview. They also reported more responsibility to produce outcomes.

### **3. Collaboration: Information Sharing and Communication**

*"... The implementation of the DOC areas has not increased communication." (P11)*

*"My officers look forward to collaboration. They don't interfere with each other. There is no problem with that. There is enough activity out there for all of us." (P42)*

*With the reverse sting, we debrief everybody to get information. They do that now; debrief everybody partly to get information about who hangs out with whom. Collective goal is to get the offender off the street. "Mind set has changed, the detective is not stealing the pinch." Before DOC collaboration, there were riffs between detectives and patrol because they [detectives]*

*would steal your pinch, but it's not like that now everyone gets credit. Everyone knows everyone, there is no more detectives looking down at patrol officers. It is a team effort. They [detectives] request patrol because they know patrol knows more than they do. No more animosity. Biggest thing with the Superintendent and the DOC is the emphasis on information sharing. (P14)*

In order, these quotes were from a field officer, a lieutenant (front line supervisor), and a district commander. They illustrate the range of perceptions within the department. Most frontline officers did not perceive that collaboration had changed for them. And generally the frontline supervisors reportedly understood that the new imperative was to collaborate but they saw it more as a directive to stay in their silos and not to interfere with other police officers' activities. And finally, the commanders who sat at the top of the middle management hierarchy characterized collaboration as the new way of doing business for the officers under their purview. These perceptions actually reflected the functions of each of these types of officers within the organization. Field officers were trying to do their job, do right by their immediate supervisors, and their fellow officers. Middle managers were responsible for translating and championing the organizational changes while still trying to fulfill the outcomes that the administration demands.

When I conceptualized *collaboration*, a central piece of this innovation, I collapsed and reviewed the relevant coded categories including information sharing - any observations or references officers made to sharing information, either with other officers, with their supervisors, or with other units. I also included any references to communication which was defined as any references middle managers or field officers made about communication, by either through informal or formal channels, including any in-person, paper-based or electronic

communications. I also included any reference to relationships between officers including any observations or references to personal or professional connections between officers. And finally, I included any observations or references to coordination between officers and/or units. I explored how hot spot policing changed the collaboration inside the department, in particular how they communicated with fellow officers.

This section reviews officers' and middle managers' perceptions of collaboration before, during, and after a DOC hot spot was established. I explored the extent that they perceived input into deployment decisions, their perceptions of collaboration while policing hot spots, their reflections on the state of collaboration post innovation. I also looked at the collaboration specific to special units and how officers perceived these connections.

#### **a. Reflections on Collaboration**

*Officer #2: DOC has no idea what this is about [reference to the recent killing] but we asked and we find out it's about a girl. They [the DOC] have no idea.*

*Officer #1: As stupid as that sounds, it's over a girl and the DOC doesn't have a clue.*

*Interviewer: Does someone relay this information to the DOC?*

*Officer #1: Yeah we have information reports. Our sergeant will let them know; whether they do something with it you'll never know. They don't do a follow-up or let you know. (P5)*

Field officers perceived that their input was not valued or taken seriously. When one field officer was asked about his input regarding DOC hot spot, he replied, "Nothing. They just look at the stats. Nobody directly asks us (P30)." Some officers expressed that they felt field officers were being listened more than under past administrations and that central administration

sometimes asked about the trouble on the street which had not happened before. One beat officer summed up both the negatives and positives experienced with the increased emphasis on collaboration. He stated, and we observed resentment from officers about, “Being told where we should be by downtown.” He thought that the creation of TRU and the increased emphasis on special operations and enhanced deployment had fostered elitism rather than facilitated collaboration. He said, “Beefing up special units” fostered negativity from the beat officers who are “doing the real work (P23).”

*“[Field officers are] more willing to take information, then give information”  
(P91)*

*Why are the gang guys [Central command] coming to our guys to figure out who the players are? Why do they ask us? Those “lazy fucks.” They don’t get any of their own intel and take info from us...And I can’t work on getting those quality arrests. “I’m too busy doing missions.” What are the gang guys [central gang units] doing? They aren’t on missions. They expect us to get the intel for them and we are busy doing missions. We are too busy to gather intelligence. (P50)*

The above quotations from a central administrator and a field officer, respectively, and they highlighted the finding that officers perceived that collaboration was lopsided. Even though most officers, regardless of rank, received the message that information sharing and collaboration was a departmental emphasis. For many, both the administration and the rank and file felt as though they were on the giving side more than receiving side of collaboration. They all knew they were supposed to collaborate but they did not know how it should happen.

*The Level 2 [DOC hot spot] is decided by “downtown.” Our detectives and the DOC people have meetings after anything big; like shootings. It’s also based on the amount of violence and calls for service. We are “constantly talking.”*

*When the DOC people come to meetings after shootings they ask “why did the shootings happen?” (P42)*

*“There is more cooperation than in the past. Cline was the Tact. Lieutenant in [District] 11. He emphasized sharing information with other watches and units.” (P72)*

*“Oh yeah! I remember when no one shared information. Cline’s biggest idea is to share information. I think that’s why he created the DOC.” (P74)*

All the above quotes came from middle managers and demonstrated how these middle managers were more likely than field officers to perceive collaboration positively. One middle manager started his interview by reflecting on how things were before the DOC with, “when I worked in tact team, people wouldn’t share information within same district or team because they wanted to make the arrest (P74).” Another middle manager lauded the DOC as a good development in the organization with, “we did not have a good pipeline [of information before the DOC] (P25).” They generally felt their input was heard and considered with DOC hot spots. One middle manager said that the central administration usually picked the DOC as right area and indicated that he had “a lot of influence” on selecting the areas. He said, “We do have some input. They do work with us (P42).” Another middle manager spoke about how districts were working with headquarters and how information sharing between these two entities was more “real time.” This manager thought that the intelligence he provided combined with the headquarters’ intelligence played a big role in establishing the right place to focus police attention. With this arrangement, he said, “You know where the problems are. We should be smart and deploy resources there (P72).”

*I don’t see any differences – [pause] – If we are arresting you, you can give us info elsewhere. That’s good. There is information that can be shared. We can*

*go upstairs and give them information. We have a lot of communication because they are right upstairs. We want to bring people in to get info...find nicknames, etcetera. We get the detectives, another bureau, and help them – good communication. That's not affected by DOCs or Hot spots. (P15)*

Many middle managers, such as the one quoted above, did not think that the organizational innovations augmented collaboration because it occurred already. Officers who perceived that collaboration was already a part of the organization tended to provide examples of informal channels of communication. They referenced relationships with old police partners as a main way to share information and having a relationship with a particular unit fostered collaboration rather than collaboration being an organizational tenet. In these instances, collaboration seemed to be a byproduct of having had a relationship with another officer.

Middle managers were more likely than field officers to express that collaboration had increased and they expressed more willingness to collaborate. But they did perceive that field officers' input was overlooked in this organizational emphasis to collaborate, particularly patrol officers. Field officers' understanding and knowledge of district context often did not get attention with this centralized model of information collection and dissemination. One middle manager highlighted this concern when he told researchers about having to shift officers elsewhere due to district level (field officer) information and intelligence that indicated emerging conflicts elsewhere. This information did not come from the DOC and they did not see any formally way to communicate with the DOC or perhaps they did not want to contradict the DOC so they quietly moved their officers around.

**b. Stepping on Toes**

One consistent observation made by field officers and middle managers alike and observed by researchers was the hot spots areas were saturated with many different officers. One middle manager even said that DOC hot spots were “oversaturated” (P17). Saturation was characterized as both a good and a bad situation for the police. There was a general consensus that saturation stopped violent activity, if only for a short time. One officer expressed this succinctly with, “Everybody is in the DOC. People won’t be fucking up as much (P9).” But on the other hand, there was so many officers that they felt they could not effectively police. One officer said, “The problem with the DOC is everyone’s out here getting the same guys (P5).” And another officer elaborated with, “I’ll tell you one thing about the DOCs. With all the different teams and units in a DOC we are constantly tripping on each other (P84).” This increased presence and activity in the hot spots did not appear to translate into collaboration among the various officers. One officer summed up researchers’ observations of street-level collaboration with, “...we just see a lot more officers on the street but there is not an increased level of communication with them (P48).” During ride along in DOCs, researchers observed that officers did not collaborate with other types of officers they encountered. Sometimes they exchanged waves or nods with each other but they rarely conversed about their activity or shared information unless they had a personal connection (i.e. an old partner or team member).

**c. Silos remain**

*Do you guys work with other units?*

*Officer: Well, we are not tied to the radio and we work closely with the other members of our team. We only work with the gun team really.*

*Interviewer: What about SOS or TRU?*

*Officer: Only if they call for help. We don't really work with them much. I don't really know any of the SOS or TRU guys. We really only talk to people we know (P46).*

“You know what could improve? – better communication (P16).” One officer talked about how units kept information from each other, information that could help him do his job. When he was asked to elaborate, he said that detectives kept information in order to keep other officers from “stealing their pinch” and that gang officers kept information they knew secret so they could get credit for either the arrests or the information. Despite the departmental emphasis on collaboration and the general acknowledgement that collaboration could help, the information silos appeared to remain intact. One officer likened the situation to the military with the following quote, “TRU doesn’t talk to us. It is the same as the army. We are two different companies. It is a good rivalry. It should be like that. I mean, “who gives a shit?!” As long as our guys know that we are together (P2).”

The persistence of silos appeared to be related to officers’ concerns about their arrests. The following quotes from field officers sum this emphasis up with, “We don’t really share information. If we share it they steal it. I don’t want anybody cashing in on our hard work.” (P46) and “It’s good if each car gets one arrest per night. Here’s a good example, tonight we did a prostitution sting. Each person has his own job. We keep everything within house. We don’t take our arrests into the desk sergeant (P3).” When asked about whether they shared information, officers said that they did not want to give the DOC analysts or any other teams information because that sharing would lead someone else to make an arrest and then they

would lose out on the recognition that an arrest would bring them. Clearly, administrative attempts to encourage collaboration and sharing of information were outweighed by other administrative systems that reward officers for good arrests.

One middle manager provided a detailed example of how collaboration back fired for his team. They had an arrest warrant for a known gang leader and they kept seeing his car but never saw him in it. After a meeting with other district, they told the other district about this gang leader and that they should arrest this guy if they saw him and sure enough, he was driving in another district and got pulled over for running a light. He was arrested by officers in this district despite the fact that they were not even looking for him. The officer said disappointedly that his officers lost out on a high profile arrest with, "All along we were searching for him and they get the arrest. That's why we are reluctant to share information but if the information ever puts another officer in danger we share it right away. We don't mess around with other officer's safety (P29)." Officer safety was a prevailing motivation for many police officers' actions and interactions and interestingly was one of the only reasons cited to share information and collaborate with other units.

#### **d. Special Units**

One large part of the organizational innovation was the use of discretionary officers. These forces were moved to areas of the city deemed hot – they were either in the midst of experiencing high levels of violence or anticipated to experience violence – and in need of extra police force. The special units used as centralized discretionary forces included the

Tactical Response Units (TRU) and the Special Operations Section (SOS). The SOS existed as centralized unit before the innovation as a mobile group of officers but the TRUs were created at the outset of the DOC innovation as a large (80 person) unit. Using discretionary and centralized police officers was not necessarily new but the number and the way in which they were deployed was new. Commanding officers in districts and areas typically had discretionary police officers too including saturation, rapid response, tactical, and gang officers but these officers were not typically considered *special units* and were considered field officers. These officers could be deployed to specific geographies or work on specific problems in the districts or areas to which they were assigned but were considered field officers for this case study because they were not part of these centralized efforts. All field officers and middle managers were asked about special units and whether or not they saw them while working and/or collaborated with them. Field officers (not including the special unit officers) perceived that having special units immediately quiets things down in any given area but that they take arrests and other activity away from the regular officers and ultimately their activity and presence causes upheaval in the community. This next section provides more detail on these perspectives.

### **1) *Quiet Things Down***

Middle managers and field officers alike felt that special units had an immediate chilling effect on any illegal activity in DOC hot spots. Officers thought that when the police presence on the street was 'up,' the guys on the street quiet down (P10). One officer said, "Special units are like a heat seeking missile" in DOC areas, clamping down and stopping and arresting anyone they

encounter (P24). Another officer elaborated, “When SOS and TRU are in the area, there is nobody on the corners. Everyone clears out (P39).” We also observed that areas appeared to be less activity when TRU and SOS were present in DOC hot spots, with no evidence of open air drug dealing and less people hanging out on the street and sidewalk. The TRU was a much bigger unit and so the presence of TRU officers was indeed overwhelming as they often drove around in a groups of three to five cars (a tactic called a “Wolf Pack” mission).

## **2) *“They fuck things up.” (P17)***

Some field officers said that the only time that they knew special units were in their district or area was if they saw them while they were working. There did not appear to be any collaboration between officers of different teams. One officer echoed this prevailing perspective with, “Half the time we are also saturated with SOS and TRU. I don’t know who the hell they are (P46).” Officers repeatedly reported on team insularity and we observed it; As noted earlier, officers tended to only speak and interact with officers that were on their teams. Field officers expressed that they were willing to assist as one officer said, “If they need our help, we will help but for the most part they do their thing, we do ours (P20).” Collaboration occurred when supervisors specifically asked for it or when officers from different teams knew each other either personally or had worked together before. Then they may have shared information or came to an assist on a stop or arrest. One middle manager summed up the

general perception about special unit officers with, “Here’s the story with them: they are where they are told to be for a brief time but when they leave its business as usual (P38).”

Field officers and middle managers alike acknowledged the immediate chilling effect that special units had on violence. Many field officers portrayed an undercurrent of negativity toward special units. They perceived that they impinged on their local resources and they had limited knowledge of the communities they were assigned to police. From their resource perspective, special unit officers got in the way. “They make it a pain in the ass, when you’re working in your district and they’re in there using your stuff, standing around taking up computers, papers, and space. They just crowd it because they aren’t doing anything (P20).”

Field officers perceived that specialized units ultimately created more problems in communities than they helped. When these units patrolled hot spots and aggressively enforced the law, many people were stopped, questioned, and cleared off corners or even arrested because the special units did not know the community context or people or even the hot spots within the DOC hot spots. Field officers conveyed that special units were unable to discern and target the bad actors because they were unfamiliar with the area and constantly being moved around the city and so all people in a DOC hot spot was considered a potential offender and worthy of scrutiny. Officers reported that special units were rotated in and out of neighborhoods or areas of which they were unfamiliar and this caused tension and an aftermath of ill will toward the

police.<sup>26</sup> One officer said this succinctly with, “They have bad reps in this district...especially SOS. There are a lot of ‘goofballs’ in those units. They have a lot of ‘dirty people’ (P17).”<sup>27</sup> Field officers also perceived that special units took arrests away from them. We observed or were repeatedly told by field officers that specialized units would often call beat officers to come deal with paperwork on less important or less exciting arrests that they may have started. Arrests in a DOC hot spot, in particular a high profile arrest of a documented gang leader or one that involved confiscating a gun, served as the ultimate policing outcome and special units tried to ‘cherry pick’ the best activity. Collaboration, central to the expressed innovation, appeared to be incidental for field officers and special unit officers.

#### **4. Intelligence**

Intelligence, the actionable data that informed deployments and police targets, including geographic and human targets, was also an important feature of the innovation. The DOC was established as a centralized team responsible to collect and vet knowledge in order to effectively prioritize and target areas and offenders. Each week, the DOC compiled specific information about ongoing and/or anticipated conflicts, problematic individuals, and the geographic boundaries of the DOC hot spot and the rationale for the boundaries. The DOC analysts accessed formal databases to glean information and they also assessed informal knowledge by talking to field officers, middle managers, and street contacts in order to compile

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<sup>26</sup> Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, the upheaval special units reportedly caused in the community and for local officers is an important consideration and avenue of future research.

<sup>27</sup> Notably and influentially, at the time of this data collection, SOS officers were being investigated for corruption and the story was in the news and on the tongues of many police officers. This situation likely influenced middle managers and field officers’ perceptions of special unit officers in addition to their actual field experiences.

intelligence. DOC analysts did not follow a set protocol when they drafted the intelligence overview for their area. Each week analysts met with each other to review their respective intelligence reports. Consequently, they would adapt, edit, or add to the final DOC package that would go out to officers.

**a. “Word of Mouth”**

*“The two watches don’t share openly, but with friends in other watches (P72).”*

*“I share info with [district] 9 and [district] 7. They are good buddies (P3).”*

*“It’s based on friendships. We are not fighting over arrests. We call the watch commanders and tell them we are in the district. Generally, our sergeants stop in. We always notify the watch commanders to let them know we are there (P72).”*

The quotes above highlighted the informal nature of the intelligence sharing in the police organization. Organizational boundaries were typically not a factor when officers considered sharing information. As the quotes indicate field officers and middle managers have informal information networks predicated on friendships. These informal knowledge streams seemed to take precedent over formal information received from central administration. The perception was that the street knows better. Field officers would patrol the DOC hot spots and listen to their supervisors as they conveyed the centralized intelligence but they gave more credence to their local connections and friendships. One officer characterized this informal network of intelligence with, “Everything is word of mouth. If they hear something, we’ll hear something (P3).” This officer described how his tactical team was housed in the same office as a gang team and often they shared the same sergeant.

**b. "Dark Stops"**

One finding gleaned from observations and heard about through interviews was ample police activity and intelligence gathering garners no official documentation. The information gleaned and the action completed resides in the officers' head or personal notebook. Examples of *dark stops* were numerous and there were conducted to stop and/or deter criminal activity and to gain information for future arrests and police actions. The following was an example of an observation of a dark stop that showed both of these motivations at play.

*We respond to a call about 3 youths smoking marijuana in a park near us. We drive over to the location and see three youths standing by a tree. One of the youths appears to be white and the others appear to be Indian. Officer 1 pulls the car up close to the youths and they don't notice. Officer 2 gets out of the car and asks the youths to put their hands on the car. All three do as they are told and Officer 2 pats them down while Officer 1 collects their Identification and goes to the computer to check them out. Officer 2 finds a blunt on the white male while he finds nothing on the other two. He tells the two other youths that he doesn't know if they have been smoking but they shouldn't hang out with this kid [the white kid]. He tells them to go home and not come back to the park. Officer 2 asks the youth if he has been arrested and the youth says that he had been arrested last week. Officer 2 Asks where and the youths says that it was in the same location as he's being arrested today. Officer 2 laughs, "You don't learn huh. Well, why don't you get in the back here and we'll figure it out in the station." The youth gets into the back of the car [next to me] and we start heading back east. About halfway the weather gets very bad and starts raining very heavily. Officer 2 chats with the youth and asks if he wants to go home tonight rather than staying overnight in the jail. The youth seems very eager and afraid and says he would like that very much. Officer 2 casually asks if the youth would tell him about his seller and identify where he lives. After a couple minutes of speaking the youth agrees that he will show the officer the seller's car and home. We make our way back to where the youth was picked up originally and we drive up to a green Bonneville. The youth shows the officers the house and the car. Officer 1 makes a quick note of the address and we turn back around toward the department. We drive all the way back in the pouring rain.*

*Interviewer: Would this be considered a “positive” debriefing [gaining information that could result in some type of police action]?*

*Officer #2: Yeah, we aren’t going to write up anything on this but a detective would probably consider this debriefing...and it was definitely positive. We usually keep our stuff internal if we have some information. We’ll run some information on this address and see if we can get a warrant. We might do it tonight or tomorrow depending on what we find (P50).*

Certainly police could not feasibly document all their encounters in any official way. *Dark stops* served as an adaptation to the innumerable encounters that occurred over the course of an eight hour shift, however these stops and the intelligence garnered and locally held by the two officers was a limitation to a department trying to centralize intelligence.<sup>28</sup>

### **c. Intelligence versus Accountability**

At the outset of the DOC, officers were reluctant to talk candidly and provide information to DOC analysts as they were concerned that information provided would be used to evaluate their work. Central administrators continually emphasized and tried to separate accountability from intelligence both practically and symbolically. The administration changed up the weekly DOC meeting formats to keep the intelligence sharing and the accountability portions of the meetings separate and they continually reminded officers that information and collaboration were central to the organizational mission and that no officer would be penalized for sharing. One way that administrators facilitated sharing was by distributing weekly DOC awards which

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<sup>28</sup> This style of aggressive policing and the "stop and frisk" approach in Chicago has since come under extreme scrutiny by the ACLU and deemed unconstitutional. Gathering intelligence in this way is no longer acceptable as the public wants to be sure there is no race bias.

rewarded officers for acts of collaboration (More detail about awards is provided in the Accountability section below). This message of the separation was mostly heard at the weekly meetings where the DOC staff assured middle managers that any contact from DOC analysts was purely about intelligence gathering and not accountability.

## **5. Accountability**

Administrators wanted to connect and more closely align their goal of reducing violent crime with the actions of the field officers. They thought the mechanism to accomplish this goal was to facilitate collaboration and enhance accountability. This next section sums up the perspectives of field officers and middle managers regarding accountability. Any observations or quotations about documenting or measuring performance were coded as accountability. Any observations that pertained to their responsibilities related to oversight and organizational expectations were also coded as accountability. The following sections explore and categorize field officers' and middle managers' perspectives on all accountability mechanisms including their views of DOC meetings and outcome expectations.

### **a. Meetings & Awards**

*“Although I hate New York City, they have COMPSTAT and the DOC evolved from it. The big thing in COMPSTAT was “holding commander’s feet to the fire.” Chicago didn’t feel that way was the most productive. They took a less confrontational approach while still relying on the data. A kinder gentler COMPSTAT (P23).”*

*“It [DOC] forces you to look at what you’re doing, where you are putting people because you know you’re going to be answering questions (P38).”*

Meetings were the main accountability mechanism, as expressed by the officers above, it was in this venue that administrators communicated with middle managers and provided feedback about progress or lack of progress. Certainly, there may have been private accountability discussions between administrators and middle managers. One middle manager did comment on receiving a telephone call from his supervisors regarding performance during one interview. However, given the data collected, the weekly DOC meetings and the semi-regular VISE meetings appeared to be the main accountability forums. VISE meetings convened every couple of months on an ad hoc basis and were facilitated by the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability (BCSA). VISE meetings served as an in-depth examination of one CPD Area's performance including crime statistics, sick days, officers' furloughs, and timeliness of data entry. During these meetings, middle managers were asked to clarify and justify numbers and discuss the plans for their Areas and teams within the Area. Although all performance measurement was important to organizational function, in this dissertation, I focus on the DOC meetings rather than VISE meetings because they concentrated solely on addressing violent crime.

*DOC meetings are weekly summaries of everything that occurs Thursday up to the meeting on Wednesday, any aggravated batteries or homicides. The commander has to go and answer what did they do, what tools did they utilize, what other actions were taken/ what support did they employ? (P74)*

*"...you have to state what you are doing in these DOC areas. What you have done previous, what you are doing currently (any missions), and what you plan on doing? You get critiqued (P14)."*

*We need the DOC meeting. The DOC hot spots and the DOC meeting go "hand in hand." There are no DOC areas without the meetings every week. We need*

*to have accountability. "How can we ensure accountability without meetings?  
(P23) "*

The DOC meetings were broken into two parts: the first part was an accounting of the violent crime activity and police responses from the previous week and the second part focused on hot spot deployment, rationale, and conflict review. Despite the administration's efforts to separate the accountability part of the DOC meetings from the knowledge management piece, not surprisingly, many officers and middle managers saw these DOC meetings as mainly about accountability. The accountability portion of the DOC meetings was usually run by the highest ranking administrator in the room, often the Superintendent. Earlier in its inception, problem solving was observed at DOC meetings. Middle managers were called on to discuss what activities and missions they were planning on carrying out in their hotspots and how they thought these actions would impact crime. Over time these meetings were observed, these impromptu problem solving presentations diminished in the DOC meeting setting.

*"That's what puts it all together. We need the meeting. It gives us checks and balances. It keeps people knowledgeable. How would you ever know how you are doing? They [DOC analysts] give us good information and provide constructive advice, "Why don't you call these guys [unit or team that might help with a certain crime issue]?" Everybody is held accountable. They got me one time (P2)."*

This quote above summarized how accountability was experienced in the DOC. "They got me one time," referred to the way in which administrators would call on commanders and other middle managers to explain why their activity was down and/or crime was up. They had to account for an increased in violent crime that occurred in the DOC hot spot from the week previous. When called on to explain middle managers, usually Lieutenants or Watch

Commanders, would stand up in the general audience and explain why they thought the numbers went up and contritely explain how they would have their officers' work harder so it would not happen again. The middle manager would stand up and give an explanation and field questions and then would wrap up with promises to have field officers do a better job next week. Another middle manager characterized the accountability portion of the DOC meeting more candidly this way, "It is like a fist reminding you to use the information (P24)." P24 gave an example of an "ass chewing" that he witnessed in a meeting when information was not shared and command staff was reprimanded for not collaborating with other departmental units. If middle managers were deemed successful in their efforts, i.e. no homicides or shootings in an area from the previous week, they could be also called on to explain what they did and how others in the meeting could learn from them.

*"[DOC is] washed down version of COMPSTAT. It's a "shame on you fest." I like the DOC awards they give at the meetings...then they "shame on you" after. That happened with my old boss. They used to not reward officers at all. They said, "that's your job." They started giving us our dues. It's good for morale (P3)."*

At the beginning of each DOC meeting awards were given to officers that had collaborated and/or shared intelligence with officers from different teams that led to closing a case or solving a community problem. The DOC awards symbolically and substantively rewarded and highlighted the behavior changes that administrators professed they wanted field officers to exhibit. DOC awards made specific examples of the type of problem solving and collaboration that department was looking to augment. Officers often brought their family to witness the award ceremony portion of the meeting. However, when officers in the field were asked about

the purpose and their thoughts regarding the DOC awards, their responses were often skeptical of administrators' motivations and one field officer who had received a DOC award summed up this skepticism with, "the department is throwing you a bone (P45)." Over the time that we observed the DOC meetings, the initial meeting intensity diminished and accountability focused on recitation of crime and activity numbers listed with minimal time focused on context and/or problem solving. Even the DOC awards appeared to lose the prestige as time went on.

#### **b. The Upside of Accountability**

*"Accountability process is more holistic." (P1)*

Middle managers reported increased discretion particularly around deployment. Rather than seeing their discretionary power curtailed, many reported having more freedom to move their forces around. The following was an example of this perceived increase in discretion:

*Middle manager: We do see some displacement into other districts. But that's why we have "combined district initiatives."*

*Interviewer: What are those?*

*Middle Manager: That's where we cross the two districts into one. For example, I can pull a gang team from another district and put it in another. One of the gang teams from 16 goes to another...usually 15. Same thing with the saturation team. They usually work in the level 2 but can shift. The superintendent has given us more leeway. (P42)*

There was a prevailing perception that the actual police work of the officers serving under them had not really changed but that they now felt more accountable to make sure the work was getting done. The following were quotes or observations made by middle managers that illustrated this perception.

“You’re looking at the person held accountable. I’m the person held accountable.” P2 said that even though he is ultimately held accountable he tries to do a lot of 1 on 1s with his officers and would like to set up a monthly meeting with his district command staff (P2).

*“Before [DOC] you had problems but you still worked on it. Now you have to face the consequences of not doing what’s expected from you (P25).”*

One middle manager when asked if his responsibilities changed, he replied that his responsibilities had not changed but his accountability has increased. He said he was still responsible to “make sure the right people are in the right place (P24).” Another middle manager supported this perception but added a caveat about having *accurate* information with, “Now if the DOC info is accurate, you know where the problems are. We should be smart and deploy resources there (P72).” This officer intimated that this increased accountability was positive as long as the information that the DOC provided was correct.

Unlike the most of the middle managers, sergeants, the very frontline of supervisors, perceived that their discretionary power over field officers had diminished. And like sergeants, field officers too perceived that their discretion had been curtailed as well with the accountability emphasis. Field officers expressed that their discretion had been restricted because of the perceived pressure to produce numbers. One field officer summed this sentiment up with, “A lot of times they want us to make an arrest rather than use our discretion (P8).”

**c. “This is our job anyway”**

*“We are now assigned where we have to go. We just go where we are told. I think that’s a good thing (P30).”*

*“However, one good thing is that it gets people off the street. Basically, we have less discretion (P9).”*

*“We pay attention more; focus all our activity on specific areas and targets because we need to get arrests (P20).”*

*“It used to be easy to get arrests now you have to work for it. You are always looking to find someone doing something wrong because they aren’t doing it as openly as they used to, it makes officers have to really do their job, we have to get out and actively be police officers (P31).”*

With the accountability imperative, field officers generally perceived two main changes to their work. First, field officers perceived that they had less discretion about where they policed and less discretion about policing activities in which they engaged (e.g. arrests or gang dispersals). And secondly, field officers perceived that generating activity numbers was central to accountability. There were some field officers that echoed middle managers’ perceptions, and talked about how accountability had not really changed anything if they were already doing their job but that they felt increased pressure to prove that they were doing their job. One officer summed up this perception during his interview when asked about how his job specifically and the department generally, had changed. He responded with, “They [command staff] keep wanting more and more paperwork (P43).” He felt that the DOC forced officers who shirked their work to be accountable in ways they never had to before. He stressed, “there is definitely more accountability” and “it is all about numbers (P43).”

There were some field officers, when asked about the DOC and accountability, described it with apathy or even hostility with, “We don’t care.” (P4) or “DOC is bullshit numbers. We warned you, we have issues with it” (P5).” Though whether field officers perceived accountability negatively, positively or neutrally, all perceived that it was predicated on generating activity and producing numbers. There was only one patrol officer that talked specifically about how

the accountability focus had fostered collaboration within the department overall and he felt it had created better relationships between patrol, organized crime, and detectives. He said, "There is more interaction between these groups, because they are relying on each other for help." He said that the DOC and the accountability emphasis should serve as a resource and help officers more broadly but also echoed some of the skepticism expressed by the other officers with, "it should be more of a resource than an annoyance, at least I hope (P23)."

#### **d. Duplicate data systems**

A notable finding was there were several middle managers and even some administrators who talked about maintaining their own data system accounting for the information and numbers produced by the various teams under their purview. Three reasons were given for this practice including the concern that police officers' activities and numbers would be entered incorrectly or not entered in a timely fashion. These were valid concerns that were raised in meetings and mentioned by many over the course of the observations. Another concern expressed by middle managers, like the one below, was that the numbers stripped of context did not provide any indicators of work quality.

*At the end of the night my guys come in and tell me what they did. I fill out a tour of duty report. I put in descriptives of what they do. I add my own because they don't really have a place for it. But, at the end, it just asks for a number and I enter it into the CLEAR system. Everything is lumped together. 2 good arrests just comes out as 2. 30 contact cards comes out as 30. 30 is more than 2 so it looks like that number is good (P3).*

The final concern prompting some to maintain duplicate data systems was the desire to maintain control over numbers in order to manage their officers as illustrated by this middle managers' quote, "Whoever controls the database, controls the taskforce (P12)."

**e. Organizational Justice**

*"They don't let you know when you do a good job but they will if you do a bad job (P45)."*

*The higher ups downtown don't tell us that, why would they? We are just the lower officers. We are not important to them. Like I already said the decisions about where to patrol are made by men who haven't worked on the streets in decades. They are not out here every night and they don't care about what we have to say about it. They don't tell us if we are doing a good job, we never go to those DOC meetings only important people go to those. It would be nice if they actually asked us what we thought might work (P29).*

Often field officers, like the ones above, perceived that their voices and input were not considered by the upper management and they perceived that directions were capricious and lacked insight. During one ride along officers were asked about why area had been deemed a DOC hot spot and one officer answered with, "Who knows? [The DOC] Never tell us shit (P85)." During another ride along, the officers were informed that they had to switch their focus that evening after meeting with their sergeant in a K-mart parking lot to discuss the switch. When asked why they were redeployed and they replied with, "You got about as much details as we did on it (P13)." Another officer spoke more bluntly about his perceived lack of input and power within the organization:

*"They ["police bosses"] see success in numbers, bullshit arrests like the crackhead, pissing in the alley...you got to look at the quality of the arrest...you are tied up for like an hour...or wait in lock up for 10 to 30 minutes...is this productive police work? You tell me...what do I think about*

*processing these silly arrests? I am in no position to say—I am just a patrolman (P8)."*

**f. "Pressured Heads"**

*"Some bosses want to see heads rather than quality arrests (P13)."*

*We don't target high ranking criminals at all. We have "pressured heads" we need to get and that's all we can worry about (P50)*

*They want heads in the Level 1...so we get heads. They aren't quality arrests. We don't have the time to get quality arrests. We are too worried about getting numbers. It all depends on the goal [of CPD]. Do we want violence reduction or do we want to arrest for quality of life offenses (P2)*

*We lock everyone up. It used to not be big on numbers. Now all they want is numbers (P85).*

Field officers and some middle managers perceived, like the ones above, that the accountability emphasis fostered pressure to generate numbers at the expense of good policing and quality arrests. When field officers were asked, "How has the DOC changed your job?," the usual response was added pressure to produce contact cards and make arrests. One special unit middle manager perceived that districts were vying for special units in order to generate numbers rather than address crime. He described this rapaciousness for arrest numbers with, "[Every district is] getting greedy. They all want us so the commanders can say we got numbers (P85)." This emphasis on generating numbers above anything else was not the expressed purpose of the organizational change and yet it was the perception. Field officers, like the ones quoted below, experienced this pressure to produce numbers and felt it was detrimental to doing good police work; potential bad actors were arrested on questionable procedural grounds and then quickly released.

*Officer: Well, our sergeant doesn't give us a reprisal. We just need to show productivity to him. He's good about it. I'll tell you though things really went "shitty" when the Level 2 [DOC] came about.*

*Interviewer: What do you mean?*

*Officer: You need some down time to get a quality arrest. Now, we are accountable for everything and we need to produce numbers. The DOC should not tolerate arresting a 58-year old for drinking. A lot of times we make these petty arrests and the gang banger says, "I'll be out in 3 hours. Go fuck yourself." P50.*

Posted on the wall of one district was the sign, "Quality comes before Quantity only in the dictionary." Field officers often used this expression, like these officers below, when asked about policing activities conducted in the DOC hot spot.

*We do GET'M missions. They are usually for "bull shit misdemeanors. We never get anything good. It's all about numbers. We have a joke "quality goes before quantity only in the districts [play on the word 'dictionary']" (P85)."*

*"Sometimes they [tactical team] make up something so they can get an event number. Like, they might call one of their missions a "robbery mission" if they are having a problem with robberies. Sometimes, I think it's quantity over quality (P19)."*

Some field officers talked about *double dipping* (counting one police action as two activities, for example generating a traffic ticket and a contact card from one stop) and *fabricating numbers* to make it appear as though a DOC hot spot was receiving more police attention when in reality policing level and type of activity in the area had not changed, only the way they reported their numbers. While this perception of fabricated numbers was not pervasive, it was expressed by enough field officers, like the example below, to include.

*It's possible that district administration uses the numbers generated in DOC areas to cover up that they are still doing what they have largely done for*

*years. They tell the other District Commanders in the DOC meetings that they have made 39 arrests, 50 dispersals, 60 contact cards, etc. so that it appears that there is a concentration in the DOC areas. We have already heard that some officers "create" numbers after their shift is over. If the area is a DO, do they count all the individuals who they told to "get out of here" as dispersals and is this different than people they tell to leave outside the DOC? (P9).*

**1) "Smoke and mirrors"**

Another expression used by over half a dozen field officers was "smoke and mirrors." This reflective phrase to reflect on the innovations lack of substance and this sentiment was expressed by many field officers' and some middle managers' like the ones below.

*"It's all smoke and mirrors, if you ask me (P10)."*

*"With the DOC they want numbers...its smoke and mirrors (P34)."*

*"It's all smoke and mirrors. We do our roll call outside in an area where a shooting occurred...then we just all leave right after. Missions are 'clouded.' They produce bogus arrests. We can't just look at the numbers [Officer 1 stressed should be looking at quality of arrests rather than quantity]. However, one good thing is that it gets people off the street. Basically, we have less discretion. [We] don't want to be doing these petty arrests (P9.)"*

*"I think It's more smoke and mirrors. Seatbelt missions and street roll call were effective in the beginning but now people are used to it. The CPD is always going to be reactive. This DOC thing is just for show to people (P75)."*

*"[Last summer] we did Roadside Traffic Missions where we would block off a road and pull over every 5<sup>th</sup> car or so. At first we got a lot of guns and drugs. We used to do them every Friday and Saturday night. Our bosses loved them. We used to do them with the county and state cops, then they pulled out and we were doing them by ourselves. Now, people are used to them and we never get anything. We don't even do them anymore. We haven't done any this summer. It's all smoke and mirrors (P86)."*

Field officers conveyed an undercurrent of skepticism regarding the administration's motivation to innovate. Field officers perceived that the administrators wanted the appearance of change more than, substantive organizational change. The expression, *smoke and mirrors*, referred to

hot spot policing that emphasized appearance and produced numbers to show action but did not change actual policing practices. Several officers used the expression “100 dollar names” to refer to using strategies that were not new but rather just repackaged to sound new.

**2) “What gets measured gets done”**

*“An arrest in DOC is like the holy grail (P36).”*

While waiting to conduct a ride along, one researcher observed the following message on the dry erase board, “We need contact cards, curfews, dispersals in all spots” and vertically along the side of this note it read, “also arrests (P50).” These officers were specifically directed to conduct certain activities and as was observed in meetings certain types of police activities were more coveted than other and often in the DOC meeting given a department-wide emphasis. For example, contact cards were a huge emphasis during the DOC innovation, and so every week middle managers were asked how many were produced and thus field officers were expected to continue to produce contact cards. And conversely, certain activities were not considered important. During one ride along, officers gave an example of how a police officer and some probation officers got in trouble for trying to arrest one guy for drinking. They were intimated that this situation/type of arrest did not fit with the spirit of the DOC. One officer then asked, “Am I going to lose my job over a couple of retards? (P45).” He implied that an arrest for drinking in the DOC was not going to result in a number that supervisors wanted to see in a hot spot and indeed could get them in trouble. For the field officers there was constant tension between generating numbers but making sure it the right type of activity and in the case of arrests, making sure arrest was conducted well and would *stick*. One officer summed up

this tension with, “The bosses just love the numbers but they want them wrapped up in a bow (P45).”

### **3) Outcomes - Crime versus Activity**

*Numbers can be both good and bad. Maybe they are too worried about the numbers (P25).*

When asked to characterize the expectations and measures that mattered to the organization, field officers reported that their primary responsibility lay in generating numbers as seen in the officers’ quotes below.

*We try to get one felony per day. It’s our job to get “heads.” You can also tell if there are few shootings in a particular week. Less violence. Central command lets us know by the stats they give us; otherwise they don’t really say anything to us (P17).*

*Officer 1: [laughing] “They don’t “toss” us”*

*Officer 2: “They say “thatta boy, keep it up.” [He laughs]. “No, they look at the numbers; higher numbers mean we are doing a good job. That was really the case in my old district. They got on you about numbers. Even patrol officers. Patrol officers can’t help it. They might be busy all day responding to calls and not have time to make arrests. There was added pressure to make arrests in the DOC (P84).”*

*There are three teams in the district. Two to three officers ride in each squad car. What we try to do is make at least one arrest a day, and five in a week. If we do all five in one day, it’s considered a weeks’ worth (P48).*

For the field officers in this study they also expressed responsible to their immediate supervisors and they characterized this accountability differently than that due to the larger organization. They expressed more of a kinship toward their immediate supervisors, like the officer quoted below.

*“Depends on what the sergeant says.” Success is through the Sarge’s eyes. If the sergeant says we did what we were supposed to do, then it was a good week (P26).*

Additionally, field officers expressed frustration about the expectations held for their immediate supervisors. Many talked about how it was unfair to hold middle managers accountable for crime rates. Despite this acknowledgement that the expectation was unfair to their supervisors, these did not feel the burden of that expectation but saw it as something only their managers faced.

Middle managers not surprisingly were more likely to refer to being reprimanded in the DOC meeting when asked about expectations and measures that mattered. Some middle managers, like the ones below, responded similarly when asked, “How do you know you were successful?”

*Officer: (laughing) “When they don’t call you out at the meetings. No, I mean, success stories. Officers get commendations. Downtown knows. They look at stats. They compliment. If arrests are down and crime is up; you’re not doing your job or you need help (P42).*

*“When you sit in a DOC meeting and they don’t call on you.” If something does happen –You have to say what you did, seatbelt missions, where, why, reverse stings. You have to give them all of your numbers. What you have done and what resources you put there (P14).*

*You never know what you are preventing so the only real gauge is the numbers like contact cards, arrests, etc. Numbers are substantive if you are where you are supposed to be, the only way to show our officers are out there are by our numbers. “Some officers don’t like that.” There are an extraordinary number of arrests in this district. “probably double” that of any other district...maybe more than the rest of our area combined (P15).*

Special unit middle managers were more likely to say that activity numbers were the most important outcome measure for their units whereas other middle managers talked about the

crime rate as the measures that mattered. This is not surprising given that special units were not affiliated with any specific geography in the department.

As the several middle managers indicated below, they perceived the reduction or suppression of crime in their areas was the main performance indicator. Some saw this shift away from previous performance measures that only focused on activity.

*If nothing happened in the DOC areas (P1).*

*We're graded on last seven days, personally I don't think they [the DOC people] care if we make arrests, as long as they are "no murders that equates success." "I think we are great at discussing the past 7 days and activities and arrests are not as important." The old days we were graded on how many arrests we made. I think now "they want to do more deterrence of crimes and that's what the Saturation team is designed for." I will look at stats from the previous weeks if crime is down it's a successful week and the amounts of arrests. We also look at the types of crimes. Even if we make a lot of arrests but crime is up that is not a successful week. I measure success by the crime rate (P74).*

*"By reduction in violence." This might be the arrest of high profile gang leaders. "Diffuses the situation." "Anything that reduce violence." (P23).*

Some middle managers expressed confusion over expectations. The example below illustrates this confusion.

*There is a dilemma with that. Used to be graded on the number of guns. Our freedom has diminished. Now, a good job...is when there is no arrests [this commander means that if crime is down than his unit is not getting arrests]. Last summer in small areas the CPD had "Operation Safe Summer." There was only three aggravated batteries in the area – a "catch-22." The arrests are lower than last year. We are arrest driven...used to wander out of the area... "now tightening that up." (P72).*

He was not sure how to evaluate his team or how they would be evaluated. Indeed, this *Catch-22* whereby the outcome of reduce crime obfuscates the usual performance measures of activity was a problem in evaluating performance. Officers felt responsible to produce numbers but if crime was down because of the strategy then numbers would be harder to generate. This tension was evident in many of the meetings observed, as the message communicated was: *crime was down that is good but we need you to generate numbers so we know you are working*. One middle manager summed up this with the quote below.

*Headquarters is not looking at the whole thing, if they call and say your guys aren't doing enough because of arrests. I say yes they are; they are talking with the community. We have a zero-tolerance policy. What this means is if we see someone committing a crime, we make a physical arrest (P74).*

This manager was intimating that his officers were going to make arrests when they saw crime but that they were not just going to arrest for the sake of performance measurement.

**g. "You'll never stop it (P5)."**

Notably some of the field officers interviewed, like the ones below, expressed frustration about the inability of law enforcement to truly address crime and felt that it was unfair to hold their commanding officers responsible for crime rates because these fluctuations could not be "controlled" by police officers. The following quotes highlight this perception.

*"They [headquarters] assume you should prevent the bad from happening. It's impossible. You can have 10 cars on one street then it [violent crime] occurs after (P25)."*

*"Well, I don't like how they make the commanders accountable. Most of the time it's not their fault. Like our commander, he's a great commander. He*

*rides out to crime scenes and does patrol all the time. Many of the commanders sit on their butts and just tell people what to do (P26)."*

*It doesn't make sense to me. Sometimes things happen in districts that you can't control. A gang moves from one area to the other. What are you supposed to do? (P28)*

*"Smart gang members move somewhere else, outside the DOC." (P4)*

*"There is always someone to replace the bad guys. We see more enforcement and assets. Sometimes the DOCs are more reactive. They usually put a DOC in a place after some shootings. That's not always good because sometimes shootings are a coincidence (P17)."*

They perceived that it was unfair and ill-conceived to think that police action could prevent crime problems. Field officers reflected on this perceived futility more often than middle managers or administrators. One officer summed up the perception of futility with, "The DOC serves as a "Band-Aid on a section for a week...other areas there's no police presence so the crime escalates (P21)." This sentiment did not appear to be specifically about the DOC strategy but rather more of a general reflection of the intractability of the gangs and crime. Whereas front line officers expressed frustration at the irascibility of gang culture, many middle managers and administrators' perceived that the right organizational changes could address gangs and the accompanying violence and they did not express the same pessimism.

In summary, field officers saw accountability as an imperative to produce numbers in hot spots (a lot of them and the right kind). Notably field officers received and interpreted the organizational strategy, collaboration and accountability, as an emphasis on numbers devoid of further analysis past, 'more officers and more activity is better and reduces crime.' Field officers and to a lesser degree middle managers often expressed that this approach was shortsighted.

Field officers also saw the accountability push as reducing their discretion and it caused low quality arrests to occur. Field officers characterized accountability as happening at two levels. First, they expressed responsibility to their immediate supervisors. Second, however, they did not see the numbers imperative as coming from their sergeants but rather their sergeants were hamstrung by an administration that did not understand and/or did not care about how this approach affected the officers or the community.

## **6. Leadership**

Although often constrained by external, situational, and structural factors, effective leadership is considered an important aspect for effective innovation or simply to get people to do what you need or want them to do. The best ways to lead people and why subordinates follow is debated but broadly we know that leadership in any organization police agency can serve as ballast for change – inspiring, rewarding, translating mission, facilitating implementation through communication and performance feedback, and encouraging collaboration. This next section looks at how middle managers and field officers perceived leadership and how that may have impacted their buy-in and how they perceived and/or implemented the strategies.

### **a. Transformational**

Evidence of transformational leadership was seen in the perceptions of some middle managers. Many middle managers characterized the innovation as an initiative conceived, inspired, and driven by the Superintendent. When middle managers referred to the Superintendent it was with reverence and respect in almost all cases. Middle managers like the one below, reported

how the Superintendent inspired the change, defined the vision and mission, and was ultimately responsible for the outcomes.

*There is a focus on high crime areas with saturation. He [Superintendent] is putting police where the crime is, in a nutshell. That is what he does. Some of his, a lot of his strategies are proactive. Puts us, for example, in an area where there may not be nothing going on but will be. Because of Cline there is a decrease in crime (P74).*

Most middle managers appeared to be inspired by the Superintendent and how he communicated (and they perceived) that their participation and input was valued as seen in the observations below.

*Information is out there, so now you take it and you do something with it. In his [Cline] 20 years, he's been changing everything he touched, he always believed in information sharing. Other districts didn't have gang mapping or contact cards, now everyone does, everyone is doing a job. "This hasn't happened in the last 4 years, it has been 20 years... Cline moving up the ranks. Other cities don't have gang maps, gang data bases." Contact cards hugely important investigation tool (P1).*

*"It's excellent. He has reduced all violent crime and all crime." We have never had a superintendent who lets us work the way we do. Before we were "reactive;" now we are "proactive." He has put "good leadership in positions." He has done a lot! (P42)*

*Officer #1 turned to me and said that Cline was well-liked and respected throughout the department. "No one wants to see him leave, he's really liked here (P80)."*

Unlike middle managers, most field officers did not typically reference the Superintendent when reflecting on leadership but rather referenced middle managers that had inspired them. Field officers appeared to buy-in when they perceived their immediate supervisors communicated clearly, participated in the action, and included field officers in the decisions.

When observed, this inspiration and buy-in seemed confined to field officers' perspectives of middle managers they served, rather than central administrators, like the examples below.

*"One of the best commanders I've ever worked with... been through 4 commanders." Their commander's philosophy is lock them up for petty stuff, if you get them off the streets then you reduce the chance of them becoming a victim. Officer said that commander wants officers to hammer them [gangs] with everything, let them [gangs] know that the attention is on them. Commander asks us to do something like concentrate on a particular gang, we do it because he takes care of us, he gets out of the car and makes arrests. Officers concentrate on "locking up gang bangers because these people [community members] deserve to live their lives." Majority are good people (P36)."*

*Officer #2: He believes in it 100%*

*Interviewer: So your Sergeant is big into the DOC?*

*Officer #1: Yeah because it caters to the gangs and he's huge into it. I believe he came up with a lot of the gang intelligence they have now.*

*Officer #2: Things gang intelligence does now, we were doing before (P5).*

When referenced, there was a difference between how field officers characterized their immediate supervisors, usually fairly complimentarily, and how they characterized the *downtown bosses*. For many field officers, they perceived that ineffective or ill-informed directives came from the top of the organization. The sentiment was clear in how the officer below perceived disenfranchisement and lack of confidence in the administrators' decisions (This quote from P29 was used early but this articulates a different point).

*The higher ups downtown don't tell us that, why would they? We are just the lower officers. We are not important to them. Like I already said, the decisions about where to patrol are made by men who haven't worked on the streets in decades. They are not out here every night and they don't care about what we have to say about it. They don't tell us if we are doing a good job, we never go*

*to those DOC meetings only important people go to those. It would be nice if they actually asked us what we thought might work (P29).*

Field officers, like the one below, often expressed affinity and defensiveness for their immediate supervisors; they perceived that the middle managers who oversaw and directed them were unfairly held accountable to produce outcomes out of their control (This quote from P26 was used early but this articulates a different point).

*“Well, I don’t like how they make the commanders accountable.” Most of the time it’s not their fault. Like our commander, he’s a great commander. He rides out to crime scenes and does patrol all the time. Many of the commanders sit on their butts and just tell people what to do. We have great respect for Commander (P26).*

**b. Transactional**

*“Everyone has to answer to someone even Cline to Daley. It’s no one’s fault our sergeant is getting heat from the lieutenant who’s getting heat from commander; it just moves up the chain. Everyone gets the heat (P5).”*

As the field officer above stated the chain of command and accountability was simplistically conceived by field officers and middle managers alike. Everyone *felt the heat* from the mayor on down if violent crime went up. Rewards and punishments meted to promote behaviors were observed to be mostly accolades or reprimands given in public meetings. The chain of command or hierarchy supported and dictated the transactional nature of the leadership in this police organization. Reportedly demotions or promotions could be based on performance as judged by managers but this type of consequence was not directly observed with this research. As these middle managers explained, organizational inputs occurred because officers do what is ordered of them regardless of buy-in.

*Everybody fights change. It becomes the best way to do it. "It's their orders (P2)."*

*"In meetings, if I say not to concentrate on tickets this week; not one ticket will be written up." (P23)*

Field officers' consistently pitted their discretion against the organizational demands. Like the officer below, field officers perceived that the organizational changes and the transactional forces promoting them adversely impacted their ability to judge and make decisions at the street-level.

*Officer 1: "Well, they want numbers." We have discretion, for example those guys drinking. A lot of times they want us to make an arrest rather than use our discretion.*

*Interviewer: Who are they?*

*Officer 1: The chain of command (P9).*

### **c. Great Man or Great Behavior**

Some field officers, like those below, perceived that they had great leaders. The leadership characteristic most cited as setting some middle managers apart from others was their willingness to go into the field and engage in actions like field officers; that they were still connected to the pulse of *real street-level police work*.

*I had been in the same district for 7 years and had some good bosses and had some bad ones. I mean, the Sergeants were great, but we had a really bad Captain in the 6th. The 6th district is a young district where many officers go to train for the first few years. Many of the officers began to think that Captains were supposed to act like that [like the Captain in 6]. They don't realize what a good Captain is. "That's not how it should go (P84)."*

*They were all in agreement that the commander is an excellent man to work for; most other commanders sit use this position to do "nothing until they*

*retire” but he is actually patrolling the streets.” He goes out there even though he doesn’t have to (P29).*

Cline’s perceived ability to adapt and promulgate his influence was cited as an example of leadership by some field officers and middle managers.

*A lot of the things we do today, Cline, when I worked with him in narcotics, he implemented these missions. When he became Superintendent he made them city-wide. For instance, tact teams do reverse stings (he provides a brief explanation: this is where undercover officers arrest drug dealers, lock-up drug dealers then replace them with our officers.) These are things we did in narcotics (P74).*

*I’ve “never seen things happen this quick, under Cline.” His main thing is “ideas to combat crime.” He has given us “crazy technology.” Now we have new weapons, Tasers, cameras, etc. He’s outfitted detectives with weapons. SWAT is now a full time unit. He’s very receptive to new things. Before you had to go through too many chains of command. He “changed the game.” He is receptive to trying new things out including watch commander meetings (P2).*

The ability and willingness to move between the administration and the field fluidly and unencumbered by the restrictions of the bureaucracy were the favorable traits and behaviors of leaders referenced by middle managers and field officers alike.

#### **d. ‘By-the-Books’ versus ‘For the People’**

*The officers talked about their immediate supervisor, their sergeant, and said that a good sergeant sticks up for his officers if an officer has to get physical. They said there were two kinds of sergeants, a “by the book sergeant” and “a people sergeant” (P18).*

Officers in this study, like the one above, frequently drew a line between supervisors that they perceived to be flexible, willing to skirt rules, and *back their officers* and those who adhered to the official policies and procedures of the department and stayed in line the bureaucratic

structure. As the officers below implied, the “for the people” leaders were viewed more favorable and perceived to be more flexible.

*Our commander should pick it because he knows what’s going on (P5)*

*Both officers were extremely complimentary of Commander \_\_\_\_\_ saying that he really understood District 25 and how diverse it is (P43).*

Field officers explained that this flexibility and leeway helped them accomplish organizational goals. Many middle managers characterized Cline’s innovations in this same way, grounded in the street-level experiences, situational understanding, and able to circumvent bureaucracy. Several middle managers, like the ones below, talked about how Cline drove the organizational change, philosophically, administratively and even strategically with this typical of situational leadership.

*They [administrators] are “so far removed from the day to day activity. It’s been better under Cline.” Seems like they listen more. They ask us sometimes in the district where trouble might happen. Some bosses are on the street. The CPD is no longer run by the “#2”. He’s [Cline] more in touch. We are also technologically driven. He [Cline] has given us lots of new things that help [references the computer he has in the car] (P17).”*

Field officers and middle managers, like those below, characterized good leaders as supervisors that listened to them and trusted their judgment.

*Officer #1: The DOC should be left up to each commander at the district*

*Officer #2: Instead of the HQ*

*Officer #1: We’re in direct contact with our commander we tell him everything and he could get us TRU and SOS. I love it when the DOC spans across districts. Like when it’s in 7, 8, and 9. That works the best. [The bad thing] is these DOCS stay for weeks but the streets change every day (P5).*

*“Sarge is good, she lets us do stuff outside of the DOC.” (P45)*

*Interviewer: Do you have to let your sergeant know that’s where you’ll be?*

*Officer #1: No, I have been here for a while and they trust my work and instinct they won’t say anything to me (P41).*

Both field officers and middle managers described how familiarity facilitated officers’ willingness to follow leaders. Like the middle manager below, officers perceived that close relationships enabled trust and made it easier to give guidance or follow the leader.

*“It’s great.” My guys are handpicked. I go through the Lt and say who we want and who we don’t want. You want “buddies.” You’re trusting them with your life. We’ve got really good guys. Nobody here needs direction (P3).*

Field officers, like the one below, typically assigned significant authority to their immediate supervisors’ evaluations of their work.

*Interviewer: How do you determine if you were successful?*

*Officer 1: “Depends on what the sergeant says.” Success is through the Sarge’s eyes. If the sergeant says we did what we were supposed to do then it was a good week (P26).*

**e. ‘Many Masters’ or None at all**

Field officers felt they received many and conflicting directives to follow and some, like the officer below, felt pulled between their immediate supervisors’ and the administrators’ demands.

*The admin [central administrators] will take beat officers off calls so they can walk the beat but then they [commanders] will quickly pull you off the foot patrol to answer backlog of calls (P10).*

This quote highlighted the finding that there was some conflict perceived between the administration and the district command staff. The observation of these competing demands for field officers' attention was reflected in one middle manager observations about officers having "two masters." He related how officers under his purview had to take orders from both the area gang lieutenant (him) and the district watch commander or district commander.

*I had all the gang and gun teams at weekly meetings. It is hard because they have "2 masters." It's 'cause I see them. I look at them like they are mine (P2).*

Although it was typical for field officers to spend much of their shift with little contact from supervisory officers, there were some field officers that reported and/or were observed to have little oversight and/or contact with supervisors. Typically, officers started their shift with a roll call or at least a check in with a supervisory officer in which they received some general guidance, usually around defining the DOC hot spot boundaries, and then the officers observed would spend their shift driving around generating activity, and/or answering calls. Over the course of officers' shifts, their supervisors would contact them via radio or cell phone and often their sergeants or lieutenants would connect with them in person during their shift either at the station or in the field. "Leadership" and "supervision" are not the same construct but they overlap and this observation seemed noteworthy when looking at leadership and innovation attempts. Some officers, like the ones included below (order of the observations, two lieutenants, a sergeant, and a field officer) conveyed this disconnect observed between some supervisors and some field officers.

*Some gang guys don't know who I am; my blackberry is how I communicate. I'll get called really late by the midnight gang team because you know the rules has been changed "lieutenants now have to accompany teams on search warrants, so I am very busy, very busy (P1)."*

*How do you communicate with your officers?*

*Officer: I'm not at the same location as all of my gang officers. I am headquartered here but I have to look out for all of Area 5. The Gang lieutenant and the Tact lieutenant do not locally control. We do have weekly meetings though. First the day team comes in, then the night team. "We do roll call and talk (P42)."*

*Officer: Lieutenant \_\_\_\_\_ is my immediate supervisor but it's strange because he doesn't overlap my hours. He is the filter of information for the Deputy Chief (P40).*

*Do you get information from roll calls about where you will be for the day and what is going on in the area?*

*Officer 2: It's not like the districts where there is a formal roll call. The sergeants tell us what's up.*

*Interviewer: So you have a meeting with your team and the sergeant?*

*Officer 2: Sort of. He gives us the scoop before we go out (P84).*

If officers did not communicate with their supervisors, then the mission and accompanying directives would not get executed. Their perceptions and actions would be less aligned with the organizational emphasis unless they were receiving information elsewhere, which did not appear to be happening in the observed cases of limited connections between field officers and middle managers.

## **7. Technology**

Some of the technology associated with hot spot policing predated the strategic intervention, like crime cameras mounted on light poles and computers in police officers' cars; however, technology was certainly listed as a main component of the strategy by administrators and it

was observed to be a focus of the organizational innovation. Technology in the field was perceived and experienced differently by the field officers and the middle managers. Overall middle managers, like the two middle managers below, were complimentary of the administrators' emphasis on technology.

*Cline introduced aggressive policing to take back the streets. His emphasis was to eliminate violent crime. He also introduced the utilization of more technology to fight crime (P11).*

*He [Superintendent] has given us "crazy technology." Now we have new weapons, Tasers, cameras, etc. He's outfitted detectives with weapons. SWAT is now a full time unit. He's very receptive to new things. Before you had to go through too many chains of command. He "changed the game." He is receptive to trying new things out including watch commander meetings. (P2).*

Middle managers perceived that some technologies had facilitated analytical capabilities of the department which allowed them to do their work more efficiently. This sentiment was clear in how the following two officers spoke of technology in the department.

*He thinks that the policies [related to hot spot strategy] have helped, camera pods especially. "Mapping has helped; has suppressed gang violence." The key [to reducing violence crime] is the supervisors. "We take any chance to get NAGIS [Narcotic and Gang Investigation Section] and Gang Units." He said that the districts work with headquarters. They take his Intel [as a commander and theirs [Headquarters]]. Gang Intel plays a big role as well [field officer Intel] (P37)."*

*The technology has made it very different. Now you have a lot of automated information available to you. You are now able to work on small geographical areas. You can go block by block to particular geographical areas and put your concentration on the areas that are obvious problem areas. Real time information and response, you can have a response within hours, which is very different from 10 years ago; information is at your fingertips (P14).*

As one officer explained, middle managers specifically perceived that cameras or pods, being hung around the city, particularly in high crime areas, were having a positive impact on crime.

*Pod Missions are useful. "We focus around the camera." The community likes them. (P37).*

The middle managers' technology perceptions, particularly those related to crime cameras, were the opposite of how field officers characterized the cameras. For the field officers in the study, like the ones below, there was skepticism regarding cameras; skepticism about whether anyone was even using them, their effectiveness to deter or solve crime, and how they were received by community members.

*Asked about the camera PODS effectiveness. They felt that they were great but that they didn't know if people were even manning/watching the cameras and gave an example of a time when shots were fired right in the view of a camera. Officer A, "People who live on that block [with cameras] love it, people who live on the next block over, hate it (P13)."*

*Officer #2: "The cameras have been up for a long time and last week was the first time they solved a crime with it (P5)."*

*The officers complain that some of the cameras in the neighborhood are worthless. Officer 1 "There was a shooting a couple of weeks ago...and when they went to check the tape they found out that it wasn't even plugged in." Officer 2 "I'll tell you what though...if they had one of those where I live, I'd be pissed off...have you seen how bright the old ones are...you'd never fall asleep." The officers indicate that the cameras are also ineffective because there is no police presence with deviant behavior, "Like anything, you test it a little bit, you test it a little bit, and if no one comes, you know no one is watching (P33)."*

*The pod missions, they just turn those on and leave them on. That's what they call a pod missions. I've only heard of one case where one of those cameras actually saw a homicide. Also, the stuff on their [video footage from the camera] is "almost impossible" to retrieve. We had this guy stabbed at Midway Airport and I asked to get the footage from it. They said I couldn't...it*

*was a dummy camera. [Officer 2 appears to be getting angry at this point] [he yells] HOW CAN IT BE A FAKE?!. We don't even have a cop retrieving information from the cameras. We have some civilian doing it. I call them sometimes to get footage. They don't even answer their phones. I mean, if you are on call you have to answer your phone. It's important (P51).*

There were at least some field officers that perceived the technology, in particular the pods, to have some efficacy. But even those field officers were relatively ambivalent about their effectiveness, like the ones below.

*Interviewer: Do you use the pods at all?*

*Officer 2: We use them often. Some are in real good locations. Some are in bad spots. "Gangs are getting immune. They either don't care or don't realize the camera is there anymore. District 11 has the most pods in the whole city. We used to have these cars where you could control the cameras from right inside the car.*

*Interviewer: You don't have them anymore?*

*Officer 2: Not in this district. We don't have them. They are a "train wreck." You have to be a block away. To use them you have to have these bulky antennas on the car and all this mechanical stuff. Better just to use them back at the headquarters [referring to district headquarters] (P17).*

*Interviewer: Do you guys use the pods at all?*

*Officer 3: They are accessed from the office. "We used to use them when we first got them. Not anymore."*

*Interviewer: Are they effective?*

*Officer 3: They are "alright." They don't really do a lot. Not until the whole city is covered in them (P28).*

For field officers in this study, having computers in their cars with the ability to access centralized data systems was the technological advancement that was referred to as having the biggest impact on their policing. Despite this acknowledgement, computers were frequently

observed to not work or had trouble connecting. This contradiction was seen in the field officers' reflections below.

*"[With the] CLEAR system on the new computers you can pull up pictures." They are really helpful but they tend to break down a lot. "But when they are working its good (P31)."*

*One of the officers had a portable car computer (PDT) and I asked him about what he thought of it and he said that he had lost information entered before due to bad connections and that it was awkward to enter information in the car because of the placement of the console. Other officers sitting at the table concurred with the assessment of the in car computers (P43).*

*The officers indicated that in this community, 50 to 60% of the people did not have IDs. That most of the time they do not know if people are lying, unless they run the information through the computer. This car had the computer removed today, and therefore, it was difficult to verify information unless it was called in. Officer 1: "It would be ideal. They are saying that in a few years from now you can put your thumbprint and the information will come up...but who knows if it'll happen (P32)".*

The plate reader car did not work the entire time I was on the ride along.

*The acting captain put us in the new "Plate reader car." An SUV type vehicle with police markings and a sophisticated computer system and scanner used to continuously read plates and compare them to data bases of stolen vehicles. When the received the plate reader car, it was "paraded around like Jesus Christ." The officer reported that it often misreads and throws you off and it cannot distinguish plates from other states and reads them as if they were Illinois plate numbers (P43).*

*Officer 1: Honestly, we pick up more stolen cars just by running plates than these plate readers do.*

*Interviewer: Why is that?*

*Officer 1: We know what stolen cars look like and know what is "hot." We have a much better ratio than these machines. We run about 40-50 plates a night ourselves along with the number of plates the reader catches. The*

*reader doesn't see the cars directly in front of us or behind us; only the ones on the sides. For some reason ours doesn't read warrants (P85).*

In many cases field officers provided examples of how technology accelerated their ability to enter, process, and access however there were cases where field officers perceived that technology had slowed down or interfered with their discretion. They had to enter the fields in the computer database or they could not continue with their work.<sup>29</sup>

*He made mention that they have changed how information is processed within the detective division. They used to be able to work on a minor case for a small amount of time; they would make the necessary phone calls but once they realized it was "a bullshit case" they would go on to the next case. This allowed them to "really sink their teeth into the big cases." Now, they enter all the information via a computer program, so now a case that once took them 5 minutes now takes them at least 30 minutes after they get through all the questions they are asked, if not longer. This has made the detective's job harder and now they have become so backed up with cases. He also said that there is a disconnect between patrolmen and detectives. When the patrolmen are filling out the information sometimes they write only 4 lines to describe an incident and this makes the detective's job harder and vice versa the detectives have forgotten how hard it is to be patrolmen (P12).*

One technology that was mentioned positively and sought-after by several of the field officers interviewed, like the one below, was Tasers.

*Interviewer When Cline came in? What do you think his impact was?*

*Officer 2: "I think crime went down. He brought in a lot of technology. He cares more about putting stuff on the street. For example, he put out a bunch of Tasers recently. Of course, we don't see them. There is such a long wait for those things. Things would be so much easier if we had them. Nobody would fight or run once they got tasered (P19).*

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<sup>29</sup> Notably, this problem is currently cited as one reason that police officers are not completing the new ACLU forms for 'stop and frisk' interactions with citizenry, they are cumbersome and lengthy.

Perhaps not surprisingly, technology was not received as positively by the field officers. Perhaps the realities of street-level field implementation like computer connections, software and hardware problems, and training, made it less appealing and accessible. And perhaps there was resistance to changes that were perceived to usurp discretion.

## **VI. Conclusion**

### **A. Overview of Findings**

Police reform and innovation have been a challenge for police organizations from the beginning. This dissertation uses a case study approach to explore police officers' perceptions during one department's attempt to innovate. Administrators introduced an innovation that targeted accountability and collaboration, and aspired to transform from an organization that was typically secretive and proprietary to one that shared and collaborated. The administrators wanted to tighten the connection between their objectives and street level behavior in order to reduce violent crime. How successful was this effort? The effort to connect field officers' actions with the administrators' objectives was largely unsuccessful. What did this effort teach us about an agency's capacity to reduce the loose coupling within the organization? Simply telling employees to collaborate and share, even if you are the leader, will not make them do it. Internal motivations, incentives, feelings of organization justice, organizational culture, and relationships are important factors in understanding actors' motivation to innovate.

#### **1. Summary of Hot Spot Policing**

Chicago's implementation of hot spots policing may have had theoretical support as an evidence-based practice and relevance to Chicago's violence problem, but there were places where the innovation fell down. Problematic aspects of the hot spot policing strategy identified in the field work included the size of hot spots (too large), arbitrariness (whole area is violent, so why focus on one spot?), there were too many hot spots (every police area got one whether

they needed it or not), they were predicated on old or incorrect data, the police actions disrupted the community, and the deployment of so many officers in one area caused friction between different groups of officers vying for action. Officers, in particular special unit officers, unfamiliar with the local community and terrain in which they were called to saturate may have caused community upheaval aside from any crime decreases. Also the heavy handed approaches (saturation and crackdowns) may have left vacuums of gang leadership or caused drug turf fights that ultimately may have caused more violence in the long run.

DOC analysts appeared to be fairly effective at identifying and elaborating on gang, drug, and violence problems with the information on hand. Even though field officers often refuted the accuracy or timeliness, DOC analysts appeared to do a thorough job of collecting and vetting intelligence, using the databases at their disposal and their informal experience, to create thorough profiles of hot spots. Beyond this thorough identification process, however, there was limited problem solving that tailored strategies to the specific hot spots. Instead, all hot spots were addressed with similar tactics and strategies that primarily focused on saturation and data collection via street contacts. The failure of police organizations to use strategic planning and problem solving in hot spots has been seriously critiqued (Rosenbaum, 2006).

## **2. Summary of Community Observations**

*“The statistical story doesn’t tell the community story (P105).”*

The administrator above talked about “post-Bratton New York” and how even with crime decreases, many communities still felt victimized. This administrator was concerned that the

very tactics used to address violence may have encouraged future violence and increased community members' feelings of being unsafe (Hinkle and Weisburd, 1988). The importance of community involvement was mentioned by a few administrators at the beginning of the study but the community *voice* was mostly missing from the knowledge gathered, disseminated, and used by the department and any collaboration referred to was unidirectional. When asked to reflect on the rationale of hot spot policing beyond crime reduction, field officers and administrators alike often mentioned cleaning up the bad guys and the drug dealing so that communities can take back their neighborhoods.

### **3. Summary of Accountability**

Police officers face conflicting demands -- they are expected to be productive (usually indicated by activity numbers) and adhere to formal procedures (doing this often makes productivity difficult or impossible to accomplish). Productivity is a matter of record, seen and evaluated by officers' supervisors and procedural adherence has low visibility to supervisors (but is central to courts). Productivity tends to win out over collaborative policing especially if officers perceive that their performance, approvals, and promotions rely on numbers (Skolnick, 1966). This perception was not unfounded as researchers observed arrests being exulted and connected to crime rates week after week from administrators at DOC meetings.

The CPD's theory of action with this innovation introduced accountability and encouraged collaboration as the way to engage field officers, making them feel more responsible and connected to the bigger departmental mission. This administration set goals of increased

collaboration, communication, and accountability but had no metrics, aside from police activity numbers, to measure progress toward these goals. Occasional recognition of a few officers at DOC meetings for collaborating with one another was insufficient to change the behavior of the organization. Every officer interviewed identified accountability as a new departmental emphasis but when asked to qualify what it looked like they alluded to all the new paperwork and increased pressure to 'get heads.' Police departments traditionally have not been good at evaluating inputs, process, or outcomes past counting numbers. Officers' decisions in the field cannot be easily controlled by command or review, beyond training, polices, and briefings (Reiss and Bordua, 1966; Skolnick, 1966). Today, more practitioners seem to realize that focusing indiscriminate arrests as way of controlling crime is a mistake. The focus needs to be on increasing the arrests of the right people - repeat offenders, high impact arrests (Papachristos et al, 2013).

Field officers seemed to perceive two layers of responsibility. They begrudgingly felt responsible to try and achieve the larger organization goals within the bounds of what they could reasonable do given the constraints of their job. And they expressed a more vigorous responsibility to the officers in their units and their front line supervisors.

Police districts are the organizational locus for most police departments (Rubinstein, 1973). And while middle managers and administrators reflected on the benefits of centralizing information and accountability, some middle managers lamented how this city-wide focus detracted and diluted district efforts to understand, address, and be accountable for local crime problems.

With all the efforts focused toward the institutional center, middle managers expressed that localized accountability and knowledge of their district, the hub for most police officers, had diminished and that this situation limited abilities to address local problems.

Middle managers sat in a translational position when innovation was introduced. They were responsible to demonstration inculcation and to communicate this mission and strategies to their officers and ensure they meet expectations. As shared in the results, mid-line supervisors feel pressure from both sides to meet different goals. Furthermore, many field officers perceived that mid-level supervisors did insulate them from the unrealistic expectations of the administrators. This position seems key to successfully executing organizational change.

#### **4. Summary of Leadership**

*The department was transforming attitudes of police officers. There was no need to rationalize the strategy, you just tell them, the police officers and the watch commanders, to do it (P95)."*

The quote from an administrator highlights a central question to understanding reform. How did leaders communicate reform? Was the message getting distorted or perhaps not happening? Perhaps first line supervisors did not convey the message. They may identify more with line officers than with management and try and shelter their officers from ill-conceived management imperatives. Although many field officers bought in to the overall strategy in largely theoretical and inspirational ways, they tended to see the faults more readily than middle managers. Rank changes ones' perspective on innovation. The more individuals were aligned or connected to the bureaucratic structure, the more likely they were to support the departmental mission and their perceptions were fairly consistent with the strategy ideal.

Perhaps the absence of critical thinking about the new approach can be attributed to middle management's limited knowledge of current street activity, but they were also more likely to endorse the strategy and be supportive of upper management as a means to keep their jobs and be promoted. Field officers characterized the innovation in less idealized ways because of their distance from the top and the realities of their day-to-day work.

### **5. Summary of Knowledge Management**

Knowledge management theory posits that the ability to transfer and use data is an organization's greatest asset. Knowledge management systems represent the processes by which an organization creates, shares, and distributes knowledge. The DOC served as this mechanism, combining knowledge gleaned from many sources to create and disseminate synthesized knowledge to better target police action. The DOC served as the central hub of knowledge sharing, trying to facilitate collaboration and break down silos with meetings and packets of information. Although field officers reportedly shared data with the DOC when asked, data sharing and use appeared to remain proprietary and localized. Field officers would reference the DOC data during their work to "cover their ass" however they appeared to rely more on their own knowledge of the streets.

Intelligence gathering was an aspect of this knowledge management strategy. The administrators pushed to get contact cards and arrests, in order to "get people in the system." The information gleaned from these sources helped police better enforce the hot spots. Since officers would have more information on people, they would be in a better position to

understand conflicts and the players involved, and thus engage in enforcement based on predictable events. The data that predicated the hot spots was the data that they encouraged officers to collect in those spots, creating reification scenario; the spot was hot because there was evidence of crime activity, now go be active in the hot spot and produce more evidence of its problems.

## **B. Implications of the Findings**

### **1. Implications for Theory**

There are implications for management theory and organizational change. When seeking to understand the process of change in police organizations, greater attention should be given to the process and role that accountability, leadership, and collaboration play. Theory of reform or innovation needs to include communication of change. Consider how different *supervisory planes*, particularly middle managers, communicate organizational objectives and methods by which to achieve them and how this impacts the front line's investment and adherence to the change strategies. Organizations need to go beyond inspiring their employees and create performance evaluation and supervision that rewards behaviors that are in line with the communicated objectives.

### **2. Implications for Practice**

Implications for practice include strengthening future organizational change attempts starting with a better understanding of officers' perspectives and motivations. As this case study demonstrated, focusing on activity as the sole performance measurement is problematic. It engenders insularity which is bad for organizational functioning and contributes to over-

policing of poor neighborhoods of color. Also this measurement imperative seems to get in the way of actual problem solving. Strengthening and focusing police organizational capacity to work in collaboration with other organizations to solve neighborhood problems rather than just focusing on outcomes would contribute to safer neighborhoods and increase police legitimacy.

Part of fostering connections and more closely aligning management's needs with those of line officers is the introduction of knowledge management systems. However, attention needs to be paid to police department's capacities to engage in crime and problem analysis. Even though police organizations today have more information technology and an increasingly greater capacity to process data that does not mean police department know how to use it. There may be limits in the availability, timeliness and quality of data. The types of data considered and included in knowledge management systems may not be comprehensive (community input comes to mind). The organizational culture may resist complex methods of analysis (Manning, 2001). Related to this resistance may be how adept line officers and middle managers are at consuming - understanding and interpreting - the information produced by knowledge management systems.

The police administration articulated its own theory of policing and crime control, some of which was consistent with prior research on hot spots, but as noted earlier, it left out a key component - problem solving. DOC analysts arguably did a fairly good job of identifying problem areas. However, the department's follow up strategies of saturation, 'stop and frisk', and arresting drug dealers and/or gang members did not solve the problems and may have

increased violence as drug markets were de-stabilized and contributed to further breakdown of community trust (Brownstein, Goldstein and Ryan, 1989). Practitioners need to think how they can use knowledge management mechanisms, like the DOC, to engage in thorough problem identification and solving that includes multiple perspectives and data sources including field officers and community members.

### **C. Conclusion**

Mayor Rahm Emanuel's Chicago Police Accountability Task Force recently concluded that the department has "no regard for the sanctity of life when it comes to people of color." It has failed to deliver adequate services, has mistreated people, lacks sufficient oversight, and has lost trust of residents. This is impetus for change.

Consistent with some of the case study observations about the importance of the field officers and front-line supervisors, the overarching change recommendations from the Accountability Task Force focus on ensuring the front-line is well trained and complying with policies and procedures. Additionally, the report recommends that the department hire and trains more field sergeants and orchestrate regular meetings with the front-line staff. But as this dissertation suggest, without introducing a new set of metrics to guide officers' discretion, the existing management system will override any desired administrative changes. The training of new supervisors must incorporate a new set of metrics if we expect a new style of policing in the 21st century.

The very tactics used to address violence may have encouraged future violence and increased community members' feelings of being unsafe (Hinkle and Weisburd, 1988). Officers were encouraged to use the DOC hot spot designation as a probable cause to stop people. Meaning if an area was declared a hot spot, officers and middle managers reported that they had more leverage to 'stop and frisk'. Anyone living or moving through a hot spot was subject to be stopped. This application of the strategy was problematic and most likely led to many people being stopped that may not have been had they not lived in a hot spot. These practices appear to have deleterious impact on communities, can erode social cohesion and are likely responsible in part for the crisis of legitimacy that the police department finds itself in today.

This is a tumultuous time in policing. Police organizations are being questioned about everything that used to define them. To achieve desired organizational behavior, address interstices in police agencies, and make change disseminate and stick, police administrators must promote an organizational culture that considers officers' needs and motivations (Chauhan and Anbalagan, 2013). Community's public safety priorities and input also need to be evaluated and integrated into reform efforts. Change is not an easy endeavor but a necessary one. This dissertation suggests that change is a complex process that must be carefully planned taking into consideration a host of factors. This research also suggests that change, even if prudently implemented and adopted, may be based on a limited understanding of the problem. The change or innovation may be inherently flawed. This suggests the need for careful planning around the concept and the incorporation of diverse perspectives in advance of implementation.

## APPENDICES

Appendix A

Interview Protocol for CPD  
**Version 2.0**

I. Violence Reduction Strategies

Obviously, reducing violent crime is the top priority of the Department lately, so we'd like to talk with you about what the CPD is doing in this area, what makes certain approaches more effective than others, and what challenges the Department faces in implementing these strategies and tactics.

Q1. First, what do you see as the most important strategies and tactics the Dept is using now to fight violent crime? What comes to mind?

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

5. \_\_\_\_\_

Q2. I have a few specific questions about these strategies *[See Appendix A for questions]*.

Q3. Now I have a few questions about some other strategies that we haven't talked about in any detail *[After covering the strategies mentioned by the respondent above, ask about those listed in Appendix B]*

II. Management Systems

Q4. Finally, I have a few questions about the accountability and deployment systems that have been created in recent years, involving the accountability and DOC meetings at headquarters. *[SEE APPENDIX C]*

**APPENDIX B  
LIST OF STRATEGIES AND TACTICS**

**A. Use of Technology**

- \*Pods (surveillance cameras)
- \*CLEAR: Data warehouse, AIRA, ARREST, Digital Mug Shot, Crime mapping, etc.

**B. Unit Deployment**

- \*TRU – hot spots
- \*TAC, Detectives, Narcotics, Guns, Saturation teams, etc. – hot spots
- \*CAPS – prevention and community engagement
- \*TURF-- prevention and third-party engagement

**C. Programs and Tactical Police Behaviors**

- \*Traffic and auto enforcement
  - >DUI roadside checks (“Operation Wolf Pack”)
  - >Seatbelt missions
  - >Impoundments
  - >Parkers and movers
- \*Gang and drug enforcement
  - >Gang dispersals
  - >Terry stop and frisk
  - >Buy busts, reverse stings
- \*Other hot spot enforcement tactics
  - >Directed patrols
  - >Vertical foot patrols (“walkdowns”)
  - >Curfew enforcement
  - >Contact cards
  - >Fugitive apprehensions
  - >Review of IDOC releases (reentry)
- \*Community and business engagement
  - >CAPS meetings
  - >Outdoor roll calls
  - >Citations of landlords and business owners
  - >Internet community surveys

APPENDIX C  
MANAGEMENT QUESTIONS: CSA and DOC

I. Accountability Process

Q1. What do you think of the accountability process that is in place – the idea of districts being held accountable for creating, implementing, and evaluating a Strategic Operational Plans (SOPs)? Good or bad idea?

Q2. How about the accountability meetings held in the multi-purpose room by CSA? Can you give us the upside and downside of these meetings?  
*[Probe: How do these meetings affect your job?]*

Q3. How would you describe the level of communication, information sharing, and cooperation among different CPD units that participate?  
*[Probe: What are the obstacles to better communication and cooperation?]*

II. Deployment Operations Center

Q1. What do you think of the idea behind the Deployment Operation Center? Good or bad idea?

Q2. How about the DOC meetings held in the multi-purpose room? Can you give us the upside and downside of these meetings?  
*[Probe: How do these meetings affect your job?]*

Q3. How would you describe the level of communication, information sharing, and cooperation among different CPD units that participate?  
*[Probe: What are the obstacles to better communication and cooperation?]*

**Appendix B**

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Impact of Hot Spot Policing  
Interview Questions – Police Personnel

1. Researcher(s) conducting interview:
2. Date and time of interview:
3. Length of the interview (minutes):
4. Location of the interview (i.e. Chicago Police Department (CPD) Headquarters, District):
5. Please tell me about your professional background. (How many years with Chicago Police Department? Various roles you have held in the department?):
6. How would you describe the Chicago Police department's mission under Superintendent Phil Cline?
7. Public violence has decreased under Superintendent Cline. When did this start happening? Generally, what do you think contributed to this decrease?
8. The Deployment Operation Center (DOC) and hot spot policing is a large part of CPD's mission. How would you describe the DOC and hot spot policing to a lay person?
9. What is your role as it relates to hot spot policing?
10. Have your responsibilities changed under the hot spot policing imperative? And if so, how?
11. Briefly describe how Chicago hot spot policing works
  - a. Probe - Describe the life of a hot spot from the decision to make an area a hot spot to the typical activities that take place in a hot spot to the outcomes.
12. What are the ultimate/ideal outcomes after an area has been declared a hot spot?
13. How does the CPD gauge the effectiveness of its hot spots initiatives? Department-wide and by specific hot spots?
14. Is Chicago's style of hot spot policing unique or innovative and if so, why?
15. Why does or why doesn't hot spot policing work?
16. What aspects of hot spot policing do you think are the most effective?
  - a. Probe – What hot spot activities or strategies would you say have stuck out as extremely effective?

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Interview Questions – Police Personnel

17. What aspects of hot spot policing are the least effective?
  - a. Probe – What hot spot activities or strategies would you say are not as effective? Why not?
  - b. What about displacement?
18. How has hot spot policing changed the collaboration between police units and bureaus inside the department?
19. Has hot spot policing affected CPD's collaboration with agencies outside of the department, for example community groups or city departments? If so, how?
20. How do CPD's hot spot policing activities and purpose blend with CPD's CAPS activities and purpose? Do they balance each other? Is there friction?
21. How has the community residents reacted to hot spot policing?
  - a. Is the response mostly favorable? Unfavorable? Why do you think that is?

**Command staff Interview Component**

22. How has the hot spot policing imperative changed the district level resources?
  - a. For better or for worse? Are district resources stretched or enhanced in your opinion?
  - b. Hot spot policing tends to centralize resources. Has this been your experience or has there been balance between district needs and city-wide department needs?
23. How does your district select level 2 hot spots?
24. Has the relationship between the special units and the district officers changed since CPD started with the DOC and hot spot policing? How?
25. In hot spots, how do the special unit officers interact with the district line officers?
26. In hot spots, how do the special units interact with the district gang and tactical units?
27. How are district officers coping with the additional and targeted strategies that hot spot policing requires?
28. Generally, how do your officers view the special units especially as they relate to policing hot spots in your district?

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 Interview Questions – Police Personnel

29. Generally, how do your officers view the special units especially as they relate to policing hot spots in your district?
30. What do you think about the DOC?
  - a. What are the best aspects of the DOC?
  - b. How could the DOC improve?

**DOC Staff & Analysts Interview Component**

31. Describe the information and contacts you use when establishing a hot spot area?
32. Briefly describe a typically week in the life of a DOC analyst.
33. What are most important factors to you when deciding on a hot spot area?
34. Describe the strengths and limits of street intelligence for making hot spot decisions?
35. Describe the strengths and limits of the formal CPD records and systems (i.e. CLEAR) for making hot spot decisions?

**Special Unit and Line Officer Interview Component**

36. How would you describe hot spot policing in the field? The actual rubber hitting the road aspects of hot spot policing?
37. Describe a typical shift for you as it relates to level 1, 2 or 3 hot spots?
38. One large component of hot spot policing is intense, forced enforcement. Why do these forceful strategies work?
39. After a hot spot is no longer a hot spot area, what factors determine if an area remains relatively “clean” (free of major violence, drug and gun activity) or if an area becomes a hot spot again? (e.g. District level officer activities, citizen group activities)
40. What percentage of the hot spots that you police become hot spots repeatedly versus one shot hot spots?
41. How do district officers and special unit officers coordinate in hot spot areas?
42. When an area in your beat and/or district becomes a hot spot how does impact your day-to-day job? Increased, decreased or the same expectations (patrol officer question).
43. How are your “hot spot expectations” different, if at all than your regular patrol expectations (patrol officer question)

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Ride-Along Protocol

**General ride-along questions**

Date:

Start (time of day):

End:

Officer's Police district of district wide affiliation (i.e. could be SOS officer or district-level officer):

Officer watch (1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup>):

Determine the geography covered during the ride along (police beats and police districts):

*Observer note: Particularly detail the hot spot area geography (i.e. Cicero Ave from California to Pulaski)*

Describe the officers (approximate age, race, gender):

*Observer note: Refer to Officer 1 and 2 distinctly when referring to them in the field notes*

Describe officer rapport when initially meeting and over the course of the ride along:

Describe officers' rapport with each other:

Describing the ride-along:

How did the officers split their time while you were on the ride along? (i.e. 50% of time writing traffic tickets, 25% driving around beat and/or police district, 25% parked)

*Observer note: try and quantify the ride along time either as percentages or time*

General feelings and impressions:

*Observer note: use this space to discuss how you generally felt about the experience and any miscellaneous observations that don't seem to fit in any of the other categories.*

**Police work**

List and count the instances of *official* police work officers engage in (i.e. called into dispatch X times, checked license plates X times)

*Observer note: "Official" is somewhat subjective but use your best judgment.*

Document any *informal* police work (i.e. talking with beat resident):

*Observer note: Document the interactions separately as vignettes and include who approached who first – was the car hailed down or did they go and talk to a store owner; include the nature of the conversation – small talk or specific crime or quality of life incident)*

**Hot spots general**

Did the officers talk about hot spots generally?

What did they generally say of about hot spots?

Did they seem to support of hot spots? Why?

*Observer note:*

Did they discuss hot spot strategies employed and encouraged by the department?

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## **CURRICULUM VITAE**

# Cody D Stephens

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## EDUCATION

### **University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL**

Doctoral program in Criminology, Law, and Justice

Expected Fall 2016

### **Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL**

M.A. in Criminal Justice

May 2000

Thesis: *Attitudes and Practice: Healthcare Practitioners and Mandatory Reporting*

### **Northwestern University, Evanston, IL**

B.A. in Psychology

Jun 1997

## EMPLOYMENT

### **Center for the Application of Prevention Technologies (CAPT) Consultant**

*Education Development Center, Inc., Waltham, MA*

Oct 2012 – present

- Consulted with state prevention leaders regarding implementation fidelity planning.
- Provided technical assistance and developed programmatic logic models with leaders of a statewide LGBTQ student group as part of Service to Science (STS).

### **Coordinator of Research Programs**

Sep 2004 – Sep 2011

*Center for Prevention Research and Development, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

- Consulted with and trained community- and school-based prevention providers to ensure evaluation efficacy and understanding.
- Served as the lead evaluation trainer and data collector for Illinois' urban and suburban community-based providers funded by Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) to execute the Strategic Prevention Framework State Incentive Grant.
- Served on national teams of evaluators and practitioners convened to develop standardized rubrics for SAMHSA grantees.
- Coordinated the evaluation of "Community Coalition Building: Responding to the Impact of Methamphetamine in Our Communities" funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and administered by Illinois' Institute of Public Safety Partnerships (IPSP).
- Developed and executed program evaluation methodologies for school-based and community-based family and youth programs.
- Managed qualitative and quantitative evaluation data collection processes and systems.
- Prepared Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocols, grants, and publications.
- Analyzed and presented data and reports to service providers and funding agencies.

**Coordinator of Research Programs**

Oct 2006 – Nov 2008

*Center for Research in Law and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago*

- Collaborated with research team including University of Illinois researchers and Chicago Police Department (CPD) personnel to evaluate policing strategies.
- Designed qualitative research instruments for field research; including interview, observation, and police ride along protocols.
- Oversaw and advised field research team.
- Ensured compliance with University of Illinois' Internal Review Board (IRB).
- Synthesized qualitative research findings in publications and presentations.

**Coordinator of Research Programs**

Jan 2004 – Sep 2005

*Center for Research in Law and Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago*

- Team member on project that examined the impact of web-based surveys, problem solving training, and police beat meetings on perceptions of crime and safety.
- Designed web-based measurement tools to collect data from community members.
- Collaborated with web developers to design Chicago Internet Project web site including compiling and refreshing web site content and advising on design.
- Documented and analyzed Chicago Police Department's accountability and strategic initiatives focused on reducing violent crime.

**Evaluation Research Specialist**

Jul 2000 – Jul 2004

*CeaseFire/Chicago Project for Violence Prevention, School of Public Health, University of Illinois at Chicago*

- Evaluated and supported violence and gang prevention program implementation.
- Collaborated with Outreach Workers and Violence Interrupters to collect timely and relevant programmatic data.
- Examined correlates of youth violence and program response and outcomes; synthesized findings for programmatic staff.
- Designed data collection tools for tracking high-risk youth outreach and activities.
- Analyzed and summarized survey and crime data using SPSS, ArcView GIS, and Excel.
- Wrote progress, outcome, and impact reports for funding agencies.
- Assisted grant writing staff with requests for proposals and funding reports.

**Research Assistantships**

Oct 1998 – Jun 2000

*Loyola University Chicago, Chicago*

- Sex Offender Probation Study – Reviewed, coded, and summarized convicted sex offenders' probation case files in three Illinois counties for analysis and comparison.
- Northwestern University Memorial Hospital Emergency Department Evaluation - Reviewed and coded medical records of women admitted to a hospital emergency department.
- National Judicial Misconduct Study - Interviewed participating U.S. states' judicial regulating offices for a misconduct and sanction study.
- Great Lakes Technology Transfer Center (GLATTC) - Coordinated and conducted field interviews with key informants in the substance abuse field.

## TRAININGS & PRESENTATIONS

- ART WORKS Panel on Gun Policy, Education & Youth Violence (Ander, R., Daley, C., Diaz, E.)  
Panel Discussant, Chicago, IL. Sep 2015
- Evaluating Environmental Change Strategies for Prevention CAPT Webinar* Jun 2013
- Coalition Member Survey Results: Understanding them and using them*  
Illinois SPF-SIG Grantee Meeting, Chicago, IL Jun 2010
- An Evaluation of Gang Hot-Spots Policing in Chicago: Qualitative Results*  
American Society of Criminology, St. Louis, MO Nov 2008
- Illinois SPF SIG Implementation Fidelity Ratings*  
CSAP SPF SIG National Grantee Meeting, Bethesda, MD Oct 2008
- How do Community Residents View Hot Spots Policing?*  
American Society of Criminology, Atlanta, GA Nov 2007
- Are Community Residents' Perceptions of Safety Influenced by What the Rest of Their Neighbors' Think?*  
American Society of Criminology, Los Angeles, CA Nov 2006
- Can the Internet Impact Participation in Personal Safety Behaviors? Preliminary Results from the Chicago Internet Project*  
American Society of Criminology, Toronto, ONT Nov 2005
- Monitoring and Managing Police Behavior with Technology: Evaluating the Process*  
American Society of Criminology, Nashville, TN Nov 2004
- Police Websites: An Opportunity to Commend or Complain About the Local Police*  
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Las Vegas, NV Mar 2004
- Community-based Violence Prevention: Increasing the role of Faith Leaders in Violence Prevention*  
Illinois Public Health Association Conference, Springfield, IL Apr 2003

## PUBLICATIONS

- Alderden, M.A., Schuck, A.M., **Stephens, C.D.**, Lavery, T.A., Johnston, R.M. & Rosenbaum, D.P. (2012). Gang Hot Spots Policing in Chicago: An Evaluation of the Deployment Operations Center, U.S. Department of Justice Final Report
- Rosenbaum, D. P., Graziano, L.M., **Stephens, C.D.** & Schuck, A.M. (2011). Understanding Community Policing and Legitimacy-Seeking Behavior in Virtual Reality: A National Study of Municipal Police Websites *Police Quarterly* 14(1).
- Rosenbaum, D., Schuck, A. Graziano, L. & **Stephens, C.** (2007). Measuring Police and Community Performance Using Web-Based Surveys: Findings From the Chicago Internet Project Final Report, NCJ 221076.

**Stephens, C.** (2005). "Breaking Ranks: Changing an American Institution," "Breaking Ranks II: Strategies for Leading High School Reform," and "Shooting for the Sun: The Message for High School Reform" entries, *The Encyclopedia of Middle Grades Education*, G.P. Andrews, V.A. Anfara, Jr., and S.B. Mertens eds., Greenwich, Conn.: Information Age Publishing.

Rosenbaum, D. & **Stephens, C.** (2005). *Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department*. Center for Research in Law and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago. Published by the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.

Skogan, W.G., Rosenbaum, D.P., Hartnett, S.M., DuBois, J. Graziano, L., **Stephens, C.**, et al. and Institute for Police Research, Northwestern University & University of Illinois-Chicago (2005). "CLEAR and I-CLEAR: A status report on New Information technology and its impact on management, the organization and crime-fighting strategies." Published by the Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium.

Skogan, W., Harnett, S.M., Dubois, J., Bennis, J. Kim, S.Y., Rosenbaum, D., Graziano, L., & **Stephens, C.** (2003). *Policing Smarter through IT: Learning from Chicago's Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) System*. Report published by Northwestern University's Institute for Policy Research for the Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, Department of Justice.

Skogan, W., Steiner, L., Hartnett, S.M., Dubois, J., Bennis, J., Rottinghaus, B., Van, K., Kim, S.K., Rosenbaum, D.P. with **Stephens, C.** et al. (2002). *Community Policing in Chicago, Years Eight and Nine; An Evaluation of Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) and Information Technology Initiative*. Published by Northwestern University's Institute for Policy Research.

## **TEACHING**

*Research Methods 261*, Department of Criminology, Law and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL  
Fall Semester, 2004

## **VOLUNTEERING**

*Chicago Public School Local School Council (LSC) Member Elect*, John M. Smyth Chicago Public School, Chicago, IL  
Jul 2012- Jan 2013