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GRASS-ROOTS ORGANIZING IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

*University of Illinois at Chicago Circle*

PH.D.

1980

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GRASS-ROOTS ORGANIZING IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

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THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology  
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, 1980

Chicago, Illinois


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ENTITLED GRASS-ROOTS ORGANIZING IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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## PREFACE

Before starting this research project, I read most of the sociology doctoral theses produced by my fellow students at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle to get some idea of what might be expected of me as I undertook my own thesis. The theses usually started out with a string of acknowledgements, paying tribute to various people who had been especially helpful in one way or another. At the time, I wondered what caused these thesis authors to write the things that appeared in their prefaces. Now that I am finishing my own thesis, I think that I have learned the answer to that question. For most of us, I suspect, graduate study leading to the successful completion of a Ph. D. is a long term task with which one becomes increasingly but more ambiguously involved as the years drag on. For me the task has occupied nearly a quarter of my life, and I find myself approaching middle age as I finish it. During most of this time I have been wrapped up in details of one sort or another, yet at the end of it all, I am expected to stand off from this undertaking and write a concluding chapter in which I survey all that I have done and find a way to tie it all together. As I struggle with this immense shift in orientation, I find myself remembering that, when I started my graduate study those many years ago, I believed that the Ph. D. was something that I would bang out over the course of two or three years and that would be that. As I reflect on my earlier naivety, I also wonder what led me into this undertaking and what caused, or perhaps enabled, me to stick it out to the end. And this brings me to the point of writing the sort of things that I previously wondered why other people put in the front of their theses.

Earning a doctoral degree is an accomplishment that few people attain and even as I wonder if the results will be worth the effort, I have more than a little bit of pride in what I have done and I am grateful for the forces in my life that have made it possible. This extends to my parents who taught me that a sense of justice, compassion and dignity, in combination with unending but focused curiosity are perhaps the greatest gifts that one generation of mankind can pass on to the next. It covers my immediate family whose support and/or tolerance has enabled me to survive the graduate student experience. It covers my informants whose contributions of time and information were essential to this project. And it includes many other people who shaped my life in positive ways from my childhood to the present time. The relationships we humans establish with one another are wonderful in their complexity and I would neither know where to start nor when to stop if I were to name the people who have especially helped me to and through this thesis. Yet, at the end of it all, two people do stand out for the immediate impact that they had on my career as a graduate student and for their influence I am particularly grateful. They are Mildred Schwartz whose reinforcement of the standards of excellence set by my parents and the undergraduate college that I attended pushed me to do my best, and David Street who rescued my career as a graduate student when it was faltering and who provided the support and encouragement that I needed to finish.

The information on which this thesis is based came from many informants, most of whom were influential people in the organizations that I studied. From time to time, I have found it convenient to mention names during the course of my writing. Social scientists often use pseudonyms to protect the identities of their research sites and informants. If the research was in

any way important, the real names usually leak out, and the pseudonyms often do little other than to create problems for readers and for researchers who seek to do follow-up work in later years. The people who participated in the organizations that I studied have little to apologize for and much to take credit for in their efforts to make their communities better places in which to live. Their activities fell primarily into the public rather than the personal or private sector of human endeavor, and I have seen no reason to resort to using pseudonyms. In only one case was a pseudonym used and then because an informant felt that he had a special and legitimate reason for not letting his name become known.

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PART I  
THE INTRODUCTION

## CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a comparative study of twenty five ever existing Chicago area Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizations. The field work was done during 1977 and 1978. The research project was designed to provide information concerning the differential development of, and the succession processes existing among, similar formal organizations operating in substantially the same environment. The project was also designed to test the applicability of certain social science research methods to this setting; an approach which has not previously been used. By virtue of the type of organization selected as the subject of this research, the project addresses another substantive area of sociological interest, namely the use of formal organizations for effecting and routinizing planned social change, and it is perhaps best viewed as an extension of the resource mobilization perspective on social movement organizations as represented by Zald and McCarthy (1966, 1973, 1977, 1979, etc.).

This research was basically exploratory in nature. Not much work has been done that is equivalent or directly comparable to what I did. This limits the extent to which there was any good reason to make reference to to sociological literature throughout most of this thesis. The general relationship between this report and the comparative study of formal organizations and the relationship to planned social change will be briefly discussed in this chapter. The question of the research methods will be deferred to Chapter Three.

The comparative study of complex organizations has produced a substan-

tial body of literature, most of which falls into one of several categories representing different perspectives on the topic. The major categories may be summarized as follows:

1. A single organization case study that contains some comparisons with other similar organizations. Two examples are Bailey's (1974) study of a grass-roots community organization, which contains some comparisons with two other nearby grass-roots community organizations; and Clark's (1960) study of a junior college which contains one chapter comparing his focal organization with a large number of other junior colleges along a limited number of dimensions. In each case, the dominant focus is on the single organization and the comparisons seem more incidental than a major component of the research.

2. Conventional case studies of a few organizations where the comparison is an explicit part of the research design. Blau's (1955) study of two employment security agencies, one state, the other federal, is a good example. Studies of this sort appear occasionally, but they usually do not encompass very many organizations because the project would grow to unmanageable proportions if more organizations were included. When Corwin, et. al. (1973) undertook their study of teachers corps training programs, they found that they had to restrict their attention to a limited number of program components to keep from becoming overwhelmed by the task that was before them. A different solution to the problem of information overflow is found in Richardson's (1956) comparison of systems of social organization on British and American merchant ships. Richardson started with large number of ships and reduced his sample to two archetypal or abstracted ideal types, the British organization and the American organization, and then based his

analysis on these two ideal types. Sometimes single organization case studies come out looking like comparative studies of a few organizations when the organization under study is sufficiently large and complex. A case in point is Selznick's (1949) study of the TVA in which he described how the TVA was shaped by the competing and often incompatible interests of its several semi-autonomous parts.

3. As the number of organizations being studied increased, selectivity of focus appears as a means of limiting the amount of collected data to manageable proportions. Corwin, et al, (1973) has clearly described the need to study only certain aspects of the organizations in question. For Corwin, et al, the need for selectivity of focus led them to look primarily at two aspects of the national teachers corps program, the training sites (certain American colleges and universities) and the trained teachers (in terms of what they did and what impact they had in their post-training teaching assignments). Other researchers have had to face this problem of selective focus. Stinchcombe (1965) restricted his attention to the differential development of the organizations' internal authority structure in his analysis of American industrial organizations founded in different historical periods, and in their studies of school desegregation and water fluoridation Crain (1968) and Crain, Katz and Rosenthal (1969) based their selectivity of focus on obtaining information from a highly restricted set of equivalent informants from each organization (for school desegregation) and from each community (for water fluoridation).

4. The study of interorganizational relations where organizations are seen as bounded social entities that interact with the rest of the social world. This general perspective can be divided into two distinctly differ-

ent types. The first approach is that of organization and environment as exemplified by Thompson (1967) and others in which the perspective is that of looking out onto the environment from inside some focal organization. The second approach is that of interorganizational relations as found in Litwak (1970), Litwak and Rothman (1970), and Evan (1963) in which the focus is on the boundary relations among some set of organizations rather than on some focal organization.

The examples cited as representative of these four categories provide rather different perspectives on the study of formal organizations ranging from a detailed analysis of the internal dynamics of a single organization (Bailey and Clark) to a less detailed comparison of the internal dynamics of two organizations (Blau) or a comparison of the different components of a single organization (Selznick) to an evaluation of organizations' different systems for boundary management problems (Litwak). Viewed from a global perspective on formal organizations, the different approaches could perhaps be said to be complementary in the sense that each might likely be the basis for a different facet of some future general theory of formal organizations. However, if the approaches are complementary they are also effectively incompatible in terms of their being collectively incorporated into any single modestly sized research project. Recognition of this incompatibility led me to select among them and I elected to use the method of studying a large number of organizations in a rather limited way. The way in which I used selectivity of focus to study the organizations is described in Chapter Three.

Formal organizations have long been studied as the sites for introducing social change, be it intentional or accidental in nature. Moore

(1968, 1973) has suggested that social change is an on-going phenomenon in human society. Swanson (1968) states that, in contemporary society, industrial and economic organizations are increasingly designed to institutionalize or routinize the process of change, thereby making planned social change an important component of organizational life. Here the focus of routinization is on the organization itself. It must be able to routinely and regularly adapt itself to a changing world if it is to enhance, or even maintain, its place in that world.

Organizations, however, do more than just adapt to a changing environment. They also export or seek to secure change in that environment. Some organizations export or seek rather little change while other organizations export or seek change on a fairly regular basis. Organizations that routinely and intentionally export or seek to secure environmental change may be regarded as another class of organization designed for the routinization of change. Private sector research laboratories and the affiliated marketing units are examples of organizations designed for the routine exporting of planned technological change to the social environment.

Organizations that export change to their environment have long been studied within the field of formal organizations if the change is technological in nature or if it is a social or political change coming predominantly from an organization or organizations that are fundamentally "establishment" in nature. Although private sector research laboratories would seem to be natural settings for studying the process of exporting planned change, these laboratories seem to have been looked at primarily from the standpoint of the organizational careers of the scientists who work in them [e.g., Marcson (1968) and Hirsch (1966)]. Studies which

look at formal organizations as the sites of planned change have ranged from Schon's (1972) study of the development of the light cane to enhance the mobility of the blind after World War II to Selznick's (1946) study of the impact of the TVA on an entire multi-state region of the United States.

In recent years these organizational studies of planned change have increasingly been directed toward non-technological change, especially those changes introduced by the government. These studies have covered such things as the impact of fair employment practices legislation [Berger (1950) and Mayhew (1968)], racial desegregation in urban school systems [Crain (1968)] and in the United States army [Bogard (1969)], and the impact of job training programs for the unemployed [Main (1968) and Stromsdorfer (1968)]. This literature might even be extended to include such studies as Tussman's (1963) study of the on-going role of the United States Supreme Court as an active agent in the production and ratification of change in the nature or racial discrimination in America.

When the source of planned change in the political sector of society is an organization or organizations not part of the "establishment," then study of that change has traditionally been viewed from the collective behavior perspective rather than from the formal organizations perspective. This approach has given rise to an emphasis on strains as the underlying factors in change processes, and it has emphasized the non-rational aspects of change. Smelzer's (1963) "value added" theory of change as a process of stages which necessarily follow upon each other once certain strain thresholds have been attained is a good example of the formal explication of this approach.

In recent years, however, a new approach to the study of social change and formal organizations has arisen. This approach, which focuses on "social movement organizations" and emphasizes a "resource mobilization" approach to understanding change is the central theme of Zald and Ash (1966) and of Zald and McCarthy (1973, 1977, and 1979), but it is also used by other writers including Gamson (1968, 1975) and Tilly (1975).

Resource mobilization, as explained by Zald and McCarthy, looks at social movement organizing in economic imagery. Since World War II, social movement organizing has become an industry, with its financial base largely outside the constituency which would directly benefit from the redresses of grievances that it seeks. The industry has developed formal careers for professional social movement organizers who move from grievance to grievance and from organization to organization as the money and the general societal interests permit. A participating constituency of organization members or supporters may exist but it is called forth as needed by the organizers and is often built around "conscience constituents" who receive no direct benefit from organizational goal attainment but who have the necessary control over their work hours to attend rallies and demonstrations around the country when asked. Grievances are usually real rather than manufactured but the constituency, if one exists, is mobilized as needed. The constituency is rarely the base on which the organization is built and the organization's creation often preceeds that of the constituency. In contrast to this approach, the traditional approaches have emphasised organizational development as coming from an aggrieved constituency and as depending on that constituency for its development and survival.

By 1977, the leading proponents (Zald and McCarthy) of the resource mobil-

ization approach to the study of social movement organizations had developed a set of formal definitions and propositions for their perspective, but other social scientists [e.g., Perrow (1979)] were beginning to suggest that the model did not have the wide applicability previously claimed for it. Zald and McCarthy also (1979) seem to be recognizing that their approach has some limitations, but even so the model seems to do a good job of explaining a lot of what has happened in social movement organizing over the past couple decades.

I have said that my work may be considered as part of, or as an extension of, the resource mobilization tradition. This statement needs to be qualified in certain ways. It is possible to design research projects to test certain ideas or in ways that bias them toward certain sorts of conclusions. Although I was familiar with the writings of Zald and McCarthy before I started this thesis, my interest was strictly empirical and the close relationship to the resource mobilization model became apparent only after the field work was over and I was writing this thesis. My findings support the resource mobilization model in many ways but they depart from it in other important ways. Some of these differences seem to have been due to the fact that Zald and McCarthy based their work on organizations which do not fully resemble the ones that I studied. The ways in which my work supports and diverges from the Zald and McCarthy model will be discussed in the concluding section of this thesis where direct comparisons between their work and my findings can be made.

Although the twenty five organizations in my sample are basically similar in type, and have all existed in a relatively similar environment, they have shown rather different developmental patterns and exploring the reasons

for these differences is the major focus of my research.

In sociology research methods classes, the students are usually taught that research begins with a theoretical question for which an answer, or at least some empirical clarification, is sought. Most real life research probably does not start out in that way and this project was no exception. The project began with an available site and some personal curiosity. During 1976, I was a member of a church committee that ended up overseeing a community worker who was assigned to work with a neighborhood Alinsky-style community organization under the day-to-day direction of the staff director of the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA), a city-wide coalition of these grass-roots community organizations. MAHA was then receiving the participation of some 30 to 40 local neighborhood organizations. I had only a minimal awareness of Saul Alinsky and his methods, but planned social change had long been a major interest of mine, and was the general subject around which my graduate work in sociology was oriented. MAHA seemed like an interesting example of people's attempts to change their urban environment, and with the support of the MAHA staff director, I began looking at MAHA as a thesis topic. My interest soon shifted from MAHA to the participating community organizations, and from there to Alinsky-style community organizations in general.

I soon learned that there were a lot of these organizations, most of which had been started since the mid-1960's and I learned that these organizations have displayed a wide variety of growth patterns; some died, some declined, some prospered, and a few worked their way into or out from the Alinsky tradition.

The research project began with the question: why has this happened?

This, of course, was not the only substantive question that I could have asked. I could have considered such things as organizational recruitment processes, internal dynamics, informal and formal structures, goal attainment, and a wide variety of similar topics. However, a research project must have some central focus or it is likely to produce much involvement in an activity that does not go anywhere. My core concern, understanding and explaining these diverse developmental patterns, did not lead me to ignore these other questions; rather it involved addressing them selectively when and where they became relevant to the basic question that I had asked.

There is not yet any well developed body of literature on these community organizations. What literature does exist is long on self-serving reports (most are favorable, a few are negative) but short on hard facts. As a result my research and this thesis are short on hypothesis testing and long on exploratory evaluation. The substantive literature on the Alinsky organizations consists of three case studies of Chicago area organizations, Bailey's (1974) study of the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) and Fish's study of the Organization for the Southwest Community (OSC) (1966) and of The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) (1973). These case studies are rich in detail about what was going on in the organizations but they are deficient in explanations for why the organizations developed as they did. The reason is obvious: by being restricted to a single object of analysis, the case study lacks a good reference point from which to assess the causal significance of that which has been observed. For example, Bailey proposed in his study of the OBA that the survival of an Alinsky organization depends upon the existence of a perceived threat to

the neighborhood and upon the presence of a sufficiently large middle-class element in the community that can respond to the threat. The model seemed to fit both OBA and OSC, but the question can still fairly be asked as to what causal impact this middle class base and perceived threat really have. TWO has survived in the Woodlawn neighborhood, which has about the weakest middle class base of any Chicago neighborhood, while OBA and OSC collapsed after the case studies on them had been completed despite the continuing presence of threat and of a strong middle class.

In developing this project, I set about to study the largest possible number of organizations so as to get the widest possible base for comparison in trying to arrive at an understanding of why the various organizations developed as they did. For any individual researcher, project design strongly resembles a zero sum game. Expanding the scope of the study reduces the intensity with which any component can be gone over. Otherwise the project will drag on forever. My compromise was to go for a large number of organizations each of which was studied in an identical but selectively limited manner.

I went into this project without having any good idea of what I would end up with. I started with a survey through the literature in the previously mentioned substantive areas of sociology and the three existing case studies of Chicago-area Alinsky organizations. This led both to a thesis proposal containing numerous hypotheses and to an interview guide covering a number of areas that seemed relevant to the basic question of organizational development. The hypotheses fell by the wayside during the transition from thesis proposal to finished thesis once it became clear that the they and my data bore little relationship to each other. In the course of working with

what remained, my data and my original questions, I number of strong empirical generalizations and some striking but quite unanticipated partial models of organizational development emerged. To summarize one's conclusions before they have been placed in context and adequately explicated is probably unwise, yet to indicate nothing about them at the beginning is also, from the reader's perspective, not helpful. Accordingly, a brief reference to the major generalizations follows, not in the form of hypotheses, but rather in the form of some not yet answered questions.

Size and longevity are important dimensions in the study of formal organizations. The relationship between size and age, and organizational health and mortality will be explored and some clear-cut trends will be shown. Another question to be addressed will be the relationship between local problems and money from outside sources in determining when organizations will emerge and how long they survive thereafter. The findings will indicate that money than are neighborhood problems and needs in shaping the destiny of a grass-roots community organization. The analysis of these questions involves primarily the question of how long organizations survive. Between birth and death, however, organizations can develop in many different directions. Exploring the question of why these differential developmental patterns exist leads to two partial models of organizational development involving distance from racially changing neighborhoods and the organizational mobility process into or out from the Alinsky style of organizational activity. Here too, the trends were clear although the mobility model is tentative because the number of cases is limited and the distance from racial change model is of uncertain generality because nearby racial change is a factor that does not affect all grass-roots community organizations even though it was a strong force in

shaping the development of most of the organizations that I studied.

The remaining chapters of Part I will cover in greater detail the definition and identification of Alinsky organizations, my research methods and the informants who provided the information that went into this thesis. Part II contains individual miniature case studies for each organization together with some summary chapters that describe the relationships that have existed among these organizations in the two sections of Chicago. Part III contains an analysis of the factors producing the differential developmental patterns displayed by the organizations described in Part II. Three appendices follow. The first contains a copy of the interview guide forms that I used in my field work. The second is an alphabetical listing of the abbreviations and acronyms used by the organizations that I studied. Most organizations are known by their initials. They make for catchy labels and they show up well on signs. I will be using these initials and acronyms for the same reason: the names are long and they take up too much space if written out in full every time that each appears in print. The third appendix is an alphabetical dictionary of the grievances or issues promoted by the organizations that I studied. Some of the issues have self-explanatory names while others do not. I found it better to mention the issues in the text and define them in the appendix than to describe each issue each time it was mentioned in the text.

This thesis began as a larger project that had to be twice reduced in scale before I ended up with something that I could finish in a reasonable time. The first reduction came near the beginning of my field work. My original goal had been to include all the Alinsky-style community organizations to have ever existed in the Chicago area. However my list of organ-

izations grew too long for me to cover them all and I decided to restrict my attention to the organizations in and around the Southwest side and Austin neighborhoods. The second reduction came after the field work had been completed. I discovered that I had collected much more data than I could reasonably analyze without dragging out the thesis completion several years beyond the time that was available to me.

## CHAPTER TWO

## WHAT IS AN ALINSKY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION?

It was easy for me to say that I wanted to study Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizations. It was not so easy for me to determine what these organizations were so that I could select a group to study. To insiders, the meaning of "grass-roots" or "Alinsky-style" is so obvious that explanation is unnecessary. To an outsider, especially one operating under the scientific norm of precise description, the meaning almost seemed to get muddier the further I went down the road toward clarity of understanding. It is probably safe to say, however, that the words "Alinsky-style" and "grass-roots" are substantially synonymous, and I will be using the terms interchangeably hereafter.

In the first section of this chapter I will present a conventional view of Alinsky community organizations such as one might find in the existing literature on the subject or gain from interviewing an experienced Alinsky-style organizer. The description that is provided is substantially correct but it is in the form of an ideal type and is thus inadequate for deciding whether real life organizations do or do not fall within the Alinsky fold. In the second section I will discuss the subject further in terms of how I managed to differentiate between Alinsky and non-Alinsky organizations as I went about the business of delimiting the sample of organizations to be included in this research project. The method worked in that I was able to come up with a list of organizations to study, but the method was riddled with unresolved problems. In the third section, I will come back to the substantive question of how one identifies Alinsky organizations with a modified

perspective which is based on some generalizations that I developed after the field work for this project had been completed.

## I. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW

Saul Alinsky achieved a degree of immortality through the identification of his name with a particular style of organizational development. While Alinsky and his method have been labelled as controversial or even subversive (see Bailey 1974, Fish 1966,1973), Alinsky (1966) states that his goal has only been to extend the benefits and practice of democracy to the "have-not" elements of our population. Alinsky (1966,1973) contends that power and resources are unequally distributed among the people and that the "haves" will not give up their privileged position without a struggle. The name of the game is power and only by developing power to offset the power of the elite will the "have-nots" ever significantly improve their position. Power can not be pulled out of a hat or borrowed, it must be built from whatever resources the "have-nots" actually possess. The three primary resources available to the "have-nots" are: (1) bodies, (2) a capacity for organization, and (3) our egalitarian ideals and the demonstrable discrepancy between the ideal and the real. [Notes 2, 3]

The Alinsky solution, then, is to develop a certain sort of mass-based or grass-roots community organization. [Note 4] Alinsky community organizations can be described in terms of an ideal type model of how they get started and of how they operate thereafter. According to this model as it is described by Alinsky (1969,1972), Fish (1966,1973), and Bailey (1974),

an organization is started when some group (usually the local churches, sometimes including other civic organizations or leaders) in a declining or threatened community perceives a need for a community organization and calls in an expert for guidance. The expert is an Alinsky organizer who is selected because he has a reputation for successfully organizing other communities. The group that calls in the organizer will not necessarily have a good understanding of the kind of package that it is buying, although this has been changing in recent years as Alinsky organizations have become more common and a greater general awareness of their characteristics has developed.

The organizer specifies certain preconditions which must be met: the sponsoring group must put up enough money to keep the prospective organization solvent for about two years, and a mass meeting must be held so that the people of the community can authorize and legitimate the organizing effort. Once these steps have been taken, the organizer brings in some assistants and they go out in the community looking for potential leaders and community problems. This is done not by going to the recognized civic leaders (although contact will usually be made with them), but rather by going out to the taverns, the street corners, the PTA's, etc. looking for the basic community infrastructure and trying to tap the indigenous leadership which has developed within it.

Once the groups, the leadership, and some problems (called issues) have been found, the organizer starts holding meetings to deal with the issues and to prepare for a community convention at which the new community organization will be formally established. At the convention policies will be voted on, a leadership structure will be established and leaders will be

elected to the leadership positions, and a mandate will be established for the organization to continue working on the problems that it has identified.

The new organization is an umbrella of lesser community and civic organizations many of which have been created by the organizers in preparation for the convention. The membership units of the community organization are these other community and civic organizations. The usual restrictions are that the member organization be located in the community and that it have at least fifteen members. Each member group sends a delegation to the community organization. The number of delegates is usually set in proportion to the size of the member organization. Churches and other large organizations which contain other organizations such as altar societies, women's groups and various committees, may send many delegations since each committee can be considered as a separate member group.

The convention is usually a large and noisy affair. It will have about 1000 delegates from 75 to 150 member groups. Officers will be elected and a senate (much smaller than the convention congress) will be selected to run the organization between the annual conventions.

The officers, the senate and any other dominant participants (i.e., the leaders) run the organization and are involved as much as possible in the day-to-day decision-making. The function of the organizer is to serve as a catalyst who keeps the organization going. The organizers keep track of things, do the street work (such as knocking on doors or recruiting new participants), help identify the issues and develop strategies for working on them, help organize and prepare for meetings, and work to obtain the involvement or participation of the largest possible number of people. The organizers are facilitators: their role is to help the people decide what to do and

then to help them do it. They do not run the organization for the people.

As the organization develops it comes to accept an "us-them" perspective on the problems or issues on which it works. The problems are seen as being caused by outsider groups which become targets or antagonists. Issues which do not have a good external target tend to be avoided. The task of the organization is to bring the community together, not to turn it loose upon itself. If the problem is garbage, the target is the city for not picking it up better. The target is not the sloppy neighbor who in large measure contributes to the problem. Confrontation and negotiation go hand in hand as means of working on the problems.

The task of the organizers, the professional staff, is to keep the organization running in this manner: to maintain the "us-them" perspective, to help the leaders find ways to keep the organization financially solvent, to beat the bushes for new recruits, and to keep the participation level high.

The problem with the Alinsky model as it has just been described is that, despite its relative clarity, it is not all that useful. Most of the organizations that were included in this study fit the model rather poorly and the rest, principally a few of the bigger organizations, fit the model well only during their early years. Most organizations give at least lip service to the idea of being an umbrella organization, but most accept individual memberships and all recognize that leadership ultimately comes from individuals due to their personal interest and concern rather than from their supposed role as delegates from some member organization. All the organizations have used confrontation at one time or another but virtually all show considerable restraint in their use of this tactic.

Most organizations regard confrontation as a tactic that worked in its day, but they feel that its day has now passed. Most organizations have never held a convention. Those that have usually have done so only for the first three or four years. Others hang in longer but have not held conventions on a regular basis. Some organizations hold "annual meetings" but many more replace their officers and formal leaders on an informal and irregular basis as incumbents resign, move away, or lose interest.

Despite the limitations possessed by this model, the organizations that I studied do have some common characteristics. They focus on issues; they are "owned" by the constituency; the staff serve as facilitators; and the leaders are the public spokesmen for the organization. The primary reason that Alinsky organizations tend to possess these characteristics is because the organizers try to make the organizations turn out that way. It is the organizers who push the idea that their task is to facilitate rather than to lead. Although a few leaders have incorporated this idea and have required that their organizers play a subservient role in the decision-making process, the bulk of the adherence to this model comes from the organizers themselves. It is they who stress their outsider transient facilitator status and promote the idea that the organization belongs to the people.

There are probably two basic reasons why things have worked out this way. The first has to do with the recruitment process into Alinsky organizing. The recruits are usually white middle-class young adults with some college background (the area of academic specialization is not important). Many are looking for a temporary interlude between college and graduate school or a career and can afford to work for a while in a field where the service potential seems high but where the hours are long, the

pay is low, and both are often irregular. They are taught by people who are already in the field. The emphasis is almost exclusively practical. People learn by doing and by being told how. There is very little reference to related social science or social service fields even in the Alinsky method training schools. Theirs is the only way. Hence there is no need to look elsewhere for better or more effective ways of doing things. If this description seems rather anti-intellectual, that is not accidental. Most of the organizers that I talked to, including the local leaders in the field, said that they had never read anything on community organizing. They sincerely felt that what they did not know about organizing was not worth knowing [Note 5]. As a result, Alinsky organizing seems to have become a closed field where organizers become experts quickly. Their way of doing things does not change because organizers come to perceive themselves as being part of a special process and because there is little outside interference with this socialization process. Recruits who do not fill this bill do not last very long, those who do last a year or so are soon elevated to positions as trainers and supervisors of the next generation of new recruits.

The second reason why organizers have become the primary vehicle for maintaining this organizational model has to do with the role the organizers play in the organizations for which they work. Few leaders try to keep their organizers in a subservient position. The leaders are part-time participants, the organizers are in the thing full time. Very little happens in the organization that they do not have a hand in. They identify the issues and devise ways of working on them. They bring in the recruits and have a lot of influence over who works their way up the

leadership ladder and when. They are at the center of the communications network and they have a lot to say about who gets told what. The organizers write the grant applications that sometimes bring in some money and they have influence over where much of the rest of the money comes from. In many cases the organization leadership does not control all the money that pays the organizers' salaries and this gives the organizers further autonomy from the leaders.

The organizers know that, despite their ideology of being merely facilitators, they are essential to the organization. The leaders usually seem to know it, too. In a way the organizers can afford to promote this organizational model. They have a high degree of informal control over what happens in the organization and the leaders seldom try to demean their profession.

## II. FINDING A SAMPLE TO STUDY

In the previous section, I described Alinsky organizations in a general sort of way. To study them, however, one must be able to identify them in a more specific sort of way. The individual organizations comprising a list of all ever-existing Chicago area Alinsky organizations might be identified through any of several methods. Two methods, however, stand out both in terms of their plausibility and in their frequency of use in sociological research. The first method involved producing a set of generally acceptable criteria by which the organizations in question might be distinguished and then selecting organizations based on how well they fit the criteria. The

TABLE 1

## A LIST OF ALINSKY ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS

1. A "People's Organization."
2. A "grass-roots" constituency and a high level of citizen participation.
3. A professional staff, usually made up of outsiders, who help the people run the organization.
4. Staff stays in the background, the up front spokesmen are the leaders from the ranks of the grass-roots constituency.
5. A well defined territory which the organization claims to represent and within which its grass-roots constituency lives.
6. Inclusive rather than exclusive in nature.
7. Works on a wide variety of community problems which are called issues.
8. Issues are handled using direct action - confrontation tactics coupled to an "us-them" perspective.
9. A formal structure which emphasizes membership through participation in other community groups (block clubs, churches, etc.), a big annual convention, formal leaders and numerous committees, all of which are set up to encourage as much participation by as much of the constituency as is possible.

second method involved identifying some recognized experts on Chicago area Alinsky organizations and asking them to produce the list based on their direct knowledge of the subject.

In the sociological Garden of Eden, both methods would work and produce equivalent lists or only one method would work and there would be no question about the adequacy of the list. In our real world, both methods sort of work, but they produce different lists. This has made the business of identifying Chicago area Alinsky organizations a bit messy and problematic. I will first explain why identification was problematic and I will then describe the process whereby I produced the list of organizations that I used for this study.

To work from a list of objective criteria is often regarded as preferable to using more subjective methods. Table 1 contains a list of criteria by which Alinsky organizations may be identified. The list was developed from the writings of Saul Alinsky, from the aforementioned case studies of Chicago area Alinsky organizations, and from some preliminary interviews with several generally recognized experts (all were well known practitioners, not academic researchers) on the subject of Alinsky organizations.

The problem with this list is that it fits the ideal type described in Section One rather well, but it does not provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for discriminating among real world organizations. Many social movement organizations which are not generally regarded as falling within the Alinsky tradition fit the criteria better than do some organizations which are considered to be within the fold. [Note 6]

Refining the criteria until they permitted me to discriminate suitably among actual organizations might have been an interesting intellectual task,

but it would not have helped in preparing for this research project. Successive improvements in the criteria would have to be tested against some yardstick of comparison, and this yardstick would almost certainly have to be a list of organizations produced using some other method. If the yardstick was a good one, the list would be reliable and I would already know which organizations to study.

It seemed best, therefore, that I pick another approach to identifying the organizations that I wanted to study. Thus it was that I went to three well known Alinsky organizers and asked each of them to list all the ever-existing Chicago area Alinsky organizations together with, if possible, the names of possible informants with whom I might talk to learn more about the organizations [Note 7]. This procedure produced partially overlapping lists which included 39 separate ever-existing Chicago metropolitan area Alinsky organizations.

Although I did not realize it until I was well into the field work phase of this research project, securing a list of organizations from recognized experts in the field was not without its risks as a research method. The explanation of why this is the case involves a description of the professional relationships and networks that exist among Alinsky organizers.

There are three fairly distinguishable schools or traditions within Alinsky organizing in the Chicago area. Two of the three trace their origin directly back to Saul Alinsky, the third is a rather independent development. The three are:

1. Tom Gaudette - who was trained by and worked with Saul Alinsky.

Tom served as director of the Northwest Community Organization (NCO) and founded and directed the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA)

in its heyday before becoming involved in the training and placing of organizers for Catholic Charities in Chicago. In recent years he has become a one man consulting firm working with and helping grass-roots community organizations all over the United States. In Chicago, Tom Gaudette trained Shel Trapp, who went on to become director of NCO and then of OBA. Gaudette also trained Gale Cincotta. Cincotta and Trapp went on to found the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA), a city-wide organization that has served both as a coalition of existing grass-roots neighborhood organizations and as a resource base for founding many other neighborhood organizations. After forming MAHA, Trapp and Cincotta went national with the founding of National Peoples' Action (NPA), a national level coalition of Alinsky organizations, and the National Training and Information Center (NTIC), a resource base for providing assistance to and for training organizers for grass-roots community organizations. MAHA and NTIC have been the mechanism for forming many of the organizations that were included in this study and for providing organizers for even more of these organizations.

2. Ed Chambers and the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) - Ed Chambers was also trained by Saul Alinsky and served as Director of the Organization of the Southwest Community (OSC) and of The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). When Alinsky died, Chambers became the director of IAF, which Alinsky had created as the institutional base for his organizing efforts. The IAF founded OSC and TWO along with many other organizations and has been a consultant to the Citizens Action Program (CAP), another city-wide coalition, as well as to The Organization of the

Northwest (TON), the Community Improvement Association (CIA) and it has provided consultation and leadership and organizer training to many other organizations throughout the United States. Since the IAF is so directly connected to Saul Alinsky, it tends to hold the view that it is the only legitimate channel through which Alinsky organizations can be founded. The IAF operates at the national level and has not done much in Chicago in recent years. During 1979 the IAF moved its offices from Chicago to New York to be closer to some of the places where it is doing things.

3. The Midwest Academy - a training school set up by civil rights and anti-(Viet-Nam) war activists who found the Alinsky method to be valuable in their work. The Academy has no direct connection to Alinsky and its trainees work primarily for the larger scale issue-based grass roots organizations. It has not played a direct role in the founding of any neighborhood organizations in Chicago, but its trainees have worked as organizers in some of the organizations that I studied.

The differences between these three traditions are few and the range of variation within any tradition far exceeds the differences among them [Note 8]; however, the traditions have remained separate. There has been more than a little mobility of organizers across organizations within a tradition in Chicago, but very few organizers have switched between the Gaudette and IAF tradition organization despite the loose and decentralized extension of each tradition. This is probably partly because the IAF and MAHA came to support concurrent and partly competitive city-wide coalition organizations which provided a vehicle for organizer mobility within a tradition, and partly because there has been an element of

chauvinism within each tradition, especially at the organizer level.

I have previously described how socialization into the profession of grass-roots organizing is based heavily upon training by those already in the field. In this way, professional socialization has become a highly decentralized and commutative process of laying on the hands whereby those whose entrance into the profession has occurred at a level several steps removed from the top are not necessarily aware of the pattern or of the place that they fill in the larger process. This commutative process has worked its way across the United States and even into other countries. Although these three Chicago schools may not be the only ones operating across the land, they have spread their influence beyond the confines of the Chicago metropolitan area.


The commutative process of professional socialization has two consequences that are important when one uses professional experts as a means of developing a comprehensive list of grass-roots community organizations. The first consequence carries what might be called a positive value. Because the organizers are the carriers of the tradition, they are probably the best place to start in seeking out experts on the subject of knowing what are and what are not Alinsky organizations.

The second consequence carries what might be called a negative value. Because the commutative recruitment process is distributive and decentralized, the more highly recognized experts do not always know of the products of their progeny's progeny. This means that while the experts may be relied on to produce relatively reliable lists of organizations, they cannot be depended upon to produce complete lists.

For this reason, even though I did not become aware of the different

schools in Chicago organizing until I was well into my field work, I asked my informants if they knew of any organizations not on my list. In this way I learned of many organizations that were not on the lists provided by my original expert informants.

I took my list of 39 Chicago metropolitan area organizations (which had been produced by combining the lists given me by the three original expert informants) and I started my field interviews on the organizations. After about a month had passed, I realized that I had defined my research project in too grand a manner, and I concluded that I would have to reduce the scope of the project if I were to complete it in any reasonable period of time. As a result, the project was adjusted downward to encompass only seventeen organizations located in two sections of the city. The two sections were the Austin area on the West Side of Chicago (including the immediately adjacent city neighborhoods and suburbs) and the southwest side of the city west of State Street and south of 67th Street (including the immediately adjacent city neighborhoods and suburbs). The decision to restrict my attention to these two sections of the city seemed desirable for several reasons. One very practical reason was that I had begun my field work in these two areas and I did not want to exclude any organizations for which I had already done some interviewing. A reason of more theoretical import was that both these areas had been the staging grounds for a succession of grass-roots community organizations over a period of about twenty years. In each neighborhood, the first such organization had folded but a plethora of newer organizations had sprung up at various times and in various places over the ensuing years. Selecting these two areas gave me a good opportunity to look at succession processes among similar



THE AUSTIN AND SOUTHWEST SIDE AREAS OF CHICAGO

organizations operating within the same territory. The third important reason for selecting these two areas was that most of the organizations had not been studied by social scientists. The few which had been studied had not been studied in recent years and each had changed considerably in the years since the case studies on them had been completed and published.

During the course of my interviews on these seventeen organizations my informants provided me with the names of an additional ten organizations not mentioned by my original informants, which raised the number of organizations to twenty-seven. I was not able to gain access to two of these organizations, which left me with a sample of twenty-five organizations about which I was able to obtain enough information to include them in this study. The organizations, their approximate locations and approximate dates of existence are listed in Table 2.

My sample of organizations did provide the sorts of information for which I had been looking. I was able to study organizations that had survived and organizations that had folded. I was able to study organizations that had been pulled into the Alinsky tradition and organizations that had worked their way out of the tradition. And I was effectively able to study the succession processes among a large number of these organizations.

My selection was not without its liabilities, however. The selection process did not correspond to any reputable sampling technique. This meant that there would be some very real questions as to the confidence with which one could extrapolate from what had been happening with the organizations in the sample to what might be happening in Alinsky organizations elsewhere in the city. This turned out to be both a theoretical and a practical

THE ALINSKY ORGANIZATIONS OF AUSTIN  
AND THE SOUTHWEST SIDE OF CHICAGO

INITIALS	NAME	LOCATION	FOUNDED	DIED
ACO	Austin Community Organization	Austin	1963	1967
BCAC*	Brainard Community Action Council	Southwest Side, Brainard neighborhood	D.K.	--
CASC	Central Austin Steering Committee	West-Central Austin	1971	1973
CCO	Cicero Community Organization	Cicero, Illinois	1966	1969
CCSC	Citizens Council of the Southwest Englewood Community	Southwest Side, West Englewood area	1975	--
CCWE	Concerned Citizens of West Englewood	Southwest Side, West Englewood area	1973	1976
CIA	Community Improvement Association of Calumet Park	Calumet Park, Illinois	1971	--
GRO	Greater Roseland Organization	South Side, Roseland area	1968	--
HF	Homeowners' Federation	Southwest Side and Evergreen Park, Illinois	1973	--
(LF)+	Little Flower	Southwest Side	1971	1975
MAC	Mid-Austin Council	East-Central Austin	1971	1974
MASC	Mid-Austin Steering	East-Central Austin	1974	--
NAC	North Austin Council	Northwest Austin	1969	--
NACC	North Austin Community Council	North Austin	1972	1974
NAO	North Austin Organization	Northeast Austin	1970?	--
OBA	Organization For A Better Austin	Austin	1966	--
OPCO	Oak Park Community Organization	Oak Park, Illinois	1971	--
OSC	Organization For The Southwest Community	Southwest Side	1958	1970
SACCC	South Austin Coalition Community Council	South Austin	1970	--
SCAC	Southwest Community Action Coalition	Southwest Side	1971	--
SCC	Southwest Community Congress	Southwest Side	1968	--
The Federation	Southwest Parish And Neighborhood Federation	Southwest Side	1972	--
TMO	The Midway Organization	Far Southwest Side and Summitt, Illinois	1970	1976
UNA*	United Neighbors In Action	West Side, Humboldt Park area	D.K.	--
USC	United Southwest Citizens	Southwest Side	1972	1975
(VHCO)+	Victory Heights Community Organization	Southwest Side, Victory Heights neighborhood	1975	--
WECO	West Englewood Community Organization	Southwest Side, West Englewood neighborhood	1970	--

Notes: \* = Organizations to which I could not gain access and consequently did not include in this study. D.K. = I do not know when these two organizations were founded.

+ = Abbreviations used by me for convenience, apparently not used by the organization.

-- = Organization still existed as of early 1978.

problem. Virtually every organization in the sample turned out to have been directly affected by the southward and westward thrust of white-black racial residential change in the city. The patterns of racial change in Chicago have been such that most of the organizations in the rest of the city have not been so directly faced with this major threat; and some have never been confronted with the problem.

### III. ALINSKY ORGANIZATIONS: A REAPPRAISAL

The first draft of this thesis contained a long philosophical lament about the discrepancy between my list of Alinsky organization characteristics and the list of organizations provided by my informants, and about why I had not been better able to specify just what a grass-roots community organization was. Neither my thesis committee nor I were especially impressed with that part of the thesis. After additional reflection on the matter, I concluded that it was probably possible to extend the list of criteria so that it more adequately matched only the organizations listed by the informants. In this section I will discuss the extension to the list. The extension is tentative and may or may not stand up to more rigorous scrutiny.

My need for a better understanding of just what an Alinsky-style community organization is became apparent a few months after I started interviewing informants for organizations on the south-west side. The informants for a number of organizations were making reference to the Father Lawlor block club organization because that organization had so

affected the organizations in which they had been involved. The more I learned about the Lawlor movement, the more similar it seemed to the organizations that I was studying. At the same time however, none of my informants regarded the Lawlor organizations as being within the Alinsky tradition. The interviews for the organizations that my informants did identify as being within the tradition kept me busy enough that I did not focus on the question in a serious way until I started work on the second draft of this thesis. The extension to the criteria by which an Alinsky organization may be identified was developed primarily in the effort to explain why the Lawlor organizations were not of the Alinsky type. The qualifying comments made at the end of the previous paragraph reflect the basis from which the extension to the criteria was developed. Had I looked further I probably would have found other organizations which were in many ways similar to the ones that I studied. Explaining why these organizations were or were not within the Alinsky fold might have lead to further improvements in the list of criteria.

The function of an Alinsky organization has been described as expanding the practice and benefits of democracy to some segment of the population which has not been effectively incorporated into the pluralist process. The impact of incorporation depends heavily upon whether incorporation is viewed as substantially a zero sum game or as an open ended game. In a zero sum game, the incorporation of a new group into the pluralist pie occurs at the expense of one or more groups that have previously acquired the benefits of incorporation. In an open ended game there are no losers; incorporation of another group does not occur at the expense of any previously incorporated group. The traditional liberal view of incorporation is

that of an open-ended game. In our society, that view probably has its base in the well entrenched middle and upper classes who do not see how incorporation of another group will hurt them personally and in the unincorporated groups who do not see how their incorporation can hurt anyone. The zero sum view of incorporation, on the other hand, probably has its base in the working and lower middle class groups who feel less secure in their incorporation and who stand to lose something and thereby feel threatened by the incorporation of some particular new group.

This distinction is by no means strictly academic. During the civil rights movement of the 1960's, many middle class northern whites and many blacks felt that the southern blacks and poor whites were, or should be, natural allies in a common struggle against the regional establishment. In more recent years, people have also suggested that the blacks and Chicanos of southern Texas should also be natural allies against a common white oppressive establishment.

As we know, this is not how things have turned out. Poor southern whites never provided much support for the civil rights movement and seem to have regarded the incorporation of blacks as a threat to their own marginal position. In more recent years, blacks have begun to object to the incorporation of Chicanos and Southeast Asians, arguing that the incorporation of these groups threatened the hard and marginally held gains so recently won by them.

Incorporation affects many areas of life and in some areas the effects of incorporation are more elastic than they are in other areas. Wirt (1969) has documented how the attempted incorporation of blacks in the poor rural county of Panola, Mississippi had differential outcomes in the areas of

voting registration, road paving, education, and jobs. Voting rights were won more easily than were rights in the other areas because black voting did not take voting away from the whites, although access to the ballot gave blacks some new leverage on where the county road funds were spent. Since these funds were limited, paving the roads to black farms reduced the amount of money available for maintaining the roads going to white farms. School desegregation was more strongly resisted by the whites both because of its social implications and because there was not enough money available to provide good educational facilities for all the children (i.e., for both blacks and whites). Blacks made no progress on job desegregation because there was a real shortage of jobs in the county and opening industrial jobs to blacks literally would have meant taking job opportunities away from the whites.

Viewing the situation from another perspective, Wilson (1960) has drawn a distinction between symbolic rights and welfare rights. Symbolic rights deal with such things as the manner of public respect accorded the members of an identifiable group. Welfare rights deal with such things as access to jobs, a good education, and to public facilities. Symbolic rights can often be granted with no fear that something will be taken away from someone else. Welfare rights often involve giving something to one group by virtue of taking something away from some other group.

In summary, then, for some groups (mainly the have-nots and the well established upper and middle classes) and for some areas of incorporation (mainly symbolic rights, voting, etc.) incorporation is highly elastic. That is, the game is open ended: Incorporation of a new group takes little or nothing away from previously incorporated groups. For other groups

(mainly the marginally and recently incorporated working and lower middle classes and various racial or ethnic groups) and for some areas of incorporation (for example, jobs, housing, and political office holding), incorporation is highly inelastic: Incorporation of a new group means taking something away from some other previously incorporated group.

What Alinsky (1966, 1973) describes and what his followers have almost universally retained is a welfare benefit (rather than symbolic rights) issue focus in combination with an open ended model of incorporation. The combination is a bit tricky for many of the issues with which Alinsky organizations become involved concern relatively inelastic resources. An organization may demand better (i.e., more) city services while the city budget for there services is substantially fixed, with the result that increasing the share of services provided to one neighborhood involves reducing the supply of services elsewhere. In contrast, the Father Lawlor groups, which are discussed in greater detail in Part II of this thesis, were set up in neighborhoods threatened by black invasion and were organized around the combination of a welfare benefit focus and a zero sum model of incorporation. The Lawlor movement fought the incorporation of blacks because the incorporation of blacks was seen as taking something away from them. Racial integration of their neighborhoods would take away their homes and neighborhoods. Racial integration of their schools would reduce the quality of education provided for their children. Their white neighborhood was seen as not getting its share of city services, giving more to blacks or letting more of them in would only make things worse.

An Alinsky organization possesses the characteristics described in Table 1 of section 2. In addition an Alinsky organization is concerned with

welfare problems affecting the local neighborhood and it adheres to a liberal open ended pluralist model of incorporation. The enduring attachment to this liberal model is interesting in as much as so many of the issues that the organizations address involve inelastic resources. [Note 9]

#### NOTES:

1. I am not the first researcher to study Alinsky organizations, but I seem to be the first to have a real problem specifying what I was studying. Most people have evaded the problem by doing a case study on a single organization which was so closely identified to Alinsky or his immediate followers that no one would question the Alinsky label. One person addressed the problem more directly, found it to be a bit messy and then also skirted it by selecting organizations whose identification was not really open to question.
2. A fourth resource which is vital, but which Alinsky did not discuss is residential segregation by socio-economic status. Alinsky organizers think in terms of mobilizing or organizing local communities of "have-not" constituencies, and organizations of this type would be hard to build if "have-nots" did not tend to cluster together geographically. How well the people whom Alinsky organizers mobilize fit the "have-not" model is an important question. The literature on citizen participation and Bailey's (1974) study of the "Organization For A Better Austin" suggest that what the Alinsky organizers really tap in to are primarily the upper working class and middle class components of the population.
3. It is clear that Alinsky's approach falls within the framework of some well defined sociological models. He holds a limited conflict model of society. For Alinsky, the major theme of democracy was the "harmony of dissonance" (1972, p.62). His approach for enabling the "have-nots" to gain power seems identical to Coleman's (1972) model of social change and also very similar to Lowi's (1969) model of American society as interest group liberalism. Alinsky's method is simply a means of enabling outsiders to gain access to a fair share of the pluralist pie.
4. All Alinsky organizations can be considered to be grass-roots organizations but not all are community, or at least local community or neighborhood organizations. Alinsky organizations may also be city-wide or regional organizations, or they may be built around the needs of certain groups within the population (such as migrant farm workers). Only local neighborhood or community organizations have been included in this study however.

5. I ran across only a few exceptions to this pattern.
6. For example, many civil rights, welfare rights and recent anti-war groups fit the criteria better than to some of the organizations that were included in this study, as do also many labor organizations and political protest groups.
7. My use of this method turned out to have been a bit naive. At the time I was not aware of the different schools that exist in Chicago area Alinsky organizing. The three experts (Tom Gaudette, Shel Trapp, and Don Elme) all belonged to the same tradition. Fortunately they each produced lists which cut across this division in their profession. Later on I interviewed other equally recognized experts who would not reach beyond the products of their own school in identifying organizations. Had I started with some of these experts, my work of identifying the organizations would not have proceeded so easily.
8. For example, one big difference between the IAF and Gaudette schools is the desired relationship between the organizer and the mass of participants. The IAF style has the organizer working primarily with the leaders while the leaders work with the rest of the people. In contrast, the Gaudette style makes the organizer much more accessible to the people in general. Within the Gaudette tradition, Tom Gaudette believes that the only effective organizations are the local ones. He feels that the national and even the city-wide coalitions are too far removed from the people and the gains that they obtain have little impact on the people in the neighborhoods. On the other hand, Trapp and Concotta have come to believe that the basic neighborhood problems are not really solvable at the local level and that real gains can be made only through the regional and national coalitions.
9. From a functionalist perspective, this adherence to the liberal model may make some sense. The Alinsky organization is concerned with the incorporation of its constituency. If the resources needed to solve problems addressed by the organization are inelastic that is the problem of the target organization (the city or whomever) not the problem of the Alinsky organization. At the same time the Alinsky organization seeks to represent a constituency that, at least potentially, cuts across racial, ethnic, religious and other cultural divisions within the population in its neighborhood. By sticking to the open-ended model, the organization can gloss over the cross-cutting and other ties that segments of the constituency have with various parts of the wider social environment. Adherence to the zero sum model might alienate parts of the constituency or force them to choose between allegiance to the Alinsky organization and allegiance to some other organizations or groups. The Lawlor movement combined the zero sum model with an anti-black orientation. When blacks finally moved in, the organization could neither incorporate them nor otherwise deal with the situation and the movement fell apart.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE RESEARCH METHODS

There are many ways to study formal organizations and it seems unlikely that any one method is intrinsically superior to all other methods. The method that a researcher selects will depend a lot upon the way that the research problem has been posed and upon the resources available for doing the work. Other factors of importance include the kind of organization being studied, the kind of access that the organization is willing to provide, the time limits that have been imposed upon the project, and the sheer fact of socialization into an academic discipline which has developed a tradition of doing particular kinds of things in particular ways.

This research project evolved into a comparative study of a large number of organizations in which my primary interest was trying to find out why the organizations developed as they did. The only resources were my own and they involved time (about one year without gainful employment to collect the data) but no money, which meant that I could not hire helpers to do the field work.

To do the project at all, I had to use a rather efficient method of collecting data, i.e., a method that produced a large amount of information per unit of time spent collecting it. Participant observation and conventional case studies were out of the question because I did not have the time to watch organizations go through extended patterns of change or to study intensively a large number of organizations. In addition, I soon learned that written records were either non-existent or too dispersed and limited in scope to be very helpful for most of the organizations on my list.

I seemed to be drawn to a method that involved using people as informants about what had happened and was happening with the organizations. The need for efficiency and the fact that I was more interested in finding out what had happened than I was in finding out how widely dispersed the information was throughout the organization led me to a decision to collect my information from a limited number of expert or knowledgeable informants for each organization. I quickly also learned that no such list of informants existed and that there was no impersonal or automatic way of identifying them. The experts who had provided the original list of organizations were able to name and provide access to a few informants for most of the organizations on the list, but these people did not constitute adequate lists of informants. This meant that I had to dig up my informants as I went along.

My inability to identify informants ahead of time meant that I could not use mail survey techniques. As a result I decided to personally interview the informants as I was able to find them. My entry point into each organization was usually the organization as it existed at some point in time and I had to work my way forwards and/or backwards in time identifying new informants as I went. I often learned that the organizations had more complex histories than I had been led to believe, and the quest for informants became a snowball process whereby one interview would identify another phase of the organization's history or even a new organization for which I would then have to find further informants.

Doing field work in formal organizations involves sifting through the organization looking for relevant bits of data. Single organization and participant observation case studies tend to involve the use of a filter

with a fairly fine mesh with the result that a lot of rather detailed data tends to be collected. Comparative studies of many organizations tend to require the use of filters with a much coarser mesh to avoid an overload of too much excessively detailed data. I tried to combine the advantages of both methods in a manner which was in keeping with my limited resources. My immediate goal was to avoid ending up with field notes so voluminous and unstructured that I would have a hard time trying to make any sense out of them once all the data had been collected.

Accordingly, I devised a highly structured interview guide and I used a semi-structured form of interviewing. I had set categories of information to collect, but most questions were open ended ones which allowed the informants to respond in terms of their perceptions of the events that they were describing. I divided the data into two types which would be collected concurrently but which would be processed separately. The first type was a general history of the organization. This history focused on change processes or turning points in the development of the organization. The history is selective or biased, transitions are discussed in detail while periods of little change tend to get glossed over. The second type of data was more detailed information for specific years during the life of the organization. These points were the year in which the organization was created, the year it folded or 1977 if it still existed then, and each year in between ending in a 5 or a 0. This system of sampling over time was designed to produce comparable information for each organization while reducing the quantity of information to manageable proportions. This detailed information covered the following topics:

- a. Characteristics of key leaders and of the professional staff

(i.e., the organizers).

- b. Characteristics of the neighborhood in which the organization was located and characteristics of the surrounding neighborhoods.
- c. Characteristics of the organization, including the major activities, the resource base, linkages with other organizations, the organizational "style" of doing things, the recruitment processes into the organization, and the formal and informal structure.

During each interview, I recorded the historical summaries on blank sheets of paper and the detailed information was recorded on a set of forms made especially for this purpose. These forms were designed to enable me easily to find and compare the equivalent items of information from different organizations and/or from different points in time. Copies of these detailed data forms are found in Appendix A.

The number of informants varied from organization to organization. When informants were familiar with the organization throughout its history, I needed fewer informants than I did for organizations which had different sets of leaders and organizers during different phases of their history. Wherever possible I tried to find two informants for every phase of the organization's development so that I would have some check on the accuracy of the information that I was collecting. During the early part of my field work, I interviewed more than two informants because I had no way of gauging for the reliability of the information that I was receiving. I soon learned that my informants rarely contradicted each other and that there was usually a high degree of agreement among the stories provided by the separate informants [Note 1]. The differences in the stories usually seemed to be derived from the differential positions that the informants held in their organization. These differences turned out to be largely predictable and are discussed later in this chapter.

Toward the end of my field work, I often settled for interviewing one informant for each historical phase of an organization. This was because I had trouble finding informants for some organizations and I had been setting these organizations to the side while I conducted interviews with informants who were easier to find. I probably could have found more informants for these latter organizations, but I was running out of time and I had learned that a second informant usually did not add that all that much to what I had learned from the first informant.

After completing all the interviews for an organization, I collated all the information from the separate interviews into a single set of data (i.e., a single historical summary and a single set of the more detailed data). In most cases this collating was tedious but not difficult. Apparent contradictions were usually resolved into complementary perspectives on the same events. In a few cases, the perspectives were so different, although non-contradictory, that I could find no good way to resolve them into a single story and the two stories were retained separately. When real contradictions emerged, I went back to the informants to get the problem cleared up.

The general historical summaries form the basis for the miniature organizational case studies that are found in Part II of this thesis. The detailed information was to have been processed through a computer to provide more detailed comparisons among the different organizations. This would apparently have been something of an innovation in research on formal organizations, and is part of what Etzioni (1969) has declared to be a much needed extension of our methodology for studying organizations. However the systematic analysis of this data turned out to be more than I could handle as part of this thesis and it was postponed to some more propitious date in

the future. Some of the detailed data were merged into the historical summaries to fill out the case studies, and the case studies then became the data base upon which this thesis was built.

I followed what might be called a "top-down" approach to gaining access to the organizations and to finding the informants. I ordinarily started out by making an appointment to see the staff director or a key leader whose name I had usually been given by some previous informant. In a few cases I simply called up the organization if it had a listed phone number. I explained my mission, dropped the names of any previous informants who might have given me the lead that I was now following up on, and I requested the cooperation of my new contact in identifying informants and in arranging interviews for the organization in question.

The top-down approach was something of a cross between convenience and necessity. Without the help of my original expert informants and without the help of my initial contact in each organization I would probably not have been able to find enough informants to complete the field work. The fact that my initial informants were either near the center of Chicago area Alinsky organizing or of their respective organizations made the field work go easier in two respects. Because the people who were helping me find informants were so thoroughly involved in the subject matter that I was studying, the informants that they helped me find invariably knew what they were talking about. The informants may not have been the only possible knowledgeable informants, but I ended up with very few unproductive interviews.

The second way in which the top-down method made my field work easier involved legitimating my research activities to my informants. I was a

stranger to all but four informants (and even these four I knew only to the extent of having said "hello" when our paths crossed occasionally). The fact that I could drop the name of key person in area organizing or in the organization generally made people more willing to talk to me. In a few cases, informants actually said that they were willing to talk to me because the person who had referred me said that it was OK. In other situations, it reduced the amount of explanation that I had to provide about who I was and why I wanted the interview. [Note 2]

The reader may object that a top-down approach, restricted to a small number of supposedly expert informants, all of whom had been identified by people within the mainstream of local Alinsky organizing or within the leadership core of a particular organization, is a severely limited methodology. The method too easily restricts the researcher to formal rather than to informal social processes within the organization and to what the organization officially wants to let be known about itself.

These criticisms have merit. On the other hand, there is no flawless social science research method. Even if the top-down approach to research on formal organizations is limited, the method still has a rightful place in the social scientist's tool bag. For one thing, the method is relatively direct and efficient; you can learn more about a phenomenon from the one person who knows a lot about it than you can from the hundred people who know rather little about it. For another, because the method is efficient the researcher can expand the data base without becoming trapped by the limits of time and resources. Crain (1968) and Crain, Katz and Rosenthal (1969) used the method with considerable success in their studies of school desegregation and municipal water fluoridation decisions. By restricting

their information sources (school board members, school superintendents, certain politicians, civic and interest group leaders for school desegregation; the mayor, newspaper publisher and public health officer for fluoridation), they were able to study many communities (15 for school desegregation using interviews, 700 for fluoridation using mailed questionnaires) and uncover information that had eluded researchers who had spent their time studying more intensively a smaller number of cases.

In my work, the limitations of the top-down approach seemed to be more practical than substantive. For some organizations, the approach simply did not work very well. With three organizations, my attempts to gain access at the top were rebuffed by the people with whom I made the initial contacts. In one case I was finally referred to someone else (a former executive director) who provided enough information for me to keep the organization in my sample. In two cases, I ended up dropping the organization because I was not able to gain access without spending an excessive amount of time trying to do so.

With two organizations my initial contact, the organizer, was willing to be interviewed but would not help me find the additional informants that I needed to complete my work. Fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately depending on one's perspective, the organizer had given me enough information that I finally was able to make an end run around him and find the informants and information that I needed.

In two or three other cases the top-down method did not work well because the organization had folded and I could find no top to tap into or because the organization had changed so much that no relationships seemed to exist between the top to which I had gained access and the top as it had existed

a few years earlier or a few years later. The collapse of the organization, however, is not of itself a reason not to use the top-down method. For several defunct organizations, I was able to tap into the now dispersed residue of a former leadership structure and find informants much as if the organizations were still alive and going strong.

The substantive problems with the top-down method of studying complex organizations were of little consequence in my research, largely, I think, because of the particular kind of organization that I studied. The major hazard of the method is that of getting trapped into channels that provide only officially approved information. This is probably a serious problem in studies of large businesses or bureaucracies (e.g., Selznick (1948), Blau (1955), etc.) where the members are employees and in which the people whom one interviews when starting out at the top are experienced in their roles as representatives of the organization to the outside and where the officials usually have decided what sort of organizational image they wish to present to the public. Banfield (1961), for example, noted that he tended to get official pap in his interviews of Chicago business leaders, and he had to work to get through to any real information.

In the community organizations that I studied there were few employees and many participating volunteer members. The organizations, i.e., the leaders and organizers, had had experience collectively confronting or negotiating with target organizations but had rarely been interviewed in a one-on-one basis away from their colleagues. Most informants were quite willing to be interviewed; only a few had reservations. Several felt that my work was in some sense important; they had been (or still

were) involved in important activities that were changing the patterns of urban living; it was good for someone to write it all down because they were too busy to do so themselves.

Virtually all my informants seemed to be open in their presentations of information. A few informants refused to give me detailed information about their organization's other leaders, but in only one case did I feel that I was being conned or given an official and artificial view of the organization. I was looking for informants who knew what the organization had done. In most cases, this involved interviewing people who were not the current cohort of up-front leaders. They had had time to reflect on their activities and they were critically evaluating what they and their organization had done.

Organizations seem to be like people in certain respects. In particular, they tend to develop a self-image that is generally shared by the participants. [Note 3] The process is sort of a collective version of Goffman's (1959) "presentation of self." In the voluntary associations that I studied, I received similar views from each informant because, for any organization, the informants were all part of the same group self-image process. I was not receiving censored information from an elite acting in unison; rather, I was interviewing people who were drawing from the same pool of shared experiences.

My use of quasi-structured interviewing and my use of structured interviewing forms seemed to make the interviewing easier than it otherwise might have been. Many of my informants are regularly pursued by high school and college introductory sociology course students whose teachers assign them the task of writing a paper on some organization

in their community. These students seem to come out asking their informant to tell them what they need to know. By using a structured interview, I seem to have created the impression that I knew what I was doing and I thereby seem to have set myself apart from the other students. Several informants said that they felt they were less likely to be wasting their time in talking to me than they were in talking to the other people who crossed their paths.

My legitimation and access problems existed only up to the start of each interview. Whatever reservations an informant might have had seemed to disappear once the interview got started. Many interviews were continued over several sessions and many hours. One informant who had been reluctant to talk to me looked at me after the interview was over and said that I had been real smart to get her to say so much. The truth seems more simple. I am probably a competent interviewer, but the informants believed that they had been in something important and they had a story to tell. Once the interview got started, the momentum of the tale being told carried the thing through on its own. In only two interviews was the task of extracting information at all difficult. The informants seemed to get a great deal of satisfaction from the interviews even though I directed the story-telling process to a considerable extent.

When looking for informants, I sought out people who were regarded as knowing the most about the organization that I was studying. The informants varied tremendously in socio-economic and educational background, ranging from clergy and mid-level managers in industry or the federal civil service possessing at least a four year college education to welfare recip-

ients and service occupation workers with a severely limited formal education. Despite these differences, the informants seemed to fall into one or another of three distinct categories depending upon their relationships to these grass roots organizations.

The three categories are:

1. Staff - the "professional" employees of the organization, they are the organizers or the director of the organization. The staff, whose role has previously described (Chapter 2) as outside facilitators or catalysts who help or enable the community residents to identify and solve community problems, are involved in virtually everything that the organization does. The staff play a major role in running the organization and organizations without organizers tend to fall apart rather quickly. The professional staff constitute the organization's full-time participants.
2. Leaders - are community resident volunteer participants in the organization. In contrast to a traditional social service organization, which services a clientele but is autonomous from it, an Alinsky organization belongs to and, in theory, is controlled by the community or at least by the participants from the community. Participants are part-time volunteers who are there because they want to make their community better. Participants range from people who seldom show up and play a very limited role in the organization to regulars who play a central role. Leaders are regulars who speak up, who are in the forefront of activities, and whose leadership role is recognized by fellow particip-

ants and by the staff. In theory, leaders work their way up the organizational ladder, being promoted into increasingly responsible positions as they learn and effectively display leadership skills. This promotion is encouraged and guided by the staff and leaders at the top, and is ratified by the wider membership. In practice, Alinsky organizations tend to be rather loosely structured and leadership is often a scarce commodity. As a result people often become leaders simply by asserting themselves. Depending upon the supply-demand situation, this self-assertion can consist of displaying innovative or tactical skill in developing and implementing plans, by being highly visible either verbally or physically in organizational activities, or by simply showing up on a regular basis.

[Note 4]

3. Clergy - When clergymen (I ran across no female clergy in my field work) are active in an Alinsky organization, they often play a role that is different from that of either the leaders or the staff. Some clergy do play regular staff or leader roles, but in this section, I am describing the special role that many other clergy play. Churches play a major role in the financial support (money and contributions in kind ) of grass roots organizations. [Note 5] In a Catholic church, with its episcopal authority structure, the pastor has fairly direct control over how these church resources are allocated, but even in a congregational polity Protestant church the minister plays a key but informal role by virtue of his full time employment at the

center of the church's communications and decision-making structures. In either case, the endorsement of the pastor is important both in getting the church to support the organization and in individual decisions about participating in the organization.

The clergy who are recognized as leaders usually play a behind the scenes role which often transcends their role as legitimators to their own congregation. Many attend leadership meetings, often on a regular basis. They may be in and out of the office and often have access to staff decision-making in a way that no regular leader does. They may attend staff meetings and at times serve as part-time volunteer organizers and fund raisers (especially as regards their own church and congregation). The clergy are then in a sense key leaders or staff, but in another way they are both and neither. Their role is both essential and marginal. By this I mean that their participation tends to bring with it the personal perspective of a third person observer looking down from above. [Note 6]

This categorization of informants was deduced from the content of my interviews part way through my field work. I had no prior anticipation of it, although I should have expected at least the staff and leaders to have significantly different perspectives on their organization.

The informants could be divided a second way. For any organization, some informants were major informants; other informants were minor ones. This classification too was rather distinct. Major informants were the ones that I interviewed at length for a particular organization. All these

interviews ran for well over one hour in length. Minor informants were people who gave me information in a casual and often accidental way.

Grass-roots community organizations often work together on various issues through ad hoc and formal coalitions. As a result most of my informants had some familiarity with other organizations located around the city. Often a major informant for one organization would provide useful information about other organizations during the course of an interview. In other cases, I secured information from the people with whom I talked as I sought out major informants for one or another organization. In a few instances, I simply called a person to clarify some detail in my information.

Both leaders and staff could also be usefully dichotomized in another way. They are flashes in the pan or they possess durability. Flashes in the pan seem to set unrealistically high expectations in terms of the short run benefits that the organization and the neighborhood should obtain from their participation. When these expectations are not met, they give up and drop out. This is called "burning out." Durable leaders or staff seem to set less unrealistic expectations both with respect to the extent of the gains and the speed with which they should be obtained. As leaders, they often have been, at one time or another, among the most outspoken and visible participants but they stuck it out and kept plugging away when things took longer than they expected.

Very few of my informants, either leaders or staff, were flashes in the pan. Current leaders of this sort had not been around long enough to provide the economy of interviewing that I desired. They could not reach back in time to tell what had happened several years earlier. Former leaders of this sort were unavailable because they tend to disappear after they burn out.

The staff informants were much younger than the leader informants. This is probably because the organizers get started at a younger age and turn over more quickly than do the durable leaders.. Because the organizers are young, they lack the family commitments that usually prevent an older person from working long hours for low pay. Because organizers come and go rapidly, they rise to the top rather quickly if they stick around. Through seniority they can often become the lead organizer or staff director within a very few years. Most of the staff informants were in their mid to late twenties. The older informants were usually serving as informants for an earlier period when they, too, had been of a younger age. The few who were older during the period about which they were reporting were atypical staff people. For example, one was a housewife leader whose organization hired her as staff director and another was a Catholic monk who had also been a leader in his organization and who could afford to work for low pay.

The leader and clergy informants were both older and of more diverse ages than were the staff informants. The clergy and leader informants ranged in age from the late twenties to the late seventies, with all univariate statistical measures of central tendency falling somewhere between the late thirties to the mid fourties. [Note 7] Like all Alinsky organization participants, the leaders tend to be stable home-owning, regularly employed, complete nuclear family members of their community. They are the people who have the most to lose if the neighborhood gets worse. The fact that the staff members tend to be so much younger may help to reinforce the norm by which staff try to operate as catalysts rather than administrators of the organizations. The staff usually talked about the leaders using their formal names ("Mr. Jones," "Mrs. Johnson") while the leaders usually referred to

the staff using their first names ("Tom" or "Tom Jones").

Although most staff informants had not been with their organization for more than one or two years, they usually knew more about the organization than their short term of employment would suggest. In part this was because then had learned something about what had gone on before as part of learning their job; in part it was because many organizers move from one organization to another every few years. They had been learning about the organization through the grapevine before they had been hired by it.

Clergy and leader informants had been around longer because they were the sort of informants whom I was seeking. The organizations were well supplies with participants and leaders who had been around for short periods of time, but I interviewed such people only when I had no other choice.

Virtually all my information came from my interviews and from what the informants could recall and reconstruct during the course of the interview. People's recall seemed to have been fairly good. The informants usually were able to provide both the general historical summaries and the specific details that I sought. Recall was less exact for events going back many years, but only a few informants were too hazy in their recollections to enable me to obtain the sort of detail that I desired. Recall of the more distant past was definitely worse for the clergy and staff informants than for the leaders. The usual explanation given by clergy and staff informants was that this had happened so long ago and they had been involved in so much else since then.

A few informants did dig long untouched files out of their basements and rummaged through them during the course of the interview but I did not encourage this sort of thing. These informants seemed to be picking

out whatever caught their fancy and talking about it. The informants seemed to do a better job of differentiating the more important from the less important when they stuck to what they could pull out from their memories.

In two cases, I ended up supplementing the human informants with information from two single organization case studies based on competent use of social science research methods. The two books were Bailey's (1974) The Urban Radicals which covered The Organization For A Better Austin from 1966 to 1971 and the Fish, et. al. (1966) Edge Of The Ghetto which covered the Organization For The Southwest Community from 1958 to about 1965. The Fish book was especially helpful because all my informants for that organization during those years owned up to having very poor recall of the events in which they had been among the central actors. On the other hand, the Fish book used pseudonyms and no one was sure who all the people really were. This made it hard for me to tie the information to the detailed questions in my interview guide.

Table 1 shows the number of major informants for each organization during the life of the organization including each point in time for which I collected the specific detailed data. The informants are coded as to type (staff, clergy, leader) and for the time span for which each was able to provide information. I have previously discussed the reasons for the differential informant density from one organization to another. Where the density was unusually high or low, I have indicated in the table of the informants were hard to find or if the organization was one of the first that I studied. This density information is not otherwise obvious from the content of Table 1. For some organizations, informants were hard to

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR INFORMANTS BY ORGANIZATION,  
BY YEAR FOR WHICH DATA WAS COLLECTED AND BY TYPE  
OF INFORMANT

ORGANIZATION	INFORMANTS BY YEAR, TYPE, AND NUMBER*				COMMENTS
	Creation (year)	Second data period (year)	Third data period (year)	Fourth data period (year)	
ACO	1963	1965-6(d)			
	L-----	>L			
	L-----	>L			
	C-----	>C			
CASC	1971	1972-3(d)			
	L-----	>L			
		C			
CCO	1966	1968(d)			2
	C-----	>C			
	C-----	>C			
	L-----	>L			
CCSC	1975	1977			
	C/S-----	>C/S			
CCWE	1973	1976(d)			1
	L-----	>L			
	O				
		S			
CIA	1971	1975	1977		3
	L-----	>L-----	>L		
			S		
GRO	1969	1975	1977		
	C				
	L-----	>L-----	>L		
	O-----	>S-----	>S		
HF	1973-5	1977			3
	C				
	S-----	>S			
LF	1971	1975(d)			1
	C-----	>C			
		S			
		O			
MAC	1971-2	1974(d)			
	C-----	>C			
	L-----	>L			
MASC	1973-4	1975	1977		
	C				
	C-----	>C-----	>C		
		L-----	>L		
NAC	1969-70	1975	1977		3
	L-----	>L			
	L-----	>L			
		L-----	>L		
NACC	1972	1974(d)			3
	L-----	>L			
	L-----	>L			
		L			

(TABLE 1, CONTINUED)

ORGANIZATION	INFORMANTS BY YEAR, TYPE, AND NUMBER*				COMMENTS
	Creation (year)	Second data period (year)	Third data period (year)	Fourth data period (year)	
NAO	1970-3 C L----->L L----->L/S	1975 L----->L/S	1977 L----->L/S		
OBA	1965-7 S----->S S L	1970 S L	1975 S L----->L S	1977 S	
	B----->B				
OPCO	1971 L----->L L----->L L----->L	1975 L----->L L----->L L----->L	1977 L----->L L----->L L----->L		2
OSC	1958 C----->C C----->C S----->S L----->L	1960 C----->C C----->C S----->S L----->L	1965 C----->C C----->C O----->O S----->S	1970 C O O L L	1
	B----->B	B----->B	B----->B		
SACCC	1970 C----->C L----->L L----->L	1975 C----->C L----->L L----->L	1977 L----->L S		
SCAC	1971 L----->L	1975 L----->L	1977 L----->L		1,3
SCC	1969 C L----->L L----->L	1975 L----->L L----->L O	1977 L----->L S		
Fed.	1971 S----->S	1975 S	1977 S		3
TMO	1970 L----->L	1975 L----->L	1976(d) L----->L S		
USC	1972 C----->C C----->C	1975(d) C S			1
VHCO	1975 L----->L S	1977 L			3
WECO	1970 L----->L	1975 L----->L	1977 L----->L		1

(TABLE 1, CONTINUED)

## NOTES:

Col. 1: Initials or abbreviated names are used in this table. The full names of these organizations can be found in Appendix B

\* - Col. 2-5: Listing of the years for which data was collected. Col. 2 is the year of founding. Col. 3-5 are the half decade intervals (years ending in "0" or "5") and 1977, after the organization was founded. If the organization did not survive until 1977, data was collected for the year of demise and this is indicated in the table.

a. (d) following the year indicated the date of demise for any organization that did not survive to 1977.

b. Informant codes: L = leader  
S = staff organizer or director  
C = clergy  
O = other  
B = book

Arrows extending from one column to the next indicate a person serving as an informant for more than one data collecting period. A change in informant code from one column to the next indicates a change of status for the informant.

Two informant codes separated by a slash indicates one informant filling a dual role in the organization.

## Col. 6 (Comments):

1. Informants were especially hard to find.
2. Extra informants were interviewed during the early phases of the field work.
3. Informants would not have been hard to find, but access was a problem.

find and I ended up with partial interviews from several sources, all of which did not add up to one typical complete interview.

The number of informants is a poor indicator of the quantity of information obtained for an organization. The interviews varied in length from just over one hour to over twenty hours (broken in to several sessions held on different days). Some informants were selected because they knew a lot about the organization, other informants were selected because they had familiarity with particular events. For example, when a group split in two, one group would become a continuation of the original group while the other section would become a splinter group. My major informants usually remained with the continuing group in which case I would seek out an informant from the splinter group to learn its perspective on the situation.

The selection of informants was an unfolding process. Most people were willing to be interviewed once I found them. For some of the older and defunct organizations the major problem was finding any informant at all. For some reason the informants who were least willing to talk (but finally did) were not the informants who were least willing to help me find more informants. The informants who were unwilling to help me find me informants were all quite willing to themselves be interviewed.

#### NOTES:

1. This high level of agreement was partly a real phenomenon and partly an artifact derived from the way that I gathered my information. The informants were organization regulars who had shared the same experiences. Even informants who ended up in different camps when an organization split in two usually agreed on the facts, their differences involved the interpretation of what the facts meant. To one side the facts meant getting the job done, to the other they meant selling out

to the establishment. Not all participants would have agreed about the facts, some because had not been around long enough to become adequately socialized into the shared experiences of the organization and others because they held a negative view of the organization. Newcomers and disgruntled drop-outs did not end up on my list of likely informants. It wasn't that I wanted to avoid them, rather they seldom qualified as expert informants and I did not have time to interview more people. To say that the informants seldom disagreed is not to say that informants covering the same time period of an organization said the same things. In one organization my one female informant said that the men were chauvinists; the women were not allowed to sit around the office carrying on organizational small talk. The men thought that they had done most of the work. Both the woman and the men described the same issues when asked what the organization had done. In another organization, only one informant mentioned sponsorship of a Little League baseball team. It turned that he was both the president and the major backer of the activity. In all organizations when I asked who had been the key leaders in a particular year, I got partially overlapping lists. Many leaders appeared on all the lists, a few appeared on only one or two lists. Usually an informant who had not named the person as being a key leader in that year listed the person as a having been a key leader a few years earlier or a few years later. These differences do not constitute disagreements, rather they are relatively minor variations on a common theme.

2. The Illinois State Legislative Investigations Commission was conducting an investigation of many Chicago area direct-action community organizations at the same time that I was doing my interviewing. People in at least three organizations were suspicious of me (was I a spy for the state?) and the top-down approach enabled the leaders in these organizations to check me out before talking to me.
3. In his study of the TVA, Selznick (1948) has shown that different sections of large organizations may develop separate collective self-images of what the organization is all about.
4. One informant described these leaders as "steady followers." They show concern but lack initiative and creativity. They fill leadership voids by default and they tend to get shunted aside by more assertive people when they manifest themselves.
5. For example, office space, office equipment, paper, ad phone. The paper, the mimeograph and the telephone are very important as the means of keeping the constituency informed of what is going on.
6. I am referring to the third person observer in literature. I am not making any cosmological assumptions about a religious three story universe.
7. That is, their age at the time for which they were serving as informants, not their age at the time of the interview.

8. The books were problem informants. They usually did not answer quite the same questions that I was asking. In addition, for both organizations, the staff director during the time covered by the case study was among my informants. Each director criticized the case study in question as being unreliable or inaccurate. Both directors gave the same reason: the researchers had been too much on the the outside of what had been going on and had hsed too superficial a data collecting process. One said that my interview (for one of my twenty-five organizations) was longer and more detailed than had been that of the research team that had done the single organization case study. I lack the where-with-all to evaluate these statements. Both case studied presented positive views on the directors and on the organizations and both were, in a sense, comparable to my work. That is, they were doctoral theses rather than single course term papers or the like.

PART II  
THE ORGANIZATIONS

## INTRODUCTION TO PART II

Section II contains summary case studies of each organization that was included in this study. The summaries are selective in that they focus on points of change or transition in the organizations and they tend to gloss over the periods of relative stability. This selectivity of description was intentional, and derives from my stated purpose of trying to gain some understanding of the forces influencing the development of the organizations. Since I am trying to explain social change rather than social stability, I have focused on the patterns of change.

The organizations are, or were, located in two geographically separate sections of the Chicago greater metropolitan area. The two areas are the Austin neighborhood and the surrounding suburbs or city neighborhoods on the far west side of Chicago and the Southwest side of the city and certain adjacent suburbs (see map). In general, closer relationships have existed among the organizations within either area than have existed between any organizations located in the two separate sections of the city. These relationships have more to do with relatively impersonal ecological processes of succession, competition, or adapting to specialized niches than they do with personal relationships or a common concern with problems which cross their contiguous or overlapping boundaries. Despite the apparent importance of these ecological processes, it is not good to give them too much credit. Even within Austin or the Southwest side some neighboring organizations seem to exist quite independently of each other and must be treated as largely separate developments.

Part II is divided into two chapters: the Austin area; and the South-

west Side. Each chapter starts with an overview section that describes the ecological or interactive relationships, if any, existing among the organizations located in that section of the metropolitan area. The lack of any relationships is also noted where it exists.

Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably, an interactive relationship exists between each overview section and the specific organization sections which follow. Understanding the relationships among a group of organizations involves knowing something about the separate organizations. At the same time, however, the overview section helps provide a framework for sorting out and understanding the information contained in the individual organization sections. Awareness of the general patterns and of the specific phenomena go hand in hand in understanding the development of Alinsky organizations in the city of Chicago.

The case study sections can be read in more than one way. Considered as descriptions of separate organizations, they tell how each organization got started and how it developed thereafter. Considered as a whole, they describe different aspects of a real phenomenon - grass roots community organizing. Most of the things that happened to one organization could have happened, and often did happen, to many other organizations. The similarities in structure and activities among these organizations are greater than are the differences. I have tried to avoid unnecessary repetition in these chapters, but there is a limit as to how far one can go in this direction without divorcing the descriptions from the reality that they purportedly present.

The major activity for any of these organizations is the "issues." The issues often acquire names whose meaning is not quite what one would expect

based on the common American English usages of the words that go into the names. Since the issues tended to be fairly similar from one organization to another, I have listed them alphabetically and described each in Appendix 3. This arrangement enabled me to name the important issues in the case study chapters without having to provide multiple explanations of what the names really refer to.

CHAPTER FOUR  
THE AUSTIN AREA ORGANIZATIONS  
SECTION 1: AN OVERVIEW

Table 1 contains a list of the Austin area organizations, their approximate dates of existence, and the territory they claimed as their own. The first eleven organizations listed in the table were included in the study; the last organization, United Neighbors In Action (UNA), was dropped because I was not able to gain access to the organization to conduct any interviews.

The development of Alinsky organizing in the Austin area had a lot to do with the pattern of white to black racial change and resegregation on the west side of Chicago. Racial turnover had been going across the city block by block since World War II or before. The process was gradual and largely non-violent but it was also continual and seemingly irreversible. The East Garfield Park area (see map) turned over during the mid-1950's and by the end of the decade racial change had started in West Garfield Park. West Garfield Park went black during the early 1960's and there was nothing to suggest that Austin would not be next. The expansion of the black ghetto was largely to the west and to the south. The area north of Lake Street or the Northwestern railroad tracks was not affected. In West Garfield Park the racial turnover went only as far north as Lake Street. North of that was a wide industrial belt with few through streets which protected the residential neighborhoods to the north. This meant that the westward flow of racial change was approaching only the southern section of Austin. There was an "understanding" that the city had arranged it so that the flow would go through southern Austin and then spill out in to the suburbs,


TABLE 1

## THE AUSTIN AREA ALINSKY ORGANIZATIONS

INITIALS	NAME	LOCATION	FOUNDED	DIED
ACO	Austin Community Organization	Austin, North Ave. (N) to Roosevelt Rd (S) and Belt Line Railroad (E) to Austin Blvd (W)	1963	1967
CASC	Central Austin Steering Committee	West-Central Austin, St. Lucy Catholic parish	1971	1973
GCO	Cicero Community Organization	Cicero, Illinois, a suburb immediately south of Austin	1966	1969
MAC	Mid-Austin Council	East-Central Austin, northern half of Our Lady, Help of Christians Catholic parish	1971	1974
MASC	Mid-Austin Steering	East-Central Austin, all of Help of Christians Catholic parish and perhaps St. Lucy parish in West-Central Austin	1974	--
NAC	North Austin Council	Northwest Austin, St. Angela Catholic parish	1969	--
NACC	North Austin Community Council	North Austin, consisted of NAC, NAO, and MAC	1972	1974
NAO	North Austin Organization	Northeast Austin, St. Peter Canisius Catholic parish	1970?	--
OBA	Organization For A Better Austin	Austin, same as for ACO	1966	--
OPCO	Oak Park Community Organization	Oak Park, Ill., a suburb immediately west of Austin	1971	--
SACCC	South Austin Coalition Community Council	South Austin, Lake St. (N) to Eisenhower Expressway (S)	1970	--
UNA*	United Neighbors In Action	West Side, Humboldt Park area, including the northeast corner of Austin	D.K.	--

Notes: \* = Organization to which I could not gain access and consequently did not include in this study. D.K. = I do not know when this organization was founded.

-- = Organization still existed as of early 1978.



THE AUSTIN AREA ORGANIZATIONS

thereby saving the north side of Chicago (north of Lake Street) from this peculiar affliction.

By the early 1960's the Protestant and Catholic Austin Clergy Council concluded that racial change was inevitable, at least in southern Austin, and they saw that white protectionist groups were forming in the area. In 1963 they decided to set up a community organization to help prepare the neighborhood for integration. Without entirely knowing what they were getting in to, the clergy council put up the money (about \$60,000. - mostly from the Catholic churches) to fund an organization and they hired an Alinsky organizer to run it. The organization, the Austin Community Organization (ACO), was built up from membership units or delegations from all the local churches. The organizer proved to be ineffective at his trade and the ACO was soon captured by a small group of liberal activists who then drove the more conservative majority out of the organization. Once the liberals started attacking the local Catholic churches for not being progressive enough with respect to civil rights and integration, the Catholic pastors (who were all elderly racial conservatives) pulled out their money.

The more liberal Protestant clergy objected and a compromise was reached whereby the clergy dropped their support from ACO, which soon folded, and set about to form a new organization. This time they brought in a more experienced organizer (Tom Gaudette) who started the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) in 1966. By then the eastern end of southern Austin was starting to experience racial change. Tom Gaudette built a large and effective organization out of church delegations in the white areas and out of block clubs in the black areas. The organization remained strong until

about 1971, by which time South Austin (as the area had come to be known) had gone all black. OBA finally fell apart for a variety of reasons and during the mid-1970's was converted into a more traditional social service organization to keep from going under.

By 1970 the whites in North Austin (as this area also had come to be known) were pulling out of OBA to form their own organizations. The first organization to be started in North Austin was the Northwest Austin Council (NAC) in St. Angela's parish, which had recently been assigned a pastor who supported community organizing. Soon thereafter, St. Peter Canisius and Help of Christians parishes also received new pastors who supported community organizing. With the help of NAC and the new pastors, organizations were soon established in these two parishes. At the same time an umbrella group, the North Austin Community Council (NACC), was created to encompass and coordinate the activities of the three parish organizations. The Northeast Austin Organization (NAO) in St. Peter Canisius parish soon grew into a strong local organization which came to resent the domination of NACC by NAO. This brought about the dissolution of NACC two years after it was started. NAO and NAC went on their ways as effective independent organizations, but the third member organization, the Mid-Austin Council (MAC) in Help of Christians parish, remained a small and weak organization which was soon phased out by the parish pastors as their parish turned from white to black. The pastors then started another group, the Mid-Austin Steering Committee (MASC), around the newer black residents of the neighborhood.

At about the time that the whites were forming their own organizations in the area north of Lake Street, the leadership of the big black civic unit of OBA in South Austin decided that it could do better on its own

and pulled out of OBA to become the independent South Austin Council (SAC). SAC went through several lean years and a major split, became renamed the South Austin Coalition Community Council (SACCC), and has slowly been growing stronger over the past few years.

In the previous paragraphs, I have summarized the chain of events that led from the founding of ACO as an all-Austin, all-white organization to the formation of an area-wide integrated organization, and thence to the development of a number of smaller black or white organizations covering separate sections of Austin. With the exception of SACCC in South Austin, the boundaries of these smaller organizations coincide roughly with the boundaries of the Catholic parish in which each is located. This has a lot to do with the fact that the Catholic church and its parishoners are, in one way or another, the principal source of support for each organization. Even SACCC, in its times of greatest financial need, has seen its effective boundaries shrink to the boundaries of the Catholic parishes which provided the resources that kept the organization from collapsing.

The other organizations in the Austin area have origins and developmental paths that are quite independent of each other and of the complex of organizations that were just described. The Central Austin Steering Committee (CASC), in the area just north of Lake Street and west of Help of Christians parish, was started by a small group of liberal residents and parish (St. Lucy's) members, despite the lack of support from the conservative parish pastor, as a way of trying to deal with the impending racial integration of the area. The Catholic Archdiocese hierarchy decided to close the parish rather than assign a more liberal pastor. CASC never

secured any viable basis of financial support and folded after a few years of tenuous existence.

In Oak Park, the suburb immediately west of Austin, the Oak Park Community Organization (OPCO) was started by the Campaign Against Pollution (CAP), a city-wide organization, as its local chapter. The local chapter soon declared its independence and had several good years as an autonomous organization trying to get Oak Park to face up to the problems of integration (which was moving across Austin toward Oak Park). OPCO fell into relative decline as the Oak Park village government became sufficiently activist and responsive to citizen problems that OPCO more or less had the rug pulled out from under it.

In Cicero, the suburb just south of Austin and of Oak Park, the Cicero Community Organization (CCO) was started by the churches in response to the apparent threat of racial spill-over from the black Chicago neighborhood of Lawndale to the east. Cicero has been able to stave off racial integration and the CCO, which had a conservative to moderate membership, fell under attack as a liberal integrationist organization by right wing groups in Cicero. Once so labelled, the organization lost its funding and its constituency and it folded.

UNA, the one Austin area organization to which I did not gain access, has its geographical base of support in a group of Catholic parishes located to the northeast of Austin. The things that led to its creation and which influenced its development have little to do with what was been going on in Austin. UNA claims the northeastern corner of St. Peter Canisius parish within its boundaries. As far as I could tell, NAO, which also claims the area, was a presence in this small piece of overlapping territory, but

UNA does not despite its claims to the contrary [Note 1].

As of mid-1979, NAO, NAC, SACCC, and UNO have survived as fairly strong organizations. NAO and NAC are both faced with racial integration in the form of blacks moving up from South Austin and Fillipinos and Latinos moving in from the UNA area to the east. Both NAO and NAC are making the transition from all white to multi-cultural integrated organizations. SACCC is fairly strong despite some severe financial problems. OBA (now not an Alinsky organization), MASC, and OPCO are hanging on as much weaker organizations. The rest of the Austin area organizations have stayed dead. No attempts were made to revive or replace them after they folded.

NOTES:

1. This claim to an active presence was made by the UNA director during a phone call at which I scheduled an initial interview for which the director failed to appear.

## SECTION 2:

## THE AUSTIN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION (ACO)

The Austin Community Organization was started in 1963 through the efforts of the Austin Area Protestant and Catholic clergy. This undertaking was the culmination of two independent events.

In 1963 Austin was an all white, largely Catholic, residential Chicago community area at the edge of the city, directly west of the Chicago "loop" area. In 1963 the southern half of Austin was also directly in line with the West Side black ghetto area which had been rapidly expanding toward Austin during the previous half decade. It was apparent to these clergy, if not to many other Austin residents, that the Belt Line railroad tracks which formed Austin's eastern boundary would be no more an effective barrier to the westward expansion of the black area than had been Garfield Park and Pulaski Road during the previous several years.

For a year or so prior to 1963, Father Egan, a resident priest at St. Angela's parish in northwestern Austin, who was then in charge of the Catholic Archdiocesan Urban Affairs Department and who was the man primarily responsible for bringing together the Catholic church and Saul Alinsky in the late 1950's for the purpose of organizing certain racially threatened Chicago communities, had been moving young priests who were sympathetic to the Alinsky style of organizing into the Austin area churches.


During the same time, and apparently independently, the then thriving Protestant Austin Clergy Association began discussing the desirability of establishing a community organization in Austin to help the community deal with its impending racial integration. At a critical point in 1963, the

Protestant clergy group invited the Austin Catholic clergy to come in with them and form both a more ecumenical clergy association and an Austin area community organization.

The Catholic clergy accepted the offer and, under the influence of Father Egan (and his connection with Saul Alinsky), the newly combined clergy association pledged a budget of \$50,000 to \$60,000 for the first couple of years and hired an organizer who had come out of the Alinsky model training hopper to get the organization started. Many of the clergy were not familiar with Saul Alinsky and most did not have a very clear idea of what kind of organization they were supposedly buying into.

Although preparing Austin for integration was the pastors' underlying reason for starting ACO, this remained their hidden agenda because they felt that Austin residents were not generally receptive to racial integration. Their up-front reason for creating the ACO thus became that of promoting community participation and interaction among Austin residents.

The organization got its public start at a meeting of delegates selected by the various pastors from their church memberships. These delegates were mainly racial moderates because the pastors had been careful to exclude outright racists and exceptionally conservative members from their delegations. At the first meeting, an announcement was made that the ACO was to be an Alinsky style organization. The delegates, who had had no previous exposure to what they were supposed to be doing, elected some temporary officers selected by the clergy, and were divided into issue committees (human relations, housing, education, etc.) according to their interests. At the start the organization (that is, its membership as well as its



THE AUSTIN NEIGHBORHOOD OF CHICAGO

officers and board) and most of its committees were dominated by these racially moderate and relatively typical Austin area church members. However the Human Relations Committee ended up with a membership consisting entirely of quite atypical and highly vocal pro-integration and pro-civil rights liberal Catholics and some members of the neighborhood's Third Unitarian Church [Note 1]. During the early 1960's, this ACO Human Relations Committee doubled as the West Side chapter of CORE (the Congress Of Racial Equality, then an integrated and rather active civil rights group).

Over the next six to nine months, these comparatively radical members of the Human Relations Committee gradually gained control of ACO by showing up en masse at every organization meeting and out-talking, out-lasting and, when necessary, out-shouting their more conservative fellow members. Attendance continually declined at these meetings and as the moderates dropped out, the small militant group gained control by default. Although the Human Relations Committee members finally elected themselves to every board and officer position, they never attempted to infiltrate the other issue committees and some of them continued to operate under the control of the few remaining moderate members.

At about the time that the liberals came to dominate ACO, they also began to take public stands and produce position papers on many national and world-wide liberal social action issues. Eventually, as part of their civil rights activities, many of them began to attack the neighborhood Catholic churches for their lack of speed in desegregating themselves. This led to picketing the churches and occasionally disrupting their Sunday services. Although the demonstrators apparently saw themselves as a concerned group of liberal Catholics who were trying to change their church rather than as

representatives from ACO, the conservative senior pastors of these churches failed to recognize or appreciate the distinction.

For a long time the clergy group tolerated the ACO drift away from neighborhood issues to liberal national and international causes because most of the Protestant clergy and the younger Catholic priests held similar views and many of them (especially the younger Catholics) participated in the organization. However the older Catholic pastors, who were racial conservatives and held primarily "patriotic" or conservative views on national and international issues, wanted to go slow in integrating their churches. Although these conservative pastors controlled most of ACO's money none of them participated in the organization. When the attacks on their church got started, three of the pastors who were the largest contributors to ACO produced an ultimatum: no more money for the organization.

This ultimatum produced a crisis in the clergy association. Most of the Protestant ministers did not like it and two of them and most of the younger Catholic priests felt especially betrayed. The clergy association finally worked out a compromise. There would be no more funding of ACO but the churches would instead put up money to start another organization. The arrangement was the same as it had been a couple years earlier, most of the churches were Protestant but almost all the money came from the few Catholic churches. This second time around the clergy interviewed and hired Tom Gaudette who was a far more experienced organizer than his predecessor had been. Gaudette specified that he wanted no part of ACO because it was a liberal social action group, not a community organization. The clergy group transferred its funding from ACO to Gaudette in 1966. Gaudette and his organizers created the Organization For A Better Austin

(OBA) which developed into a large and legitimate grass roots community organization.

It was evident from my interviews that ACO existed at two levels. First, it was a peoples' organization which was largely under the control of the liberal Human Relations Committee and which lacked any real representation from the community. Second was the Austin Clergy Association which had created the organization and had legitimated it to the churches, which and had recruited the initial membership, and which controlled the money. The financial dependence of ACO on the clergy gave a veto power to the small group of conservative Catholic pastors who were providing most of the money. The bridge between the activist participants and the conservative Catholic pastors consisted of a few Protestant ministers whose churches could not produce much money and the younger Catholic priests who had no real influence over their senior pastors.

The activist liberals in ACO were not trying to keep ACO from being a community organization, but they could not see any distinction between social action and citizen participation. If it came to a choice between being "right" and being a "representative" group, they pushed for the right position. For them, being right was the first step toward resocialization to a better way of life for the organization and for the community. For them, resocialization was an intellectual process involving discussion and, if necessary, argument. The Alinsky model also comes out of the liberal mold but it takes the opposite perspective. It is better to be "representative" than "right" if the two come into conflict. Mass participation is what gives the organization leverage when it comes to obtaining concessions from the establishment to solve community problems. For

the Alinsky model, resocialization is an experiential process. You learn by doing; you learn by participating.

ACO was also described as having a relatively ineffective executive director. He was apparently good at public relations and got along well with the people but he was an ineffective organizer and he could not, or at least did not, prevent the liberals from gaining control of ACO. Neither the leaders nor the clergy learned what an Alinsky-style community organization was supposed to be like [Note 2]. As a result the the activist ministers and priests became participants in the failure of ACO. They were supporters of the non-community issues pushed by the liberals and in their support of these issues; they helped steer their organization away from their intended goal of making it an effective community organization.

About six months before the churches stopped funding ACO, the organization hired an organizer who began doing some real community organizing in the southern end of Austin. In the brief time that he remained with ACO, the new organizer was not able to bring together the liberal ACO leaders and the people whom he had been contacting in the community. Shortly before the funding ran out, the ACO director resigned to become director of the Hawthorne Melody dairy farm zoo. After the clergy association hired Tom Gaudette, the ACO organizer switched over to OBA and continued his organizing activities in the Austin neighborhood. The ACO secretary and many of the less liberal members also switched over from ACO to OBA. The more social action oriented ACO leaders, however, continued to maintain ACO as a volunteer supported social action issue group until 1967 or 1968 when the organization finally folded. Most of these liberals transferred their activity focus to the civil rights movement and other liberal causes. Very few of them ever

joined OBA.

NOTES:

1. According to one informant who was in a position to know, at this first ACO public meeting only one delegate, a civil rights activist from the Unitarian Church signed up for the Human Relations Committee. He was advised to go out and find himself a committee. He recruited a number of like minded friends and acquaintances which led to a committee which had little in common with the rest of the organization.
2. The liberal leaders seem to have thought that they knew what to do and they seem to have resisted learning the Alinsky method. The clergy learned the difference after Tom Gaudette came on the scene. These, of course, are generalizations. A few liberal leaders did learn from Gaudette and a few activist Protestant ministers never did learn the difference between social action and community organizing.

## SECTION 3:

## ORGANIZATION FOR A BETTER AUSTIN (OBA)

No organization covered in this study has had a longer life span than has the OBA. At the same time, no organization included in this study has gone through greater changes during its existence than has the OBA. Although its relatively long life span made the changes possible, the underlying factors that made the changes seem necessary to the OBA people who introduced them had less to do with OBA's longevity than they did with the social context in which OBA was operating. Oddly enough, the social factors which made it necessary for OBA to change to survive were in large measure produced by OBA as part of its quest to make Austin a better community.


In the early 1960's, as the Chicago west-side black ghetto was moving close to the Austin neighborhood, the Protestant-Catholic Austin Clergy Association decided to underwrite the development of a grass-roots community organization to help prepare the area for integration. The clergy association selected an inexperienced staff director and the new organization (the Austin Community Organization - described in Section Two), was soon taken over by a small group of social action / civil rights oriented liberals. After the liberals had alienated most of the more moderate members, so that they had dropped out of the organization, and had taken some actions against the local Catholic churches for their cautious approaches to racial integration, the elderly and conservative pastors of these churches, who provided most of the money that supported the organization, decided to withdraw their funding. The younger and more liberal Protestant ministers, most of whom were sympathetic to the aims of the activists, objected and a compromise was reach-

ed whereby the clergy association agreed to withdraw its support and allocate a similar amount of money to hire a new organizer and try again.

One of the Catholic priests contacted Saul Alinsky who recommended Tom Gaudette. Gaudette, who was the director of the Northwest Community Organisation (NCO), a large organization on the north side of Chicago, looked the situation over and agreed to come providing he could start anew [Note 1]. The clergy association accepted this condition and in mid-1966, Gaudette and his team of five organizers started work in the Austin community. By this time integration was no longer a future threat; blacks had started moving into the south-eastern section of Austin during the summer of 1965.

Gaudette and his organizers started out by talking with people and meeting with groups (churches, block clubs, businessmen, realtors, politicians, and even ACO) to identify concerns, problems, and potential participants. At the most general level, basic themes emerged. Among the whites, the basic question was: what are the blacks up to? Among the blacks the basic theme involved cleaning the streets and building block clubs. The organizers received a mixed reaction from these various interest and ethnic groups. The blacks were especially suspicious, they felt that a white protectionist group might be behind the organizing effort. On the other hand, some whites regarded Gaudette and the organizers as a communist front operation.

Faced with these disparate views and concerns, Gaudette turned to the churches as the single existing community-wide institution upon which he might build the new community organization. Unfortunately the blacks were not being effectively integrated into this institution nor into any other parts of the existing community structure. As a result, Gaudette's organ-



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izing developed a dual thrust. In the white sections, he worked through the churches because they were there and were generally receptive to him. In the black section he began building block clubs so that he would have a structure with which to work [Note 2].

For the first several months, the organizing was focused on southeast Austin. This was the area of concern, the area of racial change, the area where he had no existing structure through which to reach the blacks. After he got the blacks working together, he spread the staff out around the rest of Austin. North of Division Street (1200 north), the organizers found the community so suburban-like that it was more or less unorganizable.

In April of 1967, Gaudette shifted his focus and started working to bring the clergy and the strong Austin business organization together. Although the business community had had a strong distrust of Gaudette, he did get their tentative support for a community organization.

A month later, with the support of the clergy-business-community networks that he had been building, Gaudette scheduled a public meeting to discuss the idea of creating a formal community organization. Although 400 people were expected, more than 700 showed up for the meeting. Despite some criticism of Gaudette as an outside agitator, the people voted overwhelmingly to support an organization.

The organizers then used the relationships that they had been establishing with all these community groups and started bringing them (the churches, the block clubs, the businessmen, the American Legion, youth groups, etc.) together in preparation for the first convention which was held during June. The convention which was attended by between 300 and 400 delegations from the various community groups [Note 3] served as OBA's formal public coming

out. The organization was formally established and named, officers, a board and committees were selected, by-laws and resolutions were voted on, above all it was a noisy but "good" manifestation of social solidarity by a large group of people most of whom did not know each other and who were experiencing this sort of thing for the first time.

After the convention, the staff concentrated on developing local leaders so that they would learn how to run the organization (raise money, develop issues and strategies, etc.) so that the staff was not doing everything. They also set about to formalize a widespread infrastructure of issue committees and smaller area area organizations, each with its own officers and committees, in order to expand the leadership pool and disperse the workload so that people did not get over-burdened and burned out. The resulting committee structure ranged in scale from block level to area level and to Austin-wide in scope and then covered just about everything that people were interested in ranging from the traditional issues of education, realtor practices, housing and sanitation to such non-traditional ones as art fairs and mural workshops. The resulting activity level grew to the point where it became impossible for Gaudette and the organizers to keep track of what was going on. As a result, they became dependent on a pool of volunteers who put in countless hours attending meetings and reporting back to the staff [Note 4]. For a time OBA was both an extremely active and diversified organization and by all accounts it was also the most powerful community organization in the city.

From the start until 1971 or 1972 when white participation in OBA ceased, the organization continued the practice of working through the churches in the white areas and through civic organizations, built up from

block club units by the OBA staff, in the black areas. These areas and participatory units varied in number, in location, and in strength as the years passed. The general pattern is summarized in Table 1.

In 1967 there were three areas of white strength in southern Austin located in and around certain churches; there was one fairly strong white center in a Catholic church in far northern Austin; and there was the original black civic unit in southeastern Austin.

By 1969, the white areas of strength in southern Austin were collapsing as the result of white migration out of the area. In turn, the area of black strength had expanded and now included three strong civic organizations built around the block clubs. At the same time, however, whites from northern Austin were withdrawing because they were coming to regard OBA as a black organization. This white withdrawal from far northern Austin became total and permanent after the 1969 convention for which a large (300 people) and new delegation from St. Angela parish had all their candidates for office defeated by people from southern Austin. Their candidate for president, Ray Deveraux, an active participant in OBA from the start was defeated by Gail Cincotta who was both white and one of the most influential of OBA's early leaders. After this rejection, the whites from St. Angela parish decided to form their own organization [Note 5]. These shifts in strength were accompanied by a considerable increase in support from central Austin, an area between Lake Street and Chicago Avenue, which was beginning to experience the racial change that had over-run South Austin during the previous half decade.

In April 1971, after having been in Austin for five years, Tom Gaudette resigned as director of OBA. He was succeeded by Shel Trapp who had been

TABLE 1

AREAS OF STRENGTH IN OBA BETWEEN 1967 AND 1971,  
BY LOCATION AND RACIAL COMPOSITION

YEAR	WHITE UNITS	BLACK UNITS
1967	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Assumption Greek Orthodox Church (southwest Austin)</li> <li>2. Lamon Methodist Church (northern southeast Austin)</li> <li>3. St. Peter Canisius Catholic Church (far northeast Austin) participation was only through the church, no OBA infrastructure was established there</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. An early black civic unit in southeastern Austin</li> </ol>
1968	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Assumption Greek Orthodox Church</li> <li>2. Lamon Methodist Church</li> <li>3. St. Peter Canisius Church</li> <li>4. Help of Christians Catholic Church (east-central Austin)</li> <li>5. Byfort School (central Austin)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Same as 1967 and expanding westward through southern Austin with continued racial turnover</li> </ol>
1969	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Not clear:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. White groups in southern Austin were collapsing due to racial turnover</li> <li>b. White groups in northern Austin were pulling out after their candidate for OBA president lost to South Austin candidate</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Washington Blvd. Council</li> <li>2. Central Austin Council</li> <li>3. South Austin Council (all were in South Austin, south of Lake Street)</li> </ol>
1970	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Help of Christians Catholic Church</li> <li>2. Eastern half of St. Lucy Catholic parish (west-central Austin)</li> </ol> <p>Note: No more white units in South Austin</p>	<p>Note:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Similar to 1969 during the first half of 1970</li> <li>b. Similar to 1971 during the second half of 1970</li> </ol>
1970	NONE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Southern half of Help of Christians Catholic parish (south of Chicago Avenue)</li> </ol>

Gaudette's best organizer from 1966 until 1970 when he had been hired as the director of NCO. Trapp's skill as an organizer was a major factor behind the development of the strong black civic organizations in South Austin. When Trapp came back to OBA, he found that the black areas north of Lake Street were doing OK, but that the black civic units in South Austin had almost completely collapsed during the year that he had been gone [Note 6]. The remaining leaders in South Austin, who remembered the "good old days" (1968 to 1970), were bitter and blamed the collapse on bad staff, the lack of staff, and the fact that OBA was a "white" organization [Note 6].

Trapp and OBA decided to try to pull these areas south of Lake Street back together. To do this, he assigned all his staff to work in the area. This caused the remaining whites, all of whom lived in central Austin, to withdraw from OBA because their needs were not being met. The organizing effort in South Austin met with success for they were able to rebuild the three formerly strong civic units into a single one, the South Austin Council (SAC), which soon became the strongest unit in OBA. OBA soon began running into more serious problems and SAC became stronger than the parent organization. SAC began to feel that it was carrying OBA (this is getting ahead of the story) and decided that it could do better on its own. Over the next couple of years SAC, gradually withdrew from OBA and severed the relationship completely in 1974.

By 1971 a black woman had succeeded Gale Cincotta, whose interest had turned to city-wide coalitions, as OBA president. In mid-1971 the new president moved away and a black man, Mark Salone, was elected president with the encouragement of Shel Trapp. Although nobody knew it until several years later, when the Chicago Daily News got hold of the story and printed it,

Mr. Salone was a paid police informer and organization disrupter. After his election, things started going wrong with OBA in strange ways, especially when he was involved. As president, Salone was heavily prepped by Trapp for what to do and what to expect at meetings. Soon the police became very adept at splitting OBA into opposing camps (e.g., white-black) when they were invited to meetings to discuss crime in the Austin area, and Salone developed a habit of calling in sick at the very last minute when his presence was considered to be crucial to the success of a meeting [Note 7].

The net effect was that OBA became an organization that was working at cross-purposes with itself; its organizing activities were helping the neighborhood civic organizations more than they were helping OBA itself and OBA began to develop an increasingly negative local reputation. In late 1972, Trapp resigned as director to work full time with Gale Cincotta in the city-wide coalition that would soon become the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA). OBA struggled along for another year with a less than adequately trained staff and with declining revenues and influence until Ken Dosie was hired as director.

Dosie, who was relatively inexperienced and who came at a salary that the organization could afford, found OBA to be a declining organization. Most of the formidable leadership had left, going either into the city-wide activities or sticking with SAC which had just about finished the process of separating from OBA. This produced a further decline in OBA's ability to bring in new participants, to develop a new generation of leaders, and to exercise much influence as an organization. This, in turn dried up funding from both local sources and from outside foundations.

The withdrawal of SAC left OBA with a constituency only in the black

area east of Central Avenue and north of Lake Street (i.e., the southern half of Help Of Christians parish) where the new Catholic pastors were strong supporters of community organizing. Dosie started out by trying to pull together the northern and southern sections of what had until recently been OBA's strong civic units in South and central Austin. He found himself, however, faced with several predicaments which made this difficult. Apart from his own personal inexperience, the other major factors were:

1. The rest of the OBA staff, consisting of two conscientious objectors, was at least equally inexperienced.
2. The OBA board strongly favored continuing in the style of the past in which the organization acted as the grass-roots representative of the entire Austin community area.
3. SAC was willing to remain in OBA only if OBA would provide organizers who were responsible to SAC rather than to OBA. OBA could not accept this.
4. OBA was running into trouble in Help Of Christians parish because the pastor wanted OBA's organizing to be focused around the parish and its problems. Dosie wanted the organizing to have a community-wide focus rather than a parish focus. This produced a conflict between the pastor and Dosie, with the result that the pastor secured his own organizer from Catholic Charities and gave up on OBA as a "lost cause." OBA could not effectively compete with the pastor and the new organizer with the result that the OBA block clubs were gradually pulled into a new organization, the Mid-Austin Steering Committee (MASC) as it was being put together by the pastor and his organizer.
5. OBA was not able to accomplish much on the issues. It lacked both the leadership and the participation base to follow through on the issues that it picked out to do something about. This caused credibility problems for OBA both in its community as well as to the targets that it selected for its actions.
6. Funding was an increasingly serious problem, which meant that OBA could not hire the staff that it needed for its supposed rebuilding efforts. When OBA, claiming to represent all of Austin, sought funds from a foundation, the foundation would contact Father Phelan, the pastor of Resurrection Church in South Austin and a former strong OBA leader who was now supporting SAC, and Father

Phelan would describe the situation in more accurate terms. The result was that OBA would not get the money.

Finally Dosie and his staff became convinced that OBA, caught in a state of tension between its goals and its reality, caught between the city and the stronger and now independent local organizations (SAC, MASC, CASC), with both money and credibility in short supply, could never regain its position as an effective grass-roots middleman between the community and the city. They concluded that OBA would have to find another role besides Alinsky-style organizing if it was to survive.

Dosie's solution was to transform OBA into a community development organization. He started out with housing, which has always been an important OBA issue, because it would be a good way to shift the staff and membership orientation from community organizing to running neighborhood directed programs. OBA submitted an application for \$600,000.00 in Community Development funds to rehabilitate ten deteriorating buildings. A year later OBA received \$100,000 to do four buildings. In the mean time the staff was on the lookout for other useful, income producing community service programs. By June of 1976 they had set up a job bank to locate jobs in the western suburbs for neighborhood residents. The lack of good transportation to these industrial centers was a serious limitation, but they did succeed in finding employment for a number of people. They ran a 30 slot CETA training program which was one of the largest on the West Side, they secured a grant of \$50,000 per year from the state Department of Public Aid to provide certain social services to welfare recipients, and they established youth recreation and tutoring programs.

The shift to formal social service programs produced conflict between Dosie and the OBA board. The board still wanted to organize the community

but organizing had produced few victories and very little revenue over the past several years. In contrast, the new programs were providing both a real service to the community and revenue to OBA. The conflict was never resolved. At first, the board went along because OBA was in debt and needed the money to stay alive. Over the next year or two the OBA board shrank by attrition from 22 to 10 members. This reduction weakened the board and gave Dosie the leverage that he needed to restructure the organization to better fit the programs that it was now running.

The reason that the board-director conflict continued was that it was more nearly over the loci of authority in OBA than it was over the the programs themselves. OBA had retained its traditional Alinsky structure of assigning decision making, even on a day to day basis, to the board. The staff role was to advise the leaders, not to run the organization for them. In OBA, Dosie was the director, but any employee could go over his head to the board for any reason and some board members were giving out staff jobs as personal favors. Dosie wanted to pattern OBA after the industrial model in which the board would have authority over fund-raising and over the director, but in which the director would have authority (including the authority to hire and fire) over all other employees.

Dosie spent three months preparing for the fall 1976 OBA convention. Much of this preparation involved writing a new constitution that reflected the new structure that he sought, and in selecting new board candidates who were sympathetic to his goals. Dosie got what he wanted out of the convention: a new constitution, a new authority system, and a new board that was no longer a source of conflict over how the organization should be run.

In March of 1977, three months after the new board took over, Dosie

resigned. He was tired of long night meetings and of long daily trips to Austin from the southside neighborhood where he lived. He had been trained as an Alinsky organizer. In order to save OBA, he had had to turn it into a very different organization. Now the battle was over, and he wanted to get another job that was more down his alley.

When Ken Dosie left, he recommended that Zachary Springer, an OBA staff member, be named director and that Ruby Lofton, a relatively new staff member and a community resident who had moved to Chicago two years earlier, be named associate director. The board followed this recommendation. Over the next several months the new director was gradually eased out of his job by his assistant, and in August 1977 Ruby Lofton was promoted to director of OBA.

Ruby Lofton saw a need to increase the responsiveness of OBA to community needs and to increase the extent of community input into the decision-making process. She continued the orientation toward social service programs, dropping some and making plans to add others. She started holding monthly public meetings to identify community concerns and she got what she perceived as an excessively weak and non-responsive board restructured into what she perceived as a larger board of more responsive people. She sought out ministers and other community leaders who could better reflect the interests of the community. She has tried to get back into block club organizing, but organizing divorced from the radical or issue-oriented style of the past. In this endeavor she has had very little success and she is not sure why [Note 8].

In 1967, OBA had a director and four other staff members. They were called organizers and they did community organizing. In 1977, OBA had a director and several other staff members who had acquired different job

titles. They were the social service director, the rehab director, and the youth program coordinator. OBA was alive, solvent, and possibly on the way back up, but there was very little resemblance between the OBA of 1977 and the OBA of the 1960's.

#### NOTES:

1. See Bailey (1974), page 51. Certain parts of the description that follows in this chapter reads like a paraphrase of some sections of Bailey's book but, with the exception of the explanation of how Tom Gaudette was picked to organize in Austin, the information came from my interviews not from Bailey's book.
2. At that time, although blacks were moving into Austin, the churches were still the established ones whose ministers had called in Tom Gaudette. The churches nearest to the area of transition had begun working with integration - only a few responded negatively, but the separate black community infrastructure of store-front Missionary Baptist and Pentacostal churches had not yet made its entrance into the area. When it did, the organizers were unable to gain any support from it, as they had received from the white churches and OBA had to continue building and maintaining block clubs and civic organizations to retain an institutional base in the black community after the white churches left or lost their white membership.
3. A group was considered to be any organization (church, church committees, block clubs, etc.) with at least ten members. Large organizations with various committees could send many delegations since the church and each of its eligible committees was considered to be a separate organization.
4. The most visible and most active of these volunteers was Gale Cincotta, an Austin housewife, who went on to become OBA president, a dominant leader in MAHA, and who finally received national recognition as a leader in the area of grass-roots community organizing.
5. More than this was going on. For a more complete explanation of how and why the whites from St. Angela parish decided to form their own organization see the description of the creation of the Northwest Austin Organization (NAO) in chapter eleven.
6. According to Gaudette, Trapp was an exceptionally good organizer without whom he could not have built OBA as he did. When Trapp left OBA to become director of NCO, his successor in Austin was not able to hold it all together.

7. These are only two examples of the problems that OBA encountered. Given the critical role that leadership, especially the president, plays in an Alinsky organization where the staff works hard with the leaders behind the scenes but plays a secondary role in public, Salone was in a strong position to create havoc on OBA. He seems to have succeeded rather well.

In an Alinsky-style community organization, most of the planning for how to handle an issue is done by the organizers. When a meeting or a confrontation with some target organization is scheduled, the organizers will spend a lot of time preparing the leaders for what to expect. At the meeting, the leaders will be up-front and do most of the talking, while the organizers will be on the sidelines watching what is happening. Because Salone was a key leader in OBA, Trapp spent more time working with him than he did with the other leaders. Shel Trapp, who was considered to be an exceptionally good organizer, was very puzzled about what was going on in OBA. At the time, the public did not know that the police were infiltrating and disrupting various activist organizations. All that was known was that certain policemen seemed to go out of their way to publicly support certain right-wing causes. Although this was known to be happening in South Austin, the Daily News stories about police infiltration and disruption of activist organizations were as much a surprise to Shel Trapp as they were to most other people. For Trapp, as for participants in many other Chicago-area organizations, the newspaper stories explained a lot that had previously defied explanation.

8. One of the tasks of a researcher is to evaluate the reliability of the information that he collects. In interviewing, collecting facts involves collecting interpretative summaries of events. The reliability of an informant depends partly on how accurately the informant understands the dynamics of the events that he, or she, is summarizing. My informants for OBA included all the directors except the one who served briefly between Trapp and Dosie. All these people except the current one seem to have had a fairly good idea of what they wanted to do and how to do it. In contrast, Mrs. Lofton does not seem to have had a very clear idea of how to do what she wanted to do once she was named director. My tentative inference is that the transformation of OBA provided it a niche in which to survive, but that the organization is in a weak holding pattern rather than building a secure position for itself in or around that niche.

## SECTION 4:

## NORTHWEST AUSTIN COUNCIL (NAC)


In 1966, Gaudette's organizers had found the section of Austin north of Division Street so suburban in character that it was basically unorganizable. By 1970, however, the area was not so far removed from the threat of racial change and residents were beginning to experience harassment from the realtors who benefit from resegregation. Over the next year and a half, parish sized community organizations were formed in all the Catholic parishes in northern Austin. These organizations sprang up as a result of the OBA's inability to retain its position as the dominant community organization throughout the turf that it had staked out for itself. The Northwest Austin Council in St. Angela's parish in the northwest corner of Austin was the first of these organizations to be started.

Over the OBA's decade of existence as an Alinsky-style organization, the geographical sections of Austin that provided strong representation in OBA shifted from year to year [Note 1]. Northwestern Austin, which constitutes St. Angela parish, seems to have never provided more than a few participants, although at least one of those few, Ray Deveraux, was very active both in OBA and in the ACO which preceeded it [Note 2]. Until 1968, St. Angela's, like every other Catholic parish north of Lake Street in Austin, had an elderly conservative pastor who lacked any interest in community organizing. In 1968, however, St. Angela was assigned a new pastor who was a supporter of community organizing. Msgr. Pellicore, the new pastor, came from a parish in the Northwest Community Organization (NCO) area and knew Tom Gaudette, the director of OBA who had previously been director of NCO.

Msgr. Pellicore encouraged his new parishoners to become involved in community organizing by first trying out OBA, which already existed, with the option of starting their own organization if OBA did not work out for them. With this support from the rectory, Ray Deveraux and the OBA organizer who was assigned to northern Austin organized a large delegation and a slate of candidates for OBA offices for the 1969 OBA annual convention. Many of the St. Angela delegates understood that a deal had been made which would insure that some of the whites from north Austin would be elected to facilitate the reintegration of OBA, which had become an almost completely black organization. At the convention, all the white candidates were defeated and the keynote speaker gave a strongly anti-white speech [Note 3].

After the convention, the white delegates from St. Angela's got together to talk things over and they finally decided to set up their own organization rather than try to participate in OBA. They were encouraged in this direction by Tom Gaudette who had been suggesting for some time to Ray Deveraux that the north Austin whites take this step. Gaudette loaned the St. Angela an OBA organizer for the first six months, at which time they decided to kick him out because they considered him to be too militant and because they were not sure whether his loyalty was basically to OBA or to St. Angela's. Shortly thereafter, Msgr. Pellicore secured the services of two Catholic seminarians to work as organizers. Although most people did not realize it, the seminarians and their successors were being trained by Tom Gaudette and regularly attended OBA staff meetings [Note 4].

For the first year NAC existed as a steering committee consisting of some twenty concerned parish members and representatives of various parish organizations (the school board, the Holy Name Society, the ladies group,



NAC, ST. ANGELA PARISH IN NORTH AUSTIN

etc.). St. Angela's was experiencing a rather high turn-over rate among its organizers with the result that much of the organizing and all of the continuity came from a small group of the most most active leaders. The organizing activities were greatly helped by the the wide-spread local concern over realtor solicitation, and anti-solicitation activity became the major organizing issue [Note 5].

About a year after the split with OBA, NAC held its first convention which was attended by about 450 people. At the convention, NAC was formally established as an organization, officers were elected, issue committees set up, bylaws and resolutions voted on, and the organizing work of the previous year was formally legitimated. The convention was an exciting affair in the sense that it was a new type of event for almost all the delegates and it did much to solidify the people, but it was not a very hot affair because there was no opposition to anything.

After the convention, NAC continued its organizing activities around local issues, solidifying its participatory base and acquiring a more stable organizing staff. Not long thereafter, NAC began participating in the early city-wide coalition activities, including the group that later became the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) and some more temporary coalitions involving other parishes in north Austin and in the area to the east of north Austin.

Once the NAC boundaries were formally set as St. Angela's parish, it became clear to the NAC leaders that these boundaries bore little relationship to the issues confronting the area. To increase the local impact on these issues, NAC started promoting community organizing in the other three Catholic parishes in Austin north of Lake Street. NAC's interest

in the three parishes was not entirely altruistic. The three parishes were to the east, the south and the southeast of St. Angela's and formed a potential buffer zone to separate St. Angela's from the nearby changing neighborhoods. The organizing thrust had a dual focus: first, to establish local organizations in each of these parishes and second, to bring the organizations together as member units in a stronger area-wide umbrella organization.

Although NAC did not get anywhere in St. Lucy's parish to the south, it did help get organizations started in St. Peter Canisius parish to the east (Northeast Austin Organization - NAO) and in Help of Christians parish to the southeast (Mid-Austin Council - MAC). At about the same time an umbrella organization, the North Austin Community Council (NACC) was established which included NAC, NAO, and MAC [Note 6].

The first NACC convention, which was held in 1972, served as the vehicle through which many of the people from St. Peter Canisius and Help of Christians were introduced to the Alinsky style of doing things. For the next two years a considerable part of NAC's activity was directed toward working within a common framework with NAO and MAC. Finally in October, 1974 increasing tensions in NACC over the dominant role played by NAC led to the dissolution of NACC, and NAC has worked primarily within its own boundaries since then.

Back in 1969 and 1970 when NAC was being organized, most of its members were new to community organizing and not supportive of the Alinsky confrontation style of doing things. From 1970 to about 1975, however, NAC increasingly became a confrontation style organization. This change seems to have occurred for two reasons. First, the NAC membership became more familiar

with and accepting of the confrontation model; and second, as the black-white racial boundary moved closer, the pressure in the community from realtors and mortgage lenders became greater. Over these same years, the list of major issues grew to include mortgage redlining, FHA mortgage policy abuses, and some crime and youth problems in addition to the original one of realtor solicitation.

Starting in about 1975, NAC began moving away from the confrontation style of operating. The new style has emphasized discussion and negotiation with antagonist organizations. This shift in style has been accompanied by another shift - in this case, from an organization of people who do the things themselves, to a service model where the staff does things for the people. By 1977, NAC would call the ward office about a garbage complaint rather than organize the people to confront the ward superintendent.

This change in orientation has been accompanied by, and perhaps partially caused by several other changes within NAC and in the NAC territory. As is the case in most Alinsky-style community organizations, decision-making in NAC has rested in the hands of a relatively limited number of leaders. Until 1975, leadership in NAC seems to have been dominated by the founding group of leaders, but in 1975 a new president was elected who had joined the organization several years after it was founded. At about the same time the other leadership positions also apparently shifted to other newer members [Note 7]. In recent years, the NAC president seems to have increasingly dominated the decision-making process. The current (1975-1978) president holds the view that confrontation may be helpful in the short run but that it does little to improve things over the long haul where the need is to get clear understandings of what is causing the problems

before anything can be done to remedy them. The new leadership group in NAC introduced a new system for running the organization in which an office manager was hired to run things on a day to day basis while being himself responsible to the president and to the board. This system replaced the traditional Alinsky one under which the organizers reported directly to the leaders who made or ratified most day-to-day decisions.

In 1970, the black-white racial dividing line was quite a few blocks south of St. Angela parish but the parish was being afflicted by the realtors who move ahead of the racial turnover boundary. By 1975, the black boundary had reached the southern edge of the parish and by 1977 the southern third of the parish was changing from white to black.

Racial change, however seems to be going slower in north Austin than it did in southern Austin and NAC claims much of the credit for this difference. There is probably some truth to the claim, for in recent years NAC and other similar community organizations, through their wider coalitions, have been able to change some of the laws and regulations which helped enable outside institutions to facilitate, deliberately or otherwise, the rate of residential racial change. Two other factors, not under the control of NAC, seem also to have limited the rate of black-white racial change in north Austin. First, as the black ghetto has expanded, its border has grown longer and it seem to require increasingly longer periods of time to stretch it further [Note 8]. Second, north Austin is also being invaded by another ethnic group - Filipinos who are moving in from the east. The Filipinos are seen as being by far the more desirable of the two invaders. They are of a generally higher socio-economic class, they seem to have more traditional family values and a higher regard

for keeping the neighborhood clean and in good repair. In addition, they are mostly Catholic, which means that they help support the existing major religious institution (St. Angela's). In turn, this helps keep NAC going since it still depends heavily upon the church for financial support and as a membership recruitment channel [Note 9]. By their willingness to buy housing in the area, the Filipinos limit the amount of housing available to blacks and this limits the extent of black-white racial change.

The changing racial makeup of the parish has produced a change in the orientation of NAC. In its confrontation days, the organization was concerned with problems and targets that affected the neighborhood but which had their base outside the area. This produced opposition to panic peddling realtors, a seemingly indifferent city sanitation department ward superintendent and to blacks who were threatening to move in. Now, however, NAC is working with problems that are more nearly within the neighborhood itself. It is trying to come to grips with racial invasion, to accept and even encourage cultural pluralism, to reduce the rate of change and its impact on the neighborhood, and to keep up the quality of city services and the physical condition of the neighborhood.

As part of this new emphasis on neighborhood self-maintenance, in 1977 NAC formed the North Austin Development Corporation (NADCOR) as a non-profit corporation to work in the area of housing rehabilitation. Although NADCOR was started with a certain amount of publicity, it has since accomplished almost nothing although this has not seemed to discourage NAC from otherwise pushing the idea of property maintenance.

The current generation of NAC leadership was more resistant to providing me access to the sorts of information that I sought to collect than was

any other organization that I studied. My informants from some other organizations volunteered similar information to me. They perceived NAC as being more suspicious of outsiders than was any other organization with which they were familiar. The informants attributed the higher level of NAC suspicion to the organization's experience of having its leadership and dominant position in NACC rejected by the community organizations in its neighboring parishes.

#### NOTES:

1. See Section 3, Table 1 for details.
2. Ray Deveraux was one of the few moderates not to quit ACO after the activist liberals took over, and he continued to lead one of the issue committees that the activists did not attempt to infiltrate. See Chapter Nine for details.
3. Apparently the speaker was a prominent black Chicago businessman, Augustus Savage, a southside newspaper publisher and the president of the Organization For The Southwest Community (OSC) which had been one of the strongest Alinsky-style organizations a few years earlier. According to my informants the white delegation to this OBA convention totalled about 300 people.
4. This non-publicized relationship with Tom Gaudette and OBA continued until 1971, when Gaudette resigned from OBA.
5. This issue itself helped separate north and south Austin. Once South Austin had turned black, realtor solicitation was no longer a problem and the black part of OBA in south Austin had little interest in the issue. Although NAC and OBA worked together on racial steering during 1969 and 1970, the issue was never salient enough to either organization to produce close or permanent linkages between them.
6. The extent of influence that NAC had upon getting NAO and MASC started is hard to assess. It seems clear that the arrival of Msgr. Pellicore was a major catalyst in getting NAC started. Both Msgr. Pellicore and NAC saw the need to get the neighboring parishes organized. This became possible at St. Peter Canisius and at Help of Christians in 1970 when the two parishes were assigned new pastors who were supporters of com-

munity organizing. Father Mattei, the new pastor at St. Peter Canisius was a seminary classmate of Msgr. Pellicore who had previously been the primary founder of an Alisky-style organization in Cicero, Ill., and Father Venture, one of the new pastors at Help Of Christians, had entered the priesthood partly as the result of the influence of Msgr. Pellicore. At the same time that NAC was encouraging the parishes to organize, Msgr. Pellicore and the new pastors were talking with Catholic Charities about getting organizers assigned to the parishes.

In effect the, the effect of NAC involvement was to spur on and to shape to some extent a process that would have occurred anyhow. The final impact of this involvement seems to have been greatest on NAC itself as the result of the negative reactions to its attempt to permanently dominate NACC.

7. I was not able to ascertain the extent of these changes. My informants for NAC for the period after 1974 were willing to discuss all the parts of my interview schedule except those involving the leadership and the staff. This problem arose in only three of the twentyfive organizations that I studied.
8. This is an unverified hypothesis that I derived from my interviews. Informants in white organizations all along the black-white border made equivalent statements about how racial change was going slower now. Each informant attributed the difference to the special impact that his (or her) organization had been having in its local neighborhood.
9. This financial dependence is both direct and indirect. The organization directly receives some money, office space and materials. Indirectly, the church has been an major channel for reaching out into the community for members. The members provide the mass base that the organization needs to legitimate its funding requests to outside funding agencies and the members and the church provide the organization with access to bodies and participants for its local fund raising activities.

SECTION 5:  
NORTHEAST AUSTIN ORGANIZATION (NAO)

NAO is located in the northeastern corner of the Austin community area. Its boundaries, which have never changed, are precisely those of the St. Peter Canisius Catholic parish. NAO was the second independent Alinsky organization to be founded in northern Austin following the failure of the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) to retain its constituency from this area [Note 1]. NAO was formally established as a community organization in 1973, but its roots go back to the mid-1960's. These roots, by virtue of their existence, have influenced the development of NAO in certain ways, but they were not directly part of the causal chain of events that produced NAO itself and made it the type of organization that it was during the first few years of its existence.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first two deal with the roots of NAO and with the chain of events that brought it into being. The third, and longest, section covers the organization after its founding. The first two sections involve the local effects of events that occurred largely outside of the future NAO territory. These events relate to some other Austin area grass-roots community organizations, each of which was separately included in this study [Note 2]. In this chapter I will describe only the local impact of each organization as they influenced the development of NAO.


1. The Roots - 1963-1972

When the Austin Clergy Association set up the Austin Community Organiz-

ation (ACO) in 1963, the churches in northeastern Austin sent delegations just as did most other Austin churches. Racial change was not yet a threat to the residents of northern Austin and their delegations were among those that dropped out as the liberal activists gained control of the organization. None of the influential ACO leaders seem to have come from the NAO area but, for better or for worse, ACO was the people's first exposure to community organizing.

When the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) was being formed, northern Austin was still too far removed from the area of racial change to be organizable but in 1967, with the support of an assistant pastor and an OBA organizer, a relatively strong OBA delegation was organized from St. Peter Canisius church. This representation was strictly through the church and no OBA infrastructure was ever established in the area. The church pastor did not care for community organizing and by 1968 most of the St. Peter Canisius delegates had dropped out. They were turned off both by the militant style of OBA and by its focus on racial problems in southern Austin. Most of these delegates have retained their negative attitudes toward OBA, but the experience helped prepare them for participation in NAO a few years later.

In 1970 the pastor of St. Peter Canisius reached mandatory retirement age. His successor, Father Mattei, had been a major sponsor of the Alinsky-style community organization in Cicero before coming to his new church. Father Mattei favored ecumenical cooperation and believed that every parish should have a community organization. In the same year (1970), when the pastor of Trinity Lutheran Church, the largest Protestant church in northeastern Austin, saw the need for a neighborhood community group, the



NAO, ST. PETER CANISIUS PARISH IN NORTH AUSTIN

Lutheran pastor readily secured the support of Fatherm Mattei and a relatively informal volunteer council was established. The council, which attracted the participation of many of the former OBA delegates, met regularly from 1970 to 1973. Although the council never adopted a formal name, it worked, with some success, on a variety of community problems. Even though the council had been established on an ecumenical basis and had both the support of Father Mattei and the active participation of the Lutheran pastor, almost all the participants were from the Catholic church. This was because St. Peter Canisius was far larger church, all of whose members lived in northeastern Austin, while the majority of the smaller Lutheran church's members lived outside this area.

## 2. The Events Leading To the Founding Of NAO - 1969 to 1973

In 1969, a large and new delegation to the annual OBA convention had been organized from St. Angela Catholic Church, which was located just west of St. Peter Canisius. After experiencing a rather negative reception at the convention, the delegates decided to form their own organization in St. Angela parish rather than to try to participate in OBA. The decision to organize only their own parish seems to have been made because, back in 1969, St. Angela was the only parish in northern Austin to have a pastor who promoted community organizing and because the organizers whom Msgr. Pellicore secured for NAC were assigned to the parish rather than to the larger neighborhood of northern Austin.

After NAC had been organized for a while, its leaders concluded that they needed an area-wide organization to do much about many of the problems in their neighborhood. By late 1972, NAC had started trying to get similar organizations established in the Catholic parishes immediately south, south-

east and east of St. Angela's. At the same time they set up an umbrella organization, the North Austin Community Council (NACC) to coordinate, or, depending on one's perspective, to control this organizing outreach effort. In St. Peter Canisius parish, NAC met with a great deal of success which was not exactly of its own doing. By early 1973, Father Mattei had concluded that the ecumenical community council in his parish was not going to get very far if it did not get a trained organizer. In January of 1973, Father Mattei, Msgr. Pellicore, and some NAC leaders went to Catholic Charities and secured a full time organizer for St. Peter Canisius parish [Note 3].

The salary for the new organizer was split equally between Catholic Charities and St. Peter Canisius Church, and the organizer was under the immediate supervision of the more experienced organizer assigned to NAC through St. Angela Church. This action had several fairly direct consequences. It changed the informal volunteer council into a formal community organization named NAO with boundaries identical to those of the Catholic parish, it tied NAO into the Catholic Charities organizing network and loosened the ecumenical tie with Trinity Lutheran Church, and it brought NAO under the influence of NAC and into the umbrella organization (NACC) that NAC was establishing in northern Austin.

### 3. The Subsequent Development OF NAO - 1973 to 1978

In its transition from informal volunteer group to the Alinsky-style NAO, the organization retained most of its earlier members and grew much larger after the organizer started recruiting people in the neighborhood. For these new people, and for many of the older members, the cooperation with NAC and the participation in NACC conventions and actions was some-

thing of a strange experience. The need for the aggressive confrontation style did not strike home until a number of NAO participants experienced harassment by the police while participating in a demonstration against a block busting realtor who had started operating in the neighborhood.

Later in 1973, another small volunteer civic organization which had been operating in a small section of northeast Austin since about 1968 was voluntarily absorbed into NAO. Not long thereafter, one of its leaders was elected president of NAO. The relationship with NAC and NACC continued in a seemingly stable manner until the fall of 1974 with the organizations in the NACC umbrella cooperating on a variety of problems most of which revolved around the unscrupulous realtors who had been operating in the neighborhood for several years.

In 1974, the NAC organizer, who was also the NACC staff person and the supervisor of the organizers in all the other NACC member organizations (i.e., NAO and MAC) quit. By virtue of his seniority and his greater experience, this event made the NAO organizer the senior organizer in NACC and thereby, by prior convention, the staff person for NACC and the supervisor of all the other Catholic Charities organizers, including those working for NAC. Ever since the founding of NACC, NAC seems to have regarded itself as the rightfully dominant partner in NACC, and NAC leaders had always held two or three of the four board and officer slots in NACC. The NAC leaders were not happy to see the NACC staff position and the supervisory function fall into the hands of the NAO organizer. The NAC leaders soon began expressing their displeasure with the performance of the NAO organizer and not long thereafter asked NAO to fire the man. NAO had for some time chafed under the self-assumed dominance of NAC. What particularly galled the

NAO leaders was that NAC wanted the organizer to be fired from his position as NAO organizer as well as from his positions in NACC. During a rather stormy NACC meeting, NAO refused to fire the organizer and the representatives from NAO and NAC finally decided that the best thing for them to do would be to dissolve the umbrella organization. This action brought NACC to an end in the fall of 1974 [Note 4].

NAO has continued on its own since that time. It has participated in some actions with NAC and with some other organizations when it saw some reason to do so, and it has participated in all the formal city-wide coalitions [the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) and the Citizens Action Program (CAP)] as well as in a number of other temporary ad hoc coalitions in actions or issues that were of concern to NAO.

At the end of 1974 the NAO organizer resigned and was replaced by another Catholic Charities organizer who stayed around for a few months. Early in 1975, NAO decided to hire one of its key leaders as staff organizer and it then set about the business of becoming financially independent first of Catholic Charities and subsequently of St. Peter Canisius Church.

After NAO hired the local leader, Mrs. Mary Volpe, as staff organizer, the church agreed to pay her salary while Mrs. Volpe and the organization set about raising their own money. Early in 1975, they solicited a \$500 donation from a local bank and by the end of the year they had raised \$4500.00 from an on-going "pass-the-hat" operation and from two major fund raising events. By 1977, the NAO fund raising activities were producing an income of about \$20,000 a year. About half this amount comes from running an outdoor carnival for St. Peter Canisius Church, and the rest comes from dances, raffles, rummage sales, pancake breakfasts and

similar activities which bring in about \$1000 each.

Since about 1972, St. Peter Canisius has been providing office space, office equipment and supplies, and space for meetings. This has considerably reduced the cost of running NAO and it means that almost all NAO's money can be used for staff salaries. Although NAO says that it has been financially self-sufficient since 1976, its financial solvency is still closely tied to the well being of the church which provides the facilities for most of the fund raisers and promotes the activities in the parish newsletter. The net result is that the church seems to supply most of the customers for the NAO fund raising activities.

In 1973, NAO had a largely local focus. It was concerned about keeping the community as it had been, and its primary targets were realtors whose solicitation tactics were viewed as a form of harassment by local residents. The blacks and their organization (OBA) were perceived as being far enough away to be no immediate threat to the community. By 1975, however, blacks were moving steadily closer to southern parish boundary and one or two had actually moved into the parish itself. NAO had changed and had come to view the blacks themselves as the major threat to the community. Maintaining the community as it had been was still the major goal. The organization ignored the blacks living in the area and developed a fairly well defined black versus white orientation. NAO was regarded by the black organizations in mid and southern Austin as being an obviously anti-black group.

By the middle of 1977, the blacks were invading the NAO territory in fairly large numbers. At the same time, however, the area was also being invaded by Latinos and Filipinos who were moving in from the spanish speaking communities to the east of St. Peter Canisius parish.


By 1977, also, NAO policy had shifted from trying to keep the community as it had been to working toward stabilization of the area as a multi-cultural, multi-racial community. NAO has shifted away from confrontation direct toward outside targets and had moved toward educating local residents and getting them to work together. Although it was obvious from comments that I overheard during my interviews that more than a few NAO members resent the new racial and ethnic groups which are moving into their neighborhood, NAO is officially welcoming their participation, and two blacks and one Latino have risen into important leadership positions.

The people whom I interviewed felt that the shift away from confrontation and demonstrations has been facilitated by several factors not directly internal to NAO itself. First, NAO has made a name for itself. Most targets who formerly responded only to confrontation now respond favorably to phone calls from the NAO staff and leaders. Second, changes in the state law concerning real estate practices in changing neighborhoods (solicitation, block busting mortgage and insurance redlining) have changed the practices of many potential targets to bring their actions more nearly into line with what NAO considers acceptable. Third, the pressure is off as regards the rate of turnover in a racially changing neighborhood. Long term white residents at or near the racial dividing line are moving out more slowly. Minority people are moving in more slowly, and now they often move several blocks beyond the dividing line. It is because racial change seems not to be the steamroller phenomenon of the past, as it was in southern and central Austin, that NAO feels that it can realistically work toward establishment of a viable inter-racial, multi-cultural neighborhood [Note 5].

As part of its shift away from confrontation, NAO has gone somewhat into

neighborhood civic and business boosterism. It makes available literature stressing the cultural and transportation advantages of living in the area and it has developed relationships with some firms that find sites for various business concerns. NAO claims credit for having brought several new and rather desirable businesses into the area and for having kept a few others from leaving. NAO has noted that an increasing proportion of the area residents are senior citizens. It has hired a staff person to deal directly with their needs and is working to set up a community job bank and transportation/shopping service to enable these people to remain in their houses without becoming isolated from the community that has been their home for so many years. At the same time, however, NAO has not abandoned the issues of the past. It still monitors the activities of the realtors, the mortgage lenders, and the insurance companies and it still has meetings with the police and other city agencies concerning the quality of life in the neighborhood.

To facilitate its activities at neighborhood stabilization and bringing people together, NAO has divided its territory into eleven areas (see map) with elected leaders in each area (each area leader is also a member of the NAO board). Each area has been divided into two block long block clubs, and NAO claims to have active block captains and often formal block clubs in most of these block units [Note 6]. This structure was patterned after, and originally overlapped, that of the St. Peter Canisius Altar Society which has been both active and effective for many years. At first, the two networks were much the same because most NAO members were belonged to St. Peter Canisius church. Now however (late 1977), only 60% of the NAO members belong to the church and the overlap between the two networks is lower but



THE CIVIC AREAS OF NAO

both are still going strong.

As of early 1978, NAO seems to be in a somewhat peculiar position. Despite several rapid changes in orientation is it holding its own in a racially changing neighborhood. It is holding up partly because it has strong leadership including a very committed resident as staff director. At the same time, it is strong partly because it is financially solvent. However, its strength seems tied to the strength of the local Catholic church and the Catholic churches normally decline badly in changed neighborhoods. In its present form, the fate of NAO seems tied to the outcome of the change processes occurring in the neighborhood. If the Latinos, the Filipinos and the Catholic whites do not abandon the area to the non-Catholic blacks both the church and NAO may survive better than did their sister organizations farther south in Austin.

NOTES:

1. NAC was the first such organization, having been started in 1969-1970. See Chapter 11.
2. These other organizations and the chapters covering them are:
  - Austin Community Organization (ACO) - Section 2
  - Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) - Section 3
  - Northwest Austin Council (NAC) - Section 4
  - North Austin Community Council (NACC) - Section 7
3. Father Mattei was, in effect the necessary and sufficient cause. He needed no persuading, had helped form another organization in the past, and Catholic Charities had a policy of sending organizers to changing or near changing parishes at the request of the pastor. The support of Msgr. Pellicore and NAC in comparison was primarily helpful. Their support reduced the likelihood of Catholic Charities refusing the request and it may have influenced the timing of Father Mattei's action. It was hard, with the resources available to me, to determine for sure who influenced whom and when and how much. Neither was it so very important to pursue the question beyond this point.

4. The Mid-Austin Council, the third member of NACC also had representatives at this meeting. MAC had always been very weak in comparison to NAC and NAO and was now in an irreversible state of decline. It was in no position to have a say in the outcome of NACC and it folded soon after NACC did.
5. This same view on the rate of racial change and the explanation for it came up in the interviews for almost every organization on the white side of the racial dividing line.
6. No other organization that I studied had an internal structure that was taken this seriously. NAO does a rather good job of keeping track of who lives in its area and who is moving in or out.

SECTION 6:  
MID-AUSTIN COUNCIL (MAC)

When racial change came to Austin, it came in the form of a relatively rapid invasion and resegregation process that moved out of the West Garfield Park neighborhood and passed from east to west through southern Austin. In West Garfield Park, a relatively wide industrial belt and railroad right of way with few through streets, located between Lake Street and Chicago Avenue, had blocked any northward expansion of the black area and people assumed that Lake Street and the railroad tracks would serve as an equally effective natural barrier in Austin.

A prevailing notion of the mid-1960's [Note 1] seems to have been that Chicago was permitting the black ghetto to expand westward through southern Austin and out into the western suburbs. This expansion pattern would preserve the area north of Lake Street for whites and transfer the pressure of integration from the city to the suburbs. From this perspective, the major threat of racial change in Austin north of Lake Street was not from the south across Lake Street, but rather was from the west across Austin Boulevard (a residential street) once Oak Park went black.


For about five years (1965 to 1970), which is about how long it took for southern Austin to turn black, the Lake Street/Northwestern tracks barrier held. In 1970, when blacks began moving north of the barrier, the whites living north of Chicago Avenue decided that that street would be the real barrier, and the whites living between Lake Street and Chicago Avenue moved out so fast that the area was mostly black by early 1972.

The white residents who lived in the section of Austin between Lake

and Division Streets were described by most of my informants as generally unwilling to recognize that integration would come to their area. When it came they told each other that they would not sell. When the third black moved on the block, they panicked and ran. These whites were described as behaving in a manner that was different from that of the whites who lived north of Division or South of Lake Street. In both the northern and southern sections of Austin, the whites were described as being more able to recognize the inevitability of integration and more inclined to try to make it work. The whites to the south moved rather quickly after trying, the whites to the north are more successfully resisting the impulse to move.

My informants provided two explanations for the perceived behavioral differences between the whites of central Austin as compared to that of their neighbors to the north and to the south.

One explanation involves the differential behavior and attitudes of the Catholic priests in the different sections of Austin. White Austin seems to have been largely Catholic, and the Catholic Church has been the major supporter of community organizing in the city of Chicago. When integration came to southern Austin (mid-1960's) and to northern Austin (mid-1970's), the affected parishes had pastors who were concerned about integration and who acted in positive ways to prepare their parishes for it. At the same time, these priests were active in supporting the development of grass-roots community organizations in their neighborhoods. In contrast, the pastors of the two parishes in central Austin (St. Lucy's at the western end and Our Lady, Help Of Christians at the eastern end) were conservative, elderly men who seem to have hoped that the integration threat would go away if they hid their heads in the sand. At the same



MAC, THE NORTHERN HALF OF HELP OF CHRISTIANS PARISH

time they were either indifferent or hostile toward community organizing and they did little or nothing to prepare their parishes for integration.

The other explanation has to do with the ethnic and social class backgrounds of the white residents, especially the Catholics, in this middle section of Austin. In the St. Lucy's area the Catholics were largely immigrants and many were well connected in the Chicago Democratic party. The Catholics in Help Of Christians parish were first and second generation eastern and southern European ethnics of a working class background. Both groups of people were fatalistic about the possibility of fighting the system and of trying to recognize the probability of integration before it came or of doing anything about it after it came. The people in southern and northern Austin were more middle class (newly middle class to longer time upper middle class) and they were less prone to fatalism or to pretending that change would go away if they ignored it.

These explanations have to be evaluated from two rather different perspectives. First, do they describe real differences, i.e., are they valid summaries of aggregate differences in human behavior? As far as I can tell, they seem to be. Second, if they are real, are they also valid as causal factors underlying the differences that they describe? This is much less clear. For example, the explanations may describe phenomena which are correlated but all of which are consequences of some other factors [Note 2].

I will now provide the connections between the generalizations of the previous seven paragraphs and the creation and subsequent development of the Mid-Austin Council (MAC).

Our Lady, Help Of Christians (HOC) parish in east-central Austin runs from Lake Street on the south to Division Street on the north and from the

Belt Line Railroad tracks (the eastern boundary of Austin) on the east to Central Avenue on the west. During 1970 and 1971, the southern half (Lake Street to Chicago Avenue) changed rapidly from white to virtually all black. The whites north of Chicago Avenue were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the viability of Chicago Avenue as a barrier, but they were in a leadership vacuum. They had neither church nor any other local leadership for support as they faced this integration threat [Note 3].

At some point late in 1971 or early in 1972, someone circulated flyers in the white northern section of HOC parish announcing a city-wide meeting on neighborhood problems to be held at St. Sylvester Church. A few HOC area residents, concerned about the future of their neighborhood, attended the meeting. To at least one of them, John Cascio, the meeting was an eye-opener. He learned, he says, that the problem in integration was not the blacks but was rather the real estate companies and mortgage lending institutions (especially the mortgage bankers) who make tremendous profits from scaring whites out, from racial steering (of whites out of the area and of blacks in to it), and from buying cheap from whites and selling high to often unqualified buyers through low down payment FHA guaranteed mortgages. At this meeting, he also learned that a neighboring parish (St. Angela's) had an aggressive and apparently successful community organization (Northwest Austin Council - NAC) and he met some of their people.

John Cascio decided that the only hope for his neighborhood would be to set up a similar organization. Since he received no help or encouragement from his church (HOC), he turned to NAC both for a model after which to pattern the organization and as a source of help in organizing it.

NAC was willing to provide this help because its leadership had concluded

that, over the long haul, their area needed buffer zones to the south and to the east. To this end NAC helped develop organizations in HOC parish and in St. Peter Canisius parish, and NAC established an umbrella organization, the North Austin Community Council (NACC), to cover all three parishes and to serve as their organizing vehicle in these two neighboring parishes.

Through NACC, NAC provided an organizer to work in the northern white half of HOC parish. The organizer started developing block clubs, using local issues (e.g., police protection and city services) and the existing informal networks on the blocks as their base from which to develop a number of formal block clubs. The leaders from these block clubs were brought together to work on their larger common problems and these leaders formed the leadership core for the new community organization.

Once it had been established, MAC became one of the three member units in the NACC umbrella organization. Through NACC, the MAC leaders became involved in city-wide activities on such issues as redlining, real estate practices and mortgage banking-FHA problems. Despite its integration into this network of organizations, however, MAC remained a relatively weak organization that was dominated by NAC and heavily dependent upon it for its survival.

In May of 1972, HOC church was assigned a new set of pastors who found the parish quite thoroughly divided with the whites in the north wanting to write off the southern half (below Chicago Avenue). The new pastors, a two man team ministry, favored community organizing and wanted to bring the two halves of the parish together, but they found that they had to start by dividing up their work so that one of them served the northern white half while the other worked in the southern black half. This change at the HOC

rectory brought the Catholics in MAC a pastor who, within limits, worked with them and their organization.

During 1973, blacks began moving across Chicago Avenue. By the end of 1974 the northern half of the parish had become between 45% and 55% black in a resegregation process that moved north block by block. In 1974, as a result of the failure of the Chicago Avenue barrier, and with the encouragement of the HOC pastor, the focus of local block club activity on MAC shifted from keeping blacks out to working with the blacks who were moving in.

Despite this shift in focus at the block level, MAC, as a community organization built around the block clubs, retained both its white character and its orientation toward north Austin and NACC.

In December of 1974, NACC was dissolved as the result of increasing tension between its two strong members (NAC and NAO). At the same time, NAC decided that its efforts in HOC parish were not helping to hold the line and it decided that it would do better to focus all its efforts within its own boundaries. About nine months earlier, during the spring of 1974, the HOC pastors had decided that they wanted their own organizer and when the organizer supplied by NAC left, they secured their replacement directly from Catholic Charities. As the MAC area turned increasingly black, the priests and their new organizer began to push harder for bi-racial cooperation and interaction throughout the whole of their parish. MAC declined further and further as more and more of its white leaders moved out. Not long after NACC folded and the NAC organizer left, the HOC pastors and their organizer encouraged MAC to fold up also. MAC conveniently cooperated and did so.

When MAC folded, what folded was the white, north Austin oriented leadership structure. The block clubs, the organizer, the priests and the parish

remained. The organizer, with the encouragement of the priests, began working both with the block clubs formerly in MAC and with the block clubs in the section south of Chicago Avenue which had been created by the declining and, by now, all black Organization For A Better Austin (OBA). (OBA had, for awhile, been working with the HOC co-pastor who had picked the southern half of the parish for his area to organize the new black neighborhood north of Lake Street until OBA and the pastor had come to a parting of the ways over their different schedules of priorities.) Out of the leadership that existed in these two groups of block clubs, the organizer and the priests created a new community, or block club, umbrella organization called the Mid-Austin Steering Committee (MASC). MASC started out as an integrated organization, but quickly turned all black as the whites continued to move out of the northern half of the parish.

Viewed from the perspective of the HOC parish, MAC was an effective and valuable organization despite its tenuous and brief existence, for the infrastructure that it left behind was an important factor in the successful development of the successor organization.

In all fairness, however, it must be noted that the MAC legacy was not all positive. Before 1965 Austin was perceived as a single area even though it was vaguely divided into northern and southern sections that somehow saw themselves as different. By 1970, southern Austin had a distinct identity as South Austin, the black section south of Lake Street. Northern Austin, as before, was understood to refer to St. Angela parish, St. Peter Canisius parish and an uncertain amount of territory south of there. When MAC was created, the name "Midti-Austin" was dug out of nowhere to differentiate MAC from NAC and NAO as the third member of the NACC umbrella organiza-

tion. When MAC folded the new black group adopted the Mid-Austin name and created a small but distinct neighborhood where none had previously existed. The "Mid-Austin" name thereby served to separate the black areas north and south of Lake Street, with the result that MASC has refused to merge with the black organization (the South Austin Coalition - SACCC) to form a stronger organization to work on their common problems [Note 4].

#### NOTES:

1. My sources for this information were: (1) some of my informants, and (2) some discussions I had with some banks when I was looking for a house mortgage in the South Austin and Oak Park area during the mid-1960's.
2. Without going into detail on this question, it seems clear that the behavioral differences that have been described might also have been due, in whole or in part, to changes in public attitudes and experiences concerning integration and civil rights, to changes in state and federal law that affect the way that businesses deal in racial change in residential neighborhoods, or various other factors.
3. The reader may note an apparent discrepancy between the statements that there was a leadership void in white central Austin and the information in Table 1, Section 3 which shows that OBA had fairly good representation from the HOC parish during 1968 and 1970. The conflict is more apparent than real. The white delegations from HOC were strong in 1968 and 1970 but not in other years, were not very stable, and, like the OBA participation from other white area churches, did not reach beyond the church to its neighborhood. As a result, when participation from HOC did not receive support from the rectory and when the OBA organizer had other things to tend to, the participation declined without leaving much of a residue to carry on on its own. One may also note (see Chapters 1 to 3), that even a strong grass-roots community organization draws the support of only a very small proportion of the population in its area. It follows that even a strong white delegation from HOC would have missed almost the entire population of the parish.
4. Further discussion of this is contained in Section 8 which covers MASC.

SECTION 7:  
NORTH AUSTIN COMMUNITY COUNCIL (NACC)

The NACC was a short lived coalition of three Catholic parish community organizations in North Austin that existed from sometime in 1972 until October of 1974 when it was dissolved by the mutual agreement of its three member organizations. The three member organizations were:

1. Northwest Austin Council (NAC) in St. Angela parish
2. Northeast Austin Organization (NAO) in St. Peter Canisius parish
3. Mid-Austin Council (MAC) in the northern half of Help of Christians parish

Each member organization is included in this study as an organization in its own right. In one way or another, NACC had a significant impact on the development of each member organization. As a result, some of the information in this chapter is duplicated in the separate chapters for these organizations.


NAC, which was formed during 1969 and 1970, was the first member organization to be established. MAC and NAO followed during 1972 and 1973. After NAC was established, its leaders realized that many of their problems were common to all of northern Austin and they concluded that they could more effectively tackle these problems if the rest of the area was organized and working with them. As a result, NAC decided to reach out and organize the other three parishes in northern Austin. In St. Lucy parish, their outreach efforts were rebuffed by the organization which was just being started there. In Help of Christians parish one or more local residents asked for organizing help from NAC. In St. Peter Canisius parish, the

pastor was ready to seek organizing help and NAC had a hand in directing the development of NAO.

NAC had two reasons for trying to organize these neighboring parishes. The first reason was to create effective buffer zones between their corner of Austin and the racially changing neighborhoods to the south and east. The second reason was that NAC wanted to establish an umbrella organization, an OBA (Organization For A Better Austin) of North Austin, which would be bigger and stronger than the separate parish organizations. When NACC was started, both NAO and MAC were basically informal groups which were willing to go along with NAC and NACC because they could use the greater experience and support that NAC wanted to provide. The result was that NAC dominated NACC and thereby also dominated the pattern of organizing activities in the neighboring parishes [Note 1].

NACC was simply an umbrella for its three members. NACC had a board consisting of four officers selected from the membership of the participating organizations at the NACC annual convention and it had an organizer who served as the supervisor of the organizers working in the member organizations. This supervision arrangement was not entirely determined by NAC and NACC. All the organizers were sent out by Catholic Charities, which paid half their salaries (the other half was paid by the parish to which the organizer was assigned). The general rule was that the most experienced Catholic Charities organizer in a neighborhood served as supervisor of his less experienced colleagues. NAC had the most experienced organizer, so the NAC lead organizer was both the NACC staff person and the supervisor of all the other organizers.

Despite its apparently successful emergence as a community organization,



NACC, IN NORTH AUSTIN

NACC seems to have been born containing the seeds of its own destruction. The problem was that there was no firm agreement within NACC on two rather important questions. The first question involved the role of NACC: was it to be a loose coalition of its three member organizations, or was it to be a strong central organization that would substantially control the destinies of its member organization? The second question involved the role of NAC in NACC: how long would it be appropriate for NAC to be the dominant partner in the coalition?

At first NACC worked fairly well. NACC controlled or coordinated (depending on one's perspective on what it was supposed to be doing) the organizing and fund-raising activities of the member organizations. The other organizations accepted the leadership provided by NAC and NAC seems to have come to regard NACC as sort of an extension of itself.

NAC never developed very far as an organization. Its leaders recognized that their organization was dependent on NAC and NAC never questioned the self-assumed role of NAC in the coalition. NAO grew into a larger organization, which came to rival NAO in size and assumed effectiveness. As time passed, NAO came to resent the domination from NAC, and this brought up the previously unresolved and previously unimportant questions about the role of NAC and the function of NACC. NAC leaders generally held the view that NACC was a strong central organization and they seem to have felt that the leaders from NAO were still learning the business and were not their equals in skill or experience. The NAO leaders, on the other hand, felt that they and their organization were the equals of NAC and they came to feel that NACC was taking up too much of their time and making too many of their decisions.

During the spring of 1974, the NAC lead organizer left, and by tradition, the NACC staff job and overall supervisory responsibility went to the NAO organizer because he now had the greatest experience and seniority. Unfortunately, NAC was not too happy about the locus of staff authority shifting over to NAO and, in particular, the leaders at NAO did not care for this particular NAO organizer. At NAO, this organizer was regarded as a bright and fairly effective young man who suffered from having a grand vision of creating an super organization to encompass both northern Austin and some adjacent neighborhoods further removed from the racial change going on south of NACC. At NAC, however, the organizer was considered to be a divisive person whose standard method of operating involved getting people to compete against each other with, the result that they eventually began to turn against each other.

By the fall of 1974, NAC dissatisfaction with the organizer had risen to the point that the NAC-dominated NACC voted to fire him. At the same time NACC, carried the matter one step further and instructed NAO to fire the man from his position as their organizer. This NAO refused to do. By this time, NAO had come to feel that what was needed was a loose coalition in which the organizations could participate to the extent to which they individually saw fit, and which would not make decisions for NAO or take a share of the money that it raised [Note 2], as being preferable to the tight control handed out by NACC.

The outcome was a meeting, in October of 1974, attended by delegates from each organization. The MAC delegates came to observe. The basic difficulty was between NAO and NAC. MAC would be affected by what happened, but their organization was almost dead and they did not think that they

were in any position to influence whatever was going to happen. The meeting went calmly, there was no shouting or theatrical performances but NAO and NAC could not resolve their differences. The outcome was a decision to dissolve NACC. The decision was acceptable, or even desirable, to NAO, but it was disturbing to NAC. One NAC leader, a NACC board member, cried when the decision was made.

NAC and NAO have continued to cooperate from time to time, both in joint ventures and as parts of some larger coalitions, but the NACC experience has continued to affect the relationship between the two organizations. NAC feels that the divisive spirit brought forth by the departed organizer has continued to linger on. NAO leaders feel that NAC has become a relatively closed and suspicious organization. Relations between the two organizations have been further strained by the success that NAC had in 1977 in getting NAO members to buy into the North Austin Development Corporation, which subsequently failed to get off the ground. Despite the close proximity of the two organizations and the virtually identical problems that they now face, most of the contact between NAC and NAO occurs in the form of informal relationships existing between leaders who are parts of the various social networks that are to be found among the members of the two adjacent Catholic churches.

#### NOTES:

1. One informant, who subsequently became a central figure in NAO, described her participation in the first NACC convention, which had between 600 and 900 delegates, as a strange experience. She and the other NAO delegates were selected as representatives from various parish organizations and they were attending this event where people were up on the stage making lots of noise, attacking various things, and passing resolutions. She, and most of her fellow delegates from St. Peter Canisius, just did

not understand what was going on.

2. NACC consumed some of the money that it raised from and for its member organizations. NACC had some office and materials expenses and at one point hired an organizer who was responsible to NACC and its staff leader, but who was not responsible to any member organization.

## SECTION 8:

## SOUTH AUSTIN COALITION COMMUNITY COUNCIL(SACCC)

The South Austin Coalition Community Council was known as the South Austin Council (SAC) until July 1976, when the organization split into two groups. One group, SACCC, has become generally recognized as the grass-roots continuation of SAC while the other group seems to have lost its identity as a grass-roots organization.

SAC got its start as the South Austin geographical subdivision of the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) back in the days when the OBA was still an effective Alinsky-style organization. The OBA developed a pattern of working through church congregations in the white sections of Austin and of building block clubs and then block club based civic organizations in the black sections of Austin. By the late 1960's, when southern Austin had turned mostly black, the OBA had built three active civic units in the central and eastern sections of south Austin. In 1970, the organizer who had done most of this work left, and his successor was not able to hold it all together. In mid-1971, when the organizer returned as director of OBA, the OBA was beginning to have trouble keeping its act together. In particular, the blacks in South Austin were angry and felt that OBA had deserted them for the area north of Lake Street. The new OBA director put all his organizing staff into South Austin and soon rebuilt the three declining civic units into a single area wide unit known as the South Austin Council. OBA then turned its attention back to the whole of Austin south of Division Street.


The SAC and the pastors of the two Catholic churches (St. Thomas and Resurrection) at the eastern end of South Austin continued to feel that OBA

was not giving the area the attention that it deserved and needed. As a result, the two churches, which had been the major financial backers of OBA in southern Austin sought, and secured, a two year grant from Catholic Charities to hire an organizer who would be assigned to SAC rather than to OBA.

By the early 1970's, south Austin had become South Austin, a distinct neighborhood separate from the rest of Austin, which lay across Lake Street. At the same time, SAC was coming to see itself as the organization for South Austin, and SAC was coming to view OBA as the organization for the Austin north of Lake Street. The result was that SAC, which was now developing a financial base separate from that of the OBA, became increasingly independent from its parent organization.

SAC retained its formal affiliation with OBA until 1973 or 1974, when the conjunction of three events led to a complete break between the two organizations. The events were:

1. OBA moved its offices north of Lake Street and dropped almost all of its directly supported organizing activity in South Austin. The OBA regarded this as necessary or even good. The section north of Lake Street was experiencing racial change and the new black area needed its attention. OBA had now fallen on financial hard times. It had the SAC staff for south of Lake Street and decided to put its other staff where they were needed most. SAC saw this all this as indicating that OBA was turning away from South Austin.
2. OBA had shrunk from perhaps the strongest community organization in the city to a rather weak organization. In contrast, SAC had remained strong and was now stronger and more effective than OBA. SAC, which had retained its relationship with OBA because of OBA's reputation now was finding the relationship something of a liability because the OBA's decline had become known to significant components of the outside world. SAC could see no reason for remaining affiliated with OBA.
3. The final straw was the election of Mark Salone as president of OBA. His candidacy had been encouraged by the OBA director in an election where the loser was one of the key leaders of SAC. Near the end of his time as OBA president, Salone was unmasked as a police spy and organization disrupter.



After the Catholic Charities grant ran out in 1972, the SAC organizer was paid directly by Resurrection and St. Thomas Churches for another year or two. The decline in SAC resources meant that the organization had to close its storefront office and move to rent free space in one of the Catholic churches. By 1974 the two Catholic churches, which were faced with rapidly declining revenue as their white congregations moved away, no longer had the money to underwrite SAC, and SAC lost its organizer. At this point, Gale Cincotta, who had moved from being a key leader in OBA to becoming the main leader in the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) city wide coalition, approached Father Phelan, the pastor at Resurrection church and a strong supporter of SAC, about supplying SAC with an organizer trainee paid by MAHA. Father Phelan accepted and from 1973 through 1976, SAC received a series of organizer trainees, each sent out by MAHA for a three month training period. Faced with this high turnover of poorly trained organizers, SAC shrank from a South Austin-wide organization to a much smaller organization located primarily within the boundaries of Resurrection parish.

SAC had retained its structure as a coalition of block clubs and the organization became increasingly dependent on the volunteer efforts of its more influential resident leaders. Although the number of participating block clubs seems to have remained relatively constant until 1976 when the organization split, the level of participation declined. The organization also retained its orientation as an issue based group with a primary focus on slowing up or halting the physical decline of the neighborhood. This focus has always been reflected in three basic issue areas: crime, sanitation, and housing. As one might expect, the dep-

endence on volunteer leadership produced a significant decrease of real activity on these issues. SAC went into a slowly decaying holding pattern with an organizer cycle that repeated itself with distressing regularity. A new organizer trainee would come out and start to make contact with the existing leadership structure. As soon as the organizer had learned his way around well enough to start recruiting new participants and to start doing something on the issues, he would leave to soon be replaced by another trainee who would start the cycle all over again.

Back in the days when SAC had been an active part of a moderately effective OBA, SAC and OBA had started two non-profit corporations to complement their grass-roots confrontation style with an attempt to help the community by entering into certain forms of community development activity. One corporation, the Austin Development Corporation, was established to bring new business into the neighborhood. It never got very far in this direction but in 1971 it did set up a day care center located in the Third Unitarian Church. The day care center has become a fairly large federally funded organization and the development corporation has survived as the board of directors of the center. The second corporation is the South Austin Realty Association (SARA) which was established to rehabilitate HUD-FHA and other housing in the area. After getting off to a weak start, SARA served briefly as the manager of all HUD property in the community and then in 1977 began developing into an increasingly effective organization. The directors and leaders of these corporations were the long-time major black OBA-SAC leaders and officers. By the mid 1970's many of these people had dropped out of SAC because they had concluded that the development corporations offered more hope for their com-

munity than did the increasingly problematic SAC. After they left, a new pool of leaders, built around the remaining leaders and other people who traced their participation back to the OBA days rose to the top and kept the organization going in much the same manner as had their predecessors.

During the spring of 1976, a white mid-Austin resident was blinded while being robbed by a black teenage neighbor. The event received a great deal of city-wide publicity and touched off some acrimonious interaction between SAC and the city of Chicago government over the issue of street crime and public safety. At some point, the city and the SAC leaders agreed to set up a federally funded anti-crime program in South Austin. This produced the June, 1976 split in SAC. About half the group, including the president, had decided that confrontation tactics were no longer getting them anywhere and they decided that cooperation with the city was a better way to improve the South Austin community because SAC was too remote from the city government for it to get much done. The other half of SAC felt that the city hadn't done much before and was not going to do much in the future unless SAC continued to operate independently and exerted pressure on it.

For several months following the split, an acrimonious relationship existed between the two groups, each claiming that it was the true SAC. Thereafter things calmed down and each faction went its own way. Although the independent faction changed its name to SACCC to distinguish itself from the anti-crime SAC, the consensus of my informants, including the former president who helped lead the anti-crime faction, is that it is more realistic to view SACCC as a continuation of the old SAC than it is to make such a claim for the anti-crime group. At the time of the split,

most of the anti-crime group lived in southwestern Austin while the SACCC group primarily lived in the eastern end of the neighborhood.

The anti-crime program set up an office on Madison Street and, with federal money, hired 34 workers to operate programs in public safety, citizens security patrols, and on buildings in housing court. The program is under the general supervision of a self-perpetuating board of directors made up of the SAC leaders who made the transition from SAC to the program.

The SACCC group has retained the old SAC style, the affiliation with Father Phelan, Resurrection Church and MAHA, and continued receiving organizer trainees from MAHA. During the spring of 1976, the MAHA staff decided that South Austin would be a fertile place to send more skilled organizers, with the goal of building SACCC into a strong and solvent organization. During the same spring, the Third Unitarian Church at the western end of South Austin asked MAHA to supervise its community worker and soon thereafter St. Thomas asked MAHA to send it an organizer. By early 1977, this had transformed SACCC from an organization hanging on in Resurrection parish to an organization that was operating, with three well trained organizers, from one end of South Austin to the other. Later in 1977, MAHA and the churches decided to raise the SACCC organizer salaries to a level well above the trainee level in an effort to reduce staff turnover and its associated problems. By the end of 1977, SACCC was embarked on a program to increase its size and effectiveness and to make it financially independent of MAHA and the churches. The outcome of this effort is still in doubt.

SECTION 9:  
MID-AUSTIN STEERING COMMITTEE (MASC)

The organizations that I studied do not always have clear cut beginnings. They may emerge out of a complex web of organizational antecedents in such a way that it is difficult to specify when the new organization has actually arrived on the scene. Even the question of when the organization first presents itself to the public as itself may not be answerable. All one can say is that at some point in time the organization did not exist, that at some subsequent point it did exist, and that a transition took place between these two times. This ambiguity of origin is well illustrated in the development of MASC.

Mid-Austin has only recently developed self identity as a neighborhood. Long before the black invasion of South Austin occurred, Austin residents seem to have felt that northern and southern Austin were somehow different although the dividing line between them was conveniently vague. Help of Christians (HOC) parish, located in the eastern central region of Austin, was part of the vague area [Note 1]. HOC parish is also the area that subsequently came to identify itself as Mid-Austin.


The events that helped produce Mid-Austin as a neighborhood are also pretty much the same events that helped produce MASC as a community organization. These events cluster into three relatively unrelated groups of Austin area happenings.

The first cluster involves the community organizing role played by the Catholic church in Chicago since 1960. In about 1960 the church started promoting Alinsky-style organizing in parishes that were threatened by

racial change. At first the Church merely allowed parishes to hire organizers if they had the money, but by 1970, Catholic Charities was sending organizers out to the churches. This helped establish a pattern of small community organizations whose boundaries matched those of the parishes to which the organizers were sent.

The second cluster of events was tied to the racial transition of southern Austin, immediately south of HOC parish, from white to black during the late 1960's. For several years Lake Street and the Northwestern railroad tracks were the north-south racial dividing line, and during that time southern Austin developed an identity as South Austin, a neighborhood which definitely stopped at Lake Street. From 1966 to 1970 the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA), which had been established in response to the threat of racial integration in Austin, was the only community organization of consequence anywhere in Austin. The OBA had started out as a community wide organization, but by 1970, it had become identified as the blacks' organization, and the whites in northern Austin started setting up their own organizations. The first of these northern Austin organizations was the Northwest Austin Council (NAC) in St. Angela parish which was started during 1969-1970. By 1971, the people in NAC had decided that they could not save northern Austin by themselves and they started trying to help get the neighboring parishes organized. As part of this cause, they set up a northern Austin umbrella organization, the North Austin Community Council (NACC).

The third cluster of events involves the way the pastor at HOC church tried to deal with the problems of racial change in the parish. Until 1972 the church had a pastor, Father Kelly, who did not want to face the problems



- 1 Help Of Christians Church
- 2 Austin YMCA, Public Library, Town Hall
- 3 Area Claimed by MASC once it turned Black
- 4 Area also claimed by NAC, MASC doesn't organize there

**MASC, IN MID-AUSTIN**

of integration and who was also antagonistic toward the idea of community organizing. During Father Kelly's last two years at HOC, the southern half of the parish, below Chicago Avenue, changed from all white to almost completely black. During this time, the OBA was attempting to organize the blacks in the southern half of the parish and NAC was organizing the whites north of Chicago Avenue. NAC and some parish members got an organization, the Mid-Austin Council (MAC), started in the northern half of HOC parish.

In 1972, Father Kelly retired and was replaced with a team of pastors who saw the changing parish as chance for a meaningful professional and personal outreach and who supported community organizing. The two priests found the parish so divided that they too split their efforts along racial lines. One pastor, Father Ventura, took the white half. The other pastor, Father Dressler, took the black half. Father Ventura started working with MAC and Father Dressler started working with OBA. For a time, all coordination of effort between the two areas and groups occurred in the form of communication and planning between the two priests.

By 1974 both MAC and OBA were declining organizations. MAC was on the way down because blacks were moving in to the area north of Chicago Avenue and MAC, tied in to white northern Austin through NACC, could not reorient itself. In the fall of 1974 NACC collapsed and NAC pulled its organizer out of HOC parish. The OBA had lost its effectiveness as a grass-roots organization and it had lost most of its funding. The OBA staff was trying to find a new mission for the organization which would produce the income needed to keep OBA alive. In the mean time, OBA was trying to show responsiveness to the community by doing some organizing when asked, but this was not done with real enthusiasm because the organizations which did

the asking were not putting up money to underwrite the efforts.

Father Dressler at HOC was one of the people who was pushing OBA to do more organizing, especially in HOC parish and usually, or so it seemed to OBA, in the blocks around the HOC church property. Ken Dosie, the director of OBA, objected to this highly localized organizing and Father Dressler came to regard Dosie as an ineffective organizer. The two finally parted company and OBA abandoned organizing for the new service programs that it was just getting started.

In mid-1974, the two HOC priests, with the cooperation of the organizer supplied to MAC from NACC, made one last attempt to bring the gap between the black and white sections of their parish. The attempt largely failed, but they did succeed in synthesizing a small inter-racial "Mid-Austin Steering Committee" out of some of the stronger block club leaders in the northern and southern ends of the parish. After NACC was dissolved and MAC pulled out its organizer, the HOC priests went directly to Catholic Charities to get their next organizer who would be responsible to them and to the parish rather than to some outside group.

By the time the church received its own organizer, the parish team ministry had been expanded to include a third priest, Father Wheaton, whose assignment was specifically to work in the area of community organizing. Father Ventura, Father Wheaton, and their new organizer then made a deliberate effort to phase out MAC as a community organization. MAC, most of whose white leaders had moved away, obligingly folded. With the two older organizations (OBA and MAC), each of which had had its base outside of HOC parish, out of the way the priests and their organizer were left with a number of still active, and (at the northern end) still-integrated block

clubs. As MAC faded out, the only remaining larger entity was the small MASC which had been just a device to bring together MAC and the OBA groups in HOC parish. The organizer, working with Father Wheaton (the other two priests by now had left the community organizing work to him), then started building up MASC into a respectable parish-wide community organization. By 1975 or 1976, they had succeeded to the extent that MASC could legitimately lay claim to being such an organization.

MASC has continued with its initial structure as a coalition of block clubs whose existence has been maintained partly by the volunteer efforts of its resident leaders and to a larger extent by the efforts of the HOC priests who provided office and meeting space and whose intercession, first with Catholic Charities and later with the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA), once it became the agent for distributing Catholic Charities organizers around the city, produced the organizers that MASC needed to keep itself going.

This dependence on the white HOC priests and the integrated but white staffed MAHA produced a split in MASC in 1976 after the organization had become all black following the exodus of its remaining few white leaders. A number of the black leaders from the area south of Chicago Avenue had become dissatisfied with MASC's continued dependence on the white establishment and they decided to form their own all-black organization which would rebuild the Mid-Austin community using only the resources that were from the black community. They set themselves up as an restrictive and private organization to prevent themselves from being infiltrated and destroyed by the oppressive white establishment that they were sure would not tolerate any authentic self-determination arising from a black community. They

seem to have established a relationship with a local black church and apparently have undertaken some limited steps toward community redevelopment (restoring one or two apartment buildings) while they make larger plans to transform their community and develop a local base so secure that they can not be destroyed when they finally go public.

The rest (the majority) of MASC continued the relationship with HOC and MAHA, participating in the various MAHA coalitions, until the spring of 1977 when MASC decided to pull out of MAHA because they felt that the participation took too much away from the local issues and because they saw the MAHA staff as starting to make too many demands on the local organizations [Note 2]. When MASC stopped participating in MAHA, MAHA stopped paying the organizers salaries and for the rest of 1977 the level of issue activity was curtailed as the organizers and the MASC leaders were trying to generate enough income for the organizers to continue in their jobs.

During 1976 and 1977, MASC devoted much of its efforts to two issues, based on what the organization regarded as the neighborhoods two most serious problems. Neither issue produced any really successful results.

The first issue involved housing. Mid-Austin seems to have become one of the two Chicago neighborhoods with an exceptionally large amount of empty and boarded up FHA foreclosed housing [Note 3]. MASC wanted to get this housing fixed up and back in the hands of community residents who needed places to live. After not getting very far on the problem, MASC started working with the Greater Roseland Organization (GRO), which also had made its their major issue, and the two organizations started pushing HUD to auction off the homes to private citizens. When they did not

get very far, the two organizations held mock auctions which generated a lot of publicity but did not accomplish much else.

The second issue involved seeking federal community development money to construct a badly needed youth recreation center for their neighborhood. Besides being a youth center, the building would also be a place from which other needed social services could be made available to community residents who otherwise have to travel outside their community to find the services (health, legal aid, etc.) that they need. This issue also went nowhere despite all the work that MASC put into it. This outcome was inevitable and the reason the issue arose at all is part of the legacy left behind by MAC and the parish based community organizing supported by the Catholic Church in Chicago.

When MAC was created, the name "Mid-Austin" was invented to distinguish MAC from NAO and NAC. There seems never to have been an area named "Mid-Austin." The blacks whose participation in MASC helped build it into a community organization did not know this. For them South Austin was across Lake Street and North Austin was where the whites lived. They adopted "Mid-Austin" as the name of their neighborhood and the name seems to have caught on. The vaguely defined region between northern and southern Austin, however, had stretched all across Austin from east to west and HOC parish was only the eastern half of the region. In the western half of the region (St. Lucy parish), a separate community organization, the Central Austin Steering Committee (CASC), existed over about the same period as had MAC. CASC, which was also a Catholic Charities organization, never received much support from the St. Lucy priests, and remained a small independent organization for the few years that it existed. A successor organization never

emerged, and "Central Austin" never caught on as the neighborhood name even though the area's residents recognized that they also lived between black South Austin and white North Austin. About the time that MAC and CASC folded, the Catholic Church closed St. Lucy parish and merged it with a neighboring parish whose physical plant was located in the adjacent suburb of Oak Park. My informants for MASC all verbally described Mid-Austin and MASC as extending across the former St. Lucy's area to the western end of Austin but their behavior [Note 4] indicated clearly that they, and the rest of MASC, really believe that Mid-Austin stops at the HOC boundary.

Just a few blocks west of the HOC boundary at the center of the old St. Lucy parish is to be found a major complex of organizations, including the Austin branch of the public library, a large and active Austin YMCA, and a large city-run recreational center, which collectively provide all the youth and social services that MASC was saying could not be found in their neighborhood. There have been no gang problems or physical barriers to separate the two sides of what should be Mid-Austin and the two sides went through a roughly equivalent process of racial change at the same time. MASC has not extended its organizing efforts west of the HOC boundary (at least at first the organizers were assigned to HOC, not to the wider area) and in 1976-1977, MASC rejected the invitations of SACCC and MAHA to combine forces (either as a single organization or as two cooperating ones) to provide a stronger presence covering the entire black section of Austin.

The legacy of MAC, the Catholic Church, and its way of encouraging community organizing was to give MASC an excessively myopic view of its viable geographical base and to help it put major emphasis on an impos-

ible issue. The effect of the legacy has served to unnecessarily restrict MASC's turf and to reduce its potential effectiveness as a community organization.

NOTES:

1. The vague area spread across the middle of Austin from the eastern to the western boundaries and included both HOC parish as the eastern end and St. Lucy parish at the western end.

The vagueness was no problem when the area was all white, and the residents seem to have never tried to establish a separate identity for their area. The vagueness made it possible for the people to identify with southern Austin, with northern Austin, or just with Austin as their needs or wishes dictated. See Hunter (1974) for a discussion of how residents on the periphery of a more desirable area try to define themselves as being within that area.

2. During 1976 and 1977, MAHA went through a change in staff leadership. Leaders in many of the organizations that had been participating in MAHA took a dislike to the new MAHA and, like MASC, a large proportion dropped out. By this time MAHA was a staff run organization whose existence did not depend in any clear way upon being a coalition of neighborhood community organizations. MAHA's financial base was independent from its participating community organizations and MAHA was even the major source of financial support for many of them. Many of the other organizations that dropped out of MAHA seem to have suffered the same financial consequences as did MASC. The main reason that SACCC, in neighboring South Austin, decided to stay in MAHA was that its leaders felt their organization could not survive the financial consequences of pulling out.
3. Roseland, on the far south side of Chicago, was the other neighborhood with a really big HUD/foreclosed FHA housing problem. The Greater Roseland Organization (GRO) had been working on this as its major issue for several years and MASC seems to have turned to GRO because it did not see anywhere else to turn for help in trying to figure out how to successfully tackle the issue. The informal GRO - MASC relationship fell apart in 1977, partly because their tactics (which were used only by these two organizations) were not producing much in the way of successes and partly because GRO was becoming more closely involved in MAHA when MASC was doing the opposite.
4. My information is based on observation of a MASC leadership meeting that I sat through while waiting to interview an informant, on informat-

ion received from informants from other organizations, and on other miscellaneous information that I received as I was doing my field work (and sometimes because I was doing it).

## SECTION 10:

## CENTRAL AUSTIN STEERING COMMITTEE (CASC)

In 1971 St. Lucy Catholic Church in western central Austin was staffed by an elderly pastor who wanted to control the church himself in the traditional manner, and by two assistants who wanted to increase lay participation in running the church. The parish straddled the Chicago city limits, being split about equally between west central Austin and the village of Oak Park. The church's physical plant was located on the Austin side just north of Lake Street and the Northwestern tracks and just north of South Austin, which had recently finished changing from white to black. St. Lucy's pastor was also a conservative man who was said to have hoped that the threat of racial change in his parish would go away if he ignored it. He was said to have still held to this view the day that he looked through a window and saw a black woman walking out of the apartment building across the street from his rectory.


The two assistant pastors created a parish council because they believed that this was the only way to keep the parish viable. Among the many committees that were established as parts of the council was the Community Committee which was intended to relate the parish (as a church organization) to the community in which it was located. The focus of the committee was to be on the Chicago side, which was threatened by racial invasion, rather than on the Oak Park side, which was not yet so threatened. The committee had a majority of relatively conservative parishoners, selected by the pastor, who were fearful of blacks and who wanted to keep them out of the parish, and a minority who felt that this was not a realistic goal. The committee

majority was seen as reflecting the views of both the pastor and of a majority of the residents of the community. The committee took a human relations approach to trying to maintain the status quo within the neighborhood.

The human relations approach did not last very long and it did not accomplish very much. The committee minority decided that the church would not buy any other approach, and they concluded that they would have to forget about the Community Committee and the church if they were make any progress toward their goal of dealing realistically with the impending racial integration of the neighborhood.

Some of these committee members held a few public meetings in which the racial situation and what might be done about it were discussed. These meetings produced certain consequences: (1) Some of the fearful church members attended and managed to escalate the level of fear in the community, (2) Some militants from the Northwest Austin Council (NAC) in St Angela parish just north of St. Lucy's came out to promote their brand of activism as a means of building the parish into a buffer zone for NAC, and (3) Some non-Catholic community residents attended the meetings.

The members of the Community Committee together with the non-Catholic participants at the open meetings decided to form themselves into a community organization that would be independent from the church, and they adopted the name "Central Austin Steering Committee." As was the case further east in "Mid-Austin," the name "Central Austin" was pulled out of a hat; it had not been previously used to identify the area [Note 1]. The church leaders who had been involved in forming CASC all lived in the Oak Park side of the parish and, although several of them remained active in the organization, the leadership of CASC quickly became dominated by some non-Catholic neighbor-



CASC, ST. LUCY PARISH IN CENTRAL AUSTIN

hood liberals who sought to establish an integrated community and an integrated community organization. While CASC was getting organized, the activists from NAC organized a confrontation with a realtor over panic peddling and pushed the St. Lucy's group in the direction of confrontation activism. The liberal CASC leaders, however, did not care for the NAC approach and decided to go their own separate way.

CASC started and remained a relatively small group without any widely based grass-roots following. Its leaders described the organization as a strategic group that was seeking to effect change by applying leverage on various target or establishment organizations and by creating the appearance of being a stronger and more representative group than it really was [Note 2].

CASC felt that it needed a trained staff worker and asked Catholic Charities to provide one. Catholic Charities provided a worker to be paid half by Catholic Charities and half by St. Lucy Church. St. Lucy's paid its half for the first six months and then refused to continue, partly because money was getting tight and partly because the pastor did not like community organizing. After one year, Catholic Charities removed the worker because St. Lucy's would not, and CASC could not, pay the church half. CASC objected strenuously to this decision and as a compromise, Catholic Charities finally agreed to train Betty Benedetto, the dominant CASC leader, as an organizer and paid her tuition for a three month training course at the Chicago Mid-America Institute (an Alinsky-style organizer training school). After the training ended in mid-1973, Betty Benedetto remained in CASC as resident organizer and key leader until the organization folded sometime between late 1973 and November 1974. (The uncertainty about this

date will be explained later on.)

During the period when CASC had its Catholic Charities organizer, the bulk of the organizations activities were handled by the organizer and by Betty Benedetto, together with whatever people they could pull together for any particular activity. Betty Benedetto acquired this central role in CASC for two reasons: (1) She was highly committed to the organization and had adequate ability to do the work, and (2) She alone among the small group of organization regulars had no employment other than as a housewife, which meant that she was the only member who had the time to help the organizer ring doorbells and to participate on a regular basis in the meetings and other activities undertaken by CASC.

From the time in 1972 when CASC became an independent organization (i.e., when it had ceased to be just the church Community Committee) until the fall of 1973, CASC became involved in a variety of activities ranging from regular public meetings which had an outside speaker-informational focus rather than the more traditional attack-some-antagonist focus (this operating style made it hard for CASC to organize any large scale action against a potential antagonist) to meetings which sometimes involved confrontation with such organizations as St. Lucy's and Catholic Charities (over supporting CASC), with real estate companies (over their tactics in the neighborhood), with the fire department (over alleged neglect in the area of arson investigation), and with a grade school (over overcrowding and declining quality of education). There were also meetings with block clubs and other organizations during which "whistle-stop", a positive image toward the neighborhood, and CASC were usually promoted.

Until the fall of 1973, the general goal of CASC seems to have involved

stabilizing the community. This was interpreted to mean reducing the level of panic among whites and limiting their flight from the community, developing a public image of central Austin as a good place for whites to move to, and promoting integration and cooperation among the blacks and whites who lived in the area.

CASC failed to achieve this goal and the failure helped bring about the demise of the organization [Note 3]. Three factors seem to be especially important in explaining this failure. They are: (1) CASC was not able to stem the tide of racial change within its territory, (2) CASC was never able to develop a large base of participants, and (3) The Chicago Catholic hierarchy kept racially conservative pastors at St. Lucy's and then phased out the parish (the school in the spring of 1973 and the church a year later). The significance of these factors will be discussed in the next several paragraphs. As will become evident, the factors are highly interrelated.

Other grass-roots community organizations have survived racial change of their neighborhoods if there was either continuity of leadership or continuity of financial support [Note 4]. Although CASC lost its financial sponsor and it had a small (and almost all white) leadership core, most of those leaders were still living in the neighborhood as recently as 1978.

CASC interpreted its goal of neighborhood participation in terms of white liberal integrationist values coupled with an emphasis on education and social activism. This approach made CASC a suspect organization to the predominantly conservative Catholic whites living in the area, and it did not go far in attracting the participation of the newly arriving blacks [Note 5].

After the neighborhood started to change, a number of liberal members

of St. Lucy's and CASC approached the Archdiocese about replacing the near-retirement age conservative pastor with one of his younger assistants who had been helping them try to deal with integration in a more constructive manner. The Archdiocese responded by providing a replacement whose views were little different from those of his predecessor [Note 6]. When the parishoners and CASC tried to get the new pastor replaced with a man of more liberal outlook, they were not successful. CASC then tried to pressure the pastor into taking a more progressive stance toward neighborhood racial concerns and the pastor responded by cutting off the limited support (office space and supplies, use of the telephone, etc.) that the church still had been providing.

At about the same time (spring 1973), the Archdiocese announced that it would stop subsidizing the the St. Lucy school at the end of that school year. Since the parish could not maintain the school on its own, this was the same as announcing that the school would be closed. Despite the efforts of the parishoners and of CASC to keep the school open, it was merged with the St. Catherine parish school in time for the fall 1973 school term. St. Catherine parish is located just south of St. Lucy and is also split between Chicago and Oak Park, but its physical plant is in Oak Park which was white, rather than in Austin which was rapidly going black.

Although this decision, and the decision a year later to close the parish completely, made good sense to the Archdiocese, it was very demoralizing to the whites who lived in the area; it seemed to indicate that their church was abandoning them and their neighborhood [Note 7]. According to my informants, the net result of this was to increase the distance between the Church and CASC, and to encourage white flight from the area [Note 8].

In mid-1973, after Betty Benedetto had finished her organizer training and after CASC had been evicted from St. Lucy's, CASC operated out of the Benedetto's house for lack of anywhere else to go. Although CASC was beginning to get away from its liberal style and was getting into more local "bread and butter" issues such as sanitation (especially garbage pickup) which were starting to attract more (mostly black) residents, the leaders were displaying an increasing tendency to "let Betty do it" (she was the trained leader, the usual leader and the office was in her house). The result was that any increase in the size or activity level of CASC simply increased her burden.

In September of 1973, Robert Downs, an Oak Park lawyer who had just decided to run for the state legislature as an independent Democrat, came to CASC seeking its support and endorsement. The CASC board, still composed of middle class, primarily white, liberals was sympathetic to his very liberal views and to his desire to challenge the Daley machine, and they voted to endorse and support his candidacy [Note 9].

The CASC board decided that supporting Down's liberal challenge to the Democratic organization was a more viable way of securing neighborhood change than was running their somewhat unsuccessful community organization and over the next several months CASC gradually evolved into a Downs campaign committee. By the time of the election in November 1974, CASC had no more autonomous existence as a community organization and it folded with the rest of the Downs campaign organizations [Note 10].

During the 1960's when the Austin Community Organization (ACO) and then the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) were the big Alinsky organizations in Austin, the St. Lucy section of Austin was the home turf for the

most effective of the area's white run anti-black organizations, the Austin Town Hall Assembly (THA). The virulent attacks of the THA helped enable the liberals to gain control of ACO and was the reason why the OBA never made much of an effort to organize in St. Lucy parish. As a result, the CASC leaders regarded OBA as an irrelevant organization and few, if any, of them ever had anything to do with that organization. CASC's only involvement with any other community organization came briefly from NAC which unsuccessfully tried to coopt it. The result of this freedom from involvement with other organizations was to make CASC an isolate amidst a sea of grass-roots community organizations.

Like the rest of what might be called middle Austin, the area from Lake Street to about Division Street, the Austin side of St. Lucy parish had turned mostly black by the end of 1974, with whites living mainly along the northern edge, which also went black between 1974 and 1977. There is, however a section of St. Lucy parish along Race Street and Midway Park (half-way between Lake Street and Chicago Avenue), from 5800 west to 6000 west which contains mainly mansions and very large homes. This section has remained integrated (in 1979, whites were still buying homes there) long after the surrounding area (south, east, and north) had been abandoned to the blacks, and many of the original CASC white liberals still live in or around the periphery of the integrated area. The failure of this little section of Austin to go black is probably the reason why the small band of white liberals were still in their neighborhood and in control of CASC long after the "time" when their colleagues in other changed neighborhoods had moved out and turned their organizations over to the new black residents.

The isolation of CASC, coupled with the continued opposition from the St. Lucy rectory and the pocket of distinctive housing which whites would not totally abandon, go a long way toward explaining why CASC remained a liberal white dominated group which ended its days as an anti-machine political campaign committee.

#### NOTES:

1. The Chicago side of St. Lucy's was a strange neighborhood in that it was sort of invisible even though it possessed many institutions and features that should have made it rather noticable. The area had many rather fancy homes, the local library, the YMCA, a large city-run recreational facility as well as various churches, some stores and lots of more ordinary houses and apartment buildings.

During my interviewing of informants for the community organizations on all sides of the CASC area, every informant skipped over the St. Lucy area and identified the next most distant region as the adjacent neighborhood. Informants for SACCC in South Austin (south of CASC) identified North Austin (St. Angela and St. Peter Canisius) as the adjacent neighborhood to the north. Informants for NAC in St. Angela parish in North Austin (north of CASC) identified South Austin as the adjacent neighborhood to the south. Informants for MAC and MASC in Help of Christians parish in Mid-Austin (east of CASC) identified Oak Park as the adjacent neighborhood to the west. Informants for OPCO in Oak Park simply identified Austin as the neighborhood to the east, they did not recognize the subdivisions of Austin.

Even St. Lucy parish (in the days before it was closed) was different from the other Catholic parishes in the area. It had money but it had by far the smallest physical plant and it had vaguely defined boundaries which meant that the neighboring parishes sort of flowed into St. Lucy's. All the other parishes in the area seem to have had rather clearly defined edges.

2. This image of being a strategic lever for securing change probably arose as a post hoc response to the inability of the organization to grow larger rather than as an a priori plan for organizational development.
3. This is not an entirely trivial statement. As was evident from the information that I collected on these grass-roots community organizations,

failure in organizational goal attainment is not a strong factor in producing organizational decline.

4. Examples include the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA), the Greater Roseland Organization (GRO), and the Organization For The Southwest Community (OSC). All were included in this study.
5. Although community organizations can survive a neighborhood transition from white to black, the organizations that I studied seem not to have generally been effectively integrated for any length of time. The reasons go beyond the obvious fact that the neighborhoods did not stay integrated for very long. On one hand, the way that middle class liberal activist whites interpret integration and social activism seem to have a limited direct appeal to members of any racial group including their own. On the other hand, as a Catholic priest, who has worked hard to maintain a viable community organization in a changing neighborhood, pointed out, the things that blacks and whites seek from a community organization in a changing neighborhood are largely antithetical.
6. This replacement of a conservative priest with another conservative in a changing neighborhood was a exceptional event, at least in Austin. Every other parish in the area received a progressive integration-accepting pastor to replace the racially conservative predecessor when the parish was about to become integrated.
7. St. Lucy and St. Catherine parishes were both split between Austin and Oak Park. Each parish lost about half its membership when the Austin section went black. St. Catherine had a much larger physical plant which was located in Oak Park rather than in Austin. The Archdiocese seems to have concluded that merging the two adjacent parishes would produce one solvent church about as large as either had been before their Austin sides changed. The problem for the white Austin St. Lucy parishoners, in part, was that St. Catherine had changed first and to get to St. Catherine church they had to travel through or along the border of black South Austin. This trip was perceived to be hazardous, which increased their fear of going to church and increased their sense of distance from that church since their children had to walk that same path to get to their new school.
8. This was a very unusual step for an Alinsky-style community organization to take. Such organizations usually avoid participation in partisan politics because it has an adverse effect on their community organizing activities and inevitably alienates some large section of the real or potential constituency.
9. Downs won that election but lost the next one two years later largely, he said, because of the difficulties involved in keeping a low budget, independent, volunteer political organization going in competition with the machine, which had the resources to keep a strong organization from one election to the next.
10. The problem of deciding when CASC came to an end results from the

way that it was gradually absorbed in to the Downs campaign effort and gradually lost any identity as a group.

## SECTION 11:

## OAK PARK COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION (OPCO)

Oak Park is a residential suburb, with some business areas but virtually no industry, located five miles directly west of the Chicago downtown "Loop" area. Oak Park is also immediately west of the Austin neighborhood of Chicago which has been undergoing a process of racial transition since the mid-1960's. Oak Park has long had, and cultivated, the image of being an upper middle class community with good schools, a progressive outlook, and a generally good place to live and to raise a family. Oak Park is also the only suburb to be directly threatened by racial invasion as part of the on-going westward expansion of the Chicago west-side black ghetto [Note 1].

OPCO was started, rather inadvertantly, in 1971 by the Chicago-based metropolitan area wide Alinsky-style Campaign Against Pollution (CAP) which had recently been started and which was trying to expand its influence by developing local neighborhood chapters [Note 2]. Early in 1971, CAP sent an organizer to Oak Park to get a chapter started there. The organizer moved into a house just being vacated by Paul Bloyd and the two men became acquainted. Bloyd had been part of an ad hoc citizens action group that had managed to get a fair housing ordinance passed in the village back in 1968, after several years work and he was generally sympathetic with CAP's plan to get a local group started in Oak Park. Bloyd put the organizer in touch with the rest of the fair housing group and and Oak Park CAP chapter was organized around the interested remnants of that group and some individuals who had responded to the CAP metropolitan publicity. For the first

six months, the group grew slowly and served only as an Oak Park delegation to the downtown CAP meetings. After the first six months, the group began holding local meetings and by the end of the first year it had begun fund-raising and was able to transfer the organizer from CAP to its own payroll (although it was only able to pay him between \$200. and \$300. per month).

Pollution was never much of a problem within Oak Park, but the village residents were becoming increasingly aware of, and apprehensive over, the rising threats to their good middle-class community from the racial change in Austin to the east. The result was that Oak Park CAP began working on some of the available local problems and thereby attracted many new members who were not particularly interested in pollution or in metropolitan CAP. Consequently, in 1972, the organization broke away from CAP and became an independent local community organization, although it did not change its name from Oak Park CAP to OPCO until 1973.

The local problems on which OPCO began working were tied into two basic and potentially serious changes to the image that Oak Park had of itself as a community. The first problem area had to do with increasing crime rates, mortgage redlining, and the danger of black invasion and ghettoization of the southeast section of the village that bordered on the section of Austin (South Austin) that had already turned black. The second threat involved a large and out of character residential high-rise building that a developer was trying to erect in the west-central section of the the village which was otherwise composed of single family homes and smaller walk-up apartment buildings.

Progressivism in local government is a relative thing. The Oak Park village government was willing to approve the Stankus high-rise with few



questions, and was taking virtually no action on the problems facing south-east Oak Park apparently because it simply did not know what to do. OPCO was able to step into the situation at the right time, to attack and force an eventually permanent delay of the high-rise, and to propose some solutions to the problems facing south-east Oak Park. The attack on the Stankus high-rise enabled a lot of otherwise unorganized opposition to the project to coalesce around OPCO. The village eventually adopted OPCO's proposals for the south-east end of the village, which did reduce the problems of crime and redlining in Oak Park. At the same time racial invasion from South Austin remained a threat which has not yet materialized [Note 3]. As a result OPCO continued to attract attention to itself and it grew as an organization. As a result, also, OPCO was able to attract public support for a preventive approach - to take action on problems before they become serious - rather than sticking to the more typical Alinsky-style approach of reacting to problems only after they have become serious.

Crime (or public safety), redlining, and the Stankus high-rise remained the three basic issue areas around which OPCA organized from 1971 through 1977 (the point at which I did my research) although the specific way in which the issues were handled changed from time to time over the years. In 1971, the public safety problem was crime on the Congress Expressway EL platforms. In 1975, it was getting more police patrols in the eastern section of the village. In both cases, OPCO came up with changes that were implemented and which reduced the problems. In 1971, redlining involved confronting specific lending institutions. By 1977, OPCO had secured a local anti-redlining ordinance, and had participated with other similar organizations in a successful drive to get state legislation passed to control the

problem. In 1977, the redlining problem had become one of monitoring the disclosure information made public by the mortgage lending institutions and meeting with them to reinforce adherence to affirmative action regulations. In 1971, the high rise issue involved getting the village to hold up construction of the project. In 1977, the problem had become one of working with the village and other groups to decide what should be built in the block long pit, situated next to the village's newly renovated mall shopping area, that was left after Stankus abandoned his high-rise project.

During the years from 1971 to 1977, the Oak Park village government gradually came to accept the idea that more aggressive action on its part could help maintain the stability of Oak Park as a community. By 1976 and 1977, the village was acting on many problems with little or no prodding and the residents of the village were becoming less fearful of the the black Austin community to the east (especially since integration was going slowly and the ghetto had not crossed over into the village). South Austin was seen as beginning to stabilize itself, rather than as rapidly declining into the sort of ghetto that seemed to typify the black neighborhoods farther east, and whites were still willing to buy homes in the section of Oak Park nearest to South Austin. As part of its new activism the village was establishing citizen advisory boards to increase the apparent level of citizen participation in many areas of governmental responsibility. The result was that OPCO began having trouble finding good issues to organize around (the village was taking action on them too soon) and OPCO was having trouble finding new participants and retaining the old ones (the village was appointing them to the advisory boards). Some OPCO leaders feel that their organization is now on the skids, but other leaders feel that the organization

is still viable, although it will have to reassess its methods and its role in the village if it is to survive.

OPCO was been an unusual organization in several respects. It has maintained itself as a white, liberal, activist dominated group in a community where such an image has not been an albatross around the neck of the organization and it has acquired some black participants and leaders as the village has slowly become integrated. The organization has remained financially solvent ever since 1971, drawing upon funding from local churches, voluntary donations from members and other village residents, and from at least one grant from an outside philanthropic foundation. OPCO has participated in the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) on various issues, but, unlike other organizations, it has refused to seek organizing help from MAHA which might have enabled it to expand its level of organizing activity. The OPCO leaders preferred to avoid any reciprocal obligations that this might have entailed and they were always able to raise enough money from sympathetic village churches to maintain their organizing effort at a level that was judged to be satisfactory for their purposes. The funding arrangement possessed adequate stability over the years because ghettoization did not occur and the funding churches did not suffer declining memberships as has been the case for other organizations in other neighborhoods.

The village of Oak Park has gone through some substantial changes during the 1970's while still retaining its image as a good place for middle-class white families to live, and this has changed OPCO from a successful growing organization to an organization in search of a mission. It is hard to say how much of the change in Oak Park was produced by OPCO

and how much of it would have occurred anyhow, but it seems clear that OPCO was unusually successful at producing solutions to community problems and is now paying the price of that success.

NOTES:

1. Other suburbs are either still well removed from the areas of racial change, or in the case of Cicero, Ill. are separated from the black residential neighborhoods of Chicago by a continuous industrial belt that is between one half to one mile wide. The dividing line between Austin and Oak Park is a residential street with housing on both sides. The southern end of Austin was all black by 1969 or 1970, which was before OPCO was started, and the Oak Park-black Austin boundary has continually been expanding northward ever since as blacks have been replacing whites en masse block by block going from southern Austin to northern Austin.
2. CAP got started as a citizens action group to deal with air pollution in some suburbs and city neighborhoods on the far southwest side of Chicago. The organization soon decided to address pollution problems all over the Chicago greater metropolitan area. Not long thereafter, CAP started working on all sorts of community issues and was renamed the "Citizens Action Program."
3. Oak Park has experienced gradual integration in which blacks have clustered in the southeastern section but are encouraged to spread themselves out across the entire village. The clustering that has occurred has been mainly in the walk-up apartment buildings and this has not been sufficient to stop whites from buying houses in the area. The result so far has been that Oak Park has not experienced the block by block resegregation that has rapidly occurred almost everywhere else.

## SECTION 12:

## CICERO COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION (CCO)


The Chicago suburb of Cicero appears to long have had a reputation for being a closed community with a syndicate-connected political system which discourages citizen participation in government and which justifies its existence through its efforts at keeping taxes down at the expense of limiting municipal services and avoiding community planning. Cicero is bounded on the east by the Chicago Lawndale neighborhood which went black during the early 1960's, and is bounded on the north by the Chicago Austin neighborhood the southern section of which was going black during the latter half of the 1960's. Although a one-half to one mile wide industrial belt separates Cicero from the residential sections of these two Chicago neighborhoods, whites in Cicero have been fearful of blacks and have opposed any threat of racial integration in their community. These feelings were intensified during the mid-1960's when a black civil rights organization unsuccessfully attempted to stage an open housing march into Cicero.

These two, not entirely unrelated, themes of town planning and of blacks pervade the history of the CCO from its beginning to the end of its brief existence. Concern over community planning and improvement was the public or "up-front" agenda of the organization, while preparation for the expected racial integration of Cicero was a hidden concern of the founders and of many promoters. Being pro-integration was also a label which opponents of CCO successfully hung on the organization thereby substantially negating the organizations perceived legitimacy as a spokesman for the residents of Cicero and helping drive the organization to an early grave.

The CCO got its start in 1966 through the concern of a small group of Cicero clergy and through the interest of the Chicago Archdiocese of the Catholic church which was then promoting the idea of setting up Alinsky-style community organizations in the neighborhoods within its jurisdiction. The principle promoter appears to have been a Catholic priest, Father Mattei, whose parish in northeastern Cicero was both the most run-down section of the suburb and also the section most directly threatened by black invasion. The organization started as a small volunteer group composed of two Catholic priests, a Lutheran minister, and some laymen most of whom came from Father Mattei's church.

For about one year this group worked on some problems involving community planning, zoning, and air pollution [Note 1]. At the end of this first year, the group raised a two year budget, mainly from the nine Catholic churches in Cicero - the rest from several Protestant churches, sufficient to establish a larger community organization. With this money a director and two organizers were hired and the organization took the name of the "Cicero Community Council" The director was Ed Halle, a milk truck driver who had been active during the volunteer stage and was a member of Father Mattei's church. Ed Halle had had no prior experience in community organizing but he began meeting regularly with Tom Gaudette the director of the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) in the neighboring Austin community and he began observing how OBA was operating as a form of in-service training. With its new staff, the organization began working on a variety of specific zoning problems as well as on problems involving abandoned cars on the streets and the inadequate youth recreational facilities in the community.

CCO IN CICERO, ILLINOIS



Shortly thereafter Ed Halle began planning for the organization's first annual convention, and when convention time approached (early 1968) almost all issue related activity came to a stop as convention preparation became the principle activity. The convention was an apparent success for it attracted some 500 Cicero residents, elected officers, set up many committees, and adopted the name "Cicero Community Organization" (CCO).

The convention was both the high point of the CCO's existence and the beginning of its rapid decline. Most of the delegates were there because they had been recruited by the clergy, who were promoting the organization, rather than because they had any first-hand enthusiasm for the organization. The director had been assuring the participants that the convention would put the CCO "on the map." This would open the funding doors in industry and local business that had formerly been closed and the CCO would no longer be dependent on the funding from the Catholic churches that was about to run out. With the funding secured the CCO could successfully involve its newly recruited members in the issues that would make Cicero a better community.

Things did not work out this way. At the same time that the CCO had been growing, a right wing opposition "hate" group, the "Concerned Citizens Of Cicero And Berwyn" had also been growing and this group was vehemently attacking the CCO at every opportunity as an intergationist group. The opposition group also started going after the same funding sources that the CCO had been expecting to tap. Once this controversy was dumped in their laps, the industrial concerns and businesses became leary of giving money and CCO never received more than a small share of the funding that it needed.

At this point the director resigned to direct another organization in Detroit, and the CCO was left with inexperienced organizers, a high overhead operation, and no money with which to maintain itself. Out of necessity fund raising became the organization's principle activity and participation declined rapidly due to the continued vocal opposition and due to the virtual cessation of activity on the issues that the organization had been set up to work on. Finally in early 1969 the few remaining stalwarts, most of whom had been in the organization since before the first convention, met to close up shop and dispose of the material remains of the organization.

The CCO never did develop a large leadership pool. Most of the work was done by the staff and a small group of committed participants, including several not otherwise employed housewives who attended daytime meetings with a vengeance. The organization had few, if any racial liberals. Most participants seem to have been fairly ordinary citizens who wanted a better community in which to raise their families. Even the clergy founders were not promoting integration, they were just trying to be prepared in case it came. In spite of all this, it became clear from my interviews that most of the active lay leaders, if not the clergy, received a great deal of harassment as a result of their participation in CCO. The harassment came in about equal proportions from the town political establishment and some of its syndicate connected supporters who strongly resented citizen participation in the affairs of municipal government, and from the strongly organized right-wing hate group which continually and successfully accused CCO of promoting racial integration in Cicero.

## NOTES:

1. The air pollution was a continual problem for the citizens of Cicero and was derived from the activities of certain industries and the Chicago sanitary district plant located just south of Cicero. The CCO never did much about the problem and instead focused on the zoning and recreational problems in Cicero. A few years later, residents living just south of the air pollution sources made the problem their major issue and built their organization, the Campaign Against Pollution (CAP - later renamed the Citizens Action Program) into one of the biggest grass roots organization in the city. One of my informants said that he always had felt that CCO should have made the air pollution its major issue. (Hindsight seems often to be a good source for information on what you should have done)

CHAPTER FIVE  
THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SOUTHWEST SIDE  
SECTION 1: AN OVERVIEW

The Southwest Side of Chicago is much larger and much more diverse than is the westside Austin area. As a result, the Alinsky organizations on the Southwest Side were more diverse, both in origin and in subsequent development, than were the organizations in the Austin area. There are far fewer threads tying together the various organizations. The threads that do exist are more decentralized and link together pairs or small groups of organizations in rather individual ways. There was no large cluster of linked organizations as there was in Austin. A consequence of this is that it was harder to find the organizations on the Southwest side, and I have no certainty that I was able to identify all the Alinsky-style community organizations in this section of the city. In contrast, I am certain that I found all such organizations in the Austin area.

In Chicago, the phrase "Southwest Side" seems to define geography in terms of a certain social relationship rather than geography in terms of absolute coordinates. That is, the words "Southwest Side," refer to the section of southwest Chicago that is inhabited by whites. As the black-white racial boundary has shifted over the years, so also have the boundaries of the Southwest Side. Today (mid-1979), the Southwest Side is the area west of Western (2400 w.) which is now the racial dividing line, and south of about 55 th. Street.

In this study, however, the Southwest Side refers to the area south of about 67th. Street and west of State Street, because State Street was the

racial dividing line back in the mid-1950's when the Southwest side's first recent Alinsky organization was started [Note 1].

For decades, the black south side ghetto has been expanding to the south and to the west of its original location just south of the Chicago Loop. By the mid-1950's, this expansion had brought the ghetto to State Street and to about 70th Street south. The expansion of this ghetto had been accompanied by rapid turn-over, by tension, and often by violence. Shortly after blacks started moving west across State Street, some Catholic and Protestant clergy in the neighborhood just west of the ghetto hired Saul Alinsky to set up the Organization For The Southwest Community (OSC) to help deal with racial change in the area. The OSC developed a base in the area from State Street to Ashland Avenue (1600 w.) from about 6700 south to 9500 south and it helped pave the way for a fairly smooth racial transition as the organization built successively a white, then an integrated, and finally a black constituency. When OSC collapsed rather abruptly in 1970 as the result of internal problems, it was still functioning as a viable organization.

In 1971, some OSC leaders formed the Southwest Community Action Coalition (SCAC) to continue the work that OSC had been doing. SCAC could never raise the money to hire any organizers but it did finally secure state funding for some social service programs. SCAC has survived as a social organization which is still trying to become a grass roots community organization.

During the mid 1960's as the racial dividing line moved across the OSC territory and approached Ashland Avenue, OSC made some efforts to include the area west of Ashland within its field of operations. The churches and civic organizations west of Ashland had pulled out of OSC a half-decade earlier when OSC, by majority vote, had rejected their approach of opposit-

TABLE 1


## THE ALINSKY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SOUTHWEST SIDE

INITIALS	NAME	LOCATION	FOUNDED	DIED
BCAC*	Brainard Community Action Council	Southwest Side, Brainard neighborhood	D.K.	--
CCSC	Citizens Council of the Southwest Englewood Community	Southwest Side, West Englewood area, St. Justin Martyr Catholic parish	1975	--
CCWE	Concerned Citizens of West Englewood	Southwest Side, West Englewood area	1973	1976
CIA	Community Improvement Association of Calumet Park	Calumet Park, Illinois, a suburb immediately south of Chicago	1971	--
GRO	Greater Roseland Organization	South Side, Roseland area, everything between Calumet Expressway (E) to I-57 (W) and Dan Ryan Expressway (N) to city limits (S)	1968	--
HF	Homeowners' Federation	Evergreen Park, Illinois, a suburb southwest of Chicago and the Chicago neighborhoods to the north, east, and south of Evergreen Park	1973	--
(LF)+	Little Flower	Southwest Side, St. Theresa of the Infant Jesus (Little Flower) Catholic Parish	1971	1975
OSC	Organization For The Southwest Community	Southwest Side, west of Day Ryan Expressway to about Ashland (1600 W.)	1958	1970
SCAC	Southwest Community Action Coalition	Southwest Side, a successor to OSC in the southern part of its area	1971	
SCC	Southwest Community Congress	Southwest Side, Ashland Ave. (E) to Cicero Ave (W) and 47th St. (N) to 74th St. (S)	1968	--
The Federation	Southwest Parish And Neighborhood Federation	Southwest Side, same area as SCC except does not go east of Claremont (2322 W.)	1972	--
TMO	The Midway Organization	Far Southwest Side and Summit, Illinois, overlapped the western part of SCC and The Federation and extended west of them	1970	1976
USC	United Southwest Citizens	Southwest Side, St. Ethelreda Catholic parish, North Beverly area	1972	1975
(VHCO)+	Victory Heights Community Organization	Southwest Side, Victory Heights neighborhood of Chicago just north of Calumet Park	1975	--
WECO	West Englewood Community Organization	Southwest Side, West Englewood neighborhood	1970	--

Notes: \* = Organization to which I could not gain access and consequently did not include in this study. D.K. = I do not know when this organization was founded.

+ = Abbreviations used by me for convenience, apparently not used by the organization.

-- = Organization still existed as of early 1978.



THE SOUTHWEST SIDE ORGANIZATIONS

ion to racial integration. This time, too, the area west of Ashland rejected the integrationist approach and became instead the basis of the Father Lawlor block club movement which attempted to stop the westward movement of blacks at Ashland [Note 2].

The Father Lawlor movement was one of two organizations set up west of Ashland to deal with the threat of racial change in that area. The Father Lawlor organization was based in a narrow strip extending about six blocks west of Ashland from 55th. Street to about 95th. Street. Father Lawlor built a strong organization which lasted until about 1970, when it collapsed because it could neither permanently prevent nor positively work with racial change in its area.

The Catholic Church officially opposed Father Lawlor's organization due to its racist tendency, and, in two parishes at the center and southern ends of the Lawlor area, attempts were made to establish alternative community organizations with a more positive orientation to racial issues. In Little Flower parish (at the center), a number of temporarily viable ad hoc coalitions were established, but no durable organization developed. In St. Ethelrede parish (at the southern end) a full fledged organization, the United Southwest Citizens (USC), was established. USC started as an integrated group, became all black as the neighborhood changed, and finally became integrated again when the remnants of the Father Lawlor group joined up after their organization collapsed. USC folded a little while later, because neither the members nor St. Ethelreda Church were willing to put up the money to keep the organization going.

The first part of the Father Lawlor area to integrate was the northern section around St. Justyn Martyr Catholic Church. When this section broke,

the Lawlor group was still struggling to prevent the change. The result was very rapid turnover combined with high interracial tension and some violence. The new black residents decided to band together for their own protection and, with the help of some Protestant churches, set up the West Englewood Community Organization (WECO). WECO established a community center in the local Presbyterian church and combined social service programs with community organizing. WECO was forced to close its center in 1975 as the result of staff problems, financial problems, and a lot of vandalism at the center. About all that remains of WECO are a volunteer Christmas basket program and a state funded mental health center that it helped establish.

The disorganization continued in the West Englewood area after the area turned all black. In 1973 two local residents decided to start an organization to work on the problems facing the area. Their organization, the Concerned Citizens of West Englewood (CCWE) never really got very far, but the organization was picked up by the Citizens Action Program (CAP) which helped keep it going until CAP collapsed and the remaining key CCWE leader got tired of carrying the load alone. At that point she gave up and CCWE folded. In about 1976, St. Justyn Martyr church was assigned a young assistant pastor who was interested in community organizing. With some outside help, this priest started another organization, the Citizens Council of the Southwest Englewood Community (CCSC), which has been growing ever since despite financial problems which made it dependent upon the priest for its organizing services.

The other organization which was established in the mid-1960's to deal with the threat of racial integration west of Ashland, was the Southwest Community Congress (SCC), which had its base in the area well west of the

racial dividing line and well west of the Father Lawlor area. The SCC set its eastern boundary at Ashland to include the immediate problem area, but the SCC soon became dominated by racial liberals who lived in the area near Kedzie (3200 w.), and the whites near Ashland stuck with their Lawlor Organization and their opposition to integration. Although the SCC got off to a big start, it went downhill rapidly and, in the early 1970's it went to Catholic Charities asking for organizing help. Catholic Charities finally sent out an organizer who looked at the SCC and then decided to form a new organization which would be more representative of the views of the people who lived in the community west of Western (2400 w.) The new organization, the Southwest Parish And Neighborhood Federation (The Federation), started small but by 1978 it had grown to become perhaps the biggest grass-roots community organization in the Chicago area. The SCC too has survived but as a small liberal organization seeking survival niches in whatever the Federation decides not to incorporate into itself.

The remaining organizations on the Southwest Side have rather more independent existences.

CAP was started as an anti-pollution organization in the Chicago neighborhoods west of Midway Airport. After CAP was transformed into a city-wide coalition, some of the local members decided to set up a local organization to deal with some of their local problems. Their organization, The Midway Organization (TMO) started out as part of CAP, but it grew into a rather strong organization and split away from CAP after about two years. A few years later, most of the major problems were solved, the leaders got tired and TMO went into a decline. TMO has been inactive since 1977.

By the late 1960's, the black ghetto had expanded southward to 95th

Street, and the Roseland Clergy Association in the area just south of the racial dividing line set up the Greater Roseland Organization (GRO) to deal with the impending racial integration of the neighborhood. In its early days, GRO split into direct action and traditionalist camps. The traditionalists won the fight for control of GRO and the organization continued as a non-Alinsky civic organization until the mid-1970's. By that time a host of housing problems deriving from the racial change in the area had brought GRO into the Alinsky-style Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) and GRO accepted an offer to get community organizers from MAHA. The organizers recruited many new members who were sympathetic to the confrontation style. The new members soon became a majority in GRO and GRO was transformed into an Alinsky organization.

In Chicago, a railroad and industrial belt with very few through streets divides the neighborhoods west of Western Avenue into rather different communities north and south of 73rd Street. South of 73rd and west of Ashland, the Catholic Churches set up an organization once the black-white boundary drew near the eastern boundary of their neighborhood. This organization, the Homeowners' Federation (HF), has grown into a fairly large organization which has participated in some MAHA coalition activities and otherwise works on local problems. The HF has a somewhat unusual territory, being constructed out of the suburb of Evergreen Park and the Chicago neighborhoods to the east, the north, and the south of this suburb. The reason for this arrangement is that the area is that of the local cluster of Catholic parishes which set up the organization.

In the suburb of Calumet Park, an organization was established by local residents, with the help of the Catholic Church, to deal with the threat of

racial integration, once adjacent the Chicago neighborhoods east and north of Calumet Park started turning black. This organization, the Community Improvement Association (CIA), which has grown into an effective local organization has tried to maintain support from the conservative as well as the liberal and moderate segments of the community. The CIA's major issues have involved fighting block-busting and racial steering activities. This has been done both by attacking realtors for unfair practices and by helping run a housing center that the CIA persuaded the local mortgage lending institutions to support financially.

When the Chicago neighborhood of Victory Heights, a long, thin residential strip running along the northern border of Calumet Park, turned black, some residents set up an organization, the Victory Heights Community Organization (VHCO), to deal with some problems relating to the racial transition. This organization has led a tenuous existence. It was tied into CAP for a while, has avoided relationships with the CIA, and its survival seems to depend on the continued volunteer activity of one or two strong local leaders.

I was not able to gain access to the Brainard Community Action Committee (BCAC) and I do not know how it got started. The organization has been strongly influenced by one dominant leader, formerly cooperated with USC on some issues, and is, I am told, heavily involved with youth recreation programs.

As of 1980, the Federation is the one really big organization on the Southwest Side. CCSC, CIA, HF, and BCAC exist as viable, moderately strong organizations. SCAC has found a durable means of survival as the board of directors for its social service programs and is still looking for a way to become a community organization. The SCC, WECO, and Victory Heights are

weak organizations with uncertain futures. The rest of the organizations on the Southwest Side have folded.

NOTES:

1. OSC was not the first Alinsky organization on the southwest side of Chicago. The first was the Back Of The Yards Council which Alinsky started in the early 1940's. This organization still exists, but its territory is north of the Southwest Side as defined earlier in this Chapter. The OSC was the first of the more recent organizations on the Southwest Side.
2. The Father Lawlor organization was not identified as Alinsky in type by any informant and it departed from the Alinsky model in one significant way (see Chapter 2, section III). The organization is discussed here and in Section 4 because of its important impact on many of the organizations that I studied.

## SECTION 2:

## ORGANIZATION FOR THE SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY (OSC) [Note 1]

OSC was founded in the area around St. Sabina Catholic Church on Chicago's Southwest Side during 1959. The organization had a rich and varied existence for over a decade until it abruptly collapsed in 1970. OSC preceeded every other organization included in this study by half a decade or more, and it was the only organization founded with the help of Saul Alinsky. By the time the other organizations were founded, his disciples were running the show. OSC was also the first manifestation of Alinsky-style organizing in Chicago since Alinsky organized the Back Of The Yards Council in the early 1940's.


OSC was started mainly because Msgr. Mahon, the pastor of St. Sabina Church, was concerned about the impending racial intergration of his parish. He had previously served another parish as it went through the destructive effects of uncontrolled racial change, and he did not want to see the same thing happen again. In the 1950's, racial attitudes on the Southwest Side (or almost anywhere else in the United States for that matter) were not what they are in the late 1970's. Racial change was accompanied by violence, blockbusting, rapid white flight, and the virtual collapse of most neighborhood institutions. Msgr. Mahon and his parish had a lot to lose from this type of racial change. Not only would the church lose most of its members and become financially dependent on the Archdiocese for its survival, but the parish also contained within itself many of the leaders of the violence.

In mid-1958, Msgr. Mahon turned to the Archdiocese for help. He was steered in the direction of Saul Alinsky and given the authorization to expend parish funds to explore the feasibility of establishing a grass-roots


organization in the community [Note 2]. As the discussions and preparation continued, more and more community people were drawn in - bankers, other businessmen, and other clergy. In early 1959, a contract was drawn up with the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), Saul Alinsky's organization, and a team of organizers came in to get the organization started. Like most large Alinsky organizations, the OSC was created in two stages. First was a self-selected provisional organization of community leaders that legitimated the organizing effort. Second was OSC itself, which was established as the first convention in the fall of 1959.

From the start, OSC was enveloped in a network of tensions and conflict that seems to have gone beyond that experienced by any other organization that was included in this study. This tension existed at two levels, internal to the organization, and external in the community and the country at large [Note 3].

The internal tension arose over the issue of racial integration. Although preparing the community for integration was the back-stage reason for organizing OSC, its participants came from all persuasions, and the direction that the organization would take was left up to the decision of its participants (although the founding clergy were among the participants who helped pick the direction that the organization would take). Although the elected leaders were primarily racial liberals, and in the early years mainly clergy founders, the organization gradually coalesced into two almost equal camps of the racial moderates and the racial segregationists. The liberal leaders began implementing integrationist policies, including the accepting of black delegates, working to control block-busting, and supporting integration in the schools and in housing. These policies led to the virtual withdrawal



ORGANIZATION FOR THE SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY



OSC, THE ORIGINAL HOME BASE

of some conservative groups and to the increased polarization of the organization. The third (1961) convention turned into a fight between the moderates and the conservatives over control of OSC. The conservatives won some victories, but lost the crucial ones, and over the next year most of them withdrew from the organization.

The external tensions, which were resolved rather more quickly, centered around Saul Alinsky and his role in developing the organization. Literature attacking Alinsky as an integrationist and as a communist was circulated in the community and printed in a neighborhood newspaper. The Christian Century, a widely respected national Protestant religious periodical, turned the tables by attacking the OSC and Alinsky for supporting segregation. The external controversy gradually burned itself out over OSC's first year of existence.

Race and the struggle for control were not the only issues that OSC confronted in its early years, but because the racial moderates and liberals always held the key leadership positions, convention resolutions and other policy matters were always implemented in ways that reflected the liberals' views on the situation.

During the first year, 1959-1960, OSC put a lot of time into fighting unscrupulous realtors on the issues of block-busting and the failure to repair run down buildings. During the second year, by which time increasing numbers of blacks had moved into the area and were participating in OSC, the focus shifted to include better race relations in the areas of fair employment practices and open occupancy. It was this shift in orientation that brought the polarization in OSC to a head and produced the fight for control of the organization. During the third year, OSC voted to support the activi-

ties of blacks in the area east of OSC who were Protesting overcrowded school conditions. By the next year. OSC was working to get other nearby neighborhoods open to blacks, so that the OSC area would not become totally overwhelmed by the advance of the ghetto.

Other program areas remained more stable from year to year, which probably means that they reflected less clearly the cutting edge of how racial issues were affecting the community. OSC ran health fairs and home improvement shows which were always well attended. The OSC conventions, through at least 1962, drew between 850 and 1000 delegates from some 130 different groups (many of which were parts of larger groups as, for example, the various committees of a church), and the OSC leaders and staff worked to bring new organizations into OSC and to create civic organizations to become OSC members when the need or the possibility existed.

Shortly after OSC was started, its leaders discovered that there was no mortgage money available for people to buy houses in the area, because the banks had declared the area to be a bad risk once the racial dividing line had drawn near. The OSC got a number of local banks to set up a trial home loan program, including 10% down FHA loans and involving pooled resources and pooled risks, to enable people to buy housing in the area. At first, OSC screened all loan candidates and referred only the good ones; however the program was so successful that the banks took it over and ran it themselves. The program was devised to allow white families to buy housing in the area and many young families were able to buy homes that would otherwise not have been available to them. The program was a success in more than one way. As time passed it enabled new black families to buy housing without having to pay a "black tax." My informants regarded the home loan program as one of

OSC's major successes.

OSC was set up as an organization whose boundaries extended from State Street west to the city limits and from 67th Street south to the city limits. The organization's strength was always in the narrow strip from 6700 south to 103rd Street between the Dan Ryan expressway and about 1500 west. In 1959, the northeast corner of this strip had turned black, the rest was "on the edge of the ghetto." In the days before the area turned black, this strip provided most of the white clergy and all of the white lay participants. In general, the clergy participation was spread fairly evenly across the strip although some clergy came from neighborhoods well removed from the threat of racial change. The white lay participation was strongest from the churches which had the most active pastors and from the blocks that were closest to the racial dividing line. Since this line moved as the years passed, the loci of white support in OSC also shifted, moving mainly from east to west across the strip.

At first, OSC drew participation from the churches and civic associations in the area between Ashland Avenue (1600 w.) and Western (2400 w.), but these groups withdrew once OSC developed a clear bias against their segregationist approach to the race issue. A few years later, when the ghetto boundary had moved closer to Ashland, these same groups formed the basis of Father Lawlor's Southwest Associated Blocks movement which sought to solve the race problem by preventing the in-migration of blacks.

OSC's attempts to reach out beyond its narrow strip produced only the individual participation of a few clergy now and then after the segregationists pulled out of the organization, and OSC became tied to its narrow strip. Locked into this strip and its problems, OSC and the neighborhood

slowly changed from being integrated to being all black, and OSC started undertaking the new task of working on the problems of a changed and now black community.

From beginning to end, OSC's existence depended on the churches. The churches created it, supported it, and provided it with leaders and participants. In the early days the churches supported it directly. A decade later, after the area was mostly black, most of the original churches were still around and still participating in OSC. However, because racial change had reduced the financial solvency of the churches, most of the money came from the regional or national level in the denominations. The image that OSC projected was that of a broadly based community organization. The South-town Economist, a neighborhood newspaper, ran several pages of information in advance of the October, 1959 convention. Beside the clergy and the lay . . . delegations from the churches were the leaders of several civic associations, veterans' organizations, officers (president and vice president) from two local banks, and several other business leaders. What was not stated (and is not discussed in the Fish, et al book) is that these non-church leaders, including the bankers and other businessmen, were lay leaders in the churches (especially in St. Sabina) who were participating at the urging of their pastors. In effect, then, the churches were behind almost all participation, even when it was not evident from the front-stage perspective.

OSC was credited with several significant accomplishments in its early years in addition to the home loan program. It was perhaps the first example in Chicago of Protestant and Catholic churches officially working together on a task of such importance. This was no small accomplishment for the times and at first there was a great deal of suspicion between the two groups

[Note 4]. It was also a reasonably successful attempt at making integration work at a time before the civil rights movement had started and when integration had not yet become a generally acceptable idea. Once OSC was started, the area went through a far calmer and more gradual racial change than had been the case in the neighborhoods to the east or would later be the case in the neighborhoods immediately to the west.

After 1962, the character of OSC changed. The fight for control of the organization was over, and the conservatives had mostly pulled out. Integration was an accomplished fact and many areas were becoming resegregated. For the next several years, OSC led a rather quiet (in comparison to the earlier years) existence working on educational issues (e.g., overcrowded black schools near low enrollment white schools), working on integration problems (e.g., realtor practices and white flight) at the edge of the racial dividing line as it slowly moved across the area, and becoming involved in community maintenance problems within the expanding black area (e.g., slum housing, city services complaints, developing a head start program and starting a mental health center). As Fish points out, the focus was changing from organizing to working on community services.

The transition within OSC continued during the remainder of the 1960's. OSC had become a respectable and accepted part of the community. It maintained the support of many elements in the community ranging from the business and clergy leaders who served on its board to the people further down the ladder who were the beneficiaries of its service oriented activities. From this perspective, OSC was increasingly becoming an organization run by its staff and its board rather than working from the direct mandate of a grassroots constituency. At the same time, however, OSC was able to turn the

people out for issues when the need was there. In 1968 or 1969, OSC led an action against the public schools in which 9000 children were pulled out of 18 schools for a day during which parents went into the schools to inventory supplies, teaching resources, and to evaluate the physical conditions. The goal was to establish the accountability of the schools to the parents and to the community. At first, the schools decided to ignore the proposed action, but when it seemed clear that OSC was going through with it, the board decided to play along and it held an open house day. 1000 parents participated in the inventory activities.

OSC was also involved in other activities of a confrontation nature in its later days. It took on Jewel foods because Jewel stopped keeping up its stores in the area after the area had changed. OSC negotiated with National Foods over a new store site and over National versus Del Farm brand products. When National broke the agreement and put in the Del Farm products, OSC led a two week boycott which was effective enough to cause National to switch the store over to National brand products [Note 5].

OSC kept its budget at about \$60,000. a year throughout almost its entire existence. The increasing extent to which OSC became an adversary to the Board of Education and to local white businesses did not sit well with the local businesses which had been significant contributors to OSC since the early years. The result was that both church and business contributions to OSC declined at the same time. OSC felt that it could not cut its expenses very much without reducing its effectiveness excessively, so it kept up the spending while it looked for other ways to raise money. By 1968 and 1969, OSC was spending about \$10,000. a year more than it was taking in. The budget was balanced by not paying the IRS and certain other bills. Pete

Martinez, the OSC director, negotiated a special grant from a Lutheran denomination to pay off the IRS, but he resigned to take another job before the payment was made.

Despite the transition of OSC away from its original grass-roots structure, the organization continued to hire directors whose background lay in community organizing. The last director, who was hired in the fall of 1969, came with strong recommendations from The Woodlawn Organization, a nearby strong Alinsky organization, where he had been an organizer. The OSC board, however, was now being selected by the director rather than being elected by a grass-roots constituency based on past leadership service in the organization. These board members were increasingly traditional community leaders (businessmen and clergy) who had had no prior participation in OSC and who often were not especially familiar with the organization. In December of 1969, Gus Savage, a well known southside black newspaper publisher, stepped down as OSC president after about two years in that position. The next president was a local contractor and charter member of Operation Breadbasket, a southside civil rights organization and the predecessor of Rev. Jesse Jackson's PUSH, who had been recruited to OSC as a new board member just six months earlier. The new president did not know much about OSC, but he took the job because he saw it as a change to bring OSC and Breadbasket closer together. He did not realize that OSC was in deep financial problems until after he became president. Once elected, his primary task became that of raising money to keep the organization ahead of the creditors. After much effort, he finally got enough money together to pay off most of the IRS debt [Note 5]. He soon discovered, however, that most of the money that he and the other board members were raising and turn-

ing over to the director was not going into the OSC treasury, but rather was being spent as the director saw fit. As a result, by the spring of 1970, a confrontation had developed between the director and the Board president over the question of accountability. On this issue, most of the rest of the board tried to ride the middle of the fence.

Shortly thereafter the president fired the director who appealed to the rest of the board for support. The board sided with the director by a slim majority and the president quit. The next president was a mainline denomination Protestant minister who had been asked to join the board a few months before and who also had no prior familiarity with the organization. After receiving his vote of confidence from the board, the director seems to have continued in his ways by largely ignoring the board and its new president. The board seems to have decided that it made a mistake, but could neither gain control of the director nor raise enough money to keep OSC going and the organization collapsed during the summer of 1970. A number of the board members, including the new president, had decided that the organization was too deeply in debt and now doing too little to be worth the effort of saving it. Shortly thereafter, the previous president came back and closed up the office.

Although this was the end of OSC as far as the community was concerned, it was not the end as far as the IRS was concerned. It came after the money that was owed it to collect from the officers what it had not collected from the organization itself. A couple of years later, a settlement was reached whereby partial payment was made by the officers, including the two most recent former presidents, out of their own pockets.

Some OSC members felt that OSC, or at least an organization like it,

was still needed in the community. Later in 1970, they formed the South-west Community Action Coalition (SCAC) to continue where the OSC left off. The SCAC was never able to get off the ground as a grass-roots community organization and has survived largely because it received state support for some social service programs that it runs.

OSC went through the transition from a white constituency to a black constituency at a rather awkward period in American history. It went black at the same time that the civil rights movement was going into its black militancy phase. When the white businesses that helped support OSC were responding negatively to the organization's limited confrontation with the white institutions, militants within the black community were attacking OSC and pushing it to go even further. This left OSC in the position of having to simultaneously promote an activity while working to cool out the militants lest they run away with the issue and reduce the likelihood of winning desired concessions from a target organization.

In its later years OSC's informal northern boundary shifted from 67th Street to 75th Street, and its southern boundary moved south to the city limits. In this area OSC, was credited by my informants with some non-trivial achievements before it folded. Once again the organization had a real impact in stabilizing the process of racial change at the extended southern edge with the result that violence and white flight were lower than they in the adjacent neighborhoods. The slower transition was accompanied by little of the physical decline that arose in conjunction with racial change in Englewood and many other nearby neighborhoods. Even in 1970, before it folded, the OSC area still had some white residents, some of whom had been in OSC since the early days when both the neighborhood and the organization

were at very different stages of development.

#### NOTES:

1. OSC was something of a problem organization. Although it was a big organization and it lasted a long time, I had trouble finding good informants. Senility, death, and the simple passage of time made information hard to come by, even from informants who had played central roles in the organization. I was quite unable to find informants for several key periods during the organizations existence. Much of my information for the early years (1959-1967) came from a book, *The Edge Of The Ghetto*, by John Fish, et. al.. Unfortunately the book was written using pseudonyms and even with the help of the author, I was not able to get very far in identifying the real names to help in fitting together the information from the book with the information vaguely recalled by my human informants.
2. This outcome was the result of another fortuitious event. Msgr. John Egan, a social activist, was in a key position in the Archdiocese to bring Mahon and Alinsky together. Msgr. Egan was also able to secure the support of the Cardinal for this sort of community organizing. In a sense, Alinsky, Egan, and the Cardinal were the prime movers behind virtually all the grass-roots community organizing that has occurred in Chicago over the past two decades.
3. Several other organizations (SCC, CCO, ACO, WECO) experienced a lot of hostility from conservative groups just as OSC did. It would be hard to say for sure that one organization experienced more harassment than did another, although only in Cicero did the opposition succeed in closing down the organization. OSC, however, seems to have been the only organization to be attack by both liberals and conservatives; it was the only organization to experience direct opposition from sources far outside its local neighborhood.
4. Several informants emphasized this point. The Reader (1/5/79) in an article titled "John Egan's Priestly Duties" points out that at the time that Cardinal Stritch was authorizing the use of church money for organizing purposes, he was also explicitly prohibiting Catholics from participating in the World Council Of Churches meeting in Evanston, Ill. Fish (1966) points out that OSC had a Catholic-Protestant balance that helped even out the religions suspicions and tension. The OSC area had 6 Catholic churches and 23 Protestant churches. Because they represented more organizations, the Protestants had a majority in the one vote per organization council which met monthly, while the Catholics had a majority at the annual conventions which used proportional voting and which elected the officers and set the general guidelines for OSC's activities.

The involvement of the churches in OSC reportedly had other benefits for OSC which were never publicized. The pastors of two Catholic parishes (Msgr. Mahon at St. Sabina and Msrg Mulloy at St. Leo) were said to have very good connections with the Democratic party organization. Msgr. Mulloy reportedly had lunch almost weekly with Mayor Daley. When OSC, for example, had problems with slum landlords, the two pastors would often intervene behind the scenes to get the cases through the courts much faster than OSC could have done on its own. The net effect was that OSC and the Protestant churches unknowingly benefited from this clout which they did not possess. The clout lasted until the area went mostly black and then it disappeared.

5. Until the mid-1970's, National Foods was one of the big retail grocery chains in Chicago. The company ran at least two separate chains of stores. One was the National stores which stocked the well known National brand products. The other was the Del Farm chain which stocked Del Farm products. The National stores tended to be found in white neighborhoods and the Del Farm stores seemed to exist only in black neighborhoods. When neighborhoods changed from white to black, the National stores changed from National to DelFarm. Blacks regarded the Del Farm label as representing an inferior product line, and fights occurred in many neighborhoods over the National versus Del Farm issue.

National was not the only grocery chain to follow apparently racially discriminatory practices, but National was the only company to use a technique involving the store names and proprietary product labels. Jewel, another major Chicago grocery chain, had a separate division to cover the black neighborhood stores. This division received different unlabeled products (meat and fresh produce) and had different personnel practices, which served to prevent black employees from rising to supervisory and managerial positions, but none of this was visible to the public and so escaped the attention of the activist community organizations.

6. OSC seems to have gotten itself into something of a mess after the new director replaced Pete Martinez. Several informants referred to the fighting that went on. Two informants said (incorrectly) that the IRS closed down OSC as part of a deal not to take the officers to court over the back taxes. No informant knew what happened to the grant from the Lutherans except that it got to OSC, but not to the IRS. One informant said that The Woodlawn Organization gave the man a good recommendation because he had been a real troublemaker and they badly wanted to be rid of him. This was part of what may have been the downfall of OSC. The organization remained in the Alinsky-style network, but the new board members were outside that tradition and lacked the contacts, and hence the knowledge about people and methods that was available to the leaders of other Alinsky-style organizations.

## SECTION 3:

## SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY ACTION COALITION (SCAC)

"The SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY ACTION COUNCIL is an UMBRELLA organization, representing Civic, Religious, Business Associations and Block Clubs on Chicago's Southwest Side.... SCAC was organized in 1971 and became incorporated in 1972, specifically as the result of the problems that occurred in a socially changing neighborhood.... Against this background, the SCAC, through its standing committee structure..., can more effectively monitor the social problems in the community." [Note 1] The SCAC goal is to improve the community through securing better services from outside sources, through developing local leadership, and through implementing programs in areas where unmet needs are identified.

My interviews on SCAC included brief discussions with some employees who talked about the social service programs that SCAC runs, and a formal interview with a long term board member who also talked about SCAC in terms of what its founders tried to create. The overall picture is that of an Alinsky-style organization that never got off the ground, but which, in the process of trying, created some state funded social service programs which have become the primary basis for insuring the survival of the organization.


SCAC got its start in the collapse of the Organization For The Southwest Community (OSC), a once powerful and rather successful organization that fell apart during the summer of 1970 as the result of internal problems [Note 2]. Despite its collapse, OSC seems to have been working fairly effectively on a variety of community problems and it maintained a sound

core of leaders and participants up to the very end. Many of these leaders felt that OSC was still needed in the community and they attempted to create a new umbrella organization (SCAC) to continue the work that had been OSC's mission. At the same time, because OSC's problems with the Internal Revenue Service had not been resolved (in 1971), the people from OSC tried to avoid any direct links to OSC in founding their new organization.

SCAC was set up with the same boundaries that had belonged to OSC, going from 7900 south to 119th Street between the Dan Ryan Expressway on the east and Damen (2000 w.) on the west. Later on, after the area between Damen and Western (2400 w.) changed from white to mostly black, SCAC moved its western boundary from Damen to Western.

SCAC has never had an annual budget of more than about \$2,500, apart from the funds that are earmarked for its service programs [Note 3]. As a result, the Alinsky-style community organization component of SCAC has always been a volunteer effort. This has meant that SCAC has had a limited capacity for making itself visible in its community. In turn, this has limited the extent to which SCAC had been able to establish the sort of community infrastructure that OSC possessed.

Over the years, most of SCAC's activity as a grass roots community organization has fallen into one or another of three areas: (1) SCAC was involved in the anti-crosstown expressway issue from about 1971 to 1977. The concern over this issue arose because one leg of the expressway would have gone through the SCAC area and affected many residents. As part of its action on this issue, SCAC became involved with the Citizens Action Program (CAP). SCAC was willing to participate with CAP in the issues as two equal organizations working together on a common concern, but SCAC was not willing to



## SCAC ON THE SOUTHWEST SIDE

join CAP, partly because the SCAC bylaws had no provisions for joining other organizations, and partly because the SCAC board felt that it would be demeaning for SCAC, which regarded itself as an inclusive umbrella organization to become a member of a larger group over an issue that fell within the SCAC geographical area. (2) During the time (1971-1973) that SCAC was cooperating with CAP, SCAC also ran regular accountability sessions over the availability of city services in the SCAC area, but there has been no follow up on this issue since SCAC dropped its involvement with CAP. (3) During 1974 and 1975, SCAC was involved in a property tax rebate issue.

SCAC has also been involved, as a grass roots organization, in a number of other activities although the extent of organizational involvement was often much less. For example, for the past three or four years, SCAC has held public question and answer meetings with local political candidates at election time. In 1974 SCAC started an neighborhood Little League baseball parade. A few years later, the Little League program took over the parade and SCAC merely participates in it now.

The dominant force in directing the course of SCAC's development from the start until 1976 when she moved out of the city, was Ms. Gwen Brown. Ms. Brown, who had been an influential leader in OSC, was the major force in getting SCAC started and she served as the volunteer director and organizer for SCAC. It was through her recognition of community needs and her desire to do something about them that SCAC got into the business of running the social service programs.

The first such program, which involved providing services to children with developmental disabilities was started in 1973 and was funded by the Illinois State Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS). By the time

that the DCFS phased out this program in 1976, SCAC has successfully started (in 1975) two other programs. One program, also funded by DCFS, involves providing counseling, tutoring, and recreational activities, etc. for delinquent children who are referred by the state department of corrections and for foster children who are referred by DCFS because they are felt to need more care and attention than they are otherwise receiving. The second program, which is funded by the State Department of Mental Health (DMH), involves providing therapy (psychological and/or chemical) for crisis experiencing disturbed teenage children and their families.

SCAC is run by a volunteer board consisting of officers (president, secretary, treasurer and 5-6 vice presidents) who are elected annually at one of the SCAC meetings, and twelve community people who serve as representatives from certain neighborhood organizations and block clubs which belong to SCAC. SCAC accepts as members neighborhood organizations and block clubs that are located within its boundaries. In areas where no such organizations exist, SCAC will accept individual memberships.

Because SCAC is a volunteer run community organization, it has had a limited capability for reaching out into its territory. As a result, it has usually had a rather small membership base. Its first members came from the residue left over from the breakdown of OSC. At present only one active member is left over from that group. A few years ago, when SCAC was involved in the property tax rebate issue, the organization picked up about 200 new members. Most of the currently active members are from this group. After this issue died out, SCAC drifted into a state of apathy and has been losing members ever since. As of mid-1978, SCAC had about 75 active members (people acting as individual members or as representatives from member organ-

izations). Since the tax-rebate issue days, SCaC has had no effective means of recruiting new members and few people have joined.

The primary means that SCAC has of recruiting people is through distributing leaflets about its activities, meetings, and programs. SCAC is usually only able to distribute the leaflets in the blocks immediately around its office, this being as much as its volunteer members, supplemented with occasional help from some program staff members, can cover. When SCAC moved from its original location at 79th and Halsted to its current location at 1931 W. 87th Street three years ago, the organization lost some of the members who lived near the old address and picked up some members who live near the new address because SCAC could not leaflet both areas and so distributed its notices only in the new area [Note 4].

The SCAC board hires the employees for its service programs, but day to day responsibility for running the programs is in the hands of the staff and the director, and the overall responsibility for the programs rests with the funding agencies. The SCAC staff members are aware that SCAC runs three programs (the two service programs and the community organization), but the staff people seem to have very little knowledge about the community organization aspect of SCAC. Most SCAC board members have been involved in SCAC for several years and one traces his involvement back to OSC. Because the SCAC service programs pretty well run themselves, business concerning the programs does not take up much time at the board meetings and this gives the board plenty of time to deal with other concerns. The two durable topics that the board is thus able to work on are how to make the community organization aspect of SCAC more effective, and how to get a better and larger physical plant to house the organization. The move

from 79th and Halsted to the present location was made because SCAC needed more space. The organization still needs more space for its programs, so most of the \$2,500 per year budget goes into a building fund to eventually provide the organization with improved quarters.

At some point in 1977 or 1978, the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) tried to set up a grass-roots organization in the SCAC area and/or approached SCAC about joining up to work together on community problems. SCAC refused to join MAHA because the SCAC board felt that MAHA was operating with some overly simplistic ideas both about the community problems and about what could reasonably be done about them. The SCAC board, which can trace its history directly back to 1971 and indirectly (through OSC) for many years before that, viewed MAHA as a sort of upstart and wet-behind-the-ears organization that wasn't really worth bothering with. The MAHA organizing effort, as of late 1978, has not gotten off the ground, and SCAC has continued to hold on to its goal of becoming a viable successor to OSC as the grass-roots community organization for its section of Chicago. The SCAC also has retained its self-image of possessing a strong and experienced pool of leadership in dealing with community problems, even though the organization never has acquired any funding and never has done much as a much community organization.

In effect, SCAC is a community organization that has failed to get off the ground. In the process of trying, however, it succeeded in establishing some non-autonomous but largely self-running social service programs. The social service programs have both kept SCAC alive and, because they are self-running, have given the SCAC board time to keep its attention on the original goal of becoming an Alinsky-style community organization. At the

same time, however, although SCAC seems to have no trouble keeping the social service programs going, it cannot raise any money to get its community organizing mission off the ground. Over the years this pattern has become a stable organizational configuration. This means that SCAC has acquired durability coupled with a limited likelihood of either losing track or of ever attaining its goal of becoming a real successor to OSC.

#### NOTES:

1. Source: a three page descriptive handout provided by SCAC. The last two words have been changes so that the abbreviated quotation makes grammatical sense.
2. See the previous section for a description of OSC. OSC was founded back in 1959, with the help of Saul Alinsky, when the eastern edge of the OSC-SCAC area was about to become racially integrated
3. This was not entirely a matter of choice. The SCAC founders wanted to avoid a public connection with OSC because of the IRS, but they tried to tap the funding sources that had been open to OSC. They were never able to do this, partly because SCAC was not OSC and partly because some of the funding sources had developed strong negative images of OSC, due to its financial mismanagement during 1969 and 1970.
4. The effectiveness of SCAC as a community organization can be inferred from the following bit of information. The pastor of the Catholic Church located five blocks from the current SCAC office was not even aware that SCAC was a community organization when I interviewed him for another organization during 1978. The pastor had an interest in community organizing and had been a supporter of another now defunct organization in the immediate area.

## SECTION 4:

FATHER LAWLOR'S ORGANIZATION:  
ASSOCIATED BLOCK CLUBS, INCORPORATED (ABC)

None of my informants identified Father Lawlor's organization as being within the Alinsky tradition, and the organization was not included in this study. The reasons for this exclusion were discussed at some length in Chapter Two and will not be repeated here. His organization was, however, the dominant organization within its turf for several years and it had a significant impact on several organizations that were included in this study. Most of these organizations were, in effect, reactions to the Lawlor organization and their development cannot be understood apart from this fact. This has made it necessary for me to provide a brief description of the Lawlor organization. Rather than repeat much of this information in each of the sections that cover the affected Alinsky organizations, I have decided to pool all the information on Lawlor's organization into a single description.

For decades, the Chicago black South Side has been expanding from its original base near 13th and State. This expansion has rarely been well received by the whites whose neighborhood was being integrated. Integration has been quickly followed by white flight and racial integration becomes black invasion as the ghetto moves block by block across the city. From time to time, and from place to place, the whites have defined certain ecological boundaries (major streets, railroad tracks, etc.) as Marginal Lines beyond which the black movement must not be permitted to pass.


During the mid to late 1960's, Ashland Avenue (1600 w), from 59th

Street to at least 95th Street [Note 1] was such a line. Although racial Marginot Lines are usually strictly local and poorly defended, Ashland Avenue was defended by a large scale, well financed and strongly supported community organizing effort. This organizing effort was led by Father Frances Lawlor, a white Catholic priest assigned to the south side area, and it included all the Catholic parishes immediately west of Ashland from 59th Street to 95th Street. Father Lawlor brought together enough money to hire organizers and establish block clubs all along this area. These block clubs were grouped into several neighborhood councils as well as being part of the larger community organization which was called the Associated Block Clubs, Inc.

Father Lawlor's thrust was toward maintaining the area west of Ashland as an acceptable place for whites to live. This organizing effort had a dual focus. On one hand, it provided a host of improved services and heightened political efficacy to the people within his service area, and, on the other hand, it was directed toward keeping the blacks out because this was seen as the only way to maintain the area as an acceptable place for whites to live. This meant that Father Lawlor's organizing had latent, if not overt, anti-black overtones [Note 2].

Because these overtones were labelled as racist by black organizations and by Cardinal Cody, the head of the Chicago Catholic Archdiocese, the parish priests in the Lawlor service area were instructed not to cooperate with the Lawlor organization. This instruction served as an explicit order to the priests under Cody's authority, but it had little impact on the laity who flocked to the Lawlor movement in large numbers.

By the late 1960's, this movement had developed enough strength to success-



FATHER LAWLOR'S ASSOCIATED BLOCK CLUBS

fully challenge the Chicago Democratic organization on its own turf, and Father Lawlor was elected to the city council. A few years later, however, the organization collapsed because it was able to retard for a while, but not to prevent, the expansion of the black area across Ashland, and because it had no program with which to deal with the actuality of black invasion.

Father Lawlor got started in Our Lady of Mt. Carmel parish, a small Croatian ethnic parish south of 59 th. Street in about 1965. How he got started is not clear to me, but he was invited to speak at the parish, the people responded to his message, and an organization, the Associated Southwest Block Clubs, was formed.

His organizing effort spread southward through St. Justin Martyr parish (5800 - 7400 south), St. Theresa Of The Infant Jesus, popularly known as "Little Flower," (7400 - 8400 south), and St. Ethelreda (8400 - 9500 south). The organizing effort was largely a grass-roots phenomenon. Lawlor was able to expand to the south because people wanted him to. Rightly or wrongly, they saw him as the last hope for saving their neighborhoods. As Lawlor expanded southward from his original Associated Southwest Block Clubs area, he set up additional block club councils in each neighborhood. A new umbrella organization, the Associated Block Clubs, Inc., was established as the over-all organization.

By the time that Father Lawlor was getting well established in St. Ethelreda parish, racial change had started in the northern part of his territory and the focus of his organization changed from expansion to a retrenching operation as the influx of blacks pushed the ABC's northern boundary further and further south. By 1973, blacks were moving into St. Ethelreda parish, and the organization collapsed shortly thereafter.

The Lawlor organization's territory, like many white Chicago neighborhoods, was predominantly Catholic. The parishes within its territory had little else in common apart from their fear of a black takeover. Before the changeover, Mt. Carmel was a small Croatian ethnic parish, St. Justin was described as a small working class parish, Little Flower as a wealthy high status, upper middle class parish, and St. Ethelreda as a more typical middle class parish.

The Catholic clergy are divided into two classes. One consists of the diocesan clergy, who are educated in the seminary of the diocese in which they were previously lay Catholics. Diocesan clergy are under the authority of the head of the diocese and, with rare exceptions, they spend their entire professional career within the boundaries of the same diocese. The other class of clergy consists of the religious orders (note: not all the men in an order are priests: some go to seminary and secure ordination to the priesthood, while others remain as lay brothers who find their vocational outlet in other directions) who are under the authority of the order and who may be assigned to any geographical location where the order has a monastery. Under agreement with a diocese, priests from an order sometimes serve in diocesan parishes. The parish remains under the diocese and the priest under the authority of his order.

All the parish priests in the Lawlor area parishes were diocesan priests, which put them under the authority of Cardinal Cody. Father Lawlor, however, was an Augustinian priest, who had been teaching in a nearby Catholic high school, and he was not under the direct authority of the Cardinal. Once Father Lawlor got started in Mt. Carmel parish, he was attacked in the press and by the Cardinal as a racist. This image helped attract people to the

organization, some of whom were indeed racists, and many more who simply believed that keeping blacks out was the only way to maintain their neighborhood as they knew it.

My informants who knew Father Lawlor, including one who worked for him, saw Lawlor not as a racist, but rather as a man who was concerned for the people and whose motives remained private or unclear. He was described as a man who became captive to the racist thrust of his organization and who finally became disillusioned because the organization never met the purposes for which he had created it.

Near the end, some of his organizers tried to establish a base in the northern sector after it had turned black, but this cost them their legitimacy in the remaining white area without providing any corresponding gain in way of a renewed base in the new black area. The organization that they represented had acquired such an anti-black image that the organizers could not develop adequate credibility among the blacks.

The Lawlor organization, however, was by no means a monolithic block on racial matters. Once blacks started moving in, many Lawlor block clubs were willing to incorporate them, but the Lawlor civic area block club associations, to which these block clubs belonged, would not accept black members. The result was that some blacks participated at the bottom level of the organization, but they could never rise to the leadership level.

During the early 1970's, the Chicago Archdiocese tried to counter the influence of Father Lawlor's organization by assigning Catholic Charities organizers to the Little Flower and St. Ethelreda parishes. These organizers worked hard, but did not get very far toward that goal. The parish priests were, in a way, caught in the middle. Racial change would trans-

form their parishes from large congregations and financial solvency to small congregations and financial dependence. They were ordered not to cooperate with Lawlor, but they ministered to parishioners, most of whom seemed to support Lawlor. The Catholic Charities organizers, with the support of the rectories, tried to establish parallel organizations among the parishioners who did not support Lawlor and among the blacks who were moving into the parishes.

The counterthrust provided by the Cardinal and by the Catholic Charities organizers seems to have been not entirely beneficial. Although some linkages were established between the invaded white and invading black communities, the Church's attack on Father Lawlor created a sense of distance between the laity and their church, and it increased the grass roots support for Father Lawlor, who was seen as an underdog under attack by an indifferent collosus.

The short term effects of the Catholic Charities organizing and the long term effects of the Lawlor organization varied from parish to parish. No Catholic Charities organizers were sent to Mt. Carmel or to St. Justin parishes and this was the first section of the Lawlor area to change from white to black. When the area changed, the Lawlor movement was trying hard to hold the line. Racial change was accompanied by tension and by violence. Change occurred rapidly. The departing whites established no viable transitional linkages with the incoming blacks, who had to start their own community organization to defend their interests against the whites. Even the neighborhood name was lost in the racial transition.

In Little Flower parish, the people were more resigned to the inevitability of integration, and, when it came, they were more willing to work

with the incoming blacks. In Little Flower parish, the Catholic Charities organizer and an assistant pastor established a series of interracial but short-lived ad hoc organizations around different neighborhood problems. None of these organizations was effective for more than a few months, and no durable community organization was ever established.

In St. Ethelreda parish, the Catholic Charities organizer was able to establish a viable community organization involving some white parishoners and the incoming black residents. The organization survived the racial change to become an all black organization and then, after the Lawlor organization finally folded, the organization became integrated again when a number of the former Lawlor organization's members decided to join. This organization finally folded in 1976, when neither St. Ethelrede church nor the members were willing to maintain the organization any longer.

The next several sections of this Chapter describe the several Alinsky organizations that existed in the Lawlor area. The next three sections cover the three different organizations that existed in St. Justin Martyr parish, which was the first to go black. The following two sections cover Little Flower and St. Ethelreda parishes, in that order.

#### NOTES:

1. This Marginot Line stopped at 59th Street even though the invasion threat extended north of there, I was told, because north of 59th Street was the Back Of The Yards Council and Father Lawlor did not want to infringe on its territory. Supposedly the Council told him to stay out unless he wanted to experience a public failure there. The organization stopped at 95th Street at the southern end partly because the area south of St. Ethelreda parish was a separate neighborhood, and partly because the organization collapsed before it got any farther south.

2. The few informants who were familiar with Father Lawlor's organization emphasized that, despite the almost entirely negative publicity that Father Lawlor received outside his area, his organization did do a lot of good things for the people that it represented. I have previously mentioned that the phrase "Southwest Side" seems to be a white code-word used to distinguish the white residential neighborhoods from those which are occupied by blacks. During the 1960's, at least, the phrase had an additional meaning for the whites who lived there. It identified a white area which had been forgotten, or was being ignored, by the white establishment that ran the city. The whites felt that they were, in effect, being accorded the benefits of second class citizenship. New City College campuses were being built everywhere but on the southwest side; theirs was the only section of the city to have no Chicago Transit Authority or other rapid transit lines; they seemed to be getting less than their fair share of the city services that their taxes were paying for, and the Democratic Party organization seemed to take their votes for granted. What Lawlor promised, and in large measure provided, was an apparent increase in the extent of political incorporation for the people of the Southwest Side. His organization provided an increased level of city services and set up a number of programs that helped the people in his neighborhoods.

## SECTION 5:

## WEST ENGLEWOOD COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION (WECO)


West Englewood is the neighborhood that was called South Lynn and Murray Park when the whites lived there. The area, which was also the St. Justin Martyr Catholic parish, was the first section of the Father Lawlor organization's area to experience racial integration. Once the Ashland Avenue barrier had been breached, the blacks moved in across Ashland farther and farther south over the next several years. By the time that integration reached the southern end of Father Lawlor's area, it took place a fairly peaceful manner. In the north, however, where integration occurred first, the situation was very different. "Whites conducted an active campaign to keep black prospective home owners east of Ashland. Homes were burned and some blacks were physically attacked, shot and black children were violently attacked and run home from the then predominantly white schools by old and young adults." [Note 1]

In response to these problems, the blacks west of Ashland began forming block clubs. These were usually independent, all black organizations. The white block clubs usually would not accept black members and the Father Lawlor civic organization refused to accept black block clubs into membership. In 1970, the black block clubs formed into a task force to work more effectively on their local problems. At the time, the school situation was seen as being the most serious problem, both because of the harassment that black children were receiving and because the standard school solution to overcrowding was to reassign the newer black children to black schools east of Ashland, often so far east that the parents had to drive their children

to and from school. Once the task force made itself visible, by seeking help from or pressuring city agencies to work on some of the problems, the task force members came under additional harassment from both the local whites and the city police.

The problems continued, although they shifted in nature as more and more whites moved out. In 1971, the task force decided that its only solution was to form a more structured community organization. In 1972, it received its state charter as the West Englewood Community Organization. WECO had well defined boundaries of 59th Street to 69th Street between Loomis (1400 w) to Western (2400 w). At about the same time, WECO began to receive support from the national denominational organizations of three local and originally white Protestant churches (Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Methodist). Although some of this help was in the form of cash, much was in the form of in kind contributions and money which was given on a matching grant basis. The major in kind contribution was the use of a large building at 6455 S. Marshfield which was provided by the Presbyterians (it had been their neighborhood church before its members moved out). WECO recognized the usefulness of the building as a community center, and began looking for programs that would meet community needs while they continued to also work on other neighborhood problems on a more direct basis.

In response to particular needs, as they became apparent, WECO established a day care center, a mental health center, various youth programs, a sewing class, a martial arts class, and a number of other programs. WECO never had much money. Its service programs were paid for by various public and private agencies including the YMCA, the State of Illinois Department of Mental Health, the City of Chicago (which provided money for programs funded



WECO, IN WEST ENGLEWOOD

by the Federal government including the day care center and various youth programs). Desks, furniture, and other similar materials were donated by the city and several other organizations and agencies.

WECO's limited funds went to cover utilities on the building and to pay its staff which consisted of a part-time secretary (a high school student) and one community organizer. The organizations cash budget ranged from \$5,000 in 1972 to about \$17,000 a year between 1974 and 1976. From 1972 through 1974, most of the money came from the three Protestant denominations. In 1975, the church contributions were reduced considerably, but the difference was made up by a grant from the Wiebolt Foundation, which continued until the middle of 1976.

Because WECO never had much money to invest in an organizer, the organization fairly well had to take whoever was willing to work for the pay that it could provide. Their first organizer talked good, but couldn't do much, and he had to be let go. Willie Curtis, the second organizer, who stayed around from 1973 until shortly after WECO ran out of money in 1976, was described as a capable and hard working, but excessively aggressive and hard-headed young man. While he was there, Willie Curtis was far and away the most visible component of WECO [Note 2]. In addition to being hard-headed and aggressive, he had a strongly anti-white orientation. As part of his work in the community, he was inclined to touch base with local youth gangs. He also participated in the Martin Luther King, Jr. movement's activities against the Nazis and other whites in the Marquette Park area across Western Avenue.

Not long after WECO established its community center, the center became subject to regular vandalism by unknown persons or groups. Office supplies

were vandalized, furniture broken, and day care equipment destroyed. WECO had been given all these necessities, and it could never quite keep up with the vandalism. By 1976, the cumulative impact of this vandalism had become so bad that WECO had to abandon the center. At about the same time, the organization ran out of money. For a few months it kept Willie Curtis on a no-pay basis while it tried to find some way of financially reestablishing itself. Once his pay stopped, Willie Curtis concluded that he had no reason to listen to the WECO board, and he extended the scope of his more militant activities in the name of WECO. This brought the long term tension between the WECO board and its organizer to a head; the board terminated its relationship with Willie Curtis, who then stopped his work in the neighborhood. The departure of Willie Curtis and the closing of the community center put WECO in the position of having extremely low visibility even within its own neighborhood. Two years later, even though other grassroots community organizations existed in the area, it took me six months to find even one informant who knew what had happened to the organization. Everyone else that I talked to said that the organization has folded up in 1975 or 1976.

Right up to time that it abandoned the community center and decided not to seek renewals of the funding that it had been receiving, WECO was trying to find ways of expanding its services to the community. Early in 1976, WECO applied for funding to rehabilitate abandoned FHA foreclosed houses in the neighborhood. The WECO application was accepted but all the funds were frozen. By the time that the money became available, WECO had lost its center and its staff. WECO told the grant agency to find another organization that was in a better position to effectively use the housing rehabili-

tation money.

WECO has existed as an organization with a formal board and a participating following. In the early days, neighborhood problems were so severe for blacks that people came to WECO without being asked. By 1975, the more aggravating problems were over. Harassment by whites was a thing of the past, school overcrowding was not so bad, and participation in the WECO community organizing activities began dropping off. Although the problems have declined in terms of their impact on the people, they have not gone away. The whole range of city services became worse once the whites were gone. The quality of education in the public schools is poor even if overcrowding is less severe, and crime (now black-on-black) is still a significant problem.

The WECO board still exists with basically the same members that formed the task force back in 1970. Now (1978) there are about ten regular members and another ten to twenty relatively inactive members who show up for specific activities when they are asked. The board has always been the same volunteer group that learned things the hard way. Back in 1972 when they started receiving grants, they didn't know to take out withholding tax, etc., and they gave out the whole grant as salary. Later on, they had to pay the government and they had a hard time finding the money.

When WECO lost its funding and gave up the community center, it had to drop virtually all its service activities. Only the state-funded West Englewood Mental Health Center has survived and it is now located in a new office building at 79 th. and Oakley [Note 4]. The WECO board still runs a few activities on its own. It obtains toys and food from various sources and it runs a food cooperative for, and provides Christmas

baskets for, needy families in the area. WECO has also managed to maintain a skills bank [Note 4], although by 1978 the program was not as strong as it has been in earlier years.

In 1976, many WECO board members and about twenty other people formed a volunteer CB patrol, with a volunteer base station that monitors the patrols and calls the police when necessary. The CB patrol was established to deal with the local crime problems and it has held together quite well through mid-1978, but it has no direct connection with WECO.

For WECO, the big days seem to be over. The board is still trying to work on community problems, but it sees no way to re-establish a large multi-program community center and is not sure that it would want to if it could. It is, however, trying to find some way to have an office and to increase both its presence in the community and its capacity for working on the problems that the community still faces.

#### NOTES:

1. Quotes from a mimeographed WECO report written sometime during the fall of 1974.
2. A number of my informants for organizations other than WECO were familiar with WECO. All these informants described WECO as "Willie Curtis's organization." They knew nothing about WECO activities other than his organizing, and his aggressive style left most of the informants with a somewhat negative view of both Willie Curtis and of WECO.
3. At some point in 1975 or 1976, WECO expanded its boundaries southward from 69th Street to 79th Street, thereby doubling its service area.
4. A skills bank is a directory or listing of residents' skills in a variety of service areas (mechanic, carpenter, etc.). It is a formal

means of maintaining an bootstrap operation to improve a community and the quality of life of its residents, using skills and resources possessed by the people who live in the area.

SECTION 6:  
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF WEST ENGLEWOOD (CCWE)

My informants for CCWE were the primary leader of the organization, an organizer who worked with CCWE, and a few other outsiders who had some familiarity with the organization but who had neither lived in West Englewood nor personally participated in the organization. The information that I collected on CCWE seemed to fall rather naturally into two different perspectives, one being the inside view provided by the CCWE leader, and the other being the outside view provided by the organizer and the other informants [Note 1]. Although I could have synthesized the two perspectives into a single description of CCWE, it seems that the real nature of CCWE comes across more clearly if the two perspectives are presented separately, with the reader synthesizing them by remembering the one while reading the other.

A. CCWE As Seen From The Inside


The West Englewood area experienced rapid white to black racial change during the early 1970's. This change was accompanied by a substantial decline in both the physical condition of the neighborhood and in the city services provided to the area. One of the new black residents, Mrs. Hazel Montgomery, became concerned about the decline of the neighborhood and she began talking to other people about the problem and what they could do about it. Through her participation in a local Girl Scout program, Mrs. Montgomery heard of the Southwest Community Congress (SCC), a community organization operating in the white neighborhoods west of West Englewood. She went

to one of the SCC meetings and persuaded the organization to provide her area with an organizer.

Mrs. Montgomery and another interested resident decided to form a local community organization, and, with the help of the organizer, they went door to door identifying issues (aspects of the neighborhood decline, especially the inadequate garbage pickup by the city) and recruiting participants for the organization. After six months, the organizer left and for most of 1974, the organization continued as a volunteer effort with Mrs. Montgomery as the dominant leader and promoter.

Late in 1974, a Citizens Action Program (CAP) organizer came to see Mrs. Montgomery about having CCWE work with CAP. Mrs. Montgomery recognized both that CAP was about the only source from which she would be able to get organizing help for CCWE and that many of the local problems, especially those involving the FHA and the deteriorated condition of much of the neighborhood's housing, could not be resolved at the local level. As a result, Mrs. Montgomery and CCWE decided to affiliate with CAP. This affiliation produced a shift in CCWE from a focus solely on local problems and actions to participation in CAP's metropolitan area issues and problems. Although some people dropped out of CCWE as a result of this shift in orientation, other people joined the organization because of the shift. The CAP organizer was able to work with CCWE only on a part time basis, which left most of the work of maintaining and promoting CCWE up to Mrs. Montgomery. Other members did not work as hard as she to promote the organization, and in 1976 when she became physically exhausted and could no longer work as hard or attend meetings on a regular basis, CCWE more or less fell apart.

CCWE never sought outside funding; it was strictly a local effort. Al-



**CCWE, IN WEST ENGLEWOOD**

though quite a few people participated in CCWE over the years, the organization never developed any stable leadership base apart from Mrs. Montgomery. I was given several reasons why other stable leaders never developed. They were:

1. When people began to understand how immense the task of combating neighborhood deterioration was, many gave up.
2. Other people responded by moving out of the area rather than by staying around to fight such a big problem. A large proportion of initial black residents were middle class people who were really concerned about what happened to their neighborhood. When the area started deteriorating, these people moved out and were replaced by a lower class population which lacked this interest in fighting the decline of the community.
3. When city hall became one of the organization's targets, some people withdrew because they did not want to fight the city political machine. Other people withdrew to organize an unsuccessful local political campaign.

#### B. CCWE As Seen From The Outside

The SCC, a community organization which got off to a big start in the mid-1960's but had fallen into a decline by the early 1970's, had included West Englewood within its boundaries even though the SCC's base was really in a neighborhood farther west. The SCC was concerned about the racial change going on along its eastern edge, and it wanted to establish an organization in which the whites and blacks could work together on their problems of neighborhood stabilization and maintenance.

Because the SCC had fallen into a financial decline, it could not afford to provide a staff worker for the West Englewood area until it learned of a United Church Of Christ program through which West German conscientious objectors were being provided with alternative service work in community organizing in the United States. The SCC saw this program as a way out of its staffing problems and it applied for, and received, some of these people

during the spring of 1973. One of these workers, who wanted to do organizing in black neighborhoods, was assigned the task of creating a SCC neighborhood unit in the West Englewood area. This neighborhood had recently and rapidly changed from white to black, and it lacked any infrastructure of networks (either as a residue left behind by the departing whites or newly created by the arriving blacks) which the organizer could use as a base on which to build an organization. The organizer quickly ran across Mrs. Montgomery and she became his primary local leader in this organizing effort.

While this was going on, the SCC was experiencing a great deal of internal turmoil because a significant proportion of its leaders and a staff member decided to phase out the SCC and become part of the Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation (the Federation). While the SCC was contending with this problem, which nearly killed the organization, its organizer in West Englewood went on his merry way with Mrs. Montgomery and other local residents, creating CCWE as an autonomous organization rather than as a unit of the SCC.

In the spring of 1974, when the contract with the German organizers ran out, the SCC decided that the program had been a bad deal and it voted not to seek more organizers from that source. Since the SCC was even worse off than it had been a year earlier, it had no replacement to assign to West Englewood and the CCWE continued for the next six months as a volunteer group headed by Mrs. Montgomery.

Later in 1974, when CAP decided to seek out some black affiliates for its redlining campaign, it contacted Mrs. Montgomery about bringing her organization into CAP. CCWE joined up, and CAP assigned an organizer to work with CCWE. Unlike the SCC, which had provided a full time organizer for West Engle-

wood, the CAP organizer was also responsible for several other South Side black neighborhood affiliates. This meant that the CAP organizer worked mainly with the CCWE leaders and left them with the task of reaching out in the neighborhood for additional members.

By this time, CAP had acquired a reputation of moving in and out of black neighborhoods, depending on whether it wanted black support for whatever campaign it was currently involved in. Not long before this, the Federation had also joined CAP, and the Federation felt that organizing West Englewood was essential to its efforts to maintain the stability of its white neighborhoods which were just west of West Englewood. The Federation was one of the strongest CAP affiliates and it made no financial demands on CAP because it had its own secure financial base. Because of its size, and because the CAP president came from the Federation, the Federation was able to exert some influence in CAP. It used this influence, among other things, to see that CAP kept an organizer in the West Englewood area.

Shortly after CCWE joined CAP, Mrs. Montgomery was elected as a vice-president of CAP. Partly because of the pressure from the Federation and partly because Mrs. Montgomery was a CAP vice-president, CAP kept an organizer working with CCWE from 1974 until 1976, when CAP folded, even though the CCWE was never more than a very small and quite unimportant component of CAP.

In mid-1976, after CAP folded and Mrs. Montgomery became ill, CCWE found itself without either an organizer or a good leader. Faced with this dual loss, the CCWE, which never grew to be much more than a group of people gathered around Mrs. Montgomery, quickly fell apart and disappeared.

Most of my informants for CCWE described West Englewood as an exception-

ally hard neighborhood to organize. The last CAP organizer to work with CCWE said that the area was the worst that he had ever worked in. Whenever Mrs. Montgomery and he would identify and start developing some potential leaders to strengthen the organization, the new developing leader would move out of the area. Another informant, who was involved in another organization, described Mrs. Montgomery as a dedicated and hard worker who was up against too many local problems. Since West Englewood turned black in about 1971, there have been three attempts to establish a viable community organization there. During most of this time, two of these organizations have been operating concurrently, and at one point (1975 - 1976) all three were trying to be the West Englewood community organization. For a while, I was told, the organizer from one of the competing organizations came to CCWE to disrupt its meetings, as a means of eliminating one of his competitors. This organizer also went around accusing Mrs. Montgomery of being a front for the white man because of her relationship with CAP.

## SECTION 7:

CITIZENS COUNCIL OF THE SOUTHWEST ENGLEWOOD  
COMMUNITY (CCSC)

The West Englewood community changed from white to black in about 1971. The change occurred very rapidly [Note 1], and seems to have been accompanied by a rather rapid decline in the physical condition of the area. Although at least three community organizations had been operating in the area since it underwent racial change, none of these organizations seems to have been doing much of anything by 1975 [Note 2].


In mid-1975, Father Sehr, a young Catholic priest, was assigned as assistant pastor at St. Justin Martyr parish in West Englewood. Father Sehr was interested in community organizing and was a friend of Tom Fox, an organizer for the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA), who became director of that organization in 1977. Tom Fox and MAHA wanted to start an organization in West Englewood. Father Sehr also strongly supported the idea but said that he wanted MAHA to provide two organizers because he would not do the organizing himself. The pastor at St. Justin was also interested in community organizing, but, faced with the other demands on his time, had never gotten around to doing anything about it.

During August of 1975, one week after Father Sehr arrived at St. Justin, MAHA sent out one organizer to work with him. In the fall of 1975, MAHA supplied a second organizer. Father Sehr and the two organizers began building an organization by working on such local issues as sanitation, housing problems, and street crime. In less than two years, they built the CCSC into an organization which was regularly producing a turnout of 100 to 200 people

for public neighborhood meetings. In addition to the usual successes on such small issues as garbage pickup problems, they succeeded in getting Gov. Walker out to a meeting on housing problems in 1976; later that same year the CCSC met with Police Supt. Rocheforte on neighborhood crime problems. The organization also got the city to start rehabilitating some of the abandoned houses in the area, and it was instrumental in bringing in the Neighborhood Housing Service to rehabilitate and finance mortgages for other foreclosed and abandoned houses in the West Englewood area.

The development of CCSC, however, has not been without its problems. CCSC has never developed its own financial base, which means that it has always depended on someone else to provide its organizers. This was not a problem as long as MAHA, Father Sehr, and CCSC were all seeing things the same way. MAHA, however, has long had a built-in tension between promoting the development of neighborhood organizations which are responsive to local needs, and requiring these organizations to work on its coalitions so that progress can be made on the issues that can not be resolved at the local level.

In 1976, MAHA was heavily involved in the FHA payback issue and it wanted the organizers to bring the CCSC leaders into the payback coalition to increase its strength. Father Sehr wanted to stay away from this issue because, if the money was not forthcoming from the FHA, the people who got involved in the issue would give up on CCSC as well as on MAHA. During October, 1977, he started scheduling CCSC staff meetings for the same time (Monday morning, which was the prime time for laying out plans for the rest of the week) as the MAHA staff meetings. This effectively prevented the CCSC organizers from attending the MAHA meetings, and so forced a confrontation between MAHA and



CCSC, IN WEST ENGLEWOOD

CCSC.

MAHA responded to this by removing the CCSC organizers from its payroll. Since CCSC had no money, it lost its organizers, and Father Sehr had to take on the role of volunteer organizer. CCSC has continued as a strictly local organization which has not since become involved in any other larger coalitions, but which has retained its membership strength so far (mid-1978) despite the absence of any organizers other than Father Sehr [Note3].

CCSC has had to carefully skirt one relatively salient neighborhood issue. West Englewood is just east of Marquette Park, one of the larger city parks. Western Avenue, which lies between West Englewood and Marquette Park, has been the racial dividing line for several years. The eastern end of Marquette Park has the dubious distinction of being the self-adopted home of one of the Chicago area's two Nazi groups, the Frank Collins faction. Since the early 1970's, the Nazi group has been holding anti-black demonstrations and making it clear to West Englewood blacks that they are neither welcome nor safe in Marquette Park [Note 4].

In 1976, the Martin Luther King Junior Association, a south side militant black group began publicizing proposed open access marches in Marquette Park. This produced heightened action by the Nazis and the net result was increased racial tension on both sides of Western Avenue for a couple of summers. The CCSC felt that Marquette Park was too volatile an issue to become involved, and they tried to avoid it while not losing their credentials as an activist organization. Their solution was to use Marquette Park as a basis for pushing for more effective control of crime in the area east of Western. They got the police department to both integrate and increase the number of police patrols in the West Englewood area. They also got States

Attorney Carey to set up a program to bring area witnesses to court for cases involving crimes in West Englewood.

The space between West Englewood and the white areas across Western Avenue is divided into three long thin strips. At the western end is the Western Avenue commercial strip. At the eastern end is a one to two block wide section of railroad tracks. Between the commercial tracks and the commercial strip is a residential section known as the Bell-Oakley-Claremont area after the three north-south streets which pass through it. The track section was wide enough to serve as a residential racial barrier from about 1971 to 1976. During 1976 and 1977, however, the Bell-Oakley-Claremont area changed from all white to mostly black.

In 1977, following the racial turnover of Bell-Oakley-Claremont, the CCSC extended its western boundary across the tracks to include this area and it began organizing there with success, both among the new blacks and the remaining whites. At the same time, the Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation, which had been promoting urban renewal plans to make Bell-Oakley-Claremont secure for whites, seemed to have given up; and the long dormant Southwest Community Congress (SCC), which had developed a pattern of trying to exist in niches that the Federation did not want, got a new lease on life and started organizing in the area early in 1977. A year later, when I was interviewing informants for both CCSC and the SCC, I learned that both organizations were aware of the other's existence, and both seem to have been doing successful organizing there, even though neither organization seems to have learned of the activities of the other in that rather small neighborhood.

The CCSC is one of two black grass roots organizations in West Engle-

wood to ever have been a relatively strong organization (the other was WECO during the early 1970's). The CCSC seems to have developed a relatively able core of leaders but it has never raised much money. This has made it dependent on Father Sehr, and by extension, on the St. Justin rectory for the organizing help that it needs to retain its strength as an organization. If the CCSC ever does raise enough money to hire its own organizers, it will still be an organization dependent on others for its survival, for West Englewood is not sufficiently affluent to supply the money. The CCSC, like WECO and CCWE before it, will have to get that money from outside sources. In West Englewood, despite the benefits it appears to provide the community, there seems to be no way for grass roots organizing to avoid the slight contradiction of being a form of dependent autonomy.

#### NOTES:

1. Racial change occurred rapidly and with tension and some violence. The area was the first part of Father Lawlor's territory to change and his organization was still fighting the change.
2. The other three organizations were the Southwest Community Congress (SCC), the West Englewood Community Organization (WECO), and the Concerned Citizens of West Englewood (CCWE). The three organizations were included in this study. SCC had its base in the white area west of Western Avenue, and withdrew from West Englewood when it fell into a steep decline in 1974. WECO was started in 1970 during the racial transition and it was fairly strong in its early years. CCWE was a small organization that existed from 1973 until 1976 and revolved around one strong leader.
3. A number of informants from other organizations had unusually unfavorable things to say about Father Sehr's capability as an organizer. This may more nearly illustrate the main potential hazard of depending on the information provided by a relatively few informants than be indicative of his organizing talents. In April, 1978 I attended a regular CCSC meeting which was called to address such routine concerns as street cleaning and garbage pickup. About 200 people, including the alderman and the representatives of some city agencies were present. This was a better

turn out, both in terms of residents and public officials, than most of the organizations that I studied could have produced.

4. The area around Marquette Park has long been viewed by residents as the last viable white area on Chicago's south side. They tend to feel that if Western is breeched, the whole area will fall. They also seem to believe that Marquette Park is the only city park that is still available to whites (this is not true). Racial liberalism is not an especially popular doctrine in the area and being labelled as pro-integration helped bring about the downfall of the SCC. As a result, the area tends to be labelled as racist by the Chicago papers and by people living in other areas. While the area does harbor racists, most residents were described as being concerned mainly with keeping their neighborhood as it has been. They dislike the blacks and the Nazis about equally because both threaten to change the neighborhood from what it has been.

SECTION 8:  
LITTLE FLOWER

Little Flower is the popular name for St. Theresa Of The Infant Jesus Church. The Little Flower parish extends from Ashland (1600 w) to Western (2400 w) between 74th Street and 84th Street. This puts the parish right in the middle of the Father Lawlor block club area. Father Lawlor's Associated Block Clubs, Inc. and its Little Flower parish affiliate, the Highburn Associated Block Clubs, were a significant factor influencing the pattern of Catholic Charities supported community organizing activities in Little Flower parish. The Catholic Charities organizing was designed to provide a non-segregationist alternative to Father Lawlor, but most of the whites in the area seemed to prefer the Father Lawlor approach.

How Little Flower acquired a Catholic Charities organizer is not entirely clear [Note 1]. The organizer arrived late in 1971 and stayed until mid-1973 (about eighteen months). Although the organizer was under the general supervision of the downtown Catholic Charities staff, the particular planning and day to day decisions were made by the organizer and by Father Lyons, an assistant pastor at Little Flower who was interested in community activities and who assumed and/or was assigned this role by the church pastor.

Father Lyons and the organizer adopted the general pattern of setting up temporary organizations around whatever issues were salient to community residents at any particular time. As an issue declined in importance, and as the associated organization fell apart, they would look for another significant issue around which to build another temporary organization. They took this approach because they felt that different issues would attract


different people and because they did not feel that there was any real base in the community upon which they could build a more general and durable community organization.

When the organizer and Father Lyons got started in 1971, the parish was still white and mostly Catholic. This meant that their community organizing could be a parish outreach program directed primarily toward Little Flower church members, so they selected the church's Community Relations Committee as their vehicle for reaching out into the community. As it turned out, that committee provided a rather durable base for them to work with, and, as long as the neighborhood remained white, their different temporary organizations all revolved around substantially the same group of people.

The thrust of the Catholic Charities backed organizing was toward dealing realistically with the impending racial integration of the parish. They were seeking to build relationships between the whites who were already in the neighborhood and the blacks who were about to, and in fact soon did, start moving into the area. This approach set them apart from Father Lawlor's Highburn Associated Block Clubs organization which was working to avoid racial integration, and it generally limited the people's interest in their organizing effort. As a result, they were, for the most part, limited to working with the few activist oriented whites who saw no future in the Lawlor approach, to the blocks that Lawlor had not organized, and finally to the blacks who moved into the parish.

The salient issues that the organizer and Father Lyons found to work on fell into four broad categories:

1. The local business strips.
2. Real Estate - solicitation, block busting, home sales and apart-



1 Little Flower Church

LITTLE FLOWER PARISH

ment rentals, and FHA mortgage practices.

3. Education - overcrowding in the public grade school and what to do with Little Flower High School.
4. Crime - personal safety in the neighborhood.

Some of these issues primarily involved the neighborhood residents (crime, school overcrowding) while other issues had an appeal to people who lived far outside the parish boundaries (the FHA issue pulled in people and organizations from all over the South Side). Likewise some of the issues were of concern mainly to the white residents (what to do with Little Flower High School) while other issues were of real concern to both the whites and to the incoming blacks (crime and personal safety). Only one issue served as a vehicle for enabling the Catholic Charities backed group and the Father Lawlor organization to work together, namely, apartment rentals and house sales while the area was still all white. On another issue, what to do with the Little Flower High School, the organizer and Father Lyons found their organization working in opposition to the decisions and policies of the Chicago Catholic Archdiocese. The four issue areas will be discussed separately, and in more detail, in the next several paragraphs.

#### 1. Local Business Strips

As racial change closed in on the parish, the business strips became affected by the impending change. White businessmen began to leave and other white businesses would not move in. This produced empty store fronts and a general physical decline of the commercial strips because white owners were fearful of investing any money in their physical plants and blacks were not yet in a position to move in. The primary area of concern was 79th Street west of Ashland, although other areas, including the 87th Street commercial

strip, also evoked concern.

Late in 1972, a biracial businessmen's association, the Biracial Businessmen's Council, was formed to deal with business area redevelopment along the corridors radiating outward from the corner of 79th and Ashland (i.e., Ashland from 76th to 84th and 79th Street from Racine (1200 w) to Damen (2000 w)). This group held meetings, including planning sessions with consultants from the University of Illinois, and eventually spun off a community development corporation early in 1973. The corporation drew participation from a number of community organizations, churches, and businessmen on both sides of Ashland Avenue. It is not clear what these groups accomplished, but they seem to have become inactive later in 1973.

## 2. Real Estate

The real estate issue area involved very different things as the neighborhood went through the different stages of the racial transition. When the area was all white, the issue had a dual focus. The parish cooperated with the Lawlor organization to attract new white residents to the area and it worked to stop solicitation harassment by realtors who viewed the area as ripe for racial change. Once the blacks started to move in, the area of concern shifted to block busting by realtors. The final area of concern, after many blacks had moved in, involved the perceived misuse of FHA mortgages by the FHA and by the realtors who were working in the neighborhood. Although much of this issue concern came up at some of the general community meetings that the organizer and Father Lyons held, at least two organizations were established to deal with specific real estate problem areas.

The Highburh Community Housing Referral Service was established in April of 1972. It was a joint venture by the parish and the local Father Lawlor

group (the Highburn Associated Block Clubs). Its purpose was to attract white tenants and buyers into the area by soliciting house and vacant apartment listings and then advertising them in the community newspapers which were circulated in the white neighborhoods further west. In March of 1973, the service was formally closed because whites were not responding, because the area was turning black, and because neither the parish nor the Lawlor organization were any longer willing to underwrite the cost of maintaining the program.

Later in 1972, Father Lyons and the organizer established the "Southwest Coalition Against FHA." This coalition involved both local residents and a large number of community organizations (mostly white and usually liberal white if the organization's base was very far away from Ashland Avenue (e.g., the Southwest Community Congress)) from all over the southwest side of Chicago. The FHA was seen as a problem because: (1) too many loans were being given to financially unqualified buyers through realtor and purchaser falsifying of mortgage application information; (2) too many buyers (blacks not whites, almost any white buyer would have been welcomed) were first time home owners who possessed neither the knowledge and the preparation nor the money for maintaining their new homes. In addition, though blacks were being sold inferior homes at highly inflated prices, the FHA was not doing much of anything to curb these abuses of its policies.

The FHA coalition, which was led by Father Lyons, held public meetings at which particular realtors were the targets of action over specific FHA abuses. Some realtors agreed to clean up their act, but most of the others refused to have anything to do with the coalition. The coalition seems to have fallen apart sometime in mid-1973 for reasons that were no longer known

to any of my informants.

### 3. Education

Education was an issue with three related sides. As blacks started moving in, the local public grade school became overcrowded. At the same time, Little Flower, which was one of the few parishes in Chicago to run both a grade school and a high school, was faced with both declining revenue and declining high school enrollment and could no longer afford to maintain the high school. This concerned the parishioners, who viewed the high school as a status symbol for their church. The parishioners wanted to have a say as to what was going to happen to the building if the diocese was going to close the school. They wanted the building turned into a community center or a senior citizen center and residence, if it could not be kept open as a high school. These alternatives also, however, involved money that the parish did not possess. After a lot of agitation from many parishioners, the diocese sold the building to the Chicago Board Of Education which opened it as a public grade school [Note 2]. Although this solved the local grade school overcrowding problem, the white parishioners were unhappy because the school, by virtue of the continuing racial change in the area, had a black student body. This resolved the local school problems, and education died out as an issue as the neighborhood turned increasingly black. No organizations seem to have been established over the education issues; the issues were left to public meetings and more ad hoc groups.

### 4. Crime

Crime and personal safety seem to have become a problem as the area changed from white to black. No single purpose organization arose around

this issue, although it was a real concern to both the whites in the area and to a primarily black block club organization that existed during 1973 and 1974. This organization will be described in the next several paragraphs.

By 1973 a large number of blacks had moved into Little Flower parish. The new blacks had a negative image of the Highburn Associated Block Clubs which refused to admit black block clubs into membership. As part of their program of establishing local black-white relationships, Father Lyons and the organizer reached out to these new black residents. Their efforts at establishing inter-racial linkages fell by the wayside, however, because most whites were unwilling to participate. When the parish promoted block club organization, the "People Organized For The Concern Of The Highland Community" (POCHC), was formed during 1973, its membership was mostly black. PCHC dealt with such concerns as public safety (its major issue), city services, slum buildings, and slum landlords.

In mid-1973, the Catholic Charities organizer left. The parish, understanding that it would have to pay the full salary of any replacement, did not seek to have Catholic Charities assign another organizer to the parish. For a time thereafter, Father Lyons tried to keep things going. Later in 1973, Tom Fox, the organizer at St. Ethelreda Church (the parish immediately south of Little Flower) helped out part time with the organizing at Little Flower. Tom Fox helped out because the two parishes faced common problems and because he saw it as a way of building up the organization, the United Southwest Citizens (USC), that he was working with at St. Ethelreda.

During the fall of 1973, Father Lyons withdrew from the community organ-

izing activities because he and the other rectory staff saw their primary responsibility as being with the church and its big, and as yet unresolved, problem of what to do with the high school. Not long thereafter, Tom Fox also pulled out of Little Flower, partly because he regarded the high school as a no-win situation from an organizing standpoint, and partly because his work at MAHA and at St. Ethelreda kept him too busy to do much at Little Flower.

Racial turnover in Little Flower parish meant a change from a white and mostly Catholic population, which had direct ties to the church, to a black and mostly Baptist population, which had no ties to Little Flower Church. The parish pastors were of the opinion that, in its now black neighborhood, their church was no longer a local base of power and they felt that it was not an institution that the blacks would particularly trust or have any reason to turn to. As a result, they never made any effort to pick up the community organizing activities that they had dropped.

Left to its own devices, POCHC faded from the view of my informants. It is safe to assume that the organization disintegrated at about the same time. It had come into existence too recently to have developed any means of replacing the support that it had been receiving from the parish and from Catholic Charities. I was not able to find any traces of POCHC that went beyond the early part of 1974. Father Lawlor's Highburn Associated Block Clubs seems to have faded away in 1973 also, and the departure of these two organizations appears to have denoted the end of Alinsky style community organizing in Little Flower parish.

## NOTES:

1. Father Coughlin, a priest on supply at Little Flower, worked at Catholic Charities, and the Chicago Catholic hierarchy had a policy of opposing Father Lawlor and countering his influence where possible. Somehow Catholic Charities and the church must have decided to have an organizer assigned to Little Flower.
2. In the Catholic Church, assets and real estate in a parish are held in the name of the Diocese, which has the final say over what is to be done with them. Chicago Catholic churches tend to be built around large congregations and large physical plants which require large budgets. As long as the church can stay in the black, its parishioners can have a lot to say about how their church's money is spent, but when the church can no longer support itself, much of this freedom disappears. Because Little Flower could no longer fully support the high school, the diocese had the final say over what happened to the building. The white parishioners knew that the diocese plan to sell the building to the Board Of Education would mean a black grade school next door to their church. That was why they were promoting plans that would have tied the use of the building to the neighborhoods remaining white population.
3. The concern of the whites had been with crime mainly by blacks on whites. The concern of POCHC was with black on black crime. Racial change in Little Flower went rather calmly, and by the time that POCHC was started, not many whites were still in the neighborhood.

## SECTION 9:

## UNITED SOUTHWEST CITIZENS (USC)

The first Catholic Charities organizer arrived at St. Ethelreda parish sometime during 1972. No one was entirely sure why the worker had been sent there [Note 1], but, once on the scene, the organizer found himself in something less than a community organizing void. In specific, (1) the Father Lawlor neighborhood council, the North Beverly Civic Association, was still doing rather well, (2) the Alinsky-style Catholic Charities organizer assigned to Christ The King parish, just south of St. Ethelreda, had been working in St. Ethelreda as part of an outreach program that extended beyond his assigned parish's boundaries (this stopped in 1973 when Christ The King parish opted out of Alinsky style and became a major backer of the more conventional and establishment oriented Beverly Area Planning Association (BAPA) in its own neighborhood), and (3) the Catholic Charities organizer assigned to Little Flower parish, just north of St. Ethelreda, had also been doing some organizing in the area.


St. Ethelreda parish runs from Loomis (1400 w) to the Penn Central tracks at about 2100 west between 8400 south and about 9400 south. Starting at about 87th Street, the railroad tracks turn from a south to a southeast direction, making a triangle of the southwestern sector of the parish. The section of St. Ethelreda parish east of Ashland Avenue turned black during the late 1960's and was on the opposite side of the Ashland Avenue Marginot Line that Father Lawlor's organization had defined. The church property (the church, rectory, convent, and school) were all one block west of Ashland. All the organizing efforts described in this section took

place only in the western side of the parish, unless otherwise specified.

The first Catholic Charities organizer found about ten interested residents. He established them as a board, which came up with the name of United Southwest Citizens, and USC was thereupon established as a community organization. The organizer remained at St. Ethelreda for about one and a half years, during which USC had its ups and downs as a community organization, attracting a large number of participants when it got hold of a good issue and involving the participation of a relatively small number of people at other times. During the first organizer's tenure, the western side of the parish started experiencing racial integration.

In early 1974, the first organizer left and Catholic Charities sent out another one. This new organizer looked at USC, decided that it was largely an empty shell that had been organized from the top down with no real grass roots support, and he set about to rectify the situation. He went out looking for issues and for people. Under his direction, the organization got into such issues as zoning and FHA foreclosures, and it changed from a predominantly white to an almost entirely black membership.

After the organization had become largely black, the organizer started expanding eastward across Ashland Avenue and began participating in cooperative actions with the Brainard Community Action Council (BACA), a volunteer based black organization which had been operating in the area east of Ashland for several years. BACA had previously used Alinsky tactics when it had, from time to time, become involved in community organizing activities. The bulk of the USC - BACA cooperative action revolved around the FHA foreclosure issue. The issue was of much greater concern in the area east of Ashland than it was in the western side of the parish and the organizer pushed the



USC, IN ST. ETHELREDA PARISH

issue as a vehicle for bringing the eastern side of the parish into USC and as a means of avoiding future problems in the western side of the parish.

In late 1974 or early 1975, the all white Lawlor organization collapsed. Many of the remaining members of its North Beverly Civic Association joined USC either as individuals or as block clubs, and USC once again became an integrated organization. The whites joined USC because they recognized that the blacks were there to stay and because their socialization into grass roots organizing through the Lawlor organization was much stronger than was their adherence to that organization's anti-black orientation. The blacks in USC accepted the new white members without rancor, which shows how different the integration experience was at the northern and southern ends of the Lawlor organization's area [Note 2].

During the last half of 1975, the second USC organizer was promoted upwards into a staff position with the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA), a city-wide Alinsky style coalition which had become the vehicle through which Catholic Charities was assigning organizers throughout the city, and a new organizer was sent to USC.

The original agreement between Catholic Charities and St. Ethelreda had been that Catholic Charities would, for a limited period of time, pay half the salary of an organizer if the church would pay the other half. This would enable the parish to get an organization started and to find an alternate long range means of funding the organization [Note 3]. During 1976, Catholic Charities informed the parish that the seed money period was over and the parish and USC would be expected to pick up the support that Catholic Charities had been providing. The pastor at St. Ethelreda, faced with declining

parish income, decided that the parish's primary community outreach responsibility involved maintaining its grade school, which had acquired a primarily non-Catholic black enrollment, rather than in maintaining the community organization. The pastor decided that if Catholic Charities was going to pull out of USC, then the church would too, and he informed the USC board that it would have to find its own funding if it wanted to keep its organizer. The USC, which never had raised much money, could not cross this hurdle. The organizer left after his pay ceased, and the USC disappeared not long thereafter. The church pastor decided that the people must not have had a very strong commitment to their organization.

During its existence, USC seems to have been as much an umbrella that covered some diverse sets of people and activities, as it was an indigenous organization with a durable leadership core. It seems, however, to have shared this characteristic with several other organizations that I studied. USC was involved with BCAC over FHA foreclosures in the area east of Ashland; it was involved with zoning and abandoned business sites in a commercial strip west of Ashland; and, at one point, it created the Brainard Area Redevelopment Corporation, which got off to a bad start and fell apart. The most durable component of USC was an autonomous CB anti-crime patrol program which involved the participation of some seventy people for several years, until its members got tired of running the program without additional support and quit. The CB patrol seems to have been the only part of USC that had a really committed leadership base. The CB patrol was quite capable of surviving on its own and it slowly drifted away from the rest of USC.

The section of St. Ethelreda which lies west of Ashland and south of 87th Street, which contains the parish building complex, has remained a clean

and well maintained middle class community. Racial change did not introduce many long term problems in this area. Relatively few buildings have fallen into decline or have been foreclosed, and the city has responded rather quickly to fix things up. This comparative freedom from problems made it hard for the USC organizers to find strong issues around which to build a strong organization. One of the reasons that the USC leaders failed to take over the financial support of their organization was that they simply did not feel that they were in that much need of a community organization [Note 4].

The sections of the parish north of 87th Street, and especially, east of Ashland were more nearly in need of community organizing, but one of the legacies of the Lawlor organization was to set up a gap between the eastern and western sections that survived the racial transition of the western section. In addition, one of the realities of Catholic Charities organizing is that the organizing starts at the front door of the rectory and works outward from that point only as far as time and money permit. For USC, 87th Street was several blocks away, and crossing Ashland into the eastern half of the parish was like reaching out into another community. Even the USC - BCAC cooperation was an action promoted from the top down. The organizer felt that the effort was necessary for the development of USC as an organization, and he brought several BCAC people to serve on the USC board. The rest of the USC membership, however, remained hung up over the east-west division of the parish and the participation by the people from east of Ashland continued only as long as the organizer pushed the matter.

## NOTES:

1. Four different explanations were offered by various informants. The truth is probably best represented by some uncertain combination of them:
  - a. The parish pastor approached Catholic Charities about providing an organizer
  - b. Catholic Charities approached the pastor about sending him an organizer
  - c. The Catholic Charities organizer assigned to Christ The King pushed the idea as a means of establishing a buffer zone between his parish and the blacks.
  - d. Father Coughlin, a priest who worked at Catholic Charities, but who lived at Little Flower, promoted the idea. Little Flower got an organizer before St. Ethelreda did.
2. See the sections covering Father Lawlor's Associated Block Clubs and the West Englewood Community Organization for what happened at the northern end. In that section the racial transition was accompanied by violence and a great deal of tension.
3. This seems to have been a standard contractual arrangement between Catholic Charities and the local parishes. The Catholic Charities seed money period usually ran for two years. At St. Ethelreda it ran considerably longer.
4. I was told that several private foundations had refused to help fund USC because they considered the area to be too middle class.

## SECTION 10:

## SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY CONGRESS (SCC)

Some organizations start with a bang and seem to have nowhere to go but down. In retrospect, the SCC seems to have been such an organization. The decline was continuous, yet it could be broken into two distinct stages. The first stage derived from how, where, and when the SCC was founded. The second stage resulted from the somewhat ironic fact that, in its efforts to stave off further decline, the SCC managed to found a competitor organization operating in the same neighborhood. In the process of growing from small to large, the competitor forced the SCC into a greater state of decline than it would otherwise have experienced. The competitor is the Southwest Parish And Neighborhood Federation, popularly known as "The Federation" [Note 1]. Over the four years of its existence, The Federation has grown from a small committee to what may be the highest budget (\$200,000 per year) grass-roots community organization in the city. The rapid growth of The Federation has forced the SCC into a pattern of trying to find survival niches constructed almost exclusively out of whatever The Federation elects not to incorporate into itself.


Although the SCC officially came into existence at its first annual convention in March of 1969, the efforts to found some such organization in the area go back to at least 1965. The first stage in this effort seems to have occurred in about 1965 when a Mr. Vondrack, the editor and publisher of the Southwest News Herald, a neighborhood paper with offices at 63rd and Kedzie, called a meeting of area business and religious leaders [Note 2]. Mr. Vondrack presented his concern that changes were coming to the area, the

two most important of which were that blacks were about to move in from the east and that the local crime rate was increasing. He felt that a community organization was needed to help the people prepare for the changes. The meeting produced a lot of discussion and a general feeling that the idea was good, but nothing was done to implement it.

A few months later, Mr. Vondrack called another meeting of the clergy and business representatives who had expressed a willingness to support such an organization. The business representatives said that their companies could support a community organization if one were started, but that the impetus should come from community residents rather from their group, because most of them just worked in the community, they did not live there. This meeting also ended without any plans being made to go beyond the "good idea" talking stage.

Sometime later, Msgr. Hardiman, the pastor of St. Nicholas of Tolentine Catholic Church, located at 3700 W 62nd Street, received a call from Rev. Cox, the recently arrived minister of the nearby Marquette Park Presbyterian Church. Rev. Cox suggested that the community organization would never come to pass unless the Protestant and Catholic clergy did something to make it happen. Soon thereafter a clergy meeting was held at St. Nicholas Church to decide whether to form an organization. The clergy decided to start by hiring an organizer, and they established a committee to find one. The committee's first choice was Tom Gaudette, the director of the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA), but they finally settled on John Daley, an organizer trained by Gaudette who was working for the Northwest Community Organization (NCO) on the north side of Chicago.

When the organizer came, the clergy group rented an office at 63rd and



SOUTHWEST COMMUNITY CONGRESS

Kedzie and set up the United Southwest Community Organization (USCO) as a temporary vehicle for legitimating the organizing effort and for preparing for the first convention. USCO was funded with \$40,000 in contributions provided by the local churches. \$25,000 came from the five largest Catholic churches; \$5,000 came from several smaller Catholic churches; and \$6,000 came from the Protestant churches [Note 3]. Among the Catholic contributors, only Msgr. Hardiman was an real supporter of the organization. The other Catholic pastors were willing to give money when they were put on the spot, but they never participated in the organization. Many of the younger assistant pastors were active in the organization, but they did not have much influence in their churches. As a result their support did not go very far toward offsetting the lack of support from their senior pastors.

With the money and USCO as a base, John Daley lined up some workers and began canvassing the community seeking contacts, community needs, and some initial goal for the organization to work on. USCO, and later SCC, used a three-fold recruitment process to bring people into the organization [Note 4]:

1. Personal-secular: Daley and his organizers knocked on doors, sometimes randomly, sometimes working from leads given by people to whom they had already talked.
2. Personal-religious: The church pastors recruited people or suggested the names of people whom they thought might be interested.
3. Impersonal-secular and religious: Publicity about meetings on particular issues was distributed through local newspapers, church newsletters, and leaflets distributed in the community.

Finding a good first big issue proved to be not very easy. Much of the local concern was over little things that had no area-wide impact and, although an area-wide concern did exist over a number of related issues involving race (black-white), racial matters were felt to be bad issues for USCO

and SCC to promote. The western end of the area was far enough away from the ghetto that race was not all that important, and throughout the area, the prevailing attitude toward blacks and racial matters was negative. The churches were on record as favoring integration, and the founders of USCO wanted the organization to be open to grass-roots participation by people of all persuasions on racial issues. For USCO to have taken a premature stand on racial concerns would have cut the organization off from some significant proportion of its real or potential constituency.

USCO and SCC finally decided to take up the lack of a local city junior college campus as its initial major issue after the organizers discovered that the topic could pull in a lot of participants. It was of some importance to a lot of people and it was a safe issue. In the early days no one was really against it and it did not divide the community.

Many people regard the junior college as the SCC's greatest success. The Chicago City College had been holding evening classes at the local Bogan High School, but there was no plan to establish a full junior college campus on the southwest side of the city, although plans were underway to build new campuses in several other sections of the city. Once the SCC took up the issue, the city college system resisted the idea because there was a limited need for a campus there, because no site was available, and because there was no money available with which to build such a college. The SCC pursued the issue and found a site at 71 st. and Pulaski near the Ford City shopping center which the city college finally accepted. Once the site had been selected, the SCC started pushing for a temporary campus until the permanent campus could be built. Again the college demurred, citing the lack of funds. The SCC designed a temporary campus that could be built with the available

money and also participated in the design of the permanent campus. The temporary campus was opened in the early 1970's as the Bogan Junior College. The permanent campus was built during the late 1970's and renamed the Richard J. Daley College not long after the death of Mayor Daley. Once the permanent site had been selected, opposition arose from right-wing groups who didn't want the college because some of the students would be black. Although the opposition was rather vocal, it did not succeed in blocking the project.

The SCC got off to a good start. The first convention in 1969 was attended by over 500 delegates representing about 100 organizations, mostly church groups. The activities of USCO before the convention and of the SCC after the convention were well publicized in the neighborhood papers. The convention itself was covered by at least one metropolitan paper, the Chicago Tribune. At the convention, the SCC established a \$60,000 annual budget, which it later raised. It had a staff of organizers and it had a variety of activities on which to work. Nevertheless the SCC's path led downhill almost from the convention itself.

There appear to have been five interrelated reasons why the SCC went into this almost immediate and continuous decline. The first four reasons were explicitly provided by my informants, the fifth is an inference that I developed after I compared the experience of SCC with that of several other organizations that I studied.

1. Although the SCC tried to bring together all elements of the community, the official support that it received from the churches made it suspect from the start to the racial conservatives, to the segregationists, and to the political right wingers. In addition, more than a few of the liberal members were diehards who were more interested in seeing the organization

take the "right" stand than in preserving or developing SCC's image of being an organization that represented the whole community. Although the SCC staff and leaders tried to control things so as to avoid dividing the organization along liberal-conservative lines, the delegates continued to bring up things that kept the issue alive.

The point of no return came near the end of the second or third convention, after many of the delegates had left, when one of the liberal delegates introduced a resolution that the SCC work to bring racial integration to the community. The resolution was passed by just over half of the remaining delegates. The local papers, substantially ignoring everything else that had occurred at the convention, summarized the affair with a headline to the effect that "SCC moves to integrate area." The event polarized the organization and a lot of people quit. The leaders and staff had to engage in a lot of double talk trying to repair the damage that had been done. The affair was a big thing within the organization for about six months after which it gradually died down and most of the people came back to work on other issues. A strongly liberal image hung on the SCC thereafter, however, and this seriously limited the organization's ability to attract new members. The SCC never did do anything to integrate the community. Even the delegates who pushed the resolution were not interested in working on the issue; they just wanted the organization to make a public statement about integration.

2. The SCC assigned Msgr. Hardiman the task of raising the bulk of the SCC budget from the Catholic churches. Msgr. Hardiman went to each pastor one-on-one in the fall just after each parish had collected its parochial school fees when the churches had large financial surpluses. When put on the spot, the pastors were pretty good about producing the money and did so,

although in declining amounts, until Msgr. Hardiman was assigned to another parish outside the SCC area in 1972. The other Catholic pastors never supported the SCC and most of the Catholic participants came from Msgr. Hardiman's church. Most of the SCC supporters came from the Protestant churches, but the area was so heavily Catholic (about 80%, according to my informants) that the Protestants were too few in number to be able to support the SCC by themselves. When Msgr. Hardiman was transferred, no one was available to assume his role as principle fund-raiser, and the SCC lost its leverage and its connection with what had been the bulk of its financial base.

3. The third factor was internal to the SCC. According to my informants, the director was having an affair with the secretary, who was a married woman. All the church people knew about it, and the situation finally made it necessary for the director to resign. His replacement, an SCC organizer promoted from within, was not as capable, and this had a bad effect on the SCC.

4. The fourth factor was an accident which the SCC created. In the early 1970's the SCC, faced with declining income, started looking for alternative means of obtaining organizers. The SCC leaders knew that Catholic Charities was providing organizers in other neighborhoods and they wanted to get one too. After some demonstrations and some confrontations, Catholic Charities finally agreed to assign an organizer to the area.

In accordance with the standard Catholic Charities policy, however, the organizer was assigned to the Catholic churches in the area, not to the SCC itself. Since the pastors, apart from Hardiman, were not SCC supporters, they left the organizer to his own devices rather than directly assign him to a non-church organization, as was done by the churches in several

other neighborhoods. As a result, Jim Keck, the new organizer, felt that he was responsible to the churches, not to the SCC. He went to work, interviewed many community residents, looked over the SCC, and concluded that the SCC was so liberal that it would be a hinderance rather than a help to his organizing efforts. Keck then set up parish councils with which to work, and he gradually built the councils into the Federation, which soon became the stronger organization.

In 1973, the SCC found itself in the position of having one organizer and some officers who wanted to join the Federation. They organizer toward this end, and late in 1973 held a meeting at which they voted to disband the SCC. Other SCC members objected and called a second meeting at which the first vote was rescinded. The dissidents and their organizer left the SCC for the Federation, which left the SCC as a very small and entirely liberal shell of a community organization.

5. The fifth factor in the decline of the SCC was a matter of timing. The SCC was created to deal with racial change over a decade before its local neighborhood was actually threatened with integration. Later in this thesis, I will develop the proposition that organizations created for this purpose either get captured by liberals or acquire an image of liberalness and soon fall apart, if racial change does not hit the neighborhood soon after the organization is formed. The applicability of this proposition to the SCC experience requires a bit of explaining.

When the SCC was created, it staked out a rather large territory for itself, extending from Ashland (1600 w) on the east to Cicero (4800 w) on the west, and from 47th Street on the north to 75th Street on the south. This SCC area was approximately a rectangle, except that two corners were

missing. The northeast corner was part of the area serviced by the Back Of The Yards Council, and it was deemed inappropriate for the SCC to infringe on the area. The SCC area was bounded by a rather effective ecological barrier consisting of a wide industrial and railroad track strip along the southern and southwestern edges, and by Midway airport to the west. 47th Street, the northern boundary is a major commercial street, but it seems otherwise to have been a more arbitrary limit for SCC.

Drawing the eastern boundary at Ashland Avenue was a deliberate action by the early non-segregationist USCO-SCC leaders. Back in 1969, Ashland was the black-white racial boundary and the SCC founders figured that this line would not hold up very much longer. By picking Ashland as the boundary, the SCC founders expected that the organization would soon be addressing the integration issue, become an integrated organization, and serve as a positive force in the community once blacks crossed Ashland.

This, however is not what happened. While the plans were underway to establish the SCC, the area just west of Ashland was being organized by Father Lawlor, who built a strong and largely anti-black block club network in the area. The SCC never developed any following in the area and managed only to send some representatives to some of the ad hoc coalitions being organized around Little Flower Church. Despite these carefully drawn boundaries, the SCC remained an organization whose base never extended very far to the east or to the west of its center in the Chicago Lawn area around Marquette Park. The result was that the SCC was in actuality an organization whose real neighborhood was not threatened by racial change until over a decade after the organization had been started.

The vote to disband the SCC and the subsequent decision to rescind the

first vote were both the low point of the SCC's existence and the point of greatest tension between the SCC and the Federation. The tension declined, partly due to the passage of time and partly because the two organizations ceased to be competitors even though they continued to occupy the same turf. The Federation soon grew so large that the SCC became irrelevant to its activities. The SCC, in turn, became so small that it was more concerned with staying alive than in trying to challenge a Goliath on its own terms.

By 1974, the SCC was down to a budget of \$4,000 a year, solicited mainly from local businesses. The organization had a membership of about 14 discouraged people and no staff; the office was retained, but it was manned by volunteers [Note 5]. In 1975, however, the SCC secured a grant from the Wiebolt Foundation, which raised the budget to \$12,000 per year. With this additional income, the organization hired a member as activity coordinator (not as an organizer) and the leaders set about trying to maintain some minimal level of activity and visibility in the community.

From 1974 through 1976, the SCC developed involvement in two types of activities. On the one hand, the SCC set up some service type activities, whistlestop being one, in which interested members volunteered to go to community groups to present the SCC programs and promote the organization. This helped to maintain some old ties in the community, established some new ones, and provided some publicity for the organization. On the other hand, the SCC tried to maintain some involvement in significant local issues in ways that did not involve organizing people or require commitments beyond the capability of the SCC's very small membership base. Toward this end, the SCC joined the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) to participate in its issue coalitions. The decision to join MAHA was made with many

reservations. The SCC felt that it was too small to do very much on its own, but the only alternative to MAHA was the Citizens Action Program (CAP), and the Federation was affiliated with it, which led the SCC to view CAP in an even more negative terms than it did MAHA. The MAHA connection produced publicity for SCC, along with such things as trips to Springfield to testify at various hearings, and it produced some organizing assistance from MAHA.

In 1977, the SCC dropped the relationship with MAHA because it felt that it was not getting a big enough piece of the action, because it felt that MAHA was handling the issues in an excessively sloppy manner, and because the SCC was not satisfied with the quality of the organizing help that it was receiving from MAHA [Note 6]. In addition, the SCC was making plans to resume grass-roots community organizing within its own territory.

The decision to resume organizing activities early in 1977 was made for three reasons. First, the leaders and the coordinator wanted to do this. Second, they felt that the organization had sufficiently recovered from its low point that it could realistically undertake organizing on a limited basis. Third, the SCC was able to identify some target areas where it believed that its organizing efforts would not be overwhelmed by the vastly greater manpower and resources available to the other nearby community organizations.

By 1977, the SCC had come to a consensus as to the differences between itself and the Federation. Apart from the considerable difference in size, in budget, and in resources, the SCC was oriented directly toward a grass-roots base and it was bi-racial. Its boundaries extended into the black area east of Western and it always had had a few black participants, although the SCC had no reason to believe that these blacks were any more representative of their neighborhood than the liberal SCC whites were of theirs. In

contrast, the Federation was oriented toward working through the Catholic parishes and it had a focus on building a durable buffer zone at Western Avenue to separate the white and black communities [Note 7].

When the area between the railroad tracks at 2100 W and Western (the area is a thin residential strip known as "Bell-Oakley-Clairmont" after the three north-south streets that run through it) was threatened by racial invasion from the east, the Federation was working on a plan to tear down the entire area and built a low density middle-income high rise complex to be filled with liberal middle class whites who would not mind living across the tracks from the blacks. When the area started turning black, the Federation abandoned both the plan and the area and started making plans to build up and rehabilitate Western Avenue into a buffer zone.

The SCC felt that it could now enter the Bell-Oakley-Clairmont area, because the Federation no longer wanted it, and, in the fall of 1976, the SCC started organizing in the area [Note 8]. In the spring of 1977, the SCC also started organizing in the Gage Park area. Gage Park was the northeast corner that the SCC had previously left to the Back Of The Yards Council. The SCC decided that it was safe to enter that neighborhood because the Council had not done anything there for years and the Federation would not enter, because the pastor of the Catholic church in Gage Park kept his parish ties with the Council rather than with the Federation. Later in 1977, the SCC also started organizing in the Chicago Lawn neighborhood. This area was tied to the Federation through the Catholic parishes, but the area had a civic organization, the Council of Lawn Neighbors. The council, which had been one of the strongest units within the SCC umbrella in the early days, still retained some relationship with the SCC.

As of early 1978, these organizing activities had brought some new blood into the SCC and had enhanced its self-perception of being bi-racial, now that the Bell-Oakley-Clairmont section had become at least 90 percent black. The new participants, however, had not yet broken into the inner circle of SCC leaders and most of them were known only to the organizers who were working in the neighborhoods.

By early 1978, the SCC was holding its own and had recovered somewhat from its low point, but it faced an uncertain future. Once the Bell-Oakley-Clairmont section had gone mostly black, both the SCC (to the west) and the black Citizens Council For The Southwest Englewood Community (CCSC) (to the east) moved into the area. A year later, both organizations were drawing participants from the neighborhood, but neither organization seemed to be aware that the other was working there. This might not be very significant if the neighborhood were not so small. During 1977, the Catholic church in Gage Park was assigned a new pastor, who decided to drop the church ties to the Council, and joined the Federation early in 1978. This made the SCC apprehensive and less certain of its future, for it rather expected that the Federation would move in and effectively nullify all SCC activity in the area.

I was left with the impression that the SCC was holding its own because it has a small but durable core of experienced leaders who feel that their mission has validity, and because the SCC was able to maintain a minimal level of financial solvency. The SCC seems to be waiting for the day when racial integration will make its mission more palatable to the community, at which time organization can regain its rightful place in the social order.

## NOTES:

1. The Federation is also included in this study. See the next section.
2. At this point, the area was defined as Ashland (1600 w) to Cicero (4800 w) from 55th St. to 71 st. St. In attendance were representatives from Sears and many other businesses, realtors, all Catholic pastors, and many Protestant ministers, including some who lived just outside this area.
3. This distribution was typical of the big ecumenically based grass-roots community organizations. The original funding bases for OSC, ACO, and OBA were similarly distributed among the supporting churches. The reason that the Catholic churches provide most of the money is that most of the residents in these neighborhoods belong to the Catholic churches.
4. This process seems to be typical of large organizations started with big budgets and church support.
5. In effect, the SCC had been transformed from an umbrella organization, whose members were other organizations, to a small organization, whose members were individual people. The SCC survivors grew so dispirited over the fall of their organization that they began to invent issues and put out press releases on them. One such "issue" involved a proposed meeting with Senator Stevenson to discuss putting scattered site public housing on his Libertyville farm. Fortunately from the retrospective view of the SCC members, these press releases drew little response, and the practice was dropped when the Wiebolt grant came through and things started looking better for the organization.
6. This dissatisfaction was a mutual thing. MAHA wanted to build local mass-based grass-roots organizations and expansion back to this state was not one of SCC's goals at the time. The SCC had years of experience, but few bodies to contribute to MAHA. MAHA felt that it had alternative sources for the experience, but needed the bodies. MAHA did not think that it was getting all that much from the SCC and in return, it did not give all that much to the SCC. When the SCC pulled out of MAHA, neither organization seems to have felt hurt by the split.
7. In this section, of course, things are described from the SCC perspective. The Federation would have described them differently.
8. That the area was changing from white to black was also important to the SCC. It gave the organization a chance to emphasize its bi-racial nature.

## SECTION 11:

SOUTHWEST PARISH AND NEIGHBORHOOD FEDERATION  
(THE FEDERATION)

The story of the Federation starts with the Southwest Community Congress (SCC), which was established in 1969 as a broadly based church and business supported grass-roots community organization on the Southwest Side of Chicago. The SCC got off to a big start, but soon ran into opposition from right wing political groups and acquired a lot of liberal participants who were more interested in taking the "right" stand than in consensus politics. The combination of these two forces drove the moderate to conservative majority out of the SCC. As a result, the liberal element gained control of the organization which then went into a continuous and rapid decline. The decline was reflected both in membership and in financial income.


During the spring of 1971, when the SCC learned that Catholic Charities was supplying organizers to other Chicago area community organizations, they then asked for one for the SCC. Catholic Charities refused, saying that they gave organizers to Catholic parishes, not to community organizations. Catholic Charities also said that the SCC was not a high priority area, because its base was two or three miles from the racial boundary, and that their real concern was with areas that were actually facing change. The SCC continued to pester Catholic Charities until it finally gave in and agreed to assign an organizer to St. Nicholas and St. Gall parishes (these two parishes, located in the center of the SCC area, were the real geographical base of the organization insofar as it had one). This decision satisfied the SCC because the organization's leaders figured that they now had the

organizer that they wanted.


Catholic Charities interviewed and hired Jim Keck, a man with previous organizing experience in the civil rights movement, and sent him out to the two parishes. Keck asked the two church's pastors to set up a twelve member (six from each parish) review committee to oversee his work, and the pastors agreed. The committee was filled with moderates who were heavies in the parish organizations, but few of them were active members of the SCC.

Keck spent his first six months interviewing hundreds of people trying to get a clear sense of what the community and its people were like. He reported back to the committee, which became known as the St. Gall - St. Nicholas Committee, on a monthly basis. At the end of the six months, he had concluded that the SCC was too dominated by non-representative community liberals and had acquired such a poor reputation, as a result of the attacks from the right wing, that it could not become a broadly based community organization. As a result he continued to work with his committee and he selected real estate practices as his first organizing issue.

The real estate issue was relatively salient for a number of reasons. In about 1970, the SCC and several other similar organizations [Note 2] had succeeded in getting a state law passed which prohibited realtors from soliciting (door to door, by mail, or by phone, etc.) as potential customers any homeowners who had signed forms saying that they did not want to be solilcited. The community organizations saw the law as a device for controlling the panic peddling and block busting tactics of unscrupulous realtors. Early in 1971, the SCC, with the help of the St. Gall and St. Nicholas pastors and Holy Name Societies, had conducted an effective drive for anti-solicitation signatures in the two parishes, but the law was being attacked by the



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real estate industry and the parish leaders had come to feel that they had been suckered into the anti-solicitation signature drive.

Finally, early in 1972, a realtor solicited a parishoner who had signed one of the anti-solicitation forms and both Keck and the SCC became aware of the event. Keck and the SCC, however, decided to handle the problem in very different ways. Keck came to feel that the SCC rather hated him and his committee with the result that relations between the two groups grew continually worse over the next several years.

As Keck saw it, the SCC approach involved encouraging the individual who had been solicited to file a complaint with the Illinois Commission On Human Relations and the Illinois Attorney General to prressure them into taking action against the realtor. The state wanted to go slow because it was not sure that the law would be upheld in the courts. When nothing happened, the SCC attacked the state for lack of action.

In contrast, Keck went to the realtor to find out why the person had been solicited. The realtor said that she had received no list of anti-solicitation signers from the state. Keck then went to the state and arranged a meeting between the Human Relations Commission and his St.Gall - St. Nicholas committee. At this meeting, the commission said that it did not have enough money to properly distribute the list and so it only went after realtors who were known to be troublesome and realtors located in transitional neighborhoods. This realtor fit neither category. Because the state wanted to move slowly (the law had not been tested in the courts) a strategy was worked out whereby local people would be trained to serve the non-solicitation lists on the local realtors.

At a subsequent community meeting to which about one hundred people were

selectively invited, the strategy was approved and the people volunteered to serve as two member teams to distribute the lists. The teams went out, and, for their efforts, were screamed at and subjected to other verbal abuse from the realtors. This changed the people's opinions of realtors as businessmen to that of realtors as creeps. The activity also brought in the participation of the St. Turibius Holy Name Society (St. Turibius is another Catholic parish within the SCC boundaries) which had gathered about 2000 signatures from their parish. This changed the committee into a three parish group of about 150 members and shortly thereafter it changed its name from the St. Gall - St. Nicholas Committee to the "Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation." Over a period of five or six weeks during the fall of 1972, some 75 two member teams served the lists on about 250 realtors who were located within an area ranging from Halsted to Naragansett and from 35th Street to 79th Street. After the lists had been served, the Federation went into a holding pattern and did little until a realtor at 85th and Pulaski, who had not been served with a list, solicited several people who had signed the forms.

One of the people who had been solicited was an SCC leader, another was a signer from St. Turibius Parish. The Federation response was to send letters to 6000 families in the three parishes thanking them for signing the forms and supplying each family with a complaint form to be returned to the Federation, rather than the state, in the event that the family was solicited. By running all the complaints through the Federation, it was both better able to keep track of what was happening and it was able to serve as the agent for handling local complaints.

In addition, a committee of twelve Federation leaders, the St. Turibius priest, and Jim Keck went to see the realtor and ask what was going on. They

also went to serve the list and have the realtor sign an agreement not to solicit homeowners in the Federation area. The realtor became angry, refused to cooperate, and said that he was going to court to get the law thrown out.

In turn, this made the Federation angry; its members had gone to the realtor with the intention of being polite, and they had expected to be treated in kind. A meeting was then called for all eighty men from St. Turibius parish who had secured the non-solicitation forms, and, at the meeting, they decided to picket the realtor and otherwise generate bad publicity for him. This soon led to the realtor's decision to sign the non-solicitation agreement at one of the Federation's public meetings.

About four months later, the Federation decided to go after the largest realtor on the Southwest Side for soliciting one of the non-solicitation form signers. This company also initially refused to go along with the Federation's demands, and, during early 1973, a four month campaign finally led to his capitulation. This campaign produced the active participation of some 500 Federation members who were engaged in such activities as picketing the realtor, jamming the realtor's incoming phone lines, typing notices, distributing leaflets at Sunday church services and in mail boxes around the community, in leading meetings, and so forth. The capitulation of this realtor ended the official resistance of the Chicago Real Estate Board to signing non-solicitation agreements, and shortly thereafter about fifty other realtors more or less voluntarily agreed to sign non-solicitation agreements with the Federation.

This campaign brought in the St. Rita parish Community Life Committee. It held an anti-solicitation drive which produced about 2000 signatures. The inclusion of St. Rita parish in the Federation served to extend the

Federation boundaries eastward towards the black West Englewood area. In addition to enabling the Federation to expand into these nearby parishes, the non-solicitation campaign was also the activity that "put the Federation on the map" as it produced city-wide recognition from other community organizations for the work that the Federation was doing. During all this time the Federation was also involved in many limited and local issues in the particulara neighborhoods that fell within the Federation's expanding boundaries. The the overall growth of the organization, however, was based on its major activity, the real estate practices issue, rather than on a gradual building upward from the numerous and smaller local issues.

At about the same time the Federation went through a major reorganization. This resulted in the Federation electing its own officers and selecting its own leaders from the pool of people who had risen to prominence as a result of their prior participation in the organization. The new structure replaced the previous system in which the key leaders were delegates selected by the church pastors based on their presumed interest in the organization or on their prominence in parish activities.

During the summer of 1973, the Marquette Bank began advertising home improvement loans, but people in the east end of St. Rita parish (the Bell-Oakley-Clairmont area), which was still all white but was just across the railroad tracks from the black West Englewood area, discovered that they were all being rejected when then applied for the loans. The Federation got hold of six well documented complaints and went to the bank to see what was going on. The Federation was not sure how to handle this issue, which became known as mortgage redlining, and it joined forces with the Citizens Action Program (CAP), a city-wide coalition, which was developing a strategy for

working on the issue. During July of 1973, the Federation won a disclosure agreement from the bank [Note 3].

The Federation, having reached the conclusion that other lending institutions were also probably redlining, invited representatives from twenty-four nearby institutions to a meeting to discuss the situation. Representatives from three institutions showed up and denied that they practiced redlining, but they also refused to provide the disclosure information that the Federation had requested.

CAP and the local organizations that were involved in the redlining issue went to the banks and to the the various state and federal regulatory agencies and legislators trying to secure disclosure rules that would allow the organizations to evaluate and counteract the redlining practices. They secured a limited form of disclosure that was not helpful because it did not show the relationship between the geographical distributions of savings and of loans and because it provided information for the industry as a whole, which prevented the organizations from evaluating the performance of particular institutions.

During the spring of 1974, because they were not getting very far at the federal level, CAP and the Federation developed their "greenlining" campaign. Greenlining was a technique whereby local organizations tried to apply pressure to nearby lending institutions by threatening to have their members withdraw their savings if the lending institutions did not cooperate with the community organizations. In most parts of the city, greenlining was not a very effective technique, because the organizations could not secure the cooperation of enough savers to gain any real leverage on the lending institutions. On the Southwest Side, however, the Federation secured

withdrawal pledge cards from between 12,000 and 15,000 savers, whose accounts in the various institutions added up to about 60 million dollars. The Federation set deadlines by which time the institutions were expected to be cooperating with the Federation unless they wanted all these savings to be transferred elsewhere.

Just before the deadline set for the Talman Federal Savings And Loan Association, the biggest mortgage lending institution on the Southwest Side, agreed to provide the disclosure information that the Federation had been requesting. After Talman gave in, the seven other large local institutions quickly followed suit. Two smaller institutions refused to cooperate and were actually greenlined, with \$2,000,000 in savings being withdrawn from one institution, and \$1,000,000 being withdrawn from the other, before they too agreed to cooperate [Note 4].

During 1974, three additional parishes joined the Federation, thereby expanding the Federation territory to include all the area west of West Englewood that the SCC had claimed as its territory some five years earlier. With this expansion, the Federation reached a relatively stable geographical shape, which provided some rather effective "natural" boundaries between the Federation and the rest of the city. As had previously been the case with the SCC, these boundaries included a major industrial belt to the south, Midway Airport to the west, the 47th Street commercial strip to the north, and the black West Englewood neighborhood to the east. The major difference between the Federation and the SCC was that the SCC had intentionally extended its eastern boundary over to Ashland to be on the edge of the black ghetto. A half-decade later, the ghetto had moved westward, so that the Federation had no choice about being bounded to the east by that

ghetto.

Since 1974, the only geographical changes in the Federation seem to have been the apparent abandonment, or at least a greatly reduced interest in, the Bell-Oakley-Clairmont area east of Western Ave after it turned black during 1976 and 1977, and the acquisition of St. Clare parish in the Gage Park neighborhood in 1978 [Note 5].

Late in 1974, with the disclosure battle largely won, the Federation branched out in two other directions. The first, and lesser, direction involved participating in the CAP campaign against FHA mortgage bankers. This attack had a two pronged thrust. In black neighborhoods, the primary thrust was toward preventing fast foreclosures by the FHA mortgage bankers. In white areas, the primary thrust was toward forcing greater selectivity in the granting of FHA mortgages.

For the Federation, the desire to limit the intrusion of FHA mortgages into its area [Note 6] was closely related to the need to make conventional mortgage money available, as it had been in the past when the black-white line had been three miles further east. This need gave rise to the second, and more important, new thrust for the Federation.

Once the Federation secured the disclosure information that it wanted from the local lending institutions, it analyzed the information and concluded that all the institutions were practicing mortgage redlining. The Federation then developed a reinvestment campaign in which it sought to get a signed agreement from each lending institution to assign a certain amount of money for mortgages in the Federation area. This was based upon both the total amount of savings deposits, belonging to local residents, in the institution, and upon the overall demand for conventional mortgage money in the

area. The two institutions that had been greenlined signed the reinvestment agreements without too much difficulty, but the larger ones refused to sign. In response to this refusal, the Federation undertook a five month campaign to get an agreement from Talman Federal Savings and Loan Association. The campaign against Talman culminated in a summer 1975 march on the institution by 2,000 local residents. After that march, Talman and the other major local institutions began putting more conventional mortgage money into the area.

By mid-1976, however, the Federation was coming to realize that curbing solicitation, redlining, and the FHA abuses would not, by themselves, be sufficient to be sure that the people would be able to retain their stable neighborhood. The problem, in economic terms, was seen as that of correcting the disinvestment and decline that had already occurred, especially at the eastern end near Western Avenue. The correction, as the Federation viewed it, would have to involve neighborhood redevelopment of both residential and commercial areas.

This realization came at a very convenient time for the Federation and was partly the result of some major changes within the organization. By 1975, Jim Keck, the founding director, had concluded that it was about time for him to move on to another job and he wanted to find and train his successor before leaving. His first choice as successor was hired in 1974 and then fired in 1975, after he tried to split the two parishes at the eastern end into a separate organization. At the time, the director had only limited power to hire or fire the other staff members, so after the troublesome organizer was finally dismissed, the board decided to increase the director's authority over the other staff members.

In the summer of 1975, Jim Keck hired another possible replacement for

himself. This time the replacement worked out and became the director when Keck resigned in June of 1976. Phil Mix, the new director, had a somewhat different agenda for the Federation than Keck had had. In particular, he was more interested in fund raising and in negotiating with and working cooperatively with the major political, commercial, and financial institutions which affected the Federation neighborhoods. The shifts in orientation, in a way, were functional for the organization. The Federation had grown to the point that it needed to reliably raise a budget of over \$200,000 a year from diverse, and primarily local, sources, and it needed to be able to routinely negotiate and work with the important institutions from a position of relative strength. The reorientation of the Federation went beyond just the change at the top. When Jim Keck left, his associate director also resigned, and by 1977 Phil Mix had replaced the entire staff with people of his own choosing.

The timing of this shift in orientation was also convenient for yet another reason. The Federation had always been an organization that placed a heavy emphasis on working on some big issue that was of real importance to the entire community as well as working on the smaller issues that were of interest only to particular parishes or to particular groups within the organization. During 1974 and 1975, the Federation had put so much time and effort into the mortgage redlining issue that, after the issue peaked and started to decline during the second half of 1975, the Federation found itself in something of an empty or depleted state. The new emphasis on redevelopment, as a means of enhancing neighborhood stability and for correcting for past disinvestment, provided a focus around which the Federation could regroup and rebuild itself.

Toward this end, the Federation began working with financial institutions, businesses, and city agencies (where this was possible) to develop plans and to find the financial resources with which to implement them. In 1977, the Federation organized the Southwest Economic Development Commission to work on specific east end residential and commercial projects and, over the past year, a number of projects have reached various stages of development. One major project involving the Federation, the city, and some major financial institutions, involves the redevelopment of the deteriorating 63rd Street commercial strip from Western Avenue to Central Park. Some \$600,000 in redevelopment money has been secured and more is being sought. In addition, a planning firm has been hired to set up specific plans for the particular new construction and rehabilitation projects which are parts of the overall redevelopment plans.

In the residential area, two general plans are in the works for the east end. To fix up deteriorating buildings, the Federation is trying to set up a rehabilitation program with the city, but this has not yet gotten off the ground. The Federation is also working on a plan to insure property values on the east end. The plan, which is similar to that established by the suburb of Oak Park, would be financed by a special tax district in the Federation area [Note 7]. This plan was approved by the Federation board during March of 1978.

Over the years from 1972 to 1978, the Federation has grown from a Catholic Charities paid organizer working with a small committee appointed by two parish pastors to a large autonomous and self-supporting organization with a territory covering eight square miles, a budget of over \$200,000 a year, and a multi-person staff [Note 8]. The Federation has grown from a

small group to an organization with sufficient influence to have a significant voice in the destiny of its community. In the process, the Federation has changed from being a protest organization which held antagonistic relationships with the major political and business institutions in its area to an organization that tries to work cooperatively with these same institutions. In this process of rapid development, however, the Federation has sought not to lose track of its grass-roots beginnings. It still employs community organizers who work with the residents on local problems and it is a member of the Illinois Public Action Council (IPAC), a state-wide Alinsky-style coalition which is sort of a successor to CAP.

This growth has made the Federation perhaps the largest and most effective (as of 1978) grass-roots community organization in the city. Despite this, however, the Federation seems to face an uncertain future. Its primary goal has been neighborhood stability, but this seems to be a code word for maintaining a community that white people will want to live in. If the Federation is not anti-black in the way that Father Lawlor's organization was, its activities still seem designed to maintain Western Avenue as a boundary beyond which the black ghetto must not be permitted to pass. If the ghetto does spill across Western Avenue, and no other city street has ever served as a permanent barrier, the Federation may be ill prepared to deal with smooth transitions or with integration as primary goals within its community [Note 9].

#### NOTES:

1. See the previous section for a report on the SCC.

2. Two other organizations that were involved in this issue in 1970 were the Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) and the Northwest Community Organization (NCO). Other organizations were also involved, but I can not specify exactly which they were.
3. Mortgage disclosure was sought by the community organizations because the lending institutions were suspected of using the money deposited to city savers to finance mortgages out in the suburbs.
4. Not long after the Federation won its local disclosure victories, state and federal legislation was passed which made it easier for other community groups to obtain this type of information.
5. Until 1977, both the SCC and the Federation stayed out of Gage Park because the area had been part of the Back Of The Yards Council. The SCC started organizing there in 1977 because it was an unmet need and an opportunity to help rebuild itself. In 1977, the local Catholic church, St. Clare, was assigned a new pastor who decided to switch the parish from the Council to the Federation, effective early in 1978. As of my last field work (mi-1978) the Federation seemed more confident of its future in Gage Park than did the SCC.
6. One Federation informant described the impact of FHA mortgages as follows. By 1976,
  - 75% of all mortgages between Bell and Western were FHA
  - 40% of all mortgages between Bell and Kedzie were FHA
  - 10% of all mortgages between Kedzie and Central Park were FHA
  - about 0% of all mortgages between Central Park and Cicero were FHA
7. Property selling prices often go down in a white neighborhood adjacent to a black area because, though blacks have not yet moved in, whites are reluctant to buy so close to the blacks. The plan is designed to make the area more attractive to white buyers by insuring them against loss if they buy in the area. If they decide to sell, and can not get at least their purchase price out of the house within some specified period of time, the tax district or its agent will buy the house or make up the difference between the purchase cost and the selling price. The insurance is for actual dollar cost, it is not adjusted for inflation, but the house can be reappraised for value if it is significantly re-modeled or renovated.
8. About \$16,000 of this \$200,000 comes directly from the Catholic churches within the Federation area. The rest comes from Federation fund-raising activities, primarily within this area. The Federation employs a trained fund-raiser to bring in this money and the organization has been more successful in raising money than has been any other organization that I studied.
9. It is in anticipation of the need for an organization which is prepared to address the issues of integration and smooth transitions that the SCC sees its change to regain its position as an organization of impor-

tance in the area that it and the Federation share.

## SECTION 12:

## HOMEOWNERS FEDERATION (HF)

There is a tendency to judge the plausibility of grass roots community organizations using criteria that emphasize local roots, homogeneous turf, and internal factors. Using these criteria, the HF must be regarded as an improbable and delicate organization. McCarthy and Zald (1973) have pointed out the increasing importance that recent developments in professionalization of staff organizers and the expanding philanthropic organizations have had in shaping the development of social movement organizations in contemporary American society. When looked at from the McCarthy and Zald perspective, the HF becomes a more plausible organization.

In the previous sections covering other Southwest Side organizations, I have partially described how continual white to black racial change has enabled the black South Side of Chicago to expand to the south and to the west across the city. By 1973, this expansion had produced black neighborhoods south of 95 th. Street east of Ashland Avenue, while west of Ashland, St. Ethelreda Catholic parish in the North Beverly neighborhood had also turned black. The large Dan Ryan Forest Preserve, along Western Avenue and the Penn-Central Railroad tracks, which run along the western, southwestern, and southern edges of St. Ethelreda parish, served as barriers which prevented the black neighborhood from immediately engulfing the white neighborhoods which lay to the west and to the south of the tracks.

The Catholic Chicago Archdiocese has divided its many parishes into smaller units, called clusters, built around blocks of adjacent parishes. One such cluster, the southwest cluster, includes all the parishes from

79th Street to 119th Street from approximately Ashland Avenue on the east to Pulaski Road on the west. By 1973 two of these parishes, Little Flower and St. Ethelreda, lay in the black area north and east of the Penn-Central tracks. The other parishes in the cluster were all located in various white communities on the other side of the tracks.

By 1973, a few blacks had moved into the Beverly area which is located immediately to the south of St. Ethelreda parish, but the tracks, the forest preserve and the comparatively high cost of Beverly area housing were all serving to limit the expansion of the black neighborhood in that direction. In the same year, Christ the King parish, the parish most immediately threatened with the possibility of a black invasion, held a retreat to discuss the threat of black turnover in its neighborhood. Out of this retreat came a resolution that this church would be a witness to the southwest side that racial integration and a strong Catholic parish could successfully coexist. The church had decided that the domino effect of racial turnover would not overrun its neighborhood.

The church's next step was to find a way of implementing this resolution. Father Meyers, the church pastor, knew that Catholic Charities had some sort of a program, so he asked Father Coughlin of Catholic Charities to come to a parish meeting to discuss the means of implementing the resolution. In response to a question, Father Coughlin said that Catholic Charities had a seminar on communities and political power which was available to pastors or to the churches [Note 1].

At the suggestion of Father Meyers, a four to six week seminar for the southwest cluster pastors was scheduled to be held at Little Flower Church. Father Meyers especially wanted the pastors of the parishes west of Western



to attend. He said that, despite the decision of his parish, the parish would not assume any responsibility for preventing racial change from causing the decline of their parishes. This seems to have represented some sort of a challenge to the pastors, because most of them showed up for the seminar.

Out of the seminar came a decision by four or five of the pastors to seek help in raising the consciousness level of their parishes. The pastors asked Catholic Charities what it could do to help. Catholic Charities described its program of providing parishes with community organizers, if the parishes would pay half the organizers' salaries. The pastors accepted this arrangement and were assigned two organizers. The organizers' assignment was to work in all the cluster parishes, excluding the two (St. Ethelreda and Little Flower) which had already turned black.

The southwest cluster pastors and their churches did not have equal levels of concern over integration or equal levels of commitment to the idea of community organizing. The parishes at the western end of the cluster were less immediately threatened by racial change, and they, and their pastors, were not especially interested in community organizing. The pastors of the two parishes in the Beverly area (Christ the King and St. Barnabas) had an interest in community organizing, but were reluctant to provide much support for this new organizing effort. The Beverly area already had a community organization, the Beverly Area Planning Association (BAPA), to which these parishes provided strong support (financial and otherwise). As Father Meyers put it, Beverly had a strong community organization and did not need another one. The people west of Western Avenue did need a strong organization, so that was where the organizers should be working [Note 2].

Since the organizers found the people and pastors in St. John Fisher and St. Cajetan parishes to be especially responsive, the nucleus of an organization was formed in this area. Although the organizers also worked in the rest of the cluster, and although the organization's boundaries were drawn to include all the white parishes in the cluster, these two parishes have always provided the strongest support, from both the pastors and the people, for the organization, and the office has remained in the St. John Fisher convent basement.

Although the area has the common characteristics of facing a general threat of racial integration and of being part a single Catholic church parish cluster, the area has the uncommon characteristic of being spread across municipal boundaries in a rather unusual way. The center of the area, which represents perhaps two-fifths of the total, is the suburb of Evergreen Park. The edges of the area to the north, to the east, and to the south are various neighborhoods in the city of Chicago. Along the northern end, the parishes do not cut across municipal boundaries and the fringe that is in Chicago is effectively separated from the city neighborhoods to the north by the railroad and industrial belt which extends from 79th Street to 74th Street. The Chicago neighborhood of Beverly, which is the eastern fringe, has begun experiencing racial integration but also has the most attractive and expensive housing in the area. So far (as of 1979) this has prevented integration from turning into ghettoization or urban decline. Along the southern fringe, many of the parishes cut across the municipal boundaries, and the the Chicago neighborhoods included in the fringe extend south beyond the 119th Street southern boundary of both the Catholic church cluster and of the organization that it started [Note 3].

The sundry geographical units that make up the the white section of the cluster and the HF organization also differ distinctly in both the socio-economic status and the racial attitudes of their residents. The Beverly and Morgan Park sections in the east are predominantly upper class or upper middle class, and the section, which by 1978 was about seven percent black, has come to accept integration. The Chicago neighborhoods of Wrightwood and Ashburn, along the northern edge and Mount Greenwood at the southwest corner are primarily blue collar and lower middle class in nature. Evergreen Park, the suburb in the middle, is a mix of blue collar and white collar and it is generally sort of middle-middle class. Unlike the section to the east, which was experienced some integration without apparent ill effect, the sections west of Western Avenue are still completely white and all are at least moderately fearful of racial integration. When, or if, these areas do become integrated, they will experience integration in a different way than has the Beverly area. With their far more modest and less expensive stocks of housing, the sections west of Western Avenue will be attractive to a rather different group of blacks than thus far has been able to move into the more expensive Beverly area.

Not long after they started working in the area, the two original organizers were joined by a third organizer, who was also supplied by Catholic Charities. The three organizers split the area south of 87th Street into three sections (Evergreen Park, Mount Greenwood, and Beverly-Morgan Park) and each organizer assumed the responsibility for working in one of these sections. Very little organizing work was done north of 87th Street because the people there did not much favor the organizing effort.

The organizers began by working with existing groups where this was

possible and by creating new groups where they were not able to tie in to any existing organizations. The existing groups were both civic organizations (e.g., the Mount Greenwood Civic Association - founded before 1970, the Wrightwood Improvement Association - founded in 1943, and the Vanderpoel Improvement Association - founded in the 1950's) and parish organizations (e.g., the St. John Fisher Seniors - founded in the 1960's, and the Christ the King Community Relations Committee - founded in about 1970). Most of the new groups that the organizers started were parish groups (e.g., the St. Cagetan Community Relations Committee - founded in 1974), although, in the suburb of Evergreen Park, the people decided to form one civic association (the Evergreen Park Study and Action Association - founded in 1974) rather than having separate parish organizations. This mix of parish and civic organizations has produced an organizational infrastructure which possesses overlapping geographical boundaries. So far, this has caused no problems.

At first the organizers worked with the groups individually, but after they had identified a good leadership core of about thirty people, they began bringing them together to work on some common problems and to form a common area-wide organization.

When the organization, the Homeowners' Federation, was formally created in September of 1974, it was built on a basis of individual memberships. The first convention in the fall of 1975 brought in some new leaders as well as some new groups and some new issues. At this convention, the HF voted to change its membership system to include both individual and organizational memberships. HF has not changed much since that convention, although it continued to grow in size until 1977 when the membership stabelized.

In its early years, the HF was involved mainly in confrontation type issues, including the limiting of FHA and realtor abuses in the sale of housing and in seeking disclosure legislation to help control mortgage redlining by banks and savings and loan associations. The latter activity brought the HF into the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) coalition for a few years. In the HF, however, because of its substantially middle class membership base, direct confrontation has never gone over very well. The result is that, as compared to many other grass roots organizations, confrontation in HF has always has strong overtones of collaboration and cooperation. By 1977, although HF was retaining the confrontation approach over the FHA and redlining issues, the organization was also becoming involved in such non-confrontation activities as commercial strip development plans and securing zoning changes to influence a proposed senior citizen housing development.

As a result of its peculiar municipal construction, the HF has tried to avoid issues that focus only on the City of Chicago or the suburb of Evergreen Park as target organizations. The major exception to this rule was a successful campaign to get Evergreen Park to adopt an ordinance, similar to that adopted by the city, to prohibit the displaying of "FOR SALE" signs on residential property. This has meant that HF has done much less than most other organizations in working on strictly local issues in the separate sections of its area. The policy to promote only area wide issues was made in an attempt to avoid geographical fractionalization of the organization.

The tendencies toward fractionalization in the HF, however, have come more nearly along social class lines than along geographical lines. As one

organizer informant put it, people in the higher social class areas are harder to organize than are the people of lesser social status; they tend to favor different ways of working on the issues, and they have responded differently to the underlying racial issues. In particular, the people of higher social status usually hold more complex views toward the problems and the possible solutions; they are less likely to view the establishment as a "they," and they are less likely to regard direct confrontation as plausible tactic for solving urban problems.

The organizational versus individual membership question has continued to be a problem for the HF, because many organizational representatives feel that their groups should have more votes than do the individual members. There has been some real basis to the contentions of the organizational representatives. When it comes to fund-raising and recruiting new members or bringing people out to meetings, their organizations are more effective than any individual members. The problem has never become serious, because it only involves voting at the conventions, and only two conventions have been held so far (1975 and 1977). Between the conventions, decision-making is in the hands of the board and the committees, and on them, people are recognized as serving as individuals. The tension over this issue has continued, however, and my informants felt that sooner or later the organization would have to decide between individual and organizational memberships.

The development of any organization is often influenced by the unintended consequences of the participants' activities. Two such events, involving the HF organizers, have had a significant impact on the development of this organization. The original HF organizers started out as a team of equals working in different sections of the area. One original organizer was

removed by Catholic Charities because he was not accomplishing much of anything. Another original organizer introduced an issue in the Mount Greenwood section without first consulting the Mount Greenwood Civic Association. This caused a small local furor, which made the Catholic parish pastors in the area nervous. As a result, they asked Catholic Charities to remove the organizer, and this was done. The two organizers were replaced by one new organizer, and the other original organizer, because he had been on the scene longer, became designated as lead organizer. This ended the arrangement of co-equal staff, and ever since, the senior organizer has held the title of lead organizer and has been the informal supervisor of all other staff members [Note 4]. The second incident arose in about 1974, when the remaining original organizer, after becoming the lead organizer, got into a personality conflict with the director of BAPA. Since that time, even though both organizations have retained a strong presence in the area, they have not worked together. As a result, the two Beverly neighborhood Catholic churches have been supporting two independent and relatively similar local community organizations.

The Homeowners' Federation was started with funds provided by the Catholic parishes and by Catholic Charities. Even by 1977, these two sources were providing \$17,000 of the \$23,000 organizational budget, and one church was providing free office space along with the necessary furnishings and supplies. At the same time, the organizing network and the network of organizers partially established and supported by the Catholic church in Chicago have provided the trained staff needed to create the organization and keep it going. In addition, the local Catholic churches have continued to be the primary vehicle through which the organizers have been able to gain access to

the organization's potential constituency. In this way the professionalization of organizing and the availability of money from an institution with an interest in philanthropy (the Catholic church) have combined to produce a viable organization despite the non-homogeneous and improbable setting in which it was established.

NOTES:

1. The seminars were given by the Mid-America Institute, an Alinsky-style organizer training center located in Chicago, not by Catholic Charities itself.
2. What follows is a paraphrase, not an exact quote.
3. Actually a small sliver of this southern section is also part of another suburb, in this case Marionette Park. Marionette Park is a small suburb with a small population, most of which lives south of the HF boundary. The HF organizers have never tried to organize in the section belonging to Marionette Park.
4. Ever since two of the three original organizers were removed, the HF has had two regular organizers whose efforts have been supplemented from time to time by trainees sent out by the National Information and Training Center (NTIC), the training center established by the Cincotta-Trapp group after they moved up from the city-wide to the national level in community organizing.

## SECTION 13:

## THE MIDWAY ORGANIZATION (TMO)

TMO was, or is, an organization with its base in the Chicago neighborhoods of Garfield Ridge and Clearing, which are located just west of Midway Airport. The organization was established with boundaries which extended from the Stevenson Expressway on the north to 65th Street on the south, and from Pulaski Road (4000 w.) on the east to Archer Road in the western end of the suburb of Summit on the west. TMO never did organize in much of this area. It drew very few participants from the sections directly south of Midway Airport and east of Cicero Avenue (4800 w.). It drew some participants from the suburb of Summit and from the small sections of Hurst and the Le Claire Courts public housing project, both of which located along the center of its northern boundary. Because TMO accepted participants from the all black housing project, it acquired an integrationist label which made it an anathema to the people in the Archer Heights and Vittum Park neighborhoods located near the project. TMO shared the area east of Cicero Avenue with the Southwest Community Congress (SCC) and later with the Southwest Parish and Neighborhood Federation (the Federation). Neither TMO nor the SCC were able to attract participants from this overlapping area. The Federation did a lot better, during its anti-solicitation campaign, as was evident from the role that St. Turibius parishoners played in that issue. (See the sections on the SCC and the Federation as well as the appendix to this section.)


TMO got its start in 1970 as the result of the successful organizing of the Campaign Against Pollution (CAP - later renamed the Citizens Action Prog-

ram) in 1969, and TMO quickly became a rather strong organization. It remained fairly strong until 1974 or 1975, after which it declined in effectiveness until it became completely inactive in 1977. As of 1979, the organization still had its charter and a bank account although, no attempts have been made to revive the organization since CAP tried and failed during 1976 and 1977.

CAP was started in the Garfield Ridge - Clearing area as an Alinsky/Industrial Areas Foundation directed, but locally supported, effort to deal with air pollution, especially from the nearby Commonwealth Edison and Chicago Sanitary District facilities. Not long after CAP was created, it went from being a local organization to being a city-wide coalition which sought support from local organizations throughout the metropolitan area.

A number of local CAP leaders and other community activists, impressed with the success that CAP had had with pollution problems, decided to form a strictly local organization to work on other neighborhood problems. They established a separate organization, rather than simply a local chapter of CAP, because many residents regarded CAP as an excessively radical organization. At the same time, however, they benefitted from an informal relationship with CAP. Because many TMO leaders were also leaders in CAP, TMO received the services of some organizers that the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) had provided CAP.

The leaders and IAF organizers spent about a year building TMO before they held the first convention in October of 1971. Because TMO was building from the base that CAP had left behind, TMO was a viable organization during almost the entire pre-convention period. Before the convention, TMO had no money apart from a small amount donated by some participants. It got by



THE MIDWAY ORGANIZATION

with the IAF organizers and with space and office materials provided by various local churches. After the convention, which was attended by about 800 people, TMO started raising money directly by soliciting from local businesses and by engaging in other fund raising activities such as ad books and holding dances. With this money, which added up to about \$2,500 per year for the first two years, TMO hired its own organizers and rented an office.

During the organizing period, TMO latched on to one really good issue as well as some lesser ones. The area west of Midway Airport had been built up fairly recently. Curbs and sidewalks were lacking in many places and the local public high school (Kennedy) had been grossly overcrowded since its opening day in 1962. The primary TMO issue became that of getting another high school built. The Board of Education finally gave in and a second high school (Madame Curie) was built in 1974. This issue brought a lot of people into TMO and so provided the organization with a membership base and with a leadership pool of people who had not been connected with CAP. Most of the lesser issues involved obtaining the absent urban amenities of curbs, sidewalks, parks and related things.

In its early days, TMO had the support of several local clergymen, although they and their churches never provided the strong financial support than many other organizations, in other areas of the city, received from their churches (for example, OBA, SCC, OSC, HF, and the Federation, all of which were included in this study). TMO also received a great deal of publicity from the local press. TMO was established as an umbrella organization which accepted both individual and organizational memberships. The area had developed a tradition of supporting effective local civic organizations, but most of them had developed a negative orientation toward TMO as the result of its

press publicity and its activist orientation. The TMO members set out to any and all such organizations in sufficient numbers to gain control and bring the civic organizations into the TMO fold. Many other paper organizations (or many that were very nearly in this category) were established [Note 1], and TMO soon had a wide base both in individual and in organizational memberships.

Not long after TMO was started, it was confronted with the race issue because its formal boundaries in the white Southwest Side of Chicago had been based on some fairly natural boundaries which inadvertently included the all black Le Claire Courts public housing project. After considerable discussion, TMO decided to accept memberships from blacks living in the project. This decision cost TMO its credibility in the white areas around the project and it never drew many new members from the areas. In addition, TMO never acquired the financial resources to extend its organizing efforts into the area east of Cicero Avenue, with the result that TMO never was able to expand outside its original base in the area west of the airport.

Although the initial TMO leaders had come from CAP, the first president had never participated in CAP (though his wife had). The president, Jim Heffernan, soon became the dominant force in TMO, and, with its expanding base of non-CAP people, TMO and CAP gradually drifted apart. By the third convention (1973) TMO became involved in a tremendous battle over the succession to the presidency, which absorbed most of the organization's energy. The race was between two candidates, one backed by Jim Heffernan, and the other backed by Father Dubi, a local Catholic priest and a leader in CAP. When the Heffernan candidate won, many CAP members gradually dropped out of

TMO.

Following this convention, TMO went through a fairly thorough transition at the top. The new president lacked the time and the high commitment of his predecessor and he also favored a style of making decisions himself. As a result, he did not work very hard to maintain the committee structure and the decentralized decision making structure that the first president had worked to maintain. At the same time, TMO underwent a complete staff turnover and the organization began to have trouble coming up with good organizing issues [Note 2]. As a result of all this, TMO brought in few new members and the older ones became increasingly tired of working so hard for the organization. TMO continued as a fairly effective organization for about two years after the 1973 convention, albeit with progressively weaker leadership, fewer good issues, less effective staff, and declining participation. In 1975, instead of holding its fifth convention, TMO merely held an annual meeting, which was attended by about 50 people. At some point during 1975, TMO's income finally declined to the point that the organization could no longer afford to hire any organizers. Thereafter the office was staffed on a part-time basis by members who volunteered their time. In 1976, the annual meeting was dropped. That same year, the office was closed and moved to the president's house. In 1977 the last fundraiser, a dance, was held and later that year, TMO stopped holding meetings because almost nobody was showing up any more.

Although TMO went through a process of monotonic decline between 1973 and 1977, the dinner dance and ad book fundraising activities continued to be successful with the result that gradually the TMO activities evolved from protest actions to primarily social events. The people in TMO generally had

little in common apart from their participation in TMO, and this seems to have helped the organization become something of a social club as it ceased being an effective action organization. The participants remembered the "good old days," and were reluctant to relegate them totally to the past. Due to their lack of other social bonding networks, the only way for them to hold on to the past was for them to hold on to TMO itself this enabled the organization to outlast the reason for its existence.

The new president, who was elected at the 1975 annual meeting, was one of the CAP members who has remained with TMO from the beginning. Under her leadership, TMO became an official affiliate of CAP. This step was undertaken for two reasons: first, there was very little going on within TMO and the connection with CAP provided TMO with a channel for taking up involvement in various real issues; second, it meant that CAP would be providing TMO with the services of an organizer and this was of no small importance, now that TMO could no longer afford to hire one.

The first CAP organizer started working with TMO during the winter of 1975-1976. The TMO leaders soon developed a strong relationship with the organizer, and they felt that he was making a very good start toward revitalizing the organization. The leadership at CAP, however, regarded the organizer as an ineffective agent who was doing little more than holding the hands of the people at TMO, and they fired him during the spring of 1976.

This action really soured the TMO people on CAP, and this affected their willingness to work with the replacement organizer that CAP sent them. Even so, the TMO leaders seem to have personally liked the replacement although they regarded him as being too inexperienced to do much of anything. This view was also held, in retrospect, by the organizer who was one of my inform-

ants.

CAP assigned the new organizer the task of getting a grass roots organization going in the Garfield Ridge - Clearing area, either through rebuilding TMO (it had some people, a name, and some money) or by starting a new organization through working with the churches in the area, especially the Catholic churches.

After a few months, the organizer realized that the TMO members (by then about 14 in number) really were not interested in becoming leaders of a revitalized TMO although they had been reluctant to directly tell him so. He then turned to the churches, only to find that they were willing but not really committed. The key to the whole thing was to have been the pastor at St. Daniel Catholic church, but he was not really interested in community organizing.

By October of 1976, the organizer had come to realize that he was not going to be able to put together an organization, partly because of his inexperience and partly because there was not anything much for CAP to build on. At this point CAP abruptly collapsed and released all its staff [Note 3]. TMO lost its last donated organizer, and, several months later, the two or three remaining leaders looked at each other at one of their regularly scheduled executive committee meetings and sadly decided that enough was enough. Although TMO still has its charter and its bank account, the money left over from its fund-raisers - even its last dinner-dance during the spring of 1977 brought out over 200 paying participants - no one has since tried to do anything in the name of TMO, nor has any other organization appeared to which TMO might turn over its remaining money.

## AN APPENDIX - SOME SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ABOUT TMO

## A. Police Spies

Several of the organizations that were included in this study were infiltrated by police spies at one point or another. The OBA in Austin was damaged, in the early 1970's, when its police infiltrator was elected president and used his position to adversely affect the organization. After my field work was completed in 1978, the SACCC, which had been a major part of OBA during the early 1970's, was still sensitive enough to the spying issue that it changed its system of holding open leadership-planning meetings to a closed delegate-only system to keep out certain people who were regarded as being spies for the Democratic party machine and for other hostile organizations.

TMO also had its police spy during the early 1970's. His distinguishing characteristic was that he was always available to participate in the organizations activities, regardless of when then were being held. His explanation was that he was committed to TMO and he had a job which allowed him this latitude to participate in the organization. Such availability, however, is not a sure indicator of spying. The TMO president had an equivalent commitment and job latitude. He worked nights on a job that mainly required him to respond to emergencies when they arose, and he too had lots of time to give to TMO. Unlike the president, whose commitment and availabililty quickly took him to the top in TMO, the spy never rose up in the leadership structure and he never became a problem to the organization. This failure was unusual, because availability and willingness to participate seem to be the major determinants of upward mobility in Alinsky-style community organizations.

Like the OBA spy, the TMO spy was discovered afterwards when the presence of police spying in community organizations was exposed by a Chicago newspaper.

#### B. The Relationship Between TMO and SCC.

TMO had few linkages to other similar organizations except through its participation in CAP. During the early years, TMO and SCC leaders often attended each others meetings. Why these exchanges got started is not clear, although it is clear that no close relationships ever existed between the organizations or between any of their leaders. Both organizations claimed the area between Pulaski Road and Cicero Avenue, but neither organization was able to organize there, so the overlap did not produce any competition between the two organizations. The two organizations had entirely different foci of interest, the SCC was heavily concerned with the racial change going on far to the east, and TMO was mainly concerned with pollution and school overcrowding in the area west of Midway Airport.

Apart from having little in common, TMO and SCC also grew out of different schools within the Alinsky tradition. SCC came from the Gaudette school, while TMO came from the Chambers-IAF tradition.

The casual relationship with the SCC did produce one tangible benefit for TMO. At the time, the SCC, which had been started a few years before TMO, was in trouble with the IRS for non-payment of taxes. The SCC was at the point where its principle activity was raising money to get the IRS off its back. The problem hastened the SCC's decline as an organization. After observing this experience, the TMO leadership vowed to never get into as similar situation - and it never did.

### C. Neighborhood Changes And The Decline Of TMO.

I have described the decline of TMO in terms that emphasize factors that were internal to the organization (less effective leadership, few good issues after the early years, etc.) but certain changes in the Garfield Ridge - Clearing neighborhoods where TMO had its base helped dry up the supply of new blood for TMO and would have likely caused the decline of the organization even if nothing else had.

When TMO was started, its base neighborhoods had a tradition of weak Democratic party politics and strong nonpartisan (or cooperative bipartisan) civic league activity. During the 1970's, the substantial expansion of the black neighborhoods elsewhere in the city produced a significant influx of white Democratic Party workers who wanted to get away from the blacks but had to remain in the city. This influx changed the character of the neighborhood. It doubled the property values within a very short time and it probably hastened the street and sewer improvement programs. It definitely made the area a Democratic party stronghold, emasculated the independent civic league tradition (although the TMO co-opting of them may have helped also), and it severely limited the potential supply of new recruits for TMO.

At the same time, a change in the St. Daniel's rectory affected the future of TMO because so many area residents were Catholic. When CAP and TMO were started, Father Dubi was an assistant pastor in the parish. His activism and support of CAP and TMO were accepted by the pastor, and this encouragement from the rectory helped bring people into the two organizations. Father Dubi was transferred out of the area in 1974 and, in 1976, when CAP was trying to revive or replace TMO there was nobody in the St. Daniel's rectory who wanted to promote community organizing. As a result, the CAP plan, which

depended on such support, did not have much of a chance.

NOTES:

1. This is a device that many organizations seem to have used to inflate their base and improve their position as a bargaining agent for the community on issues involving various outside antagonists.
2. Other issues, such as the Crosstown Expressway were never resolved. They just dragged on from year to year and thereby lost their effectiveness as vehicles for maintaining the organization.
3. After CAP evolved from local organization in the Garfield Ridge - Clearing area, it also changed from a community based group to an issue organization which was supported by funding secured by paid solicitors who raised money to going door to door all over the metropolitan area. During October 1976, the CAP solicitors went on strike demanding a larger share of their take. Deprived of its income, and lacking any other base of financial support, CAP folded almost immediately.

The CAP organizers who were working on the South Side of Chicago had not been able to build up a base that could sustain their activities and they went elsewhere looking for work. The two CAP organizers, who were working on the north side had both better luck and more experience. They were able to shift from the CAP payroll and become employees of the organization that they had been building. This organization, TON, has survived to 1979, but it was not included in this study because it is located outside the neighborhoods that I studied.

## SECTION 14:

## GREATER ROSELAND ORGANIZATION (GRO)


Roseland is an area on the far south side of Chicago that is centered around a major shopping strip which runs along State Street from about 103rd Street to about 110th Street [Note 1]. At its least inclusive level of definition, Roseland refers to the shopping strip itself. This definition arose after the residential areas around the the shopping strip changed from white to black a few years ago [Note 2]. To the previous white residents, Roseland referred to both the shopping strip and to the residential area just west and northwest of the strip [Note 3]. The neighborhoods to the east and to the north of what the former white residents called Roseland have similar names, such as North Roseland, Rosemoor, Rose Grove, and Roseland Heights. At some point, and to some people, Roseland has referred to an area that is slightly larger than the shopping strip and the similarly named residential neighborhoods that surround it [Note 4]. This larger area is known as Greater Roseland. To the people in GRO, Roseland, or at least Greater Roseland, refers to a much larger section of land. According to this definition, Roseland runs from the Calumet Expressway on the east to the I-57 Interstate highway on the west and from 95th Street on the north to the city limits on the south [Note 5]. This largest area includes many neighborhoods that have not otherwise been identified as part of Roseland, and it includes some large industrial areas in which nobody lives. This largest definition of Roseland has a lot to do with the factors that led to the creation of GRO and to the locations of the limited access expressways that separate the GRO version of Roseland from the rest of the city, but

it has relatively little to do with people's identification of the neighborhoods (or even the extended neighborhoods) in which they live. The result has been that GRO became an organization based only in the residential neighborhoods which surround the shopping strip rather than an organization which represented the people throughout the vast area that it claims for itself.

Three informants, each of whom seems to have been in a position to know what he was talking about, gave somewhat different explanations of how GRO got started. Two of the explanations have a lot in common; the third has much less. All three informants provided substantially the same description of the community environment in which GRO was created, and, after the point at which GRO was fairly well established, all three informants provided descriptions which support each other in a rather clear cut manner. My description of GRO reflects the state of my information. A description of Greater Roseland at the time of the founding will precede the three separate descriptions of how the organization was created. The three descriptions of the founding, in turn, will be followed by a single description of how GRO developed thereafter. The birth of a social organization may reflect the coalescence of a number of relatively independent streams of activity. It is far more likely that the the different explanations provided by my informants supplement each other than it is likely that they contradict each other.

#### A. THE SETTING

By the late 1960's, Greater Roseland had become separated from the rest of the city by some fairly well defined, man made boundaries consisting



GREATER ROSELAND ORGANIZATION

of the I-57 Interstate, the Dan Ryan Expressway extension to the Calumet Expressway, and the Calumet Expressway itself. This put the northern boundary of Greater Roseland at about 95th Street, and by the mid 1960's the expanding black South Side of Chicago was approaching 95th Street.

The Roseland area had a business supported community organization known as the Roseland Area Planning Association (RAPA). Many whites in the area were opposed to integration and RAPA took a similar stand. When the threat of integration became acute, RAPA, using money provided by local businesses, started buying houses to prevent them from being sold to blacks. The basic arrangement was that RAPA would buy any house that a white buyer had not been able to sell after three months of trying. RAPA would then hold the house until a suitable (i.e., white) buyer could be found. Soon, however, the number of houses on the market far exceeded RAPA's financial resources, the housing program collapsed, and blacks began moving in at a rapid rate.

Although RAPA had had a history of being a generally beneficial organization, the failure of its program for holding off integration cost RAPA its credibility as a community organization; thereafter it began fading away. At the same time, RAPA's position on integration made it suspect to the incoming blacks and to the whites who recognized the inevitability of racial integration. Some of these people began looking for some alternative organizational vehicle with which to deal with integration and with related problems in the Roseland community. The Greater Roseland Organization was the end product of this search for an alternative to RAPA.

#### B. THE ORIGIN OF GRO, THE FIRST EXPLANATION

As racial integration became a reality in the north end of Roseland, and as some white businesses began moving out, some of the major industries

in the area, including the Pullman Bank, Borg Warner, and Sherwin Williams saw the need for an effective community organization. Through the efforts of these companies, a small group of community leaders [Note 6] was called to a dinner meeting at Mendel High School (the Catholic high school in the Roseland area). Other local business leaders, who did not attend, said that they would support the group if it could form an organization.

The decision of this group was to form an umbrella type community organization more or less equivalent to RAPA, but open to people of all races and religions. Because they wanted to avoid the bad image that had developed around RAPA, they adopted the name "Greater Roseland Organization."

The direction in which GRO would develop was left up to the community, which in practice left it up to the leadership of the three participating neighborhood community groups (listed in note 6). GRO adopted a formal membership/dues system which set membership fees at \$50-\$100 for businesses, \$10 for individuals, and \$50 for each civic association. This made GRO a modified umbrella group, because membership could be either through participation in a member group or directly through an individual membership.

GRO got its start as a rather conventional civic organization. Its goals included: (1) working for effective integration; (2) working to maintain the business community; and (3) establishing relationships among "well thinking" people of all races. The early activities of the GRO included health fairs, concerts, and a recycling program that helped raise money for the organization.

#### C. THE ORIGIN OF GRO, THE SECOND EXPLANATION

In 1967 or 1968, the Roseland Clergy Association, under the influence

of its leaders, Father Bracken and Reverend Wallin [Note 7], held a series of meetings to discuss community concerns about what was happening to Roseland now that racial integration was being thrust upon the community. Most of the clergy were antipathetic to RAPA, which they regarded as a white protectionist organization. They felt that the focus should be directed toward keeping up a good neighborhood regardless of whether it was white or black, and not simply upon keeping it white. After several meetings, the clergy decided to form a new organization (GRO) to promote integration rather than resegregation, and to deal with other problems, of which improving the community educational facilities to relieve overcrowding at Fenger public high school was probably the most important.

Although the clergy association acted as a group to create GRO, the action was primarily the result of the individual efforts of Father Bracken, Reverend Wallin and a few other people (including some lay people), rather than that of the clergy association as a whole [Note 8].

GRO started as a volunteer organization which, for a time, had an office which was staffed by volunteers. In its early days the organization never raised enough money to hire any staff members. GRO had a small but faithful leadership pool which kept it going, and a larger transitory membership base of people and organizations who floated in and out of GRO as their special interest issues rose or declined in salience. In the early days, GRO promoted open housing, better street lighting, better police protection, an open admissions policy (i.e., not racially restrictive) at the Roseland Community Hospital, health fairs, and working to secure passage of a city ordinance to prohibit the displaying of "For Sale" signs on residential property. The thrust of the GRO leadership was toward low pressure education and the moti-

vation of people. They wrote letters to the papers to promote open housing; they opposed block busting but they avoided naming any particular realtors; and they were strongly opposed to the Alinsky style of confrontation directed toward specific offenders.

#### D. THE ORIGIN OF GRO, THE THIRD EXPLANATION

By 1968, blacks were moving into Roseland as far south as 102nd Street. This happened in two different ways: (1) some new housing developments were being erected on some vacant land in the northeast section of Greater Roseland and blacks were moving into this new housing; (2) black families with school age children were replacing older white families with adult children in the existing housing. The result of all this was to place a tremendous burden on the the public school facilities, especially at Fenger high school.

Some local clergymen held some public meetings over the situation. The basic idea behind the meetings was to push RAPA to take some action on the school situation. At the meetings, however, the attending residents voiced concern over two problems, one of which was the school problem and the other of which was realtor harassment of local residents. After several meetings, RAPA decided to reject both issues and to stick with its plan of trying to keep the blacks out of the area.

At this point, a decision was made to form a new organization (GRO). As the new organization worked on the problems in Roseland, it evolved into two distinct camps. One camp, comprising the school overcrowding people, formed a small committee to approach the Board of Education on behalf of the rest of the community. Its approach was to work quietly and to be non-controversial. The other camp involved the real estate people who favored the confrontation approach, and who became rather controversial as the result

of some activities that they stirred up.

By early in 1970, the school people gained control of GRO and more or less squelched the activities of the smaller real estate group which then dropped out of the organization [Note 9]. From then on, the focus of GRO was on small group negotiations, and circulating petitions became a favored activity.

#### E. HOW GRO ACQUIRED ITS BOUNDARIES AND ITS LARGE TERRITORY

Two of the informants provided somewhat different explanations of how GRO acquired these boundaries; the third offered no explanation. One informant said that the boundaries were selected as the logical and natural result of the locations of the city limits and of the three expressways that separated Roseland from the rest of the city.

The other explanation was both different and more involved. Although the GRO area does follow some well defined and "natural" boundaries, back in 1968 the area also defined the boundaries of the the two local public high schools (Fenger and Harlan). In the early days, when education was the major issue, the GRO membership was well dispersed across the area, because people were everywhere equally affected by the high school overcrowding. Only after this issue was resolved and the organization turned to the housing problems did the GRO membership become focused in the residential areas immediately adjacent to the Roseland shopping strip. The selective focus arose because the housing problems where were so acute and because the organization did not have enough staff members to extend their activities outside this small area. As the black problem area expanded, and, after 1976 as the GRO staff was expanded, GRO also

expanded its focal area. Even so, in recent years, GRO has not come close to covering more than a small proportion of the area that it claims as its own.

#### F. THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF GRO

In its early days, GRO combined its low key issue activities with a number of "good neighborhood" activities. Some of these activities have been mentioned in the preceeding explanations of how the organization got its start. The biggest of these neighborhood activities seems to have been the annual health fairs, held in Mendel High School, at which various health agencies and other groups had booths.

In either 1970 or 1971, the GRO president decided to run for alderman, but he lost. Because he did not resign his position as GRO president, GRO acquired the reputation of being a partisan political organization and this cost GRO much of its credibility as a community organization. At about the same time as this was happening, GRO decided to hire the first staff member to be assigned the task of setting up a youth recreation program. Three months later the person left because GRO had not been able to raise enough money to pay him. The GRO leaders, who had observed the local ward Democratic organization raise lots of money through a concert, decided that GRO too could raise money in that way. GRO sponsored the concerts, but because it could not sell enough tickets, it lost about \$6,000 on the venture. Several members put up \$5,000 of their personal money to pay off the debt and keep GRO alive.

At that point, fund raising to pay back the personal loans became a major GRO activity and by late in 1971 about \$4,000 had been raised. The members were surprised at their success and decided to continue raising money for the organization. With the additional money, they hired a member, Tom

Tom Taylor, as a part-time staff person. Tom Taylor, who continued as the GRO director until early in 1977, was a monk who lived in the monastery at Mendel High School. In those years the GRO fundraising activities did not bring in very much money, but, as Tom Taylor put it, GRO could afford to hire him on a half-time basis because he did not cost all that much.

With the help of its new staff member, GRO returned to the business of working on community problems. For the first couple of years, the primary issues were school overcrowding concerning which the organization was pushing the Board of Education to build some new schools in the area, and the delivery of city services, including rodent control, street cleaning, and garbage pickup.

In 1974, GRO got back into the housing issue, this time because FHA foreclosed and abandoned houses were beginning to appear in significant numbers in the black sections of Roseland, and because HUD, which had announced a payback program to cover the cost of repairs of FHA housing that had been sold with clear defects, was being uncooperative about providing people with application forms before the time limit for applying for payback refunds was due to expire [Note 10].

As part of its involvement in the housing issue, GRO joined the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (MAHA) housing coalition, and soon became one of the stronger organizations in MAHA. By 1975 or 1976, as the result of pressure from the community organizations, HUD began cracking down on the fast foreclosing mortgage bankers with the result that the problem became less serious thereafter. Central Roseland, however, was left with a legacy of some 700 federally owned homes that had been foreclosed and abandoned before the crackdown occurred. According to my informants, both those from GRO and

those from other organizations, Roseland had more of these abandoned homes than did any other section of the city. Getting these houses fixed up and back on the market soon became the major issue for GRO to work on.

GRO decided to go after the city of Chicago which, it decided, had the money and the necessary expertise to get the houses rehabilitated [Note 11]. After a series of meetings held with the alderman, and then with the mayor, the city announced a large scale rehabilitation demonstration project that would fix up Roseland block by block, after which it would be exported to the rest of the city, if it proved to be successful. The program was to be overseen by a committee representing four relevant interest groups, the city, the bankers, the construction industry, and local residents (i.e., GRO). The timetable which the city had announced was followed for about four months at which time Julian Levy was named chairman of the committee [Note 12]. The committee ended up containing no GRO representatives. After this, things ground to a halt, with the result that by 1978 only six Roseland houses had been rehabilitated.

By early 1976, the people in GRO were getting tired of getting nowhere fighting the city, and they decided to go after HUD which owned the houses. Through their participation with other organizations in MAHA, GRO got John Waner, the local HUD official, to sign an agreement to rehabilitate the houses within a reasonable period of time. According to the agreement, HUD was to rehabilitate the houses in blocks of ten per neighborhood at a time. The problem was that HUD never let out any contracts to do the work, claiming that they could not find anyone who was willing to rehabilitate the houses. The MAHA coalition got on the phone, found fifty interested contractors, and arranged a meeting between HUD and the contractors. HUD ob-

jected to doing business with any of them and said that it would require bonds from any contractor that it accepted. The coalition then went to the Small Business Administration, which agreed to put up the bonds, and HUD finally let out some contracts.

In Roseland, the contracts went to two contractors. One contractor got two houses and finished them on time. The other contractor got eight houses and went out of business before starting on any of them. Finally, in 1978, GRO went back to HUD, which found another contractor to do two of the eight.

By this time, HUD had developed a policy of selling its abandoned houses in lot quantities to speculators who made cosmetic repairs and they resold the houses to people who often had to abandon them again because they could not afford both the mortgages and the repairs needed to properly fix up the places. GRO objected to this program, and HUD finally agreed to rehabilitate 200 houses, of which 100 would be in Roseland, before selling them. By April of 1978, however, HUD had done nothing to implement this agreement.

In 1977, GRO decided to abandon its pressure tactics against HUD because the people were getting tired of going after HUD again and again with no results, so they stopped coming out to the meetings about HUD. As a result, GRO started looking for a new angle for the neighborhood's abandoned house problem.

What GRO came up with was a modified homestead plan in which HUD would sell the homes as-is, at auctions, to prospective owner-occupants (this would keep the speculators out) and HUD would also provide the financing to cover both the sale and the rehabilitation of the buildings. HUD resisted the idea, and in February of 1978, GRO held a mock auction, at which many of the houses were "bought" by area residents. Finally, in March of 1978, HUD

agreed to hold an auction in the near future, under terms similar to those demanded by GRO. The outcome of this agreement was in doubt when I finished my field work.

From 1972, when GRO hired Tom Taylor as a staff worker, through 1975, GRO operated on a budget of about \$4000 per year. In 1974, with the help of the Roseland area Catholic churches, GRO acquired the services of one Catholic Charities organizer as a second staff member. In 1976, GRO successfully increased its budget to \$10,000 and this was raised to \$25,000 in 1977. With this extra money, Tom Taylor was hired as full time staff director in 1976 and, as an extension of its participation in MAHA (and at the suggestion of the director of MAHA), signed a contract with MAHA under which MAHA would provide GRO with three full time organizers for a flat fee of \$200 per month. In 1977 this agreement was extended, but at a fee of \$400 per month because, by then, GRO had more money.

Back in 1972 or 1973, when GRO resumed its involvement in community problems, with the new focus on block level community organizing, it directed its efforts toward the sections of Roseland that had the most problems and complaints. In practice, this meant that GRO was focusing its efforts on the black north and central sections of Roseland. Over the years, as the black section of Roseland expanded, and as the resources available to GRO increased, GRO has been able to expand its activities to include the newer black sections as well as the original black areas. The GRO emphasis, however, has continued to be on block level meetings rather than on forming block clubs per se, because the block clubs usually ended up having social and formal structural consequences that took them away from the issues with which GRO was concerned [Note 13].

Since 1974, GRO has become increasingly involved in Alinsky-style (confrontation with clearly defined targets) organizing. This has happened for two reasons: first, the issues in which GRO has become involved in recent years (especially housing) seem to have required confrontation rather than low key negotiating to get anything done; second, GRO's increasing involvement in MAHA, both as a means of gaining leverage on the big housing issue and as a source for securing organizers, has tracked GRO into activity networks that emphasize confrontation and has provided GRO with organizers who are trained to find antagonists and to promote confrontation as the style of action in working on community concerns.

GRO has continued the dual, individual or organizational, membership system with which it started. As of 1977, GRO had about 1500 members, including several strong block clubs and three neighborhood civic associations (the Maple Park Homeowners, the Roseland Heights Community Association, and the West Pullman Blazers). The first two of these civic associations predate GRO and joined at the very start. The third group is an established organization that joined GRO in 1976.

After 1974, as the result of the continued migration of blacks into Roseland and the expanded staff made possible through the larger GRO budgets, and the relationship with MAHA, GRO acquired a big influx of new members who were being oriented toward the confrontation method of doing things. By 1976, the new activist group had captured most of the elected positions in GRO and also controlled most of its committees. The newer members have tended to regard the older members as excessively conservative and pro-establishment, and this has produced no small amount of tension within the organization.

Tom Taylor, who was hired prior to the transition, survived the change

because he was flexible and moderate enough to be acceptable to both groups. Early in 1978, however, he announced that he would resign as staff director in the summer of 1978. He made the announcement early so to give GRO time to find a successor before he left. He felt that, at the increased salary that GRO could now pay, the organization should have no trouble finding a number of qualified candidates and he started setting up a search committee to recruit his replacement.

In March of 1978, however, Tom Fox, the director of MAHA, came to a GRO board meeting and persuaded the majority of the board that there was no such pool of qualified candidates available for the staff director position. He then persuaded the board that the only realistic alternative open to GRO was to hire him as the new director. The GRO board, by majority vote, decided to fire Tom Taylor and hire Tom Fox immediately [Note 14].

The older and more conservative members of GRO went along with the confrontation approach on housing and other issues because the problems were acute, but they still felt that confrontation was a tactic which should not be used because it was no longer effective. Although the activists control the issue committees, the more conservative members still raise most of the GRO budget as they have ever since they got started in 1971. The older members feel that confrontation is likely to be counterproductive for GRO because it will either alienate the members whose contacts produce the budget that keeps the organization going or it will make targets of the contacts themselves thereby cutting off the money supply at its source.

If the problem for the activists is how to get the establishment to straighten up the mess that it has made in Roseland, the question for the older members is whether the expansion and activism of GRO will become the

cause of its downfall.

NOTES:

1. The shopping strip extends farther north and south of these limits, but a rapidly declining level of development.
2. An informant put it this way, when the black youths from the area say that they are going to Roseland, they mean that they are going to the shopping strip.
3. It is approximately this area that Hunter (1974) identified as Roseland. The extension only west and north of the shopping strip is interesting. From at least 95th Street to 125th Street, State Street runs at the edge of a significant geological ridge. The land west of State Street is at the same level as is the shopping strip. However, immediately east of the State Street, the land drops down rapidly in less than one block distance. The residential areas east of State Street have names that are similar to Roseland, but the vertical drop off seems to have kept these neighborhoods from becoming part of Roseland.
4. It is this area that Burgess described as Roseland back in the 1920's. See Hunter (1974) for details.
5. See the map that accompanies this section.
6. This group included the presidents of a number of smaller community organizations (Roseland Heights, North Roseland Association, Maple Park Association, and perhaps others) as well as various business and civic leaders (including the executive directors of the Roseland Chamber of Commerce and of RAPA, the presidents of two banks (Pullman and Union National), Msgr. Bracken (a local Catholic pastor and the area's urban vicar), Rev. Wallin (a Lutheran pastor and head of the local clergy association), another Lutheran pastor, an Episcopal priest, the editor of the local newspaper (the Calumet Index), the president of the Monarch Laundry (a local business)), and other influential people.
7. Father Bracken was the pastor of Holy Rosary Church, and, as urban vicar, was informally in charge of the other Catholic clergy in the area. Rev. Wallin was pastor of Elim Lutheran Church and one of the key leaders of the Protestant clergy.
8. As a result, I was told, Father Bracken and Rev. Wallin can properly be regarded as the founders of GRO.

9. The dropping out of the real estate people was not due solely to the pressure from the school group. A major thrust of the real estate group had been to secure legislation to curb the practices of realtors. This legislation had been passed and the real estate group was slowly fading from the scene when the school people gained control of GRO.
10. See Appendix Three for descriptions of these issues.
11. Some other neighborhood organizations decided to undertake direct rehabilitation, using funds provided by the government. The South Austin Community Council Coalition and the South Austin Realty Association in the South Austin are perhaps the best local example of this approach. The leadership and staff at GRO felt that they lacked the experience to run a rehabilitation program themselves and they regarded the problem in Roseland as too massive for any limited scale rehabilitation program that they might develop.
12. The committee was called the Mayor's Office of Home Rehabilitation.
13. Block clubs like to engage in social and block booster activities, such as holding parties or dances, raising money for outdoor Christmas decorations, holding raffles to show that they can raise more money than the next block club, and they often devote a lot of time to setting unrealistic and unenforceable moral or behavioral standards for the block. Examples of these rules could include stating that children must not play in the fronts of the houses, that no cars are to be repaired or washed in front of the houses, and that teenagers must not congregate in front of the houses nor adults sit in chairs outside the fronts of their houses. Action oriented community organizations feel that this sort of stuff takes the people away from constructive work on their community problems. As they do block level organizing, they try to keep the people away from such activities.
14. Tom Fox became director of MAHA during the summer of 1977, after his predecessor resigned to move to another city. According to informants from several organizations, the elevation of Fox was the result of a power struggle within MAHA. The leaders of many organizations regarded Fox as an excessively abrasive person who would not accept things being other than his way. The result of his promotion was a decline in the number of community organizations that would participate in MAHA. In mid-1977 there were some 20 organizations involved in MAHA, but a year later there were only three or four, of which GRO and SACCC in South Austin were the two strongest. The task of MAHA, since late 1977 has been to build itself back up again. What MAHA has going for itself is its tie-in with National Peoples Action, the Cincotta-Trapp national level Alinsky coalition, and its position as the distributor of Catholic Charities organizers throughout the city.

I should add, however, that most of my information on these events came from people who were on the losing side of the MAHA power struggle and who were not supporters of Tom Fox. As far as I could determine, the

information that I received was substantially accurate although it was provided from a perspective which had a built in bias against Tom Fox.

## SECTION 15:

COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION  
OF CALUMET PARK (CIA)

Calumet Park is an irregularly shaped suburb located immediately south of Chicago. Calumet Park is bounded on the north by the Chicago neighborhood of Victory Heights and on the east by the the Colonial Village neighborhood of Chicago. By 1972, when the southward expanding black section of Chicago had reached these two neighborhoods, they began undergoing the same racial integration and resegregation processes that had engulfed much of the rest of Chicago's South Side.

Late in 1971, a group of six or seven Calumet Park residents [Note 1] were discussing this situation. It seemed to them that Calumet Park would soon be next, that the realtors with their methods of solicitation, harassment, panic peddling and racial steering were at the root of the resegregation process. What differentiated this group from the many other people in Calumet Park who must have been discussing the same topic is that they decided to do something about it. Their decision gave rise to the CIA.

For the first year and a half, they acted on their own as a volunteer group watching the realtors, trying to separate the good ones from the bad ones, and then learning the tactics of the bad ones. In mid-1973, the leader of this small group, who was on the Seven Holy Founders Catholic Church Parish Council, and the church pastor turned to Catholic Charities to secure an organizer to help make the group larger and to increase its effectiveness by providing a source of expertise which it did not otherwise possess. Catholic Charities assigned the parish an organizer on its usual two year 50-50 basis

[Note 2]. The church, in turn, assigned the organizer to the fledgling community organization, which willingly turned to him for help; he knew the tactics and how to deal with the realtors.

With the help provided by the organizer, the CIA was able to expand both its membership base and its scale of activity. Over the next two years, the CIA's participating membership rose from the pre-organizer level of about 25 to about 200 people. Over the same period the number of confrontations with realtors increased as did their effectiveness. Finally, however, the CIA concluded that its impact on the housing market and on the realtors was limited, because it had no means of working with realtors to influence the pattern of house sales in the village. As a result, a volunteer housing center was established to work with cooperative realtors to avoid block by block racial resegregation in Calumet Park.

Shortly after his arrival, the organizer tried expanding the CIA geographical base to include the two adjacent Chicago neighborhoods of Victory Heights and Colonial Village. This decision was made partly because those neighborhoods were part of the Seven Holy Founders parish which, along with Catholic Charities, was paying his salary, and partly because the two neighborhoods had always been rather isolated from the rest of the city. As a result, their residents had been oriented more toward Calumet Park than to the city.

It took about a year and a half for the CIA to realize that this geographical expansion was not going to work. The white residents of these Chicago neighborhoods felt defeated by the largeness and the distance of the city government, so they did not participate much in the CIA. Finally, in 1975, the CIA concluded that its limited resources could be better directed



toward work in Calumet Park and the organizations set its boundaries to be identical to those of the village.

As 1975 drew near, the CIA began preparing for some major changes in its way of doing things. Its two years with Catholic Charities were running out and the Seven Holy Founders Church, which was experiencing financial belt tightening as the result of the racial turnover in the Chicago sections of its parish, could not continue its support at the same scale. As a result, the CIA decided to start raising its own money through door to door soliciting and through other fund raising activities. In 1975, this fund raising produced a budget of \$14,000 for the organization. Ever since, the CIA has supported its organizing activities through local funding. It received little direct financial support from the churches and it has never turned to outside funding agencies. A major share of the money comes from the concessions that the CIA runs at the village's big annual Labor Day celebration and carnival. The rest comes from various other sources.

During the spring of 1975, the CIA held its first convention, at which time the organization switched from the informal leadership system, which had existed since 1971, to a formal structure of elected officials, an elected board, and civic area sub-units each of which had its own set of designated leaders. The previously informal leaders were elected to the formal positions along with some new leaders who had come along since the founding days back in 1971. The close knit leadership network of the earlier years was retained, the new leaders were incorporated into the network and many of the leadership positions were filled by husband-wife teams, which limited the number of new people who had to be incorporated at any one time.

The CIA formal structure, like its informal predecessor, was built

around centralized decision making. Although monthly meetings are held to discuss things, most decisions are made by the board. The strong informal social network, which arose around the formal leaders has served to prevent a separation between formal and informal leadership and it has also helped avoid the development of factions at the leadership level. Dissatisfaction tends to be individual, and the disaffected individuals tend to drop out rather than to form into other groups.

The last major change of 1975 resulted from a CIA decision to participate in the Citizens Action Program (CAP) greenlining campaign against mortgage redlining [Note 4]. Although the CIA never developed any strong involvement in CAP, the CIA leaders were concerned about the availability of mortgage money in Calumet Park; they looked on the greenlining campaign as a good thing, for strictly local reasons, once they learned about it. Calumet Park has no banks or savings and loan associations. Most of its residents' savings go to one or another of the three mortgage lending institutions in the neighboring suburbs of Blue Island and Riverdale. Most of the Calumet Park mortgage money came from the three institutions, so it was against them that the CIA greenlining campaign was directed.

What the CIA got out of its greenlining issue was, in addition to the usual concessions to provide mortgage money, an agreement from the three institutions to provide a total of \$17,000 per year to support the CIA's Calumet Park Housing Center. With the money, the center got its own board, which was composed of CIA leaders and thus under the control of the CIA, and some full-time, paid staff members. This greatly increased the effectiveness of the center's activities. In its expanded form, the housing center refers prospective buyers to acceptable realtors, monitors the practices of the

realtors who operate in Calumet Park (notifying the CIA of offenders so that action can be taken against them), and works to disperse blacks across the village, and to find white buyers for the east side near the black neighborhoods of Chicago. The net effect, from 1975 through 1978, has been that Calumet Park has experienced quite a lot of racial integration combined with very little resegregation.

Although the first CIA organizer came from Catholic Charities, he had been trained by the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). Before he left, to go to a larger organization at higher pay, he recommended that the CIA sign a consulting contract with the IAF. The CIA agreed, and the next two organizers came through the IAF. The IAF contract also provided IAF leadership training classes for some CIA leaders, along with consulting services for the CIA organizer. The contract was not renewed in 1977 because the fee of \$5,000 per year was a large chunk of the CIA budget and because the CIA did not like the second organizer that the IAF sent them.

Although realtor practices has always been the dominant CIA issue, the organization has expanded its range of activities over the years. In 1977, besides running the housing center, the CIA also actively supported a school referendum which had been presented and voted down several times before. With the CIA support, the referendum passed. The same year, the CIA persuaded the village government to set up a community relations committee to monitor and enforce fair housing practices in the village.

The CIA has always had a partially adversary, partially cooperative relationship with the village government. From the CIA perspective, the village government is too slow and cautious. It is reluctant to make changes or develop new programs and it has to be pushed by the CIA. In turn, the

government does not totally trust the CIA because of its use of confrontation tactics even though its use of such tactics is rather low key compared to the manner of use by many other community organizations. The CIA had to push the village to pass both the fair housing ordinance and to establish the monitoring commission. Once the village established the commission, however, it turned to the CIA for help in staffing the commission and in selecting its directors.

The CIA responded by selecting several of its top leaders, who were appointed by the village. This produced two direct consequences for the CIA. On the one hand, it produced a very cooperative legal channel with which the organization could work on its realtor and housing market issues. On the other hand, however, it produced a temporary power vacuum in the CIA. The people who shifted from the CIA to the Community Relations Commission included three of the remaining founding leaders, one of whom was the organization's president. The president resigned at about the same time that the CIA fired its organizer (the second, unsatisfactory one supplied by the IAF). It took a while for the organization to recoup from this dual loss. Finally a relatively inexperienced civic area secondary leader was elected to the presidency. Simultaneously, and for the first time, the CIA had to find an organizer by itself. It went for six months before finding one who started working for the CIA in January of 1978.

Since 1975, the CIA has come to avoid confrontation wherever possible. It works with the village Community Relations Commission in matters over which the commission has jurisdiction and it makes phone calls to gain realtor compliance, if possible, so that confrontation is used only as a last resort. The primary reason for this change has been the effort to

increase the effectiveness of the CIA. There are just too many targets for the organization to confront them all. If it can get concessions through phone calls, it can use confrontation for the targets who do not respond to phone calls; it can thereby accomplish more than it could if it tried to confront all possible targets.

NOTES:

1. These people, who were the CIA's founders and dominant leaders through at least 1977, were close friends. Strong social relationships have continued to be a characteristic of the CIA leadership pool. More recent leaders have tended to be incorporated into the leadership's social network as they rose up in the leadership structure.
2. Catholic Charities would provide an organizer for two years and pay half the salary if the church would pay the other half.
3. See Appendix Three for a description of greenlining.


## SECTION 16:

## VICTORY HEIGHTS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

Victory Heights is a small, but long and narrow, residential neighborhood located on the far South Side of Chicago. The neighborhood extends from 120th Street to 123rd Street between Halsted (800 W) and Ashland (1600 W). Victory Heights is on the edge of the city. On its south and east sides, it borders on the suburb of Calumet Park. Although Victory Heights residents have good access to Calumet Park across 123rd Street, the area is fairly well isolated from the rest of the city. North of 120th Street is a several block wide railroad and industrial belt which extends from at least Halsted on the east to well past Ashland on the west. Only one or two narrow streets follow a broken path, through the industrial belt, to provide Victory Heights residents with any direct access to the city's commercial and residential neighborhoods which lie north of 120th Street. Although Ashland and Halsted Streets, which form the western and eastern edges of Victory Heights, are major north-south thoroughfares, even Ashland Avenue is moderately inaccessible because the western edge of Victory Heights is undeveloped privately owned land and some of the east-west streets in Victory Heights do not extend through to Ashland. Along Halsted, at its eastern end, Victory Heights has a narrow access to the rest of the city because the industrial belt is fairly wide there. In addition, an Illinois Central Railway track runs through Victory Heights along an east-south-easterly path between 121st Street and 122nd Street, breaking the neighborhood into even smaller sections and interrupting most of its north-south streets.

When Victory Heights was a white neighborhood, its residents were much more strongly oriented toward Calumet Park than they were toward the city. The local shopping areas and churches were all in Calumet Park and the neighborhood seemed more like a suburb of Calumet Park than it did a part of Chicago. Victory Heights started undergoing racial change in about 1971, and by mid-1978, the area had become about 80% black. The racial change has moved through the neighborhood from east to west and from north to south, with most blocks being mostly white or mostly black. Although the white residents had been strongly oriented toward Calumet Park, to the new black residents, the suburb was more like a forbidden area. Even though Calumet Park had established a fair housing ordinance and a human relations commission, these were seen as being a response to necessity rather than a demonstration of real conviction. The suburb was seen as being hostile to blacks. For a number of years following the onset of integration, petty vandalism by white youths from Calumet Park was a routine irritant to the residents of Victory Heights. Even though the new blacks did not feel welcome in Calumet Park they still shared the same feelings of isolation from the city that the white residents had felt. One black informant told me that she had heard that Victory Heights had been part of Calumet Park until the blacks moved in, at which point Calumet Park had given the neighborhood to the city. Actually Victory Heights was annexed to the city in 1895.

Calumet Park has had a fairly effective community organization, the Community Improvement Association (CIA), since the early 1970's. For a number of years, this organization included Victory Heights within its boundaries, but after an appreciable number of blacks moved in, the CIA



VICTORY HEIGHTS ON CHICAGO'S SOUTH SIDE

redrew its boundaries to stop at the village limits. This action by the CIA seems to have been based more nearly on practical than on anti-black matters. See the section on the CIA for further details.

In the early 1970's, quite a bit of land, primarily towards the western end of Victory Heights was vacant. This land was slowly being developed, mainly with small bungalows on 25 foot lots, as the area was undergoing racial change. The developer [Note 1] had plans to continue with a combination of small bungalows on the 25 foot lots and small apartment buildings. One of the Victory Heights Community Organization's (VHCO) [Note 2] major accomplishments was getting the area rezoned to require only single family residences on 42 to 50 foot lots. As a result of the racial change and the new housing, the local grade school became very overcrowded during the 1970's. Trying to deal with the school situation became a major problem for VHCO, and one on which it never could accomplish very much.

Most of my information on the VHCO came from two informants, the dominant local leader and the organization's only trained organizer. Their descriptions of the organization complement each other in a way that makes it seem desirable that I present their descriptions separately.

#### A. VHCO From The Perspective Of The Local Leader

Starting in the early 1970's, racial change in Victory Heights was accompanied with a variety of community problems including school overcrowding, block busting, the construction of too much relatively high density housing, declining city services (including, but not limited to mosquito control, tree trimming, and garbage pickup), and crime problems (especially drugs and vandalism by white Calumet Park youths) about which the police

would do nothing.

By 1975, when the area still had a majority of white and Mexican residents, about ten block clubs had more or less independently developed in various parts of the neighborhood. A local resident and founder of one of the block clubs, Mrs. Catherine Henderson, who had been involved in another community organization before moving to Victory Heights, started conducting door to door rap sessions with many of her neighbors. She organized the leaders of the ten block clubs into a group which decided to expand into more of the neighborhood. Each leader agreed to canvas two blocks, not including the one that each lived on, and they thereby succeeded in getting VHCO organized.

This initial leadership group decided that it should affiliate with some more established community organizations to learn from their experience. They turned to two nearby organizations, the white CIA in Calumet Park and the black West Pullman Block Clubs in the area immediately east of Victory Heights. At the time, these two organizations were cooperating in a confrontation with a local bank over mortgage redlining, and they were glad to accept VHCO as a partner in the undertaking. After participating in one confrontation, the VHCO people felt that they had been put in a trick bag, because the other two organizations put VHCO up front and then did not provide the expected support.

VHCO thereupon decided not to work with these two organizations any more and in July of 1975 turned instead to the Citizens Action Program (CAP) for guidance. Although VHCO never did participate in many CAP activities, the organization did sign a contract to receive the part time help of a CAP organizer and it paid for a number of VHCO leaders to go through a

lengthy CAP leadership training course. The CAP organizer maintained this relationship with VHCO for the entire contract even though CAP folded half way through the contract year.

After CAP folded, VHCO decided that it had developed an adequately trained local leadership pool, and, as a result, the organization has not since sought affiliation with any other community organizations. VHCO has never tried to raise much money, apart from that needed to cover the contract and leadership training with CAP, because raising money seemed to lead to problems that could be avoided by sticking to a very small budget. In the mean time, however, a number of the trained original leaders have moved and have been replaced with less well trained new people. This has had an adverse impact on the organization. For one thing, meetings take longer because things have to be explained more carefully; many people do not want to take the extra time.

VHCO has tried to be an action organization that goes after city hall before the problems become too serious. VHCO compares its situation with that in Roseland, which has a serious problem with foreclosed and abandoned FHA housing because the community organization, the Greater Roseland Organization (GRO), waited too long before beginning to work on the problem.

VHCO has been involved in such activities as stopping a local developer from building more bungalows on 25 foot lots, improving the school facilities, and seeking improved free city services (street cleaning, filling pot holes, tree trimming - but not alley paving which would be charged to the local property owners), and in improved youth recreational facilities. The major problem areas have been zoning, controlling the developer, and education (problems with the local grade school).

VHCO succeeded in getting the undeveloped sections of Victory Heights rezoned for single family housing on 42 to 50 foot lots. Many of its members have joined the local school council. They have succeeded in increasing the number of regular teachers in the school, and, in 1976, the school agreed to keep the gym open in the afternoons, which has helped with the youth recreation problems. The local grade school has been seriously overcrowded as a result of the new housing in the area, and the zoning victory has significant educational implications. Preventing the construction of more apartment buildings and bungalows on 25 foot lots has put a limit on the potential for further overcrowding of the school.

VHCO has been able to bring out up to 500 people for some actions, and it had between 300 and 400 members a few years ago. By 1977, this had dropped to about 200 members, partly because the past victories have reduced the problems enough so that the people are no longer so sure that they need a community organization. VHCO has tried to operate as an integrated organization, reflecting the fact that the area has not yet become all black. Indeed, some white families are supposedly still buying in the area. The efforts to keep the VHCO board integrated have created problems for the organization because many of the newer black residents do not want to work with white people. This problem was especially serious in 1975, but it has declined somewhat since then.

#### B. VHCO From The Perspective Of The Organizer

The organizer was a CAP employee who was assigned the task of organizing and working with CAP affiliate organizations, mainly on the South Side of Chicago. CAP was slightly involved with the CIA over redlining by a bank, and the VHCO was drawn into this action. CAP was looking for black

area member affiliates. It was obvious that Catherine Henderson had talent and was a force in her own community, and the organizer began establishing a relationship with Mrs. Henderson and with VHCO.

In March, 1976, VHCO voted to affiliate with CAP and paid the \$150-\$175 membership dues that enabled the organization to obtain the services of a CAP organizer for local organizing activities. In his relationship with VHCO, the organizer had an exclusively local focus [Note 3]. His task was to win acceptance and overcome the local fear that coalition participation would pull the organization away from acting on the local problems.

VHCO was dominated by Catherine Henderson, and the growth of the organization was largely due to her efforts. Unlike many other organizations that develop around a strong leader, however, Victory Heights developed a group of talented secondary leaders to support her [Note 3]. As a result, VHCO became a fairly representative organization and this enabled it to generate publicity and make a name for itself. This, in turn, helped the organization to grow.

Victory Heights is a middle class black neighborhood, and noisy confrontation does not go over well unless the situation is acute and upsetting. VHCO has been a tough and solid civic group which has been involved in a variety of activities including block club networks, service and civic booster activities (including getting a local scrap metal yard cleaned up), and it conducted a 200 home in-depth survey of city services. The results of this survey were circulated to the papers. This led to a confrontation with Alderman Frost. About 140 local people came out for this meeting. The alderman brought out 40 to 50 of his own people to overwhelm VHCO and break its back, but it did not work out this way.

In general, the school situation seems hopeless. VHCO was in and out of the school issue all the time that the organizer was working there, and a VHCO group was part of the local school council. However, as VHCO's involvement in the school increased, the people became more confused and this was detrimental to the organization. Once VHCO became part of the school council, it got co-opted and sucked down by the size and the endurance of the bureaucracy. The VHCO people accomplished little and the activity took time and people away from more viable VHCO concerns.

The organizer developed a close relationship with Catherine Henderson. When she wanted more time than the CAP contract stipulated he began to provide it. Finally CAP became a distant third party to their relationship. In mid-1976, when CAP folded and the organizer became director of a new northwest side community organization, he continued his relationship with Catherine Henderson and VHCO on a part time basis until the summer of 1977.

By 1977, the strong secondary leadership base had rather fallen apart and the organization had reverted to revolving around Mrs. Henderson. She is still working away, and trying to find other people to work with her. Because she is still there, VHCO itself is still operating.

NOTES:

1. My informants were of the opinion that there was only one developer involved in this, but they were not sure about it.
2. I am abbreviating Victory Heights Community Organization to VHCO for economy of space. I do not know that the organization so identifies itself.

3. The Concerned Citizens of West Englewood (CCWE) was an example of an organization which was built around one strong leader, but in which no strong pool of secondary leaders ever developed. See the section on CCWE.

SECTION SEVENTEEN  
SUMMARY FOR PART II

This summary, which brings Part II to an end, is partly a recapitulation of the introduction. The primary content of Part II has been a series of miniature case studies of twenty five grass roots community organizations located in the Austin and Southwest Side areas of Chicago. The case studies can be read as individual descriptions of separate organizations or they can be interpreted as different manifestations of a specific social phenomenon, namely Alinsky-style community organizing. The studies of each organization are less than full case studies - to perform complete case studies on each organization would have been an impossible task for any one person - but the studies do provide fairly detailed descriptions of how each organization got started and how each developed thereafter. No study tells about everything that any organization did. The studies describe the things that seem to have been the most important to each organization. Many of the things that were mentioned for one organization also happened to many of the other organizations even if they were not so mentioned.

The case studies are based on information provided by informants, most of whom were key participants in the organizations which they were describing, and all of whom were advocates of the grass roots method of community organizing. This means that each study is a description of the world as seen from inside the organization. Outsiders might well see the world differently and disagree with the "facts" as they have been presented. At the most general level, virtually all informants felt that their organizations had played a significant and constructive role, against heavy odds and much op-

position, in making their communities better places to live. Outsiders, especially those in the local political establishment or those who became targets of confrontation by one or another organization would see the organizations in a more negative light, the grass roots community organizations would be more likely be regarded as trouble-making or irrelevant gadflies in a world in which other institutions were the major forces providing a positive impact in bettering our urban communities. At a more specific level, outsiders might disagree with the way in which particular things were accomplished. For example, the Southwest Community Congress (SCC) claimed credit for both for forcing the establishment of the Daley junior college on the Southwest Side and for designing the campus once the City College system agreed to establish the college. The City College Board and the systems administrators would probably also claim credit for recognizing the need to establish a full campus on the Southwest Side, and they would almost certainly claim credit for being behind the design of the campus that was constructed there.

Many of these organizations were started in white neighborhoods which were threatened with racial integration. Most such organizations claimed credit for influencing the process of racial change so that it occurred in a relatively calm manner or they claimed credit for slowing it down so that their neighborhoods have not passed through the turbulent process of racial resegregation that occurred in the nearby neighborhoods that went through racial integration a few years earlier. There is some question as to whether these claims can be substantiated. Without pursuing the matter in great detail, one might observe that white neighborhoods do not need grass roots community organizations to experience non-violent racial transitions. Further-

more, all of the claims to have stopped the block by block resegregation came from organizations located in neighborhoods which only recently started experiencing racial integration. It remains to be seen whether these claims will withstand the test of time.

It has not been my goal to establish the right or wrong of any such differences in assessment of the impact of these grass roots organizations. Within the limits of my capability for doing so, I have tried to be a transparent collector and collator of the information provided by my informants. My goal has been to learn and present the mainstream view of reality as it was understood within each organization. Where significant alternate interpretations have existed within any organization I have tried to describe them, and I have tried to avoid uncritically communicating any factual errors where I have become aware of them. One reader of my case studies said that, of course, I would like to correct my grammar here and there. When presented with some such instances, I said that I would leave things as they were. The idiomatic language used by many informants often conveyed nuances of meaning disappear when their statements are rephrased in proper American english.

In addition to being descriptions of individual organizations and different manifestations of a single social phenomenon, the case studies can be looked at from other perspectives. The organizations have all been operating in substantially the same urban setting, and inspite of their close physical and temporal proximity, they have often displayed rather different patterns of development. This observation brings up what was, for me, the question that led to studying all these organizations in the first place: What similarities and differences in development have existed among these organ-

izations and why? Answering this question is a two stage process. First one must identify the patterns. Second, with patterns in hand, one can look for some explanations. In Part III of this study, I will attempt to provide at least a partial explanation for why these similarities and differences have arisen.

PART III  
THE ANALYSIS

## INTRODUCTION

In Part III, I return to the substantive question which led me to undertake this research project: Why do similar organizations develop differently? This is, of course, a general question which I can only hope to answer in a rather limited way. To be specific, my research design did not allow for collecting all possible information on the organizations that I studied, much of the information that I did collect is not included in this thesis, and these twenty five grass roots community organizations are not fully representative of formal organizations as a general class of social phenomena. At the same time, however, it is safe to assume that my findings have applicability beyond the organizations that I studied.

The analysis found in Part III is based on the information contained in the miniature case studies included in Part II. This information has been supplemented from time to time by some of the more specific data that I collected on the organizations. The method of analysis involves selecting some seemingly relevant models, typologies, and continua of specific organizational characteristics which serve to differentiate organizations, or groups of organizations, from each other, and then to seek an explanation for why the organizations are differentiated in this manner. These models, typologies, and continua were not derived from some well ordered theory of comparative organizational analysis. Rather they were invented or grasped at over a period of several months as I read through the case studies time and time again, wondering what I was going to be able to come up with that would help tie things together. If there is any developed field of comparative organizational development or change upon which I could have

based this analysis, I was not able to find it. I had had the feeling that I was working in a relatively unexplored field in which I was perhaps doing some of the preliminary work upon which more general models or theories might be based some time in the future.

These typologies and models range from some fairly obvious ones that any good armchair social scientist might have thought of (size and sources of income are two examples) to ones that were based solely on what I uncovered during my field work (for example, distance from racial change and Catholic parish versus community organizations). Whatever their sources, however, the typologies and models fall into one or the other of two analytically distinct forms. The first form is used to look at developmental differences by comparing the state of an organization at one point in time (time 1) with its state at a subsequent point in time (time 2). W. E. Moore (1974) points out that this has been a standard device used for studying the development of "under-developed" nations. For the method to have any real meaning, the transition between "time 1" and "time 2" must be smoothly monotonic. Moore goes on to indicate that the research method is popular because the researcher can do his work and present his findings without ever going to the bother of finding out what actually happened between those two points in time. According to Moore, the problem is that transitions often are not smoothly monotonic and, as a result, the research presents misleading findings. When using this method, I have tried to verify that the assumption of monotonicity is valid. When the assumption is not valid or when I do not actually know what happened between the two times, I so state. My primary use of this method is in studying changes in organizational size with time. The method is used to compare the changes for each of the twenty

five organizations that I studied, and in most cases I was able to find out what happened to each organization between "time 1" and "time 2."

The second form of analysis is that used by Parsons (1966) in his study of societal evolution. Parsons selects a number of societies as they existed at certain points in time (the points in time were also selected by Parsons) and he then uses the societies as they then existed as examples of the stages of a general model of societal evolution. This research method is typological rather than historical in nature. For purposes of illustrating, or of fleshing out, the evolutionary model, each society is treated as a static phenomenon. The society is important as an example of the general type to be found at a particular stage of the evolutionary model. For purposes of its applicability as an example of the evolutionary stage, the past and future of the society (past and future with respect to the time at which it is plucked out of its historical development and stuffed into one of Parson's stages) are irrelevant. Parsons was criticized for not showing that any of his societies ever went through the stages contained in his model of societal evolution. In all fairness, though, it must be pointed out that the subject of Parsons' interest was societal evolution as a general social phenomenon rather than the evolution of particular societies. My primary use of this typological method is in devising a model of organizational development in relation to the distance from racial change in which I have selected certain organizations, as they existed at specific points in time, as examples of particular stages of the general model. The general model makes sense and it helps clarify the patterns of organizational development found in the organizations that I studied, but it is quite unlikely that any real organization could go through all the stages of the general model, even

though most organizations did go through some of the stages. The typological approach serves to clarify reality by standing off from it and abstracting a general pattern from all the little trends and changes that occurred in the real organizations.

The information on which these models is based is "soft" and often imprecise. This is not an inherent feature of the analysis of complex organizations; I did collect "hard" information for many variables which are relevant to the study of organizations. The goal of this research project, however, was to get a general understanding of how grass roots community organizations develop. This general understanding seems to hang primarily on the "soft" information. In some cases, the information was "soft" because serious conceptual problems stood between the variables in question and the measurement of them in real organizations. Organizational size, as I show in Chapter Six, is a good example. In some cases, I could have obtained more precise information if I had been willing to take much more time studying each organization. In other cases, practical problems made it impossible for me to obtain precise informations. Records no longer existed, if indeed they ever did exist, to which I could turn for accurate information, and I had to depend on the vague recollections of my informants. If I had restricted my attention to the variables, the periods of time, and the organizations for which "hard" information was available, I would have been able to write a thesis that did not depend upon imprecise information, but I would have had to throw out most of my data base of organization years. To my way of thinking, the loss would have been more serious than would have been the gain from the more quantative approach. The panoramic view of organizations developing through time would have been lost.

The analysis that is presented in Part III exists at two rather distinct levels of theoretical development. The first level, which is used in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, is that of developing empirical generalizations. In these chapters, I discuss such variables as organizational size, date of founding, parish versus community organizations, and the concept of "turf" as it exists among Alinsky-style community organizations. The generalizations that are found in these chapters are a necessary, but clearly preliminary, step toward understanding why grass-roots community organizations develop as they do. The generalizations pull together the individual case studies as they delineate a number of important developmental patterns shared by the organizations. Because the focus is on what are best called dependent variables, the generalizations clarify the developmental patterns to a considerable extent while simultaneously explaining very little.

Starting with Chapter Ten, the analysis shifts to a level which goes beyond mere empirical generalizations. Here I will present some models of organizational development that explain as well as describe. In these chapters, I will be looking at such things as the relationship between financial support and organizational survival and the impact of residential racial integration and resegregation on organizational development. These models seem to have some fairly important implications, both to students of formal organizations and to practitioners of grass-roots organizing. At the beginning of this thesis, I stated that there was a clear relationship between the organizations that I was studying and the resource mobilization perspective of social movement organizing as it has been developed by McCarthy and Zald. For this reason, I end the more theoretical form of analysis with a relatively detailed description of the McCarthy and Zald model and how it relates

to the organizations that I studied.

Here however, one point must be explicitly stated. Any successful research project must revolve around some central focus. The focus that is selected will have a substantial impact on how the research is conducted; it will guide the way that the findings are presented; and it will even determine, in a general sort of way, the sort of findings that are available to be presented. This thesis began with a strictly empirical question: why do grass-roots community organizations develop as they do? In the course of analyzing my data, I realized how close my work was to certain aspects of the McCarthy - Zald resource mobilization model of social movement organizing. At that point, I began to relate my findings to their work. My study was not, however, in any sense an extension or outgrowth of their work. Had it been so, I would have made the McCarthy - Zald model the central focus of my research, and I would have designed a study in which I used the grass-roots community organizations as a vehicle for evaluating or elaborating on the resource mobilization model. In this case, I would have been asking somewhat different questions in my research and I would have had different information to present in this thesis. The distinction is not trivial. For example, financial support is a major component of the McCarthy - Zald approach and had I started out trying to test or elaborate their model, I would have looked at the question of financial support in a rather different way. As a result, I would have sought to explore some certain important questions, which I cannot answer, about the activities of certain major sponsors of these grass-roots organizations. Having a focus of this sort would not, however, necessarily have led to a better research project. If I had set out to evaluate the McCarthy - Zald model, I would not have thought to

ask certain questions about the relationship of these organizations to change processes in their neighborhoods and in the nearby neighborhoods of the city. As a result, I would probably not have had the material needed to develop the model of organizational development in relation to distance from racial change that is found in Chapter Eleven.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE AS TIME PASSES

Grass roots community organizations come in a variety of sizes. Most seem to change considerably in size as the years pass, although some seem to stay about the same size through their existence. Size is a tricky variable to measure for Alinsky organizations both in conceptual and in practical terms. At the conceptual level, one must decide whether to base size on geographical, financial, or membership units. At the practical level, these alternatives seem not to co-vary to any significant extent, and none of them can be quantified in any way that is both reliable and meaningful.

All the organizations that I included in this study have fairly definite geographical boundaries, and the area within these boundaries could easily be measured. One problem with using geographical area to measure size is that it would not seem reasonable to regard a mere-do-well organization with very few members as large regardless of how much territory it claimed for itself. Another problem with using area to measure size is that organizations often claim territory that they have never tried to organize. In most cases, they lack the manpower to establish an organizing presence in more than a small part of their area. In other cases the territory includes vacant land, lakes, parks, or industrial areas where there is really nothing to organize. Even strictly residential areas can have very different population densities depending on whether they contain single family homes on large lots or closely clustered high rise apartment buildings.

In financial terms, size is hard to measure because virtually none of

the organizations always operated on a strictly money basis. At one time or another, every organization was supported through contributions in kind, ranging from office space and supplies to organizers and their supervisors. Some fairly large organizations have gone for years with virtually no money passing through their hands and most organizations had very little money during their early or their last days. In most cases, churches provided the office space and often all office supplies, including use of a telephone free or for a nominal charge. Other organizations, most commonly Catholic Charities or a city-wide coalition, would provide staff organizers, staff supervision and training free, or for a nominal charge, depending on what the organization could afford. Other organizations received free organizers from other sources, including conscientious objectors from West Germany who were working out their term of alternative service in the urban areas of the United States. All these contributions could have been assigned monetary values and then have been added up to provide a reasonably reliable measure of size except for two inconvenient problems. The first problem is that most of my informants could not specify precisely how much of what had been received, especially in the more distant past. The second problem was that, even if all the information had been available and had been sufficiently precise, the task of converting everything to equivalent dollar value would have been far more than I was prepared to undertake in doing this study.

Even membership is hard to measure because most organizations do not have or enforce membership rules. They regard membership as an irrelevant formality and do not keep accurate membership lists. Even for organizations that do take membership seriously, membership is a conceptually difficult variable because the organizations may accept individual memberships, organ-

izational memberships, or both. Individual members are easy to count, if the records are available, but organizational memberships are hard to measure. When a small, issue-oriented block club signs up, it may be safe to count all block club participants as members, but who should be counted as members when St. XXX Catholic church joins? The delegates from the various committees who show up for the conventions because the pastor asked them to, the smaller number of people who participate on a more regular basis, or all 5000 parishoners who, in some sense, became members when their church became a member?

I have elected to measure size in terms of membership, or more accurately, in terms of participating constituency, partly because the defined task of an Alinsky organization is to organize people, and largely because, when asked about the size of their organizations, most informants responded in terms of how many people their organization could turn out. Even the "turn out," or participating constituency, is hard to measure. Some organizations have formal mailing lists while others operate by word of mouth or by stuffing flyers in mailboxes. In the latter case, an organization may be even more uncertain about the outer fringes of its participating constituency than it is about its "members." In all organizations, however, the informants described their organization as having a fairly well defined hard core key leadership group, a larger group of more or less regular participants, and a still larger group of irregular and one-time-only participants. I was not in a position to observe the sizes of these three groups (indeed, most of my informants were describing past events where observation was physically impossible) and I had to rely on the subjective judgements and the recollections of my informants.

The measure of size has to be an overall assessment for an organization, but participants turn out for particular meetings and even the key leaders do not show up for everything. The number of people that an organization can turn out depends as much on the salience of the issues as it does on the infrastructure that the organization has built or has tapped into in its community. Within certain limits, one factor can offset the other. A salient issue can bring out people in the absence of a sound infrastructure, if someone will post enough notices and stuff enough mailboxes. A strong infrastructure can often produce lots of people for a dull issue (providing this does not happen too often) because people will feel that they ought to attend. In general, however, if the issue is salient and if the organizers work hard, lots of people will show up. If the issue is not salient, few people will attend. A meeting on gas bills will produce more people in February than it will in July; insurance redlining is usually not an attractive issue to apartment renters; and a meeting on garbage pickup can produce anything from a crowd to some people from the block that originated a specific complaint.

Because size is hard to measure, I have divided size into three categories, "small," "medium," and "large," according to the number of people that an organization could be expected to produce for a community-wide meeting on a reasonably significant issue. Size was subjectively judged by me, based on my interviews, by my expert informants, and by my organizational informants in describing their own and sometimes other organizations. Both the categories and the assignment of organizations to them are approximations I can, however, assign some rough numbers to these categories. A large organization should be capable of producing over 500 people for an important

meeting; a medium size organization should be capable of producing a couple hundred people; and a small organization is likely to turn out 50 or fewer people for an important meeting. The dividing lines between these categories are vague because the number of people that an organization can turn out vary greatly from one meeting to the next, and, given the research methods that I was using, was hard to measure with any precision.

For each organization, size was estimated for two points in time. The first point was when the organization was first started, the second point was 1977 or just before the organization folded, if it was not still in existence by 1977.

This "time 1" - "time 2" comparison posed additional conceptual problems. Some organizations start out as mergers or as divisions of existing organizations and have measurable size at the instant of creation. Other organizations, including most of the ones that I studied, started from scratch and really had no size at the instant of conception. The problem of organizational inception can be more reasonably handled through the application of a model that is substantially equivalent to the social psychological, dramaturgical model of presentation of self to a social environment. From this perspective, an organization is created when it publicly presents itself as a self-proclaimed social entity operating in some social environment. An organization may be created at the spur of the moment by a small group of people, or a lot of time, money and effort may have been expended by many people prior to the time that an organization is prepared to make its public debut. All this preparation may itself be very public, but it is still defined as paving the way - the organization's time has not yet come.

A group of people with a common concern over some community problem may meet and act collectively on the problem, but as long as they are acting only on their own behalf, individually or collectively, they are only a group or a quasi-group. In social psychological terms, they form a social organization, but they are not a community organization. They become a community organization when they make the quantum leap from publicly presenting themselves as just themselves to publicly presenting themselves as the spokesmen for their community, as the spokesmen for some geographically delimited constituency. From their position as a formal organization, it matters little whether that constituency acknowledges the organization as its spokesman, or whether the constituency is even aware of the organization's existence. (On the other hand, since Alinsky organizing can fairly be described as a means of providing outsiders with what Lowi (1969) has called the "pluralist pie," the effectiveness of the organization depends a great deal upon the extent to which the presumed constituency acknowledges the organization and follows its lead. But organizational effectiveness and organizational existence are rather different things and here our focus is on existence, not on effectiveness.)

The big organizations which are started with large budgets and staffs of several organizers may spend a year or more very publicly going through the business of being created. The organization usually comes into existence at its first convention (which has been the focus of the prior organizing) when a name and by-laws are adopted and officers and a board are elected. A small organization may be created when a group of concerned residents decides to name itself a community organization, or when some group of residents is persuaded to take this step by an organizer who has been hired

by an organization that wants to see a community organization get started. A good indicator of a group's arrival as a community organization is its decision to seek a state charter as a not-for-profit organization.

At the other end of the spectrum, the demise of a community organization may also be rather vague. Business organizations may close up in a fairly formal manner, but voluntary associations have a habit of fading away in bits and pieces. They may give up their office and their staff, but a residue of members may hang on for some time, holding regular meetings and hoping that things will take a turn for the better. At some point, the president will make a few phone calls and decide that there is no point in holding a meeting this month. They may go for several months, intending to hold a meeting, before they really give up. Even so, they seldom cancel their state charter, and their bank account may hang around for years with some money still in it. Even though the point of demise is vague, there eventually comes a time when both the former members and the other significant organizations in its environment all acknowledge that the organization is dead.

Both the birth and death of an organization are social acts. The organization comes into being when it presents itself to an environment containing other formal organizations, representing various institutional sectors of the society, as the spokesman for some geographically defined constituency. It has folded when it ceases to present itself as a corporate actor in the social environment of other organizations.

Table 1 contains a listing of each organization by its size at two points in time, the year of its creation and 1977, or the year of its demise. Table 2 represents a regrouping of this information according to the direc-

TABLE 1  
CHANGES IN SIZE OVER TIME

Organization Name	At Creation Size	Year	At 1977 Size	or Demise Year	Years Covered	Comments
ACO	M	1963	S	D-1966/67	3 or 4	
CASC	S	1971	S	D-1973	2	
CCO	L	1966	S	D-1968	2	
CCSC	S	1975	M	1977	3	
CCWE	S	1973	S	D-1977	3	
CIA	S	1972	M	1977	6	
GRO	M	1986	M	1977	10	
HF	S	1974	L	1977	4	
LF	S	1971	S	D-1975	4	
MAC	M	1972	S	D-1974	2	
MASC	S	1973	M	1977	4	
NAC	S	1970	M	1977	8	
NACC	M	1972	M	D-1974	2	
NAO	S	1972	M	1977	6	
OBA	L	1966	S	1977	12	
OPCO	S	1971	S	1977	7	1
OSC	L	1958	M	D-1970	12	
SCC	L	1969	S	1977	9	
Federation	S	1972	L	1977	6	
SCAC	S	1971	S	1977	7	
TMO	M	1970	S	D-1976	6	
USC	S	1972	S	D-1975	3	
Victory Hts.	S	1975	S	1977	3	
WECO	M	1970	S	1977	8	

Notes: 1 - May have grown to "M" during 1973-1974 before declining to "S" again.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS STAYING SAME SIZE  
OR CHANGING IN SIZE, BY SIZE, DIRECTION OF  
CHANGE, TIME SPAN, AND OUTCOME

Direction of Change	Number of Organizations						
	Total	Time Span Involved (Years)					
		2 - 4		5 - 7		9 - 12	
		Survived	Died	Survived	Died	Survived	Died
Stayed Same Size							
Large	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Medium	3	0	1	1	0	1	0
Small	7	1	4	2	0	0	0
Subtotals		1	5	3	0	1	0
Totals	10	6		3		1	
Decreased In Size							
Large to Medium	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Large to Small	3	0	1	0	0	2	0
Medium to Small	4	0	2	1	1	0	0
Subtotals		0	3	1	1	2	1
Totals	8	3		2		3	
Increased in Size							
Medium to Large	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small to Large	2	1	0	1	0	0	0
Small to Medium	5	2	0	3	0	0	0
Subtotals		3	0	4	0	0	0
Totals	7	3		4		0	
All Organizations							
Subtotals		4	8	8	1	3	1
Totals	25	12		9		4	

tion of change in size, controlling for size and outcome (survived or died). The size was estimated for the two indicated points of time with no consideration being given to what happened during the intervening years. This could produce misleading conclusions if, for example, an organization that was created in 1970 started out "small" but grew to "large" by 1973, only to shrink to "small" again by 1977. In fact, however, the end point information produces few misleading impressions for the organizations listed in Tables 1 and 2. The organizations listed as remaining the same size at the two end points remained about the same size all along. One organization (OPCO) which was coded as small at both end points may have grown to medium briefly, while one organization (SACCC) which was listed as medium at both end points may have shrunk to small for a while. The organizations shown as changing in size over the years all seem to have gone through approximately monotonic change processes, but it would be a mistake to assume that the change process was linear over time. The change processes seem often to have been more nearly exponential or relatively rapid step functions, although this conclusion is based on general impressions which can not be well evaluated with the information that I collected.

Although the differences are small, more organizations stayed about the same size than either shrank or grew. Staying small or shrinking from medium to small seems to have been relatively unhealthy conditions for a grassroots community organization. Eight of the eleven organizations in these two categories did not survive to 1977. Starting out large and shrinking seems to have been less fatal. The three organizations in this category lasted for a long time before one succumbed to the effects of hiring a staff director who seems to have destroyed the organization through the misuse

of funds. The other two organizations had fairly durable leaders (SCC) or a creative staff director (OBA) who found survival niches for their organizations in the face of overwhelming competition from other grass-roots organizations built at least partly out of former members of the original organization. Not unexpectedly, all the organizations that grew in size survived to 1977.

All the organizations that started out large shrank in size and they represent three of the four organizations that have existed for at least nine years. This may show that large organizations have a better pool of leaders, or staff, and can lean more effectively on their past reputation when it comes to finding ways of hanging on, but it is also an artifact which reflects changes in the ways of starting Alinsky-style community organizations in Chicago. All the organizations which were started as direct action organizations prior to 1970 were started as multi-church sponsored ecumenical efforts involving large sums of money, most of which was provided by the several Catholic churches which were participating in the organizing effort. In contrast, the organizations which were started after 1970 were all more limited scale efforts involving fewer churches and smaller sums of money. Most of the money still came from the Catholics, but it was channelled through Catholic Charities or one of the city-wide coalitions which put organizers into individual parishes, rather than coming directly from some group of participating churches.

It would appear that declining in size is a more drastic condition than is growing in size, although this is by no means certain. All but one of the organizations, including three of the four that started out large, declined to small. In contrast, five of the seven organizations that grew

in size went through smaller changes. These points require further clarification. All but one of the organizations that shrank in size were started in 1970 or before. The one exception was MAC, which was started in 1972 as a white organization in a racially changing neighborhood. MAC was supported by white outsiders who wanted the neighborhood to stay white. When this did not happen, the outsiders pulled out and MAC, which had never been oriented toward accepting the blacks, fell apart almost immediately. In contrast, all but one of the organizations that grew in size were started in 1972 or later. The one exception was NAC, in northwestern Austin, which was the first of several white organizations to be started in northern Austin. NAC not only got a headstart on its fellow organizations in the area, but it also was slightly further removed from the threat of racial change than were any of the rest.

What this means is that the organizations that shrank have been around longer, in most cases considerably longer, than have the organizations that have grown. Table 3 contains longevity distributions for shrinking and growing organizations listing each organization by name and outcome. The three shrinking organizations that did not last at least six years are rather special cases. One organization (CCO) was founded in an exceptionally hostile territory, the suburb of Cicero, and seems never to really have had much of a chance. The other two organizations (MAC and ACO) were phased out by their sponsors in favor of alternate, and more viable, organizations. The ACO was replaced by OBA which had a long and rather successful existence for many years, and the white MAC was replaced by the predominantly black MASC which has survived to 1980, with no current signs of folding, in its section of Austin.

TABLE 3

CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE, BY DIRECTION  
OF CHANGE, NUMBER OF YEARS OF EXISTENCE,  
ORGANIZATIONAL NAME AND ABSOLUTE SIZE AT  
BOTH ENDS OF CHANGE PROCESS, AND OUTCOME

## GROWING ORGANIZATIONS

Years in Existence											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	13
		S>M CCSC	S>L HF		S>M CIA		S>M NAC				
			S>M MASC		S>M NAO						
					S>L Fed.						

## DECLINING ORGANIZATIONS

Years in Existence											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	13
	L>S CCO(d)		M>S ACO(d)		M>S TMO(d)		M>S WECO	L>S SCC		L>S OBA	
	M>S MAC(d)									L>M OSC(d)	

## Table Codes:

"S>M" - Size and direction of change  
S = Small / M = Medium / L = Large  
Arrow ">" indicates direction of change

"CCSC," etc. - Organization names (initials)

Outcome - (d) = died / no code = survived to 1978

It is possible that, given a few more years of existence, the growing organizations will show change patterns equal to those of the declining organizations. This seems unlikely for two reasons, neither of which is evident from the information in Tables 1 to 3. Most of the declining organizations, both the ones that died and the ones that have survived, shrank from large or medium to very small. All the dead organizations, except OSC, had almost no members when they threw in the towel. Among the declining organizations that have survived, only the SCC seems to have much of a future, and even it has been in the very small category since 1975. By the end of 1979, the SCC may have found a way of rebuilding itself, but the OBA and WECO were down to almost nothing. In contrast, all the expanding organizations started as medium or, at worst, as rather big small organizations. By the same token, only one of the expanding organizations that has grown to large (the Federation) has become as large as were the shrinking organizations that started out large. The other organization (HF) to grow to large is not so securely established in that size category. The other reason that the expanding organizations may not show change patterns equal to those of the declining organizations is that five of the seven expanding organizations face uncertain futures. Two of the expanding organizations, CCSC and MASC, which have been around for only three and four years respectively, are black organizations in black neighborhoods which show no signs of becoming white again any time soon. The other five organizations, all of which have been around longer, are white organizations in white neighborhoods, which, by 1980, were either starting to become integrated or were immediately threatened by racial integration. The three organizations, whose territories are experiencing integration have made some overtures to the incoming

blacks, the other two organizations are still trying to hold the line. It remains to be seen whether any of these organizations can survive the racial transitions of their neighborhoods as their white institution financial bases decline in the face of racial change. It is even less likely that the organizations will continue their growth patterns in the face of probable financial decline and an emigrating white constituency.

Down through the millenia, social philosophers have noted the seeming impermanence of social organizations. Grass-roots community organizations are not among the more durable components of human civilization; sooner or later all the organizations that I studied will disappear. The fundamental comparison then is not between the organizations that survive and those that do not, for ultimately all will be among those that do not. The comparison rather should be among those that do not, to find out what differentiates the organizations that did not last very long from those that lasted rather longer. This is a matter of some practical import, for if organizational leaders and staffs can control, to some extent, the destiny of their organizations, then they may be able to influence their longevity and thus the duration of their impact, on their neighborhoods.

I have previously shown that staying small or shrinking in size, especially from medium to small, are relatively unhealthy conditions for a grass-roots community organization. Table 4, which lists the defunct organizations by size change and length of survival, supports this conclusion, although it also shows that survival is not guaranteed by avoiding these two conditions. Half the defunct organizations did not make it into their third year, and only two lasted longer than four years. This suggests that a major factor in longevity probably is being able to hold out for at least three,

TABLE 4  
DURATION OF SURVIVAL FOR  
DEFUNCT ORGANIZATIONS

Years Survived	Organization Names, Absolute Sizes At End Periods, and Direction of Change
1	
2	CASC (S>S) / CCO (L>S) / MAC (M>S) / NACC (M>M) / USC (S>S)
3	CCWE (S>S)
4	ACO (M>S) / LF (S>S)
5	
6	TMO (M>S)
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	OSC (L>M)
13	

Table Codes:

"S>M" - Size and direction of change  
 S = Small / M = Medium / L = Large  
 Arrow ">" indicates direction of change

"CCSC," etc. - Organization names (initials)

Outcome - (d) = died / no code = survived to 1978

and preferably four years. Survival past this point is probably not itself the basic variable in question. We must go beyond these tables and look at the individual organizations to find out what caused them to go under so soon.

The eight organizations which did not last beyond their fourth year all have at least one of the following characteristics: (1) they were founded in an exceptionally unfavorable environment (CCO), (2) they were never able to find an institutional sponsor which was willing to invest much of the various resources needed to maintain the organization (CASC and perhaps CCWE which received only a limited amount of help from CAP), (3) the organization had a sponsor which suddenly and totally withdrew its support (MAC which lost the support of both NAC and the Help of Christians parish priests, NACC which folded when its only viable member other than NAC pulled out, USC when St. Ethelreda cancelled its financial support because Catholic Charities announced that its seed money funding period would not be extended, CCWE when CAP folded, ACO when the Austin Clergy Association withdrew its sponsorship and decided to turn to Tom Gaudette to start another organization, Little Flower when the parish pastors decided to get out of community organizing).

Establishing the presence of certain characteristics is not the same as establishing that they have any causal influence. It is worth noting, however, that none of the organizations that lasted beyond the fourth year shared any of these three traits. Only a few organizations even came close. WECO, in West Englewood, was started in a hostile environment, but that condition soon evaporated as the whites rapidly moved out and abandoned their neighborhood to the incoming blacks. In Cicero, there were no underlying social processes which could facilitate abatement of the hostility, and it

increased as time passed. Victory Heights, like CCWE, lost the support of CAP when it folded, but the organizer continued his work there for another six months and the Victory Heights organization seemed to be able to raise whatever money it needed from the citizens of its community. Finally, the SCC lost the bulk of its budget when Msgr. Hardiman was transferred out of the area, but the SCC had had a large budget and it was receiving enough money from other sources (Protestant churches, local businesses, etc.) to meet its financial needs on a reduced scale of activity.

I have shown that size and changes in the direction of size are significant factors influencing the development of grass-roots community organizations. It is also clear that these factors are not all important. In the remaining chapters of Part III, I will explore the influence of a number of other variables. Although these variables are analytically distinct, they are also interrelated. This means that other implications of organizational size will be discussed from time to time in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER SEVEN  
SELECTED PERSPECTIVES ON GRASS ROOTS  
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

This chapter contains three sections, none of which is discussed to the extent that separate chapters would warrant. The first section focuses on the year of founding for these twenty five organizations. The second section is a hypothesis about organizational size at the founding and subsequent organizational decline. The third section is a brief discussion about the concept of "turf" among grass-roots community organizations.

A. The Year Of Founding

The twenty five organizations that I studied were founded between 1958 and 1975. Table 1 contains a listing of the organizations by the year of founding. GRO, which was founded in 1968, is listed for 1974 in this table because that is when GRO started undergoing its transformation from a traditional civic organization into an Alinsky-style grass roots community organization. It is evident that, at least for the Austin and Southwest Side sections of Chicago, the founding of grass-roots community organizations is not a social regularity. Only four organizations were founded before 1968, and their dates of founding are well dispersed across an eleven year span. In contrast, fourteen of the twenty five organizations were founded during the three year period from 1970 through 1972, and the founding dates of the remaining organizations all fall just outside this three year period.

In the previous chapter, I used the social psychological dramaturgical model of presentation of self to define date of creation because I needed some means of measuring the initial size of each organization. However,

TABLE 1

YEAR OF FOUNDING OR YEAR OF TRANSITION INTO  
ALINSKY FOLD, AUSTIN AND SOUTHWEST SIDE  
ALINSKY-STYLE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Year	# Org's.	Organization Names (Initials)
1958	1	OSC
1959		
1960		
1962		
1963	1	ACO
1964		
1965		
1966	2	CCO / OBA
1967		
1968		
1969	1	SCC
1970	4	NAC / WECO / SACCC / TMO
1971	4	CASC / LF / SCAC / OPCO
1972	6	CIA / MAC / NAO / NACC / Fed. / USC
1973	2	CCWE / MASC
1974	2	HF / GRO*
1975	2	CCSC / VHCO
1976		
1977		

\* - GRO, which was founded in 1968, began its transition into a grass-roots issue organization in about 1974, see text.

when one shifts from selecting size to selecting date of founding as the dependent variable to be considered, the focus must be redirected to the timing of the overall founding process. The founding of most of these organizations covered a several year time span, and the dates of founding listed in Table 1 are only approximations. The OBA, for example, was founded during 1966 and 1967, this being the period between the time that Tom Gaudette started working in Austin and the time that the OBA held its first convention. From another perspective, however, the founding of OBA can be traced back several years earlier, since the ACO can be regarded as an unsuccessful precursor organization. Had the ACO met the expectations of its clergy founders, they would never have turned to Tom Gaudette to found the OBA. In a similar vein, the SACCC was listed as being founded during 1970 and 1971. Its founding then, however, resulted from the merging of several older but smaller black OBA civic units in South Austin, and the SACCC did not come into its own as an autonomous organization until several years later when it finally broke away from the OBA. Even the organizations which had a more readily designated date of founding were founded over a period of a year or so and could easily have been assigned a slightly different date without distorting the facts in any way.

The founding of these organizations, then, cannot be specified quite as precisely as the dates listed in Table 1 would seem to suggest. In most cases, however, this uncertainty does not exceed a one year difference, which means that the uneven distribution of founding dates between the years 1958 through 1977 is a real phenomenon which needs to be understood. The discussion of this phenomenon will revolve around seeking answers to two questions. First, was this pattern of founding dates peculiar to Austin

and the Southwest Side or was it typical of the city as a whole? Second, what seems to be behind this uneven clustering of founding dates?

This research project began as a city-wide undertaking and I was developing a metropolitan area wide list of ever-existing grass-roots community organizations before I decided to restrict my work to the Austin and Southwest Side areas. Table 2 contains a list, by date of founding, for all the metropolitan area organizations that I identified but did not study. In Table 2, the organizations are identified by abbreviated names or initials. The full names of these organizations and their approximate locations are listed in Table 3. Table 2 shows a clustering of founding dates similar to that of Table 1, with about half the organizations being founded during the mid-1970's. There are, however, some obvious differences in the Table 1 and Table 2 founding date distributions. The organizations not in Austin or on the Southwest side were founded over a longer time span (1936 to 1977) and the founding dates were more evenly distributed throughout those years. The clustering in the 1970's was a much weaker trend and it occurred later, during the mid-1970's rather than during the early years of the decade.

The differences that I have described are of uncertain reliability. I do not know much about the organizations listed in Table 2 and I conducted no interviews on any of them. At least one of the organizations, the Pilsen Neighbors Community Council, was started in 1954 and existed for fifteen years as a traditional social service oriented community organization before being transformed into an issue-oriented Alinsky-style organization in 1969-1970. As was the case with GRO in Table 1, the Pilsen Neighbors was listed for the date at which the transformation into the Alinsky model took place, because, for purposes of the present discussion, that is the more relevant

TABLE 2

YEAR OF FOUNDING OR YEAR OF TRANSITION INTO  
ALINSKY FOLD, ORGANIZATIONS NOT IN AUSTIN  
OR SOUTHWEST SIDE (I.E., NOT IN TABLE 1)

Year	# Org's.	Organization Names (Initials)
1936	1	UCC
--		
--		
1939	1	B of Y C
--		
--		
1955	1	LVCC
--		
--		
1959	1	TWO
1960		
1961		
1962	1	NRC
1963		
1964	2	NCO / CRAGIN +
1965		
1966		
1967		
1968		
1969	1	COUP
1970	1	PILSEN*
1971	1	HACO
1972		
1973	1	ONE
1974	2	UNA / PULLMAN
1975	3	CAN / ONE / ONWC
1976	3	McDRAKE / TON / St. BENEDICTS
1977		

\* - PILSEN, which was founded in 1954, began its transition into a grass-roots issue organization in 1969-1970.

TABLE 3

FULL NAMES AND APPROXIMATE LOCATIONS  
OF ORGANIZATIONS LISTED IN TABLE 2

INITIALS	FULL NAME	LOCATION*	NOTES
B of Y C	Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council	Back of the Yards	
CAN	Concerned Allied Neighbors	Southwest Lakeview	
COUP	Community Of United People	West of U. of Ill. Circle Campus	
CRAGIN +	Cragin Plus	Cragin	1
HACO	Human Action Community Organization	Harvey, Ill. (far south suburb)	
LVCC	Lakeview Citizens Council	Lakeview	
McDrake	McDrake	Southwest Logan Square	
ONC	Organization of New City	New City	
ONE	Organization of the Northeast	Uptown/ Edgewater	
ONWC	Organization for the Northwest Community	Cragin	
NCO	Northwest Community Community	West Town	
NRC	North River Commission	West of Rogers Park	
Pullman	Pullman ? ?	Pullman	2
Pilsen	Pilsen Neighbors Community Council	Pilsen	
St. Benedict	St. Benedict Community	Southern Ravenswood	
TON	The Organization of the Northwest	Near North- west Side	
TWO	The Woodlawn Organization	Woodlawn	
UCC	Uptown Citizens Council	Uptown	
UNA	United Neighbors in Action	Humbolt Park Area	

Notes: \* - Location is Chicago neighborhood unless otherwise  
indicated

1 - Existed 1964-1969, all other organizations survived  
to 1978

2 - Full name known neither to my informants nor to me

date. Several others of the older organizations listed in Table 1 may have undergone similar transformations. When I collected this list of ever-existing grass-roots community organizations, I did not think to ask if the organizations had always been within the Alinsky fold. An additional factor which heightens the uncertainty about the comparisons between Tables 1 and 2 is that ten of the twenty five Austin and Southwest Side organizations were not listed by the informants who produced my initial list of organizations (upon which Table 2 is based). Eight of these ten organizations were founded between 1970 and 1972, with the other two being founded during 1973 and 1975. Had I extended the scope of my interviewing to include the rest of the metropolitan area, I might well have found a number of additional organizations, most of which were founded during the early 1970's, just as I did in both Austin and the Southwest Side.

The conclusion I reach, then, is that the historical pattern of grass-roots community organization founding is relatively similar across the Chicago metropolitan area, but the extent of that similarity between the two areas that I studied and the rest of the city cannot be stated with any degree or certainty, using the information that was available to me.

This brings us to the second question, what seems to be behind this uneven clustering of founding dates? Saul Alinsky did not invent confrontation as a means of attaining desired ends and its application by human communities must extend back into pre-history, even though Alinsky's name is closely associated with its use in contemporary urban settings.

Alinsky founded his first Chicago community organization in 1939 (the Back Of The Yards Council) and did not do anything more along this line in Chicago until the late 1958's, when he helped found the TWO and OSC in two

rather different southside neighborhoods.

The gradual expansion of Alinsky organizing in Chicago, following the founding of TWO and OSC seems to be part of the general pattern of the expansion of the social movement organizing in America that McCarthy and Zald (1973) have described. They attribute the general pattern to two factors, one of which derived from the other. The first factor is the post World War II American affluence which put philanthropic foundations in the position of having ever increasing sums of money to be directed into such activities as social movement organizing, of which Alinsky-style community organizing is but one manifestation. The second factor is the development of social movement organizing as a viable middle class career, something which was made possible by the money provided by the foundations and by the generally increasing affluence of people in the United States. The development of a professional cadre of social movement organizers lagged after the increasing investment of philanthropic foundations in social movements by a number of years. Social movement organizing became a viable career during the 1960's, which is about the time that the expansion of Alinsky organizing was getting started in Chicago.

If the expansion of grass-roots organizing in Chicago is part of a wider pattern of post World War II social movement organizing in America, the prime factor underlying it seems to have been the involvement of the Chicago Archdiocese of the Catholic Church in Alinsky's organizing activities. This involvement got its start with the founding of OCS in 1958 and has continued until at least the late 1970's.

At first, this participation involved permitting various Catholic churches to participate in, and be the major financial supporters of, large scale

organizing efforts in various Chicago community areas. This was the pattern displayed in the founding of OSC (1958), ACO (1963), NCO (1964), OBA and CCO (1966), and of the SCC (1969). Starting in about 1970, the Catholic church stopped merely allowing the churches to spend money on this sort of thing, and, through Catholic Charities, started supplying organizers to approved churches under deals whereby Catholic Charities and the churches would split the organizers' salaries for the first two years. This change produced a shift in orientation from promoting the development of a few area wide organizations to promoting the development of a larger number of smaller parish sized organizations. For example, in 1966 the Catholic churches of Austin were collectively supporting a single organization with their own money. Several years later, in the early 1970's, Catholic Charities and the same parishes were separately supporting half a dozen smaller organizations, each of which represented a separate piece of the area that the OBA alone had represented a few years earlier. This change, by itself, increased the number of grass-roots community organizations in Chicago and produced an apparent expansion of this particular social movement that was probably somewhat greater than the reality that it represented.

At the same time that this was going on, the two dominant Chicago schools of grass-roots community organizing that the the professionalization of social movement organizing had produced, the IAF and Tom Gaudette, were using money from the Catholic Church and various philanthropic foundations to build competing Chicago metropolitan area coalitions of grass-roots community organizations (The Citizens Action Program, built by the IAF, and the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance, built mainly by Gale Cincotta and Shel Trapp of the Gaudette school). These two coalitions

served both as devices for bringing existing organizations together to work on common problems and as vehicles for sending organizers out into the city to create new organizations or revitalize and expand older ones. The IAF and CAP, for example, were behind the founding of OPCO in 1970 and of TON in 1975 or 1976. MAHA and its precursors were involved in the founding of USC, CASC, The Federation, HF, UNA, McDrake, St. Benedict, COUP, and several other organizations, as well as being the vehicle through which GRO was transformed into an Alinsky-style organization. During the mid-1970's MAHA, was also the vehicle through which Catholic Charities distributed its organizers around the city. As long as Catholic Charities was a good source of organizers, this enhanced MAHA's position both as a coalition and as a vehicle for establishing new organizations.

After 1975, both city-wide coalitions went into a decline. CAP went out of business in 1976, and, after 1977, MAHA became more of a formal organization in its own right with limited involvement in local community organizations than an effective coalition of such organizations. No new coalitions have arisen to replace MAHA and CAP. Starting with the mid-1970's also, the Chicago Catholic Archdiocese, under the influence of Cardinal Cody, seems to have lost much of its enthusiasm for community organizing. This seems to have significantly dried up the supply of organizers and of money to found new organizations.

The decline of the coalitions and the changing position of the Catholic church seem to be the major factors behind the decline in the founding of new organizations after 1976 that is shown in Tables 1 and 2. If Catholic Charities had been the most visible source of money to support grass-roots organizing in Chicago, it was not the only source. The existing organiza-

tions seem, for the most part, to have adequately weaned themselves from their dependence on this single source of money and to have diversified their financial bases through securing funding from various private foundations, local churches (especially Catholic), other components of the national Catholic Church, and local fund raising activities. Only certain of the organizations listed in Tables 1 and 2 have had to face this adjustment problem. Among these organizations are MASC and SACCC in Austin and several organizations listed in Table 2 [Note 1]. Other organizations, such as CCSC, NAO, NAC, The Federation, and HF, which had been heavily dependent on Catholic Charities in earlier years, had achieved financial independence, usually through support derived from the Catholic churches in their neighborhoods, before these changes occurred. Some organizations, including WECO, USC, and CCWE declined or disappeared after the coalitions and the direct organizing support from Catholic Charities dried up. In no case, however, were the withdrawal of Catholic Charities organizers and the decline of the coalitions the only significant factors behind the decline of these organizations.

So far, then, the major impact of the decline of the coalitions and the shift in orientation on the part of the Archdiocese has been in the area of founding new organizations. Existing organizations have usually been able to find other sources of support, but no one now seems to be paying organizers to go out and start new organizations in the manner of the previous half decade. In effect, the entry of Catholic Charities into parish oriented community organizing and the development of metropolitan area coalitions seem to be the major factors behind the large number of organizations established between 1970 and 1976. The decline of the coalitions

and the withdrawal of Catholic Charities from its heavy emphasis on this sort of activity seem to be behind the decline in the founding of new organizations after the mid 1970's.

#### B. The "Big Bang" Principle: Organizational Size And Decline

One of the interesting things shown in Table 2 (Chapter 6) is that no organization remained "large" for very long. Two recent organizations that started out small have grown to "large," but they have not yet been that way for very long. All the organizations that started out "large" have declined in size, some after a few years, others almost immediately. Time alone will tell how long the organizations that have grown to "large" will remain that way, but if they stay "large" for more than a few years it may be because they are not as large, relatively speaking, as were the older "large" organizations.

This brings me to what I am going to call, for lack of a better name, the "big bang" principle. It goes as follows: An organization that starts out large enough in relation to the significant elements in its environment has no place to go but down. OSC and OBA held on for a few years before starting to decline; SCC, ACO, and CCO started going down hill almost immediately.

Direct action community organizations are not everybody's cup of tea. Some people stay around for a while, but many more people take a quick look and leave, or participate in a rather casual way. Grass roots organizations, however, are built around more than just people, they are also built around neighborhood problems, problem-oriented activities, and around money. Up to a certain point, people, problems, activities, and money can all be pro-

duced fairly easily. Beyond that point, additional increments are harder to come by. By this, I mean that acquiring and retaining them requires increasingly higher expenditures of what the organization already has in the way of people, problems, and money. The situation is not a zero sum game, but it does seem to tend toward being self-limiting.

The organizations that start out big start with seed money, relatively large donations from organizations which cannot, or will not, maintain that level of funding over the long haul. They also start out with large numbers of people who have not yet learned what they are getting into, and with sets of prospective problems whose solutions have not been tried out in their particular communities and among their particular groups of people.

At the start, much of the money and many of the people come rather cheaply, but they cannot be retained so cheaply. For example, clergymen recruit delegates, to a new organization, who come out of loyalty to their pastors, and money is provided by churches, which have vague or unrealistic expectations about what the organization can, or will, do. Over the long haul, the clergymen have limited leverage over their parishoners and they probably will not want to expend it all on participation on this particular non-church activity. A church may be persuaded to give lots of money this year and postpone the new roof until next year, but it is not likely to repeat the decision for very many years.

Starting big seems like an attractive idea. The seed money and the initially high participation will get the organization off to a good start. The thing will snowball and the organization will gain momentum, bringing in more people, money, and problem solutions. But this is not what happens. Starting big involves starting with much marginal money, many marginal par-

ticipants, and with naive expectations about both the problems and their solutions. The marginal money, people, and the naive expectations are cheaply acquired but they are not so cheaply retained. Nor do their replacements come so cheaply. The organization that starts out big seems to do so by overstretching the capacity of the environment to maintain it. It starts out with a bang and has nowhere to go but down.

But this is not the end of the matter. Starting out big is not necessarily bad. The big bang organizations acquire public recognition, a long term false image of strength, freedom from dependency on a single financial supporter (see the next chapter on the Sugar Daddy problem), and survival resiliency to a degree not available to their less ambitious brethren. In short, down is not the same as out.

#### C. Sharing The Turf: Dominance And Competition Among Alinsky Organizations

The idea of "turf" seems to be unimportant to some organizations and important to others. It seems to be reasonably important to these grass-roots community organizations. All the organizations claim some defined geographical block or territory as their own. Most organizations have formally defined boundaries, although a few claim a named neighborhood entity but do not set explicit boundaries. [Note 2]

The Alinsky-style community organizations seem to assign two meanings to the idea of "turf." First, turf is the area within their boundaries; second, turf is the area that they have organized and consider to be really theirs. For a small parish size organization, these two meanings may describe the same area, but for the geographically larger organizations the area that is "theirs" is usually smaller than the total area that is within their boundaries. The SCC claimed an area extending from Ashland (1600

West) to Cicero (4800 West), but its real base was around Kedzie (3200 West) and it drew very few participants from the far eastern and far western sections. GRO claimed a huge area but it recognizes that, in recent years, its base has been in the north-central section. OBA claimed all of Austin, but after South Austin and the OBA turned mostly black, the organization informally redefined its northern boundary as Chicago Avenue, which was then the theoretical black-white boundary.

The organizations seem to take a rather non-possessive view about the territory that is within their boundaries but which is not part of their "base," but they are rather more possessive when it comes to sharing the home base itself. Both the SCC and TMO claimed the same section of the Southwest Side between Pulaski Road (4000 West) and Cicero Avenue (4800 West), but neither organization had the resources to organize this piece of the city and they both seem to have felt that it would be rather hard to organize. Neither organization did much in the section between Pulaski and Cicero, and no problems resulted. Once South Austin and the OBA had both been left to the blacks, Tom Gaudette, the OBA director, encouraged the whites in the northern end of Austin to set up their own organization and they did so. The OBA had lost this part of its original base and there was no competition between the organizations of North and South Austin. During 1977, both the SCC and CCSC started organizing activities in the newly black Bell-Claremont-Oakley neighborhood on the Southwest Side, which the Federation seemed to have abandoned after the blacks started moving in. By early in 1978 both the SCC and CCSC were having some success in the area, but neither organization seems to have learned that the other was also working there. The area is within the formal boundaries of the SCC and within

the reasonable boundaries of CCSC, but it is not the central base of either organization.

Although the organizations seem generous when it comes to sharing their peripheral territory, they do not seem able to share the same home base. When SAC (now SACCC) split off from the OBA, SAC claimed to represent South Austin. South Austin has also been the OBA's home base and SAC its civic unit there. After the split had become final, the OBA decided that it could not compete with, or exist along the side of, SAC as a grass-roots community organization in South Austin, so the OBA changed to become a social service organization in South Austin. SAC and the OBA continued to claim the same area, but for different purposes, and the competition between them was eliminated. After the SCC inadvertently got the Federation started, the Federation grew to become the dominant organization in their shared territory. In this case, also, sharing the territory included sharing the same home base. The SCC finally conceded the area to the Federation and sought survival by finding its emphasis in whatever the Federation didn't seem to want. The SCC started organizing in the Bell-Oakley-Claremont area only after it went black, and the Federation seemed to have abandoned the area. The SCC moved into Gage Park because the Federation had stayed out and because the Back Of Yards Council was perceived as having not done much there for at least several years. When the SCC learned that the Gage Park Catholic church was joining the Federation effective January, 1979, the SCC concluded that it would probably lose the area to the Federation. The SCC became somewhat equivalent to the fictional man without a country. The Federation spoke for the area, the SCC represented the liberals in the area, but not the area itself.

The apparent inability of two grass-roots community organizations to share the same home base seems to have its explanation at two distinct levels. On one hand, each organization claims to be the spokesman, to be the representative, of a constituency that has been defined in geographical terms. These organizations do not view themselves as representing their constituencies over particular issues, although at any particular time that is all they do. Two organizations could not specialize in, or become functionally differentiated over, particular issues, races, or age groups because each organizations' claim over the constituency is always made in the most general terms. Hence, for two such organizations to claim to represent the same home base would be something of a basic contradiction. Viewed at a very different level, co-existence is hard to accept because the organizations can become possessive and personal. Upon hearing that a church might hire an organizer to work independently in its area, the lead organizer of one organization was heard to say, "if they do, we will send in a few people and blast them off the map." [Note 3]

#### NOTES:

1. I am not able to specify which Table 2 organizations were so affected. I received this information during an informal meeting several years ago during which MAHA staff members and representatives of the financial backers (of which I was one) of one such organization were discussing the situation. I was acting as the representative of my organization, not as a social scientist, and it did not occur to me to record and save the information.
2. These seem similar to Hunter's (1974) description of neighborhoods as being well defined blocks of land or as vaguely delimited entities radiating out from a well defined center.
3. This statement is, of course, not to be taken literally. Most of the

organizations that I studied claimed more territory than they could effectively control, and this organization was no exception. Money was considered as a scarce commodity in almost every organization and this made organizers a scarce commodity. The lead organizer did not actually have "a few people" to send in, and if he had, they probably could not have done much. The grass-roots community organizations that I studied have no impersonal means of coercive social control over their communities. The organizations are built mainly through personal contacts. An organizer who comes in new, or is shifted from one sector of an organization's territory to another, must develop contacts with the people as his means of building the organization. If the church had actually hired an organizer, he would have been faced with the same constraints in building an alternative organization. In fact, the church did not hire an organizer, but for totally different reasons. The lead organizer's statement is best understood as symbolizing a grass-root community organization's possessiveness over its territory and as a short-term angry reaction over the idea that a liberal activist church would not recognize the organization's primacy within that territory.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### PARISH VERSUS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

When I first was developing this research project, one of of my expert informants looked at my proposed list of organizations and said that I had included both community organizations and parish organizations. The parish organizations, he said, were not really community organizations; they tended to be part of the church rather than a means whereby people of the community could come together and work on their problems.

Another expert informant viewed the situation differently: the parish organizations were a legitimate and often desirable form of community organization. In the heavily Catholic, white neighborhoods of Chicago, the people often view the parish as the local neighborhood [Note 1]. In addition, the parish is a handy unit because it is about as far as people are willing to walk to a meeting. In Chicago, I was told, parishes average about one square mile in area. Organizations that include a significantly larger area within their boundaries will not be able to establish a grass-roots base or bring people out to meetings from throughout all their territory. In a white neighborhood, he said, if you can organize the Catholics then you have the organization made. The Protestants are window dressing to make the thing look good, but they never have enough people or money to carry the organization.

The question of whether Alinsky style organizations built around Catholic parishes are really church organizations or community organizations is as much a value judgement as it is an empirical question, but the fact is that, in Chicago, the Catholic Church has heavily influenced the pattern of grass-roots community organizing, and the relationship between church and community

organization bears some investigation.

Table 1 is a list of the twenty-five organizations, separated according to whether their boundaries were based on secular community units or on parish boundary units. The table also indicates which organizations were ever supported primarily by the Catholic church. Even though many people were said to identify their parish as their neighborhood, the distinction between parish and secular boundaries was not vague. All my informants identified neighborhood boundaries that did not exactly match the parish boundaries. In most cases, the neighborhood was bigger than the parish; in other cases, each unit included some land not included in the other; and in a few cases, the parish and secular boundaries overlaid each other in a sort of crazy-quilt manner. Examples of each parish-secular unit pattern will be presented and discussed later in this chapter.

Organizations coded as heavily supported by the Catholic Church received most or all of their financial resources from one or another of three sources: (1) the Catholic church within the boundaries of which the organization had its geographical base, (2) a number of Catholic churches inside the boundaries of which the organization had its base, (3) Catholic Charities, which provided organizers to various Catholic parishes to set up community organizations within their boundaries. Sometimes the funding came only from the churches; in a few cases, it seems to have come only from Catholic Charities; and in most cases, it came from both. Often the distribution of funding, between the churches and Catholic Charities, changed over the years. This financial support might have included any or all of the following: direct money payments to the organization, paying one or more organizers to work in the organization in which case the organizers were

TABLE 1  
ORGANIZATION BOUNDARIES AND THE CATHOLIC PARISHES

ORGAN- IZATION	BOUNDARIES		EVER HEAVILY SUPPORTED BY CATHOLIC CHURCH	COMMENTS	(TABLE CODES)
	Secular	Parish			
ACO	M-		X		Col. 2-5
CASC		S+	X	Omitted part of parish not in Chicago	Blank = Not Applicable
CCO	L-		X		
CCSC		S+	X		Col. 4
CCWE	S+				X = Yes
CIA	S+		X	Now excludes part of parish not in Calumet Park	Col. 2,3
GRO	M-		X		Letter = Size At Founding
HF		S+	X	Multiple parish boundaries	S=Small M=Medium L=Large
LF		S+	X		
MAC		M+	X		
MASC		M+	X	Boundaries theoretically extend beyond parish	Sign = Date Of Founding
NAC		S+	X	Omits part of parish not in Chicago	- = Before 1970
NACC		M+	X	Multiple parish boundaries	+ = 1970 Or After
NAO		S+	X		
OBA	L-		X		
OPCO	S+				
OSC	L-		X		
SACCC	M+		X		
SCC	L-		X		
Fed.		S+	X	Multiple parish boundaries	
SCAC	S+				
TMO	M+				
USC		S+	X		
VHCO	S+				
WECO	M+				
TOTALS	14	11	19		

supplied by Catholic Charities (or by MAHA during the period when MAHA was serving as the vehicle through which Catholic Charities was distributing organizers around the city), office space, office materials (including telephone, paper, mimeograph machine, bulletin board, desks and chairs, and space for the organization to hold its meetings. This help was usually the most significant during the organization's early years, although there were a few exceptions which will be described later.

None of the organizations founded before 1970 followed parish boundaries, even when the Catholic church was the major financial sponsor of the organization. All the pre-1970 organizations heavily supported by the Catholic church were organized as Protestant - Catholic ecumenical efforts and used secular boundaries. These boundaries ranged from municipal limits (Cicero, Illinois for CCO), to "ecological" dividing lines (SCC, for which one might note that the parish boundaries closely followed the same ecological lines, and GRO), and to recognized city neighborhood boundaries (ACO and OBA).

Tables 2, 3, and 4 further clarify the relationship between parish versus secular boundaries in relationship to date of founding and size at time of founding. Only two of the organizations, listed as having been founded during 1970 or later and having been heavily supported by the Catholic church, did not use parish boundaries. The two organizations, SACCC in South Austin and the CIA in Calumet Park, differed from the other post-1969 organizations, which received most of their support from the Catholic church, in two rather significant ways. First, neither organization was actually founded with the direct help of the Catholic church; and second, the presence of well defined neighborhood or municipal boundaries had a lot to do with the found-

TABLE 2

ORGANIZATIONS HEAVILY SUPPORTED BY THE CATHOLIC  
CHURCH, BY TIME AND SIZE AT FOUNDING, AND BY  
USE OF PARISH OR SECULAR BOUNDARIES

DATE FOUNDED	BOUNDARIES	SIZE WHEN FOUNDED		
		LARGE	MEDIUM	SMALL
Founded before 1970	Parish	0	0	0
	Secular	4	2	0
Founded 1970 or after	Parish	0	2	9
	Secular	0	1	1

TABLE 3

ORGANIZATIONS NOT DIRECTLY SUPPORTED  
BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, BY TIME AND  
SIZE AT FOUNDING

DATE FOUNDED	SIZE WHEN FOUNDED		
	LARGE	MEDIUM	SMALL
Before 1970	0	0	0
1970 or after	0	2	4

TABLE 4

ORGANIZATIONS FOUNDED AFTER 1970 AND HEAVILY  
SUPPORTED BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, BY SECULAR  
OR PARISH BOUNDARIES, BY RACIAL COMPOSITION  
OF NEIGHBORHOOD AT FOUNDING, AND BY SIZE AT  
FOUNDING\*

BOUNDARIES	RACIAL COMP.	SIZE WHEN FOUNDED		
		LARGE	MEDIUM	SMALL
Parish	White	0	1	4
	Changing	0	1	3
	Black	0	0	2
Secular	White	0	0	1
	Changing	0	0	0
	Black	0	1	0

Note:

- \* - All the pre-1970 organizations were founded in white neighborhoods and they were not included in this table.

ing of both these organizations. In South Austin, the SACCC got its start as the neighborhood's civic unit of OBA and became an autonomous organization partly because the SACCC leaders felt that OBA had become ineffective and partly because they felt that the OBA had deserted their neighborhood for the section of Austin north of Lake Street. At the time, the SACCC (initially as part of OBA) had been receiving quite a bit of direct financial support from the two Catholic churches in South Austin, and this support made it easy for SACCC to remain financially viable when it separated from the OBA. The SACCC continued to receive most of its support from one or another component of the Catholic church until at least 1977. The CIA in Calumet Park was started by a group of citizens who were concerned about what the presence of racial change in the adjacent neighborhoods of Chicago meant for their community. Not long after starting their organization, they began receiving organizing help when the the local Catholic church and Catholic Charities agreed to provide the parish with an organizer. The church turned the organizer over to the CIA. For a while thereafter, the CIA tried to include the adjacent Chicago neighborhood of Victory Heights within its boundaries because that area was part of the parish. This effort did not work out and not long after, the CIA redrew its boundaries to again include only the village of Calumet Park. The support received from the Catholic church seems to have been the main reason why the CIA was able to grow from being a small volunteer organization to a larger and much more effective community organization. However, the church did not found the organization and within a few years the CIA was able to diversify its resource base so that the Catholic church is no longer its primary means of support.

All but three of the eleven organizations founded after 1969 which received heavy support from the Catholic church and which follow parish boundaries, were founded through the direct intervention of the Catholic church. In almost every case this intervention occurred because the church pastor asked Catholic Charities to provide his parish with a community organizer. The two possible exceptions were at Little Flower and St. Ethelreda (USC) parishes where it is not clear whether the pastor approached Catholic Charities or whether the Archdiocese, seeking to counter the influence of Father Lawlor in those parishes, approached the church pastors first.

Even the three organizations which were not founded through the direct intervention of the church do not deviate very far from this pattern. These three organizations were MAC and NACC in Austin and the Federation on the Southwest Side. MAC was founded by the combination of a small and predominantly Catholic residents of Help of Christian (HOC) parish in the east-central section of Austin and NAC in North Austin, which was a parish sized organization in St. Angela parish, which had been founded with the direct support and encouragement of the parish pastor. Both the NAC leaders and the residents of HOC parish were concerned about the threat of racial change of their neighborhood and wanted to do something about it. The HOC pastor seems to have had a fatalistic view toward racial change and community organizing and he did nothing to help his parishoners prepare for the change. Not long thereafter, HOC received new pastors and the church has been directly involved in the community organizing activities within its boundaries ever since. NACC, also in North Austin, was a short-lived umbrella organization covering three parish organizations, NAC, NAO, and MAC, each of which was or soon would be strongly supported by its parish pastor. NAC and NAO,

the two big organizations within the coalition, were being supported by their Catholic churches at the time that NACC was founded. The Federation got its start because the SCC pressured Catholic Charities to sending an organizer into its Southwest Side neighborhood. The SCC expected that the organizer would be working for it, but Catholic Charities assigned the organizer to two parishes, only one of which had a pastor who supported the SCC. The organizer asked the pastors to select a joint parish committee for him to work with and they agreed. The organizer decided that the SCC did not have any future as a community organizer and he set about to found a new organization. The decision to found the Federation was the organizer's rather than either the pastors' or Catholic Charities', but from the beginning the organization has had a close relationship with, and received the financial support of, the Catholic parishes in which it is located.

Two of the eleven parish based organizations founded after 1969 have boundaries which do not correspond exactly with the local parish boundaries. In neither case, however, does this prevent the organization from being clearly identified as a parish based organization. One such organization is NAC, in northwestern Austin. A small section of the parish is located in the adjacent suburb of Oak Park. At first NAC included this area within its boundaries but later decided that it would be better to restrict itself to only the Chicago section of the parish. Most of NAC's leaders and members have come from the Catholic church; the church has been its primary means of reaching out into the community; its office is in the church rectory; it uses the church for most of its meetings; and for a long time, most of its financial support came from one or another part of the Catholic church.

The other such organization was CASC, in west-central Austin immediately

south of NAC. CASC was located in St. Lucy parish, which was also split between Chicago and Oak Park with the church physical plant being located in the Chicago side of the parish. Like NAC, CASC was organized by the local Catholic parish, but there was one major difference. CASC was organized by lay members of the church with the support of the assistant pastor, but with the opposition of the church pastor. All the lay supporters of CASC from St. Lucy's seem to have come from the Oak Park side of the parish, and the organization, whose neighborhood members were mostly Protestants and liberal Catholics who were not really part of the church, soon separated from the church. Even so, apart from contributions from its members, the only known fund raising activities undertaken by CASC involved trying to get Catholic Charities and St. Lucy's to properly support the organization.

All but two of the parish based organizations were organized around a single parish. The two organizations, the Federation and HF, which were built around more than one parish, illustrate rather closely the relationship between parish and organizational boundaries. The Federation was started with St. Gall and St. Nicholas parishes, the two parishes that agreed to accept the Catholic Charities organizer that the SCC wanted, as its boundaries. Over the years, the Federation has expanded until its boundaries have come to include all the Catholic parished within the old SCC territory that are west of Bell Street (see the map in the Federation section of Chapter 5). Each expansion of the Federation has resulted from another Catholic church joining the organization and each expansion has produced organizational boundaries which match the combined boundaries of the Catholic churches that belong to the organization. In addition, the Federation has divided its area into smaller civic units,

one for each member parish. The boundaries of these civic units also match those of the parish in which each is located.

In a similar manner, the HF is based on a number of parishes. In this case, the parishes are those which constituted the white part of the Southwest Cluster of Catholic parishes at the time that the organization was founded. Two parishes at the eastern end of the cluster had changed from white to black before the HF was founded and they were excluded from the organization. As I described in the HF case study, the organization possesses what would appear to be some very strange boundaries, if its relationship to the Catholic church were not known. The HF territory contains the suburb of Evergreen Park at its center, with various Chicago neighborhoods, or parts thereof, as its northern, eastern, and southern edges. Only along the northern and part of the eastern edge do the organizational and neighborhood boundaries correspond. This is because the organization, the parishes and the neighborhoods all stop at a common boundary - a major railroad and industrial strip and a forest preserve which collectively clearly separate the area from the residential neighborhoods to the north and to the northwest. Along the southern edge and part of the eastern edge, the combined parish and organization boundary cuts through the recognized neighborhoods in such a way that every such neighborhood, and even the suburb of Marionette Park, is partly inside of and partly outside of the HF's boundaries.

In the pre-1970 organizations, with their larger secularly defined areas, a balance usually existed between the Protestants and the Catholics that has often been lacking in the smaller parish based white neighborhood organizations. The older organizations were usually umbrella organizations in which the member units were other organizations, especially churches and

their various committees. In any white neighborhood, there were more Catholics residents and more Protestant churches. These organizations were, at least in their early years, sponsored by an ecumenical clergy association. This sponsorship insured that both the Protestant and the Catholic churches were drawn into the organization.

In contrast, in the more recent white area, parish based organizations, the primary outreach has been to the Catholics. There have been several reasons for this. In the first place, when the organizer was sent to the parish by Catholic Charities, or even when sent out through MAHA, the organizer was sent to the Catholic church, not to the parish as an abstract unit of territory. The organizers would start by working through the church and often one of the parish priests would be interested in organizing and would work closely with the organizer. This focus was intentional: after all it was the Catholic Church, the parish church and/or Catholic Charities, that was paying the salary, not some ecumenical clergy group. In the second place, working through the parish church was the easiest way to find recruits for the organization. Every white neighborhood that I studied seems to have been at least half Catholic. It has been a traditional policy of the Catholic Church that people attend the church within the parish boundaries in which they live. This meant that the Catholic church was a direct pipeline to a group of people that, in theory at least, all lived in the organization's area and comprised at least half the area's population. When, as was almost always the case for these post-1969 parish based organizations, the parish priests were in favor of the organization, the organizers could readily use the church newsletter and system of social networks to reach a large segment of the potential constituency. The more numerous Protestant churches

were always smaller, almost always very much smaller, than the Catholic church and their memberships were more widely dispersed. The areas claimed by the bigger pre-1970 organizations were large enough to contain a substantial share of the membership of many of these Protestant churches. The areas claimed by the parish organizations are enough smaller that most of the members of the Protestant churches may live outside the parish in which the churches are located. By the same token, most of the parish's non-Catholic residents probably belong to religious organizations that are located outside the parish. The net result that there is no easy way to reach the area's non-Catholic residents. There is an easy way to reach the Catholic majority and for this reason, the organizer would likely turn to the Catholic church for help in recruiting members even if the Catholic church was not his employer.

Even though the parish-based organization's primary recruitment path is the Catholic church, no such organization had an entirely Catholic membership. The other primary vehicle for spreading publicity about the organization, apart from the Catholic church's internal channels, is usually the neighborhood newspaper. The organization is identified, in both vehicles, as a community organization. As a result of this publicity and the "street work" (going door to door to recruit members) done by the organizers, the organization does extend its recruitment operations beyond those that are internal to the Catholic church. Human interest in community organization participation is by no means a peculiarly Catholic trait and, in response to publicity, people often will seek out the organization once they become aware of it, even though they have not been directly recruited by it.

These various recruitment channels produce a differential recruitment pat-

tern, as a result of which the organization is almost exclusively Catholic at its onset and becomes increasingly less so as time passes. NAO in St. Peter Canisius parish, for example, started out with a membership that was about ninety percent Catholic, even though the organization could trace its ancestry back to an volunteer group sponsored jointly by St. Peter Canisius Church and the largest Protestant church in the area. NAO got its start when St. Peter Canisius church received an organizer from Catholic Charities who started out by working through St. Peter Canisius Church in the manner described above. Five years later, in 1977, NAO was down to about sixty percent Catholic.

The Catholic Church supported organizations located in black neighborhoods are in a significantly different position because black neighborhoods have relatively few Catholics. This means that the Catholic church is not a very good vehicle for reaching out to the people in such neighborhoods. Table 5 lists the organizations that have been in black neighborhoods while receiving heavy financial support from the Catholic Church. Unlike the white area post-1969 organizations which were sufficiently similar that they could be discussed together, the six organizations listed in Table 5 are rather different in several dimensions that are relevant to their relationship to the Catholic church in their area. Three of the organizations were founded when the neighborhood was white, or at least predominantly white, and were able to benefit from the drawing power of the Catholic Church in getting started. One of these organizations (GRO) was founded by an ecumenical clergy group as a traditional civic organization and it did not become an Alinsky organization until five years later. The other three organizations were founded after 1969 as parish type organizations, founded solely through

TABLE 5

ORGANIZATIONS IN BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS RECEIVING  
HEAVY SUPPORT FROM THE CATHOLIC CHURCH BY RACIAL  
COMPOSITION OF NEIGHBORHOOD WHEN ORGANIZATION WAS  
FOUNDED, BY SOURCES OF CATHOLIC CHURCH SUPPORT,  
AND BY OUTCOME (SURVIVED OR DIED)

ORGAN- IZAT- ION	RACIAL COMPOSIT- ION OF NEIGHBOR- HOOD AT FOUNDING			SOURCES OF CATHOLIC CHURCH SUPPORT*			BOUND- ARIES		OUTCOME (AS OF 1978)	
	WHITE	CHANG-	BLACK	LOCAL CHURCH	CATHOLIC CHARITIES	CAT. CHAR. THRU MAHA	SECU- LAR	PAR- ISH	ALIVE	DEAD
GCSC			X	X		X		X	X	
GRO	X					X	X		X	
LF		1		X	X			X		X
MASC		2			X			X	X	
SACCC			X	X		X	X		X	
USC	3			X	X			X		X

## NOTES:

\* - In this table only money contributions are being counted. Office space and other in-kind contributions are being excluded from consideration.

1 - Changing, but mostly white

2 - Changing, but mostly black

3 - White, but just about to change

the impetus of the Catholic Church. Another organization, MASC, was in a relatively similar position except that the neighborhood had mostly changed, with the result that the Catholic church was no longer as effective a pipeline to the community. MASC, however, was not started from scratch. It was built from the bases that had been left by MAC and OBA after they lost their effectiveness as grass-roots organizations. Another organization, SACCC, was founded as a part of OBA and it did not need the Catholic Church to get started, although it did become dependent on the church for its survival a couple of years later.

Only one of the organizations that I studied, CCSC, was founded from scratch by the Catholic Church after the neighborhood had become black. CCSC was started after the local church, St. Justin Martyr, was assigned an assistant pastor who wanted to do community organizing. MAHA agreed to send out two organizers and they went out ringing door bells and stuffing mail boxes. For CCSC, the church as a pipeline was replaced by organizers doing street work. A little later, after CCSC had been started, it was able to survive the split between the assistant pastor and MAHA, which cost the organization its organizers, because it existed and thereby was able to generate the publicity that it needed to survive with the organizing help that was provided by the priest from St. Justin Martyr.

The Catholic Church, in one form or another, seems to have been the major supporter of grass-roots community organizations in black neighborhoods, even though most of the neighborhoods' residents are not Catholic and even though most of the organizations' participants are also not Catholic. Although, as will be shown in the next chapter, the church is the major financial backer during the founding period, the black neighborhood organ-

izations do not achieve the financial independence from the church that is common among white neighborhood organizations during the maintenance period. [Note: this pattern remained stable through at least 1977, when I was doing my field work. By 1980, with the declining Catholic Church support of community organizing, the pattern may be changing, but it is too soon to tell what direction things are now taking.] In part this is because the black neighborhoods do not seem to have the resources that white neighborhoods have for attaining alternate financial bases, and in part it is because the Chicago Catholic Church has produced a pool of younger priests who believe that community organizing is one, and perhaps the only, way of making their church relevant to the problems of racially changing and black neighborhoods. Many of these priests seem to have gone out of their way to promote a grass-roots community organization in their black or changing neighborhoods, in a way that is true of neither their colleagues in white neighborhoods nor of the other institutions in their black neighborhoods. [Note 2]

The support of the Catholic Church seems, by default if not otherwise, to be essential to the nurturing of grass-roots organizations in black neighborhoods, but the emphasis on parish boundaries which seems to be commonly associated with this source of support may be dysfunctional in black neighborhoods, in a way that is not true in a white neighborhood. MASC, in Mid-Austin, is an excellent example of this problem. MASC was founded in Help Of Christians (HOC) parish by a parish priest and an organizer that he secured from Catholic Charities after the neighborhood had turned mostly black. HOC parish occupies only the eastern half of Mid-Austin; the western half of the Mid-Austin area has had no organization since CASC folded and the OBA got out of grass-roots organizing in about 1975. The parish focus

provided by the priest and the Catholic Charities organizer seem to have helped the MASC leaders to perceive of the western section of Mid-Austin as being outside their neighborhood. Even though the organization seems verbally to say that the western side of Mid-Austin is within their organization's boundaries, MASC has never done any organizing there. As a result of the MASC leaders' perception of the area as being outside their neighborhood, the organization made a big issue of getting the city to use federal money to build a needed recreation center in their neighborhood, even though both the city and the YMCA already had big recreation centers in the western half of Mid-Austin just a few blocks west of the HOC parish boundary. Needless to say, MASC leaders lost the fight for their center, in spite of their having made it the major focus of their organization.

The focus on this chapter has been on whether parish based grass-roots organizations are really community organizations. Even though the question can not be fully answered through empirical investigation, certain conclusions do stand out. In white neighborhoods, the parish seems to be a good organizing unit because the neighborhood is usually mostly Catholic. This makes the parish something of a social unit and the Church becomes a very good pipeline for reaching the people. The recognized secular neighborhood units, however, do not match the parish boundaries, and this can create problems for parish based organizations, especially in black neighborhoods in which the parish is not a natural social unit for the area's residents. In white neighborhoods, a parish based grass-roots organization starts out basically as a church organization, but the various channels used to recruit members make it increasingly less a church organization as time passes. After a few years these organizations turn into small community organiza-

tions the boundaries of which are restricted to the Catholic parish in which each is located. In a black neighborhood, the parish based organization is never a church organization because there are too few black Catholics to make it such, even at the start. Even though parish based grass-roots organizations become community organizations, in terms of their participating constituency, they tend to remain financially dependent on the Catholic Church in a manner that is not true for their brethren who are based in larger, secular, neighborhood-bounded territories. As I will show in the next chapter, this dependence ties the survival of the parish based organizations to the ability, or willingness of the Catholic church to support the organization on an on-going basis. To a considerable extent, the secularly based organizations are free of this dependency on a single financial backer.

#### NOTES:

1. This opinion was volunteered by a number of informants from several organizations. When, as is sometimes the case, upwards of 80% of the population is Catholic, even the Protestants will identify the parish as their neighborhood. Not all the informants who provided this information were Catholic, which enhances the credibility of their statements. It should be noted, however, that Hunter (1974) did not note any such phenomenon in his study of Chicago neighborhoods.
2. The reader should not infer that the Catholic Church is the sole supporter of black neighborhood organizations. Four of the six organizations never heavily supported by the Catholic Church were in black neighborhoods. Starting in the 1950's, the Chicago Archdiocese was headed by Cardinals who supported community organizing. Cardinal Cody, the current head, seems not to share this enthusiasm. By 1978, his views were beginning to have some effect and the church involvement in organizing has declined since then. This contributed to the separation between Catholic Charities and MAHA during 1978.

## CHAPTER NINE

THE SURVIVAL OF ALINSKY-STYLE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS:  
THE SUGAR DADDY HYPOTHESIS

Bailey (1974) has hypothesized that perceived threat to a neighborhood and the presence of a sufficiently large middle class element in the population to respond to the threat are the basic conditions which enable an Alinsky organization to get started and to survive thereafter. This hypothesis seemed plausible, based on the limited perspective provided by Bailey's case study of a single organization. The problem with a single organization case study, as I have already indicated, is that although the researcher can get a good understanding of the social dynamics within the organization, no basis exists for making the comparisons needed to develop causal explanations for the general pattern of organizational development and change that has been observed.

Viewed from the perspective of the twenty five organizations that I studied, which included the one (OBA) that Bailey studied, things look quite different. As a result, I now offer an alternate hypothesis (or more accurately, an empirical generalization) to explain the creation and maintenance of Alinsky type community organizations: An Alinsky organization will be created when someone is willing to put up the money to get it started, and it will survive as long as someone is willing to foot the bill.

Perceived threats and a middle class base would seem to be very helpful in getting an organization started, but they probably are not necessary and represent subjective concepts which, even if they do have a real base, are hard to pin down in any objective manner. All neighborhoods are hetero-

geneous in many ways, and it is not likely that a neighborhood exists in which some segment of the population would not be willing to organize around some perceived threat - be it block busting, mortgage redlining, air pollution, excessive military spending, water fluoridation, or communist invasion. By the same token, the desirable attributes to be found in middle class residents are a sense of political efficacy and a tendency toward civic participation. But these attributes are neither possessed by all middle class people nor are they necessarily unique to them. Neither is any neighborhood devoid of middle class people or of people possessing a middle class orientation even if they are not themselves middle class [Note 1]. Alinsky organizations are not built solely of middle class people, although they will ordinarily dominate the leadership core when they do participate. Alinsky (1972) has stated that even his strongest organizations have never involved more than three percent of the local population. This means that a very small number of middle class people in a neighborhood can go a long way, as far as Alinsky organizing is concerned.

What Alinsky organizers, and Bailey also, do is make threat a scarce commodity by defining some threats as legitimate while rejecting others. Hence Alinsky organizing, as manifested in these twenty five organizations, represents organizing around only certain values. For example, activism on behalf of stopping panic peddling, preventing redlining, and eliminating slum landlords is good, while activism in support of these same activities is bad. By the same token, stable communities are preferable to rapidly changing ones, which is why Alinsky organizers will work to retain white property owners while the area is white, to prevent wholesale turnover and disorganization when integration does come, and to rebuild the community

after racial change and the establishment predators that accompany it have taken their toll. In all probability, the main reason why my informants did not identify Father Lawlor and his block clubs as being within the Alinsky tradition is that his organizers were working with a slightly different value system. His group had a zero sum image of political incorporation and it carried the white property owner stability theme too far in strongly opposing racial integration. At the same time, however, Lawlor and the Alinsky groups have one thing in common. Their focus is on political incorporation and they work within a framework of welfare goals rather than symbolic goals. In this respect, Lawlor and many (or perhaps even most) of his followers seem not to have been segregationists in the classical sense. To the classical segregationist, the symbols were at least as important as the welfare benefits.

None of the twenty five organizations that I studied, or any other grass roots community organization that I have heard of, has been built using funds raised from community members directly for that purpose, and very few such organizations have been able to raise enough money from their constituency to stay solvent, once they were up and running. The money to found an organization ordinarily came from local churches, which originally raised the money for other purposes but now were willing to spend it on the Alinsky organization based on the decisions of the pastor, the hierarchy above him, or the board of trustees. Funds also sometimes came from some local businessmen, usually active church members, who were following their pastor's lead in giving some money or from certain outside sources, usually Catholic Charities or an Alinsky-style city-wide coalition organization. The money to maintain an organization, once it has been started, comes from local churches,

from local businesses, many of which did not give money during the founding period, from local fund-raising activities, from Catholic Charities, from the city-wide coalitions, and/or from various local philanthropic foundations. Many organizations have dues or membership fees but this never brings in much money.

Table 1 contains a listing of where the money to start each organization came from and where the money came from to keep it going thereafter. In Table 1, contributions in kind are treated as income. For example, an organization that receives office space and supplies from a church and has its organizer paid by Catholic Charities is listed as having received income from all these sources, even though no money may actually have passed through the organization's hands. Only the significant or major sources of income are listed in the table, and the comparative levels of support are not indicated. Many organizations get nickel and dime support from many different sources, but the total is usually negligible. To list every source of support without indicating the differential amounts provided would have involved presenting misleading information. In addition, the information in Table 1 is aggregated over the entire creation period and over the entire maintenance period for each organization.

Table 1 shows that churches are far and away the most common source of support for these organizations both during and after founding. The difference is that church support is usually the major source of support during the founding period while it is merely one of several major sources of support during the maintenance period. Catholic Charities became important after 1970, as an alternative to having the local Catholic church put up money for an organizer. Catholic Charities was an important source of

TABLE 1

MAJOR SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR EACH ORGANIZATION  
AGGREGATED OVER FOUNDING AND MAINTENANCE PERIODS

ORGAN- IZAT- ION	DURING FOUNDING					SOURCES OF SUPPORT* DURING MAINTENANCE								
	CH	BU	CC	CW	OA	CH	BU	CC	CW	OA	FC	FS	FO	GO
ACO	X					X								
CASC	X					X		X						
CCO	X					X	X							
CCSC	X		X			X								
CCWE					X				X					
CIA	X		X			X	X	X				X		
GRO	X	X				X	X		X			X		
HF	X		X			X		X				X		
LF	X		X			X		X						
MAC	X				X	X		X		X				
MASC	X		X			X		X	X					
NAC	X		X		X	X		X				X		
NACC	X				X	X				X				
NAO	X		X		X	X		X				X		
OBA	X					X	X				X	X	X	X
OPCO				X		X	X					X	X	
OSC	X	X				X	X					X		
SACCC	X				X	X	X	X	X					
SCAC														X
SCC	X					X	X						X	
Fed.	X		X			X	X				X			
TMO	X			X			X		X			X		
USC	X	X				X	X							
VHCO									X			X		
WECO	X					X								X
TOTALS	21	2	8	2	6	21	8	9	6	2	2	10	2	3

\* Sources of Support:

CH = Church (single churches or a group acting together)  
 BU = Businesses, usually located in the neighborhood  
 CC = Catholic Charities  
 CW = City-Wide Coalition (MAHA or CAP)  
 OA = Other Alinsky Organization (a community organization)  
 FC = Fund-raising (canyassing)  
 FS = Fund-raising (social activities, dues, "passing the hat")  
 FO = Foundations (usually local rather than national)  
 GO = Government Agency (federal, state, municipal)

income, during both the founding and maintenance periods through its programs of sending organizers to the parishes and paying half or all of their salaries. Among the churches, either directly or through Catholic Charities, the dominant income source was the Catholic Church. Protestant churches put up small amounts of money for all the organizations founded before 1970 and for a few organizations founded after 1970, but for only one organization (WECO) was a Protestant church, the Presbyterian denomination, the major religious contributor.

In a few cases, an existing community organization or a coalition provided an organizer to help get an organization started. For purposes of analysis, this help can be considered as either direct and intentional or it can be considered as indirect and inadvertant. Direct and intentional help from another local community organization seems to have been restricted to the Austin neighborhood, where the OBA helped NAC get started and NAC then helped start MAC, NAO, and NACC. Only OBA seems to have been operating with an altruistic motive, NAC thought that it needed the other organizations that it helped start to protect its own area from racial change. To a considerable extent, the help provided by NAC was help from various components of the Catholic Church because it was they, not NAC itself, that were supporting NAC. In contrast, the OBA had a fairly well diversified financial base at the time that it was helping NAC, and its help was basically from the one organization to the other. The help provided by OBA and NAC differed in one other way. The help provided by NAC was not altruistically provided but it was open and above board. The help provided by OBC to NAC, on the other hand, was quietly provided to the NAC leaders by the OBA director and neither party seems to have wanted the fact ad-

vertised. The blacks in South Austin probably would have objected to using their organization's resources to help create another organization in the northern end of its territory, and the whites in northern Austin probably would not have accepted NAC if they had known that it was receiving help from the OBA.

The two instances of unintended assistance in the creation of a new organization involve two Southwest Side organizations. In one case, the SCC sent one of its West German conscientious objector organizers, who wanted to work in a black neighborhood, into the West Englewood area to set up a civic unit for SCC. The internal problems that the SCC was experiencing helped it to lose control of what its organizer was doing, and the end product was WECO, as an independent organization rather than a West Englewood unit of SCC. In the other case, the experienced leadership pool that OSC left behind when it abruptly collapsed served as both the impetus for organizing SCAC and as the leadership and volunteer staff group that actually put together the successor organization.

In only two cases was a city-wide coalition the major resource base used in creating a local organization. In one case this was intentional, in the other case, it may not have been. The intentional case, involves the help that CAP provided in organizing TMO. CAP and TMO were started in the same area of the city, and many CAP leaders wanted to have their own neighborhood community organization after CAP went city-wide. As a result, CAP provided the organizers that helped organize TMO. Close relations, and a partially overlapping leadership group, existed between the two organizations for another two years before TMO separated from CAP. This happened after the CAP group lost an election to the non-CAP group for leadership succession in TMO.

In the other case, which may not have been intentional, CAP sent an organizer to Oak Park to establish a chapter of CAP there. The organizer and his first recruits spent the first six months building Oak Park-CAP into a viable organization. After another six months, the organization had raised enough money to pay the organizer directly; it then broke away from CAP and became an autonomous and independent community organization.

Business contributions seem to have been an important factor in the founding of only two organizations. In one case, OSC, the contributors were active in the dominant sponsoring Catholic church, and the contributions were something of an extension of the church. The other organization to receive a significant amount of founding resources from business sources was GRO, but GRO was founded as a traditional civic community organization and did not become an Alinsky organization until half a decade later.

The reader may have noticed that none of the Table 1 founding period income columns are checked for the Victory Heights Community Organization. Among the organizations that I studied, VHCO comes closest to having been founded using only indigenous resources. VHCO established a policy of raising and maintaining the smallest possible treasury and seems to have been helped greatly by its relationship with CAP. This relationship was established near the end of the founding period or early in the maintenance period, and the leadership training provided by CAP seems to have been an important factor in building VHCO into an effective organization. When CAP folded and VHCO reverted to an independent, minimal budget volunteer effort and lost several of its trained leaders, the organizations seems to have lost much of its power and effectiveness.

Certain income sources listed in Table 1 represent what might be called

"point sources." That is, the income listed under that category usually comes from a single source. Examples include the church, where the church is either a single Catholic parish church or a clergy association acting as a single unit, Catholic Charities, or a city-wide coalition. Other income categories, however, usually involve more diffuse sources, by which I mean that the money came from several places with no one contributor playing a really dominant role. Examples include fund-raising activities, where many people or organizations contribute something, and business contributions, which seem never to have come mainly from one company.

Almost every organization was founded using a single contributor income source. This source was usually a Catholic church, a Catholic church and Catholic Charities jointly paying an organizer, an ecumenical clergy association acting as a single unit, Catholic Charities, or a city-wide coalition. After the organization was founded, the financial base was often diversified so that the organization was not highly dependent on any one contributor. This was especially true of the big organizations founded before 1970, where income diversification was a major goal of the staff director. In most cases, this income diversification was achieved by finding new sources of income to supplement the existing ones, thereby reducing the proportion of income controlled by any one source. In a few cases, however, income diversification was achieved at least in part because a clergy association stopped contributing as a group and started contributing as individual churches. This shift produced diversification without itself producing an expanded income base. The only big pre-1970 organization not to develop a diversified income base after being founded was ACO, which hired an ineffective director and never gained financial independence

from the clergy association that put up the money to found the organization. For the ACO, the clergy association never turned into a group of individually contributing churches. When enough heavily contributing Catholic pastors became dissatisfied with the ACO, all the churches stopped contributing, even though several pastors were sympathetic with what ACO was doing.

Very few of the organizations founded since 1970 have sought and achieved financial security in the sense of not being highly dependent on one or two major contributors. Table 2 is a listing of the organizations according to whether they have ever been highly dependent on a single income contributor since being founded. Most of the organizations that were ever dependent upon a single source during their maintenance period were always that way. In most cases, the dependency remained with the same source, but in at least one case, WECO, the dependency shifted from one organization to another. WECO went from being dependent on the Presbyterian Church to dependency on the Wiebolt Foundation, and from there to the state agency that funds the mental health center. Four organizations are coded with question marks as to whether they were always dependent on a single source. In two cases, the question marks indicate lack of information on my part. During 1978, MASC separated from MAHA, which had become its major income source, and MAHA stopped paying the MASC organizers. MASC went through a very rough period for a while thereafter, but recovered eventually. I do not know whether MASC developed a differentiated income base or became dependent on another major contributor. SCAC represents a similar form of uncertainty. The organization's survival seems keyed to its continued funding for some state run social service programs. I do not know whether these funded programs are really independent of each other or not.

TABLE 2

HAS THE ORGANIZATION EVER BEEN HEAVILY DEPENDENT  
ON A SINGLE INCOME SOURCE SINCE BEING FOUNDED?

ORGANIZATION NAME	EVER DEPENDENT ON A SINGLE INCOME SOURCE			
	No	Yes	Always Yes	Diversified Later
ACO		D	X	
CASC		D	X	
CCO	D			
CCSC		S	X	
CCWE		D	X	
CIA	S			
GRO	S			
HF	S			
LF		D	X	
MAC		D	X	
MASC		S	?	?
NAC		S	?	?
NACC		D	X	
NAO		S	?	?
OBA	S			
OPCO	S			
OSC	S			
SACGC		S		X
SCAC		S	?	?
SCC	S			
Fed.	S			
TMO	S			
USC		D	X	
VHCO	S			
WECO		S	X	

TABLE CODES: S = survived / D = died / X = yes / ? = don't know

For two other organizations, NAO and NAC, the uncertainty is of another kind. These two organizations were heavily dependent upon the Catholic Church (the local parish and Catholic Charities) but achieved financial independence through fund raising activities. The fund raising activities, as were described in the NAO case study, seem keyed to the parish church in a way that leads me to suspect that the organizations are still extremely dependent on the well being of their respective Catholic churches. This form of dependency will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

In only one instance, SACCC, has an organization developed a diversified income base after being dependent on a single source during the maintenance period. SACCC achieved this diversification during 1978 and 1979 after my field work was completed. The diversification has produced a marginal income level and was achieved only with some help from the non-profit housing rehabilitation corporation that SACCC helped found back in the early 1970's.

Four of the five organizations founded since 1970 which have not been heavily dependent on a single income source have grown substantially since being founded. One of these organizations, the Federation, has grown into a \$225,000 a year budget and hires professional fund raisers to oversee its fund raising activities, which include canvassing the people and the businesses in the community. The other three organizations, HF, CIA, and TMO, did not become as big financially, but they did diversify their financial bases. For the HF, the diversification arose largely because the churches started contributing individually rather than as a group. The one post-1970 organization not to grow and to still remain independent of a single income source is OPCO which was one of the few organizations to be founded by a city-wide coalition without direct church involvement. OPCO decided

not to let itself become dependent on any one contributor and scaled down its staff level and its activities when money was tight, as a means of maintaining its financial independence.

Table 3 shows the extent to which financial dependency on a single financial source is a property of the smaller organizations and of the organizations founded after 1970. These are not independent factors; the organizations founded before 1970 were generally much larger than were the ones founded more recently. Table 4 lists the dependent organizations by size at time of founding and by type of major contributor. In most cases the dependency has been long term and in many cases it has existed since the organization was first being started. The crucial contributor usually has been the Catholic Church, but it was occasionally a clergy association or a city-wide coalition. State agencies were the key contributors for two organizations, SCAC and WECO, although this form of dependency has been a long term situation only for SCAC, which was able to find money to run some social service programs but not to become a grass-roots community organization. WECO's other funders stopped supplying money and the organization collapsed leaving behind mainly a state funded mental health center.

Depending on a single money source is sometimes a straightforward affair, while in other cases it is a complex phenomenon, leading to the illusion that financial diversification has been attained. A few examples will help explain the difference.

WECO was started with money from some Protestant denominations, mainly the Presbyterians. When the church money became less after a few years, WECO secured a relatively large grant from the Wiebolt foundation. These income sources paid the organization's minimal staff and community center

TABLE 3

ORGANIZATIONS WHOSE SURVIVAL AFTER FOUNDING WAS EVER  
LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON A SINGLE SOURCE OF SUPPORT

DATE FOUNDED	SIZE WHEN FOUNDED		
	Large	Medium	Small
Before 1970	0/4	1/2	0/0
1970 or after	0/0	3/5	10/13

Note: Each cell contains two numbers written  
in the form N/M, where:

N = number of organizations of this size  
and date of founding ever dependent  
on a single source of support

M = all organizations of this size and  
date of founding

TABLE 4

ORGANIZATIONS (MOST FOUNDED AFTER 1970) WHOSE SURVIVAL  
DURING MAINTENANCE PERIOD EVER DEPENDED LARGELY UPON A  
SINGLE SOURCE OF SUPPORT, BY SIZE AT FOUNDING AND BY  
SOURCE OF THIS SUPPORT

SOURCE OF SUPPORT	SIZE AT FOUNDING		
	Large	Medium	Small
Local Church		3	7
Catholic Charities			1
City-wide Coalition			2
Government Agency		1	1
Clergy Association Acting As A Single Source		1	

NOTE: Two organizations, WECO and SACCC, are listed  
twice because each was twice dependent on a  
single and different source of support

utility expenses, but WECO never produced enough money, from other sources, to offset the vandalism it experienced, or to supplement the church and foundation grants and so improve its marginal existence. The vandalism caused enough problems, but when the church and foundation grants ran out, WECO had to abandon all its activities and never recovered from the blow. All that remains of WECO is the state funded mental health center and a small Christmas Basket program. WECO represents serial, single source dependency: first, the church; second, the foundation; third, the state agency. If the state were to close the mental health center, all traces of WECO might well disappear.

CCWE was organized by a local resident and an organizer sent to her neighborhood by the SCC. The organizer left after six months and this ended the SCC's involvement in West Englewood. Not long thereafter, CCWE was picked up by CAP, which was looking for black neighborhood affiliates. CAP provided some organizing help and CCWE stayed afloat until CAP folded in 1976. When the organizing help stopped, CCWE also folded because the key local leader was unable to carry the load by herself.

SACCC was founded when the strongest neighborhood civic unit in the OBA decided to become an independent organization. For the first two years, SACCC (then known as SAC) operated primarily through funding provided by the neighborhood's two Catholic churches. After that, the revenue of the two churches declined so much, as the result of racial change, that both churches had to stop their money contributions. SAC had to close its office and let its staff go. Not long thereafter the pastor of Resurrection Church, one of the two Catholic churches in South Austin, secured a series of organizer trainees provided first by Catholic Charities and later by MAHA, which became

the distribution vehicle for Catholic Charities organizers. The Resurrection rectory became the SAC office and the organization went through a number of very lean years, during which many of the key leaders dropped out to work with the non-profit development corporations that OBA and SAC had founded because they seemed to offer more hope for the neighborhood. During these same years, the organization split, with half affiliating with a new city funded neighborhood improvement program while the other half remained with Resurrection Church and Catholic Charities to become SACCC. In about 1976, MAHA decided to use Catholic Charities money to increase and improve the organizing help available to SACCC. SACCC grew into a stronger organization and remained quite dependent on the Catholic Church until 1979. The support from the two Catholic churches enabled SAC to become an independent organization, the help from Resurrection church and Catholic Charities almost certainly kept the organization from collapsing during its lean years, and the help from Catholic Charities provided through MAHA helped rebuild the organization a few years later. SACCC represents long term dependence on the Catholic Church, first in the form of help from the local parishes, then from a parish and from Catholic Charities, and later yet, primarily from Catholic Charities. In 1978, after a total staff turn-over in MAHA resulted in MAHA making new demands on the affiliated organizations, the SACCC leaders felt that they had to do anything that MAHA asked. They recognized their dependency on MAHA and were afraid that any termination of the help from MAHA would be fatal for their organization.

In the nearby Help of Christians parish in Mid-Austin, community organizing became a church concern when the parish was assigned some new pastors in the early 1970's. Shortly before, a white organization, MAC, had been

set up in the northern half of the parish, which was changing from white to black. MAC, which had a white only orientation, lasted about two years, until the parish was mostly black. At that point, the two sources of MAC's support, NAC in northern Austin and the local parish pastors, withdrew their support. Although many of the individual block clubs in MAC had become integrated, MAC collapsed immediately after NAC and the parish pastors withdrew their support.

NAO, in St. Peter Canisius parish in North Austin, was created in about 1971 when support from the new parish pastor, who favored community organizing, help from NAC in neighboring St. Angela parish, and assistance from Catholic Charities were combined to create the new organization. For the first several years, NAO grew into a fairly strong organization as the help from these three sources continued in a steady manner. By 1975, however, NAO was raising its own budget and became independent of NAC, of Catholic Charities and of St. Peter Canisius Church, other than the office space and materials that the church continued to donate. Ever since, most of the NAO budget has come from fund-raising activities, with lesser amounts coming from the church and from some local businesses. Virtually all the fund raising involves such things as running an annual carnival for St. Peter Canisius Church (this brings in about \$10,000 each year), and holding some breakfasts in the church, and dinner dances (each of which produces about \$1,500). These activities create the appearance of independence, but they all seem to hinge upon the St. Peter Canisius remaining a 10,000 member church of people who are willing to come out to the carnival and the other events. If the neighborhood should turn black, the church would shrink and NAO would lose its channel for bringing people out to its fund-raising events. In their present

form NAO and St. Peter Canisius will survive or decline together.

In West Englewood, CCSC was founded in 1975 when the local Catholic church was assigned an assistant pastor who wanted to do community organizing. The priest, Father Sehr, got MAHA to send him two organizers to get things started, and the three men set about creating CCSC. In 1976, Father Sehr and MAHA had a falling out because Father Sehr wanted to focus on local issues and MAHA wanted the organizers to push the MAHA coalition issues. As a result, MAHA stopped paying the organizers' salaries and they had to leave, because neither CCSC nor the parish had the money to pay them. Father Sehr picked up the organizing activities after the organizers left and has continued to serve as CCSC's only organizer. CCSC has a fairly large turnout for its meetings, but it has no budget of any consequence. It has remained independent of any coalitions since the relationship with MAHA was terminated. If Father Sehr were to be transferred or required to devote more time to parish concerns, CCSC might well collapse.

In most of the above examples, I have suggested that organizational survival is dependent on a key financial contributor being able and willing to maintain the support provided to the organization. In many cases, the key contributors have pulled out their support, usually because they were unable to continue or because the money had been intended as seed money to get an organization started and give it time (about two years) to find its own financial base. Table 5 shows the relationship between continuation of support and organizational survival. In the six cases where the support was not pulled out, the organizations survived through 1977. In seven of the nine cases when the support stopped, the organization collapsed. The two survivors are special cases. WECO all but fell apart when the church

TABLE 5

ORGANIZATIONS (MOST FOUNDED AFTER 1970) EVER DEPENDENT DURING MAINTENANCE PERIOD LARGELY UPON A SINGLE SOURCE OF SUPPORT, BY WHETHER THE SOURCE PULLED THE PLUG AND BY SURVIVAL THROUGH 1977

DID THE SOURCE PULL THE PLUG?	SURVIVAL TO 1977	
	No	Yes
No	0	6
Yes	7	1*

Note: \* - This organization is a special case, see text

TABLE 6

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS WHICH DID NOT SURVIVE TO 1977 AND WHICH WERE NOT EVER LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON A SINGLE SOURCE OF SUPPORT DURING MAINTENANCE PERIOD AND THE REASON WHY EACH ORGANIZATION DID NOT SURVIVE

NAME OF ORGANIZATION	PRIMARY REASON WHY IT DID NOT SURVIVE TO 1978
CCO	Harassment by political right wing dried up the sources of money and of new members. CCO acquired the image of a bad liberal organization
TMO	This organization ran out of issues
OSC	Internal subversion. The staff director seems to have done in the organization

and foundation money dried up; the organization now exists as the community board for the mental health center that it got started and as the sponsor of a small Christmas Basket program. Victory Heights was a small volunteer-run organization until help from CAP enabled it to expand. When CAP collapsed, the CAP organizer continued working there on a volunteer basis. Gradually the organization reverted to the smaller volunteer group that it had been before CAP entered its life. The seven organizations that collapsed after support was withdrawn were ACO, CASC, CCWE, MAC, NACC, LF, AND USC. For six of these organizations, the withdrawal of financial support seems to have been the crucial factor behind the demise of the organization. The exception is NACC which folded when the two strong organizations that belonged to it, NAC and NAO decided to go their separate ways. [Note 2].

Table 6 lists the reason for the collapse of the three organizations, with well diversified financial bases, which did not survive through 1977. Money was tight in each of these organizations, but financial problems were not the basic reason behind their demise.

In Table 7, the relationship between available standard Alinsky-type organizing issues and organizational collapse is shown. Only one organization, TMO, felt that it had run out of good issues. At the time, however, CAP still felt that the area had good issue potential and sent out an organizer to rebuild the organization. CAP fired the first organizer and sent out a replacement. Then CAP folded before the second organizer was able to get anything going. TMO continued to fade away and the question of whether CAP was right about the area's issue potential was never fully evaluated. The CCO had good issues to work with, but the organization was harassed to death through effective opposition from anti-integration right-wing groups

TABLE 7

THE SUPPLY OF ACCEPTABLE, STANDARD ALINSKY-  
 STYLE, ISSUED FOR ORGANIZATIONS THAT DID NOT  
 SURVIVE TO 1978, BY REASON FOR NON-SURVIVAL

REASON FOR DEMISE	GOOD ISSUES AVAILABLE	
	Yes	No
Supporter pulled the plug (from tables 4, 5)	7	0
Other reasons (from table 6)	2	1

in Cicero. Both in its life and in its death, the CCO unusual, in comparison to the rest of the organizations that I studied. The third organization not to survive and not dependent on a single financial contributor, OSC, also had good issues available. Instead of having its plug pulled by an external contributor, the OSC was reportedly done in by a staff director who misappropriated funds to such an extent that the organization could not survive the experience. OSC was succeeded by SCAC, which for lack of money, but not for lack of trying, has never been able to become a grass-roots community organization like its predecessor.

A number of well-defined and consistent patterns have emerged from the information contained in this and the preceding chapters concerning the relationship between financial support and organizational development. Organizations are founded when an organizer arrives on the scene. Only two exceptions to this rule could be found among the organizations that I studied. The exceptions were WECO and Victory Heights, which were founded by local residents. The rule was irrelevant to the founding of NACC and GRO. NACC was founded as an umbrella to facilitate its outreach program and GRO was not founded as an Alinsky-style organization. However, the conversion of GRO into the Alinsky fold was effected by the organizers supplied by MAHA. After being founded, the development of an organization depends on its receiving adequate income to maintain a staff of organizers. This income can either be in the form of money received by the organization or it can be in the form of an organizer who is paid by some other source. Within limits, the more organizers an organization has, the bigger it can grow, but having one seems to be essential. The only organization which did not succeed as a grass-roots community organization, SCAC, was also the only organization

never to receive any outside support towards obtaining an organizer. Both WECO and Victory Heights, the two organizations not founded with the help of an organizer, became considerably more effective organizations when they started receiving organizing help. The major factor behind organizational decline is a decline in income with which to pay organizers. Ten of the twenty five organizations did not survive to 1978 and another four survived in a seriously weakened state. The loss of financial support was the major factor behind the decline of eleven of these fourteen organizations. Even among the remaining organizations, all of which survived to 1978, a clear relationship existed between the level of financial support and the level of organizational well being.

The reason why money or some other means of paying an organizer is so critical to organizational creation and survival is not hard to understand. Grass roots community organizations require a lot of care and feeding, especially in the area of beating the bushes for issues and participants. Finding these key ingredients is a full time job and few resident participants are able to carry this load on their own for any length of time. This is where the organizer comes in. He is paid to do the necessary work. When the issues or the participants poop out, the organizer finds new ones. When the organizer poops out, the organization or its financial sponsor finds a new one. And this brings us back to the Sugar Daddy hypothesis. An Alinsky organization will survive as long as somebody is willing to foot the bill. This much is necessary; all the rest is merely helpful [Note 3].

## NOTES:

1. Bensman and Vidich (1952) describe these characteristics as dysfunctional for lower class people and hence relatively uncommon in them. But uncommon is not the same as totally absent.
2. In Table 5, both MASC and CCSC were coded as organizations which did not have the plug pulled on them, even though both MAHA abruptly stopped paying their organizers' salaries after the organizations reduced their participation in MAHA. For both MASC and CCSC, at least one parish priest was a strong supporter of the organization and worked hard to keep the organization going after the MAHA action. In CCSC, the priest took over the organizing duties after the organizers left. In MASC, the organizers stayed on, living from hand to mouth as the priests and the MASC leaders sought alternate sources of money to pay the organizers. The MASC events occurred after my field work was finished and I know that the organization survived, but I do not know the details of the organization's recovery from the blow.
3. The importance of the "Sugar Daddies" was a major finding that I did not anticipate in designing this research project. As a result, I did not do any research on them. In Chicago, the major sponsor of grass-roots community organizing has been the Catholic Church and knowing why that church, over the years, has made its various decisions on the supporting of community organizing is an important component of any explanation of grass-roots organizing in Chicago. In retrospect, my failure to search out this sort of information is perhaps the major short-coming of my research.

## CHAPTER TEN

THE THREAT OF RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE FOUNDING  
OF ALINSKY-STYLE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS: A MODEL  
OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Many of the twenty five organizations that I studied were started in white neighborhoods to deal with the threat, or the apparent likelihood, of local racial integration. Most of these organizations fell into one or another of two fairly distinct categories: they were (1) set up by the churches, usually under the initiative of the clergy, to prevent violence and enable integration to go smoothly, or they were (2) set up with the help of the churches, under the initiative of lay residents, to help the residents keep the neighborhood as it had been before the threat of intergration arose. Working to enable integration to go smoothly is not necessarily the same as being really enthusiastic about it. One may also recognize the futility of trying to stop it, and may be merely trying to make the best of an undesirable situation. By the same token, trying to maintain the neighborhood as it has been is not necessarily the same as supporting segregation, although most people probably do not want integration to come. Once integration comes close, an organization will have its hands full trying to deal with the white establishment representatives who change their neighborhood before the blacks move in: panic peddlers, soliciting realtors, insurance and mortgage redliners, businessmen and landlords who stop their property maintenance programs, an apparent decline in the quantity and quality of city services, etc. This does not leave much time dealing with integration a moral or ideological level.

The two types of organizations tend to arise under slightly different

circumstances and they tend to develop differently, depending on the distance of an organization's home base from the nearest place where integration is actually occurring at the time when the organization is founded.

Table 1 lists each organization according to its distance from actual racial change when it was founded. The distance from racial change variable was divided into four categories:

Far - means a distance of at least one mile

Near - means that the adjacent neighborhood has mostly changed

Changing - means that the organization's home base neighborhood was changing when the organization was being founded

Changed - means that the organization was set up in a black neighborhood that had been white less than ten years before the organization was founded

These four categories are not both exhaustive and mutually exclusive, but they suffice to cover all the twenty five organizations that I studied.

Although at least four organizations fell into each distance category, more organizations (ten) fell into the near category than any other category.

Two organizations coded into the far category are listed with question marks.

These two organizations may have been in the near category at the time of founding and, if not, they were at least not too far from being in that category.

Table 2 lists the organizations according to the relationship of racial change to the reason for founding the organization. Racial change was a factor in the founding of all but two of the organizations. These two organizations, OPCO and TMO, were both in the far category of distance from racial change at the time of founding. The other twenty three organizations

TABLE 1

DISTANCE BETWEEN ORGANIZATION'S HOME BASE AND AREA  
OF RACIAL CHANGE WHEN THE ORGANIZATION WAS FOUNDED

ORGANIZATION	DISTANCE FROM RACIAL CHANGE			
	Far	Near	Changing	Changed
ACO	X			
CASC		X		
CCO	X			
CCSC				X
CCWE				X
CIA		X		
GRO		X		
HF	X?			
LF			X	
MAC			X	
MASC			X(2)	
NAC		X		
NACC		X		
NAO		X		
OBA		X		
OPCO	X?			
OSC		X		
SACCC				X
SCAC				X
SGC	X			
Fed.		X		
TMO	X			
USC		X(1)		
VHCO			X(2)	
WECO			X	
TOTALS	6	10	5	4

Notes: (1) just ready to change / (2) mostly changed

TABLE 2  
ORGANIZATION FOUNDING AND RACIAL CHANGE

ORGANIZ- ATION	THE ORGANIZATION WAS FOUNDED TO:				Racial Change Not A Factor In Founding
	Help Integrat- ion Go Smooth- ly	Keep Neighbor- hood As It Has For Its White Residents	Help Black Res- idents Deal With Changed Neighborhood		
ACO	X				
CASC	X				
CCO	X				
CCSC			X		
CCWE			X		
CIA		X			
GRO	X				
HF		X			
LF			X		
MAC		X			
MASC			X		
NAC		X			
NACC		X			
NAO		X			
OBA	X				
OPCO					X
OSC	X				
SACCC			X		
SCAC			X		
SCC	X				
Fed.		X			
TMO					X
USC	X				
VHCO			X		
WECO			X		
TOTALS	8	7	8		2

were quite evenly divided among three categories of relationship between response to threat of racial change and reason for founding: (1) to help integration go smoothly, (2) to keep the neighborhood as it was, or (3) to help the black residents deal with their neighborhood after the whites had left. For these organizations, racial change always involved a transition from white to black. This was not the only form of racial change going on in the city, but the other forms all fell outside the two sections of the city that I selected to study. For the neighborhoods that had not actually turned black before the organization was founded, there was no one-to-one relationship between distance from racial change and the reason for founding the organization. The relationship between these two variables will be the subject of the next several paragraphs.

The white neighborhood organizations founded to help integration go smoothly were all founded by clergymen or by clergy groups. The clergy founders invariably had concluded that integration was inevitable and that to ignore the fact, or to not take positive action to prepare for it, would be asking for trouble. They clergymen believed that it was better to start the preparation process early than to wait until the last minute and be caught reacting to a situation that had been allowed to get out of control. For this reason many of the organizations were founded when integration appeared inevitable but before it was actually imminent.

All this seems to make good sense. The funny thing, though, is that the advance preparation actually seems to have been counter-productive. Table 3 lists the eight organizations that were founded to facilitate racial integration, indicating both the distance from each organization's home base to the nearest racial dividing line and the developmental path taken by the

TABLE 3

ORGANIZATIONS DESIGNED TO FACILITATE INTEGRATION, BY  
DISTANCE FROM RACIAL CHANGE AT TIME OF FOUNDING, AND  
BY OUTCOME OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ORGAN- IZATION	DISTANCE	OUTCOME
ACO	Far	Captured by racial liberals, it became a small liberal social action forum which finally attacked the Catholic Churches, which provided most of the money, for not moving fast enough on integration. The Catholic Churches then stopped funding ACO and the organization soon collapsed.
CASC	Near	Founded by the parish Catholic church without the pastor's support, it became a liberal group. When the parish and Catholic Charities stopped funding CASC it struggled on for a while as with one leader serving as organizer. Shortly thereafter, CASC became a partisan politican committee on behalf of an independent candidate and the organization disappeared after the election.
CCO	Far	The members were racial moderates. CCO was attacked by right-wing groups with the result that CCO acquired a pro-integration public image. In Cicero, Ill. this was like a kiss of death. CCO's income sources and membership recruitment dried up and the organization folded.
GRO	Near	Founded as a traditional civic organization, it kicked out its activist members and became a conventional petition peddling community organization. After Roseland acquired some serious housing problems, GRO turned to MAHA for help as a result of which the MAHA organizers recruited new members who converted GRO into an Alinsky-style community organization.
OBA	Near	Started as a replacement for ACO when Austin was about to experience racial integration, OBA began as a white organization, became a broadly based integrated organization, worked effectively on community problems for several years. A few years later, its major civic unit separated from OBA. Lacking money and any grass-roots constituency, the OBA director converted the organization into a social service organization to survive.
OSC	Near	OSC started out white, became a broadly based integrated organization, and then an all black organization as the neighborhood continued to change. After many years of working effectively on community problems, OSC was finally done in by a staff director who misappropriated its money.
SCC	Far	Started out all white, became dominated by liberals and went downhill rapidly. SCC has managed to hang on as a small liberal group supporting integration in a still white neighborhood. In its struggle for survival, the SCC inadvertently created the Federation which became the dominant grass-roots organization in the area. This furthered the decline of SCC.
USC	Near	Started out white, soon became integrated and then black as the neighborhood changed. Became re-integrated after the local white protectionist Father Lawlor organization collapsed and many of its members joined USC. USC never developed any independent financial base and collapsed when the Catholic Church decided to stop supporting the organization.

organization after it was created. The information in Table 3 shows that certain patterns occurred without exception. In all cases, when the organization was started, the clergy would influence the selection of delegates or representatives to the organization to insure that the organization was stocked primarily with racial moderates combined with some liberals while excluding right wing conservatives and other probable troublemakers. As a result each organization started out being fairly representative of the neighborhood as a whole, if biased somewhat in favor of "men of good will." Even though all organizations were provided with this common starting point, each organization's subsequent development seems directly related to the organization's distance from racial change.

When the organization was started far enough in advance of racial change, the racial liberals would soon come to dominate the group and they would alienate the moderates, who would soon drop out in large numbers. The organization would also be attacked as pro-integrationist by right-wing sponsored white property owner groups and the liberals would attack back. This fight, based largely on ideological considerations, would hasten the departure of the less activist oriented moderates. The organization would decline in effectiveness with the result that, when racial change actually came, it was either dead or too ineffective to do anything. This was the pattern displayed by the ACO, CCO, and SCC. Although there were some differences among the organizations, for example, the CCO had few liberals and much greater right-wing opposition than the other groups and neither Cicero nor the SCC's home base have become integrated, the general pattern was very much the same for all three organizations.

If the organization was founded when racial integration was actually

about to occur, the moderates and the liberals both stayed in the organization and both groups were well represented at the leadership level. If an attack from the right-wing came, it was generally more muted and it did not help to drive moderates out of the organization. Blacks were accepted into the organization, although sometimes not without a fight (e.g., OSC), once a reasonable number have moved into the community and at that point the organization really becomes integrated. This integration is a transitional state for both the neighborhood and the organization. Both gradually become all black as more and more whites move out.

The organization survives integration, working on neighborhood problems before, during, and after the racial transition has occurred. This was the pattern displayed by CASC, GRO, OBA, OSC, and USC. Little Flower followed basically the same pattern, but was not included in Table 3 because no durable community organization was established there. Once again the pattern was much the same for all these organizations with the exception that the sponsors of USC and CASC (and also Little Flower), who were in effect their Sugar Daddies, cut off their support and the organizations collapsed.

I did not become aware of this divergent developmental pattern until after I had completed my field work, and my field notes do not provide enough information for me to state with certainty why things go this way. It seems likely, however, that the following events produce this outcome: When integration is about to occur, the community is set upon by any number of organizations and people who seek to benefit from the change and who want to get in on the ground floor (they are vultures of a sort, the panic peddlers and block busters, etc.) or who expect the worst from racial change and are trying to cut their losses (they also, the redliners,

the slum landlords, etc., are vultures from the community's point of view). This provides liberals and moderates alike lots of immediate problems to work on, and the organization can keep busy working on them before, during, and after integration. When integration is further off, the immediate problems are less serious and it is hard to keep the organization's agenda filled with welfare issues. This gives the liberals plenty of time to push their social action concerns such as resolutions against the war in Viet Nam, resolutions in support of civil rights, resolutions supporting gay rights, resolutions opposing military spending, and so forth. The moderates feel uncomfortable with this sort of stuff and they are not as durable participants as are the liberals. The shortage of immediately salient welfare issues also gives the liberals time to get into ideological fights with the right-wing when attacks come from that quarter. When disagreements arise, either those internal to the organization or externally from the right-wing, the moderates drop out first. The liberals gradually shift from a minority to a majority position in the organization as total participation declines, and they then transform the organization's focus from welfare goals to symbolic concerns. All this leaves the organization with a bad reputation in the community and otherwise ill-prepared to again deal with welfare issues when integration actually draws near.

The differential development pattern that I have described is an abstraction based on the experience of eight organizations. It seems desirable that I clarify the range of the pattern by discussing to a greater extent some of the ways in which real organizations diverged from the abstract model.

1. All the neighborhoods for which integration was imminent did be-

come integrated and then turn black. However, not all the neighborhoods for which integration was not so immanent have turned black (at least not as of 1979). CCO was founded to help Cicero deal with integration, but Cicero is still all white and it shows no signs of changing any time soon. The SCC had its home base on the Southwest Side in the area around 60th and Kedzie. The SCC tried to offset this by setting its eastern boundary at Ashland, which was at the edge of the black neighborhood, but the plan did not work. The SCC attracted virtually no support from the area around Ashland, which Father Lawlor successfully organized at about the same time, and the SCC remained a white organization in an area well removed from the threat of immediate racial integration.

2. The CCO did not become captured by liberals. In Cicero, racial liberals were either rare or they maintained a very low profile and the moderates remained in control of the organization. However, local right-wing conservatives so strongly attacked the organization that it acquired a pro-integration image. This image, which was not deserved, was like a kiss of death in Cicero, and the CCO could not survive.
3. CASC, in west-central Austin, was a parish sized organization which went liberal in spite of being faced with immediate integration. CASC was founded by liberal lay members of St. Lucy Catholic Church, with the support of an assistant pastor, but without the support of the senior pastor. As a result, CASC never secured the participation of parish moderates and never was anything other than a small non-representative liberal group.

In all eight instances of organizations established to make integration go easier, the sponsoring clergy (sometimes one, sometimes many) were as a whole not opposed to integration. The clergy did not always make public their real reason for starting the organization. Sometimes they said it was because integration was coming and they wanted to prepare for it; sometimes they said that the organization was being established to give the residents a better voice in the affairs of their community. When the real reason, to help prepare for integration, was not put on display "up front," the organization had more of a fight about accepting integration and black members (OSC was a good example), but this does not seem to have affected the relationship between distance from racial change and organizational development.

Six of these eight organizations were big organizations founded before 1970, while the other two were parish based organizations founded after 1970. Date of founding and size at time of founding do not seem to have affected the relationship between distance from integration and organizational development. This assertion can be verified by looking at the developmental outcomes of the seven organizations that were founded in white neighborhoods to keep the neighborhood as it had been for its then current residents.

Table 4 contains a listing of the seven organizations founded to preserve the neighborhood for its then current residents, indicating the distance from racial change at the time of founding and the developmental outcome for each organization. A specific pattern of development can also be seen in the information contained in this table. These organizations were set up only when integration was geographically near. The organizations were established with the support of the church pastors (all the supporting churches were

TABLE 4

ORGANIZATIONS DESIGNED TO PRESERVE THE NEIGHBORHOOD  
AS IT HAS BEEN FOR ITS WHITE RESIDENTS, BY DISTANCE  
FROM RACIAL CHANGE AT THE TIME OF FOUNDING AND BY  
OUTCOME OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ORGAN- IZATION	DISTANCE	OUTCOME
CIA	Near	Started out fighting the "vultures" that precede integration, accepted but does not encourage integration. Set up and runs a housing center to disperse blacks and prevent block by block racial re-segregation of the community. As of 1978, CIA had few black members.
HF	Near? or Far?	Started out fighting the "vultures" that precede integration. The organization seems generally opposed to integration, although not violently so. As of 1978, the area has not yet become integrated.
NAC	Near	The first white organization to be started in northern Austin, NAC reached out to help establish NAO, MAC, and NACC in the effort to preserve its own area. When the outreach program failed to stop the blacks and NAO resisted the domination of NAC, NAC withdrew into its own boundaries. The organization works to maintain the neighborhood and has seems to be somewhat resistant to accepting integration, although this may be changing.
MAC	Near	Set-up by some white parishoners and NAC at the northern end of the local Catholic parish after blacks started moving in at the southern end. A new pastor could not bring together the two halves of the parish and decided to phase out MAC which did not favor integration. As blacks moved further north, MAC shrank rapidly and soon collapsed once both NAC and the pastor withdrew their support.
NACC	Near	Set-up by NAC to coordinate the activities of NAC, NAO, and MAC, NACC collapsed because NAO could not accept continual domination by NAC.
NAO	Near	Set-up by NAC and the parish pastor, NAO started out fighting the "vultures" and developed a more clearly anti-black orientation as blacks were about to move into the parish. Once the started moving in, NAO decided to accept integration and started working to bring the people together and maintain a stable multi-racial, multi-ethnic neighborhood. NAO now has white, black, latino, and Filipino members.
Federat- ion	Near	Accidentally started by SCC, the Federation started out fighting the "vultures" and has grown very large in the process. The Federation is now pushing community redevelopment and does not seem to favor integration. It seems to have withdrawn from the one section of its area that had experienced racial integration by 1978. Racial integration has not extended beyond that one area, and the Federation's real test has not yet come.

Catholic), but much of the push seems to have come from lay members of the parishes. The pastors were supporters or acceptors of community organizing. Their views on racial integration were not known to me, but they seem not to have been directly relevant to their willingness to support the organization.

When started, the organizations were not in favor of racial integration. The focus was not so much on outright segregation as it was on keeping the neighborhood as it had been. But integration was close at hand, the neighborhood was going to change anyway. Block busters and soliciting realtors were on the scene, mortgage lenders were redlining the area, and many landlords were letting their property deteriorate, etc. The organization soon had its hands full fighting these problems, and no time was left to play segregationist.

After a while, blacks started moving in and only then did the organization have to take a stand for or against integration: should it accept black members or not? This problem produced tension within the organization, but it finally decided to accept them. Gradually the community became increasingly black and the organization's focus changed from merely accepting blacks to promoting the development of a stable integrated community.

Here the pattern ends because only one neighborhood with such an organization had turned all black by the time that this report was being written. The pattern can be extrapolated, however, with an adequate degree of confidence. By this time, the organization has become much like the organization designed to help integration go smoothly. The organization will work for a stable integrated community for as long as that is feasible and will then work for a stable and good black neighborhood after the transition has been

completed. As the neighborhood changes, the organization will become increasingly black and the Catholic church will become increasingly small. Most of these organizations were founded after 1970 as parish based organizations for which the church was the primary financial sponsor. After the neighborhood becomes mostly black, the church will run into financial problems and the organization will have trouble remaining solvent. It will die if it does not find a good Sugar Daddy.

Here too, the factors underlying the pattern seem to have a lot to do with the focus on welfare goals, which is in large measure made possible by the vultures who descend on the community just before the blacks do. Fighting vultures does not make people more accepting of integration, but it does keep the moderates involved in problems that are of immediate concern to them. Because the moderates do not drop out, no liberal or segregationist minority gains control, and this keeps the focus on welfare issues rather than on more diffuse symbolic concerns. When integration does come, the focus on immediate problems enables whites and blacks to work together just as it had enabled the white liberals and moderate conservatives to work together.

This pattern also is an abstraction which does not exactly fit the real life development patterns of these seven organizations. Once again, the real life departures from the pattern merit some discussion for the light that they can shed on the subject.

1. The development of NACC has little to do with this subject. NACC was a failed attempt to merge or coordinate three organizations and its outcome had to do with the relationships that developed between the two strong member organizations, NAC and NAO, not with

racial change.

2. MAC, which was the only organization among these seven to be in an area which went all black before this report was finished, seems like a contradiction to the pattern but is not, because of unusual circumstances behind its founding and development. The local Catholic church had a pastor who tried to ignore the integration of his parish. MAC was founded at the end of the parish farthest from racial change by some residents and the leaders of the community organization, NAC, in a neighboring parish, all of whom wanted to see the MAC area remain white. When MAC was started, the other half of the parish was black and the two sides were rather polarized. MAC had an orientation toward the adjacent white neighborhood from whence its financial support was coming; when the parish was sent some new pastors who were interested in community organizing, they eventually decided to phase out MAC in favor of a new organization which would represent the entire parish. For other reasons, the neighboring community organization dropped its support at the same time and MAC collapsed. The new organization, MASC, has survived to work for a stable black community.
3. Most of these seven organizations, MAC, NAO, NAC, CIA, and NACC, are in neighborhoods that were becoming integrated by the end of 1979 when this report was being written. Excluding NACC and MAC, which were just discussed as exceptions to the pattern, the other three organizations all fit the pattern rather well so far and I have reason to believe that they will continue to fit the pattern, as I have extrapolated it, through the complete racial transition.

The other two organizations, however, The Federation and HF, are in neighborhoods which have not yet started integrating. For reasons that were stated in their case study sections of Part II, I am not sure what their reactions will be to integration when it comes. Their responses will affect the model in a big way because they are the only large multi-parish organizations in the group.

4. The Federation does not fit the developmental pattern in another way. It was founded as a result of the SCC's efforts to pressure Catholic Charities into sending it an organizer. Neither the residents nor any parish pastors were directly the cause for its being founded, but, during the founding period, it evolved into a keep the neighborhood as it had been group. The Federation's original base was on the far edge of being near racial change, but the organization was quickly faced with realtor solicitation problems and, as it expanded, it moved closer to the area of racial change and soon was on the boundary. Apart from the prime cause behind its founding, the Federation so far fits the pattern.

Another possible developmental pattern emerges from looking more carefully at the examples provided by Little Flower and MAC. Little Flower was an attempt by Catholic Charities and the Little Flower pastors to provide an alternative to the segregationist-image Father Lawlor organization. The attempt to establish this alternative was started after blacks had begun moving into the parish. As a result the attempt to start an organization involved bringing whites and blacks together at the very start. The organizers and the pastors were able to put together groups of blacks and whites who could work together, but they were never able to establish a viable

community organization. MAC, too, was in an integrating neighborhood when it was started, and the closeness seems to have helped produce tension, rather than cooperation, toward blacks at the MAC leadership level. This was one of the reasons that the new parish pastors decided to phase out the organization rather than help it become integrated. Even though the situations were different (for example there was no such level of tension among the blacks and whites that were brought together at Little Flower) I am tentatively offering an extension to the set of developmental patterns that I have described so far: if racial change is too close at hand, i.e., the area is actually integrating, it will be difficult to establish a viable community organization even though the key ingredients, a Sugar Daddy and good welfare issues, are at hand.

The hypothesis that grass-roots organizations are hard to establish in racially changing neighborhoods is tentative at best. Two cases with little else in common are a weak indicator of a clear-cut trend. The problem is that my information does not provide much in the way of clues as to the underlying dynamics of the situation. Until the pattern can either be explained or better documented, it is hard to defend. One priest, who served as an informant for MAC, suggested that blacks and whites seem to want different things from a community organization when the neighborhood is actually changing. Perhaps creating the organization before the change has started gives the organization some momentum of its own which, in turn, provides a better base for enabling people of the two races to work together.

The patterns that I have described thus far can be further clarified by two examples that do not seem to fit anywhere else in this discussion:

1. USC was founded in St. Ethelreda parish, which was at the southern

end of the Father Lawlor territory. After USC had turned all black and after the Father Lawlor group collapsed, many of the white Lawlor organization members joined USC, thereby re-integrating the organization. The extent of their socialization into the direct action grass-roots organizing method was strong enough that they were able to make the transition from being part of a white only group to becoming part of an otherwise all black organization.

2. Father Lawlor's organization might seem to be a case contradicting the pattern just described, and in some ways it does so. His organization was set up to preserve the white neighborhood and it too had a focus on welfare goals. However, when its area started undergoing racial integration, the organization could neither stop the integration nor work with it. This produced a high degree of tension and disorganization in West Englewood as it went through its racial transition. The principal difference seems to have been the Lawlor organization's zero sum model of political incorporation. This made inter-racial cooperation especially difficult. The patterns that I have described may be applicable primarily to Alinsky-style organizations which hold to the open-ended model of political incorporation.

The patterns that I have described in this chapter can be merged to produce a single model of Alinsky-style grass roots organizational development in relation to the distance from racial change at the time of founding. The model is summarized in Table 5. An Alinsky organization can help a neighborhood deal with racial integration, but starting too soon is counterproductive. All the successful organizations that were established

TABLE 5

A DEVELOPMENTAL TYPOLOGY FOR ALINSKY-STYLE  
GRASS-ROOTS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS BASED  
ON THE DISTANCE FROM RACIAL CHANGE AT THE  
TIME OF FOUNDING AND THE REASON FOR FOUNDING

DISTANCE FROM RACIAL CHANGE AT TIME OF FOUNDING	REASON FOR FOUNDING RELATIVE TO RACIAL CHANGE	ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOME
Very Far	Not Relevant	(Not part of the model. Organization's outcome is dependent on other factors)
Far	Make Integration Go Smoothly	Organization starts OK, but is captured by liberals, becomes small and ineffective. May have folded by the time that integration comes. If not, it will still be ineffective.
Near	Make Integration Go Smoothly	Organization starts OK and retains its broad base and effectiveness, during both the periods of integration and resegregation.
Near	Keep The Neighborhood As It Has Been	Organization starts OK, develops salient welfare goal focus, works on neighborhood problems, accepts integration when it comes, and retains its effectiveness during the periods of integration and resegregation.
Neighborhood Has Started Changing	Any	Viable organization can not be built.
Neighborhood Has Changed	Rebuild The Neighborhood	Viable organization can be built if a Sugar Daddy can be found. CCSC, MASC, and SACCC demonstrate this.

to make integration proceed smoothly faced actual integration within a year of being founded. If an organization is established when integration is close at hand, it will be successful in helping integration go smoothly regardless of whether it was founded for this purpose or in order to help the white residents preserve their neighborhood as it was (providing that it adheres to the open-ended model of incorporation and does not take an explicit stand against integration). If an organization is established to keep the neighborhood as it was, it can survive for several years and still be around to help the area deal with integration providing, the threat of integration remains close at hand. The dominant factor seems to be the presence of external forces acting on the community in such a manner as to enable the organization to retain a focus on immediate welfare goals. Change close at hand, however, is not the same as actual change. Viable organizations are hard to start in changing neighborhoods. After the neighborhood has changed, viable organizations can once again be established

Two aspects of this model may run counter to current thinking in the social and related sciences. The first aspect is that a viable organization is hard to establish in a racially changing neighborhood even if a Sugar Daddy can be found. The second, and more significant, aspect is that prevention seems to be counter-productive.

CHAPTER ELEVEN  
ORGANIZATIONAL RECRUITMENT IN TO AND  
OUT FROM THE ALINSKY MODEL

So far, I have treated organizational survival, that is the creation and demise of grass-roots community organizations, in terms of the founding of new organizations and the death of existing ones. There is, however, another way in which grass-roots organizations can arise or disappear and that is through organizational transformation. An organization can come within the Alinsky fold after being started as a different sort of organization, and an organization can work its way out of the Alinsky model without ceasing to exist as a formal organization. Most of the organizations that I studied started out as Alinsky-style organizations and continued in that same mold throughout their existences. A few organizations, however, did work their way in to or out from the Alinsky model and by looking at what happened to these organizations, I was able to develop a set of conditions for organizational recruitment in and out of the Alinsky fold. The number of cases is few and my conclusions are therefor tentative, but they still form a useful extension of the models of organizational development that have been presented in the preceeding chapters.

Table 1 is a listing of the twenty-five organizations according to whether they have always been Alinsky-style, or whether they have moved into or out of the Alinsky tradition. One organization, SCAC, was hard to code because it resulted from an attempt to create a replacement for OSC after it folded. SCAC never made it as a grass-roots community organization and has survived because it was able to secure state funding to run some social service pro-

TABLE 1  
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE ALINSKY-STYLE

ORG.	ALWAYS ALINSKY	BECAME ALINSKY	QUIT ALINSKY	COMMENTS
ACO	X			Became social action group at the end
CASC	X			
CCO	X			
CCSC	X			
CCWE	X			
CIA	X			
GRO		X		Neighborhood problems brought it in
HF	X			
LF	X			
MAC	X			
MASC	X			
NAC	X			
NACC	X			
NAO	X			
OBA			X	Became social service org. to survive
OPCO	X			
OSC	X			
SACCC	X			"Pushed" OBA out of Alinsky fold
SCAC	X			Special case, has always tried to become Alinsky-style, but never succeeded
SCC	X			
Fed.	X			
TMO	X			Became sort of a social club near the end
USC	X			
VHCO	X			
WECO			X	Set up some social service programs which are only parts of WECO to survive

grams. I have, with reservations, coded SCAC as always Alinsky because the organization has never given up its goal of becoming a grass-roots direct action organization.

Being a direct action grass-roots community organization does not mean being only a direct action grass-roots organization and this slightly clouds the picture of what is, and what is not, an Alinsky organization. Table 2 lists the eleven Alinsky-style organizations that also established and ran other types of programs. The most common such programs have been non-profit state chartered neighborhood development corporations and state funded social service programs of various types. Bailey (1974) has pointed out that running programs of this sort has usually created problems for the direct action organizations because they can easily become their own targets of protest. Fish (1973) and Bailey both describe the tension that endured in The Woodlawn Organization (a big organization not included in this study) because of the neighborhood redevelopment programs that it ran. Bailey describes a parent asking that an OBA convention censure some of its officers because they were doing a bad job of running the day care center. center.

Some of these community development and social service programs have been more successful than others. The social service programs have usually been relatively successful because they seem to always have received funding from outside agencies. In most cases the funding comes from the city or the state, although the YMCA seems to have sponsored at least one program developed by WECO. The neighborhood development corporations have been more nearly dependent on funding raised by the sponsoring grass-roots organization, and the development organizations have had widely varying outcomes.

TABLE 2  
GRASS-ROOTS ORGANIZATIONS THAT ESTABLISHED  
OTHER TYPES OF PROGRAMS

ORGANIZATION	OTHER PROGRAMS	PROGRAM IMPACT
CIA	Set up and oversees the Calumet Park	Apparently rather successful
	Set-up a neighborhood development corporation (North Austin Development Corporation - NADCOR)	NADCOR has never gotten off the ground
NAO	Participated, without much enthusiasm, in the founding of NADCOR	
	Established a businessmen's council	Apparently, not much
OBA-SACCC (see note below)	Established a day care center and a neighborhood housing redevelopment organization (South Austin Realty Association - SARA)	Both programs have rather successful, although it took SARA a few years to really get going by which time it was an independent organization
SCC	Recently established a neighborhood development corporation	Has adequate financial backing, successfulness not known
Federation	Recently established a neighborhood development corporation	Not known to me
SCAC	Established some state funded social service programs	Seem to be successful
USC	Established a neighborhood development corporation for the area east of Ashland Avenue	Never got off the ground
WECO	Established a day care center, youth center, and several social service programs all funded by outside agencies	All seem to have been successful as long as long as WECO was able to maintain its community center. Only a state funded mental health center survived the decline of WECO.

Note: OBA and SACCC are listed together because they were still one organization when these two programs were established

Some, including those sponsored by NAC and NAO, by Little Flower, and by USC have never gotten off the ground. Other development corporations, including those established by The Woodlawn Organization and by OBA and SACCC, have been quite successful, although the one established by OBA and SACCC did not accomplish much of anything until several years after it had been created.

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Table 1 is that most Alinsky organizations are what they are because that was how they were founded. This is not a very profound conclusion. Most formal organizations do not change all that much. They may shrink or grow, fold or survive, but as long as they survive they remain rather much the same sort of organization. Manufacturing corporations rarely become social service organizations. Manufacturers may change their product line and sometimes shift from a primary emphasis on manufacturing to a primary emphasis on supplying materials to other manufacturers or to representing their products but they seldom stray outside this general field of activity. Even the internal structure of such an organization, as Stinchcombe (1965) points out, is not much subject to change once the organization gets going. Social service organizations, too, may shift from providing one sort of service to providing another sort, if the need or the opportunity present itself, but when such an organization changes it remains within the same general field of activity.

One may carry this argument one step farther. Alinsky organizations are what they are because this is the orientation contributed by their first "professional" staff member. The basic process was discussed in chapter two and will be briefly summarized here. The founders or promoters of a community organization decide to hire a professional staff person to pro-

vide the expertise that they lack for getting the organization up and running on a sound basis. The founders may or may not have a strong commitment to the Alinsky method and often, at least before 1970, they may not even have been familiar with the Alinsky model. Alinsky organizers are a relatively in-grown group who carry the model relatively unchanged from one generation of organizers to the next. If the founders, either intentionally or accidentally, hire an Alinsky organizer as their first staff person, then what they get is an Alinsky organization.

The identification with the direct-action model remains fairly strong for even the organizations that extend themselves to include social service, neighborhood development and/or other programs. All the organizations that ran such programs retained their emphasis on grass roots organizing. The Federation, which has come to place a major emphasis on community re-development, still has community organizers to keep the people involved and to work on issues at both the block and the community wide levels. Many of the organizations that started development of service programs developed a rather restrained style of confrontation and many have come to prefer phone calls and negotiating to direct confrontation. But this is also true of the organizations that never established such programs. The organizations that have come to emphasize phone calls and non-confrontation negotiating are CCO, CIA, HF, NAO, NAC, OPCO, OBA, OSC, SCC, The Federation, SCAC, TMO, and Victory Heights. These organizations are mostly in white neighborhoods, the exceptions being SCAC and Victory Heights, and they started emphasizing the use of phone calls after they felt that they had made enough of a "name" for themselves that they no longer needed to confront a target organization to get what they wanted. Only a few organizations, all in working class, black neighbor-

hoods (SACCC, MASC, GRO, and CCSC), seem to depend much on confrontation in its direct and noisy traditional style. None of these organizations currently runs any service or development programs but, with the exception of GRO, they all work closely with autonomous development organizations that they either created (SACCC) or helped bring into the neighborhood (MASC and CCSC). By early 1980 even GRO was preparing to set up a neighborhood housing redevelopment program.

What seems to differentiate Alinsky-style community organizations from other community based organizations is a self-maintained identification with the Alinsky model of confrontation and negotiation with target organizations. The model with which an organization identifies may be one of restraint or it may be direct and brassy, and the identifying organization may create and run or cooperate closely with external non-Alinsky programs, such as community development organizations and social service programs. All these alternatives have been found in one or another of the twenty five organizations that I studied. Because the Alinsky organizations may exercise restraint in their use of confrontation and because they may become heavily involved in other types of programs, their identification with the Alinsky model cannot always be impersonally discerned from a distance. In many cases, it comes instead from the way the organizations' leaders and staff members expressed themselves during my interviews with them as they described their organizations and their organization's participation in its varied activities. This was especially true of OPCO, which never did much confronting, and of SCAC, which never established a viable community organization. In the case study of SCAC, I have described how that organization has neither succeeded in becoming a grass-roots organization nor has it ever

dropped its identity as such an organization. I also described how this identification with an unattainable goal, in the face of success in maintaining a variety of traditional social service programs, has become a durable survival pattern for that organization.

Because the identification of an organization as being within the Alinsky tradition is as much a matter of internal definition as it is a matter of externally discernable criteria, the transition of an organization into or out from the Alinsky model is a fairly well defined condition even though the question of what is and what is not an Alinsky organization remains objectively cloudy. Three of the organizations listed in Table 1 have not always been Alinsky organizations. The transitions of these three organizations toward or away from the Alinsky tradition will be described in the next several paragraphs. The actions taken by these three organizations seem to have been primarily responses to the local conditions faced by each organization. In one case, the organization deliberately planned the transition. In another case, the transition was an unintended consequence of the way that the organization decided to work on a major local issue. In the third case, the transition just sort of happened.

The OBA got its start as a big grass-roots organization. During the late 1960's, it was probably the strongest such organization in the city. During the early 1970's however, the OBA went into a substantial decline. The decline seems to have occurred for two reasons. One reason was because the organization, with the encouragement of its director, elected a police spy as president. Once so elected, the president was able to do a fairly good job of disrupting the organization. His effectiveness in this role seems to have been facilitated by the other factor which contributed to the

decline of the OBA. The second factor behind the decline of the OBA was that the organization got trapped between the various sections of the Austin community area.

When the OBA was founded, the area was just beginning to experience racial integration. This integration occurred only in the southern part of Austin and moved all the way across the community to the city limits. During this period of time, a railroad embankment and industrial area along Lake Street served as a effective barrier to integration of the middle and northern sections of Austin. The OBA, which was trying to represent all of Austin, put most of its resources into working in the changing southern section of Austin because that was where the need was the greatest. As southern Austin became increasingly black, this left the whites of northern Austin feeling that OBA was really a black organization of southern Austin. When an attempt in 1969 to reintegrate the OBA was sabotaged, the whites of northern Austin decided by form their own separate organizations. This led to the creation of NAC and NAO as the effective community organizations in what had become North Austin. When the middle section of Austin started becoming integrated, the OBA started working more intensively in that area and finally moved its office to the section north of Lake Street. By this time the black section south of Lake Street had developed its identity as a distinct neighborhood, South Austin, which stopped at Lake Street. The OBA move to the north side of Lake Steet, was interpreted as a withdrawal from their black neighborhood by its members in South Austin, and they started pressuring the organization to put more of its organizers in South Austin. The OBA could not meet this demand because it was experiencing financial decline, and gradually the South Austin civic unit of OBA (SAC, later to become SACCC)

began to disengage itself from the parent organization. This disengagement furthered the decline of the parent organization and when the Catholic priests in Mid-Austin who had been cooperating with the OBA, also pulled out of OBA, the organization was left with very little money and no constituency. The OBA staff director concluded that he could not compete against the newer organizations in North, Mid, or South Austin and that he could not raise enough money to keep the organization solvent as a grass-roots organization. He found money and a new mission for the OBA by providing services to the clients of various state-run social service programs. The OBA survived, but not as an Alinsky organization.

GRO was founded by the Roseland area clergy association, in the late 1960's, to help prepare the area for integration. Soon after being founded, GRO evolved into two camps, a traditional civic organization group which was primarily concerned with school problems and an activist group which was interested primarily in some housing problems. After a short time, the traditionalists gained control of the organization and most of the activists withdrew from the organization. For several years thereafter, the primary thrust of GRO involved such civic booster activities as health fairs and passing petitions to seek various changes in the neighborhood. By the mid-1970's, central Roseland, which had become a resegregated black area, was hit by a very high rate of FHA foreclosed mortgages and the resultant abandoned and boarded up houses. GRO did not know what to do with the problem and turned to MAHA for help because MAHA was working on the problem. GRO had never had much of a budget and had only a very small staff. When MAHA offered to provide several organizers for a small monthly fee that was within what GRO could afford, GRO decided that this was a good deal. The

new organizers started working on the central Roseland housing problems, using the Alinsky techniques promoted by MAHA, and began recruiting many new members for GRO during the course of their work. The new members, who soon became a voting majority within GRO, were oriented toward toward the Alinsky methods. Although the MAHA methods have never enabled GRO to accomplish much on the housing problems, the new activist majority has continued to dominate GRO and to tighten the relationship with MAHA. At first the traditionalist members of GRO went along with MAHA because the housing problem was serious and they could offer no alternative solution to the problem. Later on, they went along because they had no choice. The affiliation with MAHA had brought a new cohort of activists into GRO and they had transformed the organization into an Alinsky-style grass-roots organization.

West Englewood was the first part of Father Lawlor's area to go black. In 1970, the new black residents set up WECO as a means of dealing with harassment from the white residents. WECO was the only organization that I studied to be created by neighborhood residents and to be supported only by the mainline Protestant denominations in its service area. WECO operated as an Alinsky organization which, after the neighborhood turned all black, also ran a variety of service programs, including a day care center, some youth programs, adult education programs, and a state funded mental health center in its community center. The community center was a former Presbyterian church which had been loaned to WECO by the Presbyterian denomination. WECO never had much money. What it had went to pay its community worker and the utilities for the community center. WECO was dependent on other agencies both to run the service programs and to provide most of

the materials needed to run them. Shortly after WECO opened the community center, the center became subject to regular vandalism by unknown persons or groups. WECO lacked the financial means to make up for the damage and finally had to close the center. At about the same time, WECO's temporary funding from the Protestant denominations and from a Chicago foundation came to an end and WECO had to drop virtually all its activities, including its grass-roots organizing. WECO's major problem seems to have been dependency on outside funding sources for financial maintenance. This was a problem because WECO's funders, like many philanthropic organizations were geared toward providing seed money to get a project started, not toward providing maintenance money to keep it going over the long haul. WECO, located in a relatively poor, black, working class neighborhood, lacked experienced fund raisers and had no place to turn when the seed money ran out. The WECO board could not stop the decline and WECO soon devolved into an organization which ran a Christmas Basket program and a skills band, and served as the community board for the state-run mental health center. WECO seems to have largely lost control over its destiny. It has survived as a small organization which is now outside the Alinsky fold because the only surviving parts of the organization are definitely non-Alinsky in form. WECO wants to re-establish itself to provide needed services to its community but it has no expectation of reestablishing its community center or of re-instating its function as a grass-roots community organization.

The adaptations made by these three organizations were responses to the local conditions faced by each of them and may not have been the only alternatives open to each organization. Although the number of cases is few, and although no strong pattern emerges from their experiences, it

is possible to make some tentative generalizations. Traditional civic organizations may come into the Alinsky fold if, when faced with a serious community problem, they turn to an Alinsky organization or organizer for help. The organization's probability of being co-opted into the fold would seem to depend on the amount of help that it accepts. MAHA offered GRO a rather big carrot: several organizers for a very low fee, and GRO swallowed the bait. Organizations move out of the Alinsky fold as a response to, or as a consequence of, decline. Two examples were cited. In one case (OBA), the departure was deliberate; in the other (WECO) it was not. Departure from the Alinsky fold may not be the only response to decline, but of the eight declining organizations (see Table 2, Chapter 6), two (WECO and OBA) survived as drop-outs from the fold, while five of the remaining six remained true to the tradition and died. The survivor was the SCC, which was able to hang on, despite its integrationist image, in a community which did not favor integration, and despite strong competition from the Federation which has become about the strongest Alinsky organization in the city. No Alinsky organization totally dominates its turf. The SCC survived by finding niches with which the Federation did not particularly want to bother.

Transitions into the Alinsky fold are by no means a sure path to organizational survival. GRO may have increased its membership and its capacity for working on community problems as a result of its transformation into the grass-roots model, but GRO's older, traditionally oriented members are not so sure about the organization's future. They fear that the new militant majority will attack one or more of the organizations upon which GRO depends for its financial well-being. This fear is not without foundation. SACCC, in South Austin, recently lost what had been arranged as a sure grant

when one of the SACCC organizers decided to pull a confrontation on the foundation that was to have provided the money because it was not moving fast enough to suit him. By the same token, transitions out of the fold are not a sure path to survival, even though traditional civic and social service community organizations probably have lower mortality rates than do their grass-roots colleagues. WECO ended up out of the fold because that was all that was left after the organization collapsed. What was left, however, is not very much and the organization could easily disappear in the not too distant future. Being outside the fold probably enhances WECO's chances of survival, although not by very much, because the organization does not have to carry with itself its failure to be the grass-roots representative of its community. Even though the OBA survived its transition by finding both a new mission and a means of supporting itself, its future was not assured. The director who steered OBA through the transition resigned shortly thereafter and was succeeded by less capable people who did not fully understand what sort of organization they were leading. The OBA had become an organization which was expected to pay its way by engaging in activities that would earn the organization the money that it needed to function. The succeeding director looked more to foundations to support the organization and tried to shift the focus from services, for a fee, to traditional civic organization activities. This did not pan out, partly because OBA still had its poor reputation as a community organization and partly because the new director seems not to really have understood what she was doing. By 1978, the OBA had resumed its decline as an organization. During 1979 it did almost nothing as an organization, and, by early 1980, it seems to have disappeared.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

## ALINSKY ORGANIZING AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

In the introductory chapter of this thesis, I said that Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizing is a form of social movement organizing that seems to be generally compatible with the Zald and McCarthy Resource Mobilization model. Now that the findings derived from my comparative study of twenty five grass-roots organizations have been described in reasonable detail, the time has come to discuss the extent of compatibility between the the Resource Mobilization model and the organizations that I studied.

McCarthy and Zald (1973, p 17) have contrasted their resource mobilization approach to social movement organizations with a more traditional model. As they summarize it, the traditional model views social movement organizing in the following terms:

1. Social movements start in a "class, category, or group of individuals who have a common grievance or who are subject to common strains."
2. "Communication among the members of the group is seen as important to later common effort."
3. "Environmental factors impinge upon the group, molding grievances and the possibilities for group action."
4. "If communication is more or less effective, the group is more likely to take some concerted action to rectify the grievances."
5. "In the early stages .... ill-organized, somewhat random responses designed to redress grievances" may be expected.
6. "Only after well-defined leadership emerges do we find well-defined group action."
7. "As emergent leaders confront the common problems of the group, they help to define them and to devise explanations for their

occurrence - i.e., they develop an ideology. The ideology helps to direct action toward specific targets and helps the leadership define legitimate organizational forms designed to make efficient use of the mass base."

8. "The membership or mass base provides the resources - money and manpower - that allow the movement to survive and carry out its program."
9. "The size and intensity of social movement organizations is thought to reflect the existence or non-existence of grievances that must be dealt with by the political leadership of the society in question."
10. "Once the problems that formed the initial basis for concerted action have been solved, the mass base will be satiated, and the movement may disappear since the grievances on which it was based have disappeared. Or, as more frequently happens, such a movement is transformed and institutionalized."

McCarthy and Zald go on to say that no social movement organizations seem to draw all their resources, the "money, voluntary manpower, and leadership," from the membership base of aggrieved participants. "Early civil rights movements, for instance, were heavily populated with whites, while the prime beneficiaries of any successful civil rights movement were black." Even so, they assert, the distinction and the difference between the resource base and the base of aggrieved participants has increased in recent decades so that the traditional social movement organization model is a thoroughly misleading representation of the reality that it seeks to describe. As McCarthy and Zald see it, there has been a significantly increased separation between any mass base of aggrieved people and an organization's leadership and sources of financial support. Financial support comes increasingly from philanthropic foundations, churches, and individual people whose affluence is sufficient for them to have some discretionary income that may be allocated to these various "good" causes. At the same time, social movement leadership is coming primarily from

full-time, paid, social movement organizers who find an issue and a financial base, and then set about to found an organization. The mass base, if it exists, is usually built after the fact, and exists in a latent form available for mobilization as needed by the organization's leadership. This mass base is increasingly constructed of part-time professionals whose jobs permit them sufficient discretionary use of their time so that they can participate in the meetings and demonstrations called by the organization's leaders. According to McCarthy and Zald, social movement organizations have increased in America over the past two decades. The increase is due to the increases in available money, from outside the mass base, and to the development of a professional cadre of social movement organizers. This has made possible an expansion in social movement organizations in the absence of any generally increased level of mass participation by the American citizenry.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) state that the resource mobilization approach, which "emphasizes both societal support and constraint of social movement phenomena. ... (and) examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements. .... depends more heavily upon political, sociological and economic theories than upon the social psychology of collective behavior." (1977, p.1213) They further state that the recent work of quite a few social scientists, including James Q. Wilson, Charles Tilly, William Gamson and others, falls within this Resource Mobilization approach to the analysis of social movement organizations.

Perrow (1979), however, suggests that there are really two distinct resource mobilization models which must be evaluated separately. The first model, which he calls "RM I" "was formulated chiefly by Oberschall, Tilly, and Gamson .... is Clausewitzian in character, protest is the continuation of orderly politics by other (disorderly) means. .... It is a commodious view of social movements - all kinds of things can become resources for movements and there all kinds of ways to mobilize them." The second model, which he calls "RM II," was "formulated by McCarthy and Zald, .... building on the insights of .... Daniel Moynihan, is a good deal narrower in scope and is only applied to the 1960's (although its generality, of course, is asserted). Politics plays a minor role in it, instead, it finds its agreeable imagery in economic theory. .... It is more rationalistic than RM I, is indifferent to ideology, and has little, and at times no, dependence upon grievances." Perrow suggests that RM II is a "very striking formulation and constitutes a genuine insight" which is consistent with RM I, although more elaborate, but it seems to work "for only a small number of movements in the 1960's .... ." He goes on to say that RM II is a somewhat cynical view, in which group solidarity and even grievances are not essential to social movement organizations. "Political factors are present, .... but they are there as limits, not as engines." In contrast, RM I is a "political process model" which emphasizes political resources, of which group solidarity is one, in evaluating the relationship between grievances, deprivation and organized protest.

Although Perrow may have overdrawn the distinction between RM I and RM II, for McCarthy and Zald, as Perrow himself states (p.201), do discuss

the importance of various non-economic factors, the distinction does seem to have merit. In effect, though, RM II is an offshoot and even perhaps a proper subset of RM I, for RM I would seem to be general enough to include everything in RM II. To the extent, however, that RM I is general enough to incorporate RM II and much more, its strength is also its weakness. For an approach that can explain a great deal by incorporating a great deal into itself is more nearly a bucket of bolts than a clearly defined theory. It does a good job of explaining things after they happen, but doesn't help much in estimating things ahead of time.

The remainder of this chapter will be an assessment of the extent to which my work does and does not support the resource mobilization approach to the analysis of social movement organizations. My focus will be primarily, but not exclusively, on the relationship of my work to Perrow's RM II as represented by the writings of McCarthy and Zald. Their two major essays (1973, 1977) on resource mobilization contain both statements highlighting the important components of their approach and a number of propositions that their approach would seem to support. The analysis in this chapter is necessarily an incomplete evaluation of RM II, my data and findings do not touch on many of their points and propositions.

At the most general level, McCarthy and Zald emphasize the dependence of outside financial bases for contemporary social movement organizations, they emphasize the extent to which leadership has come from a cadre of professional social movement organizers rather than from the grass-roots constituency, and they downplay the importance of such a constituency in building the organization. The importance of outside financial resources was certainly evident in the organizations that I studied. Many of the

organizations that I studied had diversified financial bases, at least for a while, but most were at least occasionally dependent on some Sugar Daddy for their financial support. In addition, I found a very strong relationship between continuation of a viable financial base and organizational survival. In virtually every case of organizational mortality, the key factor underlying the demise of an organization was the loss of financial support. At the same time, the organizations' financial bases, both the diversified ones and the Sugar Daddies, were almost always external to the organizations' mass bases. Viewed in rather general terms, the financial bases could be considered as containing one or more of the following components: (1) churches, at the denominational or local church level, (2) grass-roots organizations, either the coalitions or other neighborhood organizations, (3) foundations, (4) business sources, either small neighborhood businesses or larger national ones which had a plant or division located in the neighborhood, and (4) local residents, either organization members or other people in the neighborhood. The churches, the other grass-roots organizations, the foundations, the businesses, and even the people were normally external to the organization. Only the Victory Heights organization, which raised such money as it had from its members seems to have had its financial base in its mass base. Another organization which comes close to the traditional model of a financial base is CCSC, which had no money, but was surviving because a local parish priest volunteered his time as the group's organizer. In this case, the priest was a key factor in getting the organization started and was very much part of the organization. CCSC does not quite fit the traditional model because the Catholic church, quite apart from the

participation of the priest, also provided meeting space and some very necessary office materials and supplies. Apart from Victory Heights and CCSC, several other organizations have their financial bases in the local community. These include NAO, NAC, GRO, CIA and HF. GRO had been getting a lot of money from local businesses but they were not part of the organization's mass base. HF gets most of its money from the local Catholic Churches, but the mass base is found in the organization's participants, not in the churches, even though the churches are supporters of the organization and even though most participants probably belong to the churches. To be specific, the support of the church comes primarily from the pastor, but the parishoners participate mainly for their own reasons. An increase or decrease in support from the pastor or from the parishoners would neither directly nor automatically cause an increase or decrease in support from the other. Even NAO, NAC and the CIA, which get most of their money from local residents, do not exactly get it from their mass base. For example, NAO and the CIA sponsor or participate in community social events that produce the money in question. Many, or at least some, of the people who spend money at the Calumet Park Labor Day Celebration (CIA) or the St. Peter Canisius annual parish carnival (NAO) are participants in the organization, but many more are not. It is stretching things a bit to claim that every community member is a part of the mass base simply because the organization claims to be the representative of the entire community. It makes more sense to regard the mass base as including only the participants or the more casual supporters. Probably the majority of the people participating in the community and parish celebrations do not fall in either category. The term "Sugar Daddy" is an abstraction describing the parallel

activities of a large number of individual social entities. Many of these Sugar Daddies are local and highly accessible to the neighborhood organization, for example, one or more community churches. Even when the churches are local and organizational supporters, they seem to play the role of a more distant philanthropic foundation. ACO, OBA, USC, LF, and SCC, for example, were founded and at least partially supported by neighborhood churches, but in all cases the churches unilaterally stopped their support quite apart from the wishes of the organizations' leaders. In effect, both for people and for Sugar Daddies, being local does not of itself make one part of an organization's mass bases in any real way.

At the leadership level, things are a bit cloudier, with the result that the grass-roots community organizations and my findings correlate well with Perrow's eclectic RM I, while supporting and departing from both the traditional and McCarthy - Zald approaches in certain obvious ways. For Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizations, leadership exists at two distinct levels, staff and leaders. Staff organizers come from outside the community (this is commonly regarded as important) and they play a behind the scenes role in finding issues and participants to keep the organization going. Leaders are community residents, the core of the grass-roots constituency or mass base, who have been recruited by the organizers or participated and risen to leadership level through their own interest and ability. The staff organizers fit the McCarthy and Zald model very well. They come from the outside, work hard for low pay, are often trying to make a career in organizing, and move from organization to organization as money and opportunity permit. More than a few of the organizers who worked for organizations that I studied had shifted from

one organization to another for more money or because they thought that it was "time." Some other organizers had had previous experience in the civil rights movement or in the farm workers organizing activities. The leaders fitted the traditional model rather well. They were the up-front spokesmen for the organization. They helped plan what to do, they ran the public meetings (after being prepped by the staff organizers as needed), and they viewed the organization as belonging to them, or more accurately, to their community rather than to the staff organizers or to the financial sponsors.

The standard pattern for founding an organization goes something like this: A Sugar Daddy (one or more organizations) hires an organizer, and the organizer beats the bushes to find some issues and some participants. When some issues have been identified and enough participants have been found to act collectively on the issues, the organization has been created. The grass-roots participants seldom create the organization on their own, only WECO and Victory Heights among the twenty five organizations that I studied were established in the absence of an organizer hired by some one else. In keeping with the traditional model, the organization is its mass base, the leaders and the other participants always come from the community. Without them there is no organization. However, in keeping with the McCarthy - Zald model, the organization is not built by any mass base; it is built by outsiders, the professional organizers, and the external money sources. Without them there would be no organization.

The "professional" social movement organizations described by McCarthy and Zald represent what might be called "top down" grass-roots organizing. Somehow the money and organizers find each other after which the organizers

select an issue, a perspective on that issue, and then they seek an appropriate constituency and pool of adherents that may be mobilized when and if needed. In contrast to this, the mass based "traditional" social movement organizations represent what might be called "bottom up" grass-roots organizing. A group of people coalesce around a grievance; they develop their own resource base and leadership pool and then go out to solve the problem. The organizations that I studied were the result of using top-down organizing to create bottom-up organizations. This configuration seemed to work well for these neighborhood organizations, but it is of uncertain general applicability. The city-wide coalitions, MAHA and CAP, eventually evolved into McCarthy - Zald type professional social movement organizations, but, in doing so, they seem to have lost their function as real coalitions of neighborhood based grass-roots organizations. The particular ideology and territorially limited focus possessed by the organizations covered in my research may be major factors underlying their capacity for developing a relatively stable combination of the top-down and bottom-up approaches.

Ideology is one component of organizational design with respect to which the Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizations are strongly allied with the traditional model rather than with RM II. Perrow seems to be right in saying that RM II ignores ideology. The social movement organizations described by McCarthy and Zald seem to depend on transitory teams for their occasionally mobilized participatory bases. This involvement does not seem to depend so much on any specific ideology being shared by the organization and the transitory team as it does seem to depend on the transitory teams' generalized willingness and capability for participating in "good" causes. At this level an ambiguously explicated ideology that emphasizes a

general concern for what is "desirable" or "just" may well be better than a clearly articulated ideology which might prematurely turn off some well-meaning potential participant.

In contrast, ideology is an important component of the way that the grassroots community organizations define themselves, the way in which they perceive the rest of the world, and the way in which they relate to it. In this respect, ideology is a form of glue that serves to bind the organization together and make it a "we." The ideology emphasizes the "us-them" nature of the world: it emphasizes the importance of focusing on issues of importance to the neighborhood; it emphasizes the importance of a special relation with the neighborhood through which it serves as spokesman for it, even though the organization never secures the participation of more than a very small proportion of the neighborhood's residents; it emphasizes the role of resident-leadership and decision making; it emphasizes the staff organizer role of behind the scenes facilitator rather than up-front leader; and it encourages adherence to a set of value judgements, by means of which incorporation is understood to be an open-ended process rather than a zero-sum game. The ideology is important because the mass base is important. The ideology insures that the organization belongs to the part-time participants rather than to the full time staff members. To say that ideology is important because the mass base is important is a bit circular, for the importance of the mass base is part of the ideology. From a functional perspective, however, it is clear that the ideology plays a major role in holding the organization together and maintaining its focus as an issue oriented organization.

I have touched on the problem of the mass base during my discussion

of leadership, but the relationship between RM II, the traditional view, and the mass base has not yet been adequately evaluated. Before continuing, however, it seems desirable that I repeat some definitions developed by McCarthy and Zald (1973 p 17, 1977 p 1220-1223). The definitions are provided for two reasons: (1) it is easier to discuss resource mobilization using the terms as McCarthy and Zald defined them, and (2) they define some terms differently from the way that they have been used in the previous chapters of this thesis. The definitions can be gathered into several groups or dimensions and will be listed in that manner. Groups two through four represent roughly orthogonal dimensions, and terms from the different dimensions can be strung together to denote specific individuals or groups with respect to two or three dimensions. In the following definitions the word "whatever" may be replaced with any of the terms defined in categories two or three (below).

#### 1. Concerning Social Movements:

Social Movement (SM), a "set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some element of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society."

Countermovement, "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population opposed to a social movement."

Social Movement Organization (SMO), "a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals."

Social Movement Industry (SMI), "all SMO's that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement."

Social Movement Sector (SMS), "consists of all SMI's in a society no matter to which SM they are attached."

#### 2. The People, By Extent Of Participation:

Constituents, people and organizations providing resources for a SMO

Adherents, people and organizations that believe in the goals of a movement.

Bystander Public, "nonadherents who are not opponents of the SM and its SMOs but who merely witness social movement activity."

Opponents, people opposed to the SM and its SMOs.

### 3. The People, By Relationship To The Grievances Or Issues:

Beneficiaries, people and organizations which directly benefit from successful resolution of the SM and SMOs grievances or goals.

Conscious (whatever), people and organizations which do not directly benefit from successful resolution of the grievances or goals.

### 4. The People By Extent Of Available Resources:

Mass (whatever), "individuals and groups controlling very limited resource pools. The most limited resource pool which individuals can control is their own time and labor."

Elite (whatever), "those that control larger resource pools."

### 5. Social Movement Organizations And Their Resource Bases:

Classical SMO, SMO which focuses upon beneficiary adherents for resources.

Professional SMO, SMO "which direct(s) resource appeals primarily toward conscience adherents (and) tend(s) to utilize few constituents for organizational labor."

Grass-roots community organizations claim to represent the entire population of some defined geographical area and they seek to mobilize as much of the population as their resources permit. They never get very far, of course - Alinsky says that to involve three percent of the population is exceptional - but they never give up on either the goal or the claim. Because the community organizations were territorially based, one more distinction must be made. The relevant people and organizations are either

within or outside the organization's turf. Outside the turf means being part of the wider society. For McCarthy's and Zald's terms there was no territorial distinction, everything was with reference to the society as a whole.

For grass-roots community organizations the issues, at least the major ones, are selected with reference to the entire territory. Hence all the individuals and organizations that the organization seeks to mobilize are potential beneficiaries. Conscience participants are acceptable only as staff organizers or as financial contributors. Participants, other than occasional financial contributors, are not highly affluent, they are of the "mass" rather than of the "elite." Even Sugar Daddies are not always of the elite. Some of the organizations are small and it doesn't take much to become a Sugar Daddy. The combination of Father Sehr and St. Justin Martyr Church (CCSC) is an example. Father Sehr contributes his time and the church some space and supplies. St. Justin Martyr is in a black non-Catholic neighborhood. It has a small congregation but the same physical plant and money needs that it had when the area was white and the congregation much larger. Now the church is not a money making proposition but it still can afford to be CCSC's Sugar Daddy.

Many of the financial contributors were churches and pastors or clergy groups located within an organization's boundaries. These contributors usually supported the organization for moral reasons, not because they expected to benefit directly from their action. This was especially true for Catholic churches in black neighborhoods, but it was sometimes also true for churches in white areas. The actions of these contributors made them conscience contributors while their location made them beneficiaries.

The bigger issues that the organizations addressed, insurance and mortgage redlining, realtor and FHA practices, etc., often have an impact for an entire metropolitan area rather than only within the boundaries of the organization. This wider impact has been the basis on which the city-wide coalitions were founded. As a result, conscience contributors located outside the organization's area can often unintentionally end up being beneficiaries, if the organization successfully resolves a particular class of grievances. Other examples of conscience beneficiaries could also be found. In its present form, then, the McCarthy - Zald set of definitions is not fully adequate for dealing with this and other cross-cutting relationships produced by territorially based social movement organizations.

McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977) have produced a number of hypotheses about social movement organizations based on their resource mobilization perspective. The hypotheses that bear on my data, or vice versa, will be discussed in the next several paragraphs.

1. "Hypothesis 2: The greater the absolute amount of resources available to the SMS the greater the likelihood that new SMIs and SMOs will develop to compete for these resources. .... Parallel hypotheses could be stated for the relationship of resources amongst different categories of SM adherents and SM growth." (1977 p 1225)

McCarthy and Zald assert that their findings substantiate this hypothesis. My findings do not disagree, but they suggest that McCarthy and Zald have not fully realized the implications of their own perspective. If money becomes available, expansion of an SMI does not simply happen as new people move in. Instead the SMOs already in the field may go out and create new organizations. This is especially true for territorially based organizations where the organizations expand their industry by setting up new organizations in new territory, rather than themselves

expanding into the area. Thus NAC helped found NAO and MAC rather than literally move in itself, and the organizations in a coalition helped in the effort to create new organizations in other neighborhoods. The territorial bases of the organizations precluded any competition among them for participants and the extra help on big issues served to provide additional leverage against target organizations on the major issues. Competition over financial support might exist in the future if money became scarce, but over the short haul, increasing the money supply within the industry meant new opportunity, not more competition. Hence the SMOs in the industry used the money to expand their numbers deliberately.

2. "Hypothesis 5: A SMO which attempts to link both conscience and beneficiary constituents to the organization through .... solidary incentives, is likely to have high levels of tension and conflict." (1977 p 1231)

McCarthy and Zald cite the problems produced by unpredictable white involvement in the civil rights movement and the uncertain support intellectuals provided to the labor movement as examples. The question is that of how common are the interests of outsiders and potential beneficiaries, and how long will this commonality last. It would seem that a distinction needs to be made, depending on the role that the outsiders play in the organization. When outsiders try to participate in the front lines and make the decisions, as northern whites often did in the southern civil rights movement, then the basis for tension exists. The organizations that I studied were built on a close coalition of outsiders and insiders, but their roles were carefully defined. The insiders were the participants and the decision makers; it was their organization. The outsiders were the organizers, they kept the organization going but stayed in the back-

ground. They guided the organization but they did not explicitly try to dominate the decision-making process. For these grass-roots community organizations close, but structured, involvement of outsiders, who are very few in number, and insiders, who are many in number, is essential to the well being of the organization. Stability, not tension, was the result.

3. "Hypothesis 6: Older, established SMOs are more likely than newer SMOs to persist through the cycle of SMI growth and decline."  
(1977 p 1233)

My study strongly supports this hypothesis. Organizational demise usually occurred among organizations that were in their first or second year. Organizations of more than three years duration seldom folded.

4. "Hypothesis 7: The more competitive a SMI (a function of the number and size of the existing SMOs) the more likely it is that new SMOs will offer narrow goals and strategies." (1977 p 1234)

McCarthy and Zald cite the Welfare Rights Organization as an example. It was a late starter in the civil rights movement and specialized in black welfare mothers to avoid direct competition with the older organizations in the field. The hypothesis does not stand up for the organizations that I studied. Not only was competition not a problem for territorially based organizations which did not share the same home base, but organizations attempting to share the home base competed head on. In all cases (the Federation and SCC, ACO and OBA, OBA and SACCC, OBA and NAC) the new organization won the territory and the older organization had to retract or develop a specialized and narrower niche to survive.

5. "Hypothesis 4: The more a SMO is dependent upon isolated constituents the less stable will be the flow of resources to the SMO."  
(1977, 1228)

McCarthy and Zald assert that isolated constituents are less bound

to either the organization or each other, with the result that they are more subject to influence from extra-SMO sources, which may not describe the SMO in a favorable light. This would seem to be true, but it may not be the whole story. Isolated constituents may be less strongly bound to the organization, but their isolation makes them less likely to deliberately act in unison. The larger organizations that I studied sought diversified financial bases composed of many unrelated contributors. This reduced the impact on the organization for a negative response from any one contributor. Closely related constituents can act in unison with disastrous results for the organization. The main reason that St. Ethelreda and Little Flower churches stopped contributing to the organizations in their parishes was that Catholic Charities also stopped contributing. The paired decisions, one caused by the other, led to the termination of grass-roots organizing and the demise of the local organizations in both parishes. Had there been effective isolation between the parishes and Catholic Charities, the cessation of funding by the one might not have produces the equivalent decision by the other and the organizations might have survived longer.

6. Inclusive organizations are weaker than exclusive ones. (1973 p 19)

Inclusive organizations have open membership and weaker linkages between the organization and its constituency than is the case with more exclusive organizations. The organizations that I studied are simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. To belong, you must live within the organization's boundaries, but anyone who lives there can participate. This pairing of exclusive and inclusive aspects seems to help define the organ-

ization and bond it to both participants and beneficiary adherents. At the same time, it helps maintain the public image of being the representative of the entire neighborhood. Inclusive and exclusive, then, are not the simple dichotomy described by McCarthy and Zald.

7. "Does the piper call the tune?" (1973 p 25)

When conscience constituents and adherents are the major real and potential financial base for the organization, does this influence the issues it selects and how it handles them? McCarthy and Zald regard this as a real problem and they suggest that the affluent elites may use selective funding to steer social movement organizing into ameliorative rather than into radical channels. Looking at social movement organizing as a whole, the problem may be real, but for Alinsky-style community organizing, it seems not to be the case. Despite Alinsky's image as a radical, the community organizations founded in his name are hardly radical, and, as Bailey (1974) points out, the primary goal of their participants is to increase their integration into the existing social system, not to change it. Most of the organizations' financial sponsors contribute because they see the organizations as devices for stabilizing the community. In most cases, the contributors are content to let the organization make its own decisions on how to carry out its mission. The converse does happen, though, and it is more frequent among contributors with minimal involvement in the organization. ACO, in Austin, lost the support of the conservative Catholic pastors who dominated the money flow when ACO attacked the Catholic churches for not moving fast enough on civil rights. Also in Austin SACCC lost its support from the Third Unitarian Church because the church's leaders felt that the organization was not doing enough in the blocks im-

mediately around the church. The organization felt its mission was to the community as a whole. A similar split occurred between the OBA and Help Of Christians Church in Mid-Austin.

Foundations often give money for specific programs and the organization must adapt its expressed interests to those of the foundation to get the money. If the money comes in, the organization can use it for both the foundation's interests and its own. Without the money, it could do neither, so earmarked money is better than none. At the same time, both the community organizations and the foundations are interested in ameliorative neighborhood goals so there is seldom a major conflict between the interests of the organization and the foundation.

Perrow (1979) states the the McCarthy - Zald RM II model fits many social movement organizations of the 1960's but that the model is inapplicable for other decades, especially for the 1970's. Perrow states that for RM II, the major factor behind an expansion of social movement organizing is an expansion of the money available to support such organizing. According to Perrow, the expansion of available money did not really appear until the mid-1960's, and continued through the 1970's, while the expansion in social movement organizations started during the late 1950's, before the money supply increased dramatically. At the same time, social movement organizing declined starting in the early 1970's, even though the money supply continued to grow. Perrow, who held the view (p 195) that the reasons given for the decline of a social phenomenon must be consistent with those given for its origin, felt that this was a strong indicator of the limited generality of RM II.

Perrow's analysis is based on aggregate societal data, and this may be a serious weakness in his analysis. Aggregating data forces the disappearance of numerous smaller trends, and these smaller trends may be very important for phenomena that, like social movement organizing, are themselves small components of the overall societal activity pattern. To be specific, grass-roots community organizing peaked in Chicago in the mid-1970's, not in the 1960's, and the changes in the rate of new organization foundings closely paralleled changes in the supply of money, especially that of the Catholic Church. In addition, changes in the rate of new organization founding even more closely paralleled changes in the way that the Catholic Church distributed its money, as was evident from the number of new, if geographically smaller, organizations that appeared once the Catholic Church started channelling the money to individual parishes through Catholic Charities. Changes in the way in which money is made available would seem to be very important, if the community organizations that I studied are a representative example of what can happen with other social movement organizations, but this sort of information cannot be detected using the sort of data on which Perrow based his analysis. It is not clear, then, that RM II is as limited as Perrow claims. It fits, for example, certain aspects of the organizations quite well over a time period from the late 1950's to the late 1970's, and thereby, at least, has temporal applicability beyond that credited by Perrow. Whether its applicability is as general as McCarthy and Zald claim remains to be seen.

The conclusion that I reach is that the data from the twenty five grass-roots community organizations that I studied support the McCarthy - Zald model in certain respects and support what they call the tradition-

al model in other respects. I could probably safely make an even stronger statement: my data strongly support the McCarthy - Zald model as regards the organizers and the money base, and my data strongly support the traditional model as regards the participating mass base and the issues. This is not, I think, quite the same as saying that my data strongly supports the more eclectic RM I, which could incorporate both RM II and most of the traditional view, because RM I may suffer from the disease that afflicts most other general theories: highly eclectic theories make for well fitting post-hoc explanations, but at the expense of being good theory. When one finds, as I seem to have, a real life phenomenon with one foot firmly implanted in each of two supposedly contrasting theories, then it is time to look at both the theories and the phenomenon to find out what is going on. At the theoretical level, one might be able to improve RM II and the traditional view, but I am not now going to undertake that task. Both RM II and the traditional view are ideal-type models and it is common for real life to fit ideal type models in ambiguous ways. On the other hand, contemporary Alinsky organizing seems to have combined RM II type organizing methods with a traditional rhetoric and ideology. The combination seems to have generated a group of organizations possessing theoretical contradictions, which apparently provide a degree of actual stability as long as the organizations remain within the relatively limited sphere of action for which they were designed.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A comparative study of twenty five formal organizations is no small undertaking and constraints must be imposed on the research task lest it both start and end as unfocused busy work giving rise to few useful findings. As a result, I did not set out to study grass-roots community organizations in general; rather I wanted to find out how the organizations got started and what influenced their development thereafter. In addition, I was especially interested in the inter-relationships and the succession processes existing among the organizations that I had selected to study. The need for a defined focus carried over into both the field methods that I used and into choosing the sort of information to be collected. The field method involved interviewing a limited number of expert informants, usually staff organizers or key leaders, from each organization as the sources of my information. The information included a general description of how each organization got started and what happened to it thereafter, and more specific information concerning the organizations' leaders, organizers, financial resources, activities, linkages to other similar organizations, the neighborhood, and the adjacent neighborhoods. This detailed information was collected for the year that the organization was founded, for 1977 (the year that I started my field work) or for the year the organization folded if it did not survive to 1977, and for every half decade (years ending in "5" or "0") in between. Even with this selectivity of focus, the amount of information that I collected was far more than I could handle, and most of the detailed information was not formally analyzed as part of this thesis. Despite this, the selectivity of focus seems

to have paid off, for I obtained quite clear pictures of how each organization developed and, in comparing these pictures, I was able to go a long way toward explaining why the organizations developed as they did.

Deciding to study Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizations did not take me very far toward deciding precisely which organizations to study. Selecting the organizations was a problem that had to be solved at two different levels. First, I had to distinguish Alinsky-style community organizations from all other formal organizations. Second, after identifying the population of such organizations, I had to select a sample to study. To a first approximation, identifying the population of organizations was easy. I restricted my interest to organizations in the Chicago metropolitan area and asked some well recognized local Alinsky organizers to name all the ever-existing Chicago-area Alinsky community organizations that they could think of. As I found and interviewed informants for these organizations, I asked them for the names of other Alinsky-style organizations. I soon had a list containing far more organizations than I could handle. To a second approximation, however, this method of identifying the organizations was not fully satisfactory, despite its convenience. If my only way of recognizing Alinsky organizations was to ask my informants, then it was obvious that I really did not know what I was studying. To remedy this situation, I tried to enumerate a set of criteria by which these organizations might be identified. With the help of my expert informants and a number of books on Alinsky organizing, I was able to develop such a list (found in Chapter 2, part II). The list looked nice but it fit a lot of organizations that my informants did not name better than it did many of the organizations that were on my list. I stuck with the organizations named by my informants

and I went about my field work feeling that my position was, professionally speaking, slightly embarrassing. It simply would not do to write a doctoral thesis on Alinsky community organizations and not know quite what I had been studying. Finally, as I was writing this thesis, I realized that Alinsky-organizing could best be understood as a manifestation of what Lowi (1969) called "interest group liberalism," that this dealt with political incorporation, and that incorporation could be perceived as either an open-ended or a zero-sum game. The recognition that Alinsky organizing was tightly wedded to an open-ended model of incorporation seems to have cleared up the discrepancy between my list of organizations and my list of criteria, and it became an important component of the interpretation of my findings in the third part of this thesis.

Finally, having produced a list containing too many organizations, I decided to study only the organizations in or around two sections of the city, namely Austin and the Southwest Side. This choice was made for two reasons. The first reason was that I had already done some interviewing in these two areas. The second, and more important, reason was that it was obvious that these two sections of the city had a much higher density of Alinsky community organizations than did the rest of the city and this was important to understanding the relationships existing among such organizations.

As I was working my way through the analysis that became the third part of this thesis, it became clear that, despite my rather unorthodox sampling technique, I had come with up a collection of organizations that were spread fairly evenly across most of the variables that I was finding useful in my search for an explanation of why the different organizations developed as

they did. I had big organizations, small organizations, and medium-sized organizations. Some organizations had been around for only a year or two, while other organizations had lasted for many years. Some had survived to 1977 and others had not. Some had secure well-diversified financial bases, others were dependent on some single major contributor, and still others had no real financial base. Some organizations had grown in size, some had shrunk, and some had stayed about the same size throughout the years. Most organizations had always been Alinsky in type but a few had worked their way into or out from the fold.

Most of the dimensions, or variables, that formed the basis of my analysis are found in the chapter and section names contained in Part III. They are: size, date of founding, mobility in or out of the Alinsky fold, their turf, the financial base, their distance from racial change, and outcome. In Part III, these variables were, for the most part, considered individually, but they are closely related and they fit together to provide a general explanation of the development of the organizations.

All the organizations that I studied were founded between 1958 and 1975. All but five were founded after 1970, and fourteen of the twenty five were founded between 1970 and 1972. Post-World War II Alinsky-style community organizing in Chicago got its real start with the founding of OSC in 1958, and the major factor behind its subsequent growth seems to have been the decision of the Chicago Archdiocese of the Catholic Church to support community organizing. At first, the Catholic Church allowed, or encouraged, the development of large scale neighborhood-wide organizations that were formed with the cooperation of the Protestant churches in the area. All of these organizations were formed in white neighborhoods containing large

and financially solvent churches, which put their own money into the organizations. Later on, however, the focus of the Catholic Church changed and Catholic Charities established a program wherein it sent organizers to the local parishes on the condition that the parish church pay half the organizer's salary. This shift in focus, which occurred after 1970, made the Catholic Church perhaps the major promoter of grass-roots neighborhood organizing and changed the pattern of Chicago metropolitan area organizing in several ways. First, it enabled churches with declining revenues in racially changing and black neighborhoods to participate in the community organizing movement. Second, the participation of the Protestant churches (but not of Protestant people) in community organizing declined to negligible proportions and the movement became principally a Catholic Church phenomenon. Third, the focus changed from community-wide organizing to Catholic parish-based organizing. At first, at least in white neighborhoods, each of these parish-based organizations seemed really to have been a community action component of the local Catholic church, but by the time two or three years had passed, each organization had developed into a real, if small, community organization as its participatory base shifted to become more representative of the area as a whole.

By the early 1970's, the number of Chicago-area grass-roots community organizations had risen to the point that they began forming into coalitions to work together on their common problems. The two strong coalitions that resulted, MAHA and CAP, served both as coalitions for bringing together the existing organizations and as bases for creating new organizations in areas where none existed. By the mid-1970's one of these coalitions, MAHA, had become the primary vehicle through which Catholic Charities distributed and

supervised the organizers that it was providing to the Catholic churches. The big increase in founding of grass-roots community organizations after 1970 seems to have been the result both of the Catholic Church shift to parish-based organizing and of the organizing efforts of the coalitions themselves. The peak of organization founding occurred earlier (1970-1973) in the two sections of the city that I studied, the Austin area and the Southwest Side, than it did in the rest of the metropolitan area (after 1973). This appears to have been because grass-roots organizing got off to an earlier start in the two areas that I studied. When the coalitions were being formed, the bulk of their bases were in these areas and it took them a few years to become effective exporters of their product to other sections of the city. In turn, the organizing got its earlier start in these areas both because of some air pollution problems on the far Southwest Side and because most of the city's black-white racial change was occurring on the West and Southwest Sides, which caused the Catholic Church to direct its organizing thrust into these same two areas. The rate of founding new organizations seems to have declined after 1976, both because the Catholic Archdiocese seems to have greatly reduced its support for community organizing and because the two city-wide coalitions went into a decline, with one of them (CAP) folding and the other (MAHA) becoming more an independent professional issue organization than a coalition of grass-roots neighborhood organizations.

Distance from the area of racial change at the time of founding turned out to be a major factor explaining the development of the organizations that I studied. The model that I developed is summarized in Table 5 of Chapter Ten. In essence, it goes as follows: In white areas, the churches

get into community organizing when their pastors see racial change as inevitable and they want to prepare the community for the on-coming change. If they get off to an early start, which is usually their goal, their organizations evolve into small, liberal, social action groups which are dead or ineffective by the time that racial change comes. Organizations founded just before the change comes, founded either by the pastors to help prepare for integration or by their parishoners to forstall the change, become effective vehicles for helping the community work its way through the racial transition. Effective organizations cannot be established once the neighborhood has started to change, but the possibilities for creating them rise after the area has turned black.

Most of the organizations remained within the Alinsky fold from beginning to end, but a few worked their way into or out of that tradition. Organizations seem to become co-opted into the fold if they turn to an Alinsky organizer for help on serious community problems, and they work their way out of the fold as a response to, or as a consequence of, decline.

The community organizations that I studied were turf-based organizations. The real geographical base of most of these organizations was relatively small. If the organization claimed a large piece of territory, as many organizations did, it seldom was able to organize the whole thing. Only for the smaller parish based organizations were the organization's home base and its claimed territory usually one and the same. The organizations were possessive about their territory, especially their home base. Two organizations seem able to share the same territory only when the shared area is peripheral to at least one of the organizations. When two organizations tried to occupy the same home base, as occasionally happened, the

older organization ended up abandoning its claim to be the grass-roots spokesman for the area. The fact that the geographically large organizations seem effectively unable to manage all their territory may seem to support the idea that the Catholic parish is a good size for a grass-roots community organization. This, however, is by no means certain. Some of the smaller organizations that I studied could not manage an area as large as a parish, while many of the larger organizations effectively managed much larger areas.

It seems clear that the relationships found among these organizations exist at two distinct levels. One is the social level of affective relationships among the organizers and participants belonging to the various organizations and the instrumental level of cooperative action on issues of common concern to the organizations. The major vehicle for developing and maintaining these social relationships is the various ad hoc and formal coalitions that have arisen among the organizations. The formal coalitions, MAHA and CAP, have been discussed to some extent during the course of this thesis. The informal coalitions have been discussed in less detail but they occur rather frequently when the people in one organization find a specific but relatively temporary reason for working with the people from another organization. The other level of relationship is ecological in nature and is manifested in the inability of two organizations to share the same home base. There is a close correlation between what happens at the social and ecological levels, but they are nevertheless distinct. For example, strained social relationships are not necessarily the cause of a decision to establish a second organization in the home base of another grass-roots community organization, but strained relationships and a need

to disparage the competition seem inevitable at the social level until the dominance question is solved at the ecological level. Once one organization has relinquished the home base to the other, the social strain declines.

Money is perhaps the major factor behind for formation and the survival of grass-roots community organizing. This is probably why, as McCarthy and Zald (1973) suggest, the growth of social movement organizing in America seems to have paralleled the post-World War II growth in American economic affluence. In his case study of one Alinsky community organization, Bailey (1974) proposed that perceived threat to a neighborhood and the presence of a good sized middle class component in the neighborhood's population to respond to the threat are the major factors behind the formation and maintenance of grass-roots community organizations. These two factors, threat and middle class, were shown to be helpful but not essential. Bailey's hypothesis turned out to be deficient for several reasons. On one hand, neither perceived threat nor middle class people are as scarce commodities as Bailey seems to suggest. On the other hand, very few of the organizations that I studied were really economically self-sufficient - or at least not for very long. Most organizations were started because someone paid an organizer to come in and do so. Most organizations survive because someone has continued to pay the organizer to do his work. Most organizations that appear to be self-sufficient were shown to be really dependent on one major supporter, usually the local Catholic church. If the church did not give the money directly, it still served as the key means of providing access to the people that produced the money that kept the organization solvent.

Some organizations have developed well diversified financial bases. The older organizations that did so all lost them sooner or later. It remains

to be seen whether the more recent organizations which diversified their financial bases can do any better over the long haul. If someone pays an organizer to work in a neighborhood, he will find the participants and the issues needed to keep the organization alive. The loss of financial support seems to have been the major factor behind the decline and demise of the organizations in my survey. Only two organizations ran low on issues, and for only one organization (TMO) was the shortage a basic reason underlying the demise of the organization. The other organization that seems to have run low on issues (USC) continued to exist until Catholic Charities and St. Ethelreda Church simultaneously withdrew their support, and the decision was not due to the shortage of issues. No organization, other than TMO, ran out of participants as long as it still had an organizer. The reason is not hard to understand. Grass-roots community organizations are relatively fragile social entities and they require a lot of care and nurture. Local residents may be concerned about their community, but they are not able to put in the work needed to maintain a thriving organization. The few leaders who tried to maintain their organization without the help of a paid organizer were unable to keep up the pace for very long.

This brought me to what I called the "Sugar Daddy" hypothesis: a grass-roots community organization can be established and maintained only to the extent that someone is willing to foot the bill. The major "Sugar Daddy" for the twenty five organizations that I studied turned out to be the Catholic Church, in one or another form. Although the Church's decision to support community organizing was a general one made by Cardinal Stritch in 1958 and strongly endorsed by his successor, Cardinal Meyer, in 1959, the role of "Sugar Daddy" was generally decentralized and was manifested in the

individual decisions of church pastors, Catholic Charities staff members, and city-wide coalition staff directors to support, or to withdraw support from, organizing activities in specific locations and at particular times. Although these decisions were part of a general pattern, at the level of the particular organization, they appeared to be substantially independent and keyed to local situations and to the changing priorities of local decision-makers. In short, the "Sugar Daddy" was a general phenomenon but Sugar Daddies were individual people, often Catholic pastor community residents, or organizations whose decisions often spelled life or death for specific neighborhood organizations.

One of the striking features of the organizations that I studied was the considerable difference in the sizes of their participatory bases or memberships. These differences exist both at the point of founding and throughout their subsequent existence. The organizations were classified as small, medium, or large in size. Some organizations remained about the same size, while other organizations grew or shrank in size after being founded. When an organization changed in size, the changes in time were always grossly monotonic. Most changes in size were only from one size category to the adjacent one, but a few organizations did grow from small to large or shrink from large to small. No organization that started out large remained that way for very long. They all soon declined to medium or small in size. Remaining small or declining from medium to small were very unhealthy states for the organizations. The mortality rate among these organizations was exceptionally high. Most of them were dependent upon a Sugar Daddy, and mortality was closely correlated with withdrawal of financial support by the Sugar Daddy. The few organizations that declined from large to

small fared better in the mortality column. This seems to be due to their stronger past reputation, their stronger remaining membership core, and their freedom from financial dependence on a single Sugar Daddy. The expanding organizations seemed to be rather healthy. They all had adequate financial bases and secure participating constituencies. These organizations are all relatively young, however, and it remains to be seen whether they can avoid decline in the future. This is both a theoretical and a practical uncertainty. All of these organizations are in white areas that are threatened with racial change in the near future.

Decline and growth were fundamentally different processes for the organizations that I studied, and that is why the impact of each was so different. Growth was always a deliberate process, the organizers and the leaders worked to bring more people into the organization. The efforts to expand an organization do not always seem to have worked, and some organizations were luckier than others in coming up with a really good issue at just the right time. Still, growth, when it did occur, was always the result of an organization's efforts to make itself larger. Decline, on the other hand, seems always to have been unintentional. Decline was never a purposive adaptation to changed circumstances, as, for example, might have been the case for a buggy manufacturer which changed its production expectations to fit the Amish market, once the automobile became the dominant means of personal transportation. Decline was usually, but not always, the result of diminished financial resources. In many cases the diminished financial resources were accompanied by, but not the cause of, other forces which facilitated the decline. The other factors ranged from factionalization in the organization to the emergence of ineffective leaders or the hiring of

a poor organizer, to the emergence of a competitor organization on the home turf, or to the rise to power of a liberal social action oriented minority in the organization. In effect, then, growth describes an organization in control of its destiny, while decline describes an organization which has lost control of the processes influencing its future. The loss of control always occurs in the direction toward down and out.

Size turned out to be a variable that described any organization's course of development and its general state of well being rather well, but, at the same time, size did not explain all that much. The reason seems to be because size was very much a consequence of a number of other variables which could more accurately be regarded as independent causal factors influencing the organization's development. Among these were the founders' intentions in establishing the organization: were they trying to found a large multi-member staff, multi-church, high budget community area organization, or were they trying to found a small, single organizer, low budget parish-based organization? Was the organization being founded well in advance of any threatened racial integration of the area, or was integration almost upon the area? Was the organization acquiring a diversified financial base or did it have a Sugar Daddy and therefore combine present-day financial security with long term dependence on the future intentions of its benefactor? Two aspects of size do, however, seem to have independent causal significance. Organizations that are founded large will necessarily soon decline, and organizational decline is a first rate predictor of organizational mortality, or less frequently, of a shift out of the Alinsky style of doing things.

In this study, my focus has been on organizational development and sur-

vival. Although these are important facets in the field of formal organizations, they are not all-encompassing. I have nowhere addressed the equally fundamental question: of what significance is organizational durability and survival? From a functional or instrumental perspective, this question becomes one of asking what an organization accomplishes during its existence. Since the stated purpose of the grass-roots community organizations that I studied is to work on the issues, or in other words, to solve community problems, the question becomes one of how effective these organizations are in solving problems and in improving the quality of life in the neighborhoods that they claim to represent. In my research, I did not directly address this question and my answer is accordingly qualified. The information that I obtained on organizational activities and accomplishments came strictly from the organizations' points of view. I did not seek or secure the views of outsiders or target organizations on the question of organizational effectiveness. The information of effectiveness was collected as part of the detailed data that I did not extensively analyze during the preparation of this thesis. Some of this information, however, has been partially evaluated and considered in relation to other events that have occurred in the black neighborhoods of Austin and the Southwest Side. There seems to be no question but that these grass-roots community organizations have had an impact. This impact has ranged from getting certain landlords to correct code violations in their buildings to reducing significantly the scope of mortgage and insurance redlining in all urban inner-city neighborhoods. Not all landlords have responded positively and the organizations have not been successful in ameliorating all problems that they and their coalitions have addressed. In summary, then, the organizations have had

some successes and some failures. Through their successes, they have changed, to at least a limited extent, the quality of life in our urban neighborhoods and they have provided their participants with an increased sense of political efficacy in shaping the destiny of their neighborhoods. Measuring success, not against all that they wanted, but rather against what would have been if they had not tried, the grass-roots organizations that I studied have been relatively effective brokers in the game of interest group pluralism. The benevolence of those already incorporated into the pluralist pie toward those not so well incorporated has always been limited, and had these community organizations not existed, their constituencies would have had a discernibly smaller piece of the pie.

Hence, organizational durability and survival are important components of organizational effectiveness. Survival is not, of itself, a good indicator of effectiveness, and some of the organizations have not been very effective in solving their community's problems. But effectiveness, at any level, is impossible in the absence of survival, and for this reason the question of organizational development and outcome is fundamental to the study of formal organizations.

This thesis started with an empirical question (Why do similar organizations develop differently?), for which an empirical answer was sought through the study of twenty five grass-roots community organizations. Both because my focus has been empirical and because the organizations that I have studied have been fairly well ignored by social scientists, my work evolved into a stand-alone thesis containing few references to the writings of other people. At the same time, however, I am part of a tradition of social curiosity that extends back into antiquity and has been displayed

through the work of social philosophers of previous centuries, the social scientists of the the past century, and the field of sociology as it exists at end of the 1970's. It seemed appropriate, therefore, that I at least briefly discuss where my work fits into that tradition. As I was pulling together the information that I had collected, it became clear that a very close relationship existed between certain of my findings and the resource mobilization model of social movement organizing developed in recent years by McCarthy and Zald. The fit was expecially close in the areas of financial resources and staff leadership. On the other hand, the fit was very poor in the areas of mass participation and ideology. Here a very close fit existed between my findings and the "traditional" model of social movement organizing, which seems to be the dominant theoretical alternative to the resource mobilization model. I did not fully resolve this somewhat awkward state of affairs. Part of the problem is probably a reflection of the present state of sociological theory and part of the problem is a consequence of the particular way in which Alinsky-style grass-roots community organizations have been designed. One interpretation of my findings would be that RM II and the traditional view are more nearly complementary than competitive models of social movement organizing.

In effect, then, my work has been part of the Zald and McCarthy tradition, but my focus has been on an aspect of social movement organizing that they seem not to have considered and which differs in significant ways from that which they have described. In this way, I have perhaps served to extend a sociological perspective, albeit in a way which has limited my need to refer to their work in any substantial manner throughout this thesis.

I will close this thesis on a personal note. Despite the occasional

tediousness that seems inherent in any research project that is extended over a three year period, I got a great deal of satisfaction from conducting the field work and working my way through the data that I collected. It was comforting both to learn that my work had supported some common sense notions (for example, that small size and uncontrolled decline are unhealthy conditions for a formal organization, and that money is a major factor in organizational survival) and that it produced some apparently new and unexpected information (for example, the model in Chapter 10 concerning organizational development and distance from racial change, and, in particular, the fact that prevention can sometimes be counter-productive). At the same time, however, I do not feel that this research project has really been completed. I wonder what new things would have been uncovered and I wonder how my findings would have been changed or modified if I had been able to include all the Chicago area grass-roots community organizations in my research. The question is not trivial, for the threat or presence of black-white racial change was a major factor affecting the development of virtually all the organizations that I studied, and most of the other organizations were not directly affected by this particular aspect of urban dynamics. I also wonder what else I would have learned if I had been able adequately to analyze the detailed data that I collected. Here my curiosity is operating at two levels. On one hand, I am immediately interested in how the analysis of these data would have changed or added to my findings. On the other hand, I am also interested in the applicability of quantitative methods to the analysis of formal organizations. Three years ago, one reader of my thesis proposal observed that computer-based quantitative methods are not how formal organizations are studied. On the same theme,

Etzioni (1969) wrote that the application of quantitative methods to research on complex organizations was a new frontier that badly needed to be explored. Etzioni's statement seems as appropriate today as it did a decade ago, and I collected a lot of data that addresses this question.

My satisfaction with what I have done has not reduced my curiosity about what I did not do and, although it may seem odd for me to say so, now that my thesis has been completed, one of my goals is to find a way of finishing the larger research project of which it became but a part.

## REFERENCE MATERIAL

APPENDIX A:  
THE INTERVIEW FORMS

Appendix A contains copies of each interview form used in collecting the data for this research project. The forms were printed on 8-1/2" X 11" paper and the copies contained in this appendix have been reduced in size. A separate form was designed for each variety of data that was collected and during each interview as many copies of each form were used as were needed. After all the interviews for an organization had been completed, the same forms were used to collate the information into a single set of data. Again, as many copies of each form as were needed were used.

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px 5px; display: inline-block;">INFORMANT DATA</div> <div style="text-align: right;"> Name _____ Phone _____  Address _____ Dates Interviewed _____ </div> </div>			
1. Organization Reported On			
2. How Long Has Informant Known Of Organization			
3. How Long Involved In Organization			
4. How Involved, To What Extent			
5. Informant Reports On: a. Creation - Date b. Maintenance - Dates  c. Demise - Date			

page 1 of 2

ORG. CREATION

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Founded \_\_\_\_\_

1. How did organization get started

2. Primary issues/problems leading to founding (details on separate sheet)

- |    |    |
|----|----|
| a. | d. |
| b. | e. |
| c. | f. |

3. Founders (details on separate data sheets)

- |    |    |
|----|----|
| a. | d. |
| b. | e. |
| c. | f. |

4. How well did they know each other before founding organization?

5. How did they come together?

6. What groups/other organizations were involved in founding group (details on separate sheets)

- |    |    |    |
|----|----|----|
| a. | c. | e. |
| b. | d. | f. |

7. Resources &amp; sources used in founding org. (see data sheet) Initial budget:

- |    |    |    |
|----|----|----|
| a. | c. | e. |
| b. | d. | f. |

8. Who were early leaders (details on separate sheet)

- |    |    |    |
|----|----|----|
| a. | c. | e. |
| b. | d. | f. |

9. How were leaders designated?

10. Early staff

- |    |    |    |
|----|----|----|
| a. | c. | e. |
| b. | d. | f. |

11. How was staff selected?

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ORG. CREATION

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

12. What activities did organization undertake (separate sheet for details)

- |    |    |
|----|----|
| a. | d. |
| b. | e. |
| c. | f. |

13. Organization style

a. What approach did organization take toward problems it worked on?

b. Why/how was this adopted

c. How did organization divide up its work

d. How did organization make itself known to

CommunityTargets

14. Community name and description

15. Organization territory and special focus

16. How did organization get its name

17. Changes in organization as it routinized operations/declined

18. Comments

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ORG. MAINTENANCE

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. What does org. do (general)
  
2. Particular issues/activities (separate data sheet)
 

a.	d.
b.	e.
c.	f.
  
3. Basic approach taken by org. in carrying out activities
  
4. Participation in org.
  - a. How do people become part of org. (what does it mean to belong)
  
  - b. Who can belong (individuals, groups, restrictions)
  
  - c. Who does belong (general types, resident locations, etc.)
  
  - d. How are leaders determined
  
  - e. How is staff selected
  
5. Leaders (separate data sheets)
 

a.	d.	g.
b.	e.	h.
c.	f.	i.
  
6. Staff (separate data sheets)
 

a.	d.	g.
b.	e.	h.
c.	f.	i.

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ORG. MAINTENANCE

Informant \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Data date \_\_\_\_\_

## 7. Resources sources

Total budget \_\_\_\_\_

Local sources \_\_\_\_\_

a.

d.

g.

b.

e.

h.

c.

f.

i.

## 8. How are decisions made/work allocated

## 9. How does org. handle issues/activities (role specialization, serial advocacy, all at once, one at a time, etc.)

## 10. Cohesiveness-any factions-over what

## 11. Morale within org.

## 12. Size-how measured

## 13. Linkages to other orgs. (separate data sheet)

a.

c.

e.

b.

d.

f.

## 14. Spin offs (separate data sheet)

a.

b.

c.

## 15. Geography

a. neighborhood name

b. how defined

c. org. area

d. how defined

e. special focus

## 16. Comments

**ORG. DEMISE**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

 Organisation \_\_\_\_\_ Demise started \_\_\_\_\_  
 Org. ceased existence \_\_\_\_\_

1. Why did org. fall apart (issues/participation/staff/leaders/resources/ other orgs./ role-personality conflicts/ factions/ etc.)

2. Reaction-response to decline  
 a. within org: (1-general)

(2. participation)

b. in community

(3. morale)

c. other linked orgs.

(4. cohesiveness)

d. resource sources

(5. decision-making-  
work allocation)

3. Activities during decline (separate data sheets)

a. c. e.

b. d. f.

4. Leaders during decline (separate data sheets)

a. c. e.

b. d. f.

5. Staff during decline (separate data sheets)

a. c. e.

b. d. f.

6. Comments

**STAFF DATA**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Data date \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Sex: M P  
 3. Age: 20-30 / 30-45 / 45-65 / 65+ 4. Race/ethnicity \_\_\_\_\_  
 5. Lives in org. area: No \_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ → Housing type \_\_\_\_\_  
 6. Approximate address \_\_\_\_\_

7. Org. career a. hired \_\_\_\_\_ b. left \_\_\_\_\_

b. dates				
c. position				
d. style of doing work				

8. Prior/subsequent participation in org: No \_\_\_\_\_ Yes \_\_\_\_\_ 2

a. dates	
b. position	

9. Reason given for:	Involvement	Leaving

10. Apparent satisfaction with how org. does things: ++ + 0 - DK

11. Outstanding contributions to org, if any

12. Prior career experiences

13. Comments/changes in above

## LEADER DATA

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Date date \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

Leader  
Founder

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Sex: M F
3. Age 20-30/ 30-45/ 45-65/ 65+ 4. Race/ethnicity \_\_\_\_\_
5. Marital status: married/widowed/ sep./ div./ DK
6. Children at home: no/yes → approx.# & age range \_\_\_\_\_
7. Housing: a. own/rent b. house/2 flat/apt. bldg.
8. Approximate address \_\_\_\_\_
9. Occupation \_\_\_\_\_ 10. Religion \_\_\_\_\_
11. Time span of participation in org. a. from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

b. dates				
c. capacity/ role				
d. area/issue of partici- pation				
e. extent of involve- ment				

12. Reason given for involvement \_\_\_\_\_

13. Attitude of family toward involvement: ++ + 0 - DK

14. Apparent satisfaction with how org. does things: ++ + 0 - DK

15. Leader acting as: individual

Rep. of other org. (Name) \_\_\_\_\_

16. Comments/ changes in above

**ORGANIZATION RESOURCES**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Data Dates \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

1. Source				
2. Type of support				
3. Amount of support and time span provided				
4. Impact on focal organization				
5. What did source get in return				

**ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES/ISSUES**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

1. Description				
3. Why undertaken (important to whom)				
5. How long had problem existed				
6. How long did it continue				
7. What did org. do about it (who, how)				
8. Resources and time invested in activity (amt & prop of total)				
9. Targets approached (how, by whom)				
10. Impact on organization				
11. Impact on community				

**ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Data Date \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

1. Linkage to				
2. Involving what				
3. Handled by				
4. Handled how				
5. Importance to focal organization				
6. Impact on focal organization				

**ORGANIZATION SPIN-OFFS**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Date Date \_\_\_\_\_

C M D

1. What				
2. When				
3. Why				
4. Nature and duration of connection with focal organization				

**FOCAL NEIGHBORHOOD**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Data date \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

1. Neighborhood name \_\_\_\_\_ Org. encompasses: part all

2. How defined \_\_\_\_\_  
↓

3. Family types \_\_\_\_\_

Extent of diversity \_\_\_\_\_

4. Race/ethnicity \_\_\_\_\_

Extent of diversity \_\_\_\_\_

5. Housing types \_\_\_\_\_

Extent of diversity \_\_\_\_\_

6. Economic status \_\_\_\_\_

Extent of diversity \_\_\_\_\_

Extent of diversity \_\_\_\_\_

7. Major institutions in neighborhood (religious-economic, etc.) \_\_\_\_\_

8. Major problems/issues in neighborhood \_\_\_\_\_

9. Recent changes in neighborhood \_\_\_\_\_

**ADJACENT NEIGHBORHOODS**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_ Data Date \_\_\_\_\_ C M D

Organization \_\_\_\_\_ Focal Neighborhood \_\_\_\_\_

1. Name				
2. Location				
3. How differs from focal neighborhood				
4. What is happening there				
5. How does this affect focal neighborhood				
6. How does this affect focal organization				
7. Does that neighborhood have similar community organization (linkages)				

**FINAL OVERVIEW**

Informant \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

1. How effective is organization
2. How has this changed over time - when was organization most effective
3. What does it mean for an organization to be effective
4. How stable is org. - staff/participation/leaders/activities/methods
5. How has this changed over time
6. Have I/you left anything out that you consider important concerning org/neighborhood

APPENDIX B:  
INITIALS AND ABBREVIATED ORGANIZATION NAMES

Appendix B contains an alphabetical listing of the abbreviated names or initials by which the organizations mentioned in this study are commonly known. Following each abbreviation or set of initials is the organization's full name, its approximate location, and any other comments that seemed appropriate. Where I was able to do so, I have briefly described each organization that was not among the twenty five that were the focus of this study. This list is by no means exhaustive. The number of ad hoc committees and organizations spawned by Alinsky organizations and organizers may well be legion; only a small proportion made it into this study. An asterisk (\*) following an abbreviated name or initials indicates one of the organizations that I studied.

ABC      Associated Block Clubs, Inc.    (Southwest Side, Chicago)

The umbrella group for the Father Lawlor block clubs. The local neighborhood units were:

United Southwest Block Clubs - around 51st Street, east of Ashland

Southwest Associated Block Clubs - around 69th Street, west of Ashland

Highburn Associated Block Clubs - around 79th Street, west of Ashland

Beverly Heights Associated Block Clubs - Beverly Heights area

ACO\*      Austin Community Organization    (Austin area, Chicago)

BofYC      Back Of The Yards Neighborhood Council    (South Side, Back Of The

Yards area, Chicago)

Founded by Saul Alinsky in 1939, his first organization (The abbreviation "BoFYC" is of my own making to fit the organization's name into some of my tables)

- BAPA**      Beverly Area Planning Association      (Southwest Side, Beverly area, Chicago)
- A non-Alinsky traditional style civic or community organization
- BCAC**      Brainard Community Action Council      (Southwest Side, Brainard area, Chicago)
- Reportedly an Alinsky-style organization. It was to have been included in my sample of organizations but I was unable to gain access to it
- CAN**      Concerned Allied Neighbors      (North Side, southwest Lakeview, Chicago)
- Founded in about 1975 with the help of MAHA
- CAP**      Original name: Campaign Against Pollution  
Later renamed: Citizens Action Program
- Both a city-wide coalition of Alinsky-style community organizations and a metropolitan area-wide organization in its own right
- CASC\***      Central Austin Steering Committee      (West-Central Austin area, Chicago)
- CCC**      Cicero Community Council      (Cicero, Ill.)
- The name used by the Cicero Community Organization (CCO) before its first convention
- CCO\***      Cicero Community Organization      (Cicero, Ill.)
- CCSC\***      Citizens Council Of The Southwest Englewood Community      (Southwest Side, West Englewood, St. Justyn Martyr parish, Chicago)

- CCWE\* Concerned Citizens Of West Englewood (Southwest Side, West Englewood area, Chicago)
- CIA\* Community Improvement Association (Calumet Park, Ill.)
- COUP Community of United People (West Side, just west of University Of Illinois at Chicago Circle campus, Chicago)  
Founded in about 1969
- Cragin Cragin Plus (North Side, Cragin neighborhood, Chicago)  
Founded in 1964, folded in 1969
- GRO\* Greater Roseland Organization (Far South Side, Chicago)
- HACO Human Action Community Organization (Harvey, Ill.)  
Founded in 1971 with the help of the coalition that was evolving into MAHA
- HF\* Homeowners' Federation (Far Southwest Side, Chicago and Evergreen Park, Ill.)
- IAF Industrial Areas Foundation (Originally based in Chicago, but moved to New York late in 1979)  
The organization that Saul Alinsky established to do community organizing
- IPAC Illinois Public Action Council  
A state-wide coalition and organization - sort of a successor to CAP
- Little Flower (LF)\* Refers to some ad hoc groups sponsored by "Little Flower" Catholic Church (Southwest Side, St. Theresa Of The Infant Jesus Church, popularly known as Little Flower, Chicago)
- MAHA Metropolitan Area Housing Association  
A city-wide coalition of Alinsky-style community organizations

and, in recent years, also something of an organization in its own right

MAC\* Mid-Austin Council (East-Central Austin, the northern half of Our Lady Help Of Christians parish, Chicago)

MASC\* Mid-Austin Steering Committee (East-Central Austin, Our Lady Help Of Christians parish, Chicago)

McDrake McDrake (North Side, southwest Logan Square, Chicago)

The organization's name is a composite of some neighborhood streets (Milwaukee and Drake) Mc Drake claims a small area located almost exactly in the middle of UNA's very large area

NAC\* Northwest Austin Council (North Austin, St. Angela parish, Chicago)

NACC\* North Austin Community Council (North Austin, Chicago)

A short lived coalition of NAC, NAO, and MAC

NAO\* Northeast Austin Organization (North Austin, St. Peter Canisius parish, Chicago)

NAPP Neo-Genesis Progress Programs (Southwest Side, Chicago)

A short-lived ecumenical, bi-racial, church based organization to emphasize personal re-awakening and resocialization as a means of rebuilding the community. Boundaries were 75th to 95th and from the Dan Ryan Expressway to Damen. NAPP existed during 1973 and 1974

NCO Northwest Community Organization (North Side, Chicago)

NCO's was not included in this study. It dates back to the early 1960's and is one of the more highly recognized Alinsky organizations in the Chicago area

NRC North River Commission (North Side, Albany Park (west of Rogers Park, Chicago)

Founded in 1962

OBA\* Organization For A Better Austin (Austin Area, Chicago)

ONC Organization Of New City (South Side, New City area, Chicago)

Founded with the help of MAHA in 1975. "New City" is one neighborhood name that Hunter (1974) says seems to exist on city maps but not in the minds of the people who live there. When I asked my MAHA informant how the organization got its name, he said that the organizers looked on a city map to find out what the neighborhood was called.

ONE Organization Of The Northeast (North Side, Uptown and Edgewater neighborhoods, Chicago)

Founded in about 1973

ONWC Organization For The Northwest Community (North Side, Cragin area, Chicago)

Founded in about 1975, and something of a successor to Cragin Plus which folded about five years earlier

OPCO\* Oak Park Community Organization (Oak Park, Ill.)

OSC\* Organization For The Southwest Community (Southwest Side, Chicago)

Pilsen Pilsen Neighbors Community Council (West or South Side, Pilsen area, Chicago)

This organization was founded in 1954 as a traditional social service oriented community organization but was transformed into an issue-oriented direct action organization during 1969 and 1970

POCHC People Organized For The Concern Of The Highland Community (Southwest Side, Little Flower parish, Chicago)

One of the short-lived, largely black community organizations set up by Little Flower Church. POCHC existed from early to late 1973

Pullman     The complete name of this organization was not known to my informants and I was not able to identify the organization     (South Side, Pullman neighborhood, Chicago)

RAPA        Roseland Area Planning Association     (Far South Side, Chicago)

              A traditional civic organization that opposed racial change in its area and did not survive the racial change

SAC         South Austin Concil     (South Austin, Chicago)

              The first name for the organization that later became SACCC

SACCC\*      South Austin Coalition Community Council     (South Austin, Chicago)

St. Benedicts     St. Benedict Community Relations Committee     (North Side, southern Ravenswood area, Chicago)

              A group founded in 1976 by MAHA and St. Benedict Catholic Church

SCAC\*       Southwest Community Action Coalition     (Southwest Side, Chicago)

              The successor to OSC

SCAFHA      Southwest Coalition Against FHA     (Southwest Side, Chicago)

              A 1972 umbrella group organized by Little Flower Church but also including other Southwest Side community organizations (SCC, for example, was a participant)

SCC\*        Southwest Community Congress     (Southwest Side, Chicago)

The Federation\*     Southwest Parish And Neighborhood Federation     (Southwest Side, Chicago)

THA         Town Hall Assembly     (Austin area, Chicago)

              A white group based primarily in west-central Austin which was opposed to racial integration and which fought ACO and OBA during the 1960's

- TMO\*      The Midway Organization      (Far Southwest Side, Chicago and the suburb of Summit)
- TON      The Organization Of The Northwest      (North Side, area around Armitage and Kildare, Chicago)
- Founded in about 1976 by CAP and the IAF
- TWO      The Woodlawn Organization      (First named: Temporary Woodlawn Organization)      (South Side, Woodlawn neighborhood, Chicago)
- Founded in about 1959 and one of the more widely recognized Alinsky organizations in the Chicago area
- UCC      Uptown Citizens Council      (North Side, Uptown area, Chicago)
- UCC was founded in about 1936 and predates even the Back of The Yards Council. I do not know whether UCC has always been a grass-roots organization
- USC\*      United Southwest Citizens      (Southwest Side, St. Ethelreda parish, Chicago)
- UNA      United Neighbors In Action      (Humbolt Park and adjacent sections of Chicago)
- An organization that would have been included in this study if I had been able to gain access to it
- USCO      United Southwest Community Organization      (Southwest Side, Chicago)
- The name used by SCC prior to its first convention
- VH\*      Victory Heights Community Organization      (South Side, just north of Calumet Park, Chicago)
- WECO\*      West Englewood Community Organization      (Southwest Side, West Englewood area, Chicago)
- WSC      West Side Coalition      (West Side, Chicago)
- The first attempt, apart from CAP, to develop a wider coali-

tion of adjacent community organizations. WSC included OBA, NCO, and Our Lady Of Angels. WSC was a forerunner of MAHA

## APPENDIX C:

## THE ISSUES

Grass-roots community organizations are basically established to work on community problems or issues. During the course of this report, I have mentioned various issues without explaining what they were. Appendix C is an alphabetical listing, with brief explanations, of these issues. This list was compiled from the detailed information on organizational activities that I gathered during my field work. I collected this information on an every fifth year basis, and I asked that informants mention only the more important things that their organization had done. As a result, there is no reason to believe that this list is complete, an issue could have been important only for years between the half decade points for which I collected information or an informant could have neglected to mention an issue either because he forgot about it or judged it to have been unimportant.

These issues do not include everything done by a grass-roots organization. Other activities include fundraising, finding members, holding planning meetings, holding social events, and sometimes running community service programs. I have attempted to include only the "issues" in this list, and I have tried to omit the non-issue activities engaged in by any organization that had a non-Alinsky phase of its existence.

Issues tend to be identified by single word labels where this is possible. Sometimes the meaning of an issue is obvious from its name, other times its meaning is not so obvious. Sometimes an issue has a single and clearly understood meaning while other times the issue is a name that has stood for a wide variety of things at different times and for different organizations.

Even a single issue can mean different things to an organization at different phases of its existence. For example, to a white organization at the edge of the black neighborhood "FHA" means limiting FHA mortgages to control the influx of blacks. After the neighborhood has been black for a while, "FHA" means stopping fast foreclosures by mortgage lenders, and still later it can mean doing something about the foreclosed houses that are appearing in the area.

Some of the issues are "more important" than others. That is, they have been picked up by most organizations and they have been promoted by the various city wide coalitions such as MAHA and CAP, or they have been very important to organizations that worked on them. I have marked the more important issues with an asterisk (\*) following the issue's name. There is a subjective component to my assignment of these asterisks. Readers who are knowledgeable about this subject might easily disagree with some of my decisions. Where it seemed useful to do so, I have also listed which organizations were mentioned for each issue. For reasons that I have previously stated, omission of an organization's name for an issue does not mean that the organization did not work on the issue.

This list contains every issue mentioned by my informants. The list can be used in at least three ways. First, it can serve as a dictionary to explain the issues mentioned in the text of this study. Second, by looking on the issues marked with an asterisk, it provides information about the general issue focus of the organizations that I studied. Third, by looking at the other listed issues, information can be gleaned about the range of issues used by grass-roots community organizations.

### Abandoned Cars

This issue was mentioned for only one organization, CCO. Apparently the Cicero officials were not especially interested in pulling such cars from the streets and housewives would pester the officials with phone calls until they were removed.

### Abandoned Houses

See "HUD"

### Air Pollution

This issue was mentioned only for CCO, TMO, and OPCO. Air pollution was the reason for founding CAP and it did something about the problem. TMO and CCO were located to the south and north respectively of the industrial district in which the offenders were located. Neither organization did much about the issue. OPCO participated in the issue because it was CAP's major focus when CAP started OPCO. Once started, OPCO got out of CAP and dropped the issue because Oak Park was not directly affected by the offending industries.

### Arson

Arson was an issue only for CASC, and not one of its major ones. The CASC leaders felt that the fire department was not checking carefully enough into the possibility of arson in some local fires. Local fires were not a problem in the CASC area as they have been in some other areas of the city.

### Bread and Butter

Not all issues have the same impact on the organization and on the community. Some big issues involve difficult problems for the community. Other issues represent minor but ever present and recurrent problems. Many of these issues, primarily garbage pickup and rats, involve irritating but easily solved problems for any particular block at any particular time. Organizers call these "bread and butter" issues because they provide an easy, low cost, way to recruit members for the organization. People are irritated by the problem, and the organizers can easily get the city to temporarily solve the problem on any particular block. This makes the organization look good to the people. The general problem remains, and it can be used again and again as an organizing tool. Bread and Butter describes issues that are low cost ever present ways of recruiting people for the organization. Where possible, organizers will often pick up other small issues that fall into this same category. Seeking a stop sign or getting a street light fixed are good examples.

See also "City Services" and "Sanitation."

#### Business Strip Improvement

Several organizations have watched their neighborhoods' commercial strips decline, and have tried to do something about it. The "something" ranged from confronting the city to organizing businessmen's associations or establishing not-for-profit redevelopment corporations. This seems to have been important issue for LF, NAO, NAC, OBA, and USC.

#### City Services\*

Describes a related collection of problems involving rats, street cleaning, routine and bulk garbage pickup, tree trimming, pot holes and curb repairs. Every organization seems to have been into this issue, it is the stable "bread and butter" issue. The dominant focus is on garbage with rats coming in second. See also "Sanitation."

#### Civic Boosterism

Publicizing the neighborhood as a "good place to live." This seems only to have been done by certain white organizations located on the edge of the black section of the city. Whites were moving out faster than they were moving in and, trying to attract more whites was seen as a way of keeping the neighborhood from changing. Needless to say, this publicity thrust was directed to white areas of the city, and not to black ones. Standard methods included setting up a housing referral service, and advertising homes and apartments in the white neighborhood newspapers distributed in areas farther away from the blacks.

This issue was important to CASC, NAO, and to LF which cooperated with the Father Lawlor organization in it. Organizations drop this program after it is obvious that the cause has been lost.

#### Community Development Funds

Cities can obtain federal money for community development, or redevelopment, purposes. Cities that get the money are supposed to seek citizen input on how to use it. Only two organizations made this an issue, MASC, over its ill-fated youth recreation center, and OPCO, which disagreed with the village over how some of the money should be spent.

#### Consumer Issues

This is a catch-all issue name. For my twenty five organizations it included:

Comparing prices at white and black neighborhood Jewel and A&P food stores, the belief being that the major chains set higher prices in black neighborhoods. This was a CAP issue mentioned by informants for CCWE and NAO, but other organizations also participated.

Fighting the National - Del Farm issue (See the OSC case study in Part II for details)

Objecting to the dirty condition of neighborhood National and Jewel stores (OSC).

Fighting Jewel plans to close a neighborhood store. This was done by NAO and by TMO.

#### Crime (Also known as "Security")\*

This issue involves a variety of related issues and is important to almost every organization. The related issues and the mentioned organizations were:

Street safety (NAO, NAC, MAC, OPCO, OBA, SACCC)

Personal safety on CTA rapid transit stations (OPCO)

Graffiti (NAC)

Burglary (OBA, CCSC)

Prostitution (CCWE, SACCC)

Narcotics and Vandalism (VH)

Some organizations, including WECO and USC have established volunteer CB patrols to deal with crime.

#### Crossing Guard

CCWE felt that one street corner was particularly dangerous for children to cross unaided, and wanted a crossing guard assigned there.

#### Crosstown Expressway

This has been an important issue in the city, but it was not so important to the local organizations, even those affected by it. The issue was mentioned by four organizations, three of which opposed it. The three were ACO, SCAC, and CCWE which participated only because it was a big issue for CAP. The expressway would have gone through the middle of SCAC's territory and along the eastern Edge of Austin. The fourth

organization to mention the issue, SCC, supported the idea.

#### Curbs and Potholes

This was generally part of what is called "City Services" and was particularly mentioned by CCWE. Many organizations avoided this issue because curbs and alley potholes involved financial expense to the residents. The organizations usually went after only the free city services.

A related problem for TMO involved getting a private drainage ditch filled in.

#### Del Farm

See "Consumer Issues"

#### Development Corporations

Some organizations established non-profit development corporations to engage in commercial or residential area redevelopment. The organizations that participated in this included OBA/SAC, NAO and NAC, SCC, The Federation, and USC.

#### Disclosure\*

A part of the Mortgage Redlining issue. At the federal and state level the MAHA and CAP coalitions sought regulatory agency changes and legislation that would compel mortgage lending institutions to make public the geographical distribution of their mortgages and their assets received from savers.

#### Disinvestment

Part of the Redevelopment Issue. People and companies on the edge of the black neighborhoods let their property decline, expecting the worst when racial change comes. The idea is that the behavior associated with these expectations is what makes "the worst" happen and the organizations seek extra financial investment in local housing and commercial strips to offset what would otherwise become a self-fulfilling prophesy. This was a big issue for The Federation after 1976, perhaps because it was trying to prevent racial change.

#### Education\*

Although education has specific reference to the schools, it still is something of a catch-all category. The issue was, at times, very im-

portant to certain organizations. It was never one of the over-all important issues and the asterisk is questionable. Education was an important in the following ways to the following organizations:

Establishing a neighborhood junior college (SCC)

Fighting harassment and transfers to distant grade schools for black children in an area being integrated (WECO)

Overcrowding in the grade schools (OBA, CASC, VH, SACCC) It was a very important issue for OBA.

Overcrowded high school (GRO, TMO, OBA, SACCC)

Quality of education in the neighborhood schools and/or the quality of the educational facilities themselves (MASC, VH, CASC, SACCC, OSC)

The lack of a summer school program (CCO)

High school boundaries (NAO). NAO (North Austin) was in a mostly black high school district and the parents wanted to sent their children to a nearby white high school rather than resort to parochial schools.

Getting a tax increase school referendum passed (CIA)

Trying to keep a Catholic parochial school from being closed (CASC, LF).

#### Fast Foreclosures\*

See FHA Foreclosures

#### FHA Forclosures\*

Black area organizations felt that the mortgage lenders who specialized in federally insured FHA mortgages were foreclosing too fast whenever people got behind in their mortgage. The mortgage lender could foreclose and immediately collect from the federal government. The fight was to get the FHA to require that the mortgage lenders be more patient and not foreclose without a good reason.

This issue was mentioned by MASC, GRO, NAO, VH, and OPCO, but many other organizations also participated in it. The issue was of very great importance to MASC and GRO. OPCO participated because the village of Oak Park had a single affected house.

#### FHA Payback

FHA mortgages were supposed to be given only on housing that was in good condition, but the FHA had been lax in inspecting the housing for which it had been insuring the mortgages. Organizations persuaded the federal government to establish a program to reimburse the owners of FHA housing that had been sold when defective for the needed repairs. The issue was a prolonged one because the FHA did not make applications available until the original claim period deadline was about up and then refused virtually all the claims. Quite a few families got their money but it took years in most cases and the organizations had to fight all the way. GRO made a big thing out of the issue, but the organizers at CCSC avoided the issue because they were afraid that the money would not be forthcoming which would make the organization look bad.

#### FHA Abuses

This issue stood for two things:

Especially in black neighborhoods it referred by mortgage lenders' abuse of FHA rules by making fast foreclosures.

In white neighborhoods, it referred to unscrupulous realtors and mortgage lenders engaging in block busting by getting FHA mortgages for unqualified buyers. Unqualified buyers were blacks who did not know how to take care of their new homes and who did not have the money to keep up the payments. In many cases fraudulent credit information was provided to the FHA. White organizations felt that the realtors were selecting and sending particularly unqualified blacks into white blocks as a block-busting technique. This was an issue for (MAC, SCC, LF, HF, NAC, NAO, OPCO, and the Federation) OPCO's interest in the issue was somewhat different from that of the other organizations. All OPCO wanted was more stringent inspections of housing sold with FHA mortgages.

#### Greenlining\*

Greenlining was a CAP response to mortgage redlining. The idea was to threaten lending institutions with the withdrawal of savers deposits if they did not stop redlining. Organizations secured pledges from savers saying they would withdraw their money and the pledges were presented to the lending institutions. The effectiveness of the program varied from organization to organization. The Federation had a lot of success, and CIA also had some success. For NAO and most other participating organizations the program did not accomplish very much. See the discussion of this issue in the Part II case study of the Federation.

#### Health Fairs

Health fairs were a non-issue civic booster activity engaged in by a few big organizations. Various health related organizations were invited to set up booths. GRO and OSC used this activity.

## High Rise

See "Zoning"

## Housing\*

This issue could have had either of three foci:

Fighting with slum landlords. ACO, OBA, and SACCC mentioned this, but it is a standard issue in a changing or changed neighborhood. It primarily involved absentee landlord owned multi-unit apartment buildings.

Getting owners to fix up shoddy buildings. This is a white area issue mentioned by HF and NAC

In black areas, getting the abandoned housing, (most of which is foreclosed housing held by HUD) repaired and back on the market.

## Housing Center

See civic boosterism. A device to bring new white residents into a racially threatened neighborhood. Two city organizations, MAC and LF, tried it without success.

In other places a housing center is used to disperse blacks throughout the community to prevent the standard block by block resegregation of a neighborhood. Two suburbs have used it this way with apparent success. The CIA was behind the Calumet Park center and used the CAP greenlining campaign to persuade some local mortgage lending institutions to provide money to support the center. Oak Park also has an apparently successful housing center, which the CIA used as its model. OPCO was not the promoter of the Oak Park housing center, however.

## HUD\*

Refers to the fact that the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is owner and manager of all FHA and VA foreclosed property. As a result, HUD has become the target of organizations' efforts to get the foreclosed housing fixed up and back on the market. Many black area organizations were involved in this issue, for which the city of Chicago is sometimes also a target, but the issue seems to have been the most important to GRO and MASC, because they have more abandoned foreclosed HUD property than do any other neighborhoods.

## ILIC Lawsuit

At one point, the Illinois State Legislative Investigation Commission (ILIC) decided to investigate Chicago area grass-roots community organizations. The American Civil Liberties Union decided to fight this investigation and several organizations including OPCO, SCC, and HF endorsed the idea. It was one issue that required virtually nothing from the community organizations other than the decision to participate.

## Insurance Redlining\*

Insurance redlining refers to insurance companies' decisions to set very high rates for, or refuse to issue or renew, homeowner policies for residents of certain neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were always "minority" neighborhoods or near them. The issue had two targets: the insurance companies and the state department that regulates insurance companies.

## Jewel Foods

See "Consumer Issues"

## Midway Airport

Increasing the level of activity at Chicago's Midway Airport was an issue for the SCC. It was not, however, an issue for TMO which was also located near the airport.

## Mortgage Bankers\*

See "FHA Foreclosures" and "FHA Practices"

## Mortgage Redlining\*

Refers to the decision of mortgage lending institutions not to give mortgages in certain neighborhoods because they are "poor risks." The neighborhoods are those, or near those, in which minority groups live. The redlining decision is made on the basis of the neighborhood, not on the qualifications of the people seeking mortgages to buy property there. Mortgage redlining is also known as just "redlining."

Related issues include a number designed to stop redlining. Among them are "Disclosure," "Greenlining," "Disinvestment," and "Reinvestment."

## National Foods

See "Consumer Issues"

## Park Facilities

Two organizations, TMO and CCO, felt that their communities needed better public park facilities. For TMO, the problem was that the neighborhood was relatively new and more facilities were needed. In Cicero, the city government seems to have felt that providing rather limited facilities was a desirable end, but CCO did not agree.

## Physical Harrassment

This was an issue for WECO and was racially based. See the case study of WECO in Part II for details.

## Rapid Transit

This was an issue only for SCC which wanted a public rapid transit line going from the Loop to Midway Airport.

## Real Estate Practices\*

Refers to the panic peddling, racial steering, and solicitating activities of "unscrupulous" realtors in white neighborhoods near black areas or in racially changing neighborhoods. These realtors are also known for persuading frightened whites to sell immediately at very low prices, only to resell almost immediately to blacks at market or above market prices. This was an issue for every white organization or organization in a changing neighborhood.

## Redlining\*

Redlining refers to Mortgage Redlining. Other forms of redlining, e.g., insurance redlining, were not considered as issues when mortgage redlining became an issue. Hence there was no need to differentiate among different forms of redlining, and redlining has continued to be understood to mean mortgage redlining only.

## Redevelopment

Obtaining money to fix up a declining neighborhood

## Reinvestment

The solution to Disinvestment

## Roseland Hospital

A GRO issue. After the neighborhood turned black, the number of doctors in the area declined rapidly and, because Cook County Hospital was so far away, many people started turning to the Roseland Hospital emergency room for medical attention. The hospital was not set up for the vast new patient load and seemed to be hoping the problem would go away if they ignored it.

## Sanitation\*

See "City Services." Sanitation refers most especially to garbage pickup and is the key bread and butter issue.

## Saving And Loan Association

Certain saving and loan associations have wanted to move out of their changing or racially threatened neighborhoods in favor of the suburbs. The nearby community organizations have objected. The issue is always associated with some specific savings and loan association.

## Schools\*

See "Education"

## Security\*

See "Crime"

## Services For Retarded Children

One SCC member had a retarded child. Because she pushed it, the SCC made an issue of getting an agency to provide certain retarded child services in the neighborhood.

## Utilities\*

An issue for MAHA and its participating organizations since 1977. The primary target organization was the gas company for its requested rate increases, for its providing estimated bills when it could not read the meter, for making occasional mistakes, and for

shutting of gas service in the winter if the bills got behind.

#### Whistlestop

A personal safety program promoted by certain white organizations in threatened or changing neighborhoods. The idea is that people, especially women, would carry whistles and blow them if physically threatened. The organization would promote the program at block club and other neighborhood group meetings, thereby publicizing the organization and sometimes recruiting members. The SCC and CASC emphasized this program rather heavily but other organizations have also used it.

Related issues: Crime, Security

#### Youth Work

This is an issue of concern to three separate organizations, but there was a common theme, fear of youth delinquency, in all three cases:

The CCO was concerned about local gangs and persuaded the YMCA to supply a detached street worker.

NAC was concerned about youths hanging out in the neighborhood's biggest park and sought space and organized activities as an alternative to hanging out with nothing to do. Adult residents, especially the older ones, of which the neighborhood had a great many, were intimidated in their use of the park by the sight of the teenage boys there.

Victory Heights was reacting against local vandalism caused by white youths from the nearby white suburbs. They sought better police protection.

Related issues: Crime, Security

#### Zoning

An issue of concern individually to several organizations. The issue covered a variety of related things:

For CCO, HF, and VH, the issue involved what kind of buildings a developer should be permitted to put up. For all three organizations, the problem involved residential housing, apartment buildings or a retirement/nursing home. All three organizations sought lower population densities than that planned by the developer.

For USC, the issue also involved vacant land, but my informant did not know the details.

For OPGO the issue was getting some commercially zoned land with single family housing on it rezoned to residential to protect the existing housing

For MAC, the issue was a local option referendum to get rid of the neighborhood taverns on Chicago Avenue.

Most, if not all, organizations won significant concessions as a result of their zoning fights.

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