How the *East* views the *West*: An Examination of Trends in Attitudes of Arab Citizens from 2006 - 2014

BY

SUHAD TABAHI
B.S.W., Northeastern Illinois University, 2008
A.M., University of Chicago, 2010

THESIS

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Defense Committee:
        Henrika McCoy, Chair and Advisor
        James Swartz
        Jerry Cates
        Atef Said, Sociology
        Najma Adam, United Arab Emirates University, UAE

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SUMMARY

This research seeks to better understand the attitudes and perceptions of citizens in the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on U.S. foreign policy, American people and American

and Western culture. There has been a heightened interest in the Middle East and North Africa

(MENA) region, but little attention to how citizens of different Arabic speaking countries view

U.S. regional foreign policy. Today, the United States is the most critical and dominant

international player in the Arab world. Understanding the region and its people can help avoid

policy failures of the historical and recent past. This study incorporates a quantitative

methodological approach and social theory to inform an interpretative framework grounded in

post-colonial theory.

This study is informed by the work of William Sewell. (2005), an interdisciplinary social

science American academic, and one of the leading voices on social theory and interpretative

analysis. An interpretative framework seeks to provide meaning to varying social worlds from

the perspective of the participants to ultimately contribute to in-depth knowledge. The central

question guiding the interpretive framework for this study is: **How can we make sense and**

understand the spread of anti- Americanism and anti- imperialism in the context of diverse

and contradictory attitudes? Four explanations are outlined in this study. The first, Orientalist

"clash of civilizations". The first explanation harbors the most extreme ideology which

homogenizes a whole group of people and uses racism and fear tactics to target the region and its

people, insisting that there is indeed a "clash of civilizations" between Eastern and Western

SUMMARY (continued)

cultures. The second addresses how anti- Americanism and anti- imperialism is used as a

strategy by the elites in the MENA region to justify atrocities in their own respective country.

By focusing on the differences and a common enemy, some dictators blame the West and

imperialism for all the problems facing their country. The third and fourth perspectives build off

the works of Edward Said and post- colonial theory. Said's 1978 classic work, *Orientalism*

transformed and inspired the discourse on post -colonial studies as he explored the artificial

boundaries which constructed the dichotomy of East and West, a hierarchy of binary opposites.

The third, specifically, provides a "simplistic" view of the contention in region through the lens

of colonialism and imperialism. A common "misunderstanding and misreading" of Said's work

is the lack of attention to native agency and indigenous resistance. Therefore, the fourth

explanation offered here allows a more critical perspective by addressing human agency. Doing

so, de- homogenizes the region and highlights the contradictions between citizens from different

MENA countries. This study is situated in this fourth perspective and contends that there needs

to be a more nuanced look into post-colonial theory and underscores the critical discussion of

agency as an instrument of resistance.

A secondary data analysis was conducted using data from three waves (2006-2008; 2010-

2011; and 2012-2014) of the Arab Barometer. This study is a time series cross sectional analysis

(TSCS) of the aforementioned waves. There were approximately 1,000 participants per country

per interview wave (N=34,928). The 14 countries included in the survey were: Jordan, Palestine,

Lebanon, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait and Libya. The dependent variables were responses from three statements addressing

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U.S. relations focused on U.S. foreign policy, American people and American/ Western culture. The independent variables were country of origin and time controlling for age, sex, religion, educational level and the issue of Palestinian statehood. Mixed effects ordinal logistic regressions were conducted.

Results of this study suggest that there are many nuances to consider when gauging opinions of the U.S. across the MENA region. Overall, countries were more variable in whether they viewed military intervention as justified than they were in their attitudes towards the American people. However, their opinions of military intervention did not change as much as their opinions of American people, which appeared to be more temporally volatile. Views on American and Western culture tended to be slightly more positive than views of American people and significantly more positive than views on intervention in the region.

Findings from this study have implications for international social work, practice, policy, advocacy, education and research are discussed. Concerns regarding legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and Western orientation also challenge the concept of international practice. In an effort to stimulate more interest in global issues specifically as it relates to the MENA region, this study sought to promote international social work values, ethical practices and standards of human rights to help elucidate the global process of exchange and understanding. In a globalized world and one that is becoming increasing pluralistic, it is pertinent that social workers adapt means of practice that align with the client's needs and understanding of the world- their paradigm. This form of authentic social work practice and movement away from homogenizing tendencies is a step forward in practicing anti-oppressive social work (Gray, Coates, & Bird,

SUMMARY (continued)

2008) and a twenty-first century approach that meets the needs of an ever changing social, political and economic landscape. There is a paucity in the social work literature about working with Arab peoples (Al- Krenawi & Graham, 2000). Social work practice with Arab peoples is complex because of the diversity that exists among those who are Arab-speaking reflected in the heterogeneity of ethnic identification, linguistic preference, tribal allegiance, immigration/refugee status, routes of migration, religious affiliation and national identities (Al- Krenawi & Graham, 2000). However, culturally sensitive and humble practice with Arab American citizens, and Arab immigrants and refugees is feasible when taking into account the aforementioned factors as well as grounding practice in a non- oppressive and indigenous framework. Despite progressive reforms throughout the course of history and advancements and awareness in the multicultural approach, racial and ethnic inequality and oppression continues to be a pervasive issue in society and lacks the responsiveness in social work education. Courses that promote and teach diversity with the human behavior and social environment sequence, for example, can also benefit from the inclusion of addressing both international and domestic concerns of the Arab and American population. Advocacy and organizing as means to combat injustice are critical components of social works mission for change. Micro, mezzo and macro level practitioners must understand the social, economic and political climate in which clients navigate. The social work profession, encompassing students, educators, and practitioners alike must be informed of the current domestic and foreign landscape to best meet the needs of clients that we collectively serve.

I.   INTRODUCTION

There has been a heightened interest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, but little attention to how citizens of different Arabic speaking countries view U.S. regional foreign policy (Tabahi, 2015). "War on terror" rhetoric, Orientalist logic and the promotion of Western ideals of democracy and reform have been used to justify the direct and militaristic U.S. intervention in the region. However, the practical effects of this rhetoric, and these policies on attitudes of MENA country citizens, have not been comprehensively assessed. To better inform policy and advocacy that affect Arabs and Arab immigrant groups residing in the U.S., we need a more nuanced understanding of how current policies and interventions have framed their attitudes and views of the Western world, the U.S., its culture and people (Tabahi, 2015).

Today, the United States is the most critical and dominant international player in the Arab world. Understanding the region and its people can help avoid the policy failures of the historical and recent past. Furthermore, in a country that continues to greatly invest politically, financially, militarily, and economically in the Arab world, it is imperative that we continue to gauge perceptions of the U.S. to gain a deeper understanding of America's responses to global issues. Ignoring or dismissing such voices only perpetuates stereotypes, promotes fear and hatred and continues to endorse the dichotomous view of the world as East vs. West.

The purpose of this study is thus threefold. First, to highlight and bring awareness of a region, its people, and culture that are often criticized and misunderstood by the Western world. The lack of information and knowledge of the MENA region, and the excessively negative media depictions targeted at this region, has adversely impacted the way in which the region and its people have been perceived. By providing background content and a historical look at the

shaping of the region by colonial forces, this study will illuminate misconceptions and provide a deeper understanding of how the past influences the current state of the MENA region. Moreover, this study will highlight the nuances associated with the attitudes and perceptions that their citizens may hold. Second, this study contributes to the limited research literature that explores the opinions and attitudes of citizens from the MENA region. While there are resources and research institutions that gauge Arab public opinion such as Pew International Research, the Migration Policy Institute, and Zogby International polls, there is a virtual lack of nuanced and in depth explanation of their findings that explore the historical legacies of colonialism that contribute to contemporary attitudes and perceptions. Third, there is a gap in the social work discourse regarding literature and research, as well as implications for practice and policy related to Arabs and Arab Americans. This study will contribute to social work scholarship in highlighting the need to address international and domestic issues as they impact Arabs, Arab Americans and the mainstream population.

This study is timely in that it will help address and provide insight into many of the questions Americans have in respect to the region and its people like, "who are Arabs?", "what do they want?" and do they "hate America or Western culture?" The profession of social work has a responsibility to advance social justice by including various discourses into its discussion of power, discrimination and privilege (Marsh, 2005; Reisch, 2002). However, it has neglected, to a large scale international issues (Cox & Pawar, 2013) in the MENA region (i.e. current ongoing civil war in Syria, displaced persons, and implications for refugees and immigrants entering the U.S.). It is imperative that such information and scholarship are included in our

discussions of power, privilege, oppression, and discrimination, and framed in a context that underscores the need to incorporate such insight into practice and policy.

A. Description of the Region: Land and People

The Arab world is a broad geographic region consisting of 22 Arabic speaking countries: Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen (see Appendix A). The Arab world has often been referred to in the academic literature as the MENA (an English- language acronym) region. The ambiguity[1] of the term "Middle East" urged many social scientists and academic scholars to advocate for the use of the term MENA region. The region is home to approximately 381 million inhabitants, with an estimated 315 million Muslims (Pew Research, 2015). Hence, approximately 20% of the world's Muslim population can be found in the MENA region (Pew Research, 2015). The three largest Muslim populations in the region are in North Africa: Egypt (79 million), Algeria (34 million), and Morocco (32 million; Pew Research, 2009). The Arab world is often confused with the Muslim world and the Middle East. The Muslim world includes many other countries that are not located in the region (i.e. Indonesia, India, and Pakistan) and the Middle East includes some

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[1] The term "Middle East" is ambiguous owing to the emphasis on European and Western influence in creating and dividing the region into what it is today. There is however a linguistic and political denotation inherit in the term Arab which is highly politicized (Adelson, 2012). For example, the inhabitants of Somalia may identify as African rather than Arab or may prefer a nationalistic identity as Somalian. This issue is discussed further in the later chapters on the legacies of European colonialism if the region.

non- Arabic speaking countries such as Iran, Turkey and Israel (Arab American Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2015). These aforementioned countries may share many characteristics, religious traditions and cultural attributes with their Arabic speaking neighbors.

B. Description of Study

The purpose of this study is to assess the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens about U.S. foreign policy, and the Western world, by conducting a secondary data analysis of data collected as part of a study called the Arab Barometer. The Arab Barometer (2013), is a research project that aims to: 1) produce scientifically valid data on an array of issues related to the views of MENA citizens and 2) get an understanding of the trends in attitudes of MENA citizens over three periods: 2006 to 2008, 2010 to 2011, and 2012 to 2014. Specifically, this study uses the three data sets from the Arab Barometer study to provide a more nuanced understanding of the region, its citizens, their respective attitudes towards U.S. relations and the Western world, and whether those attitudes have changed over the course of the Arab Barometer.

This study incorporates a quantitative methodological approach and social theory to inform an interpretative framework grounded in post-colonial theory. While such an approach is unconventional, it is not unprecedented. Informed by the work of William Swell Jr., the combination of quantitative inquiry and historical analysis provides a way to expand "the social range and subject matter of history so as to encompass the lives of the poor, the oppressed and the marginalized" (Swell, 2005, p. 31). Such an approach allows the examination of a central question guiding the interpretative framework: **how can we make sense and understand the spread of anti- Americanism and anti- imperialism in the context of diverse and contradictory attitudes?**

A specific emphasis on post -colonial theorist, Edward Said and his seminal 1978 work, *Orientalism* will be used to frame the conceptual understanding of how the Western world portrays the Eastern world, specifically the MENA region. Post-colonial theory is a literary theory and a critical approach that focuses on concepts of *otherness* and resistance (Asccroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2013; Childs & Williams, 1997; Lunga, 2008; Williams & Chrisman, 1994). This depiction has been used to justify militaristic intervention in the region and ideals of democracy have been imposed on its societies (Said, 1997). This study employs the term Orientalism in reference to the concept by Said to describe colonialism and contemporary power dynamics with Eastern and Western peoples, cultures and places.

The Orientalist paradigm focuses on the dichotomy of Eastern and Western cultures and serves as a dominating perspective in the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory worlds. To date, there is a virtual lack of a comparable theoretical or interpretive framework that defines the perception about the Eastern world to the West. The emphasis on Western perception of the East is well established in the academic literature (e.g. Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, and Samuel Huntington) while the contrasting perspective is seldom represented. Therefore, this study uses a critical post-colonial perspective as an interpretive framework to raise historical conciseness about histories of the colonial and imperial past as well as understand the perception of Arab agency. Doing so, provides context in understanding the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens and places power back in the hands of the populations affected by Orientalist logic.

A secondary data analysis was conducted using data from all three waves of the Arab Barometer. The dependent variables were responses from three statements addressing U.S.

relations: 1) "U.S regional interference justifies armed operations against the U.S everywhere";

2) "Despite U.S foreign policy, Americans are good people", and 3) "American and Western

cultures have positive aspects". Mixed effects logistic ordinal regressions were conducted. The

independent variable was country of origin controlling for age, sex, religion and educational

level. Furthermore, to measure change, this study surveyed respondents in their respective

country of origin at three identified points in time. This strategy allowed for an assessment of

changes in the views and perceptions of citizens.

C. Background, Rationale, and Significance of the Study

Since the beginning of the new millennium, there has been a heightened interest in the

Arab world particularly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003,

the Arab revolutions beginning in 2010/2011, and the current crisis of the Islamic State in Syria

and Iraq (ISIS/ISIL) or Daesh[2]. Despite this increased attention in the region, the voices of

MENA country citizens on international relations have not been highlighted to the degree to

which Eurocentric (Western influenced) narratives have been covered. Post-colonial literature

has influenced a wide array of academic disciplines including literature, political science,

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[2] The creation of ISIS or Daesh is a contentious political issue. Daesh or D.A.E.S.H. is the transliteration
of the acronym to describe the terrorist group better known in Western media as ISIS. Like ISIS (Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State in the Levant), Daesh is an Arabic acronym for '*al-dowla
al-islaamiyya fii-il-i'raaq wa-ash-shaam'*. The Arab world and the majority of the Western world with
the exception of the U.S. refer to ISIS as Daesh. In Arabic, the term 'Daesh" also means to "topple or
crush", therefore, ISIS members oppose the name Daesh. Critics and opponents of Daesh contend that
there is nothing Islamic about their ideology and therefore refuse to incorporate the word 'Islam' in
their name. Likewise, world leaders, such as the president of France, Francois Hollande use the term
Daesh when addressing the terrorist group. Indeed, there is nothing in Islamic theology that condones
or supports the ideology of Daesh. Noam Chomsky, a world renowned political dissident, professor
emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, believes that Daesh is the byproduct of the
Americas invasion of Iraq. For further information on this, see
http://www.democracynow.org/2015/3/3/noam_chomsky_to_deal_with_isis.

anthropology, women's studies, and sociology (Prasad & Prasad, 2002). However, despite its strong affinity with social work, specifically as it relates to marginalized people with the study of advocacy within " historical and contemporary structures of domination" (Prasad & Prasad, 2002, p. 60), social work scholarship, research and education have not included such valuable perspectives in its discourse. Colonialism's legacy can still be found in the contemporary views of immigrants, refugees and "other" individuals, cultures (i.e. treatment of women, language, literature and humanity) and societies domestically and internationally (e.g. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Syria, Palestine, Somalia, Sierra Leon, etc.).

II.   LITERATURE REVIEW

The MENA region and its people have been subjected to Orientalist and essentialist narratives that reduce the rich and diverse experiences and histories of this complex region to the circumstance of 9/11 and its aftermath. Such a narrow perspective overlooks the historical roots of contention and interest in the region by Western (predominantly British, French, and American) powers. Thus, prior to exploring the opinions and attitudes of Arab country citizens, it is imperative to first explore European historical legacies, as well as American historical and contemporary intervention in the region, as to provide a contextual framework of how the Arab world was introduced to the West.

The role of world history in the course of colonial expansion in the MENA region cannot be underscored enough in the elucidation of trends in attitudes of Arab country citizens over time. Therefore, this literature review will highlight two major themes guiding our understanding of how Arab citizens perceive the U.S. and the Western world: 1) evolution and nature of attitudes and 2) global attitudes and trends. Together, the aforementioned themes will provide a clearer understanding of a region and a people commonly misunderstood, stereotyped, and deemed a threat to the "*civilized world*".

A. Evolution and Nature of Attitudes

A comprehensive understanding of the MENA region and its people requires an in-depth examination of the historical legacies that shaped the region into what it is today. European conquest in the MENA region, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and

nineteenth century, and contemporary domination in the region by American forces, have

contributed to the shifts in trends in attitudes toward the Western world, particularly the U.S.

Together, these historical contributions and colonial institutions have left their mark in the social,

political and economic context of the region.

1. European Historical Legacy

French, British, and Russian colonial powers dominated the region between the late

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bard, 2003). For example, from 1798 to 1801, the French

invaded Egypt and annexed Algeria in 1834. In 1799, the British established outposts throughout

the Arabian Peninsula (Bard, 2003). By 1882, the British began their administrative occupation

of Egypt (Helfont, 2015). Within the region, Russian and British forces began their hegemonic

domination in Iran from 1884 to 1921 (Helfont, 2015). While Middle Eastern countries like Iran

and Turkey were never fully colonized, Iran for example, experienced imperialist pressures

(Helfont, 2015). Imperialist quests in North Africa, particularly in Sudan, created a country

plagued by violence and ongoing disruption (Benjamin, 2007). British colonial administration

from 1899 to 1956 resulted in ethnic divides and post-independence civil war struggles in Sudan

(Benjamin, 2007).

The end of Ottoman rule in the region and the invasion of British and French troops after

World War I led to the colonial expansion in Iraq, Syria, and Palestine[3] (see Appendix B). In

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[3] Partitioning of the Ottoman empire (created by Muslim Turkish tribes in Asia minor) was a political event that occurred after WW1, most notably after the Skyes-Picot Agreement. The Ottomans, commonly referred to as the "Turks" were seen as a great threat to Western European forces from the fifteen and sixteenth century and beyond. The Ottoman empire was one of the most powerful states of Europe and it challenged the European Christian states until the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when it reached its limits of territorial expansion (Lockman, 2010).

1916, the French and British signed the secret Skyes-Picot Agreement (see Appendix C) which defined their "spheres of influence" and control over Southwest Asia (Benjamin, 2007). While resistance to the colonization erupted immediately, the region was divided under French and British rule and influence. This agreement holds great significance because it was the turning point in Western-Arab relations. Furthermore, the agreement geographically defined the region, by creating the borders of Iraq and Syria, and created the contention and conflict between Palestine and Israel which continues today.

2. **The Roots of the Arab-Israeli/Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and the Balfour Declaration**

An undeniable source of contention and unrest in the region is the conflict in the occupied Palestinian territories. The historical roots of the continued Arab-Israeli conflict, also known as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, with its more localized shift in the particular geographic region of contention, is embedded in political tension and Israeli presence with military force. The Arab-Israeli conflict is the byproduct of British colonialism and the rise of the Zionist movement[4] in 1948. While historically European powers dominated the region with their imperialist quests for power and land, contemporary intervention in the region centers on the U.S. (Prados, 2001; Lockman, 2010).

The roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict date back to the early 1900s. The Arabs living in Palestine yearned to eliminate the influence of the Ottoman overlords; however, it was replaced

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[4] Zionism is a movement, first established as a political organization in 1897 by Theodor Herzl with the goal of returning Jews to Zion (the Jewish synonym of Jerusalem). Originally, it was a movement for the establishment, and now the re -establishment of a Jewish nation in the occupied Palestinian territories (Chomsky & Pappe, 2015; Pappe, 2006).

by complete British dominance in their territory. Although the years after World War II have been referred to as the "The Middle East conflict", the Arab-Israeli feud began when European colonialism expanded into Arab provinces (Lockman, 2010). The British colonial powers began to expand in their quest to conquer and transform the political map in the Middle East at the end of World War I (Lockman, 2010). This intervention in the region resulted in contradictory promises and multiple land agreements that have haunted the Middle East ever since.

Britain carefully strategized to secure their position within the Arab provinces. Their first attempt to dominate Arab lands was the Hussien-McMahon correspondence from July 1915 to May 1916 (Slavicek, 2003). This long correspondence was aimed at destroying the Ottoman Empire. Arab leaders genuinely believed that once Britain ended Ottoman dominance in the Middle East, the Arabs would finally have independent lands with minimal to no European intervention. However, in drafting the correspondence, the British were purposely vague in which countries would be allowed Arab independence (Lockman, 2010). The state of Palestine was one country in which the British cannily excluded direct mention from the correspondence so as to allow Arab leaders to assume the independence and autonomy over Palestine (Lesch &Tschirgi, 1998).

The next step in Britain's quest for power in the region was signing a secret agreement with France in 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement (Slavicek, 2003). The Sykes-Picot Agreement included a plan to divide the Arab provinces between Britain and France. In the agreement, France was granted control to govern Lebanon, Syria, and northern Iraq, whereas Britain would control Transjordan (present day Jordan) and central and southern Iraq. Although Britain dominated Transjordan and Iraq, its primary focus was on Palestine.

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By the end of World War I, a new political leader of the Zionist movement emerged, Chaim Weizmann (Finkelstein, 2003). This Russian-born Englishman lobbied British support to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Finkelstein, 2003) and on November 2, 1917, a letter was written by the British foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild to notify the Zionists that the proposal for a Jewish state was acceptable. This document is known today as the Balfour Declaration (Bard, 2003).The formation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine was greatly publicized and supported in Britain (Chomsky & Pappe, 2015).

Through a series of promises which contained extreme contradictions, the Balfour Declaration encouraged European colonial rule at the expense of Arab independence. Balfour believed that by issuing the Balfour Declaration, it would only reclaim a territory promised to the Jews by God (Chomsky & Pappe, 2015). In a memorandum he wrote in August 1919, Balfour made it evident that he was well aware of the multiple contradictory promises made to parties in the Arab world, yet his Zionist agenda was of utmost priority. In issuing the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs claimed that the British were unjustly giving away their lands without having rightful authority over it (Finkelstein, 2003). Furthermore, Arabs argued that the British did not free them from the oppressive Turks, rather Britain subjected the Arabs to more extreme hardships and unrest in their own homeland (Pappe, 2016).

On April 24, 1920, Britain and France reinstated their secret agreement (Sykes- Picot). Britain finally recognized that the mandates contravened their promises to the Arabs that they would govern themselves without Britain interfering in their affairs (Bard, 2003). Consequently, Britain made an attempt to pacify Arab leaders by installing those Arab leaders as puppet rulers over the territories that they separated out for them (Chomsky & Pappe, 2015; Pappe, 2016).

Coupled with placing their new leaders into office, Britain created an entirely new province, Jordan (previously referred to as Transjordan), which is almost 80 percent of the historic Palestine (Bard, 2003).

Neither the Jews nor the Arabs were content with the British mandate. The Jews felt as if the British lied about granting them land once they formed Transjordan (Slaveick, 2003). Moreover, the Jews were upset that the Arab population still dominated Palestine with only 90,000 Jews compared to the 600,000 Arabs (Slaveicek, 2003; Bard, 2003; Gaughen, 2004; Lesch& Tschigri, 1998). In 1937, the former secretary of state, Earl Peel, was sent by a British commission to investigate the situation in Palestine (Benjamin, 2007). Through researching the land, the commission concluded that the only solution was to divide the country into two separate states: an Arab state and a Jewish state. This resolution was later called the "Peel Plan" (Slavicek, 2003). Although this plan seemed fair, the Arabs quickly rejected it because they believed that they had rightful claims to the entire land.

The ideas of partition soon died down as the British looked towards a new solution: restricted immigration (Bard, 2003). As the number of Arab revolts grew in October 1937, British were left in the position of having to respond to their needs immediately. Hoping to placate the Arabs, the British commission recommended establishing a series of "White Papers"[5] which would halt further Jewish immigration into Palestine (Slavicek, 2003; Bard, 2003;

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[5] These "White Papers" were issued in 1922, 1930, and 1939. The British "White Papers" of 1922, also referred to as the "Churchill White Papers" (drafted by British colonial secretary, Winston Churchill) was a document to further clarify the Balfour declaration that while the white papers recognized the progress made by Zionists in the occupied territories of Palestine, it made clear that it would not be recognized as a Jewish homeland but rather a community in Palestine (Bard, 2003).

Gaughen, 2004; Lesch & Tschigri, 1998). Furthermore, a strict restriction on Jewish immigration would be put into action. This new immigration law limited no more than 75,000 immigrants through the duration of five years, and that none would be allowed in after that without the full consent of the Arabs (Bard, 2003). Zionist leaders repeatedly asked British officials to revoke the papers; Britain, however, did not comply with their requests (Gaughen, 2004). There was also discontent within the Arab community because the number of Jews entering Palestine increased from 93,000 in 1922 to 383, 000 in 1936 (Gaughen, 2004).

In 1947 the United Nations (U.N.) was asked to intervene by the British. The U.N, much like the British, failed to alleviate the hostilities between the two groups. On December 11, 1947, Britain's Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, announced that by May 15, 1948, Britain would withdraw its troops stationed in Palestine (Bregman, 2003). However, during that time period, civil war swept through Palestine, causing Arab and Jewish as well as British casualties. The Arabs were under the leadership of three men: Fawzi- el Kawakji, Sir John Bagot Glubb, and Abd el- Kader Husseini (Pappe, 2006). On the Jewish side, Ben- Gurion led the Haganah, the main Jewish militia force (Pappe,2006). In the initial phases of the war, it seemed as though the Arabs were in a better position militarily than the Jews; however, it was not long before the Jewish military were on the offensive. The Jews were able to gain momentum by receiving immense support from the United States, a proponent of the partition plans proposed by the British and the U.N. (Bregman, 2003). By May 10, 1948, Jewish forces were able to take over Jerusalem, and other major cities, securing their position in the majority of Palestine (Bregman, 2003). Finally, on May 14, 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence, and Ben Gurion, leader of the Jewish forces, became the nation's first prime minister. The British mandate in Palestine was

over, so the remaining British troops departed from the occupied territories. Although Israel had accomplished its mission, the war continued. On May 15, 1948, a day after Israel named itself an independent state, the first Arab-Israeli War began (Bard, 2003; Pappe, 2006).

The role of outside intervention, primarily led by British colonial conquests, created an ongoing crisis in the region that continues until the present day. The contradictory promises and secret agreements over the Palestinian territories, without consent of the Palestinian people, highlight the historical devaluation of Arab voices in the region. Arab aspirations for self-determination were overpowered by a Zionist agenda backed by Western powers (Little, 2008)**.**

B. U.S. and the Region: Brief History and Legacy

The following subsection will address American historical and contemporary legacies in the region to provide a critical glimpse into how American foreign politics have shaped the political and economic climate of MENA to what it is today. While European powers colonized the region for decades prior to American involvement, U.S. presence in the MENA region has been the most dominant force since the 19th century. In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. replaced the UK's commanding involvement in the region to secure Western access to Gulf oil.

1. The King Crane Commission (1919)

At the end of World War I, for the first time in history, an interest in the opinions and attitudes of Arabic speaking peoples about self -determination was solicited through the 1919 Inter- Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, better known as the King Crane Commission, during the Paris Peace Conference (Zogby, 2010). U.S. president Woodrow Wilson was appointed to spearhead a commission to assess the attitudes of the inhabitants of Palestine and

Syria on post- WWI settlement of their territories. Headed by the president of Oberlin (Ohio) College, Henry Churchill and Chicago businessman, Charles R. Crane, the commission traveled through, present day Syria (then known as "Greater Syria"), Palestine/Israel, Lebanon and Jordan between June and August of 1919 (The King Crane Commission Report, 1922). While the Commission was intended to be an international endeavor with British and French involvement, the commission became exclusively an American enterprise as European interest in the mission was never actualized (The King Crane Commission Report, 1922).

Commission members visited over 30 towns, met with 4,442 organizations and gathered 2,000 petitions (Zogby, 2010). In 1922, the population of the region totaled 3,247,500; the majority of whom were Muslim (2,365,000) with the remaining population being: Christian (587,560), Druz (140,000), and Jewish (110,000; Zogby, 2010). While meeting with representatives and other individuals, the commission gauged public opinion on what they wanted for their political future. According to the King Crane Commission report, inhabitants of the region strongly opposed the Zionist program, and requested an independent united Syria. In fact, 90% of the population who were not Jewish were against the Zionist program (The King Crane Commission Report, 1922). The commission also asked Arab citizens about transition of power in the region. Most of the respondents (60%) suggested that they would support American involvement in helping transition to a Greater Syria, 14% advocated for French intervention and only 3% favored British involvement. (The King Crane Commission Report, 1922). Recommendations regarding how to manage the formerly occupied Ottoman territories were created. First, the authors suggested the establishment of a united Syria under the leadership of

Emir Faisal[6] (Zogby, 2010) Second, they recommended that the proposed united Syria be placed under a temporary American mandate given the majority support for American intervention (Zogby, 2010). Third, the report also advised that the Zionist movement be scaled back and proposed a restriction on Jewish immigration into Palestine (Zogby, 2010).

Despite the findings and recommendations of the report, British and French colonial powers were undeterred and continued with their plans of Jewish homeland in Palestine. While the King Crane Commission was significant in that Arab voices were surveyed, their voices were quickly silenced by European superpowers (Zogby, 2010) The British, rejected President Wilson's endeavors to Arab self-determination and instead followed through with recommendations made by Lord Balfour in the Balfour Declaration. Furthermore, while in 1920 Emir Faisal was proclaimed Kind of greater Syria, a year later, the French deposed his position (Zogby, 2010).

For a few years the King Crane Commission report disappeared from the public, but it resurfaced in 1922 in the pages of the *New York Times* (Ellis, 1922; Zogby, 2010). By then however, it was too late for the public to show support or opposition to the report as the British and French had already divided the region and the U.S. Congress passed a resolution in support of the Zionist program in Palestine (Ellis, 1992).

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[6] Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, also known as Emir Faisal was a member of the Hashemite dynasty. He ruled over the Arab kingdom of Greater Syria in 1920 and from 1921-1933 served as King of Iraq.

2. **U.S. Foreign Policy in the MENA Region**: **Key Determinants Before and After 9/11**

Oil.

In 1938, oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia (Makdisi, 2002). This discovery altered U.S. involvement in region from a previously passive position pre -World War I and into a more direct role post World War II. According to Chomsky and Achar (2007), one of the driving dynamics of U.S. policy in the Middle East is its major energy reserves. When the worlds economy shifted to oil in the twentieth century, the Middle East became a major focus of world interest, specifically to the U.S. In 1920, the abundance of oil and its potential to augment economic interests in the U.S. was evident and by 1930, the U.S. gained a foothold in Saudi Arabia (Chomsky & Achar, 2007). While the U.S. understood the lucrative resource availaible in the region after WWII, the U.S. was not interested in oil consumption for itself because North America was the major producer of oil until the 1970s (Chomsky & Achar, 2007). However, the U.S. also understood gaining power and control in the region meant keeping Europe reliant on oil and ensuring that U.S. controlled the oil reserve.

A central question in regards to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is whether or not America's quest to control the vast oil reserve was the driving factor behind the war. While the invasion of Iraq occurred post 9/11, both bands of neoconservatives, and the state of Israel, considered Iraq an enemy and threat to the Western world (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). The fear of Iraq escalated in the mid-1970s when France provided Saddam Hussien, Iraq's dictator, a nuclear reactor. Israel's concerns were vocalized by Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, calling Iraq a more viable thereat than Iran because of Saddam Hussien's regimes "irresponsible behavior" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 233). The combination of Israel's plea to the world to

acknowledge the threat of Hussein and the neoconservative push to topple his regime since the mid- 1990s culminated in the Bush campaign selling the war in Iraq to a skeptical America (Gurtov, 2006).

The debate over whether to invade Iraq was complex and one that contained many variants. In one story, the Bush administration was focused and determined to control the vast oil reserve in the region thereby giving the U.S. geopolitical leverage over any other potential contenders (Chomsky & Achar, 2007). In this story, securing Iraq would be a major step in fulfilling the goal of dominance in the Middle East (Chomsky & Achar, 2007). Another story about the Iraq war motivated primarily by oil producing states and oil companies to drive higher prices for oil, thereby creating greater profits (Chomsky & Achar, 2007). According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), even scholars who are critical of Israel and its lobby (to be discussed below) support claims of the second story which was popularized by Michael Moore's 2004 documentary, *Fahrenheit 9/11*. However, the claim that the Iraq war was purely motivated by oil is one that is difficult to ascertain with certainty and contains logical and empirical challenges (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). Despite which story captures the essence of why the U.S. invaded Iraq, U.S. intervention caused much disruption throughout the region and was further evidence of American Orientalism (Little, 2008). Furthermore, such militaristic intervention furthered the spread of hostility towards America and added another layer of anti-American sentiment rooted in U.S. foreign policy.

The State of Israel and the Israeli Lobby.

Since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, American's foreign policy focus has centered on supporting the Zionist cause of a homeland in Palestine (Mearsheimer & Walt,

2007). In their controversial and *New York Times* best-selling book, The *Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,* Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) assert that the U.S.'s unwavering commitment both economically and politically to Israel does not serve the best interests of America. Rather, they contend that such unconditional, unrestrained and generous support is a liability to the U.S., making America more vulnerable, and is unjustifiable on moral, economic or political grounds. Furthermore, their argument claims that the "special relationship" (p. 77) between the U.S. and Israel is helping inspire generations of anti- American extremism thereby undermining American safety.

In general, interest groups in the U.S. aim to shape views of national interest as well as convince legislative and executive bodies to adopt their vested interests. The Israel lobby, defined as " a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro- Israeli direction" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, p. 112), is arguably the most influential interest group in the U.S. (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). Both Mearsheimer and Walt believe that "the activities of the groups and individuals who make up the lobby are the main reason the United States pursues policies in the Middle East that make little sense on either strategic or moral grounds" (p. 111). Moreover, the authors argue that the lobby and U.S. policies backed by the lobby unintentionally harm Israel, leaving both the U.S. and the state of Israel better off without intervention from the lobby. The U.S.'s continued political and financial support for the state of Israel plays an integral role in how citizens of Arab speaking countries view the West and the U.S and contributes yet another layer to the spread of anti- Americanism in the region.

Terrorism and the "War on Terror".

According to the U.S. Code, the official system of laws defines terrorism as, "the calculated use of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature…. through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear" (U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction, 1984, p. 525). The term "terrorism" has been used in a variety of contexts and has been rearticulated into American and Western discourse after 9/11. In 1981, Chomsky followed the Reagan administration's focus on the war on terror using rhetoric to describe its fundamental existence as "the plague of the modern age" and "a return to barbarism of our times" (Chomsky & Achar, 2007, p.1).

Also known as the Global War on Terrorism, the "War on Terror" refers to the militaristic response of the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks (Holland, 2013). The phrase, *War on Terror*, was first used by President George Bush and has since then been used to justify the direct and militaristic intervention in the MENA region. *War on Terror* rhetoric, as described by political theorist Richard Jackson, is an actual language and discourse which fulfills the orientalist narrative whereby Westerners, particularly Americans are seen as brave and respectful to human rights and the Easterners are portrayed as evil, hateful and a threat to democracy (Holland, 2013). In 2013, this phrase was less utilized as President Barack Obama pulled back troops from certain MENA region countries. The current (2017) political climate, however, under the leadership of President Trump has implications for continued militaristic intervention in the region. This is evidenced by Trump's request for increased military spending (Congress approved 15 million dollars in military spending) (Herb, 2017), missile attack on a Syrian airbase on April, 2017 (Starr & Diamond, 2017), and continued rhetoric against Muslim majority

countries through his 2017 travel ban executive order (currently blocked by the 9th. U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals). The continued rhetoric rooted in the "war on terror" and spread of American Orientalism in the region further perpetuates anti- American sentiment throughout the region. Again, such sentiment is directed toward a disdain toward U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the region.

III. PRIOR RESEARCH

Public opinion polls conducted in the region, while still inchoate, are beginning to play an important role in creating an understanding where none existed. Furthermore, by examining the historical and contemporary issues in the MENA region, surveys can begin to establish an understanding of the contemporary political discourse in the MENA region (Al- Sumait, 2011). Literature (e.g. Al- Sumait, 2011; Zogby, 2010) suggests that Arabs are not given the attention warranted by the international community in gauging their attitudes and perceptions of both international and domestic policies and how they directly influence their lives. Therefore, in order to find a sustainable political solution in the MENA region, it is imperative that Arab public opinion is not only assessed, but also taken into consideration in reform and peace efforts.

Prior empirical research related to the understanding of the Arab world, and how its citizens view the West and American foreign politics, helped inform the current study. In this section, an overview of a preliminary study conducted by this author, as well as research conducted by Pew Research and Zogby Polls will be addressed. Combined, this empirical body of research informed the interpretative framework for the current study.

A. Related Study

Perceptions of the Arab World on U.S Relations: An Examination of Attitudes towards U.S Foreign Policy and the American People.

A preliminary study was conducted in April 2015 to assess the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens on international relations, specifically focused on the U.S., American people and Western culture. Data from the second wave of the Arab Barometer (2008-2010)

were analyzed to address the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens toward U.S. foreign policy, American people and Western culture.

Data were obtained from the second wave of the Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen (10 MENA countries)[7] . A total of 12,782 participants across countries were interviewed between November 2010 and October 2011.The dependent variables were responses to three questions addressing U.S relations measured on a Likert scale and? ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree: 1) U.S regional interference justifies armed operations against the U.S everywhere; 2) Despite U.S foreign policy, Americans are good people and 3) American and Western cultures have positive aspects. Ordinal regressions using data weighted for sampling probabilities were conducted. The independent variables were country of origin controlling for age, sex, educational level, time spent abroad and whether external versus internal factors caused lack of development in the Arab world.

The majority of respondents from the countries (n=10) surveyed fostered negative attitudes towards the U.S. with the exceptions being Lebanese and Tunisian respondents who were the most likely to agree that Western culture has positive aspects. Sudanese citizens reported the least favorable attitudes towards American people and American culture. Among model covariates (age, sex, religion, time spent abroad, whether external versus internal factors caused lack of development in the Arab world, and educational level), having more education was also associated with increased odds of supporting the belief that Americans are good people

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[7] Details about the Arab Barometer data set are included in Chapter V (located on page. 61).

and with having positive views of American culture. Males were more likely to approve armed operations against the U.S. and respondents attributing the lack of development in the Arab world to external factors also had more negative attitudes towards the U.S. Overall, most countries (n=8) in the MENA region held anti-American sentiments with the main exceptions being Tunisia and Lebanon.

B. Global Attitudes and Trends

Global attitudes and trends on U.S. international relations have been assessed primarily by think tanks and polling institutions. This section will examine two sources of survey polling conducted with respondents in the Middle Eastern region: Pew International Research and Zogby International Polls. Both are American based sources; however, while Pew Research focuses on assessing attitudes and perceptions from the larger international community, Zogby Polls solely focus on views from the MENA region.

1. Pew International Research

Pew Research Center (2016) is a non-partisan American think tank, that addresses and informs the public on issues and trends shaping America, and the rest of the world, through public opinion polling and demographic research. One of their primary areas of inquiry is U.S. politics and policy as it relates to the international world. In a 2015 international report (Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015), the authors polled citizens in countries throughout the world about U.S. actions against ISIS, post 9/11 interrogation practices, U.S. respect of personal freedoms, and President Obama's response to international issues.

In the study, a combination of face to face and telephone interviews (N=45,435) were conducted between March and May 2015 in 40 countries with individuals 18 years or older

(Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015). Five Middle Eastern countries were surveyed: Turkey,

Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, and Jordan. Respondents from Palestine and Israel were also surveyed

and the discrepancy between Palestinian and Israeli attitudes towards the U.S. has been

highlighted in the report.

While citizens from varying countries were surveyed on a number of international issues,

responses related to MENA will be highlighted because of its relevance to the current study. In

regards to views about torture by U.S. government after 9/11, two questions were asked of

respondents: 1) "In the period following September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., the

U.S. government used interrogation methods that many consider torture on people suspected of

terrorism. In your opinion, were these interrogation methods justified, or not justified" and 2) "If

the (survey country) government used torture against people suspected of terrorism to try to gain

information about possible terrorist attacks in our country, do you think this could be justified or

not justified?" (Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015). Overall responses for those questions

suggested that citizens from all (not only MENA countries) nations surveyed who supported the

use of torture techniques in their own country of origin also supported the use of torture by the

U.S. government. For countries in the Middle East, respondents from the Palestinian territories

were least likely to support any form of torture whether in their country of origin or by the U.S.

This is compared to over 50% of Israeli respondents who believed that the use of torture was

justified both in their country and in the U.S.

America's global image remained positive overall in survey countries. However, Middle

Eastern countries scored lowest on U.S. favorability with the main exception of Israel (see

Appendix D). Notably, From the 39 countries surveyed, excluding the U.S., Israel ranked third

behind Italy (83%) and the Philippines (92%) in their positive view of the U.S. Specifically, in

2015, 81% of Israelis held favorable views of the U.S. Elsewhere in the region, U.S. favorability

was consistently low throughout years surveyed, 1999 to 2015. In 2015, Jordan held the most

negative image of the U.S. with 83% reporting an unfavorable view of the U.S. followed by the

Palestinian territories (70%), Lebanon (60%) and Turkey (58%). Religious differences in

attitudes were evident in Lebanon as the majority of Sunni Muslims and Christians hold

favorable views of the U.S as opposed to only 3% of Shia Muslims[8]. In regards to age, overall, in

22 of the 40 countries surveyed, younger age was positively correlated with having more

favorable views of the U.S.; this trend was statistically significant only in Palestinian territories

and in Lebanon.

Global perception from the international community of the U.S. is influenced by the

administration in power (McCormick, 2014). Therefore, the survey also asked respondents about

their views of President Obama and their confidence in him to do the right thing in regards to

world affairs. Specifically, the question asked, "How much confidence do you have in U.S.,

President Barack Obama to do the right thing regarding world affairs?" (Wike, Stokes, &

Poushter, 2015). Twenty -nine of the 40 countries surveyed were confident in President Obama's

ability to do the right thing. The Philippines, the country with the highest favorability of the U.S.

also ranked highest in their confidence of President Obama by an overwhelming majority of

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[8] The two major denominations of Islam are Sunni and Shiite. The division between these two factions
emerged after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632 AD. The dispute after his death over succession
of the next caliph (leader of the Muslim community) caused the divide between Sunni and Shiite
Muslims. Some believed that the Muslim community should choose the next successor (later known as
Sunnis) while others believed that someone from his family and blood should be the rightful successor
(later known as Shiites). Approximately 90% of the Muslim world identify as Sunni, while 10% identify
as Shiite.

94%. Countries giving President Obama the poorest marks, and therefore having least confidence in America's leader, included Russia (11%), Jordan (14%), Pakistan (14%) and Palestinian territories (15%). Israel reported less confidence in President Obama in 2014 than in 2015. Specifically, in 2014, 71% of Israelis were confident in President Obama's international leadership skills, but that number declined to 49% in 2015.

2. Zogby Polls

In 1984, John Zogby, the son of Lebanese immigrants founded the Zogby International Poll as a means to assess the attitudes and views of Arab country citizens towards the U.S. and to give voice to a people that have traditionally been silenced (Zogby, 2010) As the co- founder of the Arab American Institute (AAI), a non-profit, non- partisan organization focused on encouraging Arab American involvement in political and civil life in the U.S., John Zogby and his brother James Zogby, worked on bettering the understanding of Arab concerns in America as well as abroad (Arab American Institute, 2015).

The following subsections will cover polling results of three major categories: 1) Arab identity and Arab relations, 2) the question of Palestine, and 3) attitudes towards the U.S, its policies and culture. Zogby International has most frequently polled six Arab countries that represent the three major regions in the modern day Middle East: Morocco and Egypt from Northern Africa, Lebanon and Jordan from the Levant[9], and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from the Middle East Gulf they have also included other various MENA countries that fall within the category of the three identified regions. Dividing attitudes by

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[9] The name, "Levant States" was first used after WWI after the French mandate over Syria and Lebanon. This historical geographic term currently refers to the Middle Eastern countries- present day, Palestine/Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan (Naff, 1985).

country of origin, and then by region, enables Zogby International to underscore the diversity of attitudes and views within the Arab world. This attempt to not categorize, or lump the Arab world under one umbrella, captures the nuances that exist between varying countries in the MENA region.

Zogby Polls- Arab Identity and Arab Relations. In 2009, Zogby International (2010) polled 3,989 adult citizens (18 years or older) from Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding how important Arab unity was to them personally (Zogby, 2010). Arab unity ranked most important among Saudis (87%) and least important in Morocco (66%), In 2010, 4,881 adult citizens (18 years or older) were polled from Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Palestine about the importance of Arab identity. They were asked, "How important to you is your Arab identity?" All countries (i.e. Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Palestine) scored high on their belief that their Arab identity was important to them with Palestinians ranking the highest at 99.8%. While 75% of Lebanese citizens indicated that their Arab identity was important, they ranked the lowest when compared to Egyptians (99%), Jordanians (90%), Saudis (88%) and citizens of Kuwait (92%).

Zogby Polls- The Question of Palestine. The question of Palestine is a central issue for not only Palestinians but the region as a whole. In 2007, Zogby International polled 6,506 adults from Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the importance of the Palestine question issue as well as why it is important (Zogby, 2010). Respondents from each country ranked high in their belief of the importance of the Palestine question issue with Saudi Arabia holding a unanimous opinion (100%). Morocco, the country that ranked the lowest in importance of Arab

unity, also ranked the lowest in their view of the importance of Palestinian issues (87%). Despite ranking the lowest, an overwhelming majority of Moroccans, as well as other countries, surveyed deem the Palestine issue very important.

While it was established that the citizens within the MENA region viewed the question of Palestine as a major source of concern, why was the Palestinian issue important to them? Responses were categorized as either "Palestinians are Arabs like me", "religious reasons," "Palestinians are victims" and "other reasons." Responses suggesting that Palestinian issue is important because Palestinians are Arabs ranked the highest among all countries surveyed Morocco (57%), Egypt (50%), Jordan (32%), Saudi Arabia (40%) and UAE (81%). Other responses varied between religious reasons and the identification of Palestinians as victims.

Zogby Polls- Attitudes towards the U.S., its Policies and Culture. In 2002, Zogby International embarked on a survey titled, *Impressions of America.* Data were collected in 2002 across 10 (i.e. Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Unites Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, France and Venezuela) nations (N=2,400). Responses that were identified as "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable" were categorized as "favorable" and responses that were identified as "very unfavorable'" and "somewhat favorable" were categorized as "unfavorable". Zogby (2010) explained, "America was not hated but that American policy did create negative attitudes among Arabs and Muslims" (p. 84). This distinction between having negative attitudes towards American policy, as opposed to American culture or people, is a critical distinction that provides a possible explanation for anti-American sentiment.

Respondents in Kuwait held the most favorable view of the U.S. (41%), followed by Lebanon (26%). Respondents in the UAE held the least favorable attitude toward the U.S. (11%).

Four years later, in 2006, Zogby International polled the same countries to assess whether their opinion of America had changed. At that time, the Iraq War was in its third year and U.S. involvement in the region was still dominant (Zogby, 2010). Results found that overall citizens' positive attitudes towards the U.S. were declining, with most countries with low (e.g. 14% in Egypt and 12% in Saudi Arabia) or single digit (e.g. 7% in Morocco and 5% Jordan) favorability towards the U.S. (Zogby, 2010).

Attitudes toward American people fluctuated throughout the years, but were overall more positive than attitudes toward the U.S. in general. In 2004, Egypt held the most favorable views of American people (60%), but that number dwindled to 41% in 2009. Saudi Arabia held the most favorable attitude of the U.S. of all countries surveyed in 2009 with 88% of respondents holding favorable views of the American people versus 28% favorability in 2004. Favorable attitudes toward American people was high in countries such as Lebanon (58%) and Jordan (70%) in 2009 as well. While Zogby International does not provide a comprehensive explanation as to why these numbers may have fluctuated over the years, it is possible that the change from the Bush administration to the Obama administration in 2008 played a role in the changing perceptions of America and its people because like previously mentioned, global perception of the U.S. is influence by the administration in power (McCormick, 2014)

Policy toward Palestinians and Iraq had the highest un-favorability ratings in all of the countries surveyed. Egypt (76%), Lebanon (93%), Jordan (95%), Saudi Arabia (86%) and the UAE (34%) all held more than 75% unfavorable sentiment toward issues related to Palestine. Attitude on U.S. policy toward Iraq indicated a more pronounced negative sentiment throughout the region. All countries surveyed showed their disapproval for U.S. interference in Iraq:

Morocco (82%), Egypt (78%), Lebanon (91%), Jordan (86%), Saudi Arabia (88%) and UAE (83%).

Prior research discussed above influenced this current study. While the related study, research from Pew International and Zogby polls have contributed to the dearth of scholarship on the attitudes of MENA country citizens, very little attention has been focused on the historical and contemporary histories that may have contributed to those attitudes and perceptions. Therefore, this study fills a gap in the current research on gauging Arab opinion on U.S. foreign policy and relations.

IV.   INTERPRATIVE FRAMEWORK

This study is informed by the work of William Sewell Jr. (2005), an interdisciplinary social science (sociology, history, political science and anthropology) American academic, and one of the leading voices on social theory and interpretative analysis. An interpretative framework seeks to provide meaning to varying social worlds from the perspective of the participants to ultimately contribute to in-depth knowledge (Creswell, 2003). While the common sociological interpretive framework does not follow the hypothesis testing model, this framework combines both a systematic approach and descriptive component in its findings. Social history as articulated by Swell (2005) provides a unique way of combining methods, intellectual style, and historical study.

Prior empirical research and literature, related to the views and attitudes of Arab citizens from the MENA region, highlight the importance of investigating further to understand the roots of such views and attitudes. Doing so requires examining the region's colonial past and how the current social, political and economic climate contribute to our understanding of America's relationship with the MENA region. To accomplish this task, the following section will explore post-colonial theory.

A. Post-colonial Theory

Imperialist expansion of Europe into the Eastern portion of the world established a system of racial, social, economic, and political exceptionalism (Childs & Williams,1997). Those notions of superiority included an essentialist view of the colonization which pervaded throughout colonies in the Caribbean, China, India, Africa and the Middle East. Beginning in the 1980s, post colonialism developed into a body of writing focused on shifting the dominant

paradigm in which the Western world views other, non-Western nations (Young, 2003) This shift in perception is critical because it demands that one view the world differently, in a way that challenges the way in which Westerners were taught or conditioned to believe.

The division between the *West* and the *rest* was underscored in the 19th century when European colonial growth expanded to nine-tenths of the entire land surface of the earth (Young, 2003), a point explicitly addressed by Said (1993). Anthropological theories based on phenotypical and behavioral characteristics as childlike, feminine, or inferior justified the domination or rule over people of the colonized world, despite the fact they had governed themselves for millennia prior to colonization (Lunga, 2008; Young, 2003).

Post-colonial theory attempts to understand the relations between ideas and practice, relations of conflict and struggle, and between peoples and cultures. Post-colonial theory is thus not a theory in the scientific sense, it is a term to describe ideas and practices, similar to feminism or socialism (Young, 2003). According to Young (2003), post-colonialism "seeks to intervene, to force its alternative knowledge into the power structures of the west as well as the non -west" (p. 7).

As a literary theory with a critical approach, post-colonial theory can serve different purposes. In this study, literary theory provides justification to how post-colonial theory traces the historical context and evolution of nations to provide a clearer understanding of the present. It may deal with literature created in countries that were formerly colonized or it may be written literature of citizens of colonizing countries in using the colonized as subjects of discussion. Furthermore, post-colonial theory can be used to understand how colonized people "employ

creative resistance that challenge and complicate the colonizer-colonized interaction" (Lunga, 2008, p. 192).

B. Four Explanations of Understanding the Region and its People

This study seeks to better understand and explain the attitudes of MENA country citizens through gauging opinions on U.S. foreign policy, Western culture and American people. The question central to achieving this is: how can we make sense and understand the spread of anti-Americanism and anti- imperialism in the context of diverse and contradictory attitudes? There are differences within each respective country between the ruling regime and people as well as among people from the same country. Not every country is equally impacted by U.S. foreign policy or international affairs. And furthermore, those who may be most impacted by American intervention in the region have attitudes towards the U.S. that may reflect the result of histories of colonialism, imperialism and intervention.

The following discussion will therefore address four explanations of anti- Americanism and anti- imperialism in the region. Table 1 summarizes this discussion. The first explanation harbors the most extreme ideology which homogenizes a whole group of people and uses racism and fear tactics to target the region and its people, insisting that there is a "clash of civilizations" between Eastern and Western cultures. The second addresses how anti- Americanism and anti-imperialism is used as a strategy by the elites in the MENA region to justify atrocities in their own respective country. By focusing on the differences and a common enemy, some dictators blame the West and imperialism for all the problems facing their country. The third and fourth perspectives build off the works of Edward Said and post- colonial theory. One of the most prominent post-colonial scholars is Edward Said. Considered as the "father" of post colonialism,

Said's 1978 classic work, *Orientalism* transformed and inspired the discourse on post -colonial studies as he explored the artificial boundaries which constructed the dichotomy of East and West, a hierarchy of binary opposites. The third, specifically, provides a "simplistic" view of the contention in region through the lens of colonialism and imperialism. This is a crude view of *Orientalism* as mere reactions to wars and insurgency. A common "misunderstanding and misreading" (Said, 1993) of Said's work is the lack of attention to native agency and indigenous resistance. Therefore, the fourth perspective offered here allows a more critical perspective by addressing human agency. Doing so, de- homogenizes the region and highlights the contradictions between citizens from different MENA countries. This study is situated in this fourth perspective and contends that there needs to be a more nuanced look into post-colonial theory.

Table 1: Four Explanations of the Region and Its People

Explanation	Description	Role of Agency
Orientalist "Clash of Civilizations"	People in the MENA region are homogeneous. This explanation insists that there is a "clash of civilizations" between Eastern and Western cultures. This perspective thus serves as a justification to target the region and its people through wars and insurgency.	People are irrational and have no agency. Nuances between MENA country citizens are ignored. People are viewed as inferior and in need of saving.
Pragmatic Politics and the Elites	Anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism is used as strategy by the powerful elites in the region to justify their own political agendas. This explanation blames the West and imperialism for all issues in the region.	Agency is only granted to the powerful elites. Ordinary citizens have no agency. Manipulation and fear tactics are used by elites to push forth agendas of power and corruption.
"Simplistic" Post-Colonial Theory	Contention in the region is observed through a narrow lens focused primarily on colonial histories. Sociopolitical and socio-historical characterizations and the internal variation within and between people and societies are recognized as central premises of Edward Said's works (1978, 1993,1997) but further understanding of the role of agency is neglected.	People in the region are viewed simply as victims of colonial pasts. The role of agency is overlooked despite its affinities within the post-colonial discourse.
Critical Post-Colonial Theory	This explanation understands the role of past colonial and imperial histories but asserts power back in the hands of ordinary citizens. It criticizes the simplistic and shallow reading of Edward Said's works (1978, 1993,1997) to contend that resistance is possible and agency is highlighted.	The victim narrative is challenged and people are viewed as having agency despite colonial histories and the manipulation of political elites.

1. **Orientalist "Clash of Civilizations"**

As the most extreme ideology, "clash of civilizations" uses stereotypes grounded in racism and Islamaphobia, fear and political justification to create the intense polarization between "them" and "us". The phrase "clash of civilizations" was made popular by Samuel P. Huntington in a 1992 lecture and later in his 1993 book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, but was first coined by Bernard Lewis in a 1990 *The Atlantic Monthly* article entitled "The Roots of Muslim Rage*"*. In this article, Lewis (1990) asserts,

> Islam is one of the world's great religions. Let me be explicit about what I, as a historian of Islam who is not a Muslim, mean by that. Islam has brought comfort and peace of mind to countless millions of men and women. It has given dignity and meaning to drab and impoverished lives. It has taught people of different races to live in brotherhood and people of different creeds to live side by side in reasonable tolerance. It inspired a great civilization in which others besides Muslims lived creative and useful lives and which, by its achievement, enriched the whole world. But Islam, like other religions, has also known periods when it inspired in some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence. It is our misfortune that part, though by no means all or even most, of the Muslim world is now going through such a period, and that much, though again not all, of that hatred is directed against us… It should by now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provoked into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that rival.

Here Lewis emphasizes the polarization of *us* and *them* and contributes to the notion that Islam is in clear contrast to Western civilization and poses a threat to the 'civilized world'. Throughout

his work, Lewis continues to underscore how Islam has been and will be a source of conflict in diplomatic relations with the West. Lewis and his neo- conservative ideology was a pivotal perspective for the Bush administration and policies that were enacted under that administration (i.e. the war in Iraq and Afghanistan) post 9/11. Huntington built off this premise and hypothesized that culture and religious identity will be a central focus of conflict and contention in a post-cold war world, specifically, the West vs. Islam. Both Lewis and Huntington reduce Islamic civilizations to anti-democratic and irrational entities that require Western intervention. Said has vocally been a critic of both Lewis and Huntington to suggest that neither are arbiters of cultures but that their ideological foundation is a prescription for war,

> We have before us endless examples of, not the dialogue of culture but the clash of cultures, which can sometimes as Samuel Huntington, alas, is right about, be very bloody. And a lot of people like Huntington have made a universal out of this, and have said that cultures or civilizations today are so different that we have to accept the idea they are going to clash, that they cannot communicate through opposition, sometimes through even exterminatory relationship. I deeply disagree with that. I think the history of cultures, if you take a long view of them, suggests that cultures are really not impermeable, they are open to every other culture…(Said, 2001, p.271)

Said (2001) continues to address how the notion of Western culture, as independent from all other world cultures is a falsehood. Through his works, Said attempts to expose the historical roots of cultures and civilizations in order to promote dialogue between them. Literary works, ideologies and political discourses such as the newer conservative movement provide a falsification of human experiences that pit fear as a political force against Eastern cultures and religions, specifically Islam. Critics of Said often suggest that he is champion of Islam to which

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Said contends, "is complete nonsense. I wasn't trying to defend Islam. I was simply talking about a very specific form of activity: representation (Said, 2005).

Meer (2014) provides an examination of Islamaphobia conceptualized through post - colonial scholarship to suggest that post-colonialism informs the concept of Islamaphobia, "Orientalism are often translated into Islamophobia across literatures that span the recent proliferation of writing on Islamophobia" (Meer, 2014, p.509). While the term *Orientalist* or *Orientalism* has been commonly applied in the academic literature, the term *Islamophobia* more commonly applies to pop culture and in various media contexts (Zebiri, 2008). In the current context and political climate, Islamaphobic rhetoric links stereotypes of the the monolithic evil Arab and Muslim to a culturally deficient enemy.

The term Islamophobia in the U.S. and abroad is problematic because it applies to and discusses a diverse set of phenomenon across a wide range of discourses (i.e. journalistic, literary, academic, etc.; Zebiri, 2008). Nonetheless, this form of anti- Muslim prejudice can be viewed as cultural racism (Modood, 2005). In the European context, Modood (2005) contends that Islamophobia or Muslimphobia is a two- step racism; one, color racism (two- thirds of British Muslims are of South Asian decent) and the other cultural racism. These two components are lethal in a sense that it heightens the fear and hate mechanisms to ultimately produce the all-time foreign alien enemy,

> Racialized groups that have distinctive cultural identities or a community life defined as "alien," will suffer an additional dimension of discrimination and prejudice. The hostility against the non-white minority is likely to be particularly sharp if the minority in question is sufficiently numerous to reproduce itself as a community and has a distinctive and cohesive value system that can be perceived

as an alternative, and a possible challenge, to the norm…Cultural racism is likely

to be particularly aggressive against those minority communities that want to

maintain, and not just defensively, some of the basic elements of their culture or

religion and if, far from denying their difference (beyond the color of their skin)

they want to assert this difference in public and demand to be accepted just as

they are (p. 28-29).

Rubin (2002) argues that the real root of Anti- Americanism in the MENA region is not

U.S. foreign policies but rather serious fundamental problems within Arab societies.

Furthermore, Rubin suggests that shortcomings of Arab societies are often masked as the fault of

the United States. This "blame game" is a technique used by Arab societies to focus attention

away from internal weaknesses such as failed democracies, advancing rights for women, civil

society and similar progressive reforms to blaming and hating the U.S. This argument extends

even further to insist that U.S. policy toward the region has greatly aligned in the interests of the

Arab world since as far back as the 1950's and into the Cold War. Such pro- Arab policy is

grounded in U.S. sympathy for Arab nationalism and "saving Muslims" (Rubin, 2002, p.77). The

only exception to this "pro -Arab and pro Muslim" stance is the U.S. backing for Israel. Rubin

acknowledges America's unwavering support of Israel and provides that as the only opposition

to U.S. support for Arab nations. Otherwise, according to Rubin, Arabs have very little to

complain about and contends that none of their grievances against the U.S. and its foreign

policies are justified. Moreover, America is depicted as the victim in its lose/lose battle with

involvement in the region. For example, if the U.S. does intervene in region, it is accused of

imperialism and if it does not intervene, it is accused of being apathetic to the Arab or Muslim

cause.

Simply, this ideological perspective holds that Arab societies are internally deficient and attempts to dehumanize the Arab people through the lens of barbarism and rationalizes U.S. imperialism and Western hegemony (Amin-Khan, 2012). This notion of a "clash of civilizations" does not take into consideration the impact of U.S. imperialist foreign policy and is a hegemonic political tool used to close communication between cultures and people that are deemed too different. Such a perspective is the most radical of the four presented here.

2. Pragmatic Politics and the Elites

A bit more critical is the discussion of pragmatic politics and the elites. This perspective addresses how media outlets are used to distract the international community from the real issues in the region as well as how elites/ dictatorships manipulate anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism to conceal their own atrocities and crime in their country. These distractions are used to push forth more corruption and contention in the region at the expense of its citizens.

Merskin (2004) asserts that "nations 'need' enemies" (p. 159) and that governments manipulate the figure of a common enemy as a method of social control. In other words, a hegemonic device is created to divert public attention to a common threat justified through the creation of differences- race, religion, culture, traditions and values, etc. As a source of social conflict, elitist political systems may use a series of techniques to mobilize sentiment around a manipulated depiction of the "enemy". Hate propaganda has been used throughout history by drawing on fundamental beliefs and values as a mechanism of social control and mobilization (Merskin, 2004).

The need to unite against colonial forces such as Britain and France in the early 1950s

paved the way for Arab nationalism and the refusal to cede influences in the region to outside

intervention (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Pan- Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser (who

took power following a coup in 1956) in Egypt was met with hostility in the U.S. but resonated

throughout the Arab world especially after his victory of the Suez Crisis[10]. While this anti-

Americanism was not founded on a hatred of America, it did pit the Arab world at odds with the

U.S. as it was seen as a force of repression mimicking that of the regions colonial and imperialist

past (Makdisi, 2002). In a 1958 speech in Damascus, Nasser rallied support for his pan- Arab

and anti-imperialist stance,

> America, brothers, revolted on 4 July…it engaged in a revolution in
> in order to get rid of British colonialism and in order to raise the
> living standards across the United States. America revolted and won and
> proclaimed the very same principles that are today proclaimed by your brothers
> in Iraq. But in proclaiming its anger today, America refuses to see the reality of
> the situation in the Middle East and forgets its own history and its own revolution
> and its own logic and the principles invoked by Wilson. They fought colonialism
> as we fight colonialism…How do they deny us our right to improve our condition
> just as they did theirs? I don't understand brothers, why do they not
> respect the will of the peoples of the Arab East?...We call for a positive neutrality.
> All the people of the Arab Middle East are set on non-alignment. Why should
> these people not have their way? And why is their will not respected? (Nasser in
> Ahmad, 1999, p. 231-2)

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[10] The Suez Crisis or the Tripartie Aggression (known in the Arab world) was a victory for Nasser in the late 1956. Israel, United Kingdom and France combined forces in an attempt to regain control of the Western Suez Canal. The three aforementioned forces withdrew from the region after political pressure from the U.S., U.N., and the Soviet Union which strengthened support and favorability of Nasser. This was seen as a humiliation for Western powers and a victory for the Arab world (Noueihed & Warren, 2012).

Nasser continued to use anti-imperialist rhetoric to galvanize support for his call for unity among Arab leaders and against Western intervention and the state of Israel. Controlling the media in the Arab word has been closely associated with the preservation of power (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). He tactfully used the media and would broadcast on *Nasser's Voice* of the Arabs station in 1953. Other leaders across the Arab world in Libya, Iraq and Yemen mimicked Nasser's use of the media to feed their constituents pro regime propaganda. After the 1967 Arab- Israeli war[11], popularity and credibility of the radio as a mechanism for propaganda dwindled as false reports filled the airways of Arab victory over Israel when Arabs ceded territories to Israel. Nasser's rule and legacy has been the source of numerous debates. On the one hand, he was commended for his efforts to oppose Western colonial rule and his role in modernizing Egypt through education, art, music and the sciences as well as other socialist domestic reforms (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). On the other hand, he has been criticized for his repressive militaristic rule, secret police, and his involvement in the 1967 War (Noueihed & Warren, 2012).

Post- colonial regimes in the Arab world have been plagued by dictatorships and monarchies that have used anti- American and anti-imperialist propaganda to garner support for governmental factions. Brutal dictatorships across the Arab world have been accused of being just as oppressive as colonial rule. For example, from Tunisia's' Ben Ali, to Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, to Bahrain's Al- Khalifa monarchy, to Libya's Muammar Ghadafi, to Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Syria's Bashar Al- Assad, leaders of the Arab world have used a multitude of apparatuses to control and repress their own citizens. Al Assad, in Syria, claimed for example,

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[11] The Arab-Israeli war also called the Six Day War was a loss for the Arab world, in particular Palestine. Israel gained control of the Gaza strip, the West Bank from Jerusalem, and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt (Noueihed & Warren, 2012).

that his country would be immune from the revolutions that swept through the Arab world because he was "closely linked to the beliefs of the people" (Al- Assad in Pinto, 2013, p.204) identifying that as the core issue that would prevent revolts from occurring from Syria; however, Syria has been in an ongoing civil war since 2011 (Pinto, 2012). As the bloodiest of all revolutions, and creating the largest refugee and displaced people's crisis since World War II, Syria's people have endured much despair and loss in the hands of Assad and his regime (Pinto, 2013). In a 2012 speech, Assad attempted to appease his people and appeal to the mass protests against his regime by comparing the anti-government protesters to the terrorists who executed the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.,

> What we are doing now is similar to what the West did against Islam in
> The wake of 9/11. We say that there is a great religion-Islam, and there are
> terrorists taking cover under Islam. What should we banish: religion or
> terrorism? Do we denounce religion or terrorists? Do we fight those who
> trade in Islam or fight terrorism? The answer is clear: It is not the fault of Islam
> when there are terrorists who take cover under the mantle of Islam…If we go
> back to the 1970's and 1980's, when the devil's brothers, who covered themselves
> with Islam, carried out their terrorist attacks in Syria. In the beginning there were
> many Syrians who were misguided. The question is a race between the terrorists
> and reform (Syrian Arab News Agency, p.219-220).

In this speech for example, the regime portrayed the protesters as violent terrorists much like the ones who carried out the 9/11 attacks. These terrorists Assad was alluding to were Sunni militants who were trying to overthrow his Ba'ath party[12]. Drawing parallels to terrorists and

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[12] The Syrian dominated Ba'ath party which came into power in 1963 through a coup is currently in power under the leadership of Assad. Assad is an Alawite, following the Twelver school of Shite Islam.

equating protesters as violent militants, Assad continues to propagate such rhetoric to pin the atrocities in the country on anyone other than him and his regime.

Similar blame shifting was used throughout the Arab world, specifically in the midst of the Arab revolutions. In Libya, Muammar Qaddafi forty-two-year-old reign was being challenged by demands for change and reform. In February 2011, Qaddafi gave his infamous hour long speech filled with self-delusional rhetoric and in which he called his own people rats and drug addicts who were pushing forth "foreign agendas- Al Qaeda and American imperialism, as well as revolutionary ideals from Egypt and Tunisia" (Kamat & Shokr, 2013, p. 168). In his speech, he continued to state that they who would hunt down protesters from street to street, house to house and alleyway to alleyway[13]. Qaddafi was finally captured and killed in October 2011, eight months after the revolts began.

Cases in the use of anti- Americanism and anti-imperialism as a strategy to rally national support and divert attention away from civil unrest and discontent in the region can be seen throughout the Arab world. While such cases should not expel colonial and imperial histories in the region from creating continued unrest and divisions in the region, it is critical to address the impact of post- colonial regimes in furthering social, political and economic turmoil in the region.

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[13] This speech was now made infamous because of his apathetic response to the protests and insults directed at his own people. The phrase, "Alleyway to alleyway", *Zenga Zenga* in Arabic was one of the most memorable components in Qaddafi's speech which made reference to his own people as rats, made headlines across the globe.

3. "Simplistic" Post-Colonial Theory

Orientalism has been widely embraced in the humanities and the social sciences (Meer, 2014) because of its resonating affirmations with social and cultural justice and humanism as a scholarship and discourse. In *Orientalism* (1978), Edward Said makes the claim that Western European and American scholarship reinforces the age old dichotomy of West vs. East. Such a portrayal assumes Western superiority and prejudice against non- Western cultures and people. The classification of Easterners as Orientals or "others" as Said suggests, places groups of people, particularly Arabs in a precarious position, one that continuously distinguishes them as different ("people not like us"). This study uses the work of Edward Said on Orientalism to better understand how American political discourse may have used the "other" narrative to promote the "war on terror", influenced perceptions of the Arab revolutions, and created ISIS. Orientalism has been understood as a way of seeing the Arab world as exotic, uncivilized and backwards and as contemporary times indicates, as dangerous (Said, 1997). Said asserts the premise of Orientalism, "There are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the later must be dominated, which usually means having their lands occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power" (p. 36). Said draws on Foucauldian discourse theory to show that power is built from dominating institutions such as colonial powers and that there is a general continuity in which power is exercised to manipulate the colonial subject. Influenced by thinkers such as Foucault, Gramsci and Vico, Said articulates his take on the relationship between colonizer and colonized and pervasive western tradition through concepts of hegemony and theorization of discourse.

According to Said, Orientalism is embedded in the transaction between semiotic and political systems. The most comprehensive components of Orientalism can be understood as,

> An elaboration not only of a basic geographical distinction (the world is made of two halves, Orient and Occident) but also of a whole series of 'interests' which, by such means as scholarly discovery, philological analysis, landscape and sociological description, it not only creates but also maintains; it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) world; it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and exists in an uneven exchange with power political (as with a colonial or imperial establishment), power intellectual (as with reigning sciences like linguistics or anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with orthodoxies and canons of taste, texts, and values), power moral (as with ideas about what 'we' do and what 'they' cannot do or understand as 'we' do; Said, p.12-13).

One component of Orientalist logic is a lack of modernity (Said, 1997). That is ignoring the sociopolitical and socio- historical characterizations and the internal variation within and between people and societies (Said, 1997). Orientalism can also be understood as a project of post Enlightenment modernity. According to Orientalist logic, Western civilizations are the ideal model of modernity and those that do not follow in that path of the West are falling behind and need saving. Islamophobic rhetoric contributes to the simplistic and essentialist view

Neo-Orientalism or new Orientalism discourse has also emerged to explain the post 9/11 U.S. and Arab world relationship. Altwaiji (2014) suggests that a symbolic change in East-West relations has created the emergence of a neo-Orientalist academia. In this new Orientalism, Arab

countries have become the central figures toward which Western attention is directed and the classic figures of the Orientalist narrative such as India, Iran and Turkey are excluded. Altwaiji (2014) proposes that neo-Orientalism was produced after the 9/11 attacks as the Western perception of the Arab world and Islam has been further tarnished. Along with this notion of neo-Orientalism is a new imperialism. Altwaiji (2014) uses the work of Dag Tuastad, a prominent researcher and educator on the Middle East, to suggest that the American image of Arab violence is a "new barbarism". This modified representation of the Arab world resonates within the post 9/11 American political discourse and provided justification for the invasion of Iraq as Altwaiji contends:

> Fighting tyranny in the Middle East, barbarism and the aggressive nature of the local culture are the basic tenants of neo-Orientalism though the propagated message of this academia denies the relevance of hegemony…however, it is only after the 9/11 attacks the American policy toward the East is in question because the Arab world becomes the main centerpiece of the American drive for global hegemony (p. 321).

The hegemonic nature and the ethnocentric attitude of the U.S. continue to pervade American foreign politics and the portrayal of the other. Said's work and his legacy resonate within multiple disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science, history, and international studies, but has yet to make its mark on social work scholarship. It is through this lens that we can better understand scholarly inquiry of post colonialism. His work is particularly relevant to this study as it contextualizes the examination of attitudes and perceptions of MENA citizens on international relations, particularly the Western world. While very valid, this perspective, however, offers too simplistic of a view of post- colonial theory as a reaction to wars

and insurgency. This justifies everything through the lens of colonization and imperialism and people are viewed only as victims with no agency. It is therefore critical that a deeper understanding of Said's work is addressed and offered to challenge the notion that citizens in the MENA region are without a history and agency.

4. Critical Post- Colonial Theory and the Role of Agency

This study builds off the work of great scholars, such as Edward Said, and underscores the critical discussion of human agency as an instrument of resistance. This study challenges the victim narrative void of power and asserts that the colonized have inherit power. While longstanding histories of colonialism and imperialism in the region have left an undoubtable negative mark throughout the region, individuals in the region are not without agency. The counter narrative and counter discourse offered by Said is one that focuses on literary and indigenous resistance as articulated by Said as "voyage in". This phrase as described by Said in *Culture and Imperialism* is,

> *The voyage in*, then constitutes an especially interesting variety of hybrid cultural work. And that it exists at all is a sign of adversarial internationalization in an age of continued imperial structures. No longer does the logos dwell exclusively, as it were, in London and Paris. No longer does history run unilaterally, as Heigel believed, from east to west, or from south to north, becoming more sophisticated and developed, less primitive and backwards as it goes. Instead, the weapons of criticism have become part of the historical legacy of empire, in which the separations and exclusions are erased and surprising new configurations spring up (p.245).

Intellectual resistance (Said 1993; Ahmad & Rahman, 2013) and "voyage in"

(Said, 1993) as politics of resistance, are further claims of Said's acknowledgement of agency

and non- coercive forms of challenging imperialistic and colonialist histories. In his quest to

refine his works, Said revisits his thesis in *Orientalism* and suggests that "voyage in" as the

movement of Third World thinkers, critics and scholars to enter into dominant Western

discourses to transform and reposition their marginalized histories. Exiled intellectuals are to

participate in an inversion of narratives that offer counter discourses as a means of resistance.

Despite the common misconception that "voyage in" simply refers to "writing back", Said

articulates that aspects of his notion of politics of resistance covers the construction of national

or ethnic identities against identity politics, and adopting to the colonial discourse though being

conscious of colonialist ideologies. In *Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions:*

On Edward Said's "Voyage in" Robbins (1994) asserts,

> Said's "voyage in" narrative redistributes the emphasis radically. While it does not
> underestimate the continuing authority of metropolitan institutions, neither does it
> treat the composition of cultural capital as fixed once and for all or assume that to
> accept it is necessarily to offer the donor unconditional loyalty in return. National
> origin matters; transfers from the periphery to the center do not leave the center as
> it was. The transnational story of upward mobility is not just a claiming of
> authority but a redefinition of authority, and a redefinition that can have many
> beneficiaries, for it means a recomposition as well as a redistribution of cultural
> capital. In short, progress is possible (p. 32).

Critics (Ahmad, 1992; Childs & Williams, 1997; Clifford, 1988) of Said suggest that he

offers a negative view of agency and that power dynamics strip the colonized from the capacity

to resist and restore power for themselves. Furthermore, they assert that Said's discussion of

resistance remains "largely untheorized" (Zhaoguo, 2012, pg. 10) because "he fails to provide any theoretical analysis of, or grounding for, an understanding of where agency as resistance originates, or how it functions" (Childs &Williams, 1997, pg. 111). However, according to others (e.g. Pannian, 2016), at the center of the notion of humanism for Said is human agency and that this criticism is a shallow interpretation or misreading of his work. According to Pannian (2006), Said's "adherence to emancipatory humanism" aligns well with Fanon's notions of "individual agency of the disenfranchised people and his assertions on the decolonizing imagination s and anti-imperial strategies" (p. 120). Additionally, Said's emphasis on a new humanism, a humanism devoid of coercion, is an endeavor to evoke the human subject in every aspect of doing philosophy, literature and politics (Pannian, 2016). In *Power, Politics and Culture*: *Interviews with Edward Said*, interviewers probe Said on relations between knowledge and power. Influenced by both Foucault (1926-1984) and Fanon (1925-1961), Said makes it clear that there are differences between the two influential thinkers despite their similar scholarship on the culture politics of exclusion, confinement and domination (Said, 2001). He asserts that Foucault spent much of his professional career focused on the sites of political intensity (i.e. the academy, prison, hospital, army, etc.) whereas Fanon grounded his scholarship on genuine historical change whereby oppressed groups are capable of resistance and liberation, a concept he himself found particularly valuable in Fanon's work.

Said's appeal to critical consciousness, through his life's work, underscore his role of challenging the ideological misrepresentation of cultures that have been subjected to colonial and imperial histories. His work is overwhelmingly influential in helping shape intellectual resistance

and provide a counter discourse, one that situates agency back in the hands of the once

colonized,

> The secular world is the world of history as made by human beings. Human
> agency is subject to investigation and analysis, which it is the mission of
> understanding to apprehend, criticize, influence, and judge. Above all, critical
> thought does not submit to state power or to commands to join in the ranks
> marching against one or another approved enemy. Rather than the manufactured
> clash of civilizations, we need to concentrate on the slow working together of
> cultures that overlap, borrow from each other, and live together in far more
> interesting ways than any abridged or inauthentic mode of understanding can
> allow. But for that kind of wider perception we need time and patience and
> skeptical inquiry, supported by faith in communities of interpretation that are
> difficult to sustain in a world demanding instant action and reaction (Said, 1978,
> p. xxix).

Addressing the possible explanations of anti- Americanism and anti- imperialism in the

region provides context in understanding the diverse and contradictory attitudes regarding the

MENA region and its people. The U. S's dominant role in the region both with political and

military force has culminated into layers of complex polarization between ruling regimes and

ordinary citizens. Arab aspirations for self- determination have been complicated by Orientalist

propaganda which has directly and subconsciously shaped U.S. popular attitude and foreign

policies in the MENA region (Little, 2008). Previous chapters have outlined several factors that

help elucidate historical and contemporary legacies of colonialism, imperialism and American

exceptionalism to serve as context in situating the need for this current study. By combining a

quantitative methodological approach with historical analyses, this study both tends to gaps in

the empirical and theoretical literature on the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens on U.S. relations.

C. Proposed Study

This study examines trends over time in various Arab countries and provide a historical and contemporary look into the significance of variations in attitudes. Furthermore, this study conducts a rigorous statistical analysis to assess the relationship between country of origin and perceptions of U.S. policies, culture, and people. By examining the historical European and American legacies within the MENA region, as well as exploring Arab public opinions on an array of issues ranging from Arab identity to perceptions of the U.S. and international relations, we get a glimpse into the Arab world and its people. Such information is imperative in providing a clearer picture into a region, culture and people that have been commonly portrayed by Orientalist narratives through Western media and use of public opinion polls. While the aforementioned literature provides guidance on better understanding the Arab world, there remain many gaps. Such gaps include a comprehensive examination of trends in attitudes over time and a critical analysis of research and survey data. This study aims to address those gaps by conducting a secondary data analysis of data gathered in three, distinct periods of time in the Arab world: before the Arab Revolutions (2006-2008), during the Arab Revolutions (2010-2011) and "after" the Arab Revolutions (2012-2014).

V. METHODS

Data were obtained from the Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey from citizens of 14 MENA counties across three time periods relative to the Arab Revolutions: before (2006-2008); during (2010-2011); and after (2012-2014). There were approximately 1,000 participants per country per interview wave (N=34,928). Of the 14 countries surveyed, five (Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria and Yemen) were surveyed across all three waves; five were included in two waves (Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia); and the remaining four (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya) only participated in one wave of data collection. Face to face interviews were conducted in Arabic by research staff in each respective country. Complex survey designs incorporating stratification and clustering were used in each wave of data collection with sampling plans specific to each country surveyed (Arab Barometer, 2008; 2011; and 2014).

A. Data Source: Arab Barometer

Established in 2005 by scholars in the U.S. and the Arab world, the Arab Barometer (2013) was created to better understand the attitudes of MENA country citizens. Specifically, the objective was to produce and provide scientifically reliable and valid data on an array of issues related to the attitudes of ordinary citizens, to disseminate survey findings, and to augment institutional capacity for public opinion research (Arab Barometer, 2013). The University of Michigan and Princeton University spearheaded and created partnerships with research institutions and universities within the Arab world from countries including: Palestine, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria and Kuwait to create the study. In order to expand the project's scope and to

continue to enhance survey methods, the Arab Barometer formed a partnership with the Arab Reform Initiative[14] in 2010.

B. Research Design

This study is a time series cross sectional analysis (TSCS) of three waves of data. Unlike panel studies, TSCS studies do not repeat observations of the same participants over time (Beck, 2008). Instead, TSCS studies have a relatively smaller number of second level units (e.g. countries of origin) that are observed repeatedly over time (e.g. years) with different level one units (e.g., individuals residing within each country) surveyed on interview occasions (Beck, 2008). An advantage of using a TSCS design is that it increases the ability to show causation through modeling space and time (Beck, 2008).

C. Research Questions and Hypotheses

The goal of this study is to assess MENA country citizens' attitudes and views of the Western world, the U.S., including its culture and people. To achieve this goal, this study will address the following questions and corresponding hypotheses:

RQ $_1$: Do citizens in the MENA region, from different countries, have varying perceptions and attitudes of U.S foreign policy and intervention in the region?

> **H $_1$**: Citizens in the MENA region will have perceptions and attitudes of U.S. foreign policy and intervention in the region that vary by country.

RQ $_2$: Do citizens in the MENA region from different countries have varying perceptions and attitudes of American people?

> **H $_2$**: Citizens in the MENA region will have perceptions and attitudes of American people that vary by country.

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[14] The Arab Reform Initiative (ARI, 2016), founded in 2005, is an international consortium of policy analysis institutes whose goal is to further research capacity and promote democratic change in Arab countries.

RQ $_3$: Do citizens in the MENA region from different countries have varying perceptions and attitudes of American and Western culture?

> **H $_3$:** Citizens in the MENA region will have perceptions and attitudes of American and Western culture that vary by country.

Note: The three questions addressed above will be examined as further investigation of RQ$_1$, RQ$_2$, and RQ$_3$.

RQ $_4$: Have the attitudes and perceptions of MENA citizens on U.S foreign policy, American people and Western culture changed from 2006 to 2014?

> **H $_4$:** Attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens on U.S. foreign policy, American people and Western culture from 2006 to 2014 will show change over time.

RQ $_5$: Are differences in perceptions and attitudes towards U.S foreign policy, American people, and the Western world between citizens from countries in the MENA region related to age, sex, religion, and educational level?

> **H $_5$:** Differences in the perceptions and attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy, the American people and the Western world will be associated with age, sex, religion and education level.

RQ $_6$: Do views on the issue of Palestinian statehood affect MENA citizens' perceptions about U. S. foreign policy, American people and Western culture independent of other factors related to their perceptions?

> **H $_6$:** The views on the issues of Palestinian statehood will affect citizens' perception about U.S. foreign policy, American people and Western culture independent of other factors related to their perceptions.

D. Independent Variables

Country of Origin.

The main independent variable for this study, country of origin, is categorical. Fourteen

of the twenty- two Arab-speaking countries in the MENA region were surveyed for at least one

wave of the Arab Barometer study: Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq,

Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya. Data from all 14 surveyed

countries and all three survey waves were analyzed for this study. Number of respondents by

country and wave are shown in Table 2 below.

Table2: Independent Variable- Country of Origin by Interview Wave

Country	Wave 1 (2006-2009)	Wave 2 (2010-2011)	Wave 3 (2012-2014)
Algeria	(n=1,300)		(n=1,220)
Bahrain			
Egypt			
Iraq			
Jordan			
Kuwait			
Lebanon			
Libya			
Morocco			
Palestine			
Saudi Arabia			
Sudan			
Tunisia			
Yemen			
Total	N= 7,337	N=12,782	N=14,809

Time (year of data collection by wave).

Time was also included as an independent variable. Three distinct periods of time were examined: wave I: before the Arab revolutions (2006-2008); wave II: during the Arab revolutions (2010-2011); and wave III: after the Arab revolutions (2012-2014).

E. Dependent Variables

The dependent variables were: (1) attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy; (2) attitudes towards American people; and (3) attitudes towards American culture. These three variables were measured by using the responses to three corresponding questions in the Arab Barometer. These questions were measured on a 3 or 5 point Likert scale. Responses on the 3-point scales ranged from "agree" to "disagree" whereas responses on the 5-point scales ranged from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

Table 3: Dependent Variables- Survey Questions, Response Categories and Level of Measurement

Dependent Variables	Survey Question	Response Categories	Level of Measurement
POLICY **Attitude toward U.S. foreign policy**	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States' interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere.	1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Don't know 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree	Ordinal
PEOPLE **Attitude toward American People**	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Despite negative U.S. foreign policy, Americans are good people.	1. Disagree 2. I don't know 3. Agree	Ordinal
CULTURE **Attitude toward Western culture**	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: American and Western culture have positive aspects.	1. Disagree 2. I don't know 3. Agree	Ordinal

F. Covariates

There were four covariates for this study: age, gender, religion, and education level. The

variable, level of measurement, and categories are listed below:

Table 4: Covariates- Age, Gender, Religion and Level of Education

Covariates	Level of Measurement	Categories
Age	Categorical	1. 18-24 2 .25-34 3 .35-44 4 .45-54 5. 55-64 6 .65-74 7. 75-99
Gender	Dichotomous	1. Male 2. Female
Religion	Categorical	1. Muslim 2. Christian 3. Unknown
Level of education	Categorical	1. No education/Illiterate 2. Elementary 3. Prepatory/Basic 4. Secondary 5. Mid-level Diploma/Professional 6. Bachelors 7. Masters or higher

The Question of Palestine.

A variable based on a survey question on the Palestine issue was included in each model. The survey question, response categories and level of measurement are presented below:

Table 5: The Question of Palestine

Variable	Survey Question	Response Categories	Level of Measurement
Palestine Question	Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion about the problem of Israel and Palestine?	1 = The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East only when the Palestinians accept it 2 = The Arab world should not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East 3= Can't Choose/Don't know	Categorical

G. Data Analysis

All analyses were performed using Stata version 14.0 (Stata Corp, 2016). Prior to conducting the analyses, data were examined for coding errors and consistency (checking to ensure variables were measured the same across data waves). Coding errors were corrected and missing data were addressed by available case analysis (pairwise deletion). Several data elements that were collected differently in certain waves or which varied by country were identified and corrected accordingly. For Morocco and for wave three only, age was collected as a categorical variable instead of as an interval level variable as was done in all other countries and interview wave. For the purposes of keeping the variable age and the country Morocco included in the models, age was thus converted into a categorical variable for all other included countries and

waves, based on the age categories used in wave III for Morocco. Second, education was collected using a series of questions in Yemen and Tunisia in wave II instead of using a single question with multiple response categories. The education responses in wave II for Tunisia and Yemen were merged into a single education variable consistent with the categories used in other waves and by other countries. Third, religion was collapsed into three categories: Muslim, Christian and unknown. Sectarian sub- categories between Sunni and Shiite Muslims were combined to form the Muslim category because of issues of consistency across countries and waves.

Preliminary crosstabs of all categorical predictors and outcomes by country and across waves indicated there were no empty or sparse cells. Univariate analyses for each variable measured at an interval level were conducted to examine measures of central tendency (mean, median and mode), and variability (e.g. standard deviation) and to check for broad departures from normality. The first available interview wave for each country was used as that country's baseline interview and used to examine cross-country differences. Chi-square tests for categorical measures (e.g. country of origin, gender, educational status, and religious identification) and F-tests for interval level data were used to assess statistical significance.

Following the univariate and bivariate analyses, a sequential process was used to identify the best-fitting mixed-effects ordinal logistic model for each DV:

- First, null models were run with country as the random effect for each DV. The results of these analyses found that the 95% confidence interval associated with the random effect

of country was not found to include zero, indicating a significant random effect of country for each DV.

- Second, fixed-effects models that included only main effects were estimated for each DV and log-likelihood values (i.e., deviance) for each model were obtained. Time was modeled as the dummy variable (the first set of years were the reference time) which allowed for setting up a reference time to compare the effects of time on the dependent variables in subsequent survey years.

- Third, the best fitting fixed-effects models for each DV were re-estimated using robust standard errors to reduce potential bias in the standard error terms and corresponding significance levels for each predictor. These models were also checked for the proportional odds assumption (i.e., predictor effects are statistically equivalent across increasing levels of the DV) using a Brant test.

- Fourth, mixed-effects (i.e., fixed and random) ordinal models were estimated by adding a random intercept term for country and a random slope term for time to the best fitting fixed-effects model for the policy and people DV (Hamlin, 2013). For those two DVs, addition of the random effects terms was tested for statistical significance by comparing the log-likelihoods of the fixed and mixed effects models using a chi-square statistic. The culture DV only had two measurement points (wave I and wave II) and therefore did not have a random slope term.

- In the final step, regressions yielding statistically significant results, were followed by conducting *post hoc* tests to further interpret findings.

H. Human Subjects

The proposed study was reviewed by the University of Illinois at Chicago's (UIC) Institutional Review Board (IRB; see Appendix E). Data from the Arab Barometer were accessed from the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and are publicly available, non-restricted, and de-identified data. Consequently, the IRB determined the study did not meet criteria for being human subjects research and granted an exemption.

VI.   RESULTS

A. Sample Characteristics

Sample demographics are presented in Table 6. There was an approximate equal proportion of males and females represented in the study throughout interview waves (51.9% vs. 48.1% in wave I; 51.8% vs. 48.2% in wave II; and 50% vs. 49.9% in wave III, respectively). Muslims were overrepresented in the study. Seventy- nine percent of respondents identified as Muslim. Furthermore, the majority of Christian respondents were from Lebanon. Among levels of education, secondary education (21.9%) was the most reported among respondents followed by a bachelor's degree (18. 3%) prepatory/ basic (17.5%), elementary education (14.6%), being illiterate (13.2%), college diploma/2-year degree (11.8%), and a master's degree of higher (2.7%). The majority of respondents (28.0%) were 25-34 years old and the oldest age group 75-99 years old was the least represented (.91%).

Table 6: Demographic Variables

Variable	Wave I (2006-2008)	Wave II (2010-2011)	Wave III (2012-2014)	TOTAL (2006-2014)
Sex				
Male	3,802 (51.9%)	6,617 (51.8%)	7,411 (50.0%)	17,830 (51.1%)
Female	3,525 (48.1%)	6,165 (48.2%)	7,389 (49.9%)	17,088 (48.9%)
Religion				
Muslim	4,028 (54.9%)	9,412 (73.6%)	14,207 (95.9%)	27,647 (79.5%)
Christian	647 (8.8%)	731 (5.7%)	584 (3.9%)	1,962 (5.6%)
Unknown	2,662 (36.3%)	2,639 (20.7%)	18 (.12%)	5,319 (15.2%)
Level of Education				
Illiterate	894 (12.2%)	1,534 (12.1%)	2,148 (14.5%)	4,576 (13.2%)
Elementary	886 (12.1%)	1,780 (14.0%)	2,398 (16.2%)	5,064 (14.6%)
Prepatory/Basic	1,272 (17.4%)	1,926 (15.2%)	2,887 (19.5%)	6,085 (17.5%)
Secondary	1,735 (23.7%)	2,909 (22.9%)	3,002 (20.3%)	7,646 (21.9%)
College Diploma	705 (9.7%)	1,638 (12.9%)	1,769 (11.9%)	4,112 (11.8%)
Bachelors	1,521 (20.8%)	2,573 (20.2%)	2,287 (15.5%)	6,381 (18.3%)
Masters or higher	295 (4.0%)	356 (2.8%)	284 (1.9%)	935 (2.7%)
Age (in years)				
18-24	1,583 (21.7%)	2,427 (19.1%)	2,926 (19.8%)	6,936 (19.9%)
25-34	2,182 (29.9%)	3,595 (28.2%)	3,981 (26.9%)	9,758 (28.0%)
35-44	1,648 (22.6%)	3,103 (24.4%)	3,436 (23.2%)	8,187 (23.5%)
45-54	1,035 (14.2%)	2,025 (15.9%)	2,439 (16.5%)	5,499 (15.8%)
55-64	515 (7.1%)	1,035 (8.1%)	1,282 (8.7%)	2,832 (8.1%)
65-74	257 (3.5%)	450 (3.5%)	597 (4.0%)	1,304 (3.7%)
75-99	81 (1.1%)	97 (.76%)	138 (.93%)	316 (.91%)

B. Research Question #1: Policy DV

Model Estimation. A null ordinal regression model that included only the random effect for country and no fixed effect predictors other than the intercept was statistically significant (LR $\chi^2(1) = 869.19$, p < .001). This indicated there was enough variation in responses to the first policy question by country to warrant including a country random effect term in a mixed effects model. Subsequently, an ordinal logistic model that included a country random intercept term and an ordinal logistic model that included both a random intercept as well as a random slope term for time (wave) was run. A likelihood ratio test comparing the two mixed effect models (LR $\chi^2(2) = 289.84$, p < .001) as well as comparison of the BIC for each model (97778.49 for the random intercept only model; 97509.38 for the random intercept and slope model) supported the mixed effects model that included both random effects terms as the better fitting model. Final results for the mixed effects model with the inclusion of both random effects terms as well as a random effects covariance term are presented in Table 7. The overall model was statistically significant ($\chi^2(18) = 312.94$, $p < .001$) and, as expected, provided a better fit to the data than a model that did not include random effects terms (LR $\chi^2(3) = 830.11$, p < .001).

Fixed Effects. In this model, factors with odds ratios greater than one indicate a higher probability of being in the response categories reflecting a less favorable attitude and harboring more negative views of the United States. Participants in the higher response categories are more inclined to support the belief that armed operations against the U.S. are justified because of intervention in the region. Among those factors with increased odds of having a more negative view of the U.S. were: being Muslim (OR= 1.7; p<.001); those with a secondary education

(OR=1.1; p < .001), a college degree (OR=1.2; p < .001), or a bachelor's degree (OR=1.2; p < .001). Additionally, the question of Palestine was found to be associated with perceptions of U.S. intervention in the region. Believing that the Arab world should not accept the state of Israel (OR=1.1; p < .001) was associated with a 10% increase in the odds in supporting the belief that armed operations against the U.S. are justified.

The primary factor associated with a more favorable or at least less negative attitude towards the U.S. (i.e., odd ratios lower than 1.0) was time. Believing that armed operations against the U.S. is justified tended to decrease across interview waves (OR=.93; p < .001). Specifically, each subsequent wave (waves II and III) was associated with an approximate 7% increase in favorable attitude toward the U.S. Female respondents (OR=.87; p < .001) were less inclined than males to believe that armed operations against the U.S. are justified. Age was not significantly associated with response favorability for this question.

Random Effects. The random intercepts and slopes for the policy DV are presented in Figure 1, graphed on the logit scale. Countries with intercepts greater than 0 (i.e., the upper left quadrant of the graph), tended to have less favorable attitudes towards the U. S. for this policy question at baseline (interview wave in which each respective country entered the survey). Participants in these countries were more likely to endorse one of the higher response categories. As shown, countries with less favorable attitudes at baseline were: Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. Conversely, countries with a more favorable attitude at wave I had random intercepts less than 0 (i.e., lower right quadrant). These countries include: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Bahrain and Lebanon. Survey participants in countries in the

middle of the graph and with random intercepts near 0 – Palestine, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Kuwait – were close to the average response as indicated by the fixed effect terms in the model.

The random slope terms (X-axis) are interpreted similarly to the random intercept terms with negative scores reflecting a move towards a more favorable attitude towards the U.S. (i.e., endorsing one of the lower ordinal response categories) and positive scores indicating a move towards a more negative attitude towards the U.S. over time. Additionally, the negative covariance term indicates that countries with less favorable attitudes at baseline (i.e., with larger positive intercept terms) tended to have less negative attitudes across subsequent interview waves. Conversely, countries with more favorable attitudes at baseline (i.e., with larger negative intercept terms) tended to have more negative attitudes across subsequent interviews. It should be noted that the changes over time are relative and that a country moving to a more favorable attitude over time, could still be considered as having a negative attitude. For instance, participants in Iraq had one of the most negative attitudes towards the U. S. at baseline. While Iraqis tended to become less negative over time compared with the average change over time which was also towards being less negative (OR = .93, p < .01), they were still likely to have an overall negative opinion towards the U.S. compared with other countries.

Table 7: Research Question #1- Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistical Regression

Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistic Regression: U.S. Interference in Region Justifies Armed Operations Against the U.S. Everywhere

Model Type	Random Slope and Intercept		
	OR	(95% CI)	Sig
Age (in years)			
18-24	.95	(.89-1.00)	
35-44	1.0	(.98-1.09)	
45-54	1.0	(.97-1.09)	
55-64	1.0	(.94-1.11)	
65-74	1.0	(.92-1.54)	
75-99	.84	(.67-1.04)	
(25-34=reference)			
Education			
Elementary	1.1	(.99-1.15)	
Primary	1.1	(.99-1.17)	*
Secondary	1.1	(1.05-1.24)	***
College Degree	1.2	(1.09-1.31)	***
BA	1.2	(1.15-1.35)	***
MA or higher	1.1	(.95-1.26)	
(Illiterate=Reference)			
Sex			
Female	.87	(.83-.90)	***
(Male-Reference)			
Religion			
Muslim	1.72	(1.54-1.93)	***
Unknown	1.46	(1.1-1.91)	**
(Christian= Reference)			
Year	.93	(.62-.90)	**
Palestine Question			
Should Not Accept Israel	1.07	(1.02-1.13)	**
Don't Know	.88	(.81-.97)	**
(Should accept Israel=Reference)			
Random Intercept Variance	.19	(.07-.48)	
Random Slope Variance	1.6	(.64-4.1)	
Covariance	-.53	(-1.0- -.03)	
Model Statistics and Diagnostics			
Wald Chi Square [a]		312..94	***
BIC [b]		97554.18	
LR [c]		785.31	***

p<.05*   p<.01   p<.001***

Note: The sample was derived from the Arab Barometer from 2006- 2014. A total of 14 countries (N= 32,419) were surveyed across three waves of data collection (2006-2008; 2010-2011; and 2012-2014).

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[a] The Wald Chi Square reflects an F statistic which tests improvements in the model. Significance suggests a statistically reliable improvement in the model fit including parameter estimates (Swartz, 2015).

[b] The BIC or Schwarz criterion is a criterion for model selection among a finite set of models (Schwarz, 1978).

[c] The Likelihood Ratio (LR) is a statistical used to compare difference between the numbers of parameters (goodness of fit) estimated in the two models.

Figure 1: Research Question #1: Random Intercepts and Slopes

POLICY DV: RANDOM INTERCEPTS AND SLOPES
2006 - 2014

C. Research Question #2: People DV

Model Estimation. A null ordinal regression model that included only the random effect for country and no fixed effect predictors other than the intercept was statistically significant (LR $\chi^2(1) = 1667.75$, p < .001). This indicated there was enough variation in responses to the people question by country to warrant including a country random effect term in a mixed effects model. Subsequently, an ordinal logistic model that included a country random intercept term and an ordinal logistic model that included both a random intercept as well as a random slope term for time (wave) was run. A likelihood ratio test comparing the two mixed effect models (LR $\chi^2(2) = 134.04$, p < .001) as well as comparison of the BIC for each model (62181.95 for the random intercept only model; 62068.63 for the random intercept and slope model) supported the mixed effects model that included both random effects terms as the better fitting model. Final results for the mixed effects model with the inclusion of both random effects terms as well as a random effects covariance term are presented in Table 8. The overall model was statistically significant ($\chi^2(18) = 822.89$, $p < .001$) and, as expected, provided a better fit to the data than a model that did not include random effects terms (LR $\chi^2(3) = 1078.92$, p < .001).

Fixed Effects. In this model, factors with odds ratios greater than one indicate a higher probability of being in the response categories reflecting a more favorable attitude and harboring more positive views of American people. Participants in the higher response categories are more inclined to support the belief that American are good people. Older participants, those ages 65 to 74 were more likely to have a more positive view of American people (OR=1.17, p < .01). Being more favorable towards the American people was also associated with being more educated (being in a higher educational category): elementary education (OR=1.13, p < .01),

primary education (OR=1.16, p < .001), secondary education (OR=1.28, p < .001), college

degree (OR=1.44, p < .001), bachelor's degree (OR=1.62, p < .001) and masters or higher

(OR=2.10, p < .001).

The primary factor associated with a less favorable or at least a more negative attitude

towards American people (i.e., odd ratios lower than 1.0) was time. Believing that Americans

are good people tended to decrease across interview waves (OR=.70; p < .05). Specifically, each

subsequent wave (waves II and III) was associated with an approximate 30% decrease in

favorable attitude toward American people. Other factors associated with less favorable

perceptions of American people include: being female (OR=.93, p < .001); and being Muslim

(OR=.46, p < .001). Additionally, the question of Palestine was found to be related with attitude

toward American people. Believing that the Arab world should not accept the state of Israel

(OR=.58 p < .001) was associated with a 42% decrease in odds having an affirmative perception

of American people.

Random Effects. The random intercepts and slopes for the people DV are presented in

Figure 2, graphed on the logit scale. Countries with intercepts greater than 0 (i.e., the upper left

quadrant of the graph), tended to have more favorable attitudes towards American people at

baseline (interview wave in which each respective country entered the survey). Participants in

these countries were more likely to endorse one of the higher response categories. As shown,

countries with more favorable attitudes at baseline were: Bahrain, Yemen, Tunisia, and Saudi

Arabia. Conversely, countries with less favorable attitudes at baseline had random intercepts less

than 0 (i.e., lower right quadrant). The primary country being Sudan, and, to a somewhat lesser

extent, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt. Survey participants in countries in the middle of the graph

and with random intercepts near 0 – Kuwait and Algeria, and bit more inclined to a favorable attitude, Lebanon and Iraq– were close to the average response as indicated by the fixed effect terms in the model.

The random slope terms (X-axis) are interpreted similarly to the random intercept terms with negative scores reflecting a move towards a more favorable attitude toward American people. (i.e., endorsing one of the higher ordinal response categories) and positive scores indicating a move towards a more negative attitude towards American people over time. The negative covariance term indicates that countries with less favorable attitudes at baseline (i.e., with larger positive intercept terms) tended to have more positive attitudes across subsequent interview waves. Conversely, countries with more negative attitudes at baseline (i.e., with larger negative intercept terms) tended to have more positive attitudes across subsequent interviews. It should be noted that the changes over time are relative and that a country moving to a more favorable attitude over time, could still be considered as having a negative attitude overall. For instance, participants in Sudan had one of the most negative attitudes towards the U. S. at baseline. While Sudanese responses tended to become less negative over time compared with the average change over time which was also towards being more negative (OR = .70, p < .05), they were still likely to have an overall negative opinion towards American people compared with other countries.

Overall, Figure 2 highlights that for the people DV, there is less variation across countries (i.e. countries are more similar) but with more variation over time. In contrast, there was more variance between counties with less variation over time observed for the policy DV. In other

words, countries were more variable in whether they viewed military intervention as justified than they were in their attitudes towards the American people. However, their opinions of military intervention did not change as much as their opinions of American people, which appeared to be more temporally volatile.

Table 8: Research Question #2- Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistical Regression

Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistic Regression: Despite Negative U.S. Foreign Policy, Americans are Good People

Model Type	Random Slope and Intercept		
	OR	(95% CI)	Sig
Age (in years)			
18-24	1.0	(.96-1.09)	
35-44	1.0	(.96-1.08)	
45-54	1.1	(.99-1.13)	
55-64	1.1	(.99-1.18)	
65-74	1.2	(1.03-1.32)	**
75-99	.97	(.76-1.21)	
(25-34=reference)			
Education			
Elementary	1.1	(1.04-1.23)	**
Primary	1.2	(1.06-1.26)	***
Secondary	1.3	(1.18-1.39)	***
College Degree	1.4	(1.31-1.57)	***
BA	1.6	(1.48-1.76)	***
MA or higher	2.1	(1.78-2.48)	***
(Illiterate=Reference)			
Sex			
Female	.93	(.89-.97)	***
(Male-Reference)			
Religion			
Muslim	.43	(.39-.51)	***
Unknown	.31	(.15-.32)	***
(Christian= Reference)			
Year	.70	(.72-1.15)	*
Palestine Question			
Should Not Accept Israel	.58	(.54-.61)	***
Don't Know	.64	(.57-.69)	***
(Should accept Israel=Reference)			
Random Intercept Variance	.24	(.08-.67)	
Random Slope Variance	1.2	(.42-3.7)	
Covariance	-.47	(-1.0- -.08)	
Model Statistics and Diagnostics			
Wald Chi Square [a]		822.89 ***	
BIC [b]		62121.99	
LR [c]		160.63 ***	

p<.05*   p<.01**   p<.001***

Note: The sample was derived from the Arab Barometer from 2006- 2014. A total of 14 countries (N= 32,414) were surveyed across three waves of data collection (2006-2008; 2010-2011; and 2012-2014).

[a] The Wald Chi Square reflects an F statistic which tests improvements in the model. Significance suggests a statistically reliable improvement in the model fit including parameter estimates (Swartz, 2015).

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[b] The BIC or Schwarz criterion is a criterion for model selection among a finite set of models (Schwarz, 1978).

[c] The Likelihood Ratio (LR) is a statistical used to compare difference between the numbers of parameters (goodness of fit) estimated in the two models.

Figure 2: Research Question #2- Random Intercepts and Slopes

RANDOM INTERCEPTS

RANDOM SLOPE

● Countries Surveyed Across 1 Wave

● Countries Surveyed Across 2 Waves

● Countries Surveyed Across 3 Waves

PEOPLE DV: RANDOM INTERCEPTS AND SLOPES
2006 - 2014

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
D. Research Question #3: Culture DV

Model Estimation. A null ordinal regression model that included only the random effect for country and no fixed effect predictors other than the intercept was statistically significant (LR $\chi^2(1) = 946.17$, p < .001). This indicated there was enough variation in responses to the culture question by country to warrant including a country random effect term in a mixed effects model. Subsequently, an ordinal logistic model that included a country random intercept term was run. Final results for the mixed effects model with the inclusion of both random effects terms as well as a random effects covariance term are presented in Table 9. The culture DV only had two measurement points (wave I and wave II) and therefore, a random slope term was not included in the modeling. The overall mixed-effects model was statistically significant ($\chi^2(18) = 888.67$, $p <$ .001).

Fixed Effects. In this model, similar to the previous model (people DV), factors with odds ratios greater than one indicate a higher probability of being in the response categories reflecting a more favorable attitude and harboring more positive views American and Western culture. Participants in the higher response categories are more inclined to support the belief that American and Western cultures have positive aspects. Among those factors with increased odds of having a more positive view of American culture include: being female (OR=1.1, p < .001); and those with an elementary education (OR=1.1, p < .05), primary education (OR=1.3, p < .001), secondary education (OR=1.5, p < .001), college degree (OR=1.7, p < .001), bachelor's degree (OR=2.1, p < .001) and masters or higher (OR=2.7, p < .001). Much like the results of

the people DV, additional years of education (being in a higher educational category) was associated with increased odds of being more favorable toward American and Western culture.

Conversely, the main factors associated with a less favorable or at least a more negative attitude towards American and Western cultures (i.e., odd ratios lower than 1.0) was religion. Specifically, being Muslim (OR=.31 p < .001) was associated with a 69% decrease in odds of harboring a positive view of American and Western culture. Additionally, the question of Palestine was found to be related to having an attitude toward American people. Believing that the Arab world should not accept the state of Israel (OR=.50 p < .001) was associated with a 50% decrease in odds having an affirmative perception of American people. Age was not significantly associated with response favorability for this question.

Random Effects. The random intercepts for the culture DV are presented in Figure 3, graphed on the intercept scale. Countries with intercepts greater than 0 (i.e., the right portion of the graph), tended to have more favorable attitudes towards American people at baseline (interview wave in which each respective country entered the survey). Participants in these countries were more likely to endorse one of the higher response categories. As shown, countries with more favorable attitudes at baseline were mainly Bahrain and Tunisia followed by Lebanon, Iraq and Morocco. Conversely, countries with less favorable attitudes at baseline had random intercepts less than 0 (i.e., left side). Much like the results of the people DV, the primary country with the least favorable attitude was Sudan, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Algeria. Survey participants in countries in the middle of the graph and with random intercepts near 0 – Egypt and Palestine were close to the average response as indicated by the fixed effect terms in the model.

Table 9: Research Question #3- Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistical Regression

Mixed Effects Ordinal Logistic Regression: American and Western Culture Have Positive Aspects

Model Type	Random Intercept		
	OR	**(95% CI)**	**Sig**
Age (in years)			
18-24	1.0	(.96-1.14)	
35-44	.96	(.88-1.04)	
45-54	1.0	(.93-1.13)	
55-64	.95	(.84-1.07)	
65-74	.93	(.79-1.11)	
75-99	.76	(.56-1.03)	
(25-34=reference)			
Education			
Elementary	1.1	(1.02-1.28)	*
Primary	1.3	(1.13-1.40)	***
Secondary	1.5	(1.35-1.70)	***
College Degree	1.7	(1.46-1.89)	***
BA	2.1	(1.83-2.3)	***
MA or higher	2.7	(2.2-3.3)	***
(Illiterate=Reference)			
Sex			
Female	1.0	(.97-.1.09)	***
(Male-Reference)			
Religion			
Muslim	.31	(.26-.38)	***
Unknown	.35	(.28-.44)	***
(Christian= Reference)			
Year	.89	(.83-.97)	**
Palestine Question			
Should Not Accept Israel	.50	(.46-.54)	***
Don't Know	.50	(.44-.57)	***
(Should accept Israel=Reference)			
Random Intercept	.22	(.09-.51)	
Model Statistics and Diagnostics			
Wald Chi Square [a]	888.67 ***		
BIC [b]	34942.05		
LR [c]	-		

p<.05*   p<.01**   p<.001***

Note: The sample was derived from the Arab Barometer from 2006- 2014. A total of 14 countries (N= 19,717) were surveyed across two waves of data collection (2010-2011; and 2012-2014).

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[a] The Wald Chi Square reflects an F statistic which tests improvements in the model. Significance suggests a statistically reliable improvement in the model fit including parameter estimates (Swartz, 2015).

[b] The BIC or Schwarz criterion is a criterion for model selection among a finite set of models (Schwarz, 1978).

[c] The Likelihood Ratio (LR) is a statistical used to compare difference between the numbers of parameters (goodness of fit) estimated in the two models.

Figure 3: Research Question #3-Random Intercepts

CULTURE DV: RANDOM INTERCEPTS
2006 - 2011

E. Research Questions #4 – #6: Time, Sex, Education, Religion, Age and the Question of Palestine.

Overall, the results of this study suggest that MENA country citizens vary in their perceptions of U.S. policy, American people and Western culture and support all six hypotheses. First, the country random effects were significant in all models, providing support for Hypothesis one to three. Second, time was also a statistically significant predictor in all three models providing support for Hypothesis four. Third, country-level random effect terms were significant in the models incorporating the covariates for sex, education and religion to support Hypothesis five. The effects of age however appear to be more marginal than the effects of other covariates restricted to older adults and the people DV age was not a statistically significant predictor for the policy DV and culture DV. And finally, the issue of Palestinian statehood was statistically significant in these models, supporting Hypothesis six.

VII.   DISCUSSION

This discussion section will address the results of this study and provide context to help elucidate the findings. It is intended that highlighting the main findings of this study and incorporating historical and contemporary context will provide a better understanding of the region and its complexity. Furthermore, highlighting changing country-specific results across survey years underscores the variation in responses by country and time. As further context for the implications of study findings, a timeline of main events in the region is provided in Appendix E. A brief discussion on the country level random effects of age, sex, education religion and the issues of Palestinian statehood will be provided.

A. Country Specific

There is not one narrative that can capture the findings of this study or explain the complexities and nuances in the MENA region. This discussion will provide a glimpse in the region from 2006 to 2014 related to the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens. While it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a comprehensive historical analysis of the region and every country throughout the years, what will be underscored is how the results of this study allow the discussion of key moments throughout the region. Furthermore, the discussion will provide a "snapshot" into the social, political and economic situations in each respective country surveyed. The countries are presented in alphabetical order. Actual response

proportions categorized by each dependent variable is provided in Appendix F-H**.** A profile of each country is provided Appendix I-U.[15]

1. **Algeria**

Algeria is largest (in terms of size) country in Africa and the Arab world (Zaimeche, Chanderli, Brown, & Sutton, 2017). Algeria played a significant role in this study as it was one of the five countries surveyed across all three waves. Despite current positive relations between Algeria and the U.S. (the Algerian government was quick to offer its support to the U.S. in condemnation of the 9/11 attack), Algerian respondents scored unfavorably in regards to U.S. intervention in the region. In fact, post 2011 revolution Algeria held the strongest anti- American sentiment than any other country surveyed in the region. U.S.- Algerian relations have been fairly positive since President Boutuefilka visited the White House in 2001, making him the first Algerian president to do so since 1985 (Zaimeche, Chanderli, Brown, & Sutton, 2017).

The responses by Algerian citizens may however highlight the dissonance between the ruling party and its citizens in regards to diplomatic and foreign relations. Opinions about the American people remained fairly consistent across the three waves. Responses to Western and American culture was slightly more favorable in wave one as opposed to the other two waves as more than half of respondents agreed that western culture has positive aspects. That percentage however dropped in wave two, during the revolution (2010-2011), to less than half. Government controlled media outlets such as television, internet, telephone, and radio made it difficult for

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[15] Information and demographic statistics presented in the Appendix F-R were taken from Encyclopedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/ and CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.

protests to gain momentum unlike the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco where the media played a critical role in the dissemination of anti- government protests, rallies and riots. Despite the hope that Algerians felt witnessing the ousting of Egyptian and Tunisian leaders, their story was complicated with ties in Libya (Qaddafi's pregnant wife and sons sought asylum in Algeria) and geographical constraints (their border with Morocco has been closed since 1994) hindering the elements of a revolution to solidify (Slyomovics, 2013).

Strong anti-Western sentiment could be attributed to the fact that Algerians suffered considerably under French colonial rule. Post-independence Algeria was burdened by internal strife and military rule that was attributed to aspects of the French colonial era which ultimately ended in the death of over one million Algerians in their fight for independence (Zaimeche, Chanderli, Brown, & Sutton, 2017). According to Slyomovics (2013), "Algerian history could be most fully comprehended through the prism of military" (p.128) even fifty years after French presence. The emphasis on Algeria's army, navy and air force established a culture of fear spearheaded by president Adbelaziz Boutuefilka who remains in power in today.

Among North African, Arabic speaking countries, Algeria faces a paradoxical movement in which Anti-Americanism is fueled by negative views of U.S foreign policies, specifically directed towards Iraq and Palestine, but mediated by the attraction of American values and products (Zoubir & Ait-hamadouche, 2006). While other North African countries such as Tunisia and Morocco have maintained positive U.S. diplomatic ties, Algeria and Libya, for example, only recently have embraced a cooperative relationship with the U.S., primarily as a strategic choice to improve their respective countries' social, economic and political agendas (Zoubir & Ait-hamadouche, 2006).

2. Bahrain

Bahrain was only surveyed once in wave one and respondents indicated support and affirmation for the United States and the West. While there are no data to compare attitudes of Bahraini citizens over the course of the study, figures one, two and three highlight Bahrain's favorability of American people and Western cultures as well as well as their opposition to armed operations against the U.S. To understand the responses of Bahraini citizens, it is important to underscore Bahrain's complex history of internal sectarian divisions and competition for power (Hanieh, 2013). Most interesting in this case is how a Shiite majority country came to be ruled by a minority Sunni regime. According to Noueihed and Warren (2012), while these divisions between the citizens of Bahrain were never cause of major conflict, the elites use of tactical media influences painted Shiites as loyal to their Shiite majority non-Arab nation Iran, therefore, disloyal to their Arab regional neighbor of Saudi Arabia. Shiite citizens of Bahrain dispute such claims and suggest that their loyalty is one of nationalism to their country and not of religion. While Shiites continue to be excluded from governmental and political affairs, Shiites are well represented in the private sector (Hanieh, 2013). As a whole, Bahrainis are a well-educated and professional group of people and their Shiite constituency is exceptionally pronounced in their professional achievements as doctors, lawyers and businesspeople. Institutional discrimination across sectors favoring Sunni business and professional positions in schools, hospitals and other institutions (Noueihed & Warren, 2012).

In this study, sectarian differences were not accounted for and therefore, it is unknown whether Sunni and Shiite Bahrain citizens differed in their perceptions of the survey questions. The minority Sunni ruling sect relied on Saudi Arabia, a regional master power and its eastern

neighbor, and its ally, the U.S. to appease any disruptions that may oppose Bahrain's ruling monarchy, Al- Khalifa. By the end of 2011[16], relations in Bahrain between the ruling monarch, the Shiite majority and Sunnis was at an all- time low and caused further unrest and mistrust, "those Bahrainis seeking meaningful reforms were increasingly coming to realize that they were unlikely to see their wishes fulfilled until there was major changes in Saudi Arabia and a monumental shift in Western foreign policy" (Noueihed & Warren, 2012 p. 162). Both Saudi Arabia and the U.S. share vested interests in Bahrain whether it be to maintain the incumbency of a Sunni ruling party by the Saudis or strategic interests in the U.S. to preserve stability in the world's largest oil exporting region.

3. **Egypt**

Egypt has one of the longest world histories of any modern country and continues to be a pronounced member of the Arab world. Egypt's role in the international landscape is far too valuable for its strategic allies such as the U.S. and its neighboring countries of Saudi Arabia, Palestine/Israel and Libya. However, ordinary Egyptian interests in international affairs did not often match that of its government and internal issues superseded any other stakes in the region or abroad (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Foreign policy initiatives and conspiracy theories

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[16] While initial conflicts did not begin as a sectarian struggle for equality and power, tensions between Sunni and Shiites were escalated through Saudi intervention in the island. The Shiites were an oppressed majority with minority status who initially sided with their Sunni counterparts in the call for the ruling family to surrender some of its political power to end discrimination and provide government transparency. Anti- government protests took place in Mannma, the capital, around the Pearl roundabout (thus named the Pearl Revolution) in February 2011(Noueihed & Warren, 2012). These protests however were ephemeral as martial law was imposed on its citizens and the Peal monument was destroyed by Bahraini authorities and backed by the Saudi regime. Military intervention by the Saudis left protesters and opposition efforts futile and furthered civil divide between the Sunni and Shiites.

directed toward Israel and Egypt continue to leave many Egyptians skeptical of ruling officials and the shaping of Egypt's future.

Despite strong diplomatic relations in the past with former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, President Obama was left in a challenging position to address the concerns of Egyptian protestors in 2011 and American ally, Hosni Mubarak. According to Amar (2013), "Egypt may be considered the fulcrum of the 'Arab Spring' and of future transitions of democracy in the region" (p. 24). Demonstrations in Cairo's Tahrir Square, or Liberation Square, is arguably the most powerful images of the Arab revolutions. On January 25, 2011, demonstrations erupted all over Egypt against President Hosni' Mubarak and his regime (Amar, 2013). Ultimately, Mubarak lost U.S. support and backing which contributed to the fall of Mubarak which left Egypt in the hands of the Muslim Brotherhood[17].

In the beginnings of the revolution (2010-2011), Egyptian citizens responded unfavorably to U.S. intervention in the region, but that attitude became more positive over time "post-revolution" (2012-2014). More favorable responses could be attributed to President Obama's condemnation of the use of violence against Egyptian protestors and the support to reform and

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[17] The Muslim Brotherhood (Founded by the Egyptian school teacher, Hassan al-Banna, the brotherhood is Egypt's most powerful opposition movement. In its early stages, the Brotherhood quickly aligned itself with three major causes: the end to British colonialism, challenging the establishment for a new Jewish state in Palestine, and fighting corruption in the political spheres of Egypt), a longstanding Islamist political and social movement that was founded in 1920, played a critical but not leading role in initiating the 2011 revolution (Amar 2013; Cole, 2013). Indeed, it was the youth of Egypt who mobilized using different forms of social media to organize protests and rallies in Tahrir Square. Under Mubarak, there was a ban on the Brotherhood, however, Brotherhood leaders were suspected of making secret dealings with the Mubarak regime to ensure their political presence in Egypt (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Nevertheless, the military took control after the resignation of Mubarak under the command of Field Marshal Mohammad Hussein Tantawi. Not before long, Brotherhood member, Mohamed Morsi took power but his reign was ephemeral as he was deposed in less than a year after taking office. In a 2014 military coup, Abdel Fattah el- Sisi assumed control over Egypt as is currently the incumbent president.

address Egyptian citizen concerns. However, when it came to responses regarding American people, their favorability tended to decrease over time. Furthermore, as evidenced by figure three, Egypt scored fairly neutral compared to other surveyed countries regarding American and Western culture. Decreased favorability over time could have possibly been contributed to citizens' perceptions of U.S. involvement or lack thereof during the Arab Revolutions. Citizens loyal to ousted president Hosni Mubarak could have possibly highlighted their disapproval of U.S. vocal opposition to the violence in Egypt under his regime as well as the call for reform. Furthermore, negative U.S. sentiment could have been augmented because the Obama administration denounced efforts to overthrow Muslim Brotherhood member, Mohamed Morsi. Secular Egyptians may have voiced their disapproval of the Obama administrations alleged support of aiding the Brotherhood in attaining power. Such conspiracy theories of U.S./ Egyptian relations continue to pervade throughout Egypt.

4. **Iraq**

Baghdad, Iraq was once at the core of the Arab civilization for its contributions to the arts and sciences and for being the epicenter for study and research in the Arab and Islamic world. Unfortunately, Iraq's rich and beautiful history is often reduced, in the Western world, to the 2003 war and for being the birthplace of Daesh[18]. That is not stay that during the reign of Saddam Hussein, Iraq was a country void of corruption, internal conflicts and power struggles, but post- 2003 Iraq has been a continuous battlefield with competing interests of political elites

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[18] To recall from an earlier discussion, Daesh is another name for ISIS or ISIL. Please refer to 'Orientalism in the Media' for further elaboration.

and international forces at the expense of innocent Iraqi civilians. The Iraqi diaspora has been

noted as the largest of modern times and is being labeled as a "humanitarian crisis" since the

2003 war and the continued war against extremist militants (Global Policy Forum, 2017).

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a stark transformation in the landscape of the

MENA region. President George W. Bush's state of the union in 2002 quickly identified Iraq as

one of the "axis of evil" powers alongside Iran and North Korea. Further rhetoric accused Iraq of

harboring "weapons of mass destruction"- a claim that was never verified. The fall of Saddam

Hussein and his Ba'ath ("Renaissance") party, ending his over two- decade reign as President of

Iraq, has been met with much criticism especially since the rise of Daesh. While it is beyond the

scope and purpose of this study to discuss the creation of Daesh as well as implications of

existence, what is important here is that after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Daesh and its followers

began to gain increased momentum in the region, causing fear in the international community.

The opinions and perceptions of Iraqi citizens are of particular interest because of the

contemporary history of U.S. intervention in their country. Iraqi citizens were most likely to

believe that armed operations against the U.S. are justified. This overall sentiment toward the

U.S. could possibly be the the result of specific intervention in their country. In a longitudinal

survey conducted by the Global Policy Initiative from 2004- 2008[19], citizens of Iraq were

surveyed throughout the years gauging their opinions on a variety of issues, one of which was

military intervention in Iraq. The 2008 findings from the study suggested the majority (70%) of

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[19] This survey consisted of in person contact and was conducted in Arabic and Kurdish. A random national sample of 2,228 Iraqis aged 18 years or older were surveyed. The data presented here is from survey results gathered in February 2008. Prior Global Policy Initiative findings (2004-2008) were included in this final report.

Iraqis believe that since the war, the U.S. and other coalition forces have done a "bad job" or "very bad job" in carrying out their responsibilities in Iraq. Findings from previous years such as in 2005 (49%) and 2007 (76%) indicated a belief that forces were not doing a "good job" in Iraq. Furthermore, the majority of Iraqis opposed or strongly opposed the presence of coalition forces in Iraq over time. During the four years surveyed (2004-2008), opposition increased over time: 51% in 2004; 65% in 2005; 78% in 2006; 79% in 2007. In 2008 it decreased to 75%. Regarding safety, 61% believed that the presence of the U.S. military makes Iraqi "less safe" as opposed to safer or not having an opinion in 2008. Finally, respondents were asked whether they believed the situation in Iraq would get better if U.S. forces left; 46% believed it would get better, 29% said it would get worse, 23% said it would stay the same and 2% refused to answer or did not know. These findings suggest that Iraqis feel discontent and less safe with U.S. presence in their country, when respondents were asked whether the U.S. should or should not "help": 76% stated that the U.S. should provide training and weapons to the Iraqi army, 73% said the U.S. should provide financial aid for the reconstruction of Iraq, 68% thought there should be assistance in the security of Iraq related to Iran, 66% aid there should be assistance in the security of Iraq related to Turkey, and 80% thought there should be assistance in security operations against al – Qaeda or foreign jihads in Iraq.

The results from the Global Policy Initiative corroborate this study's findings regarding to the disapproval of U.S. intervention in the region. Despite the negative attitude toward U.S. presence in the region, the majority of Iraqis favor Western culture and show favorability toward American people. Iraqi citizens may see value in Western and American cultures such as their emphasis on democracy and freedom, "We are a country that has lost its dignity and freedom.

That is why our central demand is and will continue to be end the occupation, and an end to this political process which is built on a sectarian quota system" (al- Zaidi in Zangana, 2013, p. 322). These associations, for example, may have contributed to the more favorable responses to Western culture. Furthermore, increased favorability toward American people may highlight the differentiation citizens have toward U.S. intervention in the region and actual citizens of America. While these results underscore the importance of understanding the social, economic and political background of individuals' surveyed (as well as their personal favorability toward former president Saddam Hussein), they do reflect claims by Iraqis that hostilities toward the U.S. are about foreign policies and not a reflection of their attitude to Americans or the West in general.

5. Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy currently headed by King Abdullah II. After gaining independence from Britain in 1946, Jordan "enjoyed a vibrant political sphere, with multiparty elections, independent newspapers, and near-free reign to discuss politics openly" (Schwedler, 2013, p. 247). Since gaining its independence, Jordan and the U.S. have maintained a positive relationship built on the commitment to ensure peace and stability in the region. The ruling monarchy has been an outspoken advocate of peace negotiations within the region and has publically condemned acts of terrorism and violence domestically and internationally. However, despite Jordan's government being pro- American, pro-Western, anti-American sentiment in Jordan among the country's inhabitants is pronounced. The results of this study corroborate with previous findings (Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015) which indicate a strong negative sentiment toward America. In a 2015 report conducted through

Pew Research, Jordan held the most negative image of the U.S. with 83% reporting an unfavorable view of the U.S (Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015). Such widespread anti-American sentiment reached its peak in 2003 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and has since remained overwhelmingly high.

The dissonance between the Jordan's government and its people could be attributed to the ethnic composition of Jordan. Palestinians sought refuge in their neighboring country Jordan after the 1948 creation of Israel, or the Palestinian exodus known as the nakba (catastrophe) and later in 1967 after an Israeli victory in the Arab- Israeli war. While Palestinians were granted full citizenship and currently make up the majority of the population, Palestinians were never granted the political and social advantages that native Bedouin Jordanians experienced (Schwedler, 2013). Nonetheless, Jordan continued to accept refugees throughout the Middle East, more recently from Iraq and Syria. There is currently approximately over 2 million Palestinian refugees, over 200,000 Iraqi refugees and 650,000 Syrian refugees registered in Jordan (UNHCR, 2015). The influx of refugees from throughout the MENA region, primarily from countries with high anti- Western sentiment (i.e. Palestine and Iraq) could possibly explain why Jordan scored unfavorably toward U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Because ethnic differences were not accounted for in this study, it is uncertain whether respondents in Jordan were native Jordanians or refuges from Palestine, Iraq, Syria or other nationals who may possess Jordanian citizenship.

6. Kuwait

As one of seven Gulf nations[20], Kuwait is a country rich in oil but small in size. Kuwaiti citizens were only surveyed in wave III and thus there is no comparable data to suggest changes in attitudes over time. Their responses however indicated an overall negative attitude toward U.S. intervention in the region and more favorable response to American people. Respondents could have been Kuwaiti nationals, other citizens, or stateless Bedoons[21]

Although the series of demonstrations were not publicized as much, if at all, compared to other Arab nations, Kuwait did experience social unrest in the wake of the Arab Revolutions (Beugrand, 2011). In fact, Kuwaiti citizens who protested against the government because of statelessness and corruption were successful in forcing their Prime Minister, Nasser al-Sabah to resign. Stateless Bedoon were furious at the continued invisible status in Kuwait (Beugrand, 2011). Bedoon are essentially an ethnic group who are often recognized as stateless or illegal immigrants. In the case of Kuwait, the government considers Bedoon as illegal immigrants (Abu- Hamad, 1985). According to the Geneva Centere for the democratic control of Armed Forces, Bedoon currently constitute 40% of Kuwait's Army. Despite such a high number of representation in the army, Bedoons are granted but very limited rights in Kuwait. This discrimination incited the uprisings of 2011; however, minimal changes appear to have taken effect in Kuwait.

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[20] There are seven Gulf countries which borer the Persian Gulf: Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

[21] The term "Bedoon" comes from the Arabic phrase "bedoon jinsiyeh" in Arabic literally means "without citizenship" or "without nationality". This word should not be confused with the Arabic word "bedouin" which refers to nomad (Abu-Hamad, 1995).

Kuwaiti citizens were only surveyed in wave three and thus there is no comparable data to suggest changes in attitudes over time. Their responses indicated an overall negative attitude toward U.S. intervention in the region and more favorable response to American people. In a 2007 Gallup Poll of Kuwaiti residents (Burkholder, 2007), specifically those with Kuwaiti citizenship found that over one third (36%) held negative views of the U.S. When probed further about these findings, Kuwaiti citizens responded that they believed that the U.S. is an "aggressive", "arrogant", and "ruthless" country and one that "adopts biased policies in world affairs" (Burkholder, 2007). Kuwaiti citizens did however identify some positive aspects such as being technologically advanced and one that provides its citizens with many liberties and freedoms (Burkholder, 2007). These results as well as the findings of this study provide some insight into the opinions of Kuwaiti citizens. In particular, the findings highlight that Kuwaiti citizens do not appreciate U.S. involvement in the region and view the U.S. as a ruthless world power, but underscore their favorability toward the values of liberty and freedom that it affords to its citizens.

7. **Lebanon**

Lebanon has a short but dense history beginning with French imperialism (after the fall of the Ottoman Empire), the Lebanese independent movement in 1943, civil wars between sectarian and governmental factions, and wars with its southern neighbor Israel (Mikdashi, 2013). Despite Lebanon's battlefield history, it remained a status quo state amidst a revolutionary Arab world (Fakhoury, 2014). The ongoing civil war in Syria however has put much strain on Lebanon. In *Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings: In the eye of the hurricane*, Felsch & Wahlisch (2016) assert

the political elites of Lebanon have insisted they would do whatever possible to shield Lebanon from becoming another" hotspot" in the region. With over one million Syrian refugees fleeing from their homes, Lebanon has yet to acquire a strategy to manage the humanitarian crisis from its northern neighbor (Felsh & Wahlisch, 2016).

As one of the most diverse and arguably the most "secular" of Arab nations, Lebanon is composed of different Islamic sects, Christians, and other ethnic minorities, and each are represented in its parliamentary democracy[22]. The logic of sectarian power sharing and confessionalim (a system of governance that mixes religion and politics) has been broadly recognized as a problem that hinders national unity because it is "riddled with religious identity structures, legal subsystems and sociopolitical classifications" (Mikdashi, 2013, p. 268). Despite the actual and potential issues in such a governance, it, for the most part, has been a functioning system for Lebanon.

Lebanon maintains positive perceptions of the U.S, western culture, and people. Lebanon is an ethnically and religiously diverse country with a substantial number of Christians who have political representation and are socially accepted. The majority of Christian respondents in this study were from Lebanon which could possibly explain the higher favorability toward the West. Sharing a common faith tradition, Lebanese Christians may have more affirmative responses to the Western world and its cultures. It is unknown however the differences in perceptions of citizens surveyed in Lebanon. For example, distinctions between how citizens from the capital responded as opposed to other parts of Lebanon would be an important distinction to make

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[22] The president of Lebanon must be Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Parliament is a Shi'ite Muslim and the Deputy Prime Minister is Eastern Orthodox (Fakhoury, 2014).

because of the influential Shiite political party, Hezbollah, situated in southern Lebanon. As an outspoken opponent of the U.S. and its foreign policies, especially directed toward the state of Israel, Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah and his followers share an anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist agenda, therefore, strongly condemn U.S. intervention in the region and its allegiance to Israel. If surveyed, respondents from southern Lebanon and those loyal to Hezbollah may have differing perceptions of the U.S. and the West. Furthermore, Palestinian refugees who continue to be considered "second class citizens" in Lebanon may also have different views from native Lebanese. Representing 10% of the Lebanese population, Palestinian refugees for the most part have not been naturalized citizens of Lebanon thus maintaining their refugee political status. Such a status leaves tens of thousands of Palestinians living in poor economic and social conditions throughout southern refugee camps such as Shatila, Ain-al Hilweh, Bourj-el Barajna and el-Buss.

8. **Libya**

For over four decades, Libya was under the rule of Muammar Qaddafi until the revolution swept him away in 2011. For years under Qaddafi, Libya suffered economic distress and an oppressive social environment (Mezran, 2014). It was a poorly managed country that was rich in resources, namely oil (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Having one of the highest unemployment rates in the region (20-30%), no labor or trade unions and largely underdeveloped portions of the country, Libya was a state of repression and missed opportunities (Kamat & Shokr, 2013). It was no surprise then that Libyans would join their fellow activists and protestors against the brutality of Qaddafi and his regime.

Libya's story is unique in that it was not so much an organic revolution but one of international intervention. Beginning with peaceful, unarmed protests, the Libyan revolution was organized through Facebook calling on protestors to take to the streets in a "day of rage" in mid-February 2011(Kamat & Shokr, 2013: Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Qaddafi quickly called on his military to suppress the protests which ended in a bloodbath[23]. A month after the "day of rage", France, the United Kingdom, the U.S., the U.N. and supported by the Arab League passed a no fly zone resolution in an effort to protect civilians from Qaddafi's lethal forces (Kamat & Shokr, 2013). From March to October 2011, a NATO led military coalition intervened in Libya until Qaddafi was captured and killed (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). As the only country that experienced international intervention, there were rumblings of whether outside forces were necessary in toppling the regime. Further debate on the matter raised concerns on how foreign players may influence the political climate in Libya (Mezran, 2014). However, Libya, post-Qaddafi was quick to adjust to a new political and social era free of dictatorship.

The role of the U.S. and the Obama administration to take action was key in this case. Liberals commended President Obama for engaging in a humanitarian intervention whereas critics argued that "the intervention was a success for imperialism, not humanitarianism" (Kamat & Shoker, p.172). Libyans alike also struggled with accepting Western aid for fear that it once again opens the doors for interference in the political rebuilding of Libya's new pluralist political

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[23] Qaddafi became infamous for his speech addressing his fellow Libyans in which he called rats and drug addicts and vowed to search every neighborhood, every house and every alleyway to find and kill those who opposed him. His eccentric personality was conveyed in his unapologetic address to his people in which he refused to step down from power (Kamat & Shokr, 2013). Qaddafi's forces were relentless in locating and eliminating opposition through violence and torture. Libyan activists quickly assembled and called for international help as fears of an aerial strike surfaced.

government, but acknowledged that intervention was probably necessary to defeat the old regime.

Like Bahrain and Kuwait, Libya's role in this study is minimal. Libyan citizens were only surveyed once, post revolution, in the third wave of data collection. The results of this study indicate that the majority of Libyans believe that Americans are good people and that armed operations against the U.S. are not justified. These favorable views could be attributed to the role that the U.S. played in helping Libya free itself from the dictatorship of Qaddafi. Without wave one or wave two data, the results of this study could not show a change in attitudes over time for this population.

9. Morocco

A critical North African country, Morocco has a long standing history with positive ties to the U.S. and its leadership. According to Pham (2013), "Morocco was the first sovereign state to recognize America's independence in 1777 and holds the longest unbroken treaty relationship with the U.S." (p. 1). Morocco's monarchy and the U.S. share a long and close alliance. The results of this study, from only one year of data collection in wave three, indicate that Moroccan citizens share in their governments' positive relationship with the U.S. and the majority of citizens agree that Americans are good people. Despite however the convergence in attitudes among the monarchy and people in regards to the U.S. and American people, the people of Morocco showed their growing discontent with their King, Mohammad VI.

10. Palestine

Across all three waves, Palestinians showed unfavorable attitudes towards the U.S. In wave one, Palestinians were most likely to agree that armed operations against the U.S. were

justified because of intervention in the region. After Iraqi citizens, Palestinians were next to agree with that same statement in wave two. Similarly, Palestinians had the second highest un-favorability rating in wave three after Algeria. Similar findings in regards to American people were found among Palestinians. In regards to American or Western culture however, the majority of respondents in both wave one and two believe that there are positive features of Western culture. These findings were not shocking as U.S. foreign policies directed at the region have consistency been pro-Israeli. Furthermore, the strength of the Israeli lobby and its Zionist agenda has increased animosity towards U.S. policies and initiatives in the region. America's unwavering support of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people has further perpetuated to intensify hostilities in region. Both supporters (Rubin, 2002) and opponents (Makdisi, 2002) of the existence of Israel agree on one point- that U.S. support for the state of Israel is a major point of contention in the region and one that challenges and disrupts U.S.- Arab relations,

> Palestine is an organic part of the Arab people's history, consciousness and identity. It is at once the goal of the national movement of the Palestinian people and a cause that has embodied and shape shifted the collective Arab aspirations for self- determination in the struggle for freedom from Western colonialism and Zionism (Haddad, 2013, p. 288).

11. Saudi Arabia

In 1933, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Saudi were established. As a continued U.S. ally and regional superpower, Saudi Arabia has maintained a close relationship with both Democratic and Republican presidential cabinets for decades (Jones, 2013). Since

World War II, the two countries have shared similar interests in international affairs with divergence on issues such as the state of Israel, the oil embargo of 1973, the U.S invasion of Iraq and involvement of Saudis in the attacks of 9/11 among other disagreements. Despite such incongruities, the U.S. and Saudi maintain a stable, strategic alliance grounded in business (oil), shared adversaries such as Iran and a mutual interest in keeping Saudi Arabia, a stable superpower in the region.

Citizens of Saudi Arabia only participated in wave two. Despite strong U.S.- Saudi relations, the findings from this study do not reaffirm such positivity towards the U.S. The findings participation from this study are similar to those from the Zogby polls (2002). The Saudi people are divided in the perception of the U.S., its people, and culture. Citizens from Saudi Arabia had the highest numbers of "I don't know" across the three DV's. The most favorable responses were about American and Western culture; however, their attitudes toward American and Western culture were overall more negative compared to other countries surveyed. These results may point to the differences between mostly secular Western cultures and the more conservative culture of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a regional superpower and holds an influential status as the birthplace of Islam. The citizens of Saudi Arabia appear to uphold their position of favoring their culture grounded in Islamic practices and values; however, they may be conflicted about their governments stance on civil rights, particularly the rights of women. The high number of "I don't know" responses could possibly be attributed to such conflicting attitudes of being proud of the religious and cultural heritage, but harboring conflicting views of respecting the rights of its citizens.

12. Sudan (North Sudan)

The history of Sudan has been plagued by colonial rule, internal strife and famine. It is the third largest country in Arab world after Algeria and Saudi Arabia. While Arabic is the country's official language, there are over 70 languages spoken in Sudan (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009). Despite it being rich in oil, civil wars has left the country one of the underdeveloped region not only in the MENA region but also the entire world (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009). There have been three notable civil wars (1955-1972; 1983-2005; 2013- present day) and an uprising in 2011 following in the momentum of its regional neighbors (Medani, 2013). By July 2011, southern part of Sudan succeeded from the northern part of Sudan making them two separate countries. The southern part of Sudan is still experiencing civil unrest as opposition factions and government forces continue to fight for power.

Citizens of Sudan, surveyed in wave one and two, held majority unfavorable attitudes toward intervention in the region, the U.S. and Western culture. Such pronounced animosity toward the U.S. and the West could possibly be the result of imperial conquest and domination in the region as well as continued western intervention in their country. In fact, colonial presence by the British administration in Sudan from 1899 to 1956 has been identified by both Western and Sudanese historians as being the main source of ethnic divisions and internal conflict (Medani, 2013).

Wave two findings were the least favorable among Sudanese citizens. In wave three, the majority of Sudanese respondents expressed that Americans are good people, making that finding the most positive among the three questions for that country. While citizens of Sudan hold overall negative views of Western influence and intervention in the region, they appeared to

be more positive about their views of American people. Such negative views of the U.S. appear to be directed toward Western intervention and foreign policies directed toward the region. Citizens of Sudan appear to make the distinction between U.S. foreign policies and the American people. Contrary to media depictions of the Sudanese being angry and aggressive toward American people, the findings of this stud suggest that their frustrations with the U.S. are directed toward foreign policies and not ordinary Americans.

Overall, Sudan's relationship with the U.S. is unstable and contains hostilies. The U.S. is critical of Sudan's human rights record mainly due to the extreme levels of violence in Darfur (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Maintaining peace, safety, and security in Darfur is however an endeavor that U.S. has undertaken through UN peacekeeping presence (Holt, Taylor & Kelly, 2009).

13. Tunisia

Prior to the 2011 revolution, in the larger landscape of the MENA region Tunisia had played a marginal role in Arab affairs. In the early 20th century Tunisian nationalism reached its height and France agreed to Tunisian Independence after a 75-year protectorate from 1881 to 1956 (Noueihed & Warren, 2012). Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba was an unpopular ruler among the majority of Arab nations because of his secularist and gradualist philosophy[24] (Gana, 2013). Despite this unpopularity, Bourguiba made advancements and progressive reforms in his country in the areas of education and women's rights (Gana, 2013). Furthermore, Tunisia

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[24] Although Bourguiba played a critical role in gaining in independence from France, he urged Arabs to accept the 1947 United Nations partition plan for Palestine which basically would give European Jewish settlers most of historic Palestine which made him an unfavorable Arab leader.

has proven to be a leader of progressive reforms around issues of sexuality and reproductive rights.

Tunisia's progressive nature, leadership in social reform efforts, and educated population contributed to the "success" of its revolution. The results from Tunisian respondents suggest that they are a population that values Western and American culture. This favorability aligns with the progressive culture of Tunisian civil society and continued advancements in social reform. In fact, second only to Lebanon, Tunisians were most likely to agree that Western culture has positive aspects. Specifically, wave two data which was collected during the revolution (2012-2014), indicated Tunisians are favorable towards cultural components of the West. This favorability was amidst a tenacious Tunisia, yearning for freedom, dignity and reforms.

Although the start of the "Arab Revolutions", "Arab Uprisings" or "Arab Spring" has been defined as the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouzazi, a Tunisian fruit and vegetable street vendor who was frustrated, to say the least, and faced deep despair with the corruption of the government and police (Gana, 2013; Noueihed & Warren, 2012). In the wake of his death, protests erupted in Tunisia and swept throughout the Arab world. Neither social media (i.e. Facebook, personal blogs and YouTube), WikiLeaks, and/or Al- Jazeera could provide an adequate explanation of how civil disobedience and street campaigns and demonstrations resulted in the ousting of president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali who had been in power for 24 years (Gana, 2013). The hopelessness faced by Bouzazi with unemployment, poverty, political repression, rising prices for food, and social inequality resonated with his Tunisian counterparts and the rest of the Arab world who were under elitist, authoritarian regimes for decades. His death, as a suicidal protest and catalyst for change was an act of defiance and symbol of hope.

Being the first country in the region to mobilize with such great numbers and with such discipline, coordination and organization highlight Tunisia's efforts of social, political and economic reform. Western media outlets such as Facebook helped push the plea for a revolution to solidify. Tunisian citizens' openness to change, modernity and progressive reforms across an array of social issues such as women's rights appear to align with perceived Western values of freedom, democracy and equality which may explain their favorable responses toward American and Western cultures. Such attitudes are also reflected in their perception of American people.

14. Yemen

In 1990, North and South united to form the Republic of Yemen; however, Yemen was far from achieving a stable government as tribal as well as secular divisions and anti-government factions continued to clash. The first presidential elections occurred shortly thereafter the unification of North and South Yemen and the citizens elected Ali Abdullah Saleh (former president of North Yemen) into power for the next five years. According to Noueihed and Warren (2012) Yemen has "long been Arabia's anomaly" (p. 195) because it is the only country on the peninsula to hold free, meaningful elections and allows the participation of differing political parties. However, much like its geographic neighbors, Yemen experienced decades long rule by the Saleh regime and was not immune to the contagious fervor of the uprisings nearby. The 2011- 2012 uprising ended in the abdication of Ali Abdullah Saleh[25].

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[25] The case of Yemen in the "Arab revolutions" shared similarities to its predecessor revolutionary country of Tunisia and coincided with the Egyptian revolution in its demands and slogans for change as well as faced similar repression in Syria and Libya. However, according to Bruck, Alwazir & Wiacek (2014), unlike the uprisings of its fellow neighbors, Yemen differed in that "elite rivalries revealed themselves… and shaped its trajectory (p.285). Initial protests led by the country's youthful population rallied around issues of unemployment and government corruptions and later escalated into demanding the removal of their president Abdulla Saleh.

Civil tensions in Yemen between anti-government and secular factions deepened Yemen's young and troubled state with the the Houthi rebellion on insurgency in Yemen in 2004. The Yemini military and Zaidi Shia Houthi's clashed when cleric Hussien Badreddin al-Houthi launched an uprising against the Yemini government. Finally, after nine years of civil unrest and bloodshed, in 2015, the Houthis declared victory and control in Northern Yemen. However, since then, a Yemini civil war erupted in 2015 and is currently an ongoing conflict.

According to the Human Development Index[26] (HDI), Yemen has one one of the lowest ratings in the region thus having low life expectancy and low levels of educational attainment. Despite its beautiful landscape and rich culture, it remains a troubled country plagued by internal sectarian divisions and social and political turmoil. The U.S. has taken advantage of the rising tensions in Yemen by increasing its influence and military operations in the region. Yemen's geographic location and proximity to the Gulf states render it an asset to both Saudi Arabia and its ally, the U.S. (Bruck, Alwazir, & Wiacek, 2014).

Yemeni respondents were on the lower end of the spectrum in favorability toward U.S. interference in the region in waves two and three, but responded more favorably to American people and culture. U.S. interests in the region as well as military presence could possibly have influenced the more negative perceptions of the U.S. Furthermore U.S. support to a Saudi led coalition against Houthis in Yemen has left the country deeply wounded. Although the current civil war in Yemen has not received much, if any, Western media attention, the U.S. is an active player in the war in Yemen. According to Democratic senator from Connecticut, Chris Murphy,

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[26] The HDI is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education and per capita indicators. This composite statistic is then used to rank countries into four categories with higher scores indicating higher life expectancy and educational attainment

"The United States provides the bombs. We provide the refueling planes in mid-air. We provide the intel.. I think it's safe to say that this bombing campaign in Yemen could not happen without the United States."(Murphy in Northam, 2016, p.1). U.S. intervention in their country with the support of long term U.S. ally, Saudi Arabia could possibly be one explanation for anti-American sentiment among Yemini respondents.

B. Age, Education, Sex and Religion

1. Age

In this study, age was not significantly associated with response favorability for the policy or culture questions, and unlike other survey findings, younger age was not associated with increased favorability toward the U.S., specifically American people. Prior survey research (Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015; Zogby, 2010) in the region found that age played a significant role in how citizens perceived American foreign policy, people and culture. Specifically, Zogby International found that contrary to the belief or assertion that young Arabs have grown up to dislike the U.S., in every country polled (Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), young Arabs (18-29 years of age) showed more favorable attitudes towards American people, products, and values than other age groups surveyed (Zogby, 2010). Additionally, in a study conducted by Pew International, results suggest that regarding age, in 22 of the 29 countries surveyed, younger age was correlated with having more favorable views of the U.S. (Wike, Stokes, & Poushter, 2015). The difference in findings from this study and prior research highlight that there are nuances to consider when addressing anti- Americanism. While younger age was associated with increased favorability toward the U.S. in prior research, this study suggests that older age, particularly those aged 65-74 were more inclined to believe that

Americans are good people. A possible explanation of this findings could be that older citizens may have had more opportunities to travel abroad and come in contact with Westerners and Americans. This increased exposure to ordinary citizens could have altered their perception of American and the West to more favorable.

2. Education

Level of education was a significant predictor in each model. Like the related study (Tabahi, 2015), this study found that having more education was associated with increased odds of believing Americans are good people and with having positive views of American culture. This response pattern could be attributed to Western influences in the higher educational system in the region (Gentzkow & Shaprio, 2004) and the growth of American based universities in the MENA region. To date, there are eight American universities[27] in the MENA region and roughly ten more that follow the American model of education[28]. American influenced educational institutions span across liberal arts, science and technology and medical colleges and universities. The bulk of American and American-based educational institutions in the region are found in Lebanon and in the Gulf states, particularly Qatar. Lebanese respondents consistently

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[27] The eight American universities in the MENA region are: American University in the Middle East in Kuwait; American University of Beirut in Lebanon; American University in Cairo; American University of Sharjah in the UAE; Lebanese American University; American University in Kuwait; American University in Dubai; and American University of Science and Technology in Beirut. For more information on universities in the MENA region, see: https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/arab-region-university-rankings/top-10-universities-arab-region-2016

[28] Some examples include: Notre Dame University in Lebanon, Weill Cornell medical College in Qatar, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. For more information on universities in the MENA region, see: https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings-articles/arab-region-university-rankings/top-10-universities-arab-region-2016

reported high favorability in all survey questions and that could possibly be attributed to the increased western influences on the countries' educational institutions.

Gentzkow & Shaprio (2004) suggest that a possible explanation for an increased favorability towards American and western people and culture is that some countries' education systems place a greater emphasis on western information sources. Different information sources whether through media apparatuses or through formal education are purported to be associated with varying perceptions of the western world (Gentzkow & Shaprio, 2004). Further research is needed in this area however, to further explore the relationship between educational attainment and attitudes toward the U.S. and the West.

Another possible explanation is the association between educational attainment and higher income. In a study conducted by Pew International (2013) on UN's global image, finding suggested that those with higher education and higher incomes were more likely to have favorable views of the UN. While these findings do not go beyond reporting the numbers and do not exclusively survey attitudes of America, there is an association with higher education and level of wealth. While this study did not assess level of income, those who do attain level of income may be of higher social statuses and therefore have increased access to higher education.

3. **Sex**

While females were more likely to believe that armed operations against the U.S. are not justified and that Western cultures has positive aspects as opposed to males, males were more likely to believe that Americans are good people. These two seemingly contradictory findings could have several possible explanations. First, Orientalist narratives often portray women in Arab and Muslim societies as oppressed individuals and inferior to their male counterparts. This

depiction of women is often used to justify the promotion of democratic ideals and freedom in the region. However, the counter narrative, supported by the findings of this study suggest that women do not necessarily greatly support the notion that Western ideals should be spread across the MENA region. Second, pride is a cherished family value in Arab culture. Women, who are often responsible for the well-being of the family unit are encouraged to raise children honoring familial, religious, and cultural customs and traditions. Being proud of their respective heritage, females may feel a responsibility to maintain and preserve components of an increasingly Western influenced culture. Third, contrary to the Orientalist depiction of Arab males as barbaric or uncivilized individuals, the results indicate that males are accepting of American people. Furthermore, the findings also support the notion that males may have conflicting opinions about U.S. militaristic interventions and U.S. foreign policy initiatives directed toward the region, which does not imply that they hate America, American people or American culture, but rather, they do not support intervention in their region.

4. Religion

Since 9/11 survey researchers have been greatly interested in gauging anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012). Mainstream media outlets (e.g. FOX news) tend to favor covering stories and reporting on "why Muslims hate us" rather than exploring or discussing the cross national variations in their attitudes and perceptions of the U.S. The discussion on Islamophobia and the "clash of civilizations" supports the hypothesis that Muslims hate America because of fundamental differences in values, societal norms and way of living. However, an alternative hypothesis, and the one supported by this study, suggest that Muslims dislike America for its U.S. foreign policies, specifically ones directed toward the

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region (i.e. in Iraq and Palestine), and not because of who Americans are or their culture. This perspective, while seldom represented in the media, has been supported and well documented in the academic literature (e.g. Abdallah, 2003; Cole, 2006; Esposito, 2007; Esposito & Mogahed, 2008, Fuller, 2002; Kull, 2007; Makdisi, 2002; Shore, 2005; Telhami, 2002; Tessler, 2003). For example, Makdisi (2002) asserts, "Anti-Americanism is a recent phenomenon fueled by American foreign policy, not an epochal confrontation of civilizations" (p. 538). In a well-known lecture at the University of Massachusetts- Amherst, Said (1998) specifically remarks on how framing anti- Americanism as "clash of cultures" or "clash of civilizations" is indeed a prescription for war and does nothing more than fuel negative animosity between two groups of people. To that point Fuller (2002) contends, "Muslim societies may have multiple problems, but hating American political values is not among them. U.S. policymakers would be wise to drop this simplistic, inaccurate, and self-serving description of the problem" (p. 57). While former President Barack Obama (2009-2017) dropped this rhetoric during his time in office, it has since been resurrected and magnified under President Donald Trump (2017-present day).

While the findings suggest that Muslims tend to respond more unfavorably than Christians, they reported more favorable attitudes towards American people and Western culture. These findings corroborate prior research. For example, Wike, Stokes and Pousshter (2015) found that religions identification was a significant predictor of how individuals from various countries in the MENA region view U.S. foreign policy. The authors found that in Lebanon, the majority of Sunni Muslims and Christians held favorable views of the U.S. as opposed to only 3% of Shia Muslims. As discussed earlier, Shiite in Lebanon under the leadership of Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah share an anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist agenda, therefore, strongly condemn U.S.

intervention in the region and its allegiance to Israel. Again, this distinction is critical to highlight as several key U.S. foreign policies (e.g. Cold war politics, economic policies such as USAID, the war in Iraq, and support for Israel) have shaped the contemporary attitude of citizens in the region.

5. The Palestine Question

It is evident that the question of Palestinian statehood and the existence of Israel plays a critical role in shaping the attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens on American and western influences in the region. The findings based on responses to this variable supported that belief. Including this variable in this study further validates the belief that the state of Israel continues to be a major source of contention in the region and one that strongly influences attitudes related to the western world, and more specifically the U.S. The U.S.'s unwavering support for the state of Israel and foreign policy initiatives directed toward the region continue to promote anti-American sentiment in the region.

Public opinion regarding Palestinian statehood has fluctuated considerably over the past few years in the U.S. In 2012, the majority of Americans supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with 51% support, 37% opposing and 12% with no opinion. In 2015, that number has declined to 39%, 36% in opposition and 25% with no opinion (Pew International, 2015). As mentioned previously, prior surveys data dating back to the King Crane Commission in 1919, before the inception of a Jewish state in Palestine gauged the attitudes of citizens in the region regarding the creation of the state of Israel in Palestinian territories. Since 1919 Zogby (2010) surveys have indicated that the Arab world has strong negative feelings towards the existence of Israel in the MENA region. Despite the existence of Israel in the region

for over six decades, Arab citizens throughout MENA have not forgotten the exile of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and are constantly reminded of the contention in the region. On the existence of Israel, Israel's first Prime Minister Ben Gurion had stated that, "The old [generation of refugees] will die and the young will forget" pg. 282., but 69 years later that statement is far from true. Only time will tell how and/or if the Palestinian/ Israeli crisis will ever reach a resolution that both parties as well as the international world will accept The statehood of Palestine continues to be the most controversial issue in the region that impacts not only the Palestinian people, but the region and its neighbors as a whole.

VIII. IMPLICATIONS AND RELAVANCE FOR SOCIAL WORK

Issues specific to Arabs and Arab Americans have been noticeably lacking in social work curricula. The exclusion of this population(s) reflects an overall lack of attention on international issues as well as the diverse set of issues faced by varying communities of immigrants. Although social work is a profession that challenges systems of domination and promotes the use of an international lens in addressing global issues (Midgley, 2006), social work education, practice, and research has not given much attention to macro U.S. foreign policy dynamics as they affect Arabs and Arab Americans. The findings from this study can contribute to social workers' understanding of the MENA region, its citizens, culture, history, and contemporary perceptions on international relations. Furthermore, by using post-colonial theory, coupled with an international social work perspective, this study underscores the importance of such scholarship to this discourse.

A. International Social Work

In the latter half of the twentieth century social work's interest in international exchange was beginning to resurface. While some such as Healy (2012) argued that social work, since its inception, has always been an international profession, the argument can be made that along the way and in some periods, an international orientation has been forgotten or overlooked. In an effort to stimulate more interest in global issues specifically as it relates to the Eastern world, this study sought to promote international social work values, ethical practices, and standards of human rights to help elucidate the global process of exchange and understanding.

The term *international social work* dates back to the 1920s and has varied definitions and uses for the terms in social work scholarship. According to Healy (2012), the first mention of the

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term dates back to 1928 by Eglantyne Jebb of England in a speech made in the First International

Conference of Social Work. Jebb's awareness of global issues, and the need to incorporate social

work into the changing sociopolitical and geopolitical landscape, promoted a decree of change.

Since then, there has been discussion regarding what is international social work and how it is

defined. The definition that is widely used or understood combines twenty and twenty- first

century scholars work such as George Warren[29] (1939) Lynne M. Healy[30] (2008) and Cox and

Pawar (2006),

> International social work is the promotion of social work education and
>
> practice globally and locally, with the purpose of truly integrating an
>
> international profession that reflects social work's capacity to respond
>
> appropriately and effectively, in education and practice terms, to the various
>
> global challenges that are having a specific impact on the well- being of large
>
> sections of the world's population (Cox & Pawar, 2006, p. 20).

While this definition addresses the integration of global issues in education and practice, it

neglects the call for the promotion of social justice, human rights, and conflict prevention and

peace (Ahmadi, 2003). Others continue to critique the Western dominance of the field (Haug,

2005), demand a postmodern analysis of inequality and injustice (Payne & Asekland, 2008), and

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[29] George Warren published the *Social Work Yearbook in 1939* in which he defined four specific functions in international social work: intercountry casework, international relief and assistance, international cooperation regarding issues related to global organizations and international exchange of knowledge through social work conferences.

[30] Lynne M. Healey (2008) built on the work of individuals like Warren and added her notions of globalization with a call to professional action. She advocated that the definition of international practice must include: domestically focused policies on international issues, international exchange of scholarly and professional ideas, involvement in international relief efforts and inclusion in global policy formulation.

even reject the legitimacy of an international social work (Webb, 2003). Such differences and contentions on the purpose of an international perspective in the social work profession underscore a maturation of ideas, but lack the divergent value systems inherit in increasing globalization. International social work can thus be viewed as multidimensional, fluid, dynamic, and situated within the historical global issues and contemporary developments in the profession.

Concerns regarding legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and Western orientation also challenge the concept of international practice. Professional social work is a western concept derived from Europe and North America towards the end of the twentieth century (Gray, Coates, and Bird, 2008). The emergence of social work as a legitimate profession in the 21st century is critical as it was a period of European imperialism and the domination of indigenous people from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Healy, 2012). This imperialist expansion initiated international exchanges of ideas and models for practice, but was not so much of a reciprocal process of exchange as it was the assertion of colonial education. According to Healy (2012):

> Uncritical export of social work concepts and relationships based
> on superior-inferior status has created a distrust of internationalism,
> much as the negative effects of globalization on poorer peoples and
> countries have created resistance. The legacy of the export model
> remains a barrier to support for internationalizing the profession
> (p. 13).

An acknowledgment of this "export" model, as a Western construction has domestically gained increased responsiveness in the social work field. Oppression theory and anti-oppressive social work practice focuses on power, inequality, privilege and domination; and can be based on a range of factors such as gender, race, ethnicity, social class, religion etc. (Robbins, 2011). Gray, Coates, and Bird (2008, p. 6) suggests, "the challenge is to acknowledge that mainstream social

work is, at its core, a Western cultural creation and to recognize that 'good' and effective social work practice demands that we make culture explicit in thinking and practice". Furthermore, Tsang and Yan (2001) contend that one must find the balance between mainstream social work knowledge and indigenous conceptual frameworks and politics.

In a globalized world and one that is becoming increasing pluralistic, it is pertinent that social workers adapt means of practice that align with the client's needs and understanding of the world- their paradigm. This form of authentic social work practice and movement away from homogenizing tendencies is a step forward in practicing anti-oppressive social work (Gray, Coates, & Bird, 2008) and a twenty-first century approach that meets the needs of an ever changing social, political and economic landscape. Social work's response to the competing and contentious demands of globalization should align with civil society's reaction to globalization.

Social work values of challenging human rights concerns and promoting social justice must be implemented at the social and political levels. According to Payne and Askeland (2008), "Globalization influences and creates the social issues we deal with, it creates the context of our practices and education through impact on the political and cultural landscape within which we practice, educate and learn" (p. 154). Thus, in order to become an effective ally, social workers must acknowledge their responsibility to tackle globalization on a micro, mezzo and macro level. Part of that responsibility is incorporating international social work principles into the common discourse of practice, education and research.

B. Social Work Practice

This study also has implications for social work practice. According to the National Association of Social Work (NASW, 2016), "Social work practice consists of the professional application of social work values, principles, and techniques… The practice of social work requires knowledge of human development and behavior; of social and economic, and cultural institutions; and of the interaction of all these factors". In order to effectively help individuals, groups and communities, social workers must be culturally sensitive and promote cultural humility to meet the needs of diverse communities. According to the Migration Policy Institute, as of 2013, roughly about 1.02 million immigrants from the MENA region resided in the United States (Zong & Batalova, 2015). When working with the Arab immigrant population in the U.S., practitioners should be aware of the possible attitudes and perceptions of the U.S. and Western culture that they may harbor. Understanding not only the immigrant experience, but also the unique and complex relationship that immigrants may have towards Western culture and Westerner practitioners is critical in the helping relationship.

There is a paucity in the social work literature about working with Arab peoples (Al-Krenawi & Graham, 2000). Social work practice with Arab peoples is complex because of the diversity that exists among those who are Arab-speaking reflected in the heterogeneity of ethnic identification, linguistic preference, tribal allegiance, immigration/refugee status, routes of migration, religious affiliation and national identities (Al- Krenawi & Graham, 2000). However, culturally sensitive and humble practice with the Arab American citizens, and Arab immigrants and refugees is feasible when taking into account the aforementioned factors as well as grounding practice in a non-oppressive and indigenous framework.

In therapy within social work and allied professions, European American, middle-class values and treatment goals have traditionally been applied as the general framework in working with a variety of populations (Ahmed & Reddy, 2007). In social work practice, this is evident by the emphasis on individualism, interpersonal development, and task focused relational style (Dwairy, 2006). This differs from what diverse cultures, such as individuals from Eastern cultures, may prefer including working with the family system (including extended family), acknowledging the importance of supernatural entities and religiosity, addressing espoused cultural norms, and adapting the socio-emotional relational style (Ahmed & Reddy, 2007; Dwairy, 2006). Studies indicate there is a disparity on the utilization of mental health services by ethnic and racial minorities (Roysircar, 2009). Moreover, a meta-analysis (Griner & Smith, 2006) suggested one of those disparities is related to the cultural differences between practitioner and client, thus dissuading clients from seeking help (Griner & Smith, 2006; Roysircar, 2009). Without cultural awareness and sensitive practice, social workers perpetuate oppression when working with clients from other cultures. As a result, social work as a profession is truly misunderstood and not well received in the ethnic Arab community because it is seen as interference in the social well-being of the collective self (Abu Raiya & Pargament, 2010; Dwairy, 2006). In order to address this gap, social work practitioners should take into consideration levels of acculturation, stigmatization associated with mental health services, cultural expectations, family (immediate and extended) involvement, roles of religious or spiritual intervention, and the possible inclusion of traditional healers (Al- Krenawi & Graham, 2000).

C. Social Work Education

Global trends of migration and the increasing number of minorities in the U.S. augmented awareness and public consciousness in addressing the needs of diverse populations (Daniel, 2007; Abrams & Moio, 2009; Nylund, 2006; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). As the United States continues to become increasingly pluralistic, social workers' competence in serving a wider array of individuals is critical on both a micro and macro level. Although cultural diversity is not a contemporary phenomenon (Abrams & Moio, 2009), emphasis on embracing diversity though cultural awareness, cultural competence, cultural sensitivity and cultural humility is exceedingly promoted in social work. According to Constance-Hudgins (2012),

> The multicultural approach remains at the core of social work pedagogy,
> practice, research, and policy… The multicultural approach is one that
> allows us to recognize the many influences on a person's life. The approach
> recognizes that the totality of an individual's existence is underlined by social
> elements such as values, beliefs, thoughts, language, customs, and action (p. 4).

Despite progressive reforms throughout the course of history and advancements and awareness in the multicultural approach, racial and ethnic inequality and oppression continues to be a pervasive issue in society and lacks the responsiveness in social work education. Although social work has embraced the importance of a multicultural curriculum, scholars have raised concerns regarding how issues of diversity are addressed and taught in social work education (Daniel, 2011; DeCuir & Dixon, 2004; Razack & Jeffery, 2002; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). These concerns are valid as the literature suggests that there is a large discrepancy between stated goals and competencies and the delivery of practice behaviors in social work programs (Constance-

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Huggins, 2012; Abrams & Moio, 2009; Freeman, 2011; Razack & Jeffery, 2002). Students are thus left unequipped in dealing with issues of institutional racism and oppressions. Today, the multicultural perspective extends beyond race to relate to broader categories such as sex, religion, age, and other group differences (Abrams & Moio, 2009). Its relevance in social work education particularly on race has become exceedingly critical as the U.S. population projections by Pew Research (2008) suggest that by 2050, almost one in five Americans (19%) will be an immigrant; the Latino population will triple in size and claim the title of the largest group and will make up 29% of the U.S population; and that whites are predicted to become the minority with 47% in 2050 (Passel, Jeffrey and Cohn, D'Vera, 2008). Furthermore, according to a 2011 Pew International Report, Muslims in the U.S. are projected to double over the next two decades from 2.6 million in 2010 to 6.2 million in 2030. While the current political climate under the trump Administration continues to push for a ban on immigration from Muslim majority countries, it is uncertain at this point how that will affect Muslim immigration numbers. Overall, however, this upward trend in migration and an increase in racial and ethnic groups may occur sooner than the projected 2050 date depending on immigration laws and policies. Despite when the shift to a minority- majority will occur, social workers must be ready to practice with diverse populations and must be given the proper analytical tools to address the needs of the individuals', groups, and communities served.

Courses that promote and teach diversity with the human behavior and social environment sequence can also benefit from the inclusion of addressing both international and domestic concerns of the Arab and American population. Teaching and facilitating courses that allow for the inclusion of diverse topics such as Muslims and Arabs in America, as well as

bringing in current and timely issues such as the Iraqi and Syrian refugee crisis opens the door to critical dialogues. Understanding and teaching about domestic and foreign policies that are used to oppress and discriminate against individuals from diverse communities may incite deep conversations and dialogue. Furthermore, including such conversations is critical especially with the current social and political climate boasting xenophobic sentiment, particularly as it relates to Arabs and Muslims.

Arab and Muslim issues and experiences are not likely represented or addressed in social work literature and taught in the classroom. Education is thus a critical tool in combating injustices and providing clients with optimal service delivery. Despite that social work has its own tradition of critical scholarship aimed at addressing social injustices, schools of social work continue to struggle with pedagogical, theoretical and practical issues related to how to train students in working with diverse populations **(**Abrams & Moio, 2009; Constance-Huggins, 2012). Despite the recent visibility of the Arab American community, the migration of Arabic speaking people to the U.S. dates back to late 1800s (Naff, 1985). Arabs continue to migrate to the U.S for various reasons. Political instability in their native homelands has sharply increased refugee populations from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Economic opportunities, education, and the quest for a better life in America continue to attract immigrants from all over the MENA region (Naff, 1985). Waves of migration over time allowed Arabs to create their own ethnic enclaves throughout American cities (e.g. Detroit, Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles). The immigrant Arab and Arab community continue to grow and helping students navigate working with such communities is critical for the promotion of culturally sensitive practice.

Although 2010 census estimates of the Arab American population totaled 1,967,219

underreporting due to the lack of ethnic categorization suggests that this number is actually much greater than represented (Arab American Institute, 2014). Therefore, the Arab American Index adjusted population[31] proposes that the U.S is home to approximately 3,665,789 Arabic speaking persons. Ninety-four percent of Arabs live in metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, Detroit, Chicago and Washington DC. With the growth of Arab immigration, and second and third generations becoming more active in mainstream American culture, the need to address the unique needs of Arab Americans are critical for social workers in a variety of practice settings such as schools, hospitals and social service agencies. Addressing how to work with this population in practice classes and in the field can be useful for students not accustomed or unfamiliar with Arabs and Arab Americans.

Despite the current rhetoric and claim that the United States has entered a "post racial era", (Cainkar, 2009) racial, ethnic and religious profiling of persons perceived to be Arab, South Asian or Muslim has drastically increased since 9/11[32]. The historical trajectory of racial conflict

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[31] According to research by the Arab American Institute (AAI) and Zogby International Research, Census Bureau estimated of the Arab Americans is significantly lower than reported, therefore the Arab American Index(AAI) was established to adjust for the underreporting. This underreporting is due to the framing of the "ancestry" question in the U.S. Census. Therefore, reasons for undercount include: placement of and vagueness of ancestry question (as distinct from race and ethnicity); the effect of sample methodology (small, unevenly distributed ethnic groups); increase number of "out marriages" (interracial/interethnic marriages) by third and fourth generations; and the lack of trust and/or misunderstanding of government surveys by recent and longstanding immigrants (Arab American Institute, 2014).

[32] Rana (2011) explores the "racialized Muslim" narrative through stories of panic and peril. Racial techniques implemented by the racial state constructed an intensified fear of Arabs, Muslims, and Muslim look alikes. Rana argues that, "the rhetoric of terror in domestic and global War on Terror is instrumental in constructions of racialized Muslims within the U.S. racial formation and a much broader global racial system" (p. 213). Overarching narratives of threats aimed at targeting Muslims and Arabs are ignited by the FBI and Homeland Security. For example, a press release on December 29, 2002, listed the names and birthdates of individuals such as Abid Noraiz Ali, Iftikhar Khozman Ali, and Akbar Jamal and stated that the publics' assistance was needed in finding these individuals as they were suspected to have entered

and racial profiling in the U.S has varied over time and in respect to different groups; however,

today there is an ubiquitous anti-Muslim, anti-Arab sentiment that is used as a catalyst and

justification to fight the "war on terror" (Cainkar, 2009). Although discrimination against

Muslims in society predates 9/11 (Cainkar, 2009), there is no doubt that this once invisible group

in society has now become the nation's new target[33] (Cainkar, 2009; Naber, 2008).

D. Social Work Policy and Advocacy

Social justice is the cornerstone of the social work profession. Guided by a strict code of

ethics, social workers champion the rights of individuals that have been targets of hate,

discrimination, and oppression. Advocacy and organizing as means to combat injustice are

critical components of social works mission for change. Micro, mezzo and macro level

practitioners must understand the social, economic and political climate in which clients

navigate. For Arabs and Muslims, post 9/11 media coverage and legislations have created a

racialized Arab and Muslim narrative that reduces the rich experiences of this population to

the U.S illegally. In this press release, the FBI stated that the names of these individuals may be fictious and they have not made any connections related to suspicious terrorist activity. The individuals listed above, real or not, were identified and broadcasted as perceived threats without having any palpable cause or confirmation of their existence. Furthermore, despite the fact that it was explicitly stated that, "names and dates may be fictitious" (p. 215), the press and news covered the story and suggested that the nation was at heightened security threat. Stories of peril are connected to criminality. Linking illegal activity to terrorism is the key in creating narratives of peril.

[33] On November 9, 2001 Attorney General Aschcroft ordered the FBI and other law enforcement to locate and find 5,000 men between the ages of 18 and 33 who legally entered the U.S and whose national origin matched the U.S government's profile of potential terrorist to come in for interviewing (ACLU Report, 2004). Another round up 3,000 men took place in March 2002 for "voluntary questioning". According to a report on the Civil Rights Division's Post 9/11 Civil Rights Summit hosted by George Washington University Law School, in one year, the Special Registration program registered 83,310 foreign nationals, placing 13,740 into deportation proceedings. Not a single one of these individuals were ever publicly charged with terrorism. (ACLU Report, 2004). A 2003 report released by Office of the Inspector General (OIG) indicated that of the 762 cases reviewed by the OIG which included detainees from Middle Eastern countries or from Pakistan, not one man was ever charged with any form of terrorist activity.

the events of 9/11 and its backlash. The social work profession, encompassing students, educators, and practitioners alike must be informed of the current domestic and foreign landscape to best meet the needs of clients. Stajkovick (2008) suggests that there are three actions that social workers must take to ensure that the rights and civil liberties of vulnerable populations, especially individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern or South Asian, are addressed and protected. These three actions include: advocacy, protection and activism, and reaffirmation. First, advocacy may take on many forms and has various techniques. Social workers may exercise their concerns of social justice through media involvement, community organizing, and staging demonstrations. Second, protection entails working with organizations to ensure that the rights of individuals are not being compromised. Stojkovick (2008) proposes that the greatest protection is promoting more visibility to the plight of individuals unjustly accused, prosecuted or persecuted by the government. Doing so, allows awareness into the inside workings of how the state promotes racial projects in the name of democracy and freedom. Third, activism and reaffirmation (Stojkovick, 2008) entails being vocal and more involved in the political processes. With our long standing commitment to social justice, social workers speak up against wrongdoings and inequalities perpetrated by the government and laws. Activism may take on many forms such writing letters to legislators, politicians, and newspapers; signing petitions; and lobbying, etc. In the era of social media and technology, virtual activism also allows for social workers to get involved and speak out against violations of civil liberties endured by discriminated minorities such as the PATRIOT ACT[34] and policies such as the travel ban proposed by President Trump

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[34] The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and

(2016-2017). Accessing organization websites and signing petitions (e.g. bills to remedy the PATRIOT ACT such as the Freedom Act through organizational websites such as the Council of American Islamic Relations[CAIR[35]] or change.org) is a form of activism that is not difficult but may have great implications in making a change.

E. Social Work Research

Research related to Arabs and Arab Americans has surfaced after 9/11; however, despite the heightened interest of Arabs internationally and domestically, social work scholarship has not given much attention to this population. This study contributes to the current gaps in our knowledge and awareness on the Arab population by giving voice to a region that is commonly misunderstood. Including nationally representative samples from the region allows for a broader understanding of a region, its people and their culture.

The dearth of research literature pertaining to Arabs and Arab Americans in the social work discourse contributed to the lack of knowledge on this population. Research grants directed toward working and understanding this population is limited and are often extremely competitive. Qualitative research endeavors focused on this population are conducted, interpreted, analyzed and disseminated in other related disciplines such as sociology, psychology, anthropology and political science. While such scholarship is critical in the

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Obstruct Terrorism Act, or better known as the USA PATRIOT Act was the direct response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S .With extreme pressure from Attorney General Aschcroft ., President George Bush signed into the law the U.S.A. Patriot Act October 26, 2001. The 324 page document contains more than 150 sections and amends more than 15 federal laws. (Stojkovick, 2008). In May 26, 2011, Congress passed a four-year extension of three expiring Patriot Act provisions without making much-needed changes to the overly broad surveillance bill.

[35] Visit: http://www.cair.com/ for more information.

academic arena, social work perspectives, focused on social justice issues are not represented nor is such literature widely circulated within the social work discourse.

On an international level, research, in general, in higher education institutions continues to be challenge because of the political, social and economic instability across the region (Almansour, 2016). Other issues with the pursuit of research include limited academic freedom, lack of financial resources, and difficulty publishing in high impact journals especially ones in English (Almansour, 2016). Continuing in the regions prestigious academic legacy of producing stimulating research (Devarajan, 2016) has proven to be a constant struggle for academics and researchers, impeded by socioeconomic and political factors.

IX. LIMITATIONS, STRENGTHS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

A. Limitations and Strengths

This study had a number of limitations that should be noted. First, not all countries were included over all three waves. Therefore, it was not possible to model change- over time for all countries of origin. Second, given language differences across and even within countries, the meaning of "somewhat agree", for example, could have different meanings for different subjects (Pena, 2007). Third, the first wave of data did not include survey weights, therefore survey weights from the second and third waves could not be applied. In order to correct for selection bias, survey weights compensate for different probabilities of selection, nonresponse adjustments and post- stratification adjustments (Wirth & Tchetgen, 2014); however, the lack thereof of survey weights limited the representativeness of the data. Fourth, age was converted into a categorical variable as opposed to a continuous variable because data on age was not collected consistently across countries as a continuous level variable. While categorization of variables allows for simpler interpretation and presentation, it loses the ability to look for change across specific ages. Fifth, there was a lack of ethnic differentiation such as in Jordan which may have impacted the results. Sixth, the lack of regional information for respondents such as in Lebanon would have also impacted the results and needed to be further explored. Lastly, while not problems of the survey design per se, it is important to note that the region is far more complex than can be reflected by the data.

Despite the study's limitations, this study has a number of strengths. First, it fills a much needed gap in the current discourse related to the Arab world. The international data allowed for

a more nuanced understanding of how different countries throughout the region perceive Americans, Western culture, and the U.S. regional policies. Second, by not clumping all the MENA countries together, this study highlighted the distinct attitudes of 14 different MENA countries. Third, by analyzing three distinct and critical moments in time, this study was able to assess differences between waves thus addressing both the time and space dimension of the complexity of the region. Fourth, this study used complex statistical analyses to interpret the data. Most public opinion polls conducted throughout the region and reported in the literature highlight actual response proportions as opposed to statistical findings. Fifth, this study combined a quantitative methodological approach with social history to provide a more in depth overview and explanation of the findings. Doing so provided much needed context to a topic area that is seldom explored in the social work discourse.

B. Future Research

There are many opportunities for future research. First, the Arab Barometer data are rich. There are many nuances in understanding perceptions of Arab citizens and including differences between religious factions, intra-country regional differences, economic status, sources of news (e.g. CNN, BBC, FOX, Al- Jazeera) for example, would provide greater insight into the complexity of the MENA region. Furthermore, there are other survey questions included in the "international relations" portion of the data sets that could be further explored. For example, there are questions that ask respondents about visiting and/or living in the U.S. as well as gauge their opinion about whether problems in the region are attributed to internal or external forces. Such questions may provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between MENA citizens and the U.S. across social and political lines.

Second, future research endeavors could focus on longitudinal data. Such a research method could track clear individual variable patterns over time. Third, including ethnic differentiation and regional information would provide more insight into respondents and their respective opinions. Doing so, would allow for an increased understanding of the complexities and nuances within the region and between and among citizens. Fourth, building relationships with diverse communities domestically and internationally entails obtaining a more in-depth understanding of its people and its culture. Thus, qualitative research through in depth interviews is a means of achieving that increased awareness of how communities feel and perceive certain issues which can provide significant insight into the attitudes and perceptions of everyday MENA country citizens. Having open ended questions and a less structured format of inquiry will allow individuals to respond fully by providing reasoning behind their responses. Furthermore, in general, Arabs are a social people who are storytellers that value oral traditions of expression (Robinson- Wood, 2007), gauging their opinions on matter related to foreign policy and international relations will provide a more illuminating explanation of their opinions and perceptions. Additionally, it is important to understand the nuances to when considering anti- Americanism and anti-Western sentiment which can be further explored through such qualitative methods of inquiry.

C. Conclusion

This study fills a much needed gap in the social work discourse on examining the social, economic and political factors that have contributed to the fluidity and nuances of attitudes and perceptions of MENA country citizens on U.S. and Western relations. Anti-Americanism or Anti-Western sentiment is a complex phenomenon and cannot be diluted into one master

narrative and is complicated by colonial and imperial legacies as well as U.S. intervention in the region. By examining differences in opinions across the MENA region, the findings of this study highlight that time and place among other factors such as sex, religion, education and the question of Palestinian statehood contribute to the diverse attitudes found within the region. Together these findings along with the country specific results discussed above highlight the variability found within the region and underscores that MENA country citizens mostly disapprove of U.S. foreign policy initiatives directed at the region more so than harboring negative attitudes towards American people and Western culture.

This study reinforced the idea that public opinion is not as homogenous as portrayed by popular media outlets and should be interpreted with a careful understanding of the regions historical and contemporary colonial and imperial pasts. Furthermore, this study built upon post-colonial scholarship based on a critical post, a perspective that addresses agency and resistance as a means to combat the decisive discourse that pits the Eastern world against the West. In challenging the *us* vs. *them* dichotomy, this study contributes to the death of scholarship in the social work discourse that promotes anti-oppressive, culturally sensitive, research, policy, education, and practice.

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APPENDICIES

MENA Region

Note: In 2011, southern part of Sudan succeeded from the northern part of Sudan making them two separate countries.

MENA region after WW1

Source: Worldpress. (2011). European colonialism in the East [png]. Retrieved from:
 **https://michelleg3399.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/european-colonialism-in-the-
 middle-east.png**

Skyes- Picot Agreement

Source: World View (2013). *Middle East and New Borders*. Retrieved from : http://www.worldreview.info/content/middle-east-turmoil-could-see-creation-new-borders-and-state

	Turkey	Jordan	Lebanon	Palestinian Ter.	Israel
1999/2000	52	---	---	---	---
2002	30	25	36	---	---
2003	15	1	27	0	78
2004	30	5	---	---	---
2005	23	21	42	---	---
2006	12	15	---	---	---
2007	9	20	47	13	78
2008	12	19	51	---	---
2009	14	25	55	15	71
2010	17	21	52	--	---
2011	10	13	49	18	72
2012	15	12	48	--	---
2013	21	14	47	16	83
2014	19	12	41	30	84
2015	29	14	39	26	81

**Source:** Extrapolatd and modified from - Wike, R. Y., Stokes, B., & Poushter, J. (2015). *Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-9/11 Torture:Asian Nations Mostly Support TPP, Defense Pivot – but Also Value Economic Ties with China .* Pew Research Center

| MENA REGION TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS (2003-2017)	
DATE	**EVENT**
2003	**Iraq:** U.S. Invasion of Iraq declared by President George W. Bush. This war waged from 2003 to 2011.Saddam Hussein was arrested in December 2003. **Iraq:** Abu Gharib Prison incident/abuse of Iraqi citizens by U.S. military
2004	**Syria:** Qamishli Massacre in Syria. This uprising was by Syrian Kurds in the northeast city of Qamishli **Yemen:** Shiite Insurgency in Yemen. Also known as the Houthi rebellion. The result of the Houthi rebellion was the ousting of president Hadi. **Iraq and Syria**: ISIS born out of the 2003 Iraqi invasion although its original founding was in 1999
2005	**Palestine/Israel**: Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader Mahmood Abbas agree to a ceasefire after over four years of *intifada* (uprisings) **Palestine/Israel**: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon resigns from the Likud Party **Sudan**: The comprehensive peace agreement was signed to end the Sudanese civil war.
2006	**Iraq**: Saddam Hussein is hanged in Baghdad **Iraq**: Shiite leaders select Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in Iraq **Palestine:** The Fatah- Hamas Conflict **Lebanon**: Israeli incursion into Lebanon. **Palestine/Israel**: Benjamin Netanyahu becomes Israel's prime minister
2007	**Lebanon**: The Nahr al- Bared conflict erupts in Lebanon
2008	**Yemen:** The South Yemen insurgency. This is the name that the Yemini government gave to the protests against the Yemini government **Palestine/Israel**: Israel launches a month long full scale invasion of Gaza
2009	**Palestine/Israel**: Despite UN call for ceasefire, Israel continues its assault in Gaza

2010	**Tunisia:** The "beginning of the Arab Revolutions" or "Arab Spring" in Tunisia with the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi .
2011	**Syria**: Syrian civil war begins as protests against Bashar al Assad become violent. This civil war continues to present day (2017) **Egypt**: Egyptian revolution begins as protests against president Hosni Mubarak take to the streets in Tahrir Square. The Million Man March takes place in Cairo. Mubarak resign in February. **Bahrain**: Uprisings in Bahrain as government crackdowns and violent protests emerge. Bahraini government calls on Saudi Arabia for military intervention. About 4,000 Saudi troops enter Bahrain. The Pearl roundabout is destroyed. **Yemen**: Protests erupt in Yemen (Yemen's Day of Rage) **Libya**: Libya's Day of Rage. NATO bombs Libya. Muammar Gaddafi flees after violent protests and riots. After over four decades of being in power, Gaddafi is found and killed outside of Sirti **Morocco**: Moroccans join in the protests to demand in government and constitutional reforms. **Sudan:** South Sudan gains independence from Sudan in July. This ended Africa's longest civil war. **Algeria:** Strikes, riots and protests arise against Abdelaziz Boutefilka who has been in power since 1999 **Tunisia:** Ben Ali of Tunisia resigns and gives up power after 23 years and flees to Saudi Arabia **Kuwait**: Prime minister Nasser Al- Sabbah resigns
2012	**Egypt**: The Muslim brotherhood's Mohammad Morsi is elected as President
2013	**Egypt**: Morsi is deposed by the military
2014	**Iraq:** Iraqi civil war escalates between Sunni and Shiite factions **Sudan:** Darfur experiences record high levels of violence since the start of rebellion in 2004 **Egypt**: Abdel Fattah el Sisi is elected is elected as president. **Palestine**: Gaza- Israeli conflict, also known as Operation Protection Edge. Israel bombs Gaza killing thousands of Gaza civilians

2015	**Sudan:** Over 3 million people are internally displaced and millions are left as refugees
2016	**Syria**: Civil war continues to displace hundreds and thousands of Syrians marking the largest refugee crisis in the world
2017	**Syria:** President Bashar al Assad allegedly uses chemical gas on his own people **Syria**: U.S. bombs Syrian airbase in response to Assad's use of chemical weapons

| **Legend** | **Wave I:**
"Pre- Arab
Revolutions" | **Wave II:**
During "Arab
Revolutions" | **Wave III:**
"Post- Arab
Revolutions" |

Policy Question: Grouped Response Proportion by Interview Wave
All Surveyed Countries

Interview Wave	Unfavorable Response	Neutral Response	Favorable Response
Wave One (2006-2008)	50.9	9.5	39.5
Wave Two (2010-2011)	49.1	14.8	36.1
Wave Three (2012-2014)	46.1	11.5	42.4

Policy Question at Wave I (2006-2008)

Policy Question at Wave II (2010-2011)

Policy Question at Wave III (2012-2014)

People Question: Response Proportion by Interview Wave
All Surveyed Countries

Interview Wave	Disagree	Don't Know	Agree
Wave One (2006-2008)	37	14.9	48
Wave Two (2010-2011)	34.7	18.1	47.1
Wave Three (2012-2014)	34.9	16.8	48.3

People Question at Wave I (2006-2008)

People Question at Wave II (2010-2011)


People Question at Wave III (2012-2014)

Culture Question:Response Proportion by Interview Wave
All Surveyed Countries

Culture Question at Wave I (2006-2008)

Culture Question at Wave II (2010-2011)

Algeria: Country Profile	
Location	North African country with a Mediterranean coastline. It borders six countries: Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Niger and Mauritania
Capital	Algiers
Population	4,854,400
Colonization	France
Independence	1962
Ethnic Composition	99% Arab-Berber 1% Other
Religious Composition	99% Muslim (Majority Sunni) 1% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	President Adbelaziz Boutuefilka

Bahrain: Country Profile	
Location	Southwestern coast of the Persian Gulf
Capital	Manama
Population	1,355,000
Colonization	Britain
Independence	1971
Ethnic Composition	46% Bahraini 45.5% Asian (Mainly South Asian) 4.7% Other Arabs 1.6% African 2.2% Other
Religious Composition	70.2% Muslim (Shiite majority) 14.5% Christian 9.8% Hindu 2.5% Buddhist 3.8% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa

Iraq: Country Profile	
Location	Western Asia. Borders 6 countries: Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Jordan
Capital	Baghdad
Population	38, 146,025
Colonization	British
Independence	1932
Ethnic Composition	75%-80% Arab 15% Kurds, Assyrians and other minorities
Religious Composition	95% Muslim (65% Shiite and 30% Sunni) 5% Non- Muslim (mostly Christian Assyrian)
Current Political Party/Ruler	President: Fuad Masum Prime Minister: Haidar al- Abadi

Jordan: Country Profile	
Location	On the Dead Sea, bordered by Palestine/Israel on the west, Syria on the north, east by Iraq and south by Saudi Arabia
Capital	Amman
Population	9,722,000
Colonization	Britain
Independence	1946
Ethnic Composition	98% Arabs 2% Other
Religious Composition	97.2% Muslim 2.2% Christian .6% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	King Abdullah II Prime Minister: Hani Mulki

Kuwait: Country Profile	
Location	Western Asia. Bordered by Iraq and Saudi Arabia
Capital	Kuwait City
Population	4,331,000
Colonization	Britain
Independence	1961
Ethnic Composition	60% Arab Kuwaitis 37.8% Asian 1.9% African
Religious Composition	85% Muslim (Majority Sunni) 15% other (Christian, Hindi, Parsi)
Current Political Party/Ruler	Sheikh Jaber Al- Ahmad Al- Sabah

Lebanon: Country Profile	
Location	Western Asia. Bordered by Syria to the north and Palestine/Israel in the south.
Capital	Beirut
Population	6,184,701
Colonization	French
Independence	1945
Ethnic Composition	Lebanese nationals Syrian refugees Palestinian refugees
Religious Composition	54% Muslim (27% Sunni and 27% Shiite) 40.5% Christian (Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Protestant) 5.5% Druze and other minorities
Current Political Party/Ruler	President: Michael Aoun Prime Minister: Saad Hariri Speaker of the Parliament: Nabih Berri Chief of Staff: General Jean Kahwaji

Libya: Country Profile	
Location	North Africa. Bordered by Sudan to the Southeast, Egypt to the East, Chad and Nigeria to the south and Algeria and Tunisia to the west.
Capital	Tripoli
Population	6,391,142
Colonization	Italy
Independence	1951
Ethnic Composition	Arabs Berbers
Religious Composition	97% Muslim (majority Sunni) 3% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	Fayez al-Saraj

Morocco: Country Profile	
Location	North African country bordering both the Mediterranean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean and Algeria to the east.
Capital	Rabat
Population	34,097,000
Colonization	French
Independence	1956
Ethnic Composition	Arabs Berber
Religious Composition	99% Muslim 1% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	King: Mohammed VI

Palestine (Occupied Territories of Palestine): Country Profile	
Location	On the Mediterranean Sea bordering Lebanon to the north, Syria to the northeast, Egypt to the south and Jordan to the east. Divided into the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Israel
Capital	Jerusalem
Population	West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip: 4,550,368 Settlers: 564,000
Colonization	Historically British. Currently occupied by Israel
Independence	Sovereignty conflict with Israel
Ethnic Composition	West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip: 98.7% Palestinian Arab 1.3% Other
Religious Composition	93% Muslim (Sunni) 6% Christian (also included are Druze and Samaritans)
Current Political Party/Ruler	President: Mohmoud Abbas Prime Minister: Rami Hamdallah

Saudi Arabia: Country Profile	
Location	Encompasses most of the Arabian Peninsula. Borders Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman and Yemen
Capital	Riyadh
Population	32,615,186
Colonization	N/A
Independence	N/A
Ethnic Composition	90% Arab and Bedouin Arab 10% Afro-Asian and Afro- Arab
Religious Composition	97% Muslim (majority Sunni) 3% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	King Salman bin Abddul Aziz Ibn Saud

Sudan: Country Profile	
Location	North African country bordered by Egypt to the north, Ethiopia to the east and South Sudan
Capital	Khartum
Population	36,729,501
Colonization	Britain and Egypt
Independence	1956
Ethnic Composition	70% Sudanese Arab 30% Other(Fur, Beja, Nuba and Fallata)
Religious Composition	Muslim (Sunni) Christian
Current Political Party/Ruler	President: Omar al- Bashir

Tunisia: Country Profile	
Location	Mediterranean coast of North Africa. Borders Algeria and Libya
Capital	Tunis
Population	10,982, 754
Colonization	Protectorate of France
Independence	1956
Ethnic Composition	98% Arab 2% Other: Berbers, Turks, Jews
Religious Composition	98% Muslims and 2% Christian
Current Political Party/Ruler	President: Beji Caid Essesbi Prime Minister: Yousef Chahed

Yemen: Country Profile	
Location	Southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula bordering the Arabian sea, Gulf of Eden and the Red Sea. Borders Saudi Arabia and Oman
Capital	Sana'a
Population	25,408,000
Colonization	Britain
Independence	1990
Ethnic Composition	Arab Afro- Arab
Religious Composition	99% Muslim (60% Sunni and 40% Shiite) 1% Other
Current Political Party/Ruler	President: Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi Prime Minister: Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
AT CHICAGO

Office for the Protection of Research Subjects (OPRS)
Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research (MC 672)
203 Administrative Office Building
1737 West Polk Street
Chicago, Illinois 60612-7227

Notice of Determination of Human Subject Research

May 19, 2016

20160554-97354-1

Suhad Tabahi, MA
Jane Addams College of Social Work
1040 W. Harrison St
M/C 309
Chicago, IL 60607-7134
Phone: (312) 914-5585

RE: **Protocol # 2016-0554**
   How the East views the West: An examination of trends in attitudes of Arab citizens
   on international relations from 2006 to 2014

Sponsor: None

Dear Suhad Tabahi:

> The UIC Office for the Protection of Research Subjects received your "Determination of
> Whether an Activity Represents Human Subjects Research" application, and has
> determined that this activity **DOES <u>NOT</u> meet the definition of human subject
> research** as defined by 45 CFR 46.102(f).
>
> This research will involve the analysis of de-identified ICPSR dataset publicly available
> at the following website: http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files
>
> You may conduct your activity without further submission to the IRB.
>
> If this activity is used in conjunction with any other research involving human subjects
> or if it is modified in any way, it must be re-reviewed by OPRS staff.

cc: Henrika McCoy (faculty sponsor), JACSW, M/C 309

SUHAD TABAHI

Email: suhadtabahi@gmail.com
Phone: 312.914.5585

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate   University of Illinois at Chicago, Jane Addams School of Social Work, Chicago, IL
2013 – Present

Dissertation*: How the East views the West: An examination of trends in attitudes of Arab citizens on international relations from 2006 – 2014*
Defense Date*: May 2017*

Master of Arts   University of Chicago, School of Social Service Administration, Chicago, IL
2008 - 2010
Magna Cum Laude

Bachelor of Arts   Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL
2004 - 2008
Summa Cum Laude

TEACHING POSITIONS

Spring 2016   **Instructor-** Human Behavior and the Social Environment II- Critical Social Work in a Multicultural Society, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL

GUEST LECTURER

Spring 2016   Community Violence: University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL
Presentation: *Hate Crimes and Violence Against the Arab/ Muslim/ South Asian Community in America Post 9/11*

Fall 2015   Community Violence: University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL
Presentation: *Domestic Violence in the Muslim Community: Faith vs. Culture*

Spring 2015	Social Welfare Policy and Services: University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL Presentation: *Racial Profiling as a Tool to Fight the "War on Terror": U.S.A. PATRIOT Act*
Spring 2014	Human Behavior and the Social Environment (HBSE): University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL Presentation: *"Who am I"- Adolescence and Minority Youth*

RESEARCH POSITIONS

June 2016- Present	**Data Consultant**, Alliance of Local Services (ALSO) Chicago, IL
August 2015- Present	**Program Evaluator Consultant**, Berkshire Arts & Technology Charter Public School Adams, MA
2014 – Present	**Research Assistant,** The Jane Addams Center for Policy and Research, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL
Summer 2014	**Research Assistant**, Gender and Women's Studies & Asian American Studies, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL
Summer 2008	**Bilingual Research Assistant (Arabic)**, Department of Social Work, Governors State University, University Park, IL
Summer 2007	**Bilingual Research Assistant (Arabic)**, Department of Social Work, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS	Swartz, J., & **Tabahi, S**. (2017): *Community- Based Mental Health Treatment Preceding Jail Detention Among Adults with Serious Mental Illness*, International Journal of Forensic Mental Health.
	Strickland, J., & **Tabahi, S**. (October 2016). *Transforming Justice: Mobilizing Incarcerated Mothers and Young Women through Community Action*. (forthcoming)
	Essex, E. L., Adam, N. M., Moukahal, W., & **Tabahi, S**. (2009, December). *Exploring the needs of Arab American older adults*. What's Hot, Issue 1: Minority Aging Research, p. 13. [Newsletter of the Gerontological Society of America]. (Published abstract from paper presentation at the GSA Annual Scientific Meeting in November 2009).
PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS	**Tabahi, S**. (2016, November). *Perceptions of the Arab World on International Relations: Implications for Social Work.* Accepted for CSWE, Atlanta, GA.

Tabahi, S., & Shalabi, I. (2016, October). *Understanding and Interacting with Muslim and Arab American Students and Their Families*. Presented at the Midwest School Social Work Conference, Lisle, IL.

Tabahi, S. (2016, January). *Perceptions of the Arab World on U.S. Relations: An Examination of Attitudes Towards U.S. Foreign Policy and the American People*. Presented at SSWR, Washington D.C.

Tabahi, S., & Taha, N. (2015, October). *Understanding and Working with Arabs and Muslims in Illinois*. Presented at the NASW Statewide Conference, Wheeling IL.

Tabahi, S. (2015, March). *Ethnic Identity Formation: Arab and Muslim American Female Adolescence*. Poster Presented at the Seventh Annual Muslim Mental Health Conference, Dearborn, MI.

Tabahi, S., & Hishmeh, F. (2013). *Domestic Violence in the Arab American Community: Cultural Barriers and Implications to Accessing Service*. Presented at the First Annual Arab American Mental Health Conference. Palos Hills, IL.

Tabahi, S., Hishmeh, F., & Salim, H. (2013) *The Immigrant and Refugee Experience- Addressing Domestic Violence and Mental Health in our Communities*. Presented at Illinois Immigrant Integration Summit. Chicago, IL.

Salim, H., Milla, E., & **Tabahi, S**. (2013) *Immigration and U.S Citizenship*. Presented at the Eighth Annual Statewide Summit for Bilingual Parents. Oakbrook, IL.

Essex, E. L., Adam, N. M., Moukahal, W., & **Tabahi, S**. (2011). *Older Arab Americans and younger family caregivers: Intergenerational experiences and needs*. Paper presented at the 15th Annual Conference of the Society for Social Work and Research, Tampa, FL.

Essex, E. L., Adam, N. M., Moukahal, W., & **Tabahi**, S. (2009). *Exploring the needs of Arab American older adults*. Paper presented at the 62nd Annual Scientific Meeting of the Gerontological Society of America. Atlanta, GA.

CLINICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SOCIAL WORK EXPERIENCES

2013 – Present   **Individual and Family Counselor**, Adam & Associates, Evanston, IL
• Provide individual and family counseling for Arabic speaking clients.
• Supervise new hires on cross cultural issues, assessment and case planning with Arab/ Muslim clients.

2013 – Present	**Arabic Translator**, Apna Ghar (Domestic Violence Shelter), Chicago, IL • Provide translation services to help mediate relationships and conflicts between staff and clients. • Complete in person and phone intakes for Arabic speaking clients.
2012 – 2013	**Arab Youth Group Facilitator**, Argo High School, Summit, IL • Developed and implemented a 12-week curriculum with Arab American female youth. Some topics discussed included: team building, self- esteem, Arab culture and achievements, identity, assimilation, strengths, self -care, family dynamics, domestic abuse, and media influences.
2012 – 2013	**Fund Development Coordinator**, Arab American Family Services Bridgeview, IL • Individually raised over $10,000 through community sponsorships. • Established, managed and implemented the first Muslim Mental Health Conference in Illinois. • Applied for and was awarded a grant for the domestic violence department ($5,000). • Recruited, trained and supervised volunteers and interns for various community projects.
2010 – 2011	**Contract Systems Analyst**, Heartland Human Care Services, Chicago, IL • Collaboratively completed 100% audit of subcontractors to be the first of eight audit teams to successfully complete reviewing over 5,000 files in a four-month period.
2009 – 2010	**Director,** Put Illinois to Work Program, Arab American Family Services, Bridgeview, IL • Trained and supervised employees to conduct preliminary interviews of potential work sites and trainee workers and utilize new computer software specialized for state initiatives. • Successfully made over 110 matches of trainee worker and worksite. 43 trainee workers were offered full time employment by worksites after the completion of the program.
2008 – 2009	**After School Youth Counselor and Assistant Program Coordinator**, Youth Organizations Umbrella (Y.O.U), Evanston, IL • Provided individual counseling services to culturally-diverse school age children. Part of a crisis intervention team at Oakton Elementary after an in- school suicide. • Designed and implemented creative cooking group befitting at risk, low income school aged children to enhance their academic performance by integrating school curriculum into recreational activities.

2007 – 2008	**Family Counselor**, Women's Residential Services (W.R.S) Vernon Hills, IL

• Provided individual assessment, treatment planning, to socio-culturally diverse adult population dually diagnosed with depression, PTSD bipolar disorder, anorexia nervosa and other affective disorders. Collaborated closely with interdisciplinary team members on development of appropriate case plans meeting individual client needs.

• Co-led weekly bereavement and psychotherapy groups using multi-modal approaches: cognitive therapy, dialectical behavioral therapy, psycho-educational, and expressive arts.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS	University of Illinois at Chicago Graduate College, Social Work Graduate School Representative Arab-Muslim Community Network (AMAC) at University of Illinois at Chicago, Board member Arab American Studies Association Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA) Islamic Social Services Association National Association of Social Workers (NASW)
ANALYTICAL AND STATISTICAL SOFTWARE	SPSS Stata Atlas Ti