

**Modernizing the Global Working Class:
U.S. Labor and Third World Development in the Cold War**

BY

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Abbreviations

AAFLI	Asian American Free Labor Institute
AALC	African American Labor Center
AATUF	All-African Trade Union Federation
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AID	Agency for International Development
AIFLD	American Institute for Free Labor Development
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIT	Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores
CLASC	Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Cristianos
CTAL	Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
FTUC	Free Trade Union Committee
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ILGWU	International Ladies Garment Workers Union
ILO	International Labor Organization
IULEC	Inter-University Labor Education Committee
NILE	National Institute of Labor Education
ORIT	Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UAW	United Auto Workers
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

Summary

This dissertation examines the history of the United States labor movement's involvement in Cold War era international development programs in the Third World, particularly Latin America. Chapters One and Two trace the shaping of the intellectual, ideological, and geopolitical context within which U.S. labor would carry out its Third World development interventions. The first chapter examines the role of industrial relations professionals, social scientists, and international labor specialists in helping to define the terms of the Cold War conflict in the decade following World War II. Pushing back against the precepts of Marxism, these liberal experts articulated the perceived social, political, and economic benefits of class cooperation over class warfare. Through modernization theory, they contended such benefits could be achieved all over the world, particularly through the guidance of bureaucratic trade unions operating within pluralistic industrial relations systems. The second chapter focuses on how the ideas of such experts were disseminated to workers across the globe through a partnership of labor educators and the international "free" trade union movement. Consisting of anticommunist labor leaders from around the world—but spearheaded by officials from the AFL and later AFL-CIO—the "free" trade union movement sought to undermine leftist, class-conscious labor organizations by establishing nonradical, pro-West alternatives. While some anticommunist labor leaders like Walter Reuther and the social democrats of Western Europe hoped to spread "free" trade unionism through multilateral institutions and small-scale educational programs in the emergent Third World, hardliners in the AFL-CIO allied themselves with the U.S. government to carry out bigger, bolder initiatives.

Chapters Three and Four are in many ways the heart of this study, as they explore the AFL-CIO's attempts to modernize developing countries in the 1960s—the years John F. Kennedy named the "Decade of Development." The third chapter looks at the labor federation's close relationship with the U.S. Agency for International Development. With the backing of the federal government under Cold War liberals Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the AFL-CIO's newly created training program for Latin American unionists—AIFLD—quickly transformed into a major, multifaceted development organization before being replicated in Africa and Asia. The fourth chapter offers some brief case illustrations of the kinds of projects AIFLD carried out in Latin American countries. These included ostensibly benign efforts like building affordable worker housing and organizing rural campesinos, but also more controversial interventions to mobilize trade unions against democratically elected governments deemed too radical or communistic by AFL-CIO officials and their U.S. government allies. The fifth and final chapter follows the growing criticism of the AFL-CIO's overseas development activities by some U.S. union officials, as well as by journalists and elected representatives, particularly during the Vietnam War era. By the end of the Decade of Development, the U.S. labor movement's international reputation had been tarnished thanks to the controversies surrounding its unyielding anticommunist interventions in the Third World.

Introduction

In 1994, an unexpected controversy erupted over President Bill Clinton's pick to be the new United States ambassador to Guyana. Only two years earlier, the tiny South American nation had held its first democratic election since winning independence from Britain in 1966, bringing septuagenarian Cheddi Jagan to power. Jagan had previously served as the country's chief minister when it was still a colony known as British Guiana, only to have his left-leaning government destabilized in the early 1960s by U.S. government meddlers who feared he was cut from the same communist cloth as Fidel Castro. To officials in the Clinton Administration, that all seemed like ancient history now that the Cold War was over and geopolitical calculations were changing. In June of 1994, Clinton nominated William C. Doherty, Jr. to be U.S. ambassador to Guyana. On the surface, Doherty seemed like a fine choice. He was nearing retirement after serving nearly 30 years as the executive director of an innocuous-sounding international nonprofit called the American Institute for Free Labor Development, or AIFLD. Run by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) but largely bankrolled by the U.S. government, AIFLD provided educational programming, credit services, housing assistance, and other forms of development aid to trade unionists across Latin America and the Caribbean. As head of the Institute for three decades, Doherty had contacts across the region, close ties to the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and intimate knowledge of diplomacy and geopolitics. His father had even served as the first U.S. ambassador to independent Jamaica.

But when Jagan learned that the AIFLD director had been tapped for the job of top U.S. diplomat in his country, he was "flabbergasted" and let it be known he was "not happy." As it turned out, the Institute had been at the center of U.S. efforts to undermine Jagan's first

government back in the early 1960s. Working with the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the international affairs departments of some AFL-CIO-affiliated unions, AIFLD had helped fund and mobilize Jagan's political opposition, fueling a general strike in 1963 that brought his government to the brink of collapse.¹ Like much of the U.S. public, Clinton had apparently been unaware of all this. "Everybody in Guyana knows what happened," Jagan said. "Maybe President Clinton doesn't know our history, but the people who advise him should at least know their own history." Doherty was soon dropped from consideration. The venerable historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.—who, as an advisor to President John F. Kennedy, had participated in the efforts to oust Jagan—admitted that, in retrospect, the United States had been wrong to intervene in British Guiana's political affairs. Speaking about the controversy surrounding Doherty's nomination, Schlesinger quoted Oscar Wilde: "The one duty we owe to history is to rewrite it."²

While it would be too bold to claim that this dissertation is a rewriting of history, it is an attempt to offer a new understanding of the global Cold War. In particular, this study traces the linkages between organized labor and international development, both potent forces in the ideological and geopolitical struggle between the capitalist United States and communist Soviet Union. The AFL-CIO's American Institute for Free Labor Development—which generated resentment not only in Guyana, but in much of the Western Hemisphere—in many ways represents the full fusion of these two forces. AIFLD's regional scope covered Latin America and the Caribbean, with the AFL-CIO later establishing separate development institutes for Africa and Asia. Though it was only active in one section of the Third World, AIFLD is key to understanding the broader history of U.S. labor's Cold War interventions in what we today call the Global South. It was the first, largest, and most generously funded of the AFL-CIO's foreign

institutes, serving as the model for the African and Asian institutes that came later. From the time AIFLD went into operation in 1962, leftists and anti-imperialists accused it of “brainwashing” workers into becoming counterrevolutionaries and serving the interests of U.S. empire. Indeed, the Institute and its graduates were implicated in assisting right-wing coups d’état, U.S. military interventions, and CIA plots in British Guiana, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Chile, El Salvador, and elsewhere, as left-wing scholars and journalists have long endeavored to expose. By the 1970s, leftist publications casually referred to AIFLD as “the CIA’s labor proprietary in Latin America,”³ often characterizing it as nothing more or less than a neatly orchestrated conspiracy masterminded in the halls of Langley.

Indisputably, AIFLD and its offshoots in Africa and Asia were Cold War creations. While Communist parties and other leftist movements traditionally relied on organized labor as a popular base, the AFL-CIO and its allies hoped to turn Third World unions into anticommunist bulwarks by convincing workers that a deradicalized, bureaucratized unionism would bring them more benefits than proletarian revolution. Yet the proselytization of U.S.-style industrial relations should not be understood solely as a CIA-manufactured ploy to trick workers in developing countries into becoming stooges of Western capital. It was also the product of a broader social-scientific vision to rapidly “modernize” the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s and a postwar liberalism that claimed collective bargaining to be one of the pillars of democracy, as important as free expression and the franchise. Focused on capital formation and wary of wage concessions, economic planners in developing countries preferred “responsible” business unions that could manage workers’ expectations and contain labor unrest. In practice, this usually meant the absence of free collective bargaining in favor of state control over unions. Western labor liberals were thus faced with a conundrum in the Third World: supporting truly

independent worker organizations would risk undermining the all-important process of modernization, but sidelining union autonomy would mean sacrificing a core principle of democracy. Liberals and social democrats were never fully able to resolve this problem, opting to tread cautiously in the Third World by implementing modest training programs. In contrast, the AFL-CIO's hardline cold warriors had no qualms about carrying out bold interventions, employing the rhetoric of modernization and democratic unionism to advance a narrow, anticommunist geopolitical agenda across the developing world in partnership with the U.S. government.

In many ways, the modernization theory espoused by Cold War development experts and labor internationalists goes hand-in-hand with the study of labor history. As historian Daniel Rodgers argued in 1977, the "new" labor historians of the 1960s and 1970s shared many of the same assumptions as modernization theorists, particularly the assumption of a kind of historical inevitability, where societies and cultures are transformed in predictable ways under the pressures of economic and technological change. Under this narrative rubric described by Rodgers, working-class people resist the initial shock of industrialization by clinging to their particular traditions before finally accommodating themselves to the uniformity and standardization of modern society. Rodgers called on historians to question the linear assumptions of modernization and to seek out more complexity and nuance in history.⁴ Originating and thriving as a school of thought and policy framework in the 1950s and 1960s, modernization itself was more complex than a simple theory of social change. As an idea and ideology, it was inherently political and largely driven by Cold War considerations, as were U.S. labor's concurrent overseas development initiatives that drew from modernization theory.

This dissertation makes interventions in both labor history—namely, the history of the post-merger AFL-CIO and its international activities—and the history of U.S. foreign relations—namely, the history of Cold War-era development programs targeting the Third World. It also makes modest contributions to intellectual history, particularly the history of mid-twentieth century social science, and modern Latin American history, especially the history of labor movements and U.S.-sponsored development schemes in the region. Perhaps the most significant contribution is bringing these various historiographic currents into discussion with one another for the first time, and showing that one cannot fully understand international development, anticommunism, and postwar liberalism without grasping the significance of unions and industrial relations to all three.

Two of the first comprehensive histories of the U.S. labor's foreign activities were Ronald Radosh's *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (1969) and Philip Taft's *Defending Freedom: American Labor and Foreign Affairs* (1973). Published in the divisive political climate of the Vietnam War, these two works are accordingly polarized in their central arguments. A New Left historian inspired by William Appleman Williams, Radosh described the AFL-CIO's role in international affairs as a gradual integration into the "machinery of the corporate-capitalist state," becoming a "junior partner" in imperial capitalism instead of a lever to change the system.⁵ Taft, having personal friendships with AFL-CIO leaders, contended that organized labor in the U.S. had long championed liberal, independent unionism, and that the AFL-CIO's foreign policy since World War II was only a response to the clear and present danger of "communist penetration" of and "direct assault" on labor movements around the world.⁶ Since the late 1960s, many scholars and researchers have emulated the critical, New Left analysis of Radosh while rightly dismissing Taft's apologetics. Hobart Spalding, Jr. in the 1970s,

Beth Sims in the 1990s, and Kim Scipes in the 2010s, among others, have argued that in its foreign affairs, the AFL-CIO was guilty of spreading “labor imperialism”—ruthlessly imposing its own anti-Left, pro-U.S. model of trade unionism on the workers of the world no matter the cost to democracy and human rights.⁷ Their main intention has not necessarily been to historicize the AFL-CIO’s international activities so much as to expose them, in order to hold labor leaders accountable.

Two historiographic developments in recent decades have brought greater complexity to the labor imperialism interpretation. First, led by scholars including Marcel van der Linden, Julie Greene, Jana Lipman, and Leon Fink, among others, the field of labor history has seen a “transnational turn,” with historians widening their studies of the working class beyond the traditional framework of the nation-state, often by highlighting themes of empire and international relations.⁸ Second, in what could be called the “global turn” in Cold War history, scholars like Odd Arne Westad, Greg Grandin, Vijay Prashad, Victoria Langland, and Joaquín Chávez have moved past traditional narratives of the East-West superpower conflict and begun examining the Cold War’s social and political implications for the peoples of the Third World by rigorously scrutinizing heretofore unavailable or overlooked archives in multiple countries.⁹ Inspired by these two historiographic “turns,” a new generation of historians from both the Global South and North have crafted more explicitly historical analyses of the AFL-CIO’s Cold War interventions abroad.¹⁰ The work of these historians is perhaps best exemplified by the edited volume *American Labor’s Global Ambassadors: The International History of the AFL-CIO during the Cold War* (2013). These scholars generally recognize the controversial legacy of U.S. labor’s Cold War era activities in the Third World, but simultaneously seek to make sense of the discrete, complex motivations behind these activities, which previous scholars tended to

gloss over in their rush to condemn or to expose CIA conspiracies. Further, they endeavor to present Third World labor movements as historical actors in their own right.

A significant advance in the evolving historiography of the global Cold War in recent decades has been the historicizing of development theories and schemes. Beginning in the 1990s, political scientists and anthropologists influenced by postmodernist thought—including James Ferguson, Wolfgang Sachs, Arturo Escobar, James Scott, and Timothy Mitchell—employed discourse analysis to offer critical studies of development and its assumptions about linear and universal social change.¹¹ Historians like Michael Latham and Nils Gilman soon turned their attention to development as well, particularly the intellectual and ideological origins of modernization theory in the post-World War II years. Since the early 2000s, a number of historians have also examined how modernization projects played out “on the ground” in the Third World as well as demonstrating how the development idea long predated the Cold War.¹² While questions of labor and industrial relations occasionally arise in these historical studies of modernization, to date, the only work to bring labor history and development history together in a comprehensive way is Frederick Cooper’s magisterial *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (1996). Cooper explores how British and French colonial bureaucracies reacted to and attempted to contain African labor movements between the mid-1930s and late 1950s. The colonial governments applied the same model they had used with European workers—legalizing unions, introducing social welfare programs, and essentially molding a modern working class in the name of “stabilization,” viewed as preferable to the chaos of rolling strikes carried out by an “unbound mass.” Cooper therefore argues that for colonial officials, the development question and the labor question went hand-in-hand. The unintended consequence of treating African subjects like European citizens, of course, was greater demands

for either full equality or full independence.¹³ This dissertation's historiographic intervention will be somewhat like Cooper's, albeit at a much more modest scale and within a different historical context. The contribution will be to bring recent historians of the AFL-CIO's late-twentieth-century foreign activities into conversation with recent historians of modernization theory and development programs in the Third World.

Chapters One and Two trace the shaping of the intellectual, ideological, and geopolitical context within which U.S. labor would carry out its Third World development interventions. The first chapter examines the role of industrial relations professionals, social scientists, and international labor specialists in helping to define the terms of the Cold War conflict in the decade following World War II. Pushing back against the precepts of Marxism, these liberal experts articulated the perceived social, political, and economic benefits of class cooperation over class warfare. Through modernization theory, they contended such benefits could be achieved all over the world, particularly through the guidance of bureaucratic trade unions operating within pluralistic industrial relations systems. The second chapter focuses on how the ideas of such experts were disseminated to workers across the globe through a partnership of labor educators and the international "free" trade union movement. Consisting of anticommunist labor leaders from around the world—but spearheaded by officials from the AFL and later AFL-CIO—the "free" trade union movement sought to undermine leftist, class-conscious labor organizations by establishing nonradical, pro-West alternatives. While some anticommunist labor leaders like Walter Reuther and the social democrats of Western Europe hoped to spread "free" trade unionism through multilateral institutions and small-scale educational programs in the emergent Third World, hardliners in the AFL-CIO allied themselves with the U.S. government to carry out bigger, bolder initiatives.

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Though this is in many ways an international history, with special attention given to Latin America, it is ultimately a U.S.-centered story. It is a story of experts, policymakers, and, above all, of labor officials in the United States who sought to impose their modernizing vision of trade unionism, industrial relations, and development on the global working class.

¹ See Chapter Four for more details.

² Tim Weiner, “A Kennedy-CIA Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton,” *New York Times*, October 30, 1994.

³ Editorial, 1974. *Counter-Spy*, *The Quarterly Journal of the Fifth Estate* 2, No. 1, 2.

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- ⁴ Daniel T. Rodgers, "Modernity, and the American Industrial Worker: Reflections and Critique," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Vol. 7, No. 4 (1977): 655-681.
- ⁵ Ronald Radosh, 1969, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, New York: Random House, 25.
- ⁶ Philip Taft, 1973, *Defending Freedom: American Labor and Foreign Affairs*, Los Angeles, CA: Nash Publishing, 251-252.
- ⁷ Hobart Spalding, 1977, *Organized Labor in Latin America: Historical Case Studies of Workers in Dependent Societies*, New York: New York University Press; Beth Sims, 1991, *Workers of the World Undermined: American Labor's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*, Boston, MA: South End Press; Kim Scipes, 2010, *AFL-CIO's Secret War against Developing Country Workers: Solidarity or Sabotage?*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
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- ¹¹ James Ferguson, 1990, *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Wolfgang Sachs, ed., 1992, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, London: Zed Books; Arturo Escobar, 1995, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; James C. Scott, 1998, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Timothy Mitchell, 2002, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
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Chapter One: Industrial Relations and Modernization

A striking feature of postwar liberalism in the United States was the fusion of rational bureaucratism with an almost millenarian faith in social progress. Not unlike their Communist rivals, in the years following World War II, U.S. liberals believed the problems of poverty, exploitation, hunger, and disease would be solved all over the world, if only the right social conditions could be put into place. While the utopian visions of communism rested on a theory of class conflict, liberal idealism relied on assumptions about the utility of social consensus. If Communists claimed that only an authoritarian state with the power to forcefully manage conflict could bring about human happiness, liberals saw themselves as offering a counterclaim that only a pluralist democracy with the capability of spurring consensus could save the world. In particular, they challenged Marxist notions of class warfare between workers and capitalists with their own concept of a pluralist industrial order where unions and managers could freely negotiate for the benefit of all. If Marx and Engels believed in the mid-nineteenth century that society was “splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other,” liberals of the mid-twentieth century believed class differences were becoming less acute and less relevant thanks in part to the extension of political democracy into the industrial workplace. The “two great hostile camps” now dividing society, postwar liberals believed, were democrats seeking to preserve individual freedom and totalitarians seeking to crush it.

The battle of ideas between U.S. liberalism and Soviet communism began as Europe recovered from the destruction of World War II and continued as scores of long-exploited nations sought to escape centuries of colonial despoliation through the promise of development. To fight the ideological Cold War, U.S. social scientists, industrial relations professionals, and international labor specialists sought to use their expertise to convince foreign workers that they

could achieve a prosperous society without waging class warfare. Frequently, an idealized image of the United States was employed to show that such an achievement was indeed possible. As modernization theorists defined a straightforward, linear path to social and economic development for the so-called underdeveloped nations, industrial relations scholars and labor diplomats made their own intellectual contributions about the essential role of unions in modernization. These early Cold War efforts—some scholarly, some propagandistic, some both—would lay the ideological groundwork for the increasing role the labor movement would play in international development during the 1950s and 1960s.

Industrial Pluralism

After World War II, with union membership at record highs, collective bargaining legally recognized, and the economy booming, a new system of labor relations emerged in the United States. Its central assumption was that unions and management need not be mortal enemies. Instead, as supposedly equal partners, they could amicably and rationally negotiate pay, benefits, and working conditions to simultaneously increase wages and productivity, thus avoiding the kind of crippling strikes that had rocked the nation during the 1930s and again in 1946. Industrial peace, it was hoped, could be achieved with a minimum of state intervention, as long as unions and management followed a mutually agreed upon set of rules. In later decades, critical legal scholars and labor historians would name this system “industrial pluralism,” as it attempted to apply the tenets of liberal pluralism and democratic consensus to industrial relations.¹ In the postwar years, industrial pluralism was widely regarded as the liberal solution to decades of labor strife and struggle.

From the beginning of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, labor leaders, policymakers, and intellectuals in the United States grappled with the question of whether and

how older ideals of republicanism could be squared with newer realities of wage work.

Republicanism celebrated independent labor—like that of the yeoman farmer or self-employed artisan—as the hallmark of liberty and the essential element of citizenship. Like slavery, the inherent dependence of wage labor ultimately posed a threat to this republican vision. As the majority of U.S. workers became waged employees in the decades following the Civil War, and as the number and intensity of industrial conflicts continually grew, the “labor question” became a national preoccupation. Many reformers and worker activists, most notably those with the Knights of Labor, initially called for a return to preindustrial republican ideals by abolishing wage work altogether—not unlike how slavery had been abolished—but such efforts ended in defeat. By the turn of the twentieth century, the apparent inescapability of wage labor was accepted by a growing number of labor leaders. The demand now became “industrial democracy,” which called for the extension of political rights into the economic sphere through trade unions, collective bargaining, and some measure of state protections. While liberals believed industrial democracy could be achieved by reforming the capitalist system that had served to commodify labor in the first place, radicals associated with the Industrial Workers of the World and various Socialist and Communist parties promoted a range of strategies to overthrow and replace capitalism, believing the system to be irredeemable.²

Founded in 1886, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) never advocated an end to capitalism, but instead favored direct negotiations between unions and employers with minimal state intervention—a system generally referred to as voluntarism, but perhaps better understood as “collective laissez-faire.”³ This was in part because the state had traditionally intervened on the side of employers in labor conflicts, using legal mechanisms and outright violence to repress workers who went out on strike. It was also because the AFL-affiliated unions represented

craftsmen whose skills made them difficult to replace, thus granting them a high degree of bargaining power and rendering government meddling unnecessary and undesirable, in their view. Having the state serve as a compulsory arbiter between employers and employees, ostensibly to create fairer labor relations—a system known as corporatism—was far more appealing to less skilled, more easily replaceable workers in the growing mass industries, particularly women and immigrants. After some important experimentation with corporatism during World War I and efforts to promote industrial democracy in the first decades of the century, the economic emergency of the Great Depression in the 1930s brought the “labor question” back to the forefront of politics. With capitalism in crisis and millions of unemployed or underpaid workers growing restless, government officials looked for ways to simultaneously revitalize the economy and stabilize labor relations.

With the passage of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act, the AFL craft unions got what they had long desired: the right to negotiate with employers free from government interference. But for unskilled, non-unionized industrial workers, both the state and organized labor needed to do more. In 1935, dissident AFL officials founded the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to organize the unorganized in mass industries. That same year, the U.S. government assumed a new, robust role in employment relations with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act. Named after its principal champion, Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner, this landmark piece of New Deal legislation established a series of rules and regulations governing collective bargaining, to be enforced by the newly created National Labor Relations Board. While AFL leaders resented this unprecedented intrusion by the federal government, the CIO took advantage of the Wagner Act to rapidly unionize the auto, rubber, and steel industries.⁴ In addition, the CIO-affiliated unions—which welcomed Communist organizers because of their

effectiveness and dedication—innovated militant tactics like the sit-down strike to win union recognition.

During World War II, the state took on an even greater role in labor relations. The federal government established the National War Labor Board to decisively arbitrate disputes between unions and employers to ensure continuous production of essential war-related materials without the interruption of strikes and lockouts. Often this meant employers had to concede to union demands for wage increases and various protections and benefits. These corporatist arrangements were generally favored by CIO leaders, who hoped to see them continued after the War Labor Board was disbanded following Allied victory in 1945. To prevent a return to pre-war wage levels, workers across the country organized a wave of massive strikes in 1946, but Republicans took control of Congress that same year on a promise to rein in labor and the perceived excesses of the New Deal. The next year, they passed the Taft-Hartley law to amend the Wagner Act. A realization of the AFL's earlier fears about government intervention into labor relations, Taft-Hartley placed several new restrictions on union activity and was decried by unionists as a "slave labor bill." Among other measures, the legislation outlawed tactics like the sit-down strike and barred Communists from union leadership. In this new, more conservative atmosphere, the CIO retreated from its earlier demands for corporatism while purging leftists from its ranks. This retreat produced what later generations would euphemistically call an "accord" between labor and management. In exchange for unions accepting employers' "right to manage," large industrial employers supposedly recognized the legitimacy of unions and collective bargaining.⁵

In the postwar years, then, industrial pluralism took shape as a kind of compromise between the AFL's desired voluntarism and the CIO's preferred corporatism. The state would act to ensure industrial peace, but it would play a much more limited role than under corporatism,

avoiding the compulsory arbitration of disputes. Instead of the government setting industry-wide or economy-wide standards on wages, benefits, and working conditions, such matters would be primarily determined at individual workplaces through collective bargaining agreements, or contracts, between unions and employers. Through the National Labor Relations Board, the government's main function would be to ensure that contracts were negotiated in good faith. Importantly, the actual enforcement of contracts would be largely left to unions and employers themselves through internal grievance procedures. This emerging system of pluralist labor relations was propounded by a generation of labor economists and legal thinkers—including Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, and Archibald Cox, among others—who had served in the federal government during the war, and who aimed to apply their scholarship toward solving real-world problems. “Most of us are probably practicing, if not theoretical pluralists,” Kerr told an audience of industrial relations scholars in 1955. “We recognize that it requires a considerable measure of power and a great deal of rule-making to operate successfully an industrial system, but that this power and this rule-making... are more safely and effectively distributed into many hands than into a few.”⁶

Strengthening and legitimizing industrial pluralism, between 1945 and 1948, liberal academics helped establish new industrial relations schools at Cornell, Yale, Rutgers, the University of California, the University of Chicago, and several other institutions. Though industrial relations had existed as a professional field of study since the 1920s, it had traditionally been dominated by personnel management specialists, who opposed unions and collective bargaining. In contrast, the new industrial relations schools of the post-World War II years encouraged collective bargaining and frequently partnered with organized labor. They offered both extension courses to improve the negotiating competence of union members as well

as residential degree programs to groom future labor relations professionals for careers in union administration, business management, or government service. The schools also provided institutional support for empirical research into all manner of labor-management problems. In 1947, the Industrial Relations Research Association was founded, and Cornell's new School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) established the first scholarly journal devoted to industrial relations, the *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.⁷

Public officials and university administrators backing the industrial relations schools aimed to replace what they regarded as the irrational "ideology" of class conflict—which could only lead to national turmoil—with the "science" of labor-management cooperation—which would bring national prosperity. "There are still those who think we are trying to produce more astute labor agitators. Nothing could be further from the truth," Cornell Chancellor Edmund Day wrote in 1950. He explained that the goal of Cornell's ILR School was to provide "mutual education" to both labor and business representatives. "Later graduates of the school are likely to find themselves on opposite sides of the same table. We hope they will...we confidently expect that at times there will be a larger measure of common understanding, common appreciation, common knowledge of what is involved in the pending issues."⁸

Though labor relations became more professionalized and routinized in the postwar period, worker discontent and union militancy persisted. During the 1950s, for example, over 3,500 large work stoppages were recorded nationwide.⁹ Compared to the tumultuous and violent strikes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—which often ended with the destruction of the union—these industrial conflicts appeared tame, with the continued existence of the union and the eventual achievement of a contract rarely in question.¹⁰ Further, while the blue collar prosperity of this period may have been romanticized in later decades, industrial

workers and their families really did see their economic fortunes improve dramatically from where they had been prior to the growth of organized labor in World War II. In addition to having more rights and protections on the job, unionized workers could now afford decent homes, take vacations, send their children to college, and retire with security. “There were choices. There were prospects. There were possibilities. Few of these had been there before,” Jack Metzgar writes in his memoir of his Pennsylvania steelworker family. “If what we lived through in the 1950s was not liberation, then liberation never happens in real human lives.”¹¹

The Cold War

The crystallization of a pluralistic, consensus-based, putatively rational model of industrial relations coincided with the beginning of the Cold War. To influential liberal intellectuals like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the crux of the emerging ideological and geopolitical conflict between the United States and Soviet Union was how nations should best respond to the social and economic shockwaves produced by the industrial revolution. It boiled down to an inescapable choice between a “free society” and “totalitarianism.”¹² During World War II, the great totalitarian threat had come from the Right in the form of fascism, but now, the story went, it was coming from the Left in the form of communism. As liberal Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas argued in 1948, the world was seeing “an increasing polarization to the Left and to the Right,” but that “the great middle group in all nations are the democrats. They are the ones who have nourished freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience.” It was this democratic middle group that Schlesinger famously dubbed “the vital center.” Unlike the totalitarians of the Left and Right, the democrats of the world “refused to cast and mould man into one ideological pattern,” instead embracing pluralist consensus.¹³ This Cold War “politics of freedom,” as Schlesinger called it, manifested itself in the crucial realm of labor-management

relations in the form of industrial pluralism as workers and employers strove to freely cooperate and voluntarily compromise without the forced intervention of a heavy-handed state.

In part because they feared that workers in the war-devastated economies of Western Europe might find the revolutionary promises of communism appealing, in 1948, liberal cold warriors in the Truman Administration launched the Marshall Plan to provide \$13 billion in economic assistance to 16 countries over four years. In an address to the CIO's constitutional convention in Portland that same year, Justice Douglas argued that U.S. labor could serve "as a missionary of the American way of life" in Europe because it could "prove by its own accomplishments that human welfare and progress can be achieved without class warfare." Because many of the social-democratic parties in Western Europe relied on a strong labor base, the U.S. labor movement would carry "good credentials," able to open doors "tightly closed to all others." Importantly, U.S. labor could "teach class-conscious groups the folly of class warfare" by propagandizing its own successes. Thanks to industrial pluralism, Douglas said, "our industrial plant today is one the great strongholds of democracy, our workers are free men," and "there is such a thing as industrial justice"—all "things that American labor can show" the workers of Western Europe.¹⁴

To actualize this liberal vision of international labor diplomacy, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)—the federal agency created to carry out the Marshall Plan—set up an Office of Labor Advisers with the help of both the AFL and CIO. Clinton Golden, a vice president of the United Steelworkers who had served on the National Labor Relations Board and War Production Board, was tapped as the CIO's representative to the ECA. Bert Jewell, a veteran unionist with international connections, represented the AFL. Each served as advisers to ECA director Paul Hoffman in Washington, while AFL economist Boris Shishkin advised the

Marshall Plan's European representative W. Averell Harriman in Paris. Labor specialists plucked from the ranks of U.S. unions were assigned to Marshall Plan missions across Western Europe to establish contacts with noncommunist labor leaders and channel information about them to the U.S. government.¹⁵ For their part, U.S. labor leaders supported the Marshall Plan not only because of their anticommunist convictions, but also because the massive aid program promised to promote U.S. exports, protect U.S. industries, and ward off unemployment and depressions.¹⁶

Meanwhile, independent of the ECA, the State Department's Foreign Service expanded its corps of labor attachés. The labor attaché program had begun as an experiment in the middle of World War II. Already planning its postwar foreign policy and knowing that the cooperation of trade unions and labor parties would be vital in the reconstruction of Europe, the Roosevelt Administration began developing a cadre of labor specialists for the Foreign Service in 1943. State Department officials chose Latin America as a testing ground since "it was the only area of the world where one had both a normal, that is a non-war, situation, as well as several countries with important trade union movements and political parties of the left influenced by labor."¹⁷ Daniel Horowitz, a Harvard labor educator and industrial relations professional who had served in various government capacities, was sent to the U.S. embassy in Chile as the very first labor attaché in December 1943. By the time of the Marshall Plan, new labor attachés were being dispatched to embassies in Western Europe. Their job was to supply intelligence about foreign labor movements and befriend noncommunist unions—the same assignment as the ECA's labor advisers—leading to duplication of efforts and conflicts, as well as occasional cooperation.¹⁸ Unlike the ECA labor advisers, the attachés answered to directly to U.S. ambassadors, who typically had no direct control over the Marshall Plan missions.¹⁹ And while the Marshall Plan's

labor advisers tended to come directly from U.S. unions, the labor attachés—at least in this period—were drawn more from academia and government, according to Horowitz.²⁰

As liberals like Douglas had envisioned, this growing community of labor diplomats helped teach foreign workers about “the American way.” To counter anti-Marshall Plan propaganda coming from the Soviet Union—which characterized U.S. aid as a Trojan Horse bringing capitalist imperialism—the State Department launched a “Labor Information Program” in 1950. The program coordinated the efforts of the ECA, Department of Labor, Psychological Strategy Board, and trade unions to direct propaganda highlighting the virtues of the U.S. industrial relations system toward European workers.²¹ That it was espoused by U.S. trade unionists made it all the more effective and convincing. This propaganda included various written and visual materials showcasing the high standard of living enjoyed by U.S. workers, emphasizing the supposed rewards of abandoning class warfare in favor of cooperation and consensus. Many of these materials were derived from empirical research conducted by industrial relations scholars as part of an ambitious, five-year project consisting of case studies from the United States demonstrating that harmonious labor relations could both augment productivity and raise wages. Eventually published under the title *Causes of Industrial Peace under Collective Bargaining*, this research-turned-propaganda project was coordinated by Marshall Plan labor adviser Clinton Golden in his role on the board of the nonprofit National Planning Association. Also in this time, European trade unionists and business managers were brought to U.S. universities through the auspices of the State Department and ECA, taking courses at the new industrial relations schools.²²

After Marshall Plan spending came to a formal end in late 1951, this Cold War propaganda mission continued with the creation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1953.

Partnering with the Advertising Council, a private nonprofit, USIA launched the “People’s Capitalism” campaign in 1956. The purpose of People’s Capitalism was to discredit Communist claims that capitalism was inevitably and necessarily a dehumanizing, exploitative system by presenting an idealized portrait of the United States, downplaying the persistence of problems like racism and poverty.²³ Through a traveling exhibit showing off the material comforts of U.S. households, which went on display around Latin America and Asia, People’s Capitalism touted how the United States was becoming a “classless” society where “the people themselves are the capitalists.” It further argued that U.S. workers shared in the fruits of capitalism, granting them genuine freedom, while arguing workers in Communist countries were little more than slaves forced to meet impossible production quotas set by a totalitarian state.²⁴ Like the Marshall Plan’s labor propaganda, the ideas surrounding People’s Capitalism were backed up by the work of liberal social scientists, whose critical inquiries into modern industrial society increasingly led them to argue that Marxism, the intellectual basis for communism, was an outdated social theory. Many such scholars interacted through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a nonprofit institution—secretly funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—that brought together anticommunist intellectuals from North America and Western Europe in the early 1950s. At the Congress’s September 1955 conference in Milan, sociologist Daniel Bell first spoke of the “end of ideology,” the notion that practical social welfare policies and democratic-pluralist politics, not proletarian revolution, had provided the solution to the social problems caused by industrialism.²⁵

The 1955 conference in Milan came on the heels of a more significant gathering in Bandung, Indonesia a few months earlier. There, leaders from across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East met to assert their political, economic, and cultural independence as a rising Cold

War order replaced a collapsing European colonialism. Importantly, the leaders of postcolonial, nonaligned nations like India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesia's Sukarno, and Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser were eager to quickly develop their economies and provide material benefits to their long-exploited populations—a “revolution of rising expectations” that caught the attention of U.S. liberals. Indeed, by the mid-1950s, with the reconstruction of Western Europe a success and with decolonization underway, liberal cold warriors increasingly turned their energies toward the emergent Third World. Like Europe after the war, they feared that Latin America, Africa, and Asia were susceptible to Communist revolution due to their low standards of living and economic “backwardness.” In order to find ways of advancing rapid, dramatic, but noncommunist transformation in these regions, liberal social scientists searched for an all-encompassing theory of social change to rival Marxism. Like the industrial relations scholars with whom they shared the same academic milieu, these academics—including economic historian Walt W. Rostow, sociologist Daniel Lerner, political scientist Gabriel Almond, and numerous others—had experienced the trauma of World War II and now wanted their research to serve the national crusade against world communism. Many of them, particularly Rostow through his Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), had helped develop early Cold War propaganda hyping the superiority of U.S. capitalism over Soviet communism.

In the mid-1950s, they molded modernization theory to serve as a blueprint for U.S. international development policy. Modernization theory posited that all societies follow a similar, linear trajectory of development, with “traditional” at one end and “modern” at the other. Traditional societies were said to be characterized by economic stagnation, rigid social hierarchies, rural livelihoods, a belief in superstition, and a cultural acceptance of fate. Modern

societies, on the other hand, were defined by constant economic growth and technical innovation, pluralist-democratic institutions, urban and industrial wage work, a reliance on scientific rationalism, and social mobility. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth*, published in 1960 as "a non-communist manifesto," served as the principal guidebook to modernization. In Rostow's framework, the crucial step to move from being a traditional society to a modern one was called "take-off," where at least ten percent of national income would be invested in factories and infrastructure to facilitate self-sustained industrialization. The goal of U.S. foreign aid, it was therefore suggested, should be to instigate take-off and speed-up the process of modernization.

As historians have argued, modernization was as much as an ideology as it was a social theory or set of policy recommendations.²⁶ Modernization ideology serves as a reflection for how liberal intellectuals viewed postwar U.S. society, since its proponents considered the United States to be the quintessential modern nation. The underlying premise was that the country had nearly solved its major domestic issues and now needed to turn its attention to fixing problems overseas, or else "run the danger of becoming a bore to ourselves and the rest of the world."²⁷ The cheery outlook that gave these social scientists faith in modernization came from the same source that gave labor scholars confidence in industrial pluralism. The postwar decades saw the United States experience the greatest period of economic prosperity in history and the rise of a robust middle class. Liberals genuinely believed that, in the words of modernization scholar Seymour Martin Lipset, "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved" because "workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship."²⁸ Rostow and his MIT colleague Max Milikan contended in 1957 that the country "is now within sight of solutions to the range of issues which have dominated its political life since 1865," namely the "central problem" of reconciling "the fact of industrialization with the abiding principles of

democracy.”²⁹ In short, the “labor question” had at last been answered. Crucial for Cold War exigencies, the answer was industrial pluralism—not communism—something liberals were eager to demonstrate to the peoples of the Third World.

Labor and Development

Industrial relations scholars and international labor specialists were prominent among experts writing about modernization and development in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Many grappled with the apparent paradox of workers in an unabashedly capitalist society like the United States attaining the highest standard of living in the world—which seemed to fly in the face of Marx—and wondered whether the U.S. experience could be replicated in the newly industrializing nations of the Third World. Particularly noteworthy was the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development, launched in 1954 by an all-star quartet of industrial relations scholars: Clark Kerr of the University of California, John Dunlop of Harvard, the University of Chicago’s Frederick Harbison, and MIT’s Charles Myers. The Inter-University Study, which continued into the early 1970s and profoundly influenced a generation of industrial relations experts, received grants from the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation to bring together labor scholars for a series of conferences and dozens of projects leading to the publication of 80 books and articles. About 100 researchers from dozens of institutions around the world participated. They mainly came from the home universities of the four coordinating board members, as well as Princeton, Yale, Vassar, and Rutgers, as well as from institutions in India, Lebanon, Japan, South Africa, England, Sweden, Italy, France, and West Germany.³⁰

One of the participants in the Inter-University Study particularly worth noting was Robert J. Alexander. An interdisciplinary scholar at Rutgers, in the postwar decades, Alexander became the most well-known U.S. expert on the labor movements and industrial relations systems of

Latin America. From the 1940s to the 1990s, Alexander did extensive field research throughout Latin America, often advising the AFL and AFL-CIO. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, he served on the board of the Institute of International Labor Research, which brought together anticommunist social democrats from across the Americas and was chaired by stalwart Socialist presidential candidate Norman Thomas. Like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, this institute was secretly funded by the CIA (see Chapter Five).³¹ Among other projects, the institute published a Spanish-language newspaper called *Combate* and distributed it across the region, propagandizing democratic political movements and their struggles against authoritarianism.³² In 1955, Dunlop asked Alexander to write a survey on Latin American labor relations for the Inter-University Study and offered funds via the Ford Foundation for an eight-month trip to the region. Alexander accepted, later publishing *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile* in 1962.³³

The analytical framework of the Inter-University Study adopted by scholars like Alexander was best articulated in its most significant publication, 1960's *Industrialism and Industrial Man* by Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers.³⁴ The authors did not dwell on an inherent conflict between workers and capitalists, believing this was an outdated and insufficient mode of analysis to understand the emergence of industrial societies. They contended that labor movements historically arose not as a reaction to capitalism per se, but to industrialization. In their view, capitalism, like communism, was simply a system of ownership. Capitalism was particular to certain societies and contexts, but not universal in the way industrialism was. The authors saw industrial societies less in terms of classes inevitably in conflict with one another and more in terms of interest groups capable of negotiating and finding agreement. They therefore focused their analysis on the technocratic relationship between “the managers and the managed,” contending that the “road to industrialization is paved less with class warfare and

more with class alliances.”³⁵ The authors believed there would eventually be a “convergence” of all countries, regardless of culture or politics, at a similar state of “pluralistic industrialism,” where equilibrium is achieved between centralized decision-making and individual freedom, and in which tensions between workers and managers are resolved through a rational, bureaucratic “web of rules.” In sum, they argued that all societies would eventually attain the kind of stable, “modern” industrial relations system as existed in the United States, though they might follow different paths to get there. Before modernization was achieved, however, the question of whether unions in developing countries should attempt to mimic their counterparts in North America and Western Europe or function differently was up for debate.

In 1957, a provocative article by Indian economist Asoka Mehta addressing this question appeared in the pages of *Economic Development and Social Change*, an influential journal among modernization theorists. Mehta argued that pluralist labor relations would not fly in the Third World, as unions there would need to subordinate their economic demands to the priorities of the developmental state.³⁶ The apparent problem, as many social scientists recognized, boiled down to an apparent conflict between the need for capital formation and demands for higher wages. In order to reach Rostow’s “take-off” stage of development, capital would need to be saved. Giving workers higher wages would, it was assumed, sabotage take-off, as demand would outpace supply and workers would spend their earnings on imported consumer commodities.³⁷ Multiple thinkers considered it “inevitable” that there would be a “collision” between “moderate union pressures for wage increases” and “the demands of ministers of finance and planning for sacrifice and capital accumulation.”³⁸ To liberal U.S. academics, expecting Third World unions to submit to the edicts of the state sounded uncomfortably reminiscent of Communist regimes, but hindering development in these countries might leave their populations frustrated and

vulnerable to the siren song of proletarian revolution. The conundrum was how to simultaneously ensure independent worker associations—considered one of the hallmarks of a democratic society—and rapid modernization. “Somehow,” as labor economist Walter Galenson put it in 1959, “a balance must be struck which both satisfies the requirements of the economic planner and the minimum demands of the industrial worker.”³⁹

At the same time, labor diplomats sometimes questioned the applicability of industrial pluralism to the Third World. In 1963, Bruce Millen, a labor attaché who had served in Italy and was now assigned to India, struggled to understand how “the American model” of unions stressing “their ‘economic’ function through more intensive efforts to bargain collectively with employers” could be useful in developing countries where there were “relatively few targets for collective bargaining” due to the “continuing lack of an industrial base.” Millen noted in African nations, for example, only four to 15 percent of the population was actually engaged in wage work, nearly half of them government employees. “I am convinced,” Millen wrote, that the “assumptions” undergirding the U.S. industrial relations model “are unwarranted in this frame of reference” and “constitute an unreliable policy base for the job of encouraging unionism” in the Third World.⁴⁰ George Cabot Lodge II, Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, made a similar case in 1962, arguing that “we need a broader perspective of the possible role of unions than we would get from looking only at the familiar scenes of North America and Western Europe.”⁴¹ While encouraging collective bargaining practices and “indoctrinating trade unionists with what we conceive to be our political and economic philosophy” were worthwhile long-term goals, they were “frequently of no practical help to the trade-union leader of Africa, Asia, or Latin America.”⁴²

Some labor experts absolutely bristled at the idea that the U.S. industrial relations model could be exported to the developing world. “Any attempt to reshape the labor movement during the early phases of industrialization after the pattern of one movement in one country of highly advanced industry with an almost unique political and social history and a long tradition of labor shortage is... bound to fail,” sociologist Adolf Sturmthal wrote in 1960.⁴³ Between 1959 and 1963, a group of labor diplomats and industrial relations scholars met regularly in Washington, D.C. as part of a seminar to understand the exportability of industrial pluralism to a wide variety of national contexts. Organized by the National Institute of Labor Education (NILE)—a nonprofit explored further in Chapter Two—the seminar included Millen and Alexander, among others, and was chaired by Everett Kassalow, a researcher with the AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department. The papers presented by participants were published in 1963’s *National Labor Movements in the Postwar World*.⁴⁴ One seminar participant whose contributions were not published was Daniel Horowitz, who had served as the very first U.S. labor attaché in Chile in the 1940s. Horowitz seemed to take partial issue with the seminar’s approach. Though appreciative of the need for comparative analysis across national contexts, he “urged humility in making generalizations because of the complexities which had to be examined and understood [and] warned against deterministic explanations.”⁴⁵

If crudely transplanting U.S.-style labor relations into the Third World was infeasible, then what function should trade unions serve in the nascent industrial economies of modernizing nations? Mehta contended that instead of making militant wage demands and being a thorn in the side of developmental states, Third World unions could act as “mediating institutions,” using educational and mutual support programs to help individuals adjust to the transition from peasant to industrial worker. This, he believed, would give unions a valuable auxiliary role in

government-led nation-building.⁴⁶ Indeed, by the early 1960s, many noncommunist unions in developing countries—including the Textile Labor Association of Ahmedabad, India, Israel’s Histadrut, and Tunisia’s Union Général Tunisienne du Travail—fashioned themselves as social welfare agencies, helping members meet basic needs like food, housing, healthcare, and education. The provision of services by unions could be a substitute for wage demands, presumably allowing capital savings to foster national growth, while establishing worker loyalty to politically moderate, government-friendly labor movements.⁴⁷ Lodge believed it was urgent for the U.S. government to address the immediate needs of workers in developing countries by assisting “worker organizations themselves in becoming agents of development for the benefit of their membership.” By aiding Third World unions in setting up housing, medical clinics, cooperatives, and credit unions, the United States “would be contributing to the establishment of a free economic and social order by preparing [unions] to take on their traditional role in the labor-management relationship when industrialization and the general level of wealth proceed far enough to allow it.”⁴⁸ It was hoped, in other words, that encouraging unions to function as social welfare organizations in the short term would help lay the groundwork for a modern society in which U.S.-style collective bargaining would eventually be more appropriate.

In addition, unions like these regarded themselves as voluntarily working with the developmental state, not least because, in many cases, they had been at the vanguard of national independence movements and because their leaders often became top government officials. Industrial relations scholars believed these close connections between the state and labor could easily be reconciled with the democratic pluralist ideal. In the modernization process, “the trade union cannot isolate itself and act in a social vacuum,” but must “align itself to the activities of the state.”⁴⁹ Serving as a willing adjunct in state planning may have seemed to go against the

notion of autonomous unionism, but an organization like the Tunisian labor federation was still “certainly free in the sense that it is not dominated by a foreign power” like the Soviet Union.⁵⁰ Besides, it was considered fundamentally modern for unions to make certain compromises and concessions, as this implied the existence of “pluralistic authority.” By participating in state planning, unions in developing countries would learn to adjust their potentially radical expectations to “reality,” allowing class tensions to “find some accommodation in *administering* the system rather than in violent, extralegal forms of seeking to *change* the system.”⁵¹ Also, of the different services unions could provide workers without resorting to demands for higher pay, one of “the most obvious of these” was the grievance procedure. While raising wages might pose a problem for development, refusing to deal with unions to resolve other types of complaints—including those related to safety, breaks, harassment, etc.—was “not economic common sense” as it would only serve to make unions more militant and “prevent their evolution into businesslike, if not business organizations.”⁵² Therefore, mainstays of industrial pluralism like grievance handling and class cooperation were still considered central to this conceptualization of development-oriented unionism.

Modernization theorists were not only concerned with economic growth, but also with the shaping of “modern” attitudes and behaviors among individuals. Unlike the parochial, fate-embracing traditional individual, “modern man” was physically and socially mobile as well as able to psychologically connect with others beyond those “he” encountered in “his” own life.⁵³ In a significant study, modernization scholars Alex Inkeles and David Smith posited that factories served as “schools in modernity” because the experience of factory work transformed traditional individuals into modern ones. As a “powerful environment” in which bureaucratic rules, precise timing, routine operations, innovative machinery, and cultural neutrality all play a

strong role, the factory impressed modern sensibilities onto the psyches of those who worked there.⁵⁴ Therefore, getting people to embrace factory work was essential to the modernizing process. Modernization theorists and labor scholars identified “commitment” to industrial work on the part of individuals as a major problem to be overcome in developing countries.

Commitment was defined as both the short-term problem of reducing absenteeism and turnover among industrial workers in the Third World (many of whom only saw urban wage labor as a temporary supplement to their traditional, rural lifestyles) and the long-term problem of creating a mature, industrial labor force to actualize economic development.⁵⁵

In March 1958, Harbison and Myers of the Inter-University Study came together with the Social Science Research Council—a group of intellectuals interested in modernization—for a conference in Chicago on the problem of commitment, resulting in the influential volume *Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas*, edited by sociologists Wilbert Moore and Arnold Feldman.⁵⁶ Clark Kerr contributed a chapter. Taking a cue from Rostow’s “stages of growth,” Kerr identified four discrete stages of commitment, ranging from “uncommitted” and “semicommitted” on the traditional end of the spectrum to “committed” and “overcommitted” on the modern end.⁵⁷ Importantly, scholars noted that a committed labor force was not a docile one—“overcommitted” workers were those who, like unionized industrial workers in the United States in this period, expected serious rewards for their labor and were prepared to fight for them.⁵⁸ The existence of healthy trade unions, in other words, signified commitment. Further, as institutions nominally indifferent to caste, kin, and religion, funded by member dues, and administered through bureaucratic procedures, unions were considered thoroughly modern. As industrial relations scholar William Friedland put it in 1963, “There are no chairmen or presidents of tribes, nor does caste have a general secretary.”⁵⁹ Labor leaders could serve as a

“counterweight” to those who “seek to organize power around traditional religious, caste, tribal, or linguistic groups,” making the trade union a “valuable adjunct to the modernists who are trying to build new social, political, and economic structures.”⁶⁰

Conclusion

In the years following World War II, liberals in the United States viewed the emerging global conflict with the Soviet Union as pitting pluralist democracy against authoritarianism. Crucial to their interpretation of the Cold War was the belief that industrialism was an inexorable process that uprooted centuries of social stability and cultural tradition, creating potentially explosive tensions that could be dealt with in only one of two ways: rational class cooperation—which would preserve and strengthen democracy—or violent class warfare—which would produce totalitarianism and stamp out human freedom. Therefore, reducing class-based antagonism through sound labor-management relations was a central concern of liberal cold warriors. The intellectual work of industrial relations scholars and the international diplomacy of labor specialists were vital components of the anticommunist Marshall Plan, helping convince Western European workers that a capitalist economy negotiated through liberal pluralism would bring them greater happiness than a communist economy planned by an all-powerful state. When the Cold War battleground began shifting away from Europe and toward the Third World in the mid-1950s, social scientists crafted modernization theory as the liberal answer to Marxism, creating an idealized picture of the United States and promising the peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia that they too could achieve political stability and economic prosperity. Again, labor and industrial relations experts offered key contributions, sketching out the role Third World trade unions could play in the development process. Rather than stirring up class conflict, which would throw modernization off the rails, noncommunist unions in the Third World could

serve as partners in state-led modernization, providing material benefits to their members and helping them adjust to industrialism as social welfare agencies.

The ideas propounded and knowledge produced by this cadre of social scientists, industrial relations professionals, and international labor specialists would need to be disseminated to workers in the Third World as a counterweight to leftist propaganda and class resentments. Accordingly, throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, labor education targeting the so-called underdeveloped nations became an important tool of Cold War liberals. While academics and government agencies would be active in shaping and promoting labor education programs abroad, anticommunist labor leaders ultimately made it their mission to teach Third World workers in the ways of what they called “democratic” or “free” trade unionism, the subject of the next chapter.

¹ Katherine V.W. Stone, 1981, “The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law,” *The Yale Law Journal* 90, No. 7, 1509-1580; Christopher L. Tomlins, 1985, “The New Deal, Collective Bargaining, and the Triumph of Industrial Pluralism,” *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 39, No. 1, 19-34.

² Joseph McCartin, 1997, *Labor's Great War: The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912-1921*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press; Roseanne Currarino, 2011, *The Labor Question in America: Economic Democracy in the Gilded Age*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

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Chapter Two: “Free” Trade Unionism and Labor Education

Liberal social scientists were not the only ones working with the U.S. government to export the industrial pluralist model in the early Cold War. Also in this period, Western-aligned labor movements made the promotion of “democratic” or “free” trade unionism one of their central objectives. The precepts of “free” trade unionism—the ability to deal autonomously with employers and the state, the acceptance of capitalism, and the preference for collective bargaining over outright class warfare—squared nicely with industrial pluralism, but long predated it. The AFL had been espousing the tenets of “free” trade unionism since its founding in 1886, though the more familiar, less romantic term was “business unionism.” The language of “democratic” or “free” trade unionism only came into vogue in the 1940s to explicitly signify a rebuke to fascism and communism, both systems where unions were subordinated to the demands of the state. In the same way industrial relations vaunted the benefits of pluralist consensus over social conflict, “free” trade unionism putatively championed the advantages of democracy over totalitarianism.

The proselytization of this brand of unionism was given added legitimacy by the social-scientific vision to rapidly modernize the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s and the by the fact that postwar liberalism claimed collective bargaining to be one of the pillars of democracy, as important as free expression and the franchise. Focused on capital formation and wary of wage concessions, economic planners in developing countries preferred “responsible” business unions that could manage workers’ expectations and contain labor unrest. In practice, this usually meant the absence of free collective bargaining in favor of state control over unions. Western labor liberals were thus faced with a conundrum in the Third World: supporting truly independent

worker organizations would risk undermining the all-important process of modernization, but sidelining union autonomy would mean sacrificing a core principle of democracy.

Liberal labor leaders like Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the social-democratic trade unionists of Western Europe were never fully able to resolve this problem, opting to tread cautiously in the Third World. Modest labor education programs, championed by Western labor liberals and U.S. academics, became the primary means to transfer the lessons of “modern” industrial relations to the Third World in the hopes of warding off Communist influence. At the same time, the AFL and later AFL-CIO’s hardline cold warriors like George Meany, Jay Lovestone, and Serafino Romualdi had no qualms about carrying out bold interventions across the developing world, especially in Latin America, in partnership with the U.S. government. By the early 1960s, the fixation on international development and labor education held by academics and policymakers would allow the AFL-CIO’s hawkish anticommunists ample opportunities and resources to carry out their foreign interventions—leading to the establishment of the controversial American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).

The AFL’s “Free” Trade Unionists

With the end of World War II in sight in 1944, the AFL—whose anticommunist leaders already saw the Soviet Union as an enemy—allocated \$1 million for the creation of a new international project: the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC). Officially, the FTUC maintained an ambiguous affiliation with the AFL, giving it leeway to respond quickly to geopolitical developments and to act without accountability to rank-and-file union members. Its purpose was to spread “free” trade unionism to other parts of the world, and particularly to disrupt the growth of Left-led unions abroad by helping set up anticommunist splinter unions.¹ The FTUC was the

brainchild of two prominent AFL leaders: ex-socialist David Dubinsky and arch-conservative Matthew Woll. Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), and Woll, head of the Photo-Engravers' Union, had earlier teamed up to create the Labor League for Human Rights in 1940, a war relief charity that assisted European labor leaders escape Nazi persecution. They founded the FTUC in 1944 with the support of fellow anticommunist George Meany, a plumber who had risen through the ranks of union officialdom to become AFL Secretary-Treasurer, and who would become president of the AFL eight years later. To run the FTUC, Dubinsky tapped his most important international adviser, Jay Lovestone.²

Two decades earlier, Lovestone had been a major Communist leader and intellectual, helping found the Communist Party USA in 1919. In 1929, however, he made the mistake of openly supporting Stalin's rival in the Politburo, Nikolai Bukharin, and was expelled from the party. Lovestone and his followers in the United States then formed the Communist Party Opposition, a group commonly referred to as the "Lovestoneites," to wage war against the official Communist Party that had excommunicated them.³ In the 1930s, Lovestone formed an alliance with Dubinsky, using his intimate knowledge to identify and purge Moscow-oriented Communists from the ILGWU's ranks. With Dubinsky's help, Lovestone was brought into the CIO-affiliated UAW in 1937 to assist its president, Homer Martin, expel suspected "reds" from the union. Acting under Lovestone's counsel, in 1938, Martin suspended several UAW leaders he believed were tied to the Communist Party USA, setting off an internal battle that nearly tore apart the union. Walter Reuther, influential president of UAW Local 174, emerged as Martin's main rival in the conflict. Though an anticommunist in his own right, Reuther opposed Martin's red-baiting and the dissension it caused. The conflict was finally resolved in December 1938

when CIO leaders stepped in to broker an agreement, which included the removal of the Lovestoneites from the UAW.⁴ Reuther—who would become president of both the UAW and CIO less than a decade later—would never forget nor forgive the role Lovestone played in sewing internal discord in his union.

After his misadventures in the UAW and with the outbreak of World War II, Lovestone disbanded his Communist opposition party and fully embraced anticommunism, heading the ILGWU's international affairs department until being named executive secretary of the newly formed FTUC in 1944.⁵ Even before the Cold War began in earnest, the FTUC's top priority was preventing the spread of communism into war-ravaged Western Europe. To carry out this mission, Lovestone recruited longtime union organizer and former labor representative to the War Production Board, Irving Brown. Stationed in Paris, Brown funneled FTUC aid to anticommunist, "free" trade unions in France, Italy, and West Germany, providing such unions and their members with CARE packages, mimeograph machines, and typewriters. As Meany would brag two decades later, the AFL was battling international communism "long before there was any such organization as the CIA and long before there was any such thing as the Marshall Plan."⁶ In 1948, the CIA—created only one year earlier—entered into a formal partnership with the more established FTUC. In exchange for providing the spy agency with intelligence on foreign trade unions and labor leaders, the FTUC would receive funds to prop up anticommunist unions.⁷

Now directly allied with the U.S. government, the FTUC aggressively supported the new Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, bringing it into conflict with Communist-led unions like France's Confédération Générale du Travail, which opposed the Plan because it was designed to curtail Soviet influence and forestall proletarian revolution. Using money from the CIA, Brown

helped facilitate the creation of anticommunist, pro-Marshall Plan splinter unions, including the Force Ouvrière in France in 1948. Meanwhile, as the State Department recruited officials from U.S. unions to serve as labor advisers to the Marshall Plan (see Chapter One), it reportedly had to clear every candidate with Lovestone, who would verify their anticommunist bona fides. Despite their shared Cold War goals, the FTUC and CIA frequently clashed in the early 1950s.⁸

Lovestone and Brown resented the CIA's attempts to control the FTUC and were jealous of the Agency's efforts to partner with the CIO. In 1953, the head of the CIA's International Organizations Division, Thomas Braden, complained to CIA Director Allen Dulles that Lovestone was not bothering to fill out reports detailing how the FTUC was spending the Agency's money.⁹ To the consternation of the AFL, Braden tried making inroads with the CIO, giving \$50,000 in cash in 1952 to Walter Reuther and his younger brother Victor—who was then serving as the CIO's main representative to Western Europe—so they could pass it along to European “free” trade unions.¹⁰ Braden, whose family life would later be fictionalized on the TV dramedy *Eight is Enough*, left the CIA in 1954, and the Agency's counterintelligence chief James Angleton became the new liaison to the FTUC. By all accounts, Angleton and Lovestone would maintain a healthy working relationship for the next twenty years.¹¹

Meanwhile, the AFL was also actively promoting “free” trade unionism in Latin America, working with anticommunist Peruvian labor leaders to establish the Confederación Interamericana de Trabajadores (CIT) in 1948. The CIT was conceived as an alternative to the leftist Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL)—founded by Mexico's Vicente Lombardo Toledano in 1938—which maintained friendly relations with the AFL's rivals in the CIO. The CIT was largely the handiwork of the AFL's main representative in Latin America, Serafino Romualdi, an Italian antifascist and anticommunist who fled Mussolini's

regime in the 1920s. For over twenty years, Romualdi was considered “the principal personification” of U.S. labor’s interests in Latin American labor affairs.¹² Like Jay Lovestone, he was brought into the halls of union officialdom by David Dubinsky, working in the ILGWU’s communications department in the 1930s. During World War II, Romualdi crisscrossed Latin America as an advisor to Nelson Rockefeller’s Office for Inter-American Affairs, also briefly going back to Italy with the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA. After the war, he became the AFL’s Inter-American Representative, building relationships with anticommunist, pro-U.S. labor leaders in the region and helping found the CIT.¹³ Among his many contacts was the scholar Robert J. Alexander, who occasionally sent his assessments of the Latin American labor scene to Romualdi as well as Lovestone. Alexander’s book for the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development (see Chapter One) was dedicated to Romualdi.¹⁴

The ICFTU and the AFL-CIO

Anticommunist unions from around the world gathered in London in late 1949 to found the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). It was the culmination of four years of growing Cold War tensions in the international labor movement. Just months after World War II ended in 1945, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was established in Paris with the vision of being a sort of United Nations for organized labor. The three largest national trade union centers involved were the CIO, the British Trades Union Congress (TUC), and the U.S.S.R.’s All Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The leftist CTAL of Latin America also affiliated with the WFTU. Under the influence of figures like Lovestone and Meany, the AFL refused to be part of the WFTU on the grounds that it included Communists. The FTUC spearheaded efforts to discredit and divide the WFTU as part of its larger crusade against the spread of Communist influence. As Cold War battle lines were drawn in the late

1940s, rifts began to appear within the WFTU. The question of Marshall Plan aid became the most divisive issue, with the Soviets and their sympathizers opposing it and the CIO and TUC favoring it. As the CIO's leaders abandoned their corporatist goals and purged leftists from their ranks in the wake of the Taft-Hartley Act, they also became disillusioned with the WFTU due to its Soviet influence. In June 1949, the CIO and TUC pulled out of the WFTU.¹⁵ At the same time, the CIO broke off its ties with the CTAL.

The AFL's anticommunist leaders seized the opportunity and led the way in the creation of the ICFTU in November-December of that same year, which included the CIO, TUC, and other Western-aligned trade union centers that had abandoned the WFTU. At a conference in Mexico City in January 1951, the CIT also voted to join the new confederation and changed its name to the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT). The new ICFTU included affiliates from all over the world—including Latin America, Asia, and Africa—and claimed to represent nearly 48 million trade unionists.¹⁶ It was headquartered in Brussels, with leaders of Western Europe's social-democratic unions serving as its officers. While the AFL defined "free" trade unionism specifically as freedom from control by political parties, the state, employers, and religious institutions, the European unionists—who were allied to social-democratic political parties—defined it more vaguely as freedom from external domination. In any case, all agreed that labor movements needed to be autonomous. "In modern society, trade unions are bound to have relations with political parties, with other units in a free society, with governments," the TUC's Arthur Deakin said at the ICFTU's founding congress. "But the trade unionists must manage their own affairs...they make their own rules...they do not await instructions from employers or political parties."¹⁷ Historian Magaly Rodríguez García has described the ICFTU as a "multi-class movement," because its leaders—turned off by class

conflict—tended to identify not only with the poor and working class, but also with elites from the realms of government and business. They championed broadly liberal values including individual freedom, political participation, private property, and equal opportunity, but foregrounded the role of organized labor in defending democracy and promoting economic development.¹⁸

CIO president Walter Reuther was more popular on the international stage than the AFL's hardline cold warriors. While also anticommunist, Reuther and the ICFTU's European leaders believed there could be peaceful coexistence and negotiations between West and East, a view fundamentally opposed by Meany, who by now was the AFL's president.¹⁹ Though they had been instrumental in the creation of the ICFTU, Meany, Lovestone, and Brown soon had doubts that its comparatively dovish leaders could effectively wage the Cold War, and thus continued to act unilaterally through the FTUC, especially in Europe and Asia. Meanwhile, the AFL heavily funded and influenced ORIT—the ICFTU's arm in the Western Hemisphere—with Romualdi and his relationships with regional labor leaders directing ORIT's priorities. As AFL and CIO leaders discussed plans to merge into a single labor federation in 1954-1955, international policy was a point of contention. Reuther believed that U.S. labor should carry out its foreign activities through the multilateral auspices of the ICFTU and wanted the FTUC disbanded. Perhaps more to the point, he wanted to oust Lovestone, whose meddling in Reuther's UAW in 1938 had nearly destroyed the union. The two men clashed over Cold War strategy at a meeting in February 1955 between leaders of the AFL and CIO to discuss the merger. "We, of the CIO, are for coexistence and we are for extending coexistence," Reuther said. "The AFL is against it. Maybe we ought to have a good, long discussion on it sometime." Lovestone shot back, "Did you ever think that coexistence means the Russians want us to

undersign and underwrite all their loot, all that they plundered since World War II. Would you like to have such coexistence?"²⁰ Reuther's reply was not recorded.

Meany was prepared to abandon neither the FTUC nor Lovestone, but he needed to appease Reuther to allow the merger to go smoothly. The compromise was to assign two chairmen to the merged federation's International Affairs Committee—the AFL's Matthew Woll and the CIO's Jacob Potofsky—making it the only standing committee in the AFL-CIO to have two chairs. Further, an uncontroversial academic and labor relations professional named George T. Brown was chosen to direct the new International Affairs Department, while Lovestone was kept on as the executive secretary of the FTUC.²¹ Meany remained convinced that the European social democrats at the ICFTU could not be trusted to fight the Cold War with sufficient vigor. He was especially troubled by what he perceived as the permissive response of the ICFTU toward Third World leaders who embraced nonalignment, leading him to publicly excoriate the neutralism of India's Jawaharlal Nehru at the same ceremony celebrating the completed merger of the AFL and CIO in December 1955. Doing diplomatic damage control, Reuther paid a friendly visit to India five months later and praised Nehru, much to the relief of ICFTU leaders who did not wish to alienate their Asian affiliates like the Indian National Trade Union Congress, tied to Nehru's Congress Party.²²

Reuther continued pressuring Meany to dissolve the FTUC through 1957, arguing it was unnecessarily competing with the ICFTU. That same year, George Brown left his post as director of the International Affairs Department and was replaced by Michael Ross, a CIO official sympathetic to Reuther's viewpoint. Finally, in December 1957, Meany agreed to end the FTUC after a high-level meeting with ICFTU officials during the AFL-CIO's convention in Atlantic City.²³ Nevertheless, Lovestone, Romualdi, Irving Brown, and other hardliners remained as

influential advisors to Meany on international policy. At the close of the decade, with the independence of multiple African states, and especially after the Cuban Revolution, the AFL-CIO's anticommunist clique increasingly believed they would have to pursue their own, more aggressive course to ensure Third World workers would not drift into a Communist orbit. With the FTUC gone, they needed a new vehicle to carry out their foreign interventions, which soon emerged as a labor education program—the American Institute for Free Labor Development, or AIFLD.

Labor Education and the Cold War

It is well worth considering why the AFL-CIO's new instrument to wage the Cold War in developing countries in the 1960s took the particular form of a labor education institute. Educational programs to train workers in the ways of rational collective bargaining and responsible union administration exploded in the post-World War II years as part of the creation of new university industrial relations schools (see Chapter One). These included both short-term, non-residential programs for trade unionists as well as residential degree programs for future labor relations professionals. As was commonly argued by the 1950s, “the operation of unions has become a profession, a complicated and responsible job, requiring training and expert knowledge in a great many fields.”²⁴ The purpose of postwar labor education was not to radicalize or agitate workers into militant action, but to foster industrial peace by imparting “a wise and sustained sense of public responsibility” onto union officials through “wider knowledge and deeper understanding.”²⁵

In 1951, eight university industrial relations schools came together to administer a \$95,000 grant from the Ford Foundation's Fund for Adult Education for experimental labor education projects. Incorporating as a nonprofit called the Inter-University Labor Education

Committee (IULEC), the partnering institutions included the University of California- Los Angeles, University of Chicago, Cornell, University of Illinois, Rutgers, University of Wisconsin, and Roosevelt University. Designed as a temporary organization, IULEC's main purpose was to foster cooperation on educational programs between universities and unions at the national level, which until then had only been managed through advisory committees between individual universities and local union councils. Its board of directors included leaders from the AFL and CIO, such as CIO General Counsel and future Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. In 1952, the board hired Joseph Mire to be the nonprofit's executive secretary. A native of Austria, Mire had served in the education department of the AFL-affiliated American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and ran IULEC from an office in Madison, Wisconsin.²⁶ Using IULEC's foundation funding, Mire conducted a broad survey of U.S. labor education initiatives, published in 1956 as *Labor Education: A Study Report on Needs, Programs, and Approaches*. Finished in the wake of the AFL-CIO merger, the study concluded that a permanent organization was needed to more effectively encourage cooperation between unions, universities, foundations, and government agencies for labor education programs. Appropriately, IULEC was reconstituted the following year as the National Institute of Labor Education (NILE), with Mire serving as executive director. Though still financed primarily by the Fund for Adult Education, NILE also received both moral and monetary support from Meany and the AFL-CIO.²⁷

Importantly, Mire framed NILE's labor education mission in Cold War terms, writing in his 1956 report that "anything which contributes to lessening industrial strife and to making our industrial system more effective also strikes a blow for freedom by vindicating our way of life in the eyes of the rest of the world." He further linked labor education to international "free" trade

unionism, describing industrial relations as “an important new dimension of our foreign policy, perhaps not less important than our policy of military preparedness.” Because Communist parties directed their appeals to workers, Mire suggesting that “our chances for survival” would depend “on the determined resistance to totalitarianism of the free trade union movement all over the world.”²⁸ Leaders of the ICFTU shared the same view, launching educational initiatives for their Third World affiliates throughout the 1950s. These labor schools were premised on the idea that would-be rabble-rousers in developing countries would need to be shaped into rational technocrats, since noncommunist modernization required cadres of unionists who could be expected to deal “responsibly” with employers and government officials. This, it was hoped, would effectively combat the potential appeal of communism among workers in weak economies, as it had in Western Europe after World War II.

After founding its Asian Regional Organization, the ICFTU set about creating a labor training school for its affiliated unions across the region. The Asian Trade Union College opened its doors in Calcutta in November 1952. Fully funded by the ICFTU, the College was directed by V.S. Mathur, one of the founders of the Indian Adult Education Association, and its curriculum was developed by M.N. Roy, former General Secretary of the Indian Federation of Labour.²⁹ The facilities included a lecture hall, library, dormitory, and cafeteria. It held both 12-week courses and short-term seminars to impart “modern methods and techniques of efficient union organization,” with the goal that students would “imbibe...the spirit of democracy” which “draws nourishment from reason and knowledge instead from passion and authority.” In addition to offering technical classes on collective bargaining and labor economics, the College taught the “meaning and implications of democracy” and why liberal pluralism was vital to the survival of “free” unions.³⁰ Interested in fostering pan-Asian unity, Nehru sometimes visited the school and

met with its students, who hailed from Burma, Ceylon, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and India itself.³¹ The College opened an extension program called the Workers' Education Center in 1953, offering classes, books, and a meeting space for local Calcutta workers. Students of the College were encouraged to develop projects for how to help grow their own unions upon returning home, and staff endeavored to keep in touch with graduates.³²

Following the model of its Calcutta school, in 1958, the ICFTU founded the African Labor College in Kampala, in what was then the British protectorate of Uganda. This school assembled unionists from anglophone Africa—since the majority of ICFTU's African affiliates were English-speaking—to “train trade union teachers who will in turn carry the message of free trade unionism together with practical trade union education to the rank-and-file in their own countries.”³³ Like the Asian Trade Union College, the “overriding importance” of the African College's purpose was characterized as the belief that “workers instilled with the tenets of democratic trade unionism will not fall easy prey to communist propaganda and infiltration.”³⁴ Before it opened, the Kampala school took center stage in the “Atlantic City Accord” between Meany and the ICFTU that saw the end of the FTUC. Just as the idea for the College was gaining traction in 1957, the AFL-CIO announced a \$50,000 scholarship program to bring African union leaders to U.S. universities for labor training, a unilateral move that offended ICFTU officials, especially British and French representatives eager to guard their influence on the continent in the midst of decolonization. At the same meeting in Atlantic City where Meany agreed to disband the FTUC, he also agreed to scrap the African scholarship program and instead put the \$50,000 toward the Kampala school.³⁵ The College was bankrolled primarily by the ICFTU's

International Solidarity Fund, established in 1957 to finance organizing, education, and humanitarian activities in the Third World.

Directed by Swedish labor leader Sven Fockstedt, the African Labor College held four-month residential courses, welcoming unionists from 16 English-speaking African countries, as well as Aden and Mauritius, selected by their respective national trade union centers. Some of the subjects taught at the College focused on questions of modernization, such as “Transition to Industrialism,” “Africa’s Economic and Social Problems,” “Trade Unions, Tribalism, and Radicalism,” and “Labor Migration.”³⁶ Its small, international staff was comprised mostly of white Europeans, who often clashed with the school’s one AFL-CIO representative—African American civil and labor rights activist George McCray. McCray, who worked at the College until 1965, was outspoken in his criticism of the paternalistic attitude of the European representatives, correctly predicting that African unionists would grow weary of ICFTU influence in their labor movements.³⁷ Meanwhile, the Israeli Histadrut, an ICFTU affiliate, opened its own residential labor school in 1960: the Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation. Based in Tel Aviv and offering three- to six-month courses in English and French for both male and female union leaders from Asia and Africa, the Institute focused less on the virtues of democracy and more on the practical role of unions in economic development. U.S. labor provided funds for student scholarships, and Meany served in the ceremonial position of the Afro-Asian Institute’s co-chairman.³⁸

For its part, the International Labor Organization (ILO)—under the directorship of former New Dealer David Morse— increasingly turned its attention toward the Third World with its own labor education and technical assistance programs. In 1960, the ILO opened the International Institute for Labor Studies near its headquarters in Geneva. The institute welcomed

not only union officials to its three-month courses, but also representatives from business and government in keeping with the ILO's tripartite structure. It was supervised by an academic council that included Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers—who also steered the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development described in Chapter One.³⁹ Much like the Inter-University Study, the ILO's institute took a comparative approach, teaching students about the differing industrial relations systems of multiple countries.⁴⁰ Using its standard-setting authority, the ILO supported the cause of “free” trade unionism by urging developing countries to codify and protect freedom of association as a fundamental human right. Leaders of these nations, who characterized the need for rapid industrialization as an emergency situation, often felt the ILO's promulgations were unrealistic and only served as obstacles to economic growth.⁴¹ Some felt that Western pressure to prioritize freedom of association above modernization was tantamount to neocolonialism, prompting numerous African trade union centers to pull out of the ICFTU at the beginning of the 1960s and form their own pan-African labor confederation more sensitive to the realities of postcolonial states (see Chapter Three).⁴² Such setbacks only further convinced Meany that idealistic or European-based international bodies could not be trusted to carry out effective labor policies in developing countries.

U.S.-Directed International Labor Education

When it came to labor education efforts in the Third World, U.S. academics and government agencies focused most of their attention on Latin America. The commonwealth of Puerto Rico provided an intriguing venue for such efforts, particularly in the 1950s. Thanks to ambitious economic development programs—including the New Deal-inspired “Operation Bootstrap”—Puerto Rico had experienced rapid industrialization in the 1940s, with the number

of factories on the island growing from 800 in 1939 to 2,000 by 1949 and with the urban population increasing 58 percent during the same period.⁴³ As businesses from the mainland United States expanded into Puerto Rico, so too did U.S. unions, establishing new locals on the island. Wanting to ease the transition to industrial wage labor for the island's emerging proletariat, as well as wanting to minimize industrial strife, the Puerto Rican government established a new Labor Relations Institute in 1950. Attached to the University of Puerto Rico, which had been founded a half-century earlier, the Institute offered both residential and extension courses for trade unionists and aspiring labor relations professionals, much like the industrial relations schools on the mainland.⁴⁴ Development and labor experts in the continental United States regarded the commonwealth as both a "showcase" for modernization and as a "bridge" between North and South America. As one labor education specialist argued, "if business unionism as practiced in the U.S. and as being innovated in Puerto Rico is the answer for Latin American labor organizations, then there is no better place in the world today for studying the effects of attempting to transplant U.S. labor organizational techniques in a non-U.S. environment."⁴⁵

Serafino Romualdi shared this assessment. Under his influence in 1951, ORIT—the ICFTU's newborn regional organization for the Americas, which was dominated by the AFL—partnered with the University of Puerto Rico's Labor Relations Institute to found the Latin American Union Leadership Training Program. Like the ICFTU schools in Africa and Asia, the program's mission was to teach union administration and collective bargaining to young, male labor leaders from across Latin America. Selected and funded by ORIT, the first six trainees arrived in the San Juan suburb of Río Piedras, home of the University of Puerto Rico's main campus, for a four-month course in January 1952. Romualdi and ORIT convinced the U.S.

Department of Labor to fund a two-month tour of the U.S. mainland for the students upon graduation. In June 1953, ORIT ended its formal ties with the program in favor of more cost-effective, short-term seminars across Latin America.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the leadership training program continued, now sponsored exclusively by U.S. economic aid, which by 1955 took the form of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA)—a descendent of the Marshall Plan’s Economic Cooperation Administration. ICA missions across Latin America, in partnership with their host governments and ORIT-affiliated national trade union centers, selected students to participate, whose transportation to Puerto Rico and living expenses on the island were covered by the ICA.⁴⁷ The Labor Department continued to fund tours of the U.S. mainland for graduates before they returned home.

In its first nine years of existence, the Union Leadership Training Program in Puerto Rico welcomed 400 students. The majority came from Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. The average age of the trainees—who mainly represented unions in the manufacturing, agriculture, and transportation industries—was 31 years old.⁴⁸ While the first course in 1952 included only six students, later courses welcomed as many as 30 participants. Of about 14 instructors, the majority were Puerto Rican faculty of the university, while a handful were labor experts from the U.S. mainland. The subjects taught included labor history, union administration, collective bargaining, labor law, economics, and English, while lectures were occasionally held on specialized topics like cooperatives, health and safety, union public relations, ORIT, and the ILO. Interestingly, although one of the main objectives of the ICA’s labor programs was to support “free” trade unionism’s anticommunist mission, the training course did not offer subjects on political ideologies or “defensive tactics” against Communist infiltration. Instead, the course simply emphasized the virtues of the U.S. industrial relations system, even as it failed to focus on

any particular issues facing the labor movements of Latin America.⁴⁹ Though not indoctrinated with explicit anticommunism, the experience of studying in Puerto Rico and touring North America on Uncle Sam's dime left many of the trainees feeling grateful and obligated to the United States. According to Miles Galvin—a researcher who evaluated the effectiveness of the program in 1961—many graduates came away from the course believing that “being militantly anti-communist is the means through which they can make their most meaningful contribution to their labor organization.”⁵⁰

Galvin's inquiry into the Puerto Rico leadership training program was part of his graduate studies at Cornell's Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) School. Upon finishing his master's degree, Galvin helped foster ties between Cornell's ILR School and the University of Puerto Rico's Labor Relations Institute. With funds from private foundations, the two universities partnered with International Trade Secretariats—global bodies of anticommunist unions covering particular industries—to train Latin American labor educators at the Puerto Rico institute starting in 1962.⁵¹ Directed by Galvin, this program aimed to address what he saw as one of the biggest deficiencies in the union leadership course by tailoring the curriculum to the specific needs of each student, rather than focus abstractly on the U.S. industrial relations system.⁵² At least some of the graduates of the labor educator program would go on to teach courses in their home countries sponsored by the AFL-CIO's AIFLD.⁵³ Cornell's ILR School carried out other international programs as well. It helped establish a Department of Industrial Relations at the University of Chile, using an ICA grant of about \$325,000 between 1959 and 1965. During the six-year project, Cornell hosted and trained 12 Chilean labor specialists to run the new university industrial relations program, hoping to pass onto them “a permanent capacity” to carry out “research, university teaching, and extension functions after withdrawal of U.S. aid.”

As part of the initiative, the ILR School organized dozens of seminars at the University of Chile to train local union members, and staff from both institutions carried out over 30 joint research projects resulting in the publication of several books, articles, and pamphlets.⁵⁴

Cornell's ILR School also ran an International Labor Training Program at its Ithaca campus between 1960 and 1963. Designed to develop a pool of international labor experts from the United States, the program welcomed 16 students in its three years of existence, who each did both residential coursework as well as a one-year internship with an International Trade Secretariat. Most of them were low-level union officials who received scholarships from their unions, though one student—Edwin P. Wilson—was later revealed to be a CIA operative. Wilson was sent to the training program by the spy agency in 1960 to gain skills on combating Communist unions abroad. Some twenty years later, he was convicted of illegally selling arms to Libya, labeled a “renegade” spy, and sentenced to 17 years in prison.⁵⁵ Also in 1960, the American University's School of International Service developed a new program in Overseas and International Labor Studies to groom cadres of labor diplomats to serve in the U.S. government, including as labor attachés in the State Department, specialists in the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs, and labor advisors in the ICA and U.S. Information Agency. It included both an undergraduate and graduate program, with courses on comparative industrial relations, labor and foreign policy, and labor problems in “underdeveloped areas.” American's Overseas and International Labor Studies program also offered a one-year course of study for U.S. trade unionists, sponsored by the AFL-CIO.⁵⁶

NILE's Joseph Mire had been particularly interested in such programs to educate U.S. unionists about international labor affairs, noting in 1958 that “the number of rank and file people involved in international activities...is still minor in relation to the total membership of

the labor movement.”⁵⁷ NILE was also involved in international labor education efforts of its own. Between 1959 and 1962, the nonprofit used an ICA grant to produce curriculum for university industrial relations courses tailored specifically to visiting Third World unionists. The curriculum covered trade union history and structure, economic development and comparative economic systems, labor and government, and U.S. government and society. Universities were assigned students from particular regions—the University of Illinois was responsible for East Asia, the University of Michigan, Michigan State, and Wayne State covered Southeast Asia, the University of Wisconsin handled South Asia, Roosevelt University welcomed African students, and Rutgers (the home of Robert Alexander) was responsible for Latin America.⁵⁸ In addition, using a grant from the Ford Foundation, NILE organized the Washington-based seminar on comparative national labor movements coordinated by Everett Kassalow and described in Chapter One.⁵⁹

AIFLD Takes Shape

It was within this context that the AFL-CIO’s new anticommunist labor education institute emerged at the start of the 1960s. After a 1957 visit to South America, Joseph Beirne, president of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and a member of the AFL-CIO’s Executive Council, was inspired to create a union training program specifically for Latin American communications workers. With funds from the ICA and with the support of Latin American specialists with the Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone International (PTTI)—the trade secretariat of anticommunist unions in the communications industry—Beirne organized a three-month course on “free” trade unionism, held at a CWA facility in Front Royal, Virginia in 1959 and attended by at least 15 Latin Americans.⁶⁰ Unlike the Puerto Rico training program, the CWA course included a subject explicitly warning students about the dangers of Communist

infiltration in their unions. Entitled “Democratic Safeguards,” the subject was taught by the eminent industrial relations professional David Saposs, who had served as the chief economist of the National Labor Relations Board and as a special adviser to the Marshall Plan, and was also a participant in NILE’s comparative labor seminar.⁶¹ Also different from the Puerto Rico program and ICFTU labor colleges, the Front Royal course gave graduates a nine-month stipend when they returned home to help them promote “free” trade unionism through self-designed organizing and educational projects.

As the Cuban Revolution set off fears that communism was on the march in the Western Hemisphere, Beirne was eager to expand the scope of his new labor training initiative. In April 1960, he approached NILE with a one-page proposal to “train between 200 and 250 trade union officers from Latin America” for three months at “universities in the U.S.A.” with money from the “labor movement, plus ICA, plus foundations.” The training content would include “regular tool subjects, plus consideration for functioning of a free society and methods of dealing with Communist efforts to capture control of unions.”⁶² NILE’s Joseph Mire initially tried to farm out the project to Latin American labor specialist Robert J. Alexander , but Alexander passed, only expressing interest in helping design the curriculum.⁶³ So instead, that July NILE turned to the University of Chicago’s labor education department—called the Union Research and Education Projects—reaching an agreement that its director, sociologist John McCollum, would produce a plan to realize Beirne’s vision.⁶⁴ The following month, Beirne and McCollum convinced Meany and the AFL-CIO Executive Council to appropriate \$20,000 to get the project off the ground.

Described as a “young, sandy-haired, square-built man,”⁶⁵ McCollum—who, by all accounts, was not a Latin America expert and had never visited the region—dove into the project with enthusiasm. He proposed putting together a Policy and Design Committee of 20 to 25

“prominent American citizens interested in Latin American labor” who could help spell out the project’s aims and objectives as well as attract \$1 million in funds from “foundations, government agencies, etc.”⁶⁶ Among the names he floated for the committee were Ralph Bunche, Margaret Mead, Walter Lippmann, Nelson Rockefeller, and J. Peter Grace of W.R. Grace and Company—a U.S. conglomerate active in Latin America since the mid-nineteenth century.⁶⁷ Students would not only get three months of training in the U.S., but, like the graduates of Beirne’s Front Royal course, they would also receive money to conduct “union organizing, administration and educational activities in their own unions for a nine month period” upon returning home.⁶⁸ After months of research and several conversations, McCollum called the first meeting of the Policy and Design Committee in Washington, D.C. in May 1961. Attendees included Meany, Romualdi, Grace, and Rockefeller’s associate Berent Friele. At the meeting, it was suggested that a nonprofit organization be created to administer the project, which would now seek \$4 million over five years to annually bring 100-150 Latin American unionists to the United States for training. It was further proposed that a handful of regional training centers in Latin America be established, partly as a way to identify which students would be best to send to the United States.⁶⁹ In the months following this meeting, McCollum contacted over a dozen foundations asking to finance the new nonprofit, which by September was being called the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).⁷⁰

Though McCollum envisioned AIFLD as something fairly similar to contemporaneous labor education initiatives targeting developing country workers, by late 1961, Meany, Beirne, and other hardline anticommunists in the AFL-CIO had plans to make it into a formidable Cold War weapon unlike the comparatively benign labor colleges of the ICFTU. Having shut down the FTUC a few years earlier to appease Reuther, frustrated by the ILO and ICFTU’s apparent

ineffectiveness in the Third World, and especially anxious after the Cuban Revolution, Meany and his fellow travelers hoped AIFLD would allow them to bring the fight to world communism on their own terms. Particularly encouraging to them in 1961 was the new occupant of the White House. Influenced by modernization theory and wanting to wage a smarter Cold War, President John F. Kennedy—who, it is worth noting, had not yet been elected when AIFLD was first proposed—enunciated an ambitious policy for international development upon taking office, dubbing the 1960s the “Decade of Development.” Meany and Beirne saw an opportunity, but McCollum was not on the same page.

In the latter part of 1961, McCollum struggled to attract funds for AIFLD as he waited for the federal government to grant the new nonprofit its tax-exempt status. Apparently without first consulting Beirne or Meany, he announced he would be stepping down from his position at the University of Chicago at the end of the year—right when AIFLD was set to begin operations. “I do not want to appear to coerce or influence you,” he wrote Beirne, but “if you wish to suggest to Mr. Meany that I assume the directorship [of AIFLD], I would be greatly flattered and delighted.”⁷¹ A surprised Beirne accused McCollum of making the “unsound” choice of “placing all of your apples in this particular bushel basket.” Moreover, he expressed extreme disappointment at McCollum’s suggestion that the Institute start off with only 25 students until it was on better financial footing, noting this was not much larger than the number of participants in his Front Royal program. “I am dismayed at the loss of 15 months and winding up where I was in 1958,” Beirne told the young sociologist in November.⁷²

McCollum took offense at Beirne’s “intemperate, inconsiderate and inaccurate letter,” urging him “as bluntly and frankly” as possible to “forget about your Front Royal program it does not compare with what we are trying to do.” Going one step further, McCollum declared

that if Beirne was so dissatisfied with his performance, he was prepared to submit his resignation.⁷³ Beirne called his bluff, saying McCollum's suggested resignation was "the only sound alternative," as he believed there was "a very sharp difference between you and me" and feared "greater discord as time goes on."⁷⁴ McCollum initially resisted, explaining that his "commitment and identification with the Institute is much to [sic] strong to do as you suggest" and offered "to try and clear up this mess."⁷⁵ But it was too late. Just after AIFLD attained tax-exempt status in December, Meany—at Beirne's urging—asked McCollum to step aside, accusing him of "initiating action without proper clearance, attempting to set policy, and...thinking too small in regard to the envisioned program."⁷⁶ In the first week of January 1962, McCollum made his resignation official. With the young academic out of the picture, Meany and Beirne moved forward with their bolder vision for AIFLD, tapping Serafino Romualdi to be the Institute's new executive director.

Conclusion

Before the Cold War had even begun in earnest, the AFL's "free" trade unionists were already eager to defeat world communism, calculatingly creating splits in the labor movements of Western Europe and undermining efforts at East-West labor unity like the WFTU. Partnering with the CIA and operating outside the multilateral auspices of international institutions, the AFL's Free Trade Union Committee earned a bad reputation among social democrats in the ICFTU and their main U.S. ally, the CIO's Walter Reuther. With the FTUC disbanded in the wake of the AFL-CIO merger, George Meany and his fellow hardliners would soon develop a new instrument to unilaterally battle communism abroad, specifically in Latin America—AIFLD. Not by accident, AIFLD was conceived as a labor education project. By the time this new institute was proposed in 1960, labor education programs targeting Third World workers

were fairly commonplace and relatively uncontroversial. Such programs provided a means through which to disseminate the knowledge produced by liberal social scientists around industrial relations and modernization to trade unionists in developing countries. As the following chapters will show, AIFLD was indeed a labor education project, but, like the FTUC before it, it was also a shadowy, de facto subsidiary of the U.S. government. More ambitiously than the FTUC and contemporaneous labor training initiatives, AIFLD—along with the other AFL-CIO foreign institutes it inspired in Africa and Asia—also attempted to be instruments of modernization in the Third World.

The 1960s would prove to be the apogee of postwar liberalism, modernization theory, and labor education. President Kennedy presented an ambitious vision for international development in the Third World, making sure to include organized labor as a valued adjunct in achieving U.S. foreign policy aims. With the full backing of the U.S. government, AIFLD would attain a size, scope, and impact far larger than any previous foreign labor education programs, leading the AFL-CIO to become one the most vocal champions of U.S. foreign aid in the “Decade of Development,” as the next chapter will show.

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² Sidney Lens, 1969, “Labor Lieutenants and the Cold War,” in *Autocracy and Insurgency in Organized Labor*, Burton Hall, ed., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 313-314; Hughes, 58-61.

³ Hughes, 22, 32-36.

⁴ Hughes, 50-52; Nelson Lichtenstein, 1995, *Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 114-115.

⁵ Hughes, 53-54.

⁶ “Meany Cites Labor’s Role in Europe’s Recovery,” May 11, 1967, box 156, folder 2, Sidney Lens Papers, Chicago History Museum (hereafter, Lens Papers).

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⁸ Hughes, 163-167; Ted A. Morgan, 1999, *A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster*, New York: Random House, 215.

⁹ Morgan, 245.

¹⁰ Thomas W. Braden, “I’m Glad the CIA is ‘Immoral,’” *The Saturday Evening Post*, May 20, 1967; James D. Selk, “No Spy Work, UAW Official Says,” *Wisconsin State Journal*, June 27, 1967; Morgan 220-223.

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- ¹⁸ Rodríguez García, 9, 289.
- ¹⁹ Carew, "Towards a Free Trade Union Centre," 193-200.
- ²⁰ AFL and CIO International Affairs Meeting, February 25, 1955, box 1, folder 4, John Windmuller Papers, Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives (hereafter, KC), Cornell University Library.
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- ²² Lichtenstein, *Walter Reuther*, 341-342; Morgan, 288.
- ²³ Morgan 289; Carew, "Towards a Free Trade Union Centre," 259-260.
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- ²⁶ IULEC Meeting Notes, May 16, 1952, box 1, folder 1, National Institute of Labor Education Records (hereafter, NILE), KC.
- ²⁷ Mire to Otto Pragan, October 25, 1956, box 3, folder "AFL-CIO Board Members," NILE, KC.
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⁶² Proposal by Joseph A. Beirne, April 28, 1960, box 18, folder 11, NILE, KC.

⁶³ Joseph Mire to Robert Alexander, June 6, 1960, box 18, folder, NILE, KC.

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⁶⁵ "McCollum," n.d., box 28, folder 4, University of Chicago University Extension Records 1892-1979, University of Chicago Library (hereafter, University of Chicago Extension Records).

⁶⁶ "A Proposal for a Comprehensive Educational Program for Leaders of South American Trade Unions," August 17, 1960, box 56, folder 27, RG1-038, GMMA.

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⁷⁰ McCollum to Board of Trustees, September 26, 1961, and McCollum to Ross, October 17, 1961, box 16, folder 15, RG18-007, GMMA.

⁷¹ McCollum to Beirne, August 14, 1961, box 25, folder 10, University of Chicago Extension Records.

⁷² Beirne to McCollum, November 14, 1961, box 25, folder 10, University of Chicago Extension Records.

⁷³ McCollum to Beirne, November 16, 1961, box 25, folder 10, University of Chicago Extension Records.

⁷⁴ Beirne to McCollum, November 22 and 28, 1961, box 25, folder 10, University of Chicago Extension Records.

⁷⁵ McCollum to Beirne, December 5, 1961, box 25, folder 10, University of Chicago Extension Records.

⁷⁶ McCollum to Board of Trustees, January 8, 1962, box 57, folder 1, RG1-038, GMMA.

Chapter Three: The AFL-CIO and the “Decade of Development”

Thanks to the liberal idealism associated with President John F. Kennedy, developing the Third World became the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s. The massive amount of government resources that went into this crusade opened the door to a confluence of modernization theory, industrial relations, labor education, and “free” trade unionism in the form of the AFL-CIO’s Third World institutes. The first and most significant of these—the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)—had already been in the works even before Kennedy’s election. Though superficially similar to other international labor education programs, AIFLD’s true purpose, in the eyes of the AFL-CIO’s hardline anticommunists, was to be a unique geopolitical weapon, fighting the Cold War on one of its most crucial battlegrounds—the realm of organized labor. Coupled with the ambitious vision of the new president and the funding his administration brought to bear, AIFLD soon became not just an education program, but a multifaceted development initiative bringing low-cost housing, medical services, cooperatives, and other services to Latin American trade unionists. As such, AIFLD served as the model for a new, similar labor institute in Africa, and still another later in Asia. Further, as this chapter will demonstrate, the AFL-CIO’s cold warriors became fierce defenders of foreign aid, arguing it was the best instrument to modernize the Third World along liberal-pluralist lines. Allowing an array of alliances around the common goal of anticommunist modernization, Kennedy’s “Decade of Development” would see U.S. labor’s impact on the rest of the world grow to an unprecedented magnitude.

AIFLD Receives AID

By early 1962, CWA President Joseph Beirne’s vision of a U.S.-based, large-scale labor education program for Latin American unionists had been nearly realized thanks to the work of a

young professor from the University of Chicago, John McCollum. But while McCollum had thought the new nonprofit he helped create would be a fairly straightforward academic project, Beirne and AFL-CIO president George Meany saw AIFLD as a new vehicle for U.S. labor to more vigorously wage the global Cold War, which they believed was urgently necessary in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. After pushing McCollum out in January of that year, Meany and Beirne brought Italian émigré and arch anticommunist Serafino Romualdi on board as AIFLD's new executive director. Since the 1940s, Romualdi had served as the AFL and later AFL-CIO's main representative in Latin America and the Caribbean. He had been prominent in the AFL's international intrigues during the earliest years of the Cold War and was largely responsible for the establishment of ORIT in 1951 (see Chapter Two). With the exception of the CIA-linked Jay Lovestone and Irving Brown, Romualdi was U.S. labor's most notorious international operative in the eyes of many. According to labor diplomat Ben Stephansky, Romualdi initially disliked Beirne's AIFLD idea because he worried it would "undercut his work," but since "he couldn't defeat it, he joined it."¹ Though he had not championed the Institute at first, Romualdi participated in the Policy and Design Committee meetings organized by McCollum in 1961 and, in early 1962, agreed to take McCollum's place as executive director.

Hoping to get AIFLD up and running as soon as possible, Romualdi and Meany turned to the White House for support. Upon taking office in 1961, President Kennedy set about making international development a higher priority than his predecessors had done. Under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the United States had carried out modest, short-term technical assistance projects in developing countries. Originally called Point Four—so named because it was the fourth foreign policy objective Truman laid out in his January 1949 inaugural address—the program later evolved into the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) under

Eisenhower. Inspired by modernization theory, Kennedy entered the White House promising national assistance “for whatever period is required” to “those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery.”² He created the Peace Corps to send idealistic young Americans to assist in small-scale community development efforts in the Third World, signed the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act—which transformed the ICA into the Agency for International Development (AID) to administer grants, long-term loans, and technical assistance to developing countries—and declared to the United Nations that the 1960s would be the “Decade of Development.” Advised by Walt Rostow and other liberal intellectuals, Kennedy hoped that through long-term modernization programs and goodwill efforts, the United States could successfully wage the Cold War by blocking the potential appeal of communism in the Third World.

One of Kennedy’s most wide-reaching new initiatives was the Alliance for Progress, which would provide \$20 billion in economic and technical aid to anticommunist governments in Latin America over ten years as a way to prevent another Cuban Revolution. Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg, who had previously served as the AFL-CIO’s general counsel, encouraged the administration to seek organized labor’s help in promoting the Alliance’s goal of noncommunist development. With Goldberg’s assistance, Meany continuously beseeched the White House to get behind AIFLD throughout 1961.³ Finally, in January 1962, a Labor Advisory Committee on the Alliance for Progress was formed to bring together high-ranking officials from the Department of Labor, AFL-CIO, and AID to consider providing federal funds to the under-resourced AIFLD. At the committee’s first meeting, the Kennedy Administration committed an initial \$350,000 to kickstart the education program—\$250,000 from AID, the rest from the President’s Contingency Fund.⁴ Going through ORIT-affiliated unions, AIFLD assembled its

first group of 43 Latin American and Caribbean students to take the three-month course in Washington that summer.⁵

Thanks to the Labor Advisory Committee, AIFLD would come to be bankrolled almost exclusively by the U.S. government—specifically AID—despite the original vision of it being funded by a mix of both foundation and government sources. After the initial \$250,000 from AID in 1962, the Institute received \$1.5 million in 1963, then \$2.3 million the following year, then \$4.7 million the year after.⁶ If the goal of Meany and his fellow cold warriors in the AFL-CIO was to sideline the social-democrat-led ICFTU as the anticommunist labor movement's main representative in the Third World, they soon succeeded thanks to the support from the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. While AIFLD was getting millions from AID, the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund—established in 1957 to finance organizing, education, and humanitarian activities in the Third World—saw its annual allocations drop in the early 1960s. The AFL-CIO's yearly contribution to the Fund fell from about \$1 million to \$185,000 by 1965. Meany and Lovestone argued the ICFTU had done a poor job handling the Fund, accomplishing little and wasting money. By the mid-1960s, as AIFLD's budget climbed to \$5 million, that of the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund shrank to less than \$2 million.⁷

Not everyone was a fan of Kennedy's robust foreign aid program. Congressional Republicans and some Democrats favored a more conservative approach to international development, emphasizing direct investment by private capital into developing countries instead of bilateral assistance from the U.S. government to Third World governments. This was the tack initially favored by President Eisenhower, summed up in the phrase "trade not aid."⁸ Though Eisenhower had come around to a less conservative vision of foreign assistance near the end of his presidency, by the time Kennedy took office, the belief that the U.S. government should limit

its role in international development and allow the private sector to take the lead still held political currency in Washington. Even liberal publications like *The New Leader* argued that “the stimulation of private entrepreneurship is the precise end at which an intelligible American aid effort must aim” because this would help create “a modified diversified free-enterprise system” in developing countries, much preferable to “a centralized, politically controlled and directed economy,” which bilateral aid to governments was, it was argued, sure to spawn.⁹ As beneficiaries of AID funding, and having also benefited from World War II-era spending, U.S. labor favored generous governmental aid, seeing state spending in all forms as a source of economic growth and job creation.¹⁰ Meany and the AFL-CIO Executive Council were therefore staunch defenders of Kennedy’s foreign assistance programs, arguing that “AID-generated exports provide business for American companies at home and add to American employment.”¹¹ Beyond this, AFL-CIO officials were naturally skeptical of the idea that unchecked private capital could be a force for good in the world. As long as a liberal-pluralist government took the lead on international development, organized labor would have a role to play, working alongside policymakers and business leaders as a legitimate partner. With labor involved, international aid efforts would include the concerns of foreign workers, which AFL-CIO leaders believed was crucial if the United States wanted to block the potential appeal of radicalism abroad.

In December 1962, Kennedy established the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World to review how effectively U.S. foreign aid was promoting global stability, undoubtedly hoping the committee’s findings would validate his administration’s efforts. Chaired by Berlin Airlift hero General Lucius Clay, the ten-member committee consisted of distinguished academics, former cabinet officials, diplomats, and other prominent individuals—including George Meany. While agreeing in principle that overseas aid was invaluable to

fighting the Cold War, the committee concluded in its April 1963 report that the United States was “trying to do too much for too many too soon” and noted that “a higher quality and reduced quantity of our diffuse aid effort in certain countries could accomplish more.”¹² Kennedy was forced to decrease his \$4.9 billion foreign aid request to Congress for fiscal year 1964 by \$420 million dollars. What’s more, the Clay Committee stated that the United States should favor private businesses over state-owned enterprises in developing countries, leading Kennedy to introduce tax incentives to encourage the investment of “enlightened” U.S. business leaders into the Third World’s private sector because “economic and social growth cannot be accomplished by governments alone.”¹³

Meany was the lone member of the Clay Committee to disagree with his nine colleagues, penning a blistering dissent and calling for increased AID funding. Describing foreign aid as “insurance” against potential military hostilities in the Third World, Meany noted that recipient governments of U.S. development assistance were required to adhere to international workers’ rights standards, arguing this was crucial to defeating Communists in the battle for hearts and minds. “Certainly,” Meany wrote, “if the worker is to bear the brunt of privation and the burden of nation-building—as in the case of developing countries—we cannot expect this vast sector to voluntarily enlist in our cause without rights, without freedom, without justice, without bread.”¹⁴ Beyond his written dissent, Meany publicly accused Clay of having “an absolute antipathy to foreign aid.” He expressed opposition to what he called the report’s “cardinal thesis,” namely that “our aid program should insist on free enterprise in the recipient countries,” because “only the Soviet Union and its satellites attempt to impose their economic system on other nations and we should not try to imitate them”—a somewhat ironic statement given Meany’s role in imposing “free” trade unionism on foreign workers since the 1940s.¹⁵

Alliances for Progress

Despite Meany's stated aversion to imposing the "free enterprise" system on other countries, he was eager for U.S. capitalists to get behind AIFLD. He and Romualdi sought to recruit more figures like J. Peter Grace—businessmen from U.S. corporations active in Latin America—to serve on AIFLD's new Board of Trustees. Charles Brinckerhoff of the Anaconda Company and Juan Trippe of Pan American World Airways were recruited, among others, while Grace agreed to become board chairman. Though such individuals contributed relatively modest corporate donations to the Institute, their real function was to demonstrate industrial pluralism's commitment to class consensus. The "fundamental credo" of AIFLD, Romualdi said, was "the concept of the various economic power elements in a free society working together, instead of in opposition."¹⁶ For years, he had aimed to convince employers in Latin America that "free enterprise" and "free labor" were natural allies in the fight against communism, noting that dictatorships often arose by exploiting the "economic disorder" caused by conflicts between workers and capitalists.¹⁷

Lovestone, who was not directly involved in establishing the Institute, explained years later the "going theory" of AIFLD's architects was that "hostility to unionists [on the part of Latin American employers] would be reduced by the good example" of "North American businessmen" ready to "sit down with the union people."¹⁸ In a speech about AIFLD to Chicago business leaders in September 1963, Meany lauded U.S. corporate titans like Grace, Trippe, and Brinckerhoff, who were "well aware that the choice today [in Latin America] is between democracy and Castroism; and that if democracy is to win, it must meet the needs and the desires of the people, starting with a higher standard of living." Meany contended that although U.S. "unions and management may quarrel over the terms of a contract" and "may be deeply divided

on a wide range of domestic issues,” it was necessary for the two to “stand together in the great struggle of our times, the struggle that will determine the future and perhaps survival of mankind”—the Cold War.¹⁹

Grace fully agreed. “History shows that when a totalitarian dictatorship takes over, the first elements to go are business and labor unions because it is in the very nature of a totalitarian dictatorship that it must control the means of production,” the businessman explained. He approved of AIFLD because it urged “cooperation between labor and management and an end to class struggle” while teaching workers they could “have better living conditions within the framework of a free, democratic and capitalistic society,” precepts that ran “completely counter to Communist propaganda.”²⁰ Grace had been particularly alarmed by the Cuban Revolution, worried that anti-capitalist, anti-Yankee sentiment would spread throughout the region and threaten his family’s century-old conglomerate, which had interests across Latin America in a variety of industries including shipping, agriculture, chemicals, finance, and textiles. He was an early supporter of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, urging fellow U.S. businessmen to get behind the initiative and calling for a kind of corporate social responsibility for U.S. firms operating abroad. Specifically, he called on U.S. companies in Latin America to stay out of local politics, employ local people “to the fullest extent possible up to the rank of manager,” and identify with the local community by observing customs and learning the language.²¹

In addition to becoming AIFLD’s board chairman, Grace also chaired the Alliance for Progress’s Commerce Committee, a group of 25 U.S. businessmen offering the private sector’s view on how to best modernize Latin America. In January 1963, a few months before the Clay Committee’s report was released, Grace’s committee submitted a report of its own to Kennedy’s commerce secretary. Though not calling for reduced bilateral aid from the U.S. government, the

Grace report said that when it came to development, private capital had “greater effectiveness and far larger potential” and was “the basic long-term sustaining factor that can maintain a high rate of growth.” Three businessmen on the committee filed a memo noting their uneasiness with what they believed was the report’s overemphasis on private investment, worried this would undermine the administration’s vision of government-led foreign assistance, but Grace insisted this was a misinterpretation and that the report implied no hostility to government aid. In any case, the Kennedy Administration waited until April to go public with the report due to the committee’s internal dissension.²²

For his part, Meany believed private foreign capital was a key ingredient for Latin American development, as long it was tempered by government oversight. At the founding congress of ORIT in Mexico City in 1951, Meany declared that “every country in need of capital investment from abroad has the sovereign right to fix the conditions under which such investment is to be permitted and regulated.” A few years earlier, he had told Latin American unionists visiting the United States that “we are keenly conscious of the sorry spectacle that some American capitalist have made of themselves in Latin America,” but that “we are just as much opposed to American capital exploiting Latin American labor as we are to American capital exploiting American labor.” “Any capital that goes into Latin America,” Meany insisted, “should go in the spirit that capital could be a blessing and should not under any circumstances be a curse.”²³ Romualdi was unsurprisingly on the same page. He believed that private U.S. capital had an important role to play in the industrialization of Latin America, but that such capital needed a “favorable climate” which could only be achieved through “public loans from the United States.” Importantly, AFL-CIO officials stressed that development—whether through public or private funds—would only be successful if the benefits were “widely shared among the

people as a whole rather than concentrated among a limited number,” arguing that increasing the purchasing power of the working class was vital to economic growth.²⁴ Despite reservations about the role of private capital in development, Meany made clear that “we believe in the capitalist system,” as it was “the best that the world has ever produced.”²⁵ When Meany testified about labor’s role in international development to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in 1963, Republican Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey called him the “most eloquent defender of the capitalist system I almost have ever heard,” to which the AFL-CIO president responded, “Why shouldn’t I be? Why argue with success?”²⁶

Meany and Romualdi convinced U.S. capitalists and policymakers alike that the AFL-CIO could serve an important function in the Alliance for Progress due its supposed influence among Latin America’s workers. After decades of “springing to the defense of [Latin American workers’] trade unions and civil rights,” as well as “advocating the extension of economic help,” Meany bragged as early as 1957 that U.S. labor had “become the trusted and admired big brother” of Latin America’s labor movements. He was hopeful that unions in the region—which were traditionally dominated by governments and political parties—would continuously achieve more autonomy, because “collective bargaining directly with the employers will in the long run be more beneficial to the workers than the still prevalent method of letting the government fix everything.”²⁷ The mid-1940s had been a period of democratic openings and mass political participation in Latin America. The U.S. government had provided ample economic aid to the region in order to bolster industrial production for the larger Allied war effort, leading to an expansion in Latin America’s urban working class. Populist political parties like Venezuela’s Acción Democrática and Peru’s Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) came to power, Communist parties were legalized, and labor unions were allowed to operate more

independently. It was in this context that the leftist labor confederation CTAL blossomed. But as the Cold War set in around 1948, Latin American politics moved sharply to the right, with economic and military elites cracking down on the popular movements that had grown in the years immediately prior. U.S. aid also decreased after World War II. As the United States spent \$13 billion rebuilding Western Europe in the latter half of the 1940s, Latin America received a paltry \$400 million in the same period. Now more reliant on attracting outside private capital, many Latin American governments moved to rein in militant unions and present a docile labor force to foreign investors.²⁸ In countries like Argentina and Brazil, labor movements were not destroyed so much as they were assimilated into the machinery of the state through corporatist industrial relations systems.

Argentines like populist president Juan Perón and development economist Raúl Prebisch recognized that Latin America's underdevelopment was not the product of "traditionalism," as modernization theory posited, but was rather due to the ongoing effects of colonialism, particularly uneven terms of international trade. As long as Latin America remained a "peripheral" exporter of raw materials and importer of manufactured goods from the "core," it could never hope to develop. Perón in particular encouraged import substitution industrialization, or ISI, as a way for Argentina and other Latin American nations to protect native industries by making imports prohibitive.²⁹ Like many others in the United States, Romualdi despised Peronism, viewing it as fascistic. He and other ORIT leaders in the 1950s considered Argentina's state-dominated Confederación General del Trabajo and the corporatist model of labor relations it represented as a serious rival to "free" trade unionism. Perón sought to challenge the regional labor influence of both ORIT and CTAL through the creation of the Agrupación de Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas (ATLAS) in 1952. Like Peronism itself, ATLAS fashioned itself

as a third option in the stark choice between capitalism and communism. It made inroads with unions in Venezuela and Colombia before falling apart after Perón's ouster in 1955.³⁰ What soon emerged as the most viable alternative to both ORIT and the Communist labor movement was the Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Cristianos (CLASC), representing trade unions inspired by Catholic social doctrine. Established in 1954 and aligned with Latin America's nascent Christian Democratic parties, CLASC steadfastly sought to remain independent of any superpower influence, preferring to build "an authentic workers movement" focused solely on social justice.³¹

Wanting to maintain and strengthen U.S. labor's regional influence in the face of corporatism, Christian trade unionism, and especially Cuba-inspired communism, at the start of the 1960s AFL-CIO internationalists packaged AIFLD as a natural partner to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. "AIFLD aims to bring directly to the Latin American union and its membership the full benefits of the Alliance through educational training, social projects and community services," Romualdi wrote.³² The Institute's stated purpose was to teach Latin American workers, frustrated at having been "heretofore denied elementary social justice," that liberal pluralism provided "the best means" of achieving political rights and higher living standards, means which were "superior to those of the totalitarian societies."³³

AIFLD Education

With its robust federal funding, AIFLD set up extensive field operations to supplement its main education center in Washington. By late 1964, the Institute had opened 13 national resident training centers across Latin America and the Caribbean running eight to 12-week courses, such as Brazil's Instituto Cultural do Trabalho and the Centro de Estudios Laborales del Perú.³⁴ According to Romualdi, by 1967, the Institute was directing schools or running seminars in

every country in the region, with the exceptions of Haiti, Paraguay, and Cuba.³⁵ By the end of the decade, the Institute would boast of having trained some 128,515 Latin American and Caribbean workers.³⁶ The overwhelming majority of students participated in AIFLD-sponsored programs in their home countries, with only a select number traveling to Washington for the more advanced, three-month residential course. Students were recruited to local training programs by ORIT-affiliated unions within their respective countries, while AIFLD's field representatives and country directors played a larger role in selecting participants for the course in Washington, often described as a kind of "graduate school."³⁷ The preferred characteristics of prospective students included "militancy [for anticommunism], the desire for education, ...trade union dedication..., and the age range of 21-35."³⁸

As intended, courses explored the functioning of U.S. democracy, collective bargaining, labor economics, and "threats to unionism and democracy" (i.e., "Communism and other forms of totalitarianism").³⁹ A writer for the *Reader's Digest* sat in on one of AIFLD's Washington training courses in 1966, providing this account of how trainees used roleplays to practice countering left-wing arguments:

Another session rehearsed a meeting of auto workers wherein "Red infiltrators" were trying to divert matters to political ends. "You are a puppet of Yankee imperialists trained in Washington!" shouted planted hecklers at Juan, the Argentine chairman. "American workers are the highest paid in the world under the free enterprise system of class cooperation," Juan shot back. "And what did you communists learn in Cuba? How to reduce living standards by 15 percent in five years? How to destroy free unions and destroy them with government bosses and forced labor? Is that how you plan to 'emancipate the working class'? If that's the best you have to offer us, take your doctrines back to Moscow—or is it Peking you're taking orders from this week?"⁴⁰

Such roleplays constituted the education program's most important function: preparing graduates to do the practical work of combating radicalism in their native labor movements. AIFLD described the nine-month internships awarded to graduates as "a concrete attempt to counter the

vigorous efforts of communists” who were “constantly trying to subvert and undermine democratic unions and to organize workers into vehicles of agitation and destruction.” The nefarious designs of Communists, AIFLD leaders insisted, would “be checked only by hard work and long hours and not merely by resolutions and verbal pronouncements”—a jab at the gentler efforts of the ICFTU and ILO.⁴¹

The *Reader's Digest* account also indicates that AIFLD students were taught to see unionists who spoke against Yankee imperialism as “Red infiltrators.” This was especially relevant in light of the vocal anti-imperialism of CLASC, the labor confederation aligned to Catholic social doctrine and Christian Democratic parties. In the years following the Cuban Revolution, CLASC leaders like Emilio Máspero became increasingly critical of growing U.S. interference in Latin America, considering it “one of the most formidable obstacles in building independent unionism” in the region.⁴² This naturally earned the scorn of the AFL-CIO’s cold warriors, who frequently tried to smear CLASC in the 1960s as being suspiciously sympathetic to the Communist line.⁴³ AIFLD students were therefore trained to not only attack “reds” in their native labor movements, but any unionists who opposed U.S. interventionism.

Latin American unionists participated in AIFLD’s education programs for varying reasons. Some saw it as an opportunity to make useful connections. A Brazilian worker who took an AIFLD course in the 1970s, for example, told historian Larissa Rosa Corrêa decades later that the training had offered “a good political network” with “all the support of the U.S. embassy,” and had been considered “very modern, since it came from the United States.”⁴⁴ Others, like Uruguayan Mabel Bermúdez Pose, were true believers. In a December 1968 letter to AFL-CIO headquarters, Bermúdez Pose wrote (in English) that she had just completed her second course at the local AIFLD-sponsored training center in Montevideo, noting she “was the only woman in

it.” She explained she was “so grateful to the Institute” that she “decided to start to do something”—namely to “make a plan” to “throw away” the general secretary of her unnamed union “because he is the communist.” “At this moment I can tell you,” Bermúdez Pose assured, the “little movement” she had launched “has become a great movement, and I believe that in a short time our syndicate [union] will be free.”⁴⁵ As her remarks suggest, women trade unionists were underrepresented in AIFLD-sponsored trainings. The Institute attempted to address this in early 1965, recruiting seven women to attend its ninth Washington course out of a total of 25 students, but it would not be until the mid-1970s that AIFLD focused serious attention on gender inclusivity through scholarships and specialized courses for women.⁴⁶

AIFLD staff struggled to keep track of the graduates of its residential program, but noted in 1966 that three quarters of those “of whom we have knowledge” had advanced or maintained their union position and remained active apostles of “free” trade unionism.⁴⁷ Graduates like Jorge Vicente Tur, who attended the sixth residential course in 1964, said they felt a “moral obligation towards the United States and especially to the AFL-CIO” for allowing them “to share in the experiences and everyday life of the North American worker,” and accordingly dedicated themselves to putting their AIFLD training to use.⁴⁸ Roberto Guillermo Payano of the Dominican Republic, a graduate of the Institute’s first residential course, went on to be elected general secretary of his country’s railroad workers’ union, where he expended “a great deal of energy and talent in his efforts to ward off communist infiltration.” Another graduate of the first course, Miguel Roberto Suazo of Honduras, took a position with that country’s national trade union center, where he organized educational seminars and delivered lectures.⁴⁹ In January 1965, four Uruguayan graduates ran against the left-wing officers of their stevedores’ union in a contested election and won, prompting AIFLD’s newsletter to rejoice that alumni were helping “oust reds”

from union leadership.⁵⁰ Despite these examples, Institute graduates did not always remain loyal to the AFL-CIO.

In the summer of 1963, the Dominican Republic's José Dolores Bautista participated in AIFLD's residential school in Washington. "Before I left my country, I was warned by some of my co-workers that I would be 'brainwashed' in the United States," Bautista told interviewers during his U.S. sojourn. "I can now answer that I am very happy to be brainwashed in the free, friendly, and comradely manner in which we are being brainwashed at the Institute."⁵¹ Secretary of the Masons Union in Santo Domingo and described succinctly by one North American observer as "32, mulatto, friendly," Bautista, like all AIFLD students, was sent home with nine months of funding to help him transmit his newly acquired knowledge to fellow unionists.⁵² But Bautista's brainwashing did not stick. In December 1965, AIFLD staff lamented that he was "working with extremist elements" of the Dominican Republic's left-leaning, anti-Yankee trade union center and was now "more of a politician than a labor activist."⁵³ Earlier that same year, Meany and the AFL-CIO Executive Council had supported President Johnson's deployment of U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic to help the country's right-wing government crush popular rebel forces, perhaps explaining the young unionist's apparent defection.⁵⁴

Coupled with the decline in AFL-CIO donations to the ICFTU's International Solidarity Fund, AIFLD's widespread education program in Latin America caused ORIT's own training efforts to struggle. After having ended its formal ties to the University of Puerto Rico's Institute of Labor Relations in 1953, ORIT began holding more cost-effective, short-term seminars across Latin America. One such seminar, held in Guayaquil, Ecuador in 1959, was widely credited with laying the groundwork for the founding of a new, anticommunist national trade union center in that country three years later.⁵⁵ ORIT eventually launched a residential school called the Instituto

Interamericano de Estudios Sindicales, with classes first held at ORIT headquarters in Mexico City in 1962, then moving to a newly built facility in nearby Cuernavaca in 1965.⁵⁶ “The day has passed...when the only tools necessary for success in the labor movement were a loud voice [and] the ability to pound the table at negotiation,” said ORIT General Secretary Arturo Jáuregui of Peru. “The *modern* leaders must be part lawyer, economist, politician, psychologist and sociologist in order to be successful.”⁵⁷ But faced with declining ICFTU funds and competition with AIFLD, ORIT was forced to shutter this institute by the early 1970s, with its newly built facility at Cuernavaca becoming nothing more than a “resort hotel” for high-ranking Mexican union officials.⁵⁸

AIDing and Abetting

U.S. government officials correctly saw AIFLD as a crucial partner in the Alliance for Progress’s mission to challenge leftist currents in Latin America through development. Labor diplomat George Cabot Lodge II, who joined the Institute’s board not long after becoming a lecturer at Harvard’s business school, was one such official. Lodge was among the experts discussed in Chapter One who believed anticommunist Third World unions should act as social welfare agencies in order to temper workers’ demands for higher wages and thereby allow capital formation and industrialization. To Lodge, unions were the “spearheads of democracy,” crucial to promoting stability and development in the Third World. He urged the Kennedy Administration to help developing country unions provide services to their members by funneling AID money to them through U.S. labor.⁵⁹ This was also considered vital to winning workers over to anticommunist unions, as it would demonstrate that “free trade unions can produce results, while the Communists produce only slogans.”⁶⁰ Consequently, AIFLD established a Social Projects Department in 1962 to complement its educational activities. Its

mission was to enable anticommunist Latin American unions to provide housing, healthcare, and credit to their members. The department was initially led by William Doherty, Jr., who, as the Inter-American Representative for the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone International, had assisted Beirne with his Front Royal school in 1959. Labor internationalism was in Doherty's blood. His father—who served as president of the National Association of Letter Carriers for over twenty years and participated in the founding congress of the ICFTU in London—was named the first U.S. ambassador to independent Jamaica by Kennedy in 1962.⁶¹ The younger Doherty would head up AIFLD's Social Project Department until 1965, when he replaced the retiring Romualdi as director of the Institute, a position he would hold for the next 30 years.

With money from AID, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the pension funds of AFL-CIO-affiliated unions, the department reportedly helped construct 10,026 new low-cost housing units in 11 countries by the end of the decade. The first major development was the 94-building John F. Kennedy Housing Project in Mexico City, which opened in 1964 and will be discussed further in Chapter Four.⁶² AIFLD built another housing project named after Kennedy for sugar workers in the Dominican Republic town of San Pedro de Macorís in 1966-1967. At a cost of \$3 million, this 110-unit project included schools, playgrounds, commercial areas, electricity, and potable water.⁶³ In 1964, the Social Projects Department also helped establish a workers' housing bank in Peru called the Caja de Ahorros y Prestamos de la Alianza Sindical Cooperativa, or ASINCOOP. A partnership with the Federation of Peruvian Workers (among other local organizations) the housing bank received a \$6 million line of credit from AID, and by 1969 had reportedly given out over 800 loans.⁶⁴ Additionally, in late 1964, the AFL-CIO began putting up its own money to fund small-scale "impact projects" through AIFLD, with grants for individual schemes totaling no more than \$5,000 each. Some of these grants went to a

construction workers' union in the Dominican Republic to repair a school, a Peruvian textile workers' union to develop a sewing cooperative, a maritime union in Chile to establish a library, and a Brazilian hospitality workers' union to set up a consumer cooperative.⁶⁵ Despite these ambitious projects, the Institute's Education Department remained the top priority, with a budget \$1.3 million higher than that of the Social Projects Department in 1966, for example.⁶⁶

For both its educational and social welfare activities, the Institute had considerable help from AID. Between 1962 and 1969, AIFLD received \$28.37 million in funding from AID, compared to only \$1.46 million from the AFL-CIO and \$1.16 million from U.S. corporations.⁶⁷ Leaders of AID and the AFL-CIO formed close working relationships in this period, especially after Meany's high-profile role as the lone dissenter on the Clay Committee in 1963. In response to Meany's dissent, Kenneth Kelley—director of AID's Labor Service—wrote to “commend” him for his “courageous defense” of the agency. “A number of my colleagues here at AID have commented most favorably about the position you took,” Kelley wrote. “The substance of their views have been—‘the AFL-CIO is the only true friend and supporter of AID.’”⁶⁸ By the fall of 1963, AFL-CIO officials and AID administrator Daniel Bell were discussing how to expand the scope of the Labor Advisory Committee on the Alliance for Progress, the body of labor and government officials that had been meeting since early 1962 to arrange funds for AIFLD.⁶⁹ In January 1964, the committee was reconstituted as the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance, now focused on questions of labor and development not only in Latin America, but Africa and Asia too. Chaired by Meany, the committee would meet in Washington every other month for the rest of the decade. Regular attendees included figures such as Lovestone, Romualdi, Beirne, and Doherty, as well as Bell, Kelley, Secretary of

Labor Willard Wirtz, and high-ranking State Department official Thomas Mann—who was named Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress by the new president, Lyndon Johnson.

At the committee's first meeting in January 1964, Bell noted AIFLD's "fine progress" and expressed his wish that "a somewhat similar mechanism could be established for the African labor scene." By March, the AFL-CIO was drawing up plans for a new "American Trade Union Development Institute" that would aim to bring AIFLD-style education programs and social projects to African workers, with the possibility of later expanding into Asia. AID offered full support for the project. In August, the initiative was renamed the Afro-American Labor Center, before finally settling on the name African American Labor Center (AALC).⁷⁰ Also in 1964, Meany proposed that AID centralize its programs and staff devoted to labor issues, which were "dispersed among half a dozen different offices and bureaus." He and Lovestone—who by this time was formally running the AFL-CIO's International Affairs Department—believed this diffusion of activities and personnel was an "intolerable situation" of bureaucratic confusion and was to blame for only one percent of AID's technical funds being devoted to labor programs.⁷¹

Though initially resistant, Bell eventually acquiesced to Meany's proposal, announcing the creation of an Office of Labor Affairs within AID in July 1964 and naming George Delaney—the State Department's Coordinator of International Labor Affairs—to be the office's new director. Delaney would report directly to Bell and would liaise with the AFL-CIO through the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance.⁷² But AFL-CIO internationalists still found themselves frustrated with AID's internal bureaucracy, complaining in 1965 that approval of grants for AIFLD and AALC projects took much too long. In November of that year, Lovestone and Doherty met with Bell to request that AID create a \$1.5 million "Labor Development Fund" to finance impact projects of up to \$100,000 each, without the normal

oversight and delayed approval processes. Bell was receptive to the idea, telling them that AIFLD and AALC “should be given the power to approve and operate projects without the necessity of receiving prior U.S. Government approval,” but cautioned that Congress might not be as sympathetic.⁷³ Indeed, three years later, a report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged AID to exercise more oversight of public monies going to the AFL-CIO’s international activities, a topic that will be explored further in Chapter Five.⁷⁴

The AFL-CIO in Africa

Headquartered next door to the United Nations in New York City, AALC was formally established between December 1964 and January 1965. Meany, Beirne, and other members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council served as board members, while Irving Brown—who had been the Free Trade Union Committee’s main operative in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s—was named executive director. Brown, who had been serving as the ICFTU’s representative to the UN since 1962, had previously made multiple visits to Africa. Despite his stint with the ICFTU, Brown’s first loyalty was to Meany and Lovestone—accepting the AALC job without first consulting his boss, ICFTU General Secretary Omer Becu.⁷⁵ From the start, AALC leaders prioritized the kind of development work being done by AIFLD’s Social Projects Department, believing the main duty of African trade unions was to help guide modernization and nation-building. Brown and others intended to assist the African labor movement “fulfill its primary reason for existence,” namely “to ensure a smooth transition from the subsistence economy to the market economy, to the industrial economy of tomorrow” and “to be the intermediary between the tribal hierarchy and the political democracy of tomorrow.”⁷⁶ Unlike AIFLD, AALC’s board did not include business leaders, though part of its stated mission was to

“encourage labor-management cooperation to expand American capital investment in the African nations” to help spur economic growth.⁷⁷

The AFL-CIO had already been active in Africa since decolonization took off in the late 1950s, forging friendly relations with nationalist leaders thanks to the labor diplomacy of Maida Springer. Not unlike Lovestone and Romualdi, Springer had entered the world of labor internationalism via David Dubinsky’s International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU). A Harlem dressmaker born to Barbadian and Panamanian parents, Springer joined the ILGWU and steadily rose through its ranks, becoming the first Black woman to represent U.S. labor abroad on a trip to Europe during the Marshall Plan years. A lifelong advocate for civil rights and Pan-Africanism, she was soon recruited to be the AFL-CIO’s envoy to Africa. In 1957, Springer made her first of many long-term tours of the continent, visiting the newly independent Ghana and the soon-to-be independent Nigeria, Belgian Congo, Kenya, and Tanganyika (Tanzania). In contrast to the ICFTU’s more tepid response to decolonization—influenced by its European affiliates—Springer was a staunch supporter of African independence movements. While the ICFTU was slow to respond when colonial governments arrested and prosecuted African trade unionists for their nationalist activities, Springer helped ensure the AFL-CIO provided financial support to such political prisoners.⁷⁸ She also sought to help young Africans who wanted to study in the United States, organizing the AFL-CIO’s African scholarship program in 1957.⁷⁹ As explained in Chapter Two, that program was scrapped in favor of the Kampala Labor College to appease the ICFTU.

Beginning with Ghana, newly independent African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s moved to exercise tight control over their labor movements through corporatist industrial relations systems for the sake of nation-building. Led by Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah,

nationalists and Pan-Africanists across the continent made efforts to cut ties with the former colonial powers in the early 1960s, including in the realm of labor. Starting with the Ghana Trades Union Congress, one by one, Africa's national trade union centers disaffiliated from the ICFTU and joined the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF). Established in 1961 and headquartered in Accra, the AATUF was conceived of as an international labor body for Africa's non-aligned movement, rejecting Western pressures for "free" trade unionism in favor of a kind of unionism that would serve the developmental state and promote African unity.⁸⁰ Despite its stated commitment to neutralism, by the mid-1960s, the AATUF was growing increasingly close to the Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the ICFTU's rival.⁸¹

Unlike some of her fellow internationalists in the AFL-CIO, especially Lovestone, Springer was sympathetic to the new governments' desire for rapid economic growth and cautioned against trying to mold African labor relations along the lines of the U.S. model.⁸² After attending a conference of international labor education experts held at Michigan State University in 1962, an unimpressed Springer wrote Lovestone to express her frustration that "many of these good folk think they can create labor leaders, can find assurances that overseas unionists will react in a certain way and even love us if we tell him what is good for him."⁸³ Instead of exporting industrial pluralism and preaching "free" trade unionism, Springer favored providing practical assistance to African unionists. In the early 1960s, she was instrumental in the establishment of two union-sponsored vocational training centers. The first was the Kenyan Institute of Tailoring and Cutting, based in Nairobi and affiliated with the local Tailors and Textiles Workers' Union. In 1961, the Nairobi tailors' union reached out to the AFL-CIO "begging" for financial help in opening a training school because "the countrymen of Kenya want good clothes and therefore there must be experienced tailors."⁸⁴ Going through her contacts

in the ILGWU, Springer managed to secure funds from the Philadelphia Garment Workers' Union to help open the tailoring school in March 1963. The second vocational program Springer helped bring to life was the Nigerian Motor Drivers School, located near Lagos. She convinced the AFL-CIO Executive Council to partner with the Nigerian United Labor Congress on the project and provide an initial \$2,500 in 1963, though the school would not formally open until in early 1965.⁸⁵

U.S. labor's most stalwart African ally in this period was Kenya's Tom Mboya. Mboya served as the general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL) in the years leading up to the country's independence in 1963. He toured the United States in the late 1950s to promote Africa's anti-colonial cause and call for an "international new deal" to raise living standards around the world. On a visit in 1959, Mboya addressed one thousand ILGWU delegates at the union's national conference in Miami Beach, where he received the "warmest" reception "accorded any guest in four days of meetings."⁸⁶ Mboya also established a scholarship program to send young Kenyans to study at U.S. universities—one of whom was Barack Obama, Sr., who would father the forty-fourth president of the United States.⁸⁷ Working with Mboya, the AFL-CIO gave \$35,000 to the KFL to build a new headquarters in 1956.⁸⁸ Upon Kenya's independence, he would first serve as the Minister of Labor, then Minister of Justice, then Minister of Economic Planning and Development before being assassinated in 1969 at the age of 38. Maintaining a healthy relationship with Meany and an especially close bond with Springer, Mboya opposed the AATUF, arguing there was no conflict between Pan-Africanism and ICFTU affiliation.⁸⁹ But even Mboya recognized the impracticability of industrial pluralism in the context of state-led economic development.⁹⁰ In 1965, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta dissolved the KFL and its rival, the Kenya African Workers' Congress, and in their place formed

a new Central Organization of Trade Unions to make it easier for the state to control the labor movement—and easier for the ruling party to ward off potential political opposition. Meany wrote Mboya to express his “concern” over the situation, hoping that “every effort will be made to preserve the free and independent character of the movement.” Mboya assured Meany that the new union structure “has not deprived the Trade Unions in Kenya of their freedom or independence,” adding that he had personally served on the presidential commission that oversaw the restructuring.⁹¹

Upon opening in early 1965, Brown’s AALC immediately set up operations in Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, South Africa, the Gambia, and Uganda. By the end of 1967, it was operational in over 20 countries.⁹² Though Springer retired from the AFL-CIO in 1966, Brown shared her assessment that unions in newly independent African states needed practical assistance more than lectures on pluralism. Besides, Brown did not want AALC to make the same mistakes as the ICFTU and ILO, whose insistence that Africans embrace autonomous trade unionism had only helped fuel the rise of the anti-Western AATUF. AALC was therefore willing to partner with tightly controlled labor movements in one-party states that failed to live up to the “free” trade union ideal. AFL-CIO officials believed they could excuse this without being hypocritical, arguing that African nations had only just thrown off the shackles of colonialism and still needed time to “mature.” As Meany pointed out, “in the first years after the American Revolution, there was much to be desired from the functioning of a multiparty system.” He added that “we must have some patience and hope through such efforts as those of the AALC that Africans will eventually develop a free and democratic society in which trade unions can grow.”⁹³

Receiving over \$1 million in AID funding between 1966 and 1970,⁹⁴ AALC worked with noncommunist unions across Africa to establish credit unions, cooperatives, clinics, and educational programs, and also assisted several unions obtain office equipment for their headquarters.⁹⁵ AALC also financed the Kenya tailoring school and Nigerian motor drivers school that Springer had helped get off the ground, reasoning that vocational training programs were vital for the transition from a traditional to a modern economy. As AID administrator William Gaud explained at the 1967 AFL-CIO convention, “Here, in our mass production economy, teaching tailoring and cutting in Kenya seems like a small thing. But it is a big thing in Africa. It can start a whole new industry.”⁹⁶ In its first six years of existence, the AALC coordinated more than 100 small-scale development projects in 33 countries and helped establish a Trade Union Institute for Social and Economic Development at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria.⁹⁷ In addition, AALC brought trade unionist and development practitioners into contact with U.S. social scientists. In 1967, for example, Brown brought a delegation of African union officials to a conference on the role of labor in nation-building at the University of Southern California. The same year, AALC convened a meeting of academics, journalists, and development professionals in New York to discuss the problems of apartheid South Africa.⁹⁸ The AFL-CIO opposed apartheid, but because most of South Africa’s legally recognized unions were white-dominated, and most of its Black-led unions were leftist, AALC struggled to find a foothold in the country.

Like AIFLD, AALC’s self-styled humanitarianism was politically motivated. Among other things, it was meant to challenge the influence of the AATUF and WFTU among African trade unionists. The Ghana-based AATUF recognized the threat. Using “hot dollars and the usual communist scare propaganda,” the AATUF warned in early 1965, the new AALC would attempt

to succeed where the “decadent imperialists” of the “neo-colonialist ICFTU” had failed in subverting and destroying African labor unity.⁹⁹ Following the 1966 ouster of Nkrumah—who had backed the AATUF and led the charge in opposing “free” trade unionism in Africa—the AFL-CIO saw an opportunity to make inroads in the Ghanaian labor movement, using development aid as a Trojan Horse. In discussing a proposed AALC low-cost housing project, for example, Lovestone did not attempt to gauge the actual housing needs of Ghanaian workers, but rather explained, “it is most imperative that we *do something* in Ghana to prevent a recurrence of bad sentiment.”¹⁰⁰ Along with other “impact projects,” AALC set up a new mobile medical clinic near Accra in 1967, stocked with \$7,000 in medicines.¹⁰¹ Also in Accra that same year, AALC helped establish a labor college in partnership with the Ghana Trades Union Congress—now under new, pro-Western leadership—by providing instructors, furnishings, and other materials. The college offered courses on industrial relations, labor law, and economic development for up to 50 students at a time.¹⁰² As if to gloat, Ghana’s new national labor leaders and their U.S. allies housed the college in the same building as the former headquarters of the AATUF, which had fled the country for Tanzania following Nkrumah’s overthrow.¹⁰³

The End of the “Decade of Development”

Lyndon Johnson came into office vowing to honor Kennedy’s commitment to modernizing the Third World. By Johnson’s first full year in office, however, military solutions to the perceived threat of world communism increasingly overshadowed softer social and economic development efforts. In 1964, the U.S. government supported a successful military coup in Brazil against the country’s democratically elected, left-wing president, believing he was sympathetic to communism (see Chapter Four for more details on AIFLD’s role in this). The following year, Johnson sent thousands of U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic to assist the

country's right-wing regime repress rebel forces accused of being in league with Communists. In setting policy for the Alliance for Progress, the Johnson Administration privileged "realism" and political stability over "idealism" and social change.¹⁰⁴ As the United States gradually beefed up its military and diplomatic presence in Southeast Asia to prevent the spread of communism into South Vietnam and beyond, Latin America faded from Washington's radar. The AFL-CIO's internationalists—who supported Johnson as vigorously as they had Kennedy—followed the new president on this more aggressive path. In particular, Meany and other top labor officials publicly expressed full support for the expanding U.S. war in Vietnam, while excoriating anyone who dared criticize the war (see Chapter Five).

Working through the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance, in early 1968, the AFL-CIO established a third nonprofit to support developing country trade unions—the Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI). Though intended to operate in multiple Asian countries, AAFLI's immediate priority was to bolster the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT), South Vietnam's anticommunist trade union center. Like their liberal allies in the federal government, the AFL-CIO Executive Council naively believed in 1967 that the war would soon be won, and therefore envisioned AAFLI assisting the CVT in building a pluralistic, modern society through educational programs and community development schemes.¹⁰⁵ Instead, AAFLI's first project upon getting up and running in early 1968 was to provide emergency relief packages to CVT members displaced by the recent Tet Offensive.¹⁰⁶ In its first year, the new institute also held several training seminars on union leadership and collective bargaining in other Asian nations, including India, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia.¹⁰⁷ As with AIFLD and AALC, AID provided the majority of AAFLI's funds—giving \$3.74 million between 1968 and 1972, compared to \$330,000 from the AFL-CIO during the same period.¹⁰⁸

In 1969, the incoming administration of Richard Nixon planned to restructure AID. Because the Rostovian “take-off” phase of rapid industrialization and economic growth had failed to materialize in most developing countries receiving U.S. aid, Nixon, like many other policymakers at the close of the 1960s, believed it was time to consider a “new approach” to foreign assistance for the new decade. This new approach was essentially a return to the more conservative “trade not aid” vision of development, where the government would largely step aside in favor of private capital. Motivated by the Overseas Development Council, a lobby group representing U.S. business interests, Nixon hoped the federal government’s foreign assistance program could be replaced by private investment in the Third World. To implement the new approach, he appointed Bank of America CEO Rudolph Peterson to head up a Task Force on International Development. Meany and the AFL-CIO Executive Council, who championed a government-led approach to foreign assistance and who had been calling for increased funding to AID for years, were alarmed by the Peterson Committee’s mission. One official in the AFL-CIO’s International Affairs Department said the Peterson Committee represented an “industrial and banking group” that was “trying to back-door labor’s participation” in foreign aid programs.¹⁰⁹

In the years following Meany’s dissent on the Clay Committee, the AFL-CIO had been consistent in its opposition to the idea that the private sector should take the lead in international development. “Private capital and the efforts of private groups must be a supplement to, but not a substitute for, essential governmental help,” the Executive Council had declared in 1965.¹¹⁰ In response to Nixon’s plans, Meany wrote that foreign aid could not be determined by “obscure banking or industrial yardsticks.” He insisted that “the organization which carries out the U.S. foreign assistance program should be the responsibility of the United States government” and

should be in the best interest of the American people, “not the vested interest of a few.”¹¹¹ In a forceful statement issued in February 1970 entitled “No Dismemberment of AID,” the Executive Council stated that “the mere transfer of capital, whether public or private...will not by themselves overcome the standard of living gap among the nations of the world.” Instead, “more consideration” should be given “to individual human beings, social institutions, and a fair distribution of wealth than to raising the [Gross National Product] as such.” The Executive Council continued by arguing that “despite rather limited resources,” AIFLD, AALC, and AAFLI had already managed to “show the way to solid human progress in developing the human resources without which there can be no elimination of the perilous economic and social gap among the nations of the world.”¹¹²

In the end, Nixon and the Peterson Committee did not scrap AID, but downsized the agency. Priority would now be given to carrying out foreign assistance through multilateral institutions like the World Bank, United Nations Development Program, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In addition, the Nixon Administration established the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in 1971 to help channel private capital into developing countries as a substitute for direct governmental assistance. By the early 1970s, the Kennedy-era enthusiasm for modernization had clearly dried up in Washington, and the AFL-CIO’s role in international development had come under intense criticism, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. In March 1973, the Labor Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance—the venue for high-ranking labor and international development officials to coordinate programs—was quietly discontinued. After “a decade of experience and activity,” AID administrator John Hannah praised the “major contribution” the labor movement had made “in our efforts to achieve economic development in Asia, Africa and Latin America.” Citing “developments over the past

decade,” but without going into further detail, Hannah noted that he and Meany agreed that both AID and the AFL-CIO “would be better served” by terminating “this formal committee structure,” but continuing to hold informal meetings “from time to time.”¹¹³ Indeed, in the years ahead, representatives of the AFL-CIO and its three foreign institutes would continue to hold occasional briefings with AID in light of their ongoing contractual relationship with the agency, but the termination of the formal committee signaled the end of U.S. labor’s “Decade of Development.”¹¹⁴

Conclusion

With its lucrative contracts from AID, the AFL-CIO’s influence in Latin America, Africa, and Asia increased substantially during the 1960s. While plenty of policymakers and public figures argued that international development was best left to the private sector, U.S. labor leaders consistently came to the defense of government-funded foreign aid programs, arguing that the unchecked flow of capital was not the solution to global poverty and economic stagnation. At the same time, drawing from industrial pluralist ideas around the utility of class cooperation, the AFL-CIO’s cold warriors partnered with U.S. businessmen—particularly in Latin America—to champion a well-regulated capitalism as the noncommunist antidote to underdevelopment. The alliances U.S. labor forged gave it the ability to reach tens of thousands of workers around the world, providing an opportunity to convert them—either through direct proselytization or charitable good works—to a bureaucratic, deradicalized, anticommunist kind of unionism. This chapter has explored the growth of U.S. labor’s footprint on the Third World, but the footprint itself—and the ground on which it trampled—is the subject of the next chapter. In particular, Chapter Four will take a closer look at AIFLD’s social projects and its attempts to spread “free” trade unionism in Latin America, and will analyze the consequences.

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Chapter Four: AIFLD at Work

The confluence of modernization theory, industrial relations, labor education, and Cold War foreign aid allowed AFL-CIO officials to significantly expand their anticommunist international activities in the 1960s. Of the three foreign institutes the labor federation established during the “Decade of Development,” the largest and most influential was the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which focused on Latin America and the Caribbean and served as a model for the AFL-CIO’s institutes in Africa and Asia. With a total budget of more than \$62 million between 1962 and 1974, AIFLD operated in every country in the region except for Cuba, Paraguay, and Haiti.¹ Though initially founded as an education program, the Institute also became a multifaceted development initiative as well as a Cold War weapon to bolster U.S.-friendly “free” trade unions. In particular, AIFLD leaders and staff devoted much of their work to constructing low-cost worker housing, organizing campesinos and advocating for land reform, and—controversially—helping to subvert democratic governments in the name of anticommunist containment. This chapter examines a few examples of AIFLD’s interventions in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Mexico, El Salvador, British Guiana, and Brazil, to illustrate some of the specific ways the Institute operated abroad, some the challenges it encountered, and some the consequences of its activities.

Worker Housing

Unions in the United States had championed decent and affordable worker housing since at least the 1920s. Tired of living in overcrowded, unsanitary tenements and being exploited by slumlords, in 1927, members of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers in New York City built a 303-unit cooperative apartment complex in the Bronx, with financial assistance from the union-owned Amalgamated Bank and other sources. The cooperative model of residents supporting one

another and pooling their resources to provide food, transportation, and educational services helped the Amalgamated Houses weather the storm brought on by the Great Depression. Between the 1930s and 1960s, multiple cooperative housing projects were built by unions in New York and in cities across the country. During this same time period the AFL and CIO—before and after their 1955 merger—lobbied government at all levels to provide public housing, bring down interest rates on home loans, and subsidize rents. Organized labor backed the 1937 Housing Act, which established national public housing, as well as the 1949 Housing Act, which gave cities federal loans to redevelop slum areas—usually to the detriment of minority communities—in what would come to be called “urban renewal.” While many of these schemes, including union-sponsored cooperative housing, tended to primarily benefit white workers and reinforce de facto segregation, some unions, like the UAW, attempted to address this by promoting racially integrated housing.²

By the 1960s, the AFL-CIO had its own Housing Committee chaired by economist Boris Shishkin, who had previously served as a labor advisor to the Marshall Plan (see Chapter One). The committee spearheaded lobbying efforts around affordable housing issues and also helped coordinate financial support to affiliated unions interested in building cooperative housing developments.³ By the time AIFLD went into operation in 1962, the U.S. labor federation already had extensive experience when it came to questions of worker housing. With many Latin American cities facing overcrowding and the growth of slums due to rural-to-urban migration brought on by industrialization and privatization of farmlands, the construction of affordable worker homes became a top priority of the new Institute’s Social Projects Department. Importantly, the intended beneficiaries of such housing developments would be members of Latin America’s ORIT-affiliated unions as part of an effort to vaunt the rewards of siding with

“free” trade unionism. In its first five years of existence, AIFLD coordinated \$35 million in loans to build housing cooperatives in Brazil, Uruguay, Honduras, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere, with the money coming from the pension funds of AFL-CIO affiliates. The first and most prominent of these AIFLD-sponsored worker housing projects was in Mexico City. It was prompted not by U.S. labor internationalists, but instead by rank-and-file members of a Mexican trade union.

Mexico: The JFK Housing Project

In 1955, faced with a shortage of decent housing, members of the Graphic Arts Workers Union (Sindicato de Artes Gráficas) of Mexico City founded an association devoted to building their own low-cost housing development for their families. “We, ourselves, will build our own homes,” they declared. “We will build them together.” Each member of the association voluntarily deposited about 15 pesos (\$1.88) per week into a central housing fund. Within a few years, the association grew to 3,000 members and raised sufficient funds to purchase a piece of land in the Atzacolco neighborhood on the northern edge of the city. But the land overlapped the border between the Federal District and the state of Mexico, creating administrative problems over how municipal services like water and sewage would be provided, so the workers needed to find an alternative location. The Graphic Arts Union was part of the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM), the country’s ORIT-affiliated, national “free” trade union center, which was closely aligned with the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI). Using these connections, the graphic arts workers enlisted the aid of prominent Mexicans to their cause. The country’s secretary of finance, Antonio Ortiz Mena, helped them swap the Atzacolco site for a new location at Jardín Balbuena, about four miles from downtown Mexico City. ORIT Secretary

General Alfonso Sánchez Madariaga, who was also a CTM leader, reached out to the newly created Inter-American Development Bank for a loan to pay for construction. And famed architect Mario Pani—who had planned the main campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico—was tapped to design the housing development.⁴

By late 1961, nearly all the pieces were in place. The PRI government, the CTM, and ORIT were fully behind the graphic arts workers' project, land had been acquired, and plans and models for the housing development had been drawn up. The overall cost of the development was estimated to be between \$13 and \$14 million. While the Inter-American Development Bank could provide some loans, the graphic arts workers were still \$10 million short. John F. Kennedy's new Alliance for Progress appeared to be the answer. Soon enough, the Kennedy Administration brought the situation to the AFL-CIO's attention, and in 1963, AIFLD adopted the project with enthusiasm, seeing it as an opportunity to showcase substantial "worker-to-worker aid." AIFLD's Social Projects Department helped arrange for three AFL-CIO affiliate unions—the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen—to loan \$10 million from their respective pension and welfare funds for construction of the housing development. Importantly, AID agreed to provide a 100 percent guarantee on the loan, which would be repaid over 20 years by the housing project's soon-to-be residents. While architect Pani would be in charge of the construction, AIFLD brought in retired Navy Seabee engineer Captain Andrew S. Klay to oversee and certify the project on behalf of the AFL-CIO and AID. In November 1963, days before his assassination, President Kennedy visited the AFL-CIO convention in New York and was shown a model of the Mexico City housing development by

Klay, George Meany, and William Doherty, Jr. Impressed, Kennedy remarked that “we need more of this type of work.”⁵

On December 5, 1963, two weeks after Kennedy’s death, a ceremony was held in Mexico City’s Jardin Balbuena to lay the first cornerstone of the new housing development. Finance Secretary Ortiz did the honors, and was joined by U.S. Ambassador Thomas Mann, among other dignitaries. The ceremony was in many ways a tribute to the slain U.S. president who had forged the Alliance for Progress. At the suggestion of Antonio Vera Jimenez, secretary general of the Graphic Arts Workers Union, it was announced that the development would be named in honor of Kennedy—the “Unidad Habitacional John F. Kennedy.” Six construction firms—five Mexican and one from the United States—were hired to build the project, which Klay described as a “small city.” The project was expected to house nearly 20,000 people. There would be a total of 3,100 individual apartment units, each with two to three bedrooms, inside 94 buildings, each with four floors. In addition, half of the overall development would be designated for play areas, gardens, parks, schools, kindergartens, retail shopping, offices, parking, and pedestrian bridges. Workers and their families would own their apartments as condominiums. The average cost was \$3,300, with residents paying between \$22 and \$48 per month over the course of 20 years—but nobody was expected to have to pay more than 25 percent of their monthly income. The interest on the loans provided by the AFL-CIO and Inter-American Development Bank was kept at 9 percent, whereas typical housing loans in Mexico from private lenders carried 18 percent interest rates.⁶

Further, the housing project was to be managed as a cooperative. From mid-August to mid-September 1964, as construction neared completion, six members of the Graphic Arts Union were brought to the United States to study cooperative housing management “to see this new

project did not become a slum,” as Meany put it. The six Mexico City unionists—aged between 24 and 56 years old and all intending to move into the Kennedy Housing Project upon its completion—had attended a preliminary two-week training on condominium management by AIFLD before coming to the United States. Once in the country, they spent several days at AIFLD’s training center in Washington hearing from cooperative housing specialists before touring housing developments, urban redevelopment offices, cooperative banks, and union headquarters in New York City, Chicago, Detroit, Madison, Minneapolis, and San Antonio. The trip was sponsored by AID and the U.S. Department of Labor, with AIFLD conducting much of the training.⁷

Finally, on November 17, 1964, the Kennedy Housing Project opened its doors “in a ceremony which became virtually a national occasion in Mexico.” Broadcast on national Mexican television, the ceremony was attended by 6,000 people, including President Adolfo López Mateos. Doherty and Joseph Beirne also attended on behalf of AIFLD and the AFL-CIO. The event appeared to be timed deliberately near the first anniversary of Kennedy’s assassination. Robert F. Kennedy came to the ceremony and stood alongside López Mateos to unveil a dedication plaque. “Like the legendary hero, [John F. Kennedy] triumphs after death,” declared Finance Secretary Ortiz Mena. “Kennedy is dead, but his spirit will live on in hundreds and thousands of homes and cities of this continent,” he added, referring to plans for more AIFLD-sponsored housing projects in Latin America. A prepared statement from President Johnson similarly noted that the new homes represented the fulfillment of a dream “not only for the union members and their families who will occupy this development but for the man whose name it honors.” The night before the ceremony, U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman hosted PRI and CTM officials at a downtown movie theater to see the world premiere of *Years of Lightning*,

Day of Drums, a U.S. Information Agency-produced propaganda film celebrating Kennedy's accomplishments narrated by Hollywood star Gregory Peck.⁸

Though the opening ceremony was well-timed to honor Kennedy, it would still be a few months before the development was ready for its first inhabitants. By early June 1965, AIFLD's Mexico country director cabled the Institute's Washington office that 625 families had signed sales contracts and 160 of them had already moved in, with move-ins expected to accelerate to 100 families per day. About 40 percent of the apartments were set aside specifically for members of the Graphic Arts Workers Union and their families, with the rest open to other working-class families, especially members of CTM-affiliated unions. One of the first residents in 1965 was 25-year-old Gloria Estrada, who moved in with her husband and three children. "The development was very beautiful," she recalled over 50 years later. "The new buildings were of several colors: yellow, blue, brown." She remembered the development was filled with so many children that the kindergarten was at maximum occupancy. "These thousands of apartments have truly become homes," Ambassador Freeman said in 1967. "The entire area has taken on a human warmth—with the shouting of children on the playground, the crying of babies and the laughter of families, as well as the savory kitchen aromas." By 1971, it was estimated that 22,000 people were living at the Kennedy Housing Project. As of 2018, the development was still home to thousands and still bore Kennedy's name.⁹

Hoping to reproduce its high-profile success in Mexico City, AIFLD's Social Projects Department quickly expanded the housing program to other countries throughout the region. By 1969, the Institute boasted of having built over 10,000 new affordable housing units in eleven Latin American and Caribbean countries.¹⁰ One such project was a development built for sugar workers in the town of San Pedro de Macorís in the Dominican Republic between 1965 and

1966, which was also named after Kennedy. Unlike the Mexico City project, this one did not seem to originate from the local workers but was instead entirely the brainchild of AIFLD officials who wanted to bolster the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Libres (National Confederation of Free Workers, CONATRAL), the Dominican “free” trade union center the AFL-CIO had helped create in 1962. The San Pedro de Macorís housing development initially promised between 700 and 900 units. Sixty-seven percent of the cost would be financed by a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, with the remaining 33 percent coming from AID-guaranteed loans by AFL-CIO affiliates. But the Inter-American Development Bank pulled out of the project citing AIFLD’s insistence that bidding on the construction contract be kept closed in order to favor U.S. firms, which allegedly violated Dominican laws, as well as the Institute’s demand that only CONATRAL members be allowed to live in the development. Without the Bank’s support, the project had to be significantly downsized, with ultimately only 110 units being built. The project was criticized by a U.S. technician for being “obviously designed to impress the U.S.A. with the tremendous impact of the AIFLD rather than serve the practical necessities of the Dominican Republic and Dominican labor.”¹¹

Other AIFLD housing projects, such as in Costa Rica and Uruguay, faced similar criticisms, especially for the Institute’s attempts to control who the residents would be.¹² As part of the application process, the Institute would usually require potential residents to fill out extensive questionnaires seeking detailed information about their respective unions—including the number of members, the political orientation of union officers, and any internal conflicts brewing—which were irrelevant to the applicants’ housing needs. Such questionnaires were an obvious attempt by AIFLD to compile intelligence about different unions, as well as to screen out applicants belonging to unions deemed “radical.”¹³ Often, the Institute’s housing projects

were delayed because of various technical and logistical issues. This occasionally led to clashes between AIFLD and AID, as in Colombia in 1964 when a Bogota housing development was put on hold over an inability to find a suitable contractor and unresolved budgeting questions. AIFLD blamed AID for dragging their feet on approving the project, goading Colombian trade unionists to complain to national authorities, who in turn complained to Washington. Under diplomatic pressure, AID approved the project despite believing it was premature to do so—indeed, it would still take AIFLD another three years of planning before construction could even begin.¹⁴ Despite such controversies, the Social Projects Department's housing program remained a source of pride for the Institute until it was finally discontinued in 1978 due to rising worldwide interest rates. AIFLD claimed that to have helped construct a total of 18,048 units in fourteen countries, housing 125,000 people.¹⁵

Agrarian Reform

While AIFLD's housing program helped ease some of the pressures of rapid urbanization in Latin America, the Institute's leaders also realized that in order to contain perceived Communist threats among workers, they would also have to contend with rural labor relations, which meant tackling questions of land ownership and tenancy. For U.S. modernization scholars like Samuel Huntington, implementing effective land reform in a given developing country was crucial to achieving political "stability" as defined by anticommunists. "The peasantry," Huntington wrote in 1968, "may be the bulwark of the status quo or the shock troops of revolution." Land reform could ensure they played the former role and not the latter by granting them a material stake in agricultural production and thus a stake in the national economy. "No social group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry," Huntington argued, while simultaneously warning that no group "is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too

little land or pays too high a rental.”¹⁶ Huntington pointed to the post-World War II land reforms in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea as textbook examples for how to successfully “conservatize” rural workers and undermine radical influence, arguing such reforms should be replicated across the Third World. Key to the land redistribution efforts in these countries was that parcels were handed over to individual peasant families rather than collectivized and owned by the state. This served to reinforce the institution of private property and turn peasants into entrepreneurs.

From its founding in 1951, ORIT supported this kind of land reform to both avoid revolution and stimulate economic growth in Latin America. At its second congress in 1952, ORIT called for an end to the latifundio system of large estates owned by absentee landlords. Dividing these estates, compensating their former owners, and legally handing the parcels over to individual campesino families would, it was generally believed, increase agricultural production. Formerly landless rural workers would now be landowning small farmers with an economic incentive to produce more efficiently. Assuming they could be provided adequate resources—including credit, inputs, machinery, and market access—it was reckoned they would succeed. Increased agricultural production, for both domestic consumption and export, would grow the national economies of Latin American countries and thereby make way for industrialization and development. ORIT was critical of the “demagogic” land reform that accompanied the Cuban revolution, which collectivized and nationalized farms without compensating former landowners, viewing it as illegitimately and hastily carried out. Rather than generate a prosperous class of small farmers, ORIT contended in the 1960s that Cuba’s land reform had created a miserable class of “serfs” enslaved by a totalitarian state.¹⁷

Recognizing that up to 70 percent of Latin America’s productive land was owned by less than 8 percent of the population, and eager to see that this inequity would not trigger more

revolutions in the vein of Cuba, ORIT declared 1960 the “Year of Agrarian Reform in Latin America.” Agrarian reform went beyond land redistribution and included increased investment in rural education, healthcare, and housing. Importantly, it also meant the establishment of producer cooperatives, whereby small farmers could pool their resources and share knowledge to improve efficiency and marketability. ORIT was also worried by population growth in Latin America and the need to keep people fed to avoid political crises. Wanting to redistribute land but also fearful of harming agricultural production where it was already efficient, ORIT took the position that if a large estate happened to be highly productive and using modern farming techniques, then it should stay in the hands of its current landowner. However, ORIT stressed that the workers on such estates should not be exploited: “The free trade union movement...demands that farm workers employed in the large modern ranches or plantations be accorded the same trade union rights as the industrial workers, including the right to collective bargaining and complete Social Security in all its aspects.”¹⁸

As AIFLD increasingly gained a foothold in Latin America in the 1960s, its leaders also took a keen interest in the politics of agrarian reform. Echoing Huntington, AIFLD’s Doherty contended “where a Latin American country escapes a violent revolution from which only communism will benefit it will be because the campesino has been given reason to believe that at long last his voice is being heard, his identity is recognized, his dignity honored.” With this in mind, the Institute established an Agrarian Union Development Service in 1965, envisioning “a multifaceted undertaking including education, establishment of cooperatives, community development and training in improved agricultural techniques, etc.”¹⁹ What was needed for AIFLD to carry out such projects was a core group of trustworthy campesino leaders. In April 1965, the Institute’s new agrarian service began a 12-week pilot rural leadership training

program in Honduras. Twenty-six students—all campesino men, mostly aged 20 to 40—participated in the training. They included four participants each from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, three each from Panama and Costa Rica, one from the Dominican Republic, and the rest from Honduras. All had been selected through previous short-term seminars AIFLD had conducted in their home countries. Courses focused on the history of Latin American agriculture, agrarian law, rental contracts, types of land ownership, cooperatives and peasant associations, the Alliance for Progress, “free” trade unionism, and agrarian reform. After the initial coursework, the trainees were divided into seven teams and sent into the rural communities of Honduras’s Atlántida department. There, they conducted interviews and surveys with local campesinos to understand community needs and identify potential “self-help projects.” Then, using AIFLD-provided funds and working with local “community-minded citizens,” the trainees helped carry out quick projects like digging wells, installing latrines, repairing school buildings, and forming committees to study the possibility of creating cooperatives.²⁰

After declaring the Honduras training a success, AIFLD leaders rapidly moved to replicate it all over Latin America. The main purpose was to connect the leadership trainings to modest rural development projects that delivered results, winning the trust of campesinos while establishing new organizational links to their communities. “It may seem strange in the eyes of some observers that a trade union oriented organization should be developing a particular concern for the unorganized rural workers of Latin America rather than for the traditional industrial and white collar segments of labor,” said Morris Paladino, Deputy Executive Director of AIFLD. “But the conditions of rural labor in Ibero-America cannot in conscience be ignored by any organization seeking, as we do, to advance the free and democratic development of our neighbors to the South.” In particular, the Institute hoped to encourage agrarian reform in Central

America, where dramatic inequities in land ownership caused many U.S. observers to fear the outbreak of another Cuba-style revolution. The surveys conducted by AIFLD trainees during the pilot program in Honduras had revealed that while many campesinos yearned to be smallholders, most were skeptical of the very concept of agrarian reform, believing it to be either a disingenuous ploy by elites or a dangerous idea promoted by subversives. The Institute hoped its campesino training program and community development projects would create a more favorable climate for agrarian reform among rural workers. It would encounter one of its biggest challenges in El Salvador.²¹

El Salvador: Campesino Organizing

Geographically the smallest country in Central America, El Salvador's traditionally communal lands were commercialized and privatized beginning in the 1880s with the introduction of coffee. While this temporarily created a prosperous class of smallholders at the turn of the twentieth century, rapid population growth began causing a sharp increase in the number of landless campesinos by the 1920s.²² Dispossessed, landless campesinos had to work for wages at large haciendas, or else permanently live and work on small plots of rented land as tenants and sharecroppers. Meanwhile, large landowners shored up their powerful position in the new export economy, controlling not only the production of coffee, but also its processing and marketing. By the 1920s, coffee accounted for over 90 percent of El Salvador's exports. Consisting of a small number of closely aligned families, the emergent oligarchy used its economic power to take control of the state apparatus. El Salvador's stark economic inequality was complemented with racism, as Ladino elites considered indigenous campesinos to be racially and culturally inferior.²³

When global coffee prices fell at the onset of the Great Depression, landowners forced their workers to shoulder most of the misery by cutting wages and raising rents. Rural workers organized into a trade union and joined the Salvadoran Communist Party, receiving aid from the Third International. In late January 1932, an unprecedented campesino uprising broke out in the country's coffee-growing western region. It was a direct response to a military coup the month before, but also the culmination of years of growing frustration. The rebellion of about 7,000 campesinos seized a handful of towns and killed perhaps a few dozen landowners and local officials. The military dictatorship, aligned with the oligarchy, quickly put down the insurgency. Working hand-in-hand with local elites, the military then methodically carried out a slaughter to ensure such a rebellion would never happen again. In what came to be called the Matanza (massacre), between 10,000 and 30,000 campesinos were systematically murdered in a matter of days. The memory of 1932 would have a profound impact on Salvadoran politics for the rest of the twentieth century. The oligarchy would not only remain intact, but would become stronger with the introduction new export crops like sugar and cotton, which only led to further dispossession of campesinos. In the decades following the Matanza, the alliance of military dictators and oligarchs would routinely employ repression to keep rural workers in check.²⁴

In the 1950s, with the Cold War in full swing, Salvadoran elites and military leaders viewed any challenge to their continued rule as part of a global Communist conspiracy. Under pressure from the United States—which in 1954 helped overthrow neighboring Guatemala's democratically elected president in the name of anticommunism—Salvadoran dictators Oscar Osorio and José María Lemus carried out violent crackdowns on dissident movements emerging from the National University. Lemus's ham-handed approach to silencing popular opposition backfired, and in October 1960 he was overthrown and replaced with a civic-military junta that

promised democratic reforms. Alienating Washington by refusing to break diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba, the junta only lasted three months before being replaced by anticommunist military officers who founded a new official party, the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN).²⁵ Supported and funded by the United States, the PCN regime fully embraced Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, putting forward a program of national security through modernization to ensure El Salvador would not go the way of Cuba. Trying to appease reformers while not alienating the oligarchy, the PCN allowed the existence of certain opposition parties and promoted economic growth through free trade. Split over whether to pursue electoral politics or direct action, the Salvadoran Left was relatively quiet in the early 1960s. Nevertheless, the PCN government implemented an aggressive counterinsurgency strategy under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress.²⁶ As the United States trained thousands of Salvadoran military officers to hunt down "subversives," the PCN expanded the state security apparatus. Most notable was the creation of ORDEN (Organización Democrática Nacionalista), a paramilitary force and intelligence-gathering network designed to monitor and extinguish any perceived radicalism in the countryside.

The U.S.-led "free" trade union movement was also actively waging the Cold War in El Salvador. During the Lemus presidency, ORIT and the AFL-CIO helped establish the Confederación General de Sindicatos (CGS) as an anticommunist alternative to the existing, left-oriented national trade union center, the Confederación General de Trabajadores Salvadoreños. In exchange for the support of the CGS, and bowing to pressure from Washington, the PCN regime passed a labor code in 1963 enshrining the right of workers to form unions and bargain collectively. Importantly, the new law excluded agrarian workers, as the oligarchy and security forces had no desire to see campesinos get organized as they had done in 1932.²⁷ AFL-CIO Inter-

American Representative Andrew McLellan called the exclusion “regrettable” as it would limit the U.S. labor federation’s ability to influence Salvadoran campesinos, but he believed that “if we approach this problem from other angles...we might possibly come up with an effective program.”²⁸ AIFLD appeared to be the solution.

Welcomed by the PCN as the labor arm of the Alliance for Progress, AIFLD was active in El Salvador from 1962 training CGS leaders.²⁹ In November 1965, just months after the pilot rural leadership course in Honduras, AIFLD organized its first campesino leader training in El Salvador. The Institute found an ally in the Catholic Church, which, guided by the new social doctrine of Vatican II, was eager to educate and organize landless laborers.³⁰ The initial 18 participants were chosen via the Church’s Inter-Diocesan Social Secretariat, which also supplied some of the instructors. More courses were organized throughout 1966 and 1967 with the backing of the Salvadoran Ministry of Labor, and with course participants nominated by local chapters of the Catholic humanitarian organization Caritas. As with the pilot training, the campesino leadership seminars were immediately followed by community development projects—such as building community centers, repairing bridges, digging latrines, and refurbishing school classrooms—initiated and nominally led by the trainees. AID provided roughly \$260 for each individual project. Municipal governments, some led by the PCN and others by the nascent Christian Democratic Party, also got behind these projects in the hope of scoring political points, providing materials and manpower.³¹

By late 1967, approximately 150 campesino leaders across the country had graduated from the AIFLD leadership course. The year before, the Institute had established a permanent office in El Salvador, sending Michael Hammer—a former Air Force pilot and graduate of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service—to be country director. Using the cadre of rural

leaders and the community development projects as a foundation, Hammer set about implementing the next phase of AIFLD's plan: the creation of campesino "unions." In compliance with El Salvador's labor code, these would not be traditional trade unions, but rather communal associations meant to facilitate "self-help" activities and the establishment of rural cooperatives, as well as to advocate for agrarian reform. Between February and March 1968, the first of these new *Uniones Comunales* (communal unions) were founded by Hammer and AIFLD's campesino graduates in the departments of Usulután and La Paz. With a \$3,000 line of credit from AID and material support from the government and Caritas, the *Unión Comunal* in La Paz acquired 31 hectares of land and, in April, turned it into a producer cooperative shared among 32 campesinos. AIFLD soon established *Uniones Comunales* in five other departments, with hundreds of members carrying out educational seminars and community development initiatives. In mid-December 1969, Hammer brought together leaders from all the *Uniones Comunales* to form a national campesino organization—the *Unión Comunal Salvadoreña* (UCS).³²

Only weeks after the founding of UCS, in January 1970, the PCN government convened the First National Agrarian Reform Congress at the legislative assembly in San Salvador. The purpose of the congress was to consult national public opinion on problems related to land use and tenancy, though it remained unclear how serious the PCN was about actually implementing meaningful agrarian reform. Participants included CGS leaders, officials from government ministries and agencies, representatives of the business sector, landowning elites, academics, and church officials. Members of various political parties—including the opposition Christian Democrats—were allowed to participate, but the outlawed Salvadoran Communist Party was decidedly banned. Also notably excluded from participation were landless campesinos, the very

people who stood to gain the most from agrarian reform. The sole campesinos permitted to attend the congress were UCS leaders, illustrating the new organization's legitimacy in the eyes of the state. Still, the UCS representatives were relegated to the audience and could only address the congress once. Though "not represented legally" at the congress, they told the participants they were thankful to at least observe. "We are following step by step the proceedings of this congress, which brings much benefit to the Salvadoran peasantry," they declared.³³

The landowners and business representatives at the congress argued there was no need for land redistribution, only better agricultural techniques to boost production, and that landless campesinos could try moving to cities and finding new jobs if they wanted to improve their economic lot. Near the end of the congress, one of the participants—Father José Inocencio Alas, a liberation theology priest who spoke in favor of land redistribution and campesino rights—was kidnapped and beaten by ORDEN.³⁴ The hostility with which oligarchs and some security officials greeted the 1970 agrarian reform congress, epitomized by ORDEN's attack on Father Alas, reflected the Salvadoran Right's growing frustration with the PCN's liberalization and modernization agenda, which they regarded as being too permissive. Viewing modernization as a Yankee-imposed doctrine, the Right articulated a nationalist, anti-imperialist discourse. Writing in the conservative newspaper *El Diario de Hoy* in 1968, right-wing intellectual Ricardo Fuentes Castellanos argued that U.S presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to Kennedy had facilitated the spread of leftism in Latin America, with the Alliance for Progress bringing "a strong dose of socialism." Calling the Alliance "the most serious and profound attempt the U.S. has ever made to submit Latin America to its dominance," and warning that continued reforms would soon bring about a "leftist dictatorship" in El Salvador, Castellanos called for the rise of a "nationalist

front” guided by the “noble ideas of homeland and liberty” to combat “the penetration of international forces.”³⁵

The mission of UCS, as conceived by AIFLD and supported by both the U.S. embassy and PCN regime, was to be a moderate, nonconfrontational organization to address rural inequities without upsetting the oligarchy or threatening existing power structures. After all, the purpose of AIFLD’s “free” trade unionism was to promote class cooperation for the sake of national prosperity and political stability. The official objectives of UCS included not only the promotion of community development projects and the formation of cooperatives, but also encouraging a “rapprochement” between landlords and rural workers “on the basis of justice, mutual respect, and subordination to the law.”³⁶ In the fall of 1971, the Salvadoran government granted UCS legal status. Using loans from the government’s Agricultural Development Bank and AID grant money provided through AIFLD, by 1973, UCS had established six producer cooperatives and expanded its presence to 12 of El Salvador’s 14 departments. The PCN regime’s tolerance for UCS stood in contrast to its repression toward other campesino organizations, including was the Federación Cristiana de Campesinos Salvadoreños (FECCAS). Founded in the mid-1960s with the help of Catholic priests and the Christian Democratic Party, FECCAS organized rural workers to call for higher wages, improved education, and better healthcare. These demands were repeatedly met with violence—including the kidnapping, torture, and assassination of FECCAS leaders—at the hands of ORDEN, the National Guard, and other state security forces.

El Salvador’s period of political liberalization came to an end with the 1972 presidential election. Despite the victory of the Christian Democratic candidate, San Salvador mayor José Napoleón Duarte, the PCN stole the election with help from state security forces. After a failed

coup attempt by more liberal elements in the military and the forced exile of Duarte, the PCN—realizing that it was losing its grip on power—took a more authoritarian turn under the new president, Arturo Molina. Around this same time, UCS drew the ire of right-wing landlords by helping scores of evicted campesino tenants around the country challenge the legality of their evictions in court. Believing AIFLD was too far to the left, the elites made their displeasure known to the PCN. In June 1973, the Salvadoran minister of labor abruptly informed the U.S. embassy that AIFLD was “no longer considered necessary” and was therefore terminating the agreement that allowed the Institute to operate in the country. AIFLD would have to leave El Salvador by the end of July. When pressed for an explanation by U.S. Ambassador Henry Catto, Jr., the labor minister admitted that the problem was UCS, which had become “overly enthusiastic” in its attempts to empower campesinos. AIFLD was “on the road to creating an apolitical and effective organization for the defense of the economic and social interest of the campesinos,” Catto cabled Washington, but unfortunately the Salvadoran government “considers an independent UCS a potential threat to the stability of the countryside.”³⁷

Doherty was concerned that UCS would face repression without the presence of the Institute and asked the State Department to intervene. Demonstrating the high value the U.S. government placed on AIFLD’s programs, under the advisement of Secretary of State William Rogers, Catto met with President Molina and Foreign Minister Mauricio Borgonovo to try to convince them not to expel the Institute. Both Molina and Borgonovo expressed concerns about an AIFLD representative named Elio Horna, who had previously worked for the Institute in Peru. They characterized him as misleading campesinos into believing that large-scale land redistribution similar to what was underway in Peru would soon be coming to El Salvador. “I cannot have untrue stories being spread,” Molina told the U.S. ambassador. “Agrarian reform is

the most difficult problem I have to face...The final solution will be, must be, Salvadoran, not Peruvian or any other foreign solution.” The Salvadoran president added that AIFLD had “become an intolerable intrusion into our affairs” as it was interfering in the delicate politics of land reform, and could not remain in the country under any circumstances. In a victory for the Salvadoran Right, on July 31, the Institute was forced to close up shop in El Salvador.³⁸ UCS would survive as a moderate, regime-friendly alternative to more independent and left-wing campesino organizations, and would later play a key role in the country’s attempted agrarian reform process in the 1980s.³⁹

Sabotaging Democracy

Like the social democrats of the ICFTU and ILO, the AFL-CIO’s zealous cold warriors encountered the problem of how to promote political stability and economic development in the Third World while simultaneously living up to the democratic pluralist ideals they espoused. Unlike their more cautious counterparts, Meany and company did not hesitate to take decisive action no matter the cost, as long as the defeat of leftists was assured. In Latin America, this occasionally took the form of actively undermining a democratic government if it was considered untrustworthy by officials in the AFL-CIO or U.S. government. AIFLD’s first attempt at dramatically altering a country’s political dynamic was in British Guiana between 1962 and 1964. The colony of only 600,000 people was led by democratically elected Chief Minister Cheddi Jagan, who expected to see his country through a planned transition to independence from Britain. A devoted socialist who did not hide his admiration for the Soviet Union, Jagan alarmed the Kennedy Administration and their allies in the AFL-CIO, who saw him as another Castro. Kennedy pressured the British government to delay independence until Jagan could be forced out of power and replaced by his main political opponent, Forbes

Burnham. British Guiana's political divide between the Indo-Guyanese Jagan and the Afro-Guyanese Burnham fueled racial tensions, with the colony's East Indians (49 percent of the population) backing Jagan and Blacks (40 percent of the population) supporting Burnham. When AIFLD held its first residential course in Washington in the summer of 1962, eight of the trainees were Guyanese labor leaders from unions affiliated with the pro-Burnham British Guiana Trade Union Council (BGTUC), who returned home that fall with nine months of funding as part of AIFLD's internship program—each getting paid a \$250 monthly stipend. Meanwhile, several AFL-CIO and AIFLD officials made visits to British Guiana in 1962, including Doherty, to meet with BGTUC leaders to discuss strategies for opposing Jagan.⁴⁰

In March 1963, Jagan's government introduced a bill to rehaul the colony's labor relations system. Saying the bill was based on the U.S. Wagner Act, allowing workers the opportunity to vote for which union they wanted to have as their collective bargaining agent, Jagan hoped the new law would enable Indo-Guyanese sugar workers to break away from their Burnham-aligned union and instead join an alternative union allied with his own People's Progressive Party (PPP). Worried that the labor bill would undercut their influence over Guyanese workers, BGTUC leaders called a general strike that April. The AFL-CIO championed the strike as an effort to preserve "free" trade unionism in the face of legislation that allegedly aimed to turn unions into an instrument of the government. Six of the Guyanese AIFLD graduates—still funded by the Institute as interns—were instructed by Romualdi to devote all their time and energy to serving on the BGTUC strike committee. Their internship funding, scheduled to end in June, was extended to August by AIFLD. William Howard McCabe, an international representative with the AFL-CIO-affiliated American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), was dispatched to British Guiana to help sustain the

strike. McCabe was ostensibly working on behalf of Public Services International, the international trade secretariat for public employees. With McCabe's coordination, the AFL-CIO donated between \$800,000 and \$1 million to the BGTUC strike fund, which provided food relief for some 50,000 strikers. McCabe's effort was assisted by U.S. labor official Gerard O'Keefe, sent to British Guiana on behalf of the Retail Clerks union. As would be discovered later, much of the money came from the CIA (see Chapter Five).⁴¹

As the general strike continued into June, Jagan published a letter to the editor in the *New York Times* defending his labor bill, saying his government had "bent over backward attempting to reach a compromise" with the BGTUC. He alleged the strike was "not industrial but rather politically inspired," directly calling out AIFLD for training Guyanese unionists "to overthrow my Government." The strike crippled transportation, communications, and government services in the colony. It also turned into a race riot, with the pro-Burnham Afro-Guyanese strikers attacking non-striking, Indo-Guyanese workers who supported Jagan. Finally, Jagan's government shelved the labor bill and the strike came to an end in early July. In December of the following year, elections were held. Adhering to U.S. pressure, the British colonial office changed the colony's electoral system to proportional representation, meaning a party would need to secure a *majority* of the vote in order to form a government, as opposed to a plurality. Both the CIA and the AFL-CIO worked hard in the run-up to the 1964 election to ensure Jagan's PPP would be denied more than 50 percent of the vote. Gene Meakins of the AFL-CIO-affiliated American Newspaper Guild was sent to British Guiana to help create and disseminate anti-Jagan propaganda in print and over radio airwaves. The CIA helped create new Indo-Guyanese political parties to try to split the PPP vote. In the end, the PPP secured 45.8 percent of the vote, while Burnham's party won 40.5 percent and another anti-Jagan party won 12.4 percent. With no

party securing a majority, the colonial governor—following the directives of the British government—invited the anti-Jagan parties to form a coalition government, with Burnham as chief minister.⁴²

With Jagan out of power, the decolonization process was allowed to move forward, with British Guiana becoming the independent Guyana in 1966. That same year, AIFLD began work on a new housing development in the suburbs of the capital, Georgetown. The Institute helped the BGTUC establish a housing cooperative and convinced the Burnham government to purchase 102 acres of land. With a \$2-million, AID-guaranteed loan from the AFL-CIO, AIFLD went about building 568 two- to four-bedroom houses. Problems with the contractor and disagreements between the Institute and AID not only led to delays, but also served to make the houses more expensive than originally expected. When the housing development—named TUCville—was finally completed, the homes were financially out of reach for poorer workers and only members of BGTUC-affiliated unions were allowed to live there. Families that could not buy a TUCville house instead set up a shantytown on the project's outskirts, leading to a drainage backup and mosquito infestation linked to a malaria outbreak. The unanticipated problems with AIFLD's housing development were emblematic of the detrimental consequences of the Institute's role in elevating Burnham at Jagan's expense. To prevent the majority Indo-Guyanese population from voting him out of office, Burnham would turn to election fraud and voter intimidation, becoming an authoritarian ruler who remained in office until his death in 1985. Perhaps worse, the racial violence stirred up by the 1963 general strike would mar the country's race relations between Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese for decades to come. Despite their aggressive intrusion into Guyana's political, economic, and social affairs, however,

AIFLD leaders like Romualdi would publicly boast of their role in undermining Jagan's supposedly Communist government and facilitating Burnham's rise to power.⁴³

Brazil: Aiding a Coup

One of the clearest illustrations of AIFLD sabotaging democracy in order to supposedly save it was its intervention in Brazil, where the Institute had a hand in the U.S.-supported military coup of 1964. Like their allies in the U.S. government, AFL-CIO leaders distrusted Brazil's democratically elected, left-leaning president, João Goulart, whom they considered "an erratic opportunist" making the country vulnerable to a Communist takeover.⁴⁴ What's more, they had long opposed Brazil's corporatist industrial relations system, wherein unions were under tight state control and collective bargaining was typically restricted. For three months in early 1963, a year before the coup that would oust Goulart, AIFLD hosted a special all-Brazilian class of 33 unionists at its school in Washington. The course included 50 hours' worth of instruction on thwarting Communist infiltration, with lectures on this topic by Romualdi and Jay Lovestone, as well as field trips to Philadelphia and New England to visit factories and union halls.⁴⁵ As with AIFLD's other courses, graduates were sent home with nine-month stipends to instruct their fellow workers in the ways of "free" trade unionism.

When Brazilian military leaders launched their coup d'état against Goulart on April 1, 1964—which they characterized as a "revolution" to "save" the country from following in Cuba's footsteps—AIFLD graduates helped ensure the overthrow went smoothly. One of them, Rômulo Teixeira Marinho of the Radio, Telegraph and Telephone Workers' Union, said that when the Brazilian Communist Party called a general strike in defense of Goulart during the coup, they specifically exhorted communications workers to walk off the job. Thanks in part to Marinho's efforts, the left-wing agitators were ignored so that "the wires kept humming, and the

army was able to coordinate troop movements that ended the showdown bloodlessly.”⁴⁶ The new regime put allegedly Communist-led unions into trusteeships, sending “intervenor” to take control of these unions and purge them of all leftists and Goulart sympathizers. Three graduates of the 1963 course in Washington, and one former student of AIFLD’s Instituto Cultural do Trabalho in São Paulo, were appointed to be government intervenors. Many other graduates of the Washington course were “recalled” by AIFLD and “employed... on a full-time basis to organize teams that would not only undertake educational activities but would also assist in rescuing unions that were for so many years under communist control.”⁴⁷

Three months after the coup, AIFLD’s Doherty openly bragged in a radio interview that Brazilian graduates of the Institute “became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution... Many of the trade union leaders—some of whom were actually trained in our institute—were involved in... the overthrow of the Goulart regime.”⁴⁸ Whether this was mere bravado on Doherty’s part, or if AIFLD graduates really had participated in “clandestine operations” in Brazil, remains a mystery. The coup regime set about implementing its plan for rapid modernization in Brazil, which centered on a wage-control policy meant to curb inflation and attract investment. Under Goulart, despite the country’s traditional corporatist industrial relations system, some unions had been allowed to negotiate salary increases with their employers. The military government soon nullified these agreements and passed the “Law of Salary Compression,” tying all wage raises to the regime’s own determination of the cost of living.⁴⁹ In the same 1964 radio interview, AIFLD’s Doherty defended the wage controls. Advocating his belief in “responsible” unionism, Doherty confidently stated that Brazil’s unions were “perfectly willing to accept any type of wage freeze necessary” and that even the destitute

would have to sacrifice for the sake of development. “You can’t have the poor suffer more than the rich, or *the poor less than the rich*,” he stated.⁵⁰

The AFL-CIO and AIFLD’s enthusiasm for the coup was partly driven by the expressed “hope that the new government would provide an atmosphere in which free labor unions could prosper.”⁵¹ At a September 1964 AIFLD graduation ceremony in Washington, Brazil’s new ambassador, Juracy Magalhães, declared that “the Brazilian Revolution which saved the country from Communism and corruption wants to establish trade union freedom” and promised that unions would no longer be “subjected to [government] intervention.”⁵² The AFL-CIO’s McLellan assisted the coup regime in drafting a new labor law that would replace state-managed corporatism with free collective bargaining. But fearful that a more independent form of trade unionism would undermine the government’s economic development policies, Brazil’s minister of finance killed the legislation. At the same time, the government implemented new restrictions on the right to strike. In October 1965, the coup’s right-wing leaders formally instituted a dictatorship. Throughout 1966, the regime decreed a number of anti-union measures in the name of anticommunism and modernization.⁵³ That June, McLellan confided to the U.S. labor attaché in Rio de Janeiro that “perhaps our efforts have been nothing more than an exercise in futility,” explaining that he “had hoped that by now, after all the effort that has gone into the Brazilian labor movement through AIFLD...that we would begin to see something positive emerge...”⁵⁴ Despite this bleak assessment and recognition that there was little hope of U.S.-style industrial pluralism taking root under such draconian conditions, AIFLD continued its educational and development activities in Brazil for many years to come.

Now operating in an outright dictatorship, the Institute’s stated purpose in the country changed from fighting a no-holds-barred battle against totalitarianism to the more watered-down

goal of preparing workers “for the day when the military regime would relax its control of organized labor and permit both free trade unionism and collective bargaining”⁵⁵—but doing nothing in particular to hasten when that day might come. For his part, Lovestone said there was a distinction between “totalitarian” dictatorships and “military” dictatorships like that in Brazil, because the latter supposedly allowed unions a greater degree of autonomy than the former.⁵⁶ Such flexibility in the face of an anticommunist military dictatorship stood in stark contrast to the brash determination with which AIFLD had confronted the democratic Goulart government. The AFL-CIO’s tolerance of Brazil’s repressive regime similarly contrasted with its uncompromising hostility toward world communism. In 1966, for example, Meany histrionically boycotted the ILO’s annual conference simply because it was chaired by an official from Communist Poland. Then in 1969, the AFL-CIO made the dramatic move of withdrawing entirely from the ICFTU partly because the latter’s European leaders sought a rapprochement with Eastern Bloc unions (see Chapter Five).⁵⁷ All the while, and well into the 1970s, AIFLD quietly continued its programs in Brazil and, according to U.S. Ambassador John Crimmins, rarely challenged the dictatorship even as local unionists were disappeared and tortured.⁵⁸ It would appear obvious, then, that the Institute’s purported dedication to democratic pluralism was ultimately secondary to a calculating anticommunism. This was an all-too familiar story in the Third World during the Cold War. Despite lofty rhetoric promoting democracy and freedom, anticommunist modernization initiatives like the Alliance for Progress—which prioritized national security as a prerequisite for development—frequently facilitated the installation of authoritarian, military governments for the sake of establishing “order.”⁵⁹

Conclusion

Though unique in that it was steered by U.S. labor leaders and primarily concerned with trade unions, AIFLD and its foreign activities did not stray too far from the general character of U.S.-sponsored international development initiatives in the 1960s. They were fundamentally political in nature, driven not so much by human needs as Cold War geopolitical priorities, which typically meant combating leftist influence in the Third World (Latin America, in this case). In certain contexts, this took the form of constructive projects like building new worker housing or organizing rural campesinos. In other contexts, it involved providing material and intellectual support to political opposition groups in order to subvert elected governments. Though certainly part of a broad campaign to demonstrate the benefits of “free” trade unionism, the John F. Kennedy Housing Project in Mexico City was an uncontroversial intervention that, by all accounts, served a need and improved the lives of thousands of workers and their families. Its success likely derived from the fact that it was the Mexican graphic arts workers themselves who had conceived and spearheaded the project, while AIFLD played a supporting role—albeit a crucial one. The creation of the campesino organization UCS in El Salvador, though packaged as an apolitical move by AIFLD, struck a nerve with that country’s right-wing oligarchy and military. El Salvador’s rightist did not care about the dedicated anticommunism of AIFLD and the Alliance for Progress; they only saw that campesinos were getting organized and making demands at the urging of foreigners, which was enough to make them believe the Institute was serving a dangerous agenda and had to be booted from the country. While perhaps unintentionally antagonizing the Right in El Salvador, AIFLD purposely antagonized the Left in other countries, using the language of freedom and democracy to undermine actual democracy in

British Guiana and Brazil for the sake of promoting “free” trade unionism and combating the perceived threat of communism.

Disrupting the internal political dynamics of Third World countries, exacerbating existing social and economic conflicts, undermining democratic processes, and excusing authoritarianism all while occasionally providing worthwhile assistance to poor and working-class people, was the hallmark of the U.S. government’s approach to international development in the 1960s—meaning the work of AIFLD and the AFL-CIO’s other government-funded foreign institutes was not particularly unusual. This approach to development, informed by modernization theory and Cold War exigencies, reached its apotheosis at the end of the decade with the Vietnam War. The anti-war movement in the United States helped spark numerous investigations and reconsiderations of international development from all sectors of U.S. society. In the process, the AFL-CIO’s foreign affairs came under unprecedented scrutiny in the late 1960s, leading to vocal criticisms of AIFLD and the first serious challenges to Meany’s anticommunist internationalism. These challenges and the schisms they fostered in the labor movement are the subject of the next chapter.

¹ Comptroller General of the United States, *How to Improve Management of U.S.-Financed Programs to Develop Free Labor Movements in Less Developed Countries*, December 29, 1975, 65.

² Hilary Botein, 2007, “Labor Unions and Affordable Housing An Uneasy Relationship,” *Urban Affairs Review* 42, No. 6, 802-804; Erik Forman, “How Unions Can Solve the Housing Crisis,” *In These Times*, October 2018.

³ Norman McKenna, “Union Aim in Housing,” *American Labour*, 20, No. 8, August 1967, 15-19, Morris Weisz Collection, Reuther Library.

⁴ “Brother to Brother, Worker to Worker: The John F. Kennedy Memorial Housing Project,” AIFLD, n.d., box 68, folder 4, AUF Records #6046, Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation and Archives (hereafter, KC), Cornell University Library; “AFL-CIO Loan Has Alliance for Progress Booming in Mexico,” AIFLD Report, December 1963, box 128, folder 1, Sidney Lens Papers, Chicago History Museum [hereafter, Lens Papers]; Susana Collin Moya, “Cuando gringos construyeron departamentos en Balbuena,” *El Universal*, September 29, 2018, <https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/cuando-gringos-construyeron-departamentos-en-balbuena> [accessed June 23, 2019].

⁵ “Adelante Con Nuestra Colonia,” *Colonia Grafica Boletin*, October 15, 1961, box 23, folder 6, RG18-001, GMMA; United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearings on the American Institute for Free Labor Development, Ninety-First Congress, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1969; “AFL-CIO Loan Has Alliance for Progress Booming in Mexico,” AIFLD Report, December 1963, box 128, folder 1, Lens Papers.

⁶ Isse Nuñez, “La Unidad Habitacional de Artes Graficas, se Llamara ‘Kennedy’,” *Novedades* December 5, 1963; “Primera Piedra de la ‘Unidad John F. Kennedy’,” *La Prensa*, December 5, 1963; Interview with Andrew Clay,

Mexico City, August 20 1963, box 8, folder 51, Robert J. Alexander Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries (hereafter, Alexander Papers); Paul P. Kennedy, "Mexico Advances Housing Project," *New York Times*, December 29, 1963; "AFL-CIO Loan Has Alliance for Progress Booming in Mexico," AIFLD Report, December 1963, box 128, folder 1, Lens Papers.

⁷ United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearings on the American Institute for Free Labor Development, Ninety-First Congress, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1969; "Program and Itinerary: Mexico Graphic Arts Union Cooperative Housing, Project 523-000-1-40014," August 9-September 12, 1964, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., box 2, folder 3, USAID Records #5384, KC.

⁸ "6,000 Attend Opening of Kennedy Housing Project in Mexico," AIFLD Report, December 1964, box 10, folder 1, Serafino Romualdi Papers, KC; Andrew Herod, 2001, *Labor Geographies: Workers and the Landscapes of Capitalism*. New York: The Guilford Press, 168.

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Chapter Five: The “AFL-CIA” Exposed

The intellectual popularity of modernization theory and the liberal anticommunism of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations combined to help make the AFL-CIO a major player in U.S.-led international development programs during the 1960s. These same forces also combined to pull the United States into the Vietnam War, a violent and destructive conflict that served to polarize U.S. politics and cause many sectors of society to begin openly criticizing the logic of modernization and anticommunist interventionism by the latter half of the decade. Working in partnership with the U.S. government overseas, the AFL-CIO leadership was undoubtedly part of the political establishment that anti-war liberals and New Left dissidents sought to overturn, or at least dramatically reform. Prior to the late 1960s, when the Vietnam War gradually became the nation's prevailing political concern, discussion of organized labor's development initiatives and other activities in the Third World had been largely limited to a handful of top-level union and government officials and kept behind closed doors. There was little disagreement or dissension about the AFL-CIO's foreign policy mainly because few people—both within and outside the U.S. labor movement—knew anything about it. But the war created a political climate of skepticism toward the establishment, including toward labor officialdom, which helped bring the AFL-CIO's international affairs out into the open.

A major challenge to the labor federation's foreign policy would come from one of its own affiliates, the United Auto Workers (UAW). With 1.3 million members and a charismatic president, the UAW was the AFL-CIO's largest and most prominent affiliated union. Ever since the 1955 merger between the AFL and CIO, the UAW's Walter Reuther had been quietly frustrated by his inability to exert much influence on the federation under the presidency of George Meany, particularly in the realm of international affairs. But it would ultimately be

Reuther's younger brother, Victor, who first voiced public disagreement with what he believed to be the AFL-CIO's inappropriate relationship with the U.S. foreign policy establishment—including but not limited to the CIA—and with the federation's controversial interventions in Latin America. This would soon lead to several investigations by the press revealing secret connections between the spy agency and organized labor, which in turn led to AIFLD coming under close scrutiny by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The end result would be not only the tarnishing of the AFL-CIO's reputation, but also heightened conflict and division within the labor movement.

Victor Reuther's Crusade

In the late summer of 1966, the AFL-CIO Executive Council took the unusual step of publicly condemning a high-level U.S. union official. Their target was UAW international affairs director Victor Reuther, younger brother of UAW president and AFL-CIO Executive Council member Walter Reuther. In a statement approved by all but of two its members—including Walter—the Executive Council charged Victor with “conduct unbecoming a trade unionist,” because he had “maliciously attempted to sabotage the successful efforts of the American labor movement in its overseas program of helping to strengthen the free and democratic trade union movement.” Most specifically, he had allegedly engaged in a “campaign of vilification” against AIFLD.¹ What had Victor done to merit such accusations? The younger Reuther had suggested to a *Los Angeles Times* reporter in May that the AFL-CIO was “involved” with the CIA abroad. Leftist and liberal publications had previously made similar accusations, but this was the first time a high-profile figure in the labor movement had gone on the record alleging linkages between the AFL-CIO and the Agency.

The “tragedy” of the AFL-CIO’s foreign activities, Reuther told the *Los Angeles Times*, was that they were “in the vest pocket” of Jay Lovestone, who headed the AFL-CIO’s international affairs department and who, as explained in Chapter Two, had CIA ties.² The Reuther brothers had despised Lovestone since 1938 due to his role in dividing the UAW under the presidency of Homer Martin (see Chapter Two). To Victor Reuther, Lovestone was one of the “most Machiavellian union-splitters ever to prey on the American labor movement.”³ From 1951 to 1953, Reuther was posted to Paris as the CIO’s main representative in Europe. There, he witnessed Lovestone associate Irving Brown spending large sums of CIA money on behalf of the AFL’s Free Trade Union Committee to influence the European labor movement. Reuther quietly disapproved of Brown’s heavy-handed attempts to “dictate” policy to Europe’s trade unions.⁴ Upon returning to the United States in 1953, Reuther became the director of the CIO’s international affairs department. When the AFL and CIO merged in 1955, the Reuther brothers tried unsuccessfully to oust Lovestone, but eventually managed to shutter Lovestone’s Free Trade Union Committee (see Chapter Two). Having “personal misgivings” about the merger due to his distrust of AFL president George Meany, Victor voluntarily stepped down from his CIO post and instead became head of the UAW’s own international affairs department, correctly believing he would have a “freer hand” there, and remained in that position for the next eighteen years.⁵

Victor Reuther watched from a distance as Meany, Joseph Beirne, Serafino Romualdi and others established AIFLD at the start of the 1960s. Early on, he warned that “this program is not well-conceived”⁶ and predicted it would “be a source of great tension” between the AFL-CIO and ICFTU, which he and Walter still believed was the ideal vehicle for U.S. labor to carry out its foreign policy. He was skeptical about the inclusion of corporate businessmen in the project,

privately complaining in June 1962 that the “presence of J. Peter Grace on the board of the Institute needlessly compromises our effort in the eyes of tens of thousands of trade unionists...throughout the hemisphere.” Despite Grace’s potential “personal merits,” he continued, “the name, Grace, arouses painful memories of ‘Yankee imperialism’ in its worst forms” in Latin America, including “generations of ruthless exploitation.”⁷ Indeed, as recently as 1960, W.R. Grace and Company had been accused of teaming up with state security forces in Peru to violently put down a three-week strike at a Grace-owned sugar plantation.⁸ Reuther was particularly troubled by the fact that AIFLD graduates would be on the Institute’s payroll for nine months upon their return home. “Each of them will not only be open to the charge by our opposition that they are agents of the U.S. but they clearly will be in the pay of a U.S. institution which includes employers and government in what is presumably a ‘labor training’ program,” he said.⁹ Beyond these doubts, Reuther had other reasons to dislike AIFLD. In 1961, he had, on behalf of the UAW, requested that AID fund a proposed trade union “Council on Social Progress” to train Third World labor leaders via the international trade secretariats. Meany had lobbied against the idea, presenting AIFLD as a superior alternative, and won out in the competition for government funding. As a result, the UAW’s Council on Social Progress never materialized.¹⁰

Reuther’s misgivings about AIFLD were confirmed by the Institute’s role in the 1964 coup in Brazil (see Chapter Four). Upon hearing William Doherty, Jr.’s public comments that AIFLD graduates had been intimately and clandestinely involved in Goulart’s ouster, Reuther privately remarked that there was “no statement that more clearly admits and confirms the major charge of Latin American Communists...that the military takeover was U.S.-engineered. If this be the case...at least the AIFLD should know enough to keep their mouths shut.”¹¹ He

particularly felt “a sense of revulsion” at Doherty and the AFL-CIO’s approval of the coup regime’s wage freeze policy. Reuther said he was “horrificed that all of this is being done in the name of establishing a ‘strong, virile trade union movement in Latin America,’” adding that “not even the most servile, company-union-minded workers’ organization in the U.S. would dare to advocate this kind of sell-out.”¹² He was angry that through AIFLD, a small number of AFL-CIO officials were helping the U.S. government aid right-wing regimes in the name of anticommunism without any debate within the U.S. labor movement. While Walter Reuther agreed with his brother, he was initially hesitant to use his position on the AFL-CIO Executive Council to speak out. The elder Reuther was uneager to risk provoking a split between the UAW and the labor federation, especially over foreign policy disagreements that he feared would be of little concern the UAW rank and file.¹³

Between 1965 and 1966, Victor Reuther and the UAW’s executive board founded their own nonprofit to assist Third World workers, naming it the Social, Technical, and Education Programs (STEP). Unlike AIFLD, STEP would aim to work in close partnership with the ICFTU and ILO, as well as with the International Metalworkers’ Federation—the international trade secretariat with which the UAW was affiliated. Through STEP, UAW members repaired discarded materials such as hospital equipment, furniture, or vehicles and then donate them to worker organizations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The nonprofit also received donations of medicine from drug companies, which it would then ship to the Third World. STEP’s guiding philosophy, according to Reuther, was that “trade unionism throughout the world is not standardized” and that material aid tended to be a bigger priority for developing country unions than training in collective bargaining.¹⁴ In its first year, among other projects, STEP helped refurbish a Chilean hospital destroyed by a fire, turned old school buses into mobile clinics for

unions in the Philippines and Kenya, and sent trucking equipment to metal workers in Mexico, Turkey, and Tunisia.¹⁵ The nonprofit had a modest annual budget of around \$60,000, funded through grants, private donations, and interest from the UAW's strike fund. STEP was not financed by AID or other government agencies, though it did occasionally partner with Peace Corps volunteers in the Third World.¹⁶ In mid-1966, an annoyed Doherty complained to Beirne about STEP, remarking, "Five years later Victor is discovering what AIFLD is all about and seems to be trying to duplicate our efforts."¹⁷

Meanwhile, despite Walter Reuther's best efforts to maintain amicable relations, a rift emerged between the UAW leadership and the AFL-CIO Executive Council over foreign policy—specifically the Vietnam War. In 1965, the UAW executive board issued a statement urging the Johnson Administration to avoid escalating the war and to seek a peaceful resolution. Progressive unions like the International Longshore and Warehouse Union and Local 1199 of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union began to publicly criticize the war in 1965, and were joined by leaders of some UAW locals and UAW secretary-treasurer Emil Mazey. But in October of that year, the AFL-CIO Executive Council, including Walter Reuther, reaffirmed staunch support for Johnson's policy of escalation while simultaneously denouncing the budding anti-war movement. Things came to a head in December 1965 at the AFL-CIO convention in San Francisco. After delegates were addressed by high-ranking members of the Johnson Administration—including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, and even President Johnson himself (by telephone)—Meany presented a resolution, written by Lovestone, pledging the federation's "unstinting support" of "all measures the Administration might deem necessary" to drive communism out of South Vietnam, noting that the war would only end when the Communists "were willing to sit down at the conference table." The last part

about sitting at the table had reportedly been added at Walter Reuther's request in attempt to satisfy those in the UAW calling for a peaceful resolution.¹⁸

As the delegates prepared to approve the resolution without any discussion or debate, a group of students from the University of California Berkeley and San Francisco State College, sitting in the balcony as observers, arose to chant "Get out of Vietnam!" and "Debate! Debate!" Banging his gavel, Meany had the protesters removed by shouting, "Will the sergeant of arms clear these kookies out of the gallery." The pro-war resolution was adopted unanimously. Later in the convention proceedings, the UAW's Mazey addressed the delegates to rebuke what he called "the vulgar display of intolerance" shown toward the college students. He said the situation in Vietnam was complicated and called for nuanced debate, noting that many Vietnamese viewed the United States as the successor to French colonialists, and criticizing the South Vietnamese government as a "corrupt military dictatorship." Mazey insisted that the AFL-CIO should be more tolerant toward anti-war protesters and not try to shut down democratic debate over Vietnam. His speech on the convention floor received only minimal applause.¹⁹

Sympathizing with the students who were derided by Meany as "kookies," Victor Reuther agreed with Mazey that there needed to be a deeper discussion within the U.S. labor movement over foreign policy. Frustrated by the Executive Council's support for the Vietnam War and disgusted by AIFLD's backing of the Brazilian coup, Reuther went against the wishes of his brother by going public with his concerns. During the UAW's own convention in Long Beach, California in May 1966, he gave his controversial interview with the *Los Angeles Times* described above. Reuther hoped to spark a debate within organized labor's ranks over Meany and Lovestone's tight control over the AFL-CIO's international affairs, but his statement that Lovestone was "involved" with the CIA naturally got the most attention. Meany, Beirne, and

others vehemently denied the claim before successfully convincing the Executive Council to condemn Reuther's "false and unfounded accusations" in August.²⁰ In the following year, however, a number of explosive journalistic exposés would lend credence to Reuther's remarks.

The "AFL-CIA"

Even before Reuther's *Los Angeles Times* interview, the mainstream press was already beginning to call attention to the AFL-CIO's foreign activities. Between December 30, 1965 and January 2, 1966, *Washington Post* investigative reporter Dan Kurzman wrote a series of four articles on U.S. labor's Cold War programs focusing on Lovestone, who until then was largely unknown to the public. Kurzman's articles described Lovestone as the AFL-CIO's powerful yet secretive "secretary of state" and the "gray eminence" behind Meany, alleging that he controlled "a vast intelligence system that appears to be informally but tightly integrated with the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency." He cited "informed sources" as saying that AIFLD was involved in "intelligence gathering" in cooperation with the CIA, and also cited critics alleging that AIFLD was solely interested in "the establishment of a narrow American-style unionism that can promote only the mild social changes derivable from collective bargaining."²¹ In response to the Kurzman series, AFL-CIO officials initially drafted a letter to James Russell Wiggins, editor and executive vice president of the *Washington Post*, complaining that "the various charges made against the AFL-CIO and the AIFLD" were "completely unsupported" or "attributed in McCarthyite fashion to unnamed 'sources.'" The letter further insisted that no relationship between organized labor and the CIA existed whatsoever. But it was apparently never sent, as Lovestone, Doherty, and Andrew McLellan were sufficiently appeased after a private meeting with *Post* editor Ben Bradlee to voice their frustration.²² Only a few months later, Reuther's public comments on CIA involvement put the AFL-CIO's foreign activities in the spotlight

again, but it would not be until early 1967 that the “AFL-CIA” story would be blown open by journalists.

On February 15, 1967, the left-wing *Ramparts* magazine released its March issue, with a feature story detailing how, for years, the CIA had been secretly channeling funds to organizations of U.S. university students—namely the National Student Association—turning their international activities into “an arm of United States foreign policy.” Funneling money through tax-exempt foundations, the spy agency had given the National Student Association some \$4 million from 1950 to 1965 to ensure the “American point of view” would always be represented at international student gatherings attended by Communist youth groups. The story was confirmed by the student organization as well as by the State Department, quickly creating a national stir.²³ It had been public knowledge since the fall of 1964 that the CIA used foundations—some real, others only “dummy” foundations—as conduits to fund a variety of civil society organizations. That discovery had been made and then brought to light by Texas Congressman Wright Patman during a probe into the finances of tax-exempt foundations.²⁴ But the *Ramparts* article on CIA financing of student organizations was the first time the U.S. public got a real glimpse of how this process worked. Victor Reuther wasted no time in using the revelations to redirect attention to organized labor’s foreign affairs, telling the *New York Post* on February 16 there was “a lot bigger story in the CIA’s financial and other connections with the AFL-CIO than with the students,” adding that he had already done his best to “lift the lid on it” and was confident that “some day it will all come out.” Lovestone responded by “blast[ing] Victor Reuther in unprintable language,” ominously warning he would “take care of Mr. Reuther.”²⁵

In the next week, investigative reporters from the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, and other papers broke multiple stories proving Reuther right. After looking carefully at the donations given by the nearly two dozen foundations already identified as CIA conduits, journalists discovered several connections to AFL-CIO-affiliated unions. The first batch of articles uncovered fresh details about U.S. unions' role in the 1962-1964 destabilization campaign directed against the government of leftist Cheddi Jagan in British Guiana (see Chapter Four). Journalists found that the American Newspaper Guild had accepted nearly \$1 million in funds over three years from four CIA-connected foundations. Not coincidentally, the Guild had sent a representative, Gene Meakins, to British Guiana to help undermine Jagan through a propaganda campaign. It then came to light that AFSCME had received up to \$60,000 in donations per year from the "Gotham Foundation"—a confirmed CIA dummy—between 1958 and 1964 for the union's international activities. The arrangement with AFSCME was in place during the presidency of Arnold Zander, who sent the money to Public Services International, the international trade secretariat for public sector workers. As explained in Chapter Four, AFSCME dispatched William Howard McCabe to British Guiana to help fund the 1963 general strike against the Jagan government. Further reports indicated that the AFL-CIO-affiliated Retail Clerks International Association—which sent its representative Gerard O'Keefe to assist McCabe in British Guiana—had similarly received CIA funds via foundations.²⁶

Another discovery was that CIA money had helped expand the global reach of the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers (IFPCW) the trade secretariat for oil worker unions, based in Denver. The IFPCW had been founded in 1954 by the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers union under the presidency of O.A. "Jack" Knight. While many IFPCW affiliates paid little to no dues to the trade secretariat, its budget nevertheless rose dramatically

from \$65,692 in 1960 to \$193,838 in 1961 and \$230,363 in 1962 thanks to contributions by Knight's union, which came directly from donations by CIA-linked foundations. The growth of the IFPCW allowed U.S. labor to build and maintain relationships with unions in the strategic petroleum sector in places like the Middle East and Venezuela.²⁷ Meanwhile, the Institute of International Labor Research, which was chaired by socialist Norman Thomas and sought to strengthen Latin America's anticommunist Left (see Chapter One), was also implicated in the growing scandal. Thomas's institute had received \$1 million from the J.M. Kaplan Fund—a CIA conduit—between 1961 and 1963. The money, which accounted for all but \$25,000 of the institute's total budget in the same time period, had been used to create a political education school in Costa Rica. Thomas claimed to have been unaware of the source of the Kaplan Fund money, admitting his own "stupidity."²⁸

Following these reports in February 1967, Victor Reuther appeared vindicated. But a few months later, retired CIA officer Thomas Braden publicly accused Reuther of being a hypocrite. As explained in Chapter Two, Braden served as the CIA liaison to the AFL's Free Trade Union Committee in the early 1950s, and had attempted to establish a similar relationship with the CIO. In May 1967, Braden responded to the public outrage at the recent CIA exposés by penning an essay in the *Saturday Evening Post* entitled "I'm Glad the CIA is 'Immoral,'" in which he defended the Agency's Cold War tactics as necessary for preventing the spread of communism. In the piece, he claimed that in 1952, he had once given Walter Reuther "\$50,000 in \$50 bills" at his request, which Victor then spent from his post in Europe to bolster "free" trade unions in West Germany. For disingenuously criticizing CIA sponsorship of foreign labor activities, Braden said "Victor Reuther ought to be ashamed of himself."²⁹ Victor admitted to the press that the UAW had indeed transferred \$50,000 in CIA money to European unions, but swore it was a

one-time-only transaction.³⁰ In his memoirs, Reuther disputed some of Braden's claims, stating that he and Walter had never requested the money, but had been actively courted by Braden, and that the money had been given to unions in France and Italy, not West Germany. Reuther said that at the time Braden first approached him, he had assumed Braden worked for the State Department or European Recovery Program, accepting the \$50,000 "with what was probably unjustified innocence about the source of the money." It was only after the funds were transferred that Braden fully explained he worked for the CIA and tried recruiting Reuther to be an operative in the same vein as Irving Brown. Shocked, Reuther "rejected the idea on the spot." "Indeed," he would later write, "I had been naïve!"³¹

For his part, Meany did damage control by telling inquisitive reporters the AFL-CIO itself had "absolutely not" received any financial or other support from the CIA, and that he was opposed to union acceptance of CIA money.³² Soon, however, journalists questioned whether AIFLD was financed by the spy agency. Meany denied that it was and, pointing to the millions of dollars the Institute annually accepted from AID, rhetorically asked, "when you get that kind of money, why do you have to run to the CIA?"³³ A few years later, former spy Philip Agee would allege that AIFLD was dominated by the CIA, describing the Institute's training and development programs as nothing more than clever fronts allowing it to access AID money, and accusing Doherty and Beirne of being CIA operatives.³⁴ While AIFLD officials undoubtedly coordinated their overseas missions with the CIA, just as they did with AID and the State Department, evidence proving the Institute was funded by the CIA has yet to be uncovered. There is evidence, however, that following the revelations of 1967, AIFLD and its counterpart institutes in Africa and Asia—AALC and AAFLI—became conduits for overseas labor programs that had previously been secretly funded by the CIA. In March 1967, President Johnson

responded to the public furor over the Agency's clandestine funding operation by prohibiting hidden government subsidies to private organizations. Former beneficiaries of the secret monies, which now became known as "CIA orphans," would have to receive government funds through new mechanisms. In May 1968, the AFL-CIO's international affairs department and AID signed a contract that would allow AIFLD, AALC, and AAFLI to transmit \$1.3 million in AID funds to certain "CIA orphans" in the realm of organized labor, including the Retail Clerks union and the IFPCW.³⁵ "Same operation—new cover," Reuther wrote of the arrangement. "Thus the AFL-CIO became, quite literally, a disbursement agent for the State Department."³⁶

Overall, the series of bombshells and accusations created a general sense that organized labor had compromised its independence and integrity in order to play cloak-and-dagger games, earning it the derisive moniker "AFL-CIA." This led to book-length excoriations of "the subversion of the AFL-CIO's foreign policy" by leftist writers in the last years of the 1960s.³⁷ In 1969, New Left historian Ronald Radosh—inspired by the anti-imperialist scholarship of William Appleman Williams—wrote what remains the quintessential study of U.S. labor's foreign policy, tracing it as far back as AFL founder Samuel Gompers. Radosh described the AFL and AFL-CIO's role in international affairs as evolving from an attempt to gain recognition by government and business in exchange for industrial peace during World War I to an anticommunist-fueled integration into the "machinery of the corporate-capitalist state" in the post-World War II era.³⁸ Throughout the book, he denounced federation leaders like Gompers and Meany for mobilizing labor to be a "junior partner" in imperial capitalism instead of a lever to change the system.

In 1971, New York playwright Eric Bentley also publicly attacked labor's foreign affairs in his satirical musical *The Red, White, and Black: A Patriotic Demonstration*. The musical

included a song set to the tune of the classic union ballad “Which Side Are You On?” entitled “AFL/CIA”:

They say in Detroit nowadays
 There ain't no neutrals here
 You're either for the cold war
 Or you just plain disappear:
 Which side are you on, George?
 Which side are you on?

George Meany was a worker
 But he ain't a worker no more
 Instead he helps the government
 To stir up hot 'n cold war
 Which side are you on, George?
 Which side are you on?

When Meany heard the workers
 In foreign lands were red
 He said: Let us explain to them
 It's better to be dead.
 Which side are you on, George?
 Which side are you on?

When AFL joined with CIO
 'Twas a great Union day
 Still greater was when AFL
 Joined with CIA.
 Which side are you on, George?
 Which side are you on?

So, how about it, fella?
 Defend George if you can!
 Are you CIO or CIA?
 A Meany? Or a man?
 Which side will you be on, fellas?
 Which side are you gonna be on?

Don't listen to Mean George's gab
 Just put an end to it
 Stand up to him and tell him straight:
 George, you are full of shit.
 That's which side you're on fella,
 That's which side you're on.
 Right, Right?³⁹

As Radosh's book and Bentley's song indicate, Victor Reuther's goal of "lifting the lid" on the AFL-CIO's controversial alliance with the U.S. foreign policy establishment had been largely accomplished.

Senate Scrutiny

Responding to media reports of labor's foreign intrigues, in June 1967, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested the Government Accounting Office (GAO) do an audit of all of AID's past and current contracts with AIFLD. The purpose of the audit was to determine whether the Institute was using AID money effectively in support of official U.S. foreign policy objectives. Not long later, staff researchers for the Foreign Relations Committee—specifically the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs—conducted their own study of the Alliance for Progress's labor programs. In other words, a study essentially focused on AIFLD. In July 1968, both the GAO's audit and the Subcommittee's staff study were completed and released to the public by Democratic Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, who chaired the Subcommittee.⁴⁰ The GAO audit was unable to reach any clear conclusions about the effectiveness of AIFLD's government-subsidized programs due to a general lack of monitoring and evaluation on the Institute's part. AIFLD could report that tens of thousands of Latin American unionists had received training, but could not say with much certainty what the training had accomplished. The GAO therefore recommended increased AID oversight of its contracts with AIFLD. The Subcommittee's staff report, meanwhile, was more overtly critical of the Institute. The report said AIFLD was viewed with suspicion by Latin American workers because it was considered an explicitly Cold War instrument, and noted the apparent irony of the AFL-CIO—a champion of "free" and autonomous trade unionism—working in close partnership with the U.S. government.

It recommended the Alliance for Progress's labor programs be kept under tight State Department control.⁴¹

Weeks after these two documents were released by Morse, the AFL-CIO pushed back in a public statement. Meany was especially angry over the staff report, saying it was filled with "distortions" while claiming the Soviets would use it as anti-U.S. propaganda in Latin America. He bristled at the idea that a private nonprofit like AIFLD partnering with the federal government should be considered bad, surmising that the only alternative was AIFLD's "disavowal" by the government. "This attitude towards the relations between the U.S. government and voluntary organizations has no place in our democratic society," Meany declared. Further, he noted the hypocrisy of criticizing the AFL-CIO's relationship with the government on the one hand and calling for tighter government control over AIFLD programs on the other. To try to smooth things over, Morse wrote to Meany reminding him that the report had been the product of congressional staff and was not meant to reflect the official position of the Subcommittee. He proposed a hearing where Meany could express his disapproval of the report, which would be entered into the Congressional Record. The AFL-CIO president replied that this would be satisfactory, but a hearing was not immediately scheduled.⁴²

Nearly a year later, after press reports detailing AID's \$1.3 million disbursement to the AFL-CIO to fund labor's "CIA orphans," Senator J. William Fulbright called on the GAO to conduct another audit of AID's contracts with AIFLD. Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Fulbright was an outspoken opponent of the Vietnam War despite his initial support for it. In July 1969, as Secretary of State William Rogers and AID administrator John Hannah testified about foreign aid before the Committee, Fulbright pointed to the millions of dollars AIFLD, AALC, and AAFLI had received in AID monies since 1962 and remarked, "I have

wondered if this is the price we paid for Mr. Meany's support in Vietnam." Two weeks later, as the GAO's new audit was underway, Fulbright called a hearing to explore the "unusual amount of flexibility accorded AIFLD in the expenditure of public funds," bringing Meany in to offer testimony. In his opening statement, Meany complained that the public hearing promised by Morse a year earlier allowing him to rebuke the congressional staff report on AIFLD had never materialized. More significantly, he attacked Fulbright's earlier statement suggesting that his backing of the Vietnam War had been bought. "It is a gratuitous insult to the American labor movement to accuse us of receiving a payoff for supporting the foreign policy of an administration," Meany stated. In a heated exchange with Fulbright, Meany rhetorically asked, "Did you get a payoff for supporting the Tonkin Gulf Resolution? I don't think you did. But neither do I think you should suggest any payoff to us for promoting the free trade union movement in Latin America, Africa or Asia." Fulbright conceded that "perhaps the term payoff was too strong," but added that "I think it amounts to the same thing."⁴³

Throughout his testimony, Meany forcefully defended the AFL-CIO's development activities in the Third World. "The AFL-CIO has always had an interest in workers in every part of the world. That is fraternal solidarity, humanitarianism in the best sense of the word," he told the Foreign Relations Committee. "Now I'm not going to tell you that we have never made mistakes or performed miracles... But we are trying to make a contribution to help the working people of these lands play a constructive role in building democratic societies through free trade unions." When Fulbright questioned whether it was proper for the U.S. government to fund a private organization like the AFL-CIO to influence the affairs of other countries, Meany responded that AID funds were being "used to carry out the foreign policy of the United States Government"—namely the containment of communism and the preservation of "free societies."

He explained correctly that the AFL had fought the expansion of Communist unions in Western Europe in the mid-1940s “without a dime of help from this Government,” and added that if U.S. government funding were ever to cease, “we’ll still carry on the work in Latin America and wherever we have programs.” When Fulbright pointed out the involvement of AIFLD graduates in the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil, Meany did not deny it, but instead replied, “We’re interested only in building effective free trade unions in free societies. If our graduates later find themselves living under repressive and dictatorial regimes and decide to do something about it, that’s their business.”⁴⁴ Meany’s response left out the fact that Goulart’s government had come to power democratically and was left-oriented.

The GAO completed its second audit in spring 1970. Once again, it could not come to any specific conclusions regarding AIFLD’s effectiveness due to the Institute’s lax standards when it came to monitoring and evaluation. Fulbright expressed dismay at what he considered both AIFLD and AID’s lack of transparency during the audit. “The more I learn about the American Institute for Free Labor Development,” the senator told the press after the audit came out, “the more convinced I am that it is both a drain on the taxpayers’ dollars and counterproductive in bettering our labor relations within the hemisphere.” He added that “AID should be phasing out this program” instead of “classifying the details” around the Institute’s “questionable activities.”⁴⁵ As one of the architects of AIFLD, Beirne wrote to Fulbright complaining that his harsh comments were not in line with the audit’s inconclusive findings. He further cited a number of high-ranking U.S. government officials—including Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—who over the years had praised AIFLD. Fulbright responded to Beirne reminding him that “neither AID nor the GAO has been able to verify in any sort of concrete way the success which you and others claim on behalf of the Institute.” Fulbright

further expressed his belief that the Institute was overly secretive. “As President of the Communications Workers of America, I feel quite sure that, following a collective bargaining session, the members of your union would not accept claims of success without some concrete evidence of it,” he told Beirne. “In the expenditure of public funds, I think the taxpayer is likewise entitled to some evidence that he is getting his money’s worth.”⁴⁶

Labor Schisms

As organized labor’s international activities increasingly came under public scrutiny, tensions over foreign policy mounted between the AFL-CIO and the UAW. One of the first major disagreements between Meany and Walter Reuther came in June 1966 over the annual ILO conference in Geneva. At the start of the conference, the ILO’s Governing Body elected Leon Chajin—Poland’s former Deputy Minister of Labor—to the largely ceremonial post of chairman of the ten-day meeting. To protest the election of a Communist to the chairmanship, U.S. worker delegate Rudolph Faupl stormed out of the conference, refusing to participate. Meanwhile, the U.S. business delegate, Edwin P. Neilan of the Bank of Delaware, chose to stay, as did the U.S. government representatives. Faupl, an official from the AFL-CIO-affiliated International Association of Machinists, answered to Meany. Worried that Faupl’s boycott of the ILO meeting would damage U.S. labor’s international credibility, Reuther believed the move had been pre-planned without his knowledge, but Meany claimed that Faupl had spontaneously walked out on his own initiative. In any case, Meany and his loyalists on the AFL-CIO Executive Council backed the boycott decision over Reuther’s protestations, even as the Johnson Administration reportedly urged them to reconsider. After this incident, Reuther was convinced that the UAW would need to chart a more independent course.⁴⁷

In the months following the ILO conference, Reuther became more vocal over his uneasiness with the AFL-CIO Executive Council's aggressive anticommunism overseas, including its hawkish stance on Vietnam. He requested the Council hold a special meeting to review its foreign policy, which was held in November 1966. Reuther, however, did not attend due to an apparent last-minute scheduling conflict, so the meeting was absent any serious debate.⁴⁸ The next month, the UAW executive board sent a letter to the union's general membership laying out their differences with the AFL-CIO leadership on international affairs. "We believe that anti-communism in and of itself is not enough," the letter read. "We must take positive steps to abolish poverty and hunger and to eliminate social and economic injustice, which are the ingredients that communism exploits and attempts to forge into political power." The letter made it clear that the disagreements were as much about domestic issues as foreign ones, citing the AFL-CIO's alleged failure to put its resources behind organizing the unorganized—especially farm workers and public sector workers—and fighting for an expanded social welfare state. Above all, the UAW executive board exhorted the AFL-CIO to allow more democratic debate and decision-making over the important issues of the day, especially in foreign affairs.⁴⁹

In February 1967, as newspapers broke the story of secret CIA funding to AFL-CIO affiliates, the UAW executive board took the bold step of issuing a statement declaring that the promise of the 1955 merger between the AFL and CIO had gone unfulfilled, and that the federation under Meany had become a "comfortable, complacent custodian of the status quo." Accordingly, UAW officials formally resigned from their positions on the AFL-CIO Executive Council, general board, and standing committees, with Reuther resigning from his symbolic position on the boards of AIFLD and AALC.⁵⁰ Victor Reuther later claimed that AIFLD's

activities in Brazil had been the final straw for his brother: “It was not until he fully understood the corrupting role of the AIFLD in Brazil, and heard Meany hail the overthrow of the Goulart regime, that Walter understood what he had, in all conscience, to do.”⁵¹ Meany showed no indication he was interested in changing the AFL-CIO’s direction, but rather excoriated Walter Reuther for trying to divide the labor movement. As both sides dug in their heels, it became clear that a reconciliation was not coming. In May 1968, the UAW executive board began withholding the union’s per capita dues payments to the AFL-CIO to try to pressure Meany into adopting reforms. Instead, Meany suspended the union. On July 1, 1968, the executive board voted to formally disaffiliate the 1.3-million member UAW from the federation.⁵² Soon after, the UAW joined with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters—which had been expelled from the AFL-CIO a decade earlier over corruption charges—to form the Alliance for Labor Action, a short-lived and relatively ineffective attempt to carry out Reuther’s progressive agenda. The schism between the AFL-CIO and its largest affiliate would prove to have wider implications for the international “free” trade union movement.

In the spring of 1968, with the impending disaffiliation on the horizon, the Reuther brothers met with several Western European trade union officials, including ICFTU General Secretary Harm Buiter of the Netherlands, to discuss the UAW’s future role on the international stage. The Reuthers wanted the UAW to remain part of the ICFTU and for Walter to retain his post on the confederation’s board. Buiter was sympathetic, preferring Reuther’s cooperative style to Meany’s unilateralism and general disdain for Europe’s social democratic trade unionists (see Chapters Two and Three). After all, in March 1965, Meany had publicly disparaged the ICFTU and its European officials using a homophobic slur, saying they were an “ineffective bureaucracy right down to the fairies.”⁵³ Because the ICFTU’s constitution would not allow the UAW to

simply continue to be part of the confederation once it broke away from the AFL-CIO, the UAW applied for membership as an independent union in September 1968. Since three-fourths of the ICFTU board would need to approve, Buiter knew that Meany would be able to get enough votes to block the UAW's admission, but he believed the full ICFTU Congress, which would next convene in July 1969, would overrule the board and admit the union.⁵⁴

With this scenario in mind, Buiter advised Meany that in order to avoid an embarrassing defeat at the 1969 Congress, it would be best not to attempt to obstruct the UAW's admission. Accusing the Reuthers of splitting the labor movement and outraged that the ICFTU general secretary appeared to be taking sides, Meany vowed he would indeed do all he could to block the UAW's acceptance into the confederation. In the fall of 1968, shortly after the UAW had applied for admission, Buiter visited the Reuthers in Detroit and successfully convinced them it would be best for the ICFTU to defer their application until the Congress convened in July. That way, if the ICFTU board voted to block admission under Meany's influence, the full Congress could overturn the decision immediately rather than let the issue be drawn out for months. This only further infuriated Meany, who saw Buiter's ongoing dealings with the breakaway UAW as a betrayal of the AFL-CIO. In November 1968, Meany demanded the ICFTU board formally denounce the UAW's supposed divisiveness and declare its full support for the AFL-CIO, but the board only voted to delay the UAW's application for admission. The following month, the AFL-CIO Executive Council announced a boycott of all ICFTU activities until the matter of UAW admission was satisfactorily resolved. Further angered as the ICFTU's leaders sought a rapprochement with trade unions in the Eastern Bloc, in February 1969, the Executive Council voted to disaffiliate the AFL-CIO from the confederation altogether. The dramatic move served to effectively kill the UAW's application for admission. Desperate to bring the AFL-CIO back

into the fold because of the resources and political clout it brought to bear, ICFTU leaders knew that admitting the UAW would only further antagonize Meany and close off any possibility of the AFL-CIO's return. The UAW's application was therefore dropped from consideration.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the federation would not rejoin the ICFTU until after Meany's retirement ten years later.

Conclusion

If the 1950s and early 1960s had been marked by a political consensus in the United States around the need to intervene in other countries—whether economically or militarily—in order to defend broadly liberal-pluralist values against the perceived threat of communism, the Vietnam War shattered that consensus by the end of the 1960s. It became more common for Americans to question what their government was doing in other parts of the world, and why. The public disagreement between UAW leaders and the AFL-CIO over labor's foreign policy, leading to heightened divisions within both the domestic and international labor movements, is illustrative of this shattered consensus.

Fully committed to anticommunist interventionism and reliant on U.S. government funds for its overseas development projects, AFL-CIO leaders decidedly resisted the new spirit of dissent. Meany avoided or outright discouraged any open debate over the federation's international activities, leaving it to whistleblowers like Victor Reuther, investigative journalists, and elected officials to shed light on organized labor's relationship with the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the activities of AIFLD. The AFL-CIO was unflatteringly labeled the "AFL-CIA," the nation's largest and most well-known union pulled out of the federation in an ugly dispute, and the official voice of the U.S. working class had increasingly isolated itself from multilateral labor institutions like the ILO and ICFTU. Moving into the 1970s, modernization

theory—which had guided U.S. foreign aid policy throughout the “Decade of Development”—would lose much of its intellectual currency. So too would the pluralist style that had guided U.S. industrial relations since 1945, thanks in part to new economic pressures generated by increased foreign competition and technological change. In short, the postwar liberalism that had proved fertile ground for U.S. labor to resolutely carry out its anticommunist modernizing mission fell apart. While the AFL-CIO’s top officials would continue their Third World interventions in the 1970s and 1980s through its government-funded institutes, they would now face increasing questions and challenges from both the general public and, perhaps more importantly, from union leaders and rank-and-file members.

¹ AFL-CIO Executive Council statement on Victor Reuther (n.d., August 1966), box 319, folder 19, CWA, TL; “CIA Ties Denied by AFL-CIO,” *Christian Science Monitor* (no author), August 24, 1966.

² Harry Bernstein, “AFL-CIO Unit Accused of ‘Snooping’ Abroad,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 22, 1966.

³ Victor G. Reuther, 1976, *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 183.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 412.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 382-383.

⁶ Victor Reuther to Walter Reuther (n.d., likely August or September 1961, box 20, folder 8, LR002254, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, (hereafter, Reuther Library), Wayne State University.

⁷ Victor Reuther to Walter Reuther, June 1, 1962, box 20, folder 11, LR002254, Reuther Library.

⁸ “Amazing Grace: The Story of W.R. Grace and Co.,” *NACLA’s Latin America and Empire Report* X, No. 3, March 1976, 13.

⁹ Victor Reuther to Walter Reuther, June 1, 1962, box 20, folder 11, LR002254, Reuther Library.

¹⁰ Anthony Carew, 2018, *American Labour’s Cold War Abroad: From Deep Freeze to Détente, 1945-1970*, Edmonton, AB: Athabasca University Press, 258-260.

¹¹ Victor Reuther to Walter Reuther, July 29, 1964, box 6, folder 9, LR000488_VRLC, Reuther Library.

¹² Victor Reuther to Walter Reuther, July 29, 1964, box 6, folder 9, LR000488_VRLC, Reuther Library.

¹³ Reuther, *Brothers Reuther*, 423.

¹⁴ UAW, *Solidar Report*, July-August 1966, box 319, folder 1, CWA, TL.

¹⁵ Reuther, *Brothers Reuther*, 411.

¹⁶ STEP budget, grants, November 22, 1968, box 24, folder 24, LR000488_VRLC, Reuther Library.

¹⁷ William C. Doherty, Jr. to Joseph Beirne, July 21, 1966, box 319, folder 1, CWA, TL.

¹⁸ Philip S. Foner, 1989, *U.S. Labor and the Vietnam War*, New York: International Publishers, 23-31.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 29-31.

²⁰ AFL-CIO Executive Council statement on Victor Reuther (n.d., August 1966), box 319, folder 19, CWA, TL.

²¹ Dan Kurzman, “Lovestone Once Told Off Stalin, Now Directs Vast Anti-Red Activity,” *Washington Post*, December 30, 1965; Kurzman, “Lovestone Now at Odds with Free Trade Unions,” *Washington Post*, December 31, 1965; Kurzman, “Use of Marines Irked Lovestone,” *Washington Post*, January 1, 1966; Kurzman, “Lovestone’s Aid Program Bolsters U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Washington Post*, January 2, 1966.

²² William C. Doherty, Jr. to Joseph Beirne, June 13, 1966 (including draft letter to J.R. Wiggins dated January 4, 1966), box 319, folder 1, CWA, TL.

²³ “The CIA’s Campus Capers,” *New York Post*, February 15, 1967; Juan de Onis, “Ramparts Says C.I.A. Received Student Report,” *New York Times*, February 16, 1967.

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- ³⁰ James D. Selk, "No Spy Work, UAW Official Says," *Wisconsin State Journal*, June 27, 1967.
- ³¹ Reuther, *Brothers Reuther*, 425-426.
- ³² Damon Stetson, "Meany Opposes C.I.A. Aid to Labor," *New York Times*, February 21, 1967.
- ³³ Meany to National Press Club, June 27, 1967, box 68, folder 5, AUF, KC.
- ³⁴ Philip Agee, 1975, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 244-245.
- ³⁵ Ernest Lee to Rutherford Poats, May 15, 1968, box 19, folder 26, LR000488_VRLC, Reuther Library; Richard Dudman, "Agent Meany," *The New Republic*, May 3, 1969.
- ³⁶ Reuther, *Brothers Reuther*, 423.
- ³⁷ George Morris, 1967, *CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO's Foreign Policy*, New York: International Publishers; Ronald Radosh, 1969, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, New York: Random House.
- ³⁸ Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy*, 25.
- ³⁹ Quoted in Foner, *U.S. Labor and the Vietnam War*, 86-87.
- ⁴⁰ Statement by J. William Fulbright Concerning a Report by the GAO on the American Institute for Free Labor Development, 1970, box 57, folder 17, RG1-038, GMMA.
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- ⁵⁰ UAW officers' resignation notice, February 3, 1967, box 4, folder 7, Jay Lovestone Papers, KC; Reuther, *Brothers Reuther*, 378.
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Conclusion

On September 11, 1973, Chile's Socialist president Salvador Allende was overthrown in a violent military coup. Allende had been democratically elected to the presidency three years earlier, much to the consternation of the U.S. government and multinational corporations like International Telephone and Telegraph, which did not wish to see his promised policies of nationalization and wealth redistribution setting an example for the rest of Latin America. The Nixon Administration, through the State Department and CIA, worked to undermine Allende's government by assisting his political opposition in destabilizing the Chilean economy—culminating finally in the 1973 coup d'état that ended with Allende's death. With backing from the United States, coup leader General Augusto Pinochet became the country's military dictator and set about murdering thousands of Allende sympathizers while imprisoning tens of thousands more. A year later, shortly after Nixon resigned under the cloud of the Watergate scandal, a series of congressional hearings and investigative news reports confirmed that the U.S. government had played a major role in toppling Allende. In particular, it came out that the CIA had been authorized to spend \$8 million to fund opposition activities, with most of the money going towards sustaining anti-government strikes led by truck owners, merchants, and other middle-class professionals that had crippled the Chilean economy in the months leading up to the coup.¹ Unsurprisingly, AIFLD was implicated in helping organize these strikes.

AIFLD had spent much of the 1960s trying unsuccessfully to stem the tide of left-wing forces in Chile. The Communist and Socialist-controlled Central Única de Trabajadores de Chile (CUT) was the largest and most powerful trade union center in the country. AIFLD made several unsuccessful attempts to create its own national labor center to rival the CUT. Eventually, the Institute focused most of its Chilean funds on supporting the anticommunist Confederación

Marítima de Chile (COMACH), an individual union of maritime workers based in Valparaíso. When Allende was elected president in 1970, AIFLD partnered with the U.S. government to create economic and social unrest to force a coup d'état. The number of Chileans attending AIFLD courses in Virginia dramatically increased. In the decade between 1962 and 1972, a total of 79 Chileans had participated in AIFLD's residential training course in the United States—an average of about eight per year. But in the single year between February 1972 and February 1973, there were 29 trainees. AIFLD particularly worked to bolster associations of middle-class professionals and employer groups known as *gremios*, who opposed the socialist agenda of Allende's Popular Unity movement. The Institute assisted with the formation of the Central Unitaria de Profesionales de Chile (CUPROCH), a *gremio* association whose members, including truck owners, staged a devastating anti-government strike in October 1972. AIFLD and CUPROCH also worked together to form the National Command for *Gremio* Defense, another powerful group opposing Allende that coordinated further strikes in 1973 eventually leading to the coup.²

As in Brazil, following the coup, AIFLD leaders initially believed the new military regime in Chile would open the door to “free” trade unionism. Once again, they were mistaken. The new dictatorship led by Pinochet quickly moved to destroy the labor movement, outlawing the CUT and arresting or murdering thousands of union leaders. The more right-wing COMACH, which AIFLD had long supported, was allowed to exist, but had very little legal room to operate. Also like Brazil, the Institute remained in Chile despite the apparent impossibility of a free labor movement. According to Robert J. Alexander, AIFLD was “making the best of a very bad situation” in Chile, providing cover for a handful of independent unionists who were critical of the government. Alexander claimed that during the dictatorship, AIFLD

allowed trade unionist of all political stripes—including Communists—to have a safe space to meet and discuss worker issues.³

Shortly before the CIA's hand in Allende's overthrow came to light, Fred Hirsch—a plumber and local union leader in San Jose, California—wrote a report on the AFL-CIO's role in the coup entitled *An Analysis of our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America*. An anti-war, anti-imperialist, left-wing activist who had travelled across Latin America, Hirsch used his connections in both the labor and peace movements to get a hold of various AIFLD and State Department documents. His report, completed in early 1974 on behalf of a group of Northern California solidarity activists called the Emergency Committee to Defend Democracy in Chile, pieced together the Institute's role in destabilizing Allende's government. In March 1974, the Santa Clara County Labor Council—of which Hirsch was a member—adopted a resolution demanding the AFL-CIO explain its activities in Chile. *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America* was then published as a pamphlet and circulated among labor activists across the country, generating buzz. Thanks to the whistleblowing of Victor Reuther and the journalistic exposés of the late 1960s, Hirsch's pamphlet was well-received by many rank-and-file U.S. unionists who were already concerned about the AFL-CIO's suspect relationship with the government, particularly with the CIA. The labor federation was compelled to respond, sending Doherty to meet with the Santa Clara County Labor Council that July. Unsurprisingly, Doherty denied any AIFLD involvement in the Chile coup, going so far as to say “We didn't even have a program in Chile.”⁴

Troubled by the accusations laid out by Hirsch, by early 1975, several dozen local labor leaders in the Bay Area formed the Union Committee for an All-Labor AIFLD. “Whether or not [Hirsch's] charges are true, the AIFLD... is wide open to such accusations because of its

connections” to multinational corporations and the U.S. government, the committee said. “This situation puts the labor movement out front to take all the knocks for the multinationals and the State Department. We don’t need that.” The committee called for the development of “a completely new approach” to labor’s foreign policy, for the AFL-CIO to disassociate AIFLD from all government agencies and corporations, and for direct union-to-union relations. “The genuine help we can offer to Latin American unions will not match the government and corporate monies, but neither will it carry the stigma of company unionism and the CIA,” the committee insisted. Several union locals around the country responded to this call by passing resolutions in 1975 demanding AIFLD be dissolved and that all AFL-CIO ties to government and corporate money be immediately cut. Around the same time, the leftist nonprofit the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) published new exposés of AIFLD’s activities across the region, and former CIA officer Philip Agee published an explosive, tell-all memoir of his life as a spy that accused the Institute of being little more than a CIA front. NACLA and Agee therefore only further fueled anti-AIFLD sentiment among the union rank-and-file.⁵

The Chilean coup and its aftermath reflected many of the social, political, and economic changes of the 1970s. The criticism of the AFL-CIO’s role in the coup on the part of local union leaders and rank-and-filers was part of a larger trend of internal dissent in the labor movement. As far as union workers of the younger generation were concerned, labor officials like the septuagenarian George Meany were out of touch, too close to the political establishment, and no different than their corporate bosses. In the early to mid-1970s, a series of youth-led rank-and-file rebellions and reform movements challenging “union bosses” broke out within multiple U.S. unions, including the United Mine Workers, United Steel Workers, and UAW.⁶ Union democracy became the rallying cry of these disaffected rank-and-filers, and the longstanding

lack of member input and involvement in the AFL-CIO's foreign activities seemed a prime example of the shadowy, top-down decision-making culture they were opposing.

Further, under the Pinochet dictatorship, Chile became what many scholars consider to be ground zero for neoliberalism. Public utilities were privatized, regulations on businesses were lifted, trade was liberalized to the benefit of capital, and workers' rights were substantially curtailed. Chile served as a laboratory for a new development model—one that ostensibly put the private sector in the driver's seat—which would replace state-led modernization. The “Decade of Development” had not lived up to idealistic expectations, and the Nixon Administration was already moving away from government-funded development aid in favor of private foreign investment (see Chapter Three). The brutality of the U.S. war in Vietnam, waged in the name of bringing modernity to Southeast Asia, had also damaged modernization theory's reputation among liberals. Walt W. Rostow, whose name was synonymous with modernization, was one of the war's most prominent boosters in his role as Johnson's national security advisor. Around the same time as the Chilean coup in the early 1970s, left-wing intellectuals like Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein attacked modernization theory for being overly simplistic in its assumptions of linear development and for failing to account for power relations between countries and social classes. Modernization lost its intellectual and political currency in the 1970s.⁷

The same kind of neoliberal policies enacted under Pinochet would soon be embraced in the United States itself as an antidote to the stagflation and oil shocks of the 1970s, helping to facilitate deindustrialization as U.S. companies were now free to move manufacturing into cheaper, less regulated labor markets abroad. The divisions within the labor movement and the collapse of the government-led approach to foreign aid were combined with increasing flows of

private capital into the developing world—first Latin America and later Asia and Africa. The resulting process of deindustrialization and globalization in the 1980s and beyond devastated U.S. workers and precipitated a staggering decline in union membership. Class cooperation, factory-level collective bargaining, and autonomy from the state—the hallmarks of industrial pluralism—did nothing to prevent U.S. capitalists from shutting down plants and moving production into less developed countries. In this context, industrial relations became an increasingly isolated discipline. A new wave of neoclassical economists emphasizing “elegant” models and pristine “free markets” scoffed at industrial relations schools’ interventionist focus on fixing labor-management problems.⁸ Many of these same neoclassical economists laid the intellectual groundwork for the rejuvenated political conservatism of the 1970s and 1980s, which aimed to weaken and ultimately destroy organized labor. Because industrial relations scholars were wedded to a belief in the necessity and legitimacy of unions, the rapid decline of organized labor in this period also meant a loss of prestige and financial support for their discipline.

In 1974, the year rank-and-file criticism of AIFLD took off, Joseph Beirne died and Jay Lovestone retired. The *Washington Post* declared Lovestone’s retirement “the end of an era for the U.S. labor movement,” but there is little evidence that his departure, or Beirne’s death, signified any change in the AFL-CIO’s foreign activities.⁹ Despite calls to cut off all government ties, AIFLD and the AFL-CIO’s other nonprofit foreign institutes—the African-American Labor Center and Asian-American Free Labor Institute—continued to accept generous AID funding while coordinating closely with the State Department and CIA. In 1977, the AFL-CIO even established a fourth government-funded nonprofit, the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI), to bring the AIFLD model to Europe, with a particular focus on stymying leftist movements in Spain and Portugal as both countries emerged from decades-long dictatorships.¹⁰

With modernization and industrial relations falling out of style among U.S. intellectuals and policymakers, it became clear that the continued federal funding of the AFL-CIO's foreign programs had less to do with a genuine commitment to development or labor rights and more to do with neutralizing leftist movements around the world. In 1983, Congress finally solved the problem of the "CIA orphans"—anticommunist civil society organizations operating abroad that had previously been secretly funded by the CIA—by creating a new grant-making entity called the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Like the various foundations that had been exposed as CIA conduits in the late 1960s (see Chapter Five), NED's mandate was to channel government monies to private U.S. organizations waging the Cold War overseas. The difference was that NED was more transparent, with its funds coming directly from Congress or through the State Department rather than clandestinely from the CIA. The recently established FTUI became one of NED's core grant recipients, dispersing the funds it received to the AFL-CIO's other three institutes, which also continued receiving AID money.

When George Meany retired in 1979 and was replaced by his long-time lieutenant Lane Kirkland, there were few changes in the federation's foreign policy. Doherty continued serving as AIFLD's executive director, while Lovestone associate Irving Brown ran the AFL-CIO's international affairs department. Kirkland did, however, attempt to satisfy critics by dismissing J. Peter Grace and the other corporate representatives on AIFLD's board, and by bringing the AFL-CIO back into the ICFTU.¹¹ Still, the labor federation under Kirkland remained committed to promoting a vehement anticommunism abroad, winning it some unlikely allies. In 1983, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch, an anti-union Republican, came out as an advocate of increased federal funding for the AFL-CIO's foreign institutes, with one of his aides praising the federation for taking "foreign policy positions to the right of Ronald Reagan."¹² Hatch sat on the board of

the NED alongside Kirkland. Meanwhile, Kirkland counted Henry Kissinger—bête noire of the anti-imperialist Left—as a close personal friend. The two men bonded over their shared anticommunism and, together with their wives, spent every Thanksgiving together.¹³

The 1980s saw the culmination of nearly two decades of internal dissention in the labor movement over AIFLD's interventionism. As AIFLD and the AFL-CIO leadership generally backed the Reagan Administration's foreign policy in Central America—which included funding repressive state security forces in El Salvador and terroristic counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua—even national union presidents began loudly demanding a change in the labor federation's approach to international affairs. In September 1981, Jack Sheinkman of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, William Winpingsinger of the Machinists, and Douglas Fraser of the UAW (which had only re-affiliated with the AFL-CIO earlier that year) formed the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador (NLC). The NLC sent delegations of North American unionists down to El Salvador, and later Nicaragua, to learn about how Central American labor activists were being murdered, imprisoned, or otherwise intimidated by right-wing elements with U.S. assistance. The NLC, along with several smaller committees of rank-and-file union members across the United States, lobbied Congress to cut off military aid to the Salvadoran government and the Nicaraguan Contras while helping organize massive protests against Reagan's Central America policy. At the AFL-CIO's biennial conventions during the 1980s, they also pressured Kirkland and the Executive Council to call for peaceful negotiations between El Salvador's leftist guerillas and U.S.-backed government.¹⁴

In 1995, Kirkland and his loyalists were displaced by a slate of union leaders calling themselves the "New Voice," who took over the AFL-CIO Executive Council in the name of

reforming and revitalizing the labor federation in the face of organized labor's ongoing decline. With the Cold War over, the New Voice leaders closed down AIFLD and the other foreign institutes in 1997, establishing a new nonprofit in their place called the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, or Solidarity Center. Framing its mission as the promotion of workers' rights and often partnering with multilateral institutions like the ILO and the International Trade Union Confederation, the Solidarity Center has undoubtedly improved the AFL-CIO's reputation around the world as a respected international nongovernmental organization. Nevertheless, like its predecessor institutes, the Solidarity Center is primarily funded by the U.S. government, namely the controversial NED. While the Solidarity Center's leaders do not parrot the geopolitical positions of U.S. government officials, funding for the Center's programs has tended to mirror U.S. foreign policy priorities. For example, when the socialist Hugo Chavez was elected president of Venezuela in 1999 much to the concern of Washington, NED's annual funding for the Solidarity Center's programs in that country suddenly jumped from \$54,289 to \$242,926. Or when President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003, the Center simultaneously received \$860,000 from the NED for its Middle East programs, up from \$292,000 the year before.¹⁵

In trying to influence the direction of Third World trade unions, U.S. liberals, industrial relations scholars, and modernization experts struggled to reconcile the tensions between democratic principles and development imperatives. Workers in developing countries expected wage raises, but economic planners demanded sacrifices to facilitate "take-off." The best solution international labor experts and development specialists could offer was the recommendation that the West provide labor training programs and social welfare funding to

Third World unions, in the hope this might lay the foundation for modern societies where industrial pluralism could eventually thrive. The AFL-CIO's cold warriors latched onto this, using labor education and the rhetoric of "free" trade unionism to pursue their most immediate goals in the developing world—the defeat of leftist movements and the containment of world communism. It was therefore not simply the machinations of the CIA that gave rise to AIFLD and the AFL-CIO's other Third World institutes, it was also the scholarly investigations, academic projects, and policy recommendations of social scientists, labor educators, and modernization enthusiasts.

Some labor and development experts seemed to have concerns early on about how their ideas might be applied, and accordingly issued early warnings. At the annual meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association in late 1962, for example, Charles Myers spoke on the "exportability" of the U.S. industrial relations model. One of the four scholars who chaired the Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development (see Chapter One), Myers questioned "whether the continuing emphasis in some quarters on promoting 'free and independent' trade unions in all developing countries, presumably on the pattern of American unionism, is realistic or even helpful." In particular, he questioned whether the U.S. industrial relations system was as infallible as commonly assumed by postwar liberals, presciently noting that "we still have unfinished business in this country" when it came to "resolving differences between management and labor," particularly how to address technological change and foreign economic competition. Aware of AIFLD, Myers cautioned that "our American philosophy of democratic pluralism and free association is better left to grow by example out of the way our representatives act abroad, rather than by direct preachment."¹⁶

Another note of caution had been issued two years earlier by the University of Chicago's Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, which published the same journal where Asoka Mehta had helped spark a scholarly debate about the role of Third World unions in modernization as related in Chapter One. In a 1960 report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-Latin American relations, the research center explained that any cooperation between the labor movements of the United States and Latin America would be "decisively affected by the tensions which decades of anti-imperialist resentment...have created." The report warned that "any suspicion that U.S. unions are under the control or influence of the State Department or other official authorities would be disastrous." It further advised that if the U.S. government "seems committed to support reactionary and dictatorial governments or management against labor in Latin America, U.S. labor would forego or reduce its power to exert friendly influence in Latin America unless it clearly disassociates itself from such official U.S. policies."¹⁷

While figures like the Reuther brothers and their social-democratic allies in the ICFTU tried to heed these kinds of warnings, the leaders of the AFL-CIO and AIFLD willfully ignored them. Rather than disassociating itself from U.S. policies that aided counterrevolutionary forces in Latin America, AIFLD frequently helped carry out such policies. Obviously not simply another school for Third World unionists, the Institute was a de facto subsidiary of the U.S. government, directly managed by the upper echelons of organized labor, and firmly allied with U.S. capital. With its highly dubious interventions in British Guiana, Brazil, Chile, and elsewhere, the Institute was justifiably denounced by the Left as an imperialist project seeking not to educate Latin American workers to become agents of democratic development, but turn them into foot soldiers of reaction and lackeys of the United States.

The AFL-CIO's decades-long mission to modernize the global working class was ultimately a crusade to stop the supposed threat of communism by offering industrial pluralism and "free" trade unionism as the preferred alternatives to class-consciousness and worker militancy. This massive undertaking—bankrolled and politically supported by the U.S. government—only served to exacerbate the most pernicious effects of globalization in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, both at home and abroad. Class cooperation, factory-level collective bargaining, and autonomy from the state—the hallmarks of industrial pluralism—did nothing to prevent U.S. capitalists from shutting down plants and moving production to the Third World. As their counterparts in the United States suffered the effects of deindustrialization and union decline, seeing their wages stagnate and employer-sponsored benefits dry up, workers in developing countries were also exploited by an increasingly reckless and unaccountable transnational capitalist class. With their labor movements divided and weakened thanks in part to years of U.S. interference through vehicles like AIFLD, Third World workers would be paid minuscule wages and offered few, if any, protections before production was again shut down and moved to still cheaper labor markets elsewhere.

¹ Seymour Hersh, "C.I.A. Is Linked to Strikes In Chile That Beset Allende," *New York Times*, September 20, 1974.

² Busch, *The Political Role of International Trades Unions*, 174-176; Spalding, *Organized Labor in Latin America*, 266; Kim Scipes, *AFL-CIO's Secret War Against Developing Country Workers*, 40-48; Don Thompson and Rodney Larson, 1978, *Where Were You, Brother? An Account of Trade Union Imperialism*, London: War on Want, 47.

³ Alexander, *International Labor Organizations*, 276, 280-281

⁴ Fred Hirsch, 1974, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America or Under the Covers with the CIA*, San Jose, CA, self-published; "AFL-CIO Role in Latin America Quizzed," *Northern California Labor* 22, No. 12, April 12, 1974 and "AFL-CIO Speaker Due Here," *Northern California Labor* 23, No. 2, June 14, 1974, box 328, folder 3, CWA, TL; Fred Hirsch, *The AIFLD, International Trade Secretariats, and Fascism in Chile: An Open Letter to the Labor Movement*, San Jose, CA, self-published, 1975

⁵ Peter B. Levy, 1994, *The New Left and Labor in the 1960s*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 160; Resolution to Suspend American Institute for Free Labor Development, Montgomery County Federation of Teachers, box 328, folder 3, CWA, TL; Agee, *Inside the Company*; Carlos Diaz, 1974, "AIFLD Losing Its Grip," *NACLA Latin America and Empire Report* 8, No. 9.

⁶ Aaron Brenner, Robert Brenner, and Cal Winslow, eds., 2010, *Rebel Rank and File: Labor Militancy and Revolt from Below During the Long 1970s*, London: Verso Books.

⁷ Michael Latham, 2011, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 166-174.

⁸ Kaufman, *The Origins and Evolution of the Field of Industrial Relations in the United States*, 123-124.

⁹ John Herling, "Lovestone's Departure," *Washington Post*, June 8, 1974.

¹⁰ Sims, *Workers of the World Undermined*, 54.

¹¹ Interview with William Doherty, October 3, 1996, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Labor Series, 5-6.

¹² Kathy Sawyer, "AFL-CIO Toils in Foreign Vineyards: Foes of Unions Stand United Behind Labor's International Network," *Washington Post*, November 19, 1983.

¹³ Lane Kirkland eulogy, September 23, 1999, box 735, folder 11, Series III: Post-Government Career, Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Yale University Library Digital Repository, <http://findit.library.yale.edu/catalog/digcoll:558935> [accessed October 1, 2019].

¹⁴ Andrew Battista, 2002, "Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The National Labor Committee, the AFL-CIO, and Central America," *Diplomatic History* 26, No. 3, 419-451.

¹⁵ G. Nelson Bass, 2012, "Organized Labor and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Solidarity Center in Historical Context," dissertation, Florida International University, 121, 149.

¹⁶ Charles A. Myers, *The American System of Industrial Relations: Is it Exportable?*, Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development, 1962, box 10, folder 13, LP001245, Reuther Library.

¹⁷ University of Chicago Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, *United States Business and Labor in Latin America, a Study Prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on American Republic's Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations* (United States Senate, January 22, 1960), 88-90.

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Vita

EDUCATION

University of Illinois at Chicago- Ph.D. in History (Spring 2020)

Dissertation: “Modernizing the Global Working Class: U.S. Labor and Third World Development in the Cold War”

Committee: Leon Fink (chair), Joaquín Chávez, Jasmine Kerrissey, Nelson Lichtenstein, Kevin Schultz

University of Massachusetts Amherst- M.S. in Labor Studies (2014)

Clark University- M.A. in International Development and Social Change (2011)

Colorado State University- B.A. in History, *Magna Cum Laude* (2004)

University of Leicester (England)- History, Semester Abroad (2003)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of History

Instructor:

- Chicago and the World; Fall 2018

Teaching Assistant:

- Modern America: From Industrialization to Globalization (Prof. Kevin Schultz); Fall 2015, Fall 2017, and Spring 2019

- The Worker in American Life (Prof. Leon Fink); Spring 2016

- Latin America Since 1850 (Prof. Joaquín Chávez); Spring 2018

South-East Asia Center

Volunteer ESL Instructor (Chicago, IL, 2015)

Mexico-U.S. Solidarity Network, Centro Autónomo

Volunteer ESL Instructor (Chicago, IL, 2011)

Clark University

Writing Center Consultant (Worcester, MA, 2010-2011)

Peace Corps

English Teacher (Ruhabat, Turkmenistan, Central Asia, 2006-2007)

Columbia College Chicago
Writing Center Consultant (Chicago, IL, 2002)

PUBLICATIONS (selected)

“Reckoning with the AFL-CIO’s Imperialist History.” *Jacobin*, January 9, 2020.

“Chicago Teachers Won Public Support for Their Strike. Here’s How.” *In These Times*, October 15, 2019.

“Graduate Workers Will Fight Like Hell to Stop the Trump Labor Board’s New Rule,” *Truthout*, September 27, 2019.

“Strikes Work: The Story of the 2019 UIC Grad Worker Strike,” *The Activist History Review*, August 14, 2019.

“How UIC Grad Workers Fought the Neoliberal University Model — And Won,” *Jacobin*, May 1, 2019.

“UIC Needs an Investment in Faculty — Not Just Campus Renovations,” *Chicago Tribune*, February 2, 2019.

“The Making of the Graduate Working Class,” *Perspectives on History*, January 29, 2019.

“A Testing of the Waters After Janus,” *Jacobin*, November 14, 2018.

“Today Amazon, Tomorrow the Railroad Industry,” *Common Dreams*, October 3, 2018.

“Thousands of Chicago Workers Are Out On the First Citywide Hotel Strike In Over a Century,” *In These Times*, September 11, 2018.

“Voters Just Killed Right to Work in Missouri, Proving Labor Still Has Power Under Janus,” *In These Times*, August 7, 2018.

“Ed Sadlowski (1938-2018),” *Jacobin*, June 16, 2018.

“In a Historic First, the Chicago Teachers Union and Charter School Teachers Have Joined Forces,” *In These Times*, February 1, 2018.

“In the GOP Tax Bill, Only the Rich Can Afford Grad School,” *Salon*, December 3, 2017.

“Workers Say NAFTA’s Neoliberal Foundations Need to Be Dismantled from the Left—Not the Right,” *Truthout*, October 28, 2017.

“8,000 Airport Workers in Chicago Just Won a Wage Raise and the Right to a Union,” *In These Times*, September 11, 2017.

“New Study Finds ‘More Sweatshops Than Starbucks’ in Chicago,” *Salon*, May 28, 2017.

“A Ph.D. in Organizing,” (**co-authored with Dawn Tefft**), *Labor Notes*, December 16, 2016.

“Life Chances: Worker Fatalities in Less Developed Countries.” *Social Forces* Vol. 95, No. 1: 191-216, 2016 (**co-authored with Jasmine Kerrissey**)

“Labor Research and Action Network Aims to Connect Researchers and Scholars with the Labor Movement,” *In These Times*, June 27, 2016.

“New Chicago Law Will Give Almost Half a Million Workers Guaranteed Paid Sick Leave,” *In These Times*, June 22, 2016.

“American and Palestinian Unionists Build International Solidarity To Win ‘Freedom’ for Palestine,” *In These Times*, April 6, 2016.

“Supermarket Checker: ‘If You Want Personality, Then You Come to My Line,’” *In These Times*, May 19, 2014.

“Equal Work Deserves Equal Pay, Say UMass Amherst Professors,” *In These Times*, January 29, 2014.

“Cooperation Without Borders,” *In These Times*, October 22, 2013.

“Seeking Environmental Justice, Community Battles Railroad and Rahm,” *In These Times*, August 22, 2013.

“Deli Worker Speaks Out Against Sexual Harassment and Racial Slurs,” *In These Times*, July 10, 2013.

“Toward Radical Risk Reduction and Revolutionary Adaptation: Climate Disasters, Agriculture, and Capitalist Modernity.” *Human Geography* Vol. 6, No. 3: 75-88, 2013.

PRESENTATIONS

“The History of Labor Movements in the U.S.” Invited guest lecture for sociology course Reorganizing Labor and Life, School of the Art Institute Chicago, September 5, 2019, Chicago, IL.

“Land, Labor, and ‘Free’ Trade Unionism: Agrarian Reform and the AFL-CIO’s Cold War in El Salvador.” Labor and Working-Class History Association 2019 Conference, May 30-June 1, 2019, Duke University, Durham, NC.

“Student Labor Struggles in the Age of Corporate Universities” (panel contributor). Invited presentation for DePaul University Department of International Studies, April 16, 2019.

“Academic Unions: History and Current Prospects” (with Prof. Robert Johnston). UIC History Department, Brownbag Presentation, February 27, 2019, Chicago, IL.

“The Making of the Graduate Working Class: Perspectives on University Activism and Responsibility” (panel contributor). American Historical Association Annual Meeting, January 3-6, 2019, Chicago, IL.

“Organized Labor’s Alliance for Progress: the AFL-CIO and Foreign Aid in the 1960s.” Loyola University Chicago History Graduate Student Conference, November 3, 2018, Chicago, IL.

“Modernizing the Global Working Class: Labor and Development in the Cold War.” UIC History Department, Brownbag Presentation, March 14, 2018, Chicago, IL.

“U.S. Labor’s Modernizing Mission: Exporting Industrial Pluralism in the ‘Development Decade.’” History of Science Society 2017 Annual Meeting, November 9-12, 2017, Toronto, Ontario.

“U.S. Labor History: A Brief Sketch.” Invited lecture for Students Organizing United with Labor (SOUL), University of Chicago, October 24, 2017, Chicago, IL.

“U.S. Labor’s Modernizing Mission: Exporting Industrial Pluralism in the ‘Development Decade.’” Labor and Working-Class History Association 2017 Conference, June 22-25, 2017, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.

“U.S. Labor’s Modernizing Mission.” Northwestern University Buffett Institute for Global Studies Graduate Conference, March 30-31, Evanston, IL.

Invited response to Jonathan Levy (University of Chicago)- “The New Economy Revised.” History of Capitalism Seminar, September 30, 2016, Newberry Library, Scholl Center, Chicago, IL.

“Toward Radical Risk Reduction and Revolutionary Adaptation.” The Politics of Disaster: The Mitigation, Management and International Response to Environmental Crises, May 26-27, 2011, American Graduate School in Paris, Paris, France.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Graduate Employees Organization, American Federation of Teachers Local 6297

- Co-President (2018-2019)
- Bargaining Committee Member (2017-2019)
- Greivance Chair (2016-2017)
- Steward (2015-Present)

Labor: Studies in Working Class History

Editorial Coordinator (Chicago, IL, 2016-2017)

Warehouse Workers for Justice

Research Consultant (Chicago, IL, 2016)

Greenheart International

Work and Travel Program Assistant (Chicago, IL 2015)

Center for Economic Progress

Assistant Manager, Free Income Tax Preparation Site (Evanston, IL, 2014-2015)

University of Massachusetts Amherst, Labor Center

Graduate Research Assistant (2012-2014)

Action Now/Service Employees International Union

Organizer/Researcher- Fight for 15 (Chicago, IL, 2011-2012)

Foundation for Sustainable Development

Research Intern, Mine Labour Protection Campaign (Jodhpur, Rajasthan, India, 2008-2009)

American Red Cross Bay Area Chapter/AmeriCorps*VISTA

Disaster Preparedness Specialist (San Francisco, CA, 2007-2008)

Habitat for Humanity of Omaha/AmeriCorps

Construction Crew Leader (Omaha, NE, 2005-2006)

AmeriCorps*National Civilian Community Corps

Corps Member (Washington, DC, 2004-2005)

HONORS AND AWARDS

University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of History

Marion S. Miller Dissertation Fellowship, 2019-2020

University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of History

Robert V. Remini Scholarship, 2018-2019

University of Illinois at Chicago, Graduate College

Provost's Award, 2017-2018

University of Illinois at Chicago, Department of History

History Doctoral Award, 2015-2019

Clark University, Department of International Development, Community, and Environment (IDCE)

IDCE Fellowship, 2009-2011

Corporation for National and Community Service

Spirit of Service Award, 2008

Executive Office of the President of the United States- USA Freedom Corps

President's Volunteer Service Award- Gold Level, 2005

Colorado State University

Phi Beta Kappa, 2004