

**CAPTURING THE LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL EUROPARTIES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION: A PLEDGE APPROACH**

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Abstract

This article presents a new dataset of pledges made by Europarties during the 2004 and 2009 EP elections, as well as pre-legislative priorities of the European Commission following these elections. The data cover two legislative cycles in the period 2004-2013. The article discusses the rationale behind the development of this dataset, the coding and measurement of the variables, and it highlights the applicability of these data.

Keywords

Europarties; European Commission, pledges; policy priorities

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Introduction

This article introduces a new dataset that identifies the election pledges that four Europarties made in the wake of the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections, and the pre-legislative priorities of the two Barroso Commissions, appointed after each of these elections. The data cover the 2004-2009 and 2009-2013 legislative periods and include 24 documents. Eight of the documents are the election programs of the oldest Europarties representing the major party families in the European Parliament: the European People's Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR)/Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE), and the European Green Party (EGP). The rest of the documents included in this dataset are released by the two Barroso Commissions during the pre-legislative steps of each fiscal year covered in the period, and include Annual Policy Strategies, President Speeches and Letters, and Work Programmes (WP). This dataset's inclusion of both pledges by transnational Europarties and Commission priorities has

relevance to the study of mandate politics and agenda-setting in the European Union (EU) context. We discuss each in turn before we elaborate on the details of the dataset.

The place of pledges in the study of Europarties and the European Parliament

Two types of formations bring parties together at the European level (Lord, 2002). One is the Europarties, which tend to be composed of national member parties from EU states, individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and ‘some form of individual membership’ (Day, 2014: 7), and another - their corresponding manifestation in the EP, the European Parliamentary groups (EPG). In the period covered in this dataset, 2004-2014, 13 Europarties and seven EPG have been identified, with several Europarties lacking a corresponding EPG (for the full list see Day 2014). We utilize the common election platforms, Euromanifestos, of the oldest Europarties – European People’s Party (EPP), Party of European Socialists (PES), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe-Party (ALDE), and European Green Party (EGP). Our selection spans the political spectrum and includes the documents identified in the Euromanifestos Project for the period we cover.¹ The four European Parliamentary Groups corresponding to the four Europarties identified in this dataset jointly comprised around 80% of the MEPs after each of the two elections, 2004 and 2009, and are instrumental for inclusion in any study relevant to the European Parliament.

The Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), which ran under the acronym EPP-ED (European Democrats) in the 2004 elections, was the largest group in the European Parliament, holding the leadership of the European Commission during both election terms included here. EPP is also the largest among the political groups on the right of the political spectrum, dominates the very diverse right-of-center political space,

and has seen its political strength increase over time (Wagner, 2011). The Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D Group), the EPG of PES, is the main political formation on the left, and the second largest in the EP. The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), known until the 2004 elections as the Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), has been the third largest right-of-center, political group in the EP, carrying the same name as the Europarty. The Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) grew its presence from 42 to 55 MEPs in 2009, making it the fourth largest party group in the EP. While many Green voters position themselves on the left (Carter, 2010), Green parties themselves represent a new dimension cross-cutting the traditional left-right ideological divide.

We utilize the Euromanifestos of the Europarties as a ‘symbol of transnational values and policy commitments’ (Hertner, 2011). In every European Parliament campaign, the manifestos of European and national member parties would be distributed and discussed by candidates and voters. Because controversial issues tend to be left out of Euromanifestos, these documents have been labeled in the past as ‘the lowest common denominator political construction’ (Day, 2014: 14), that is too vague and not useful in Europeanizing the EP elections campaigns (Hertner, 2011). While not successful in building publics’ enthusiasm for the European Union project, it is precisely because of their ‘lowest common denominator’ character that we consider them valuable in establishing a ‘party program to policy linkage’ (Klingemann et al., 1994: 17). If policy pledges made in Euromanifestos can be identified, they will represent policy positions agreed on by all key party leaders, European and national, either during closed door negotiations among key players or during the open consultations across Europe with a

variety of actors, an approach embraced by PES in the wake of the 2009 election. In the end, a consensus is needed to have these Euromanifestos ratified, which suggests once again that if policy pledges make it to the Euromanifesto document they represent key issues for the leadership of that Europarty.

The dataset builds on the study of election pledges and their relevance for democratic politics, and in doing so, this article joins works focused on national politics, which view this ‘party program to policy linkage’ as the core of the mandate theory of democracy (Klingemann et al., 1994: 17 see also Artes, 2013; Costello and Thomson, 2008; Kostadinova, 2013; Mansergh and Thomson, 2007; Moury, 2011; Naurin, 2011; Royed, 1996; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Thomson et al., 2017; Toros, 2015). By advancing the notion of democratic mandate theory in a more complex supranational structure, our data have the potential to contribute to the study of the democratic deficit in the EU polity (e.g. Follesdal and Hix, 2006), policy debates during EP elections (e.g. Hobolt and Spoon, 2012), or accountability in EU institutions (e.g. Curtin et al., 2010).

Focus on the Commission’s pre-legislative priorities

The European Commission is the only institution that can formally submit legislative proposals, but the incentive for such proposals may come from somewhere else (Pollack, 1997): other EU institutions such as the European Parliament (Egeberg et al., 2014), the European Council (Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014), the Council (Thomson and Hosli, 2006), member states (Thomson, 2008; Wonka, 2007), interest groups, public opinion (Haverland et al., 2016), or even from the transnational policy community (Bache, 2013). The dataset presented here is relevant to understanding how the Commission drafts its

proposals and sets its priorities in a wider ‘political context’ because, as Princen (2007: 23) eloquently puts it, the Commission does not operate in a ‘vacuum’ and needs to consider the actors that will ‘subsequently decide on its proposals’.

The pledges made by the Europarties that formed political groups in the EP have an important place in the research stream on Commission agenda-setting for the following reasons. The sanctioning powers of the EP have significantly increased since the wider use of the co-decision procedure (Costello and Thomson, 2013) and the threat of the EP’s veto over Commission proposals is a major consideration for the Commission (Bailer, 2014; Bocquillon and Dobbels, 2014; Egeberg et al., 2014; Rasmussen, 2007). Further, there is increasing evidence of the intense daily interactions between the European Commission and the European Parliament (Christiansen, 2001; Osnabrugge, 2015; Wille, 2010) for what Egeberg et al. (2014: 2) call a ‘mutual inter-dependence’ (2) of the two institutions. Such a special partnership has been promoted by the Commission President himself (Barroso, 2009) and could be seen as ways to maintain the Commission’s influence through the Parliament (Rosen, 2016; Stacey, 2003). The preferences of the EPGs expressed through election promises add to the possible constraints on the Commission in its role as a ‘technical’ agenda setter (Kreppel and Oztas, 2017), and study of the former’s speaks to this scholarly debate.

The data we compiled focus on the two Barroso Commissions for several reasons. First, these are the first ones with completed terms appointed under the Treaty of Nice rules with one Commissioner per member state and in accordance with the outcome of the preceding EP elections (Hix, 2004; Wille, 2010). Second, the Barroso presidency significantly differs from its predecessors in leadership style and influence over policy

output. To avoid the Commission's 'fragmentation' due to the enlargement to 25 and later 27 members, the President Barroso argued for and managed to impose a strong leadership among the rest of the commissioners, with a tighter grip on policy than its predecessors, taking full advantage of its enhanced authority listed in the Amsterdam Treaty (Kassim et al., 2013). If previous presidents have been rather portrayed as 'passive chairs' with limited ambitions, President Barroso emerges in scholarly research more as pre-eminent than an equal to the rest of the College (see the findings of the 'European Commission in Question' (EUCIQ) project coordinated by Kassim et al., 2013). A focus on Commission priorities during this period sheds light on the dynamics within this institution under the President's strong leadership.

The construction of the dataset

To capture the legislative priorities of the Europarties and of the European Commission, the authors consulted publicly available documents, and utilized the pledge approach to coding them. Below we list the documents that we used and discuss the coding approach, including its advantages and disadvantages. We also graph and describe the units of analysis, and explain how we measure the main variables highlighted in this article.

Documents

The 2004 and 2009 election platforms for Europarties (ELDR/ALDE, EPP, PES, and EGP) subsequently formed the four largest political groups in the European Parliament. These documents represent the parties' collective priorities as approved by the respective Europarty congress in preparation for each election. We relied on four sets of documents to extract the pre-legislative priorities of the Commission: (a)

Communications from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, also known as the Annual Policy Strategies (2003-2009), (b) State of the Union speeches made by the President of the European Commission at the European Parliament plenary sessions (2010-2013), (c) Letters by the President of the European Commission to the members of the European Parliament (2010-2013), and (d) the Communications from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, also known as Commission Legislative and Work Programmes (2005-2013). The priorities extracted from Speeches and Letters, respectively, were combined for each year as both documents represent communications from the President of the European Commission to the European Parliament. We refer to the last set of Commission communications as Work Programmes. From the Work Programmes we identified the items outlined in each documents' Annex, as priority initiatives.

Coding procedures

All documents were read by the researchers to identify promise-type statements as defined below. Both researchers read all eight election programs issued by the Europarties, and only statements where both agreed meet the criteria are included in the analysis. The researchers divided the coding of the remaining documents, and any questions or discrepancies about specific statements were discussed until an agreement was reached. Additionally, we conducted inter-coder reliability analyses with two research assistants. These coders read a total of 45% of the pledges, and the agreement between the authors on one hand and each of the coders was 84% and 92%, respectively.

These rates are consistent with recommended reliability metrics (e.g. Krippendorff, 1980; Riffe et al., 2005).

We chose to define pledges in the context of the Euromanifestos and policy priorities in President's Speeches and Letters in the following manner. Given the somewhat loosely structured nature of these documents, we included statements where 'the criteria used to judge the fulfilment of pledges are [...] provided by the writers of election programmes, not by the researcher' (Thomson, 2001: 180), as well as statements where the pledge/policy priority could be accomplished by more than one action, or where the course of action is not specified. We include all statements that fall within these definitions regardless of which institution(s) should undertake the action. The task of identifying policy priorities in the Commission Strategies and Work Programmes was more straight forward, and from these documents were extracted the initiatives identified by the Commission in the Annexes of each document. Unless noted otherwise by the Commission (e.g. a package of initiatives), each initiative listed in the Annexes was considered a separate policy priority.

The pledge approach, used to identify the priorities of Europarties and (some of) the Commission documents, has a number of advantages. First, it relies on publicly available documents, which facilitates the replicability of the coding, and further, such analysis can be performed retrospectively on a large number of documents. Thirdly, the coding of public information does not rely on opinions or more subjective assessment but rather than on statements issued by the institutions of interest. While there might be some subjectivity in researchers identifying pledges and priorities, this approach captures exclusively what the writers of the document intended for the public to read.

Among the main disadvantages of content analysis of election manifestos is that this process requires significant time resources. Machine-reading of relevant documents is not appropriate for identifying pledges and priorities as those vary by length and structure, and require some human judgment. The latter necessarily leads to some discrepancies among the coders that need to be reconciled, adding to the length of time to produce these data. A further weakness of this technique to extract election promises is that it does not allow for a direct measure of the salience of each pledge. As an attempt to overcome this shortcoming, we coded the pledges and priorities by policy area, using the Comparative Agendas Project Issues Code (CAPIC) categories, allowing our data to be examined by researchers interested in how many statements are issued in a specific policy area.²

Units

Following the coding procedures discussed above we identified a total of 1898 pledges and priorities. Figure 1 graphs their distribution across documents and years. While the total number of pledges is fairly consistent across both elections, 296 and 301, respectively, there is variation among the Europarties. EPP made a relatively small number of pledges, 23 (in 2004) and 41 (in 2009). The same holds for EGP, which issued 50 pledges in 2004 and 62 in 2009. The PES on the other hand, nearly tripled the number of pledges it made, from 54 in 2004 to 161 in 2009. ALDE followed the reverse trend, reducing its pledges from 167 to 37 between the two elections.

{Figure 1 about here}

There is also variation with respect to the number of pre-legislative priorities identified in the Commission documents as included in this dataset. The Annual Policy

Strategies contain between 73 (2006) and 108 (2008) such items, and more of them were identified in the second and third year after the 2004 elections. The Speeches and Letters sent by the Commission President to the European Parliament tended to be shorter, where we identified between 45 (2011) and 62 (2010) priorities, and those numbers are fairly consistent across the years. In its Work Programmes, the European Commission issued between 37 (2010) and 194 (2012) such statements. The first election cycle included in this dataset started with a larger number of priorities issued in the Work Programmes (119 in WP2006), declining in the last year (50 in WP2009). In the first two years following the 2009 elections, though, the Commission included a relatively small number of statements (37 in WP2010 and 40 in WP2011), increasing the number dramatically in the third year after the elections (194 in WP2012).

Variables

In addition to the Europarties' pledges and Commission priorities identified from the respective documents, the dataset contains the following variables. To ascertain whether or not there is an *Overlap* between the Euromanifestos and the Commission documents, we traced which of the 296 pledges made during the 2004 EP elections were included in which Commission documents, published in the respective electoral cycle between the 2004 and 2009. Similarly, we tracked which of the 301 promises made during the 2009 EP campaign were included in the Work Programmes, Speeches and Letters issued between the 2009 and 2014. Overlap between an election pledge and a policy priority specified in a Commission document was coded as a series of dummy variables to reflect whether or not each pledge was mentioned at least one in Commission document during the respective election cycle.

Consistently with other pledge studies, our data account for *Agreement* between political groups. These variables reflect whether a pledge issued by any political group shares the policy intent and direction with an election statement by another group, and allow for comparisons across Europarties. Further, we coded each pledge by *Policy area*, matching them to the CAPIC coding scheme to provide for analyses on the attention that documents give to certain policies, and to facilitate the comparability of our data to other projects. To allow for the examination of inter-institutional relations, our dataset includes two variables. Each pledge was coded to reflect whether its policy area falls under the *Ordinary legislative procedure* (OLP) rules of the European Parliament, and our measure for *Commission portfolio* accounts for whether the party that issued the pledge subsequently controlled the Commission portfolio associated with that policy area. The latter variable is similar to measures of ministerial control within coalition governments, utilized in some pledge studies.

Potential applications of the dataset

In this section we describe some of the relationships among our main variables as a way to demonstrate the potential of the dataset for the study of EU policy processes and inter-institutional relations. As our data are assigned to policy areas utilizing the CAPIC coding scheme, the examples we provide below would be valuable for scholars interested in the attention that Europarties and the Commission give to different policy areas. We first show the extent of overlap between pledges and priorities at the aggregate level. We then discuss how this overlap differs along several dimensions, i.e. policy area, Commission control of portfolio, agreement among Europarties, and EP voting procedure. In doing so, we demonstrate that some of these dimensions, such as agreement between

parties and EP rules are promising as potential explanations for why some pledges overlap with Commission priorities, while others are not. While the figures discussed below summarize the aggregate statistics, our dataset contains information for individual documents and years, allowing for more fine-tuned comparisons.

Overlap between pledges and Commission priorities

We first show the extent to which Europarties' pledges and Commission priorities reflect the same topic and the same direction of its proposed change. The data presentation is based on the *Overlap* variable, and Figure 2 graphs the share of all pledges by Europarty that are reflected in at least one Commission priority, aggregated at the level of Commission document. Across three of the four sets of documents, pledges by the EPP overlap with Commission priorities to the greatest extent, and as much as 57% with the Annual Strategies issued in the period 2006-2009. This share went down nearly in half (32%) of the Speeches and Letters issued between 2010-2013, when a greater share of pledges by ALDE (46%) than by any other Europarty was reflected in these documents. Overall, the share of ALDE pledges that overlap with Commission priorities is most consistent across documents and years (36-46%).

{Figure 2 about here}

Despite being the second largest group in the European Parliament, the share of PES pledges that overlap with Commission documents was smaller than those by ALDE in three of the document sets. Annual Policy Strategies 2006-2009 were an exception, and 39% of PES pledges were in agreement with at least one policy priority contained in those documents. The extent of overlap between PES and Commission priorities declined after the 2009 elections, to between 19-22% of pledges. In fact, the share of PES pledges

that were in agreement with Commission priorities issued between 2010-2013 was smaller than that of the EGP, with the latter ranging between 23-29%. There are variations within the sets of Commission documents as well. For example, overlap between priorities and the pledges of a single group (EPP) dominated the Strategies for the 2006-2009 period. Across the other documents, though, both EPP and ALDE had relatively similar shares of overlaps. In comparison, PES and EGP were far behind in their shares of overlaps after the 2009 elections, 19% and 23%, respectively for the S&L 2010-2013.

Attention to policy area

Figure 3 shows the share of pledges by policy area, using the CAPIC project categorization, along with the percentage of pledges in each area that overlap with Commission priorities.³ The policy areas are ordered by the attention they receive by the Europarties (the darker horizontal bars). *International Affairs and Foreign Aid* (13%) and *EU Governance and Government Operations* (around 10%) are among the most frequent pledges across all Europarties. *Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties, Banking, Finance, and Internal Trade, Agriculture and Fisheries, Labor and Employment, and Immigration* receive some attention by Europarties (around 6-7% of all pledges). *Foreign Trade, Regional and Urban Policy and Planning, Space, Science, Technology, and Communications, Culture and Media, and Health* are hardly mentioned as part of the campaign for EP elections (around 1% of all pledges).

{Figure 3 about here}

The second set of horizontal bars, in lighter shade, captures the share of all pledges within each policy area, that overlap with at least one Commission priority coded

in the same policy area. The graphs demonstrate that at the aggregate level, the extent of overlap between pledges and priorities does not seem to follow a pattern, and is rather equally spread across many of the policy areas. Further, there is hardly a connection between the attention expressed in the share of pledges to policy areas that Europarties give, and the latter's overlap with Commission priorities. For example, the most frequently mentioned policy areas, *International Affairs and Foreign Aid* and *EU Governance and Government Operations*, are not the ones where the largest share of pledges overlap with priorities (21% and 11%, respectively). The overlap between Europarties and Commission documents seems to be highest in the areas of *Transportation* (64%), *Law and Crime* (57%), and *Energy* (54%), although those areas represent a relatively small share of pledges issued by the transnational Europarties.

Commission portfolio control

Our dataset captures whether or not the Europarty that made each pledge also controlled the relevant Commission portfolio associated with the policy area of the pledge. This measure is useful, for example, in studies investigating the political dynamics within the Commission and the latter's potential impact on policy outcomes. Here we investigate whether portfolio control might be linked to overlap between pledges and priorities, and Figure 4 graphs this relationship at the aggregate level. The dark bars in the graph show the percentage of overlap between pledges and priorities when the party that made the pledge did not subsequently control the relevant Commission portfolio. The lighter bars graph the same information for pledges where the Europarty did have a Commissioner in the same policy area as the pledge.

{Figure 4 about here}

As Figure 4 demonstrates, the share of overlap between pledges and priorities is consistently higher when the party that issued the pledge also controlled the respective Commission portfolio. This percentage is higher, 37-41%, for Commission documents issued after the 2004 elections, and goes down to 26% after 2009. For pledges in the other category – when the party did not control the respective policy area, the level of overlap between pledges and priorities is lower in three sets of documents, although not significantly. For example, the share of pledges that overlap with priorities is very similar, around 25-26% for S&L 2010-2013, regardless of the value of the *Commission portfolio* variable. The data presented in Figure 4 also show some variation between election cycles. While after the 2004 elections, the overlap was higher in the first stage of Commission pre-legislative documents, this does not hold true for documents issued after the 2009 elections. In the latter period, the share of pledges that are also found in Commission documents is similar across both types of documents.

Agreement between Europarties

Consistently with other studies on party platforms we coded each pledge whether it is in agreement with the intent and policy direction of a promise issued by another Europarty. Such a coding shows the comparability of our dataset and its usefulness for research focused on intra-institutional dynamics within the European Parliament. Figure 5 graphs the share of pledges that overlap with Commission priorities, depending on whether or not the former agreed with another pledge. The dark bars show the percentage of overlap between all pledges and each set of Commission documents, when pledges are not in agreement between parties. The lighter bars show the same information but for pledges that agree with at least one promise by another Europarty.

{Figure 5 about here}

Across all sets of documents, the share of overlap between pledges and priorities is higher for those pledges that are in agreement with promises issued by another party. The overlap is highest during the first election cycle included in our dataset, 63% and 47%, respectively. The share of pledges in agreement with other parties that also overlap with Commission priorities is lowest for the Speeches and Letters during the 2010-2013 period (31%), but goes up a bit for the Work Programmes during the same period. Among the pledges that are not in agreement with other Europarties, the share of overlap with Commission documents ranges from 24-33%, and is also slightly higher during the first election cycle in this dataset. The data shown here then seem to indicate that agreement among Europarties might be of interest when investigating whether EP election promises are considered by the Commission as part of its policy priorities.

Ordinary legislative procedure

Figure 6 hints at a link between EP parliamentary procedure and the extent that pledges overlap with Commission documents. The dark bars in the graph show the percentage of overlap between all pledges and each set of Commission documents, when the policy area of the pledges does not fall under the ordinary legislature procedure of the EP. The lighter bars show the same information for pledges that are in policy areas under co-decision. Across all sets of Commission documents, the share of Europarties' pledges that were in agreement with a priority is higher when the pledge's policy area falls under OLP. The percentage of this overlap is nearly 56% between pledges issued in 2004 and subsequent pre-legislative Commission priorities. The percentage of pledges under OLP that overlap with Commission priorities went down to around 33-38% after the 2009

elections but remained higher than the same share of pledges that do not fall under the OLP rules. When a policy area of the pledge is not under OLP, the share of such pledges that overlap with Commission priorities ranges from 32-34% and 20-24%, for each respective election cycle.

{Figure 6 about here}

Conclusions

This article presents a newly compiled dataset on the election pledges issued by four transnational Europarties that formed political groups in the European Parliament after the 2004 and 2009 elections. The dataset also identifies the pre-legislative priorities issued by the European Commission in several sets of documents. Among the main features of the dataset are variables identifying overlap between each pledge and priority, agreement between pledges issued by different Europarties, and the policy focus of each pledge and priority. After discussing the development of the data, the article provided examples of potential applications of the data. Among those, we demonstrated that (a) there is significant variation between elections and across documents on the extent to which pledges and priorities overlap; (b) this variation might be linked to the type of legislative procedure associated with each pledge, and to agreement among parties; (c) the Europarties and the Commission tended to emphasize different policy areas during the period included here and these emphases do not seem to be linked to aggregate levels of overlap between documents.

The uses of our data that are demonstrated here provide for the potential to advance the study of inter-institutional relations in the EU, with a focus on Europarties' pledges. For example, despite the voluminous literature on agenda-setting and the transmission of

policy preferences across various EU institutions (see Alexandrova et al., 2014; Hage, 2016; Haverland et al., 2016), very little research focuses on whether partisan politics acts as a co-ordination mechanism between the executive and legislative branches of the EU in a similar way to the role political parties play in national elections. This dataset represents a first attempt in this direction given its focus on the transnational Europarty pledges made during EP elections and the subsequent policy priorities the Commission advertises in its Annual Policy Strategies and Work Programme documents.

There are multiple ways in which the data presented could be extended to fit a variety of research agendas. Inclusion of prior legislative periods would facilitate the cross-time comparison of our data, and allow testing the ‘uniqueness’ of the Barroso Commissions. Further, a more comprehensive account of the role of pledges in inter-institutional relations within the EU would include other institutions such as the Council and EU CO. Thus an obvious place for extending our data would be to incorporate documents specifying the policy priorities of other relevant EU institutional actors. Finally, much work is needed to understand how Europarties’ pledges relate to the success of policy proposals, and expending these data (at the pre-legislative level) to successfully passed legislation is another obvious step for a fruitful research agenda. Access to the dataset along with a description of the variables is provided through the Dataverse depository at Harvard University and the *European Union Politics* webpage.⁴

Notes

1. The documents were obtained from the <http://europeanelectionstudies.net/ees-study-components/euromanifesto-study>

2. The list of policy areas is based on the EU Policy Agendas codebook, available at http://euagendas.weebly.com/uploads/9/9/4/3/9943893/eu_codebook_3.3_april-2015_general.pdf

3. Area coded as *21. Public Lands, Water Management, and Territorial Issues* is not included in Figure 3 as no Europarty made pledges related to this topic.

4. Data available at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/> and <http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy.cc.uic.edu/home/eup>




Figure 1. Number of pledge statements by Europarty and election year and number of policy priority statements, by Commission document and year: (a) Annual Policy Strategies, (b) Party Programmes, (c) Speeches and Letters, and (d) Work Programmes.




Figure 2. Overlap between Europarties' pledges and Commission priorities, aggregate share by party and document (in %).




Figure 3. Share of Europarties' pledges by policy area and overlap with Commission priorities.




Figure 4. Overlap between Europarties' pledges and Commission priorities, aggregate share by Commission document and Commission portfolio control (in %).




Figure 5. Overlap between Europarties' pledges and Commission priorities, aggregate share by Commission document and agreement between Europarties (in %).




Figure 6. Overlap between Europarties' pledges and Commission priorities, aggregate share by Commission document and parliamentary procedure (in %).

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